1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 /// The unix timestamp in UTC provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync
127 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion
128 pub last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32>,
129 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
136 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
137 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
138 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
140 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
141 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
142 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
143 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.clone(),
148 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
149 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
150 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
151 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
154 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
155 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
157 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
158 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
159 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
160 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
161 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 ChannelUpdateMessage {
163 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
166 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
167 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
169 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
170 short_channel_id: u64,
171 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
172 /// `channel_update` message is received.
175 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
176 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
178 /// The node id of the failed node.
180 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
181 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
186 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
187 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
190 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
191 (0, short_channel_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
194 (4, NodeFailure) => {
195 (0, node_id, required),
196 (2, is_permanent, required),
200 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
201 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
202 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
203 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
204 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
205 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
211 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
212 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
213 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
214 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
215 /// serving historical announcements.
217 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
218 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
219 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
220 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
222 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
224 chain_access: Option<C>,
225 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
226 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
230 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
231 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
233 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
234 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
235 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
236 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
237 /// channel owners' keys.
238 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
240 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
242 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
244 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
249 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
250 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
251 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
252 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
253 self.chain_access = chain_access;
256 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
257 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
259 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
260 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
264 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
265 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
266 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
267 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
268 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
269 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
276 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
277 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
279 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
280 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
281 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
282 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
283 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
284 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
286 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
287 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
288 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
289 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
291 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
292 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
293 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
294 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
300 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
301 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
302 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
305 return Err(LightningError {
306 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
307 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
308 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
310 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
312 log_level: Level::Trace,
320 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
321 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
323 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
324 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
325 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
326 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
327 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
330 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
331 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
332 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
333 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
336 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
337 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
338 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
341 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
342 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
343 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
344 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
345 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
346 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
347 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
348 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
349 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
350 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
351 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
352 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
354 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
355 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
357 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
359 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
360 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
369 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
370 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
371 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
372 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
373 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
377 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
379 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
380 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
381 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
382 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
383 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
393 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
394 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
395 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
397 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
398 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
399 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
400 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
401 /// tracking this directly.
402 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
403 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
404 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
408 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
410 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
411 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
412 // updates from all our peers normally.
414 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
415 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
416 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
419 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
420 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
421 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
422 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
423 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
425 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
426 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
427 // relying on it useless.
429 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
430 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
431 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
433 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
434 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
435 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
436 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
437 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
440 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
441 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
442 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
443 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
444 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
445 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
446 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
448 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
449 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
450 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
451 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
453 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
454 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
455 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
457 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
458 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
459 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
460 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
461 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
463 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
464 if should_request_full_sync {
465 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
467 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
471 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
472 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
473 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
474 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
475 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
476 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
477 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
482 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
483 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
484 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
485 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
489 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
490 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
491 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
492 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
496 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
497 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
498 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
499 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
500 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
501 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
502 /// memory constrained systems.
503 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
504 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
506 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
508 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
509 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
510 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
512 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
513 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
514 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
515 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
516 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
517 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
518 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
519 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
520 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
522 short_channel_ids: vec![],
525 return Err(LightningError {
526 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
527 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
531 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
532 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
533 // exists even if its not yet routable.
534 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
535 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
536 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
537 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
538 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
539 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
540 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
543 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
544 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
550 let batch_count = batches.len();
551 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
552 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
553 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
554 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
556 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
557 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
558 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
559 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
560 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
561 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
562 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
564 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
565 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
566 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
568 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
569 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
570 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
572 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
573 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
574 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
575 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
577 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
578 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
580 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
583 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
585 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
586 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
587 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
588 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
592 short_channel_ids: batch,
600 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
603 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
604 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
609 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
611 C::Target: chain::Access,
614 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
615 let mut ret = Vec::new();
616 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
617 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
623 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
624 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
625 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
626 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
627 pub last_update: u32,
628 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
630 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
632 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
633 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
634 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
635 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
636 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
637 pub fees: RoutingFees,
638 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
639 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
640 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
641 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
642 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
645 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
646 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
647 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
652 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
653 (0, last_update, required),
654 (2, enabled, required),
655 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
656 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
657 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
658 (10, fees, required),
659 (12, last_update_message, required),
662 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
663 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
664 /// Received within a channel announcement.
665 pub struct ChannelInfo {
666 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
667 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
668 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
669 pub node_one: NodeId,
670 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
671 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
672 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
673 pub node_two: NodeId,
674 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
675 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
676 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
677 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
678 /// An initial announcement of the channel
679 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
680 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
681 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
682 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
683 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
684 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
685 /// network graph in memory!).
686 announcement_received_time: u64,
690 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
691 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
692 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
693 let (direction, source) = {
694 if target == &self.node_one {
695 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
696 } else if target == &self.node_two {
697 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
702 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
705 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
706 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
707 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
708 let (direction, target) = {
709 if source == &self.node_one {
710 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
711 } else if source == &self.node_two {
712 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
717 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
720 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
721 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
722 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
724 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
726 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
731 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
732 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
733 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
734 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
739 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
740 (0, features, required),
741 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
742 (2, node_one, required),
743 (4, one_to_two, required),
744 (6, node_two, required),
745 (8, two_to_one, required),
746 (10, capacity_sats, required),
747 (12, announcement_message, required),
750 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
751 /// source node to a target node.
753 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
754 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
755 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
756 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
757 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
760 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
762 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
763 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
764 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
766 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
767 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
768 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
769 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
771 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
772 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
774 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
775 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
777 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
781 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
785 /// Returns information for the channel.
786 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
788 /// Returns information for the direction.
789 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
791 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
792 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
793 self.htlc_maximum_msat
796 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
798 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
799 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
801 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
802 self.effective_capacity
805 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
806 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
807 match self.direction {
808 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
814 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
815 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
816 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
817 .field("channel", &self.channel)
822 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
824 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
825 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
828 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
829 /// Returns information for the channel.
831 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
833 /// Returns information for the direction.
835 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
837 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
839 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
841 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
843 pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
846 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
847 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
852 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
854 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
855 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
856 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
857 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
858 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
861 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
865 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
867 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
870 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
872 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
875 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
878 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
879 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
883 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
884 /// use when making routing decisions.
885 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
887 impl EffectiveCapacity {
888 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
889 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
891 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
892 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
893 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
894 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
895 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
900 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
901 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
902 pub struct RoutingFees {
903 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
905 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
906 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
907 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
910 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
911 (0, base_msat, required),
912 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
915 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
916 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
917 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
918 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
919 pub features: NodeFeatures,
920 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
921 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
922 pub last_update: u32,
923 /// Color assigned to the node
925 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
926 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
927 /// should not be exposed to the user.
929 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
930 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
931 /// An initial announcement of the node
932 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
933 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
934 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
935 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
939 (0, features, required),
940 (2, last_update, required),
942 (6, alias, required),
943 (8, announcement_message, option),
944 (10, addresses, vec_type),
947 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
948 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
949 pub struct NodeInfo {
950 /// All valid channels a node has announced
951 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
952 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
953 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
954 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
955 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
956 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
957 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
958 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
959 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
962 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
963 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
964 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
965 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
970 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
971 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
972 (2, announcement_info, option),
973 (4, channels, vec_type),
976 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
977 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
979 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
981 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
983 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
984 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
985 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
986 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
987 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
988 chan_info.write(writer)?;
990 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
991 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
992 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
993 node_id.write(writer)?;
994 node_info.write(writer)?;
997 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
998 (1, self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1004 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
1005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
1006 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1008 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1009 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1010 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1011 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1012 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1013 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1014 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1016 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1017 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1018 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1019 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1020 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1021 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1024 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1025 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1026 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1031 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1032 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1033 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp,
1038 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
1039 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1040 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1041 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1042 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1044 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1045 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1046 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1052 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
1053 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1054 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1055 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1056 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1061 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1062 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
1065 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1066 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1067 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: None,
1071 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1072 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1073 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1074 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1075 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1081 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1084 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1085 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1086 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1090 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1091 /// given node announcement.
1093 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1094 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1095 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1096 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1097 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1098 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1099 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1102 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1103 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1104 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1106 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1107 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1110 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1111 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1112 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1114 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1115 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1116 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1117 // that it be at least the current time.
1118 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1119 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1120 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1121 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1126 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1127 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1128 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1129 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1130 features: msg.features.clone(),
1131 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1134 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1135 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1143 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1145 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1146 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1147 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1149 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1150 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1151 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1152 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1153 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1155 C::Target: chain::Access,
1157 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1158 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1159 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1160 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1161 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1162 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1165 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1166 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1167 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1169 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1170 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1171 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1172 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1173 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1175 C::Target: chain::Access,
1177 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1180 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1182 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1183 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1185 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1186 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1187 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1188 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1191 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1192 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1193 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1195 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1197 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1199 capacity_sats: None,
1200 announcement_message: None,
1201 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1204 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1207 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1208 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1209 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1211 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1212 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1214 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1215 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1216 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1217 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1219 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1220 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1221 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1222 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1224 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1225 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1227 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1228 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1229 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1231 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1234 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1235 entry.insert(channel_info);
1239 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1240 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1241 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1242 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1244 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1245 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1246 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1247 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1248 announcement_info: None,
1257 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1258 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1259 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1261 C::Target: chain::Access,
1263 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1264 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1267 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1269 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1272 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1273 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1274 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1275 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1276 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1277 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1278 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1279 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1280 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1281 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1283 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1284 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1287 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1288 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1290 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1291 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1297 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1298 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1299 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1301 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1304 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1305 features: msg.features.clone(),
1306 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1308 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1310 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1311 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1312 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1313 announcement_received_time,
1316 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1319 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1320 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1321 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1322 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1323 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1324 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1326 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1327 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1328 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1331 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1332 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1333 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1335 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1336 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1342 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1343 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1345 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1347 // TODO: downgrade the node
1351 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1352 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1353 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1356 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1357 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1358 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1360 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1361 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1363 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1364 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1365 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1366 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1367 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1370 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1371 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1374 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1375 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1376 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1378 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1379 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1380 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1381 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1382 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1383 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1384 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1385 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1386 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1388 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1389 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1390 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1391 info.one_to_two = None;
1393 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1394 info.two_to_one = None;
1396 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1397 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1398 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1399 // channel_update for.
1400 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1401 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1405 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1406 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1407 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1408 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1409 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1414 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1417 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1418 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1419 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1421 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1422 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1423 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1424 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1427 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1428 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1429 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1431 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1432 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1433 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1434 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1437 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1439 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1440 let chan_was_enabled;
1442 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1444 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1445 // disable this check during tests!
1446 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1447 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1448 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1450 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1451 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1455 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1456 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1457 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1459 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1460 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1461 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1464 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1465 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1466 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1467 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1468 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1472 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1473 ($target: expr) => {
1474 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1475 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1476 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1477 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1478 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1479 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1480 // but only in the non-normative section.
1481 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1482 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1483 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1484 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1486 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1488 chan_was_enabled = false;
1493 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1495 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1496 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1498 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1499 enabled: chan_enabled,
1500 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1501 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1502 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1503 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1505 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1506 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1510 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1514 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1515 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1516 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1517 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1518 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1519 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1520 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1521 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1522 })?, "channel_update");
1524 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1526 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1527 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1528 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1529 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1530 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1531 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1532 })?, "channel_update");
1534 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1539 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1541 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1542 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1543 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1544 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1545 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1546 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1548 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1550 proportional_millionths
1552 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1553 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1554 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1556 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1557 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1559 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1560 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1562 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1564 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1565 if chan_info.enabled {
1566 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1567 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1568 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1569 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1574 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1580 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1581 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1582 ($node_id: expr) => {
1583 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1584 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1585 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1587 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1588 entry.remove_entry();
1591 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1596 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1597 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1601 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1602 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1604 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1605 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1609 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1611 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1612 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1616 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1617 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1618 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1619 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1620 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1621 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1622 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1632 use ln::PaymentHash;
1633 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1634 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1635 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1636 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1637 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1638 use util::test_utils;
1639 use util::logger::Logger;
1640 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1641 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1642 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1644 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1646 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1647 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1648 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1649 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1650 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1651 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1652 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1656 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1657 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1660 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1664 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1665 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1666 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1669 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1670 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1672 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1673 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1674 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1675 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1679 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1680 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1681 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1682 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1684 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1685 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1686 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1687 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1688 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1689 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1692 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1693 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1694 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1695 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1700 addresses: Vec::new(),
1701 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1702 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1704 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1705 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1707 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1708 contents: unsigned_announcement
1712 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1713 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1714 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1715 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1716 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1718 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1719 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1720 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1721 short_channel_id: 0,
1724 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1725 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1726 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1728 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1729 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1730 ChannelAnnouncement {
1731 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1732 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1733 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1734 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1735 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1739 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1740 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1741 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1742 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1743 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1744 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1745 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1746 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1750 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1751 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1752 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1753 short_channel_id: 0,
1756 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1757 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1758 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1759 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1760 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1761 excess_data: Vec::new()
1763 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1764 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1766 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1767 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1772 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1773 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1774 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1776 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1777 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1778 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1780 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1781 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1783 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1787 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1788 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1789 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1790 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1795 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1796 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1800 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1801 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1803 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1804 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1807 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1810 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1811 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1812 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1813 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1814 // Return false because contains excess data.
1815 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1816 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1820 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1821 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1822 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1823 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1824 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1825 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1827 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1832 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1834 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1836 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1837 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1839 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1840 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1842 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1843 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1844 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1845 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1846 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1851 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1857 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1858 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1859 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1861 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1864 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1865 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1866 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1867 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1868 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1870 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1871 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1872 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1873 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1875 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1878 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1879 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1880 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1881 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1882 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1883 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1884 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1889 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1895 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1896 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1897 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1898 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1900 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1903 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1904 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1905 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1906 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1907 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1908 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1909 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1910 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1914 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1915 Some(channel_entry) => {
1916 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1922 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1923 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1924 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1925 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1926 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1927 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1928 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1932 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1933 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1934 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1936 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1939 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1940 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1942 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1947 fn handling_channel_update() {
1948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1949 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1950 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1951 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1952 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1954 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1955 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1957 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1958 let short_channel_id;
1961 // Announce a channel we will update
1962 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1963 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1965 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1966 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1967 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1974 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1975 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1976 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1981 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1983 Some(channel_info) => {
1984 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1985 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1990 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1991 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1992 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1993 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1994 // Return false because contains excess data
1995 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1996 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2000 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2001 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2002 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2003 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2004 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2006 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2009 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2010 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
2011 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2012 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2013 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2015 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2018 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2019 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
2020 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2021 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2022 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2024 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2027 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2028 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2029 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2030 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2031 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2032 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2034 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2037 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2038 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2039 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2040 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2041 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2042 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2043 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2045 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2050 fn handling_network_update() {
2051 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2052 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2053 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2054 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2055 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2058 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2059 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2062 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2063 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2066 let short_channel_id;
2068 // Announce a channel we will update
2069 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2070 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2071 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2072 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2073 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2075 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2076 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2078 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2080 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2081 rejected_by_dest: false,
2082 all_paths_failed: true,
2084 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2085 msg: valid_channel_update,
2087 short_channel_id: None,
2093 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2096 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2098 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2100 Some(channel_info) => {
2101 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2105 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2107 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2108 rejected_by_dest: false,
2109 all_paths_failed: true,
2111 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2113 is_permanent: false,
2115 short_channel_id: None,
2121 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2123 Some(channel_info) => {
2124 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2129 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2130 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2132 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2133 rejected_by_dest: false,
2134 all_paths_failed: true,
2136 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2140 short_channel_id: None,
2146 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2147 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2148 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2149 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2153 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2154 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2156 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2157 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2158 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2159 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2162 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2163 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2165 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2166 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2167 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2168 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2169 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2171 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2172 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2173 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2175 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2176 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2177 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2179 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2180 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2182 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2183 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2184 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2185 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2186 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2187 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2188 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2190 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2191 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2192 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2195 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2196 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2200 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2201 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2202 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2203 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2204 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2206 // Channels were not announced yet.
2207 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2208 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2210 let short_channel_id;
2212 // Announce a channel we will update
2213 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2214 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2215 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2221 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2222 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2223 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2224 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2225 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2226 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2227 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2234 // Valid channel update
2235 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2236 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2237 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2238 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2244 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2245 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2246 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2247 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2248 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2249 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2250 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2256 // Channel update with excess data.
2257 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2258 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2259 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2260 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2261 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2267 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2268 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2269 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2270 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2271 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2272 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2273 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2278 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2279 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2280 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2284 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2285 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2286 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2287 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2288 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2289 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2292 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2293 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2296 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2297 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2298 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2305 // Nodes were never announced
2306 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2307 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2310 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2311 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2316 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2317 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2323 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2324 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2326 // Skip the first node.
2327 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2328 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2331 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2332 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2333 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2334 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2335 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2336 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2337 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2342 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2343 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2347 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2348 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2349 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2351 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2352 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2354 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2355 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2356 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2357 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2361 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2362 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2367 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2368 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2369 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2370 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2371 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2375 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2376 let mut network_graph = create_network_graph();
2377 network_graph.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.replace(42);
2379 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2380 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2381 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph = Readable::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap();
2382 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2383 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.unwrap(), 42);
2387 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2388 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2389 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2391 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2392 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2393 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2394 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2396 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2398 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2400 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2401 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2402 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2406 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2408 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2409 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2410 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2411 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2413 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2414 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2415 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2416 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2417 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2418 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2419 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2421 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2427 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2428 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2429 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2431 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2432 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2433 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2434 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2436 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2437 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2438 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2441 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2442 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2443 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2446 // used for testing resumption on same block
2447 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2450 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2451 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2452 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2453 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2459 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2460 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2461 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2464 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2466 number_of_blocks: 0,
2469 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2470 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2472 number_of_blocks: 0,
2473 sync_complete: true,
2474 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2478 // Error when wrong chain
2479 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2480 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2483 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2485 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2488 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2489 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2491 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2492 sync_complete: true,
2493 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2497 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2498 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2499 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2502 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2503 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2504 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2507 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2508 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2509 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2510 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2511 sync_complete: true,
2512 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2516 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2517 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2518 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2521 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2522 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2523 number_of_blocks: 1,
2528 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2529 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2530 number_of_blocks: 1,
2531 sync_complete: true,
2532 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2537 // No results in valid query range
2538 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2539 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2542 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2543 first_blocknum: 1000,
2544 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2549 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2550 first_blocknum: 1000,
2551 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2552 sync_complete: true,
2553 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2558 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2559 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2560 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2563 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2564 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2565 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2570 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2571 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2572 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2573 sync_complete: true,
2574 short_channel_ids: vec![
2575 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2581 // Single block exactly full
2582 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2583 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2586 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2587 first_blocknum: 100000,
2588 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2593 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2594 first_blocknum: 100000,
2595 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2596 sync_complete: true,
2597 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2598 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2604 // Multiple split on new block
2605 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2606 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2609 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2610 first_blocknum: 100000,
2611 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2616 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2617 first_blocknum: 100000,
2618 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2619 sync_complete: false,
2620 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2621 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2625 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2626 first_blocknum: 107999,
2627 number_of_blocks: 2,
2628 sync_complete: true,
2629 short_channel_ids: vec![
2630 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2636 // Multiple split on same block
2637 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2638 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2641 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2642 first_blocknum: 100002,
2643 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2648 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2649 first_blocknum: 100002,
2650 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2651 sync_complete: false,
2652 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2653 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2657 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2658 first_blocknum: 108001,
2659 number_of_blocks: 1,
2660 sync_complete: true,
2661 short_channel_ids: vec![
2662 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2669 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2670 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2671 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2672 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2674 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2676 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2677 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2678 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2679 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2682 assert!(result.is_ok());
2684 assert!(result.is_err());
2687 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2688 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2690 for i in 0..events.len() {
2691 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2693 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2694 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2695 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2696 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2697 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2698 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2699 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2701 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2702 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2703 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2704 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2705 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2707 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2708 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2709 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2712 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2718 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2719 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2720 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2721 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2722 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2724 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2726 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2728 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2730 assert!(result.is_err());
2734 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2742 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2743 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2744 let mut v = Vec::new();
2745 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2747 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2752 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2753 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2754 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2756 let _ = net_graph.encode();