1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
34 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
36 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
41 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
42 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
43 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
44 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
45 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
46 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
49 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
51 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
52 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
54 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
55 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
56 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
57 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
58 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
59 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
60 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
62 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
63 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
65 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
66 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
67 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
68 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
70 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
72 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
73 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
74 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
76 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
77 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
78 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
80 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
81 // transaction for nodes[1].
82 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
83 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
84 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
85 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
86 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
88 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
89 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
90 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
91 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
93 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
94 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
95 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
98 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
99 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
100 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
101 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
102 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
105 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
106 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
107 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
108 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
109 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
115 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
116 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
117 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
118 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
123 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
125 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
127 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
129 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
130 // before forwarding.
131 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
132 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
134 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
135 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
137 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
138 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
140 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
141 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
143 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
144 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
145 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
147 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
148 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
153 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
154 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
156 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
158 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
159 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
163 fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
164 // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
167 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
169 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
171 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
172 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
174 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
175 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
176 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
177 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
178 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
180 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
181 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
182 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
183 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
184 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
185 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
186 let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
188 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
190 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
191 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
193 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
194 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
196 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
197 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
200 // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
201 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
203 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
204 // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
205 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
206 // Should have no monitors left
207 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
208 // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
209 // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
210 nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
211 OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
212 funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
216 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
217 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
218 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
219 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
220 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
223 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
225 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
226 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
231 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
233 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
234 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
236 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
237 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
239 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
240 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
241 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
242 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
244 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
245 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
246 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
248 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
249 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
250 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
251 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
252 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
254 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
255 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
256 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
257 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
258 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
259 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
260 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
261 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
263 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
264 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
265 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
267 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
268 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
270 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
271 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
273 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
274 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
276 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
277 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
278 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
280 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
281 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
282 amount_satoshis: 1000,
283 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
285 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
287 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
288 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
290 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
291 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
292 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
293 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
295 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
296 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
298 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
299 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
300 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
301 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
303 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
305 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
309 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
311 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
315 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
316 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
320 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
321 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
322 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
325 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
330 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
331 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
332 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
333 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
334 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
335 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
336 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
337 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
338 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
341 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
342 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
343 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
344 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
345 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
346 if prev_commitment_tx {
347 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
348 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
349 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
350 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
351 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
356 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
357 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
362 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
363 version: Version::TWO,
364 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
365 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
368 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
369 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
372 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
373 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
378 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
379 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
382 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
383 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
384 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
385 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
387 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
388 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
389 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
390 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
391 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
392 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
393 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
395 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
397 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
398 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
400 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
401 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
402 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
403 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
406 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
407 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
408 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
409 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
411 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
412 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
413 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
416 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
417 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
418 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
419 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
421 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
422 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
423 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
427 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
428 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
429 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
430 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
431 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
434 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
435 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
436 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
437 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
438 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
439 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
440 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
441 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
442 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
443 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
444 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
445 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
446 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
448 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
450 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
452 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
453 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
454 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
455 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
457 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
459 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
461 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
463 if prev_commitment_tx {
464 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
466 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
467 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
471 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
474 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
478 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
479 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
480 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
481 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
482 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
483 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
484 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
485 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
486 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
487 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
488 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
489 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
490 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
491 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
492 if !prev_commitment_tx {
493 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
495 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
496 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
497 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
498 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
500 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
502 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
503 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
504 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
505 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
506 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
509 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
511 match events.pop().unwrap() {
512 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
513 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
514 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
515 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
517 panic!("Unexpected event");
519 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
520 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
521 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
523 panic!("Unexpected event");
525 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
526 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
532 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
533 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
534 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
535 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
536 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
537 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
538 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
539 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
540 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
542 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
546 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
547 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
549 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
550 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
551 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
553 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
554 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
555 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
556 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
557 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
558 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
559 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
560 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
561 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
562 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
563 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
564 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
565 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
566 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
567 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
568 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
569 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
570 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
572 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
574 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
575 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
577 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
578 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
581 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
582 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
583 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
584 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
585 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
586 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
587 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
588 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
589 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
591 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
592 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
594 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
595 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
596 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
597 if prev_commitment_tx {
598 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
600 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
602 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
603 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
605 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
606 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
608 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
609 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
610 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
611 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
612 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
613 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
614 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
615 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
616 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
617 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
618 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
619 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
620 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
622 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
623 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
624 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
626 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
627 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
628 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
630 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
631 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
633 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
634 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
635 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
636 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
638 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
640 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
641 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
642 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
643 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
644 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
646 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
647 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
648 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
649 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
650 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
651 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
652 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
653 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
655 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
656 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
657 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
658 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
660 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
661 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
662 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
663 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
664 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
666 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
667 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
669 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
671 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
672 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
674 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
675 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
676 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
677 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
678 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
679 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
680 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
681 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
682 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
684 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
685 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
686 // monitor events or claimable balances.
687 for node in nodes.iter() {
688 connect_blocks(node, 6);
689 connect_blocks(node, 6);
690 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
691 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
696 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
697 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
698 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
699 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
700 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
703 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
704 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
705 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
706 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
707 // delay prior to spendability.
709 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
710 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
711 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
712 // claim by our counterparty).
713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
715 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
717 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
718 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
721 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
723 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
724 version: Version::TWO,
725 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
726 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
729 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
730 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
733 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
734 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
739 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
740 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
743 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
744 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
745 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
746 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
748 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
749 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
750 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
751 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
754 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
756 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
759 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
761 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
762 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
763 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
766 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
767 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
768 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
770 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
771 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
772 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
773 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
775 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
777 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
778 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
780 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
781 // claimable balances.
782 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
783 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
784 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
786 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
787 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
788 let commitment_tx = {
789 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
790 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
791 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
792 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
795 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
796 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
797 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
798 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
799 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
802 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
803 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
804 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
807 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
808 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
809 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
810 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
813 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
814 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
815 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
816 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
817 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
818 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
819 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
820 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
822 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
823 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
826 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
827 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
828 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
829 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
831 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
833 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
834 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
835 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
836 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
837 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
838 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
840 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
842 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
843 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
844 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
845 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
847 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
848 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
849 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
850 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
851 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
852 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
853 // call, as described, two hunks down.
854 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
855 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
856 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
857 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
858 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
859 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
860 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
861 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
863 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
864 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
865 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
866 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
867 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
868 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
869 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
870 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
871 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
872 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
873 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
874 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
876 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
877 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
878 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
879 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
880 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
882 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
883 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
884 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
885 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
886 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
887 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
889 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
891 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
892 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
893 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
894 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
895 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
896 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
897 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
898 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
899 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
901 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
902 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
904 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
905 to_self_spendable_output
908 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
909 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
910 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
911 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
912 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
914 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
915 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
916 // monitor events or claimable balances.
917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
918 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
919 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
920 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
924 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
925 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
926 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
930 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
931 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
936 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
938 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
939 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
941 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
942 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
943 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
944 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
946 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
947 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
949 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
950 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
951 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
952 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
954 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
955 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
956 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
957 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
959 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
960 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
961 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
962 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
964 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
965 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
966 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
967 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
970 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
971 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
972 // HTLC output is spent.
974 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
975 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
976 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
977 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
978 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
980 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
981 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
982 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
983 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
985 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
986 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
987 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
988 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
989 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
991 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
992 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
993 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
994 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
995 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
996 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
997 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
998 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1000 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
1001 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1003 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1004 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1006 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1007 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1009 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1011 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1012 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1014 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1015 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1016 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1017 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1018 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1019 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1020 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1022 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1023 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1024 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1025 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1027 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1028 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1029 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1030 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1032 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1034 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1035 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1037 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1038 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1039 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1041 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1042 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1043 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1044 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1046 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1047 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1048 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1049 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1050 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1051 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1052 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1053 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1055 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1056 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1058 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1059 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1060 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1062 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1063 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1064 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1065 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1066 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1067 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1068 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1069 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1070 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1071 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1072 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1074 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1076 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1077 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1078 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1079 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1080 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1081 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1082 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1083 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1085 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1087 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1088 // payment failure event.
1089 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1090 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1092 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1093 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1094 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1095 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1096 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1097 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1098 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1099 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1101 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1103 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1104 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1105 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1106 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1108 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1109 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1111 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1112 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1113 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1115 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1116 // was already claimed.
1117 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1118 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1119 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1120 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1121 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1123 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1125 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1126 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1127 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1128 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1130 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1132 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1133 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1135 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1136 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1137 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1139 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1140 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1142 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1143 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1144 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1145 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1146 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1147 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1148 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1151 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1152 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1154 v.push((*t).clone());
1160 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1161 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1162 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1163 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1164 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1165 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1166 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1167 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1169 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1171 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1172 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1175 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1177 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1178 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1179 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1180 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1182 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1184 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1185 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1186 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1187 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1188 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1189 // later commitment transaction updates
1191 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1192 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1193 // HTLCs individually.
1195 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1196 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1197 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1199 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1201 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1202 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1204 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1205 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1207 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1208 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1209 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1211 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1213 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1214 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1216 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1217 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1219 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1222 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1227 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1228 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1229 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1230 events.retain(|ev| {
1232 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1233 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1234 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1237 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1238 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1244 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1245 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1247 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1251 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1254 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1256 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1257 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1258 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1259 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1260 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1261 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1262 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1263 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1264 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1265 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1266 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1267 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1268 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1269 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1270 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1271 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1273 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1276 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1277 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1279 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1280 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>());
1282 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1283 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1284 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1285 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1287 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1288 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1289 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1291 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1292 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1295 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1296 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1297 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1298 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1299 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1301 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1302 // claim balances separated out.
1303 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1304 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1305 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1306 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1307 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1308 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1309 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1310 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1313 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1314 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1316 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1317 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1318 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1320 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1322 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1323 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1324 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1325 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1327 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1328 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1329 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1330 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1332 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1333 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1334 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1335 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1338 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1339 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1340 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1342 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1343 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1344 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1347 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1348 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1349 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1351 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1352 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1355 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1356 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1360 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1361 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1363 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1364 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1366 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1368 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1369 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1370 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1371 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1372 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1373 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1374 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1375 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1376 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1377 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1378 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1379 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1380 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1381 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1382 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1383 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1385 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1387 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1388 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1390 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1391 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1392 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1393 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1394 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1396 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1397 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1398 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1399 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1400 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1401 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1402 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1403 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1404 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1406 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1408 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1409 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1410 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1411 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1412 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1413 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1414 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1418 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1419 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1420 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1421 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1422 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1425 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1426 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1427 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1428 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1430 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1432 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1433 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1438 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1439 version: Version::TWO,
1440 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1441 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1444 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1445 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1448 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1449 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1454 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1455 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1458 // Create some initial channels
1459 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1460 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1461 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1462 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1464 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1465 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1466 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1470 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1472 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1475 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1476 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1479 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1481 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1482 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1484 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1485 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1486 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1488 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1490 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1492 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1493 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1494 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1495 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1496 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1497 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1498 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1499 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1502 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1504 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1506 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1508 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1509 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1510 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1511 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1517 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1518 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1519 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1520 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1522 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1523 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1524 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1526 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1527 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1529 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1530 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1531 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1533 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1534 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1535 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1536 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1537 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1538 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1539 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1540 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1542 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1543 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1544 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1545 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1546 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1551 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1552 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1553 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1554 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1555 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1556 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1557 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1558 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1559 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1560 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1561 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1562 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1563 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1564 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1565 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1566 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1567 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1569 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1570 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1572 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1573 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1574 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1575 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1576 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1577 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1578 // spent HTLC output)
1579 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1580 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1582 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1584 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1586 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1587 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1589 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1590 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1592 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1593 // than with the HTLC itself.
1594 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1595 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1597 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1598 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1601 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1602 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1603 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1604 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1605 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1606 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1607 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1608 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1609 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1610 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1611 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1612 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1613 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1615 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1617 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1618 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1619 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1620 // to_self output to B
1621 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1622 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1623 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1624 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1625 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1626 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1628 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1630 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1631 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1632 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1633 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1634 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1635 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1636 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1638 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1640 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1642 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1643 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1644 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1645 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1646 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1649 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1651 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1652 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1653 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1654 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1657 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1658 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1659 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1660 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1662 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1663 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1664 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1665 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1667 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1668 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1669 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1670 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1671 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1672 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1673 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1677 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1678 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1679 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1680 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1681 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1682 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1683 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1684 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1685 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1687 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1689 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1690 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1691 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1692 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1693 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1694 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1695 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1697 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1699 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1700 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1701 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1702 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1703 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1704 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1705 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1706 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1708 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1710 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1711 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1712 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1713 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1715 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1717 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1718 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1719 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1720 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1721 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1722 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1723 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1727 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1728 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1729 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1732 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1733 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1734 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1735 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1736 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1737 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1738 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1739 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1740 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1744 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1745 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1750 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1751 version: Version::TWO,
1752 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1753 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1754 output: vec![TxOut {
1755 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1756 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1759 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1761 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1762 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1763 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1764 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1766 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1767 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1768 // revocation-claim transaction.
1770 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1771 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1773 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1775 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1776 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1777 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1778 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1780 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1781 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1783 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1784 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1786 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1789 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1790 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1793 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1796 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1799 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1800 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1801 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1803 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1804 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1806 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1808 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1809 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1810 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1811 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1812 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1813 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1814 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1815 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1816 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1817 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1819 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1821 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1823 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1826 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1827 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1828 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1829 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1830 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1831 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1832 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1833 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1834 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1835 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1836 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1838 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1839 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1840 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1841 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1842 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1846 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1848 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1849 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1850 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1851 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1852 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1853 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1854 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1855 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1856 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1857 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1858 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1859 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1860 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1861 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1863 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1865 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1868 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1869 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1870 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1871 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1872 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1874 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1875 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1876 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1877 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1880 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1882 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1883 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1885 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1886 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1887 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1888 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1890 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1891 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1892 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1893 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1894 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1895 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1897 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1898 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1899 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1900 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1901 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1902 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1903 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1906 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1907 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1908 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1909 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1910 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1911 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1912 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1913 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1914 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1915 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1916 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1917 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1918 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1919 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1921 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1923 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1924 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1926 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1927 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1928 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1929 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1930 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1931 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1932 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1933 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1934 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1935 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1937 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1939 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1940 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1942 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1943 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1944 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1945 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1946 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1947 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1948 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1949 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1951 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1953 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1954 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1956 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1957 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1958 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1959 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1960 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1962 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1965 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1967 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1969 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1972 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1973 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1974 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1975 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1976 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value.to_sat(),
1977 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1979 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1981 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1982 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1983 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1985 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1988 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1991 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1993 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1995 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1996 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1997 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1998 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1999 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2000 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2002 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2003 } else { panic!(); }
2006 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2008 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2010 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2011 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2012 // monitor events or claimable balances.
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2015 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2016 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2020 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2021 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2022 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2025 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2026 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2027 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2028 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2030 let new_chain_monitor;
2032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033 let node_deserialized;
2035 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2037 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2038 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2039 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2040 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2041 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2042 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2043 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2044 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2045 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
2046 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2048 let commitment_tx = {
2049 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2050 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2051 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2052 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2056 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2057 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2058 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2059 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2060 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2063 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2064 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2065 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2066 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2067 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2068 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2072 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2073 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2074 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2075 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2076 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0",
2078 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2081 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2082 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2083 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2084 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2087 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2088 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2089 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2091 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2094 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2095 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2096 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2097 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2103 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2104 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2105 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2108 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2109 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2110 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2111 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2113 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2115 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2116 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2121 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2122 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2124 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2125 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2126 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2128 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2130 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2131 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2132 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2133 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2134 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2135 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2136 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2137 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2139 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2140 version: Version::TWO,
2141 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2142 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2143 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2144 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2145 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2148 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2150 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2151 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2152 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2153 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2154 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2155 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2156 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2157 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2158 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2163 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2164 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2165 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2166 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2167 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2168 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2169 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() -
2170 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>();
2171 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2172 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2177 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2178 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2179 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2183 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2184 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2185 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
2186 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2187 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2190 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2191 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2192 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2194 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2198 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2199 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2200 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2202 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2203 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2204 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2206 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2207 // transactions pre-anchors.
2208 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2209 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2211 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2212 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2213 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2215 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2216 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2217 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2218 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2220 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2221 // transactions pre-anchors.
2222 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2223 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2225 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2226 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2227 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2228 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2229 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2230 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2231 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2232 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2234 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2235 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2239 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2240 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2241 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2245 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2246 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2247 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2248 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2249 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2250 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2251 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2252 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2254 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2255 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2256 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2257 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2259 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2261 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2262 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2264 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2265 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2267 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2268 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2270 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2272 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2273 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2275 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2277 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2278 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2279 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2282 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2283 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2284 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2286 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2287 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2288 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2291 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2292 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2293 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2294 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2295 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2296 version: Version::TWO,
2297 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2298 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2299 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2300 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2301 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2304 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2305 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2306 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2307 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2308 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2309 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2310 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2311 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2312 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2317 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value.to_sat(), 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2318 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value.to_sat(), 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2320 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2322 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2326 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2327 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2329 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2330 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2331 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2332 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2334 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2335 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2336 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2337 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2339 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2340 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2344 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2345 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2346 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2347 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2348 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2349 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2350 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2352 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2354 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2355 for event in holder_events {
2357 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2358 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2359 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2360 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2361 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2362 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2363 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2369 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2370 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2372 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2374 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2376 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2377 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2378 for event in holder_events {
2380 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2386 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2387 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2388 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2389 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2393 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2394 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2395 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2396 // revoked commitment.
2397 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2398 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2399 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2400 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2403 let bob_chain_monitor;
2405 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2406 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2407 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2408 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2410 let bob_deserialized;
2412 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2414 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2415 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2417 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2418 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2420 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2421 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2422 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2424 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2426 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2427 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2429 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2430 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2432 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2435 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2438 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2440 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2441 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2443 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2445 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2446 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2448 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2449 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2450 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2451 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2452 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2453 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2458 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2459 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2460 // the HTLCs still pending.
2461 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2462 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2463 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2464 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2466 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2467 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2468 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2470 let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2471 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2472 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2473 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC * (idx + 1) as u64;
2474 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2475 version: Version::TWO,
2476 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2477 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2478 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2480 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2483 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2485 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2488 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2489 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2490 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2491 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2492 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2494 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2496 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2497 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2499 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2500 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2503 for node in &nodes {
2504 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2506 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2507 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2508 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2510 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2513 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2514 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2516 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2517 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2519 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2524 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2526 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2527 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2530 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2531 // through the success path.
2532 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2533 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2534 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2535 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2536 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2537 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2538 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2539 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2540 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2541 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2542 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2545 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2548 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2549 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2550 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2551 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2552 version: Version::TWO,
2553 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2554 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2555 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2556 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2557 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2560 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2561 version: Version::TWO,
2562 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2563 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2564 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2565 ..Default::default()
2567 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2568 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2569 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2572 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2573 for event in events {
2574 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2575 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2576 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2577 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2578 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2579 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2580 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2581 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2583 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2584 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2586 panic!("Unexpected event");
2589 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2590 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2591 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2592 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2593 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2594 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2596 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2597 let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2598 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(
2599 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2601 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2602 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2603 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2606 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2607 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2611 for node in &nodes {
2612 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2615 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2616 // the second level instead.
2617 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2618 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2619 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2621 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2622 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2623 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2624 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2625 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2626 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2627 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2628 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2631 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2632 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2633 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2635 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2637 for node in &nodes {
2638 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2642 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2644 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2645 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2647 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2648 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2650 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2651 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2652 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2654 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2655 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2656 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2657 for event in spendable_output_events {
2658 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2659 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2660 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2661 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2662 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2665 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2666 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2668 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2671 panic!("unexpected event");
2675 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2676 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2677 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2678 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2679 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2680 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2681 // balances to claim.
2683 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2684 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2685 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2688 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2689 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2690 // channel upon deserialization.
2691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2695 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2696 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2697 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2699 let node_deserialized;
2700 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2702 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2704 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2705 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2706 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2707 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2708 let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2709 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2710 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2712 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2713 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2714 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2715 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2716 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2717 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2718 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
2719 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2721 let commitment_tx = {
2722 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2723 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2724 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2725 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2729 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2730 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2731 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2732 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2733 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2734 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2735 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2736 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2737 commitment_tx_conf_height
2739 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2740 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2741 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2742 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2743 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2744 commitment_tx_conf_height
2746 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2747 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2748 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_p2wsh());
2750 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2751 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2753 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2754 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2755 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2756 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2757 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2758 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2759 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2760 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2761 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2764 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2766 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2771 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2772 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2773 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2776 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2777 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2778 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2779 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2782 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2784 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2785 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2788 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2790 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2791 version: Version::TWO,
2792 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2793 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2796 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2797 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2802 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2805 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2806 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2807 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2809 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2810 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2812 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2815 get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2816 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2819 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2820 let commitment_tx = {
2821 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2822 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2823 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2827 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2828 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2829 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2830 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2832 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2833 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2834 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2835 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2837 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2838 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2839 if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2840 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2843 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2844 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2846 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2847 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2851 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2852 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2854 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2855 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2856 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2857 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2858 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2862 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2863 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2864 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2865 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2868 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2869 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2870 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2871 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2875 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2877 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2878 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2879 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2880 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2881 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2885 fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
2886 // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
2887 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
2888 // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
2889 // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
2890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2893 let new_chain_monitor;
2894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2895 let node_deserialized;
2896 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2898 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
2900 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
2902 do_claim_payment_along_route(
2903 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], payment_preimage)
2906 // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
2907 // dance has completed.
2908 let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
2910 // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
2911 // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
2912 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
2913 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2914 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
2916 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
2917 reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2919 // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
2920 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);