1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
12 use ln::msgs::LightningError;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
23 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
24 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
27 /// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
28 /// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
29 /// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
30 pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
32 // Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
33 const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
34 // Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
35 const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
37 pub enum NextNoiseStep {
49 // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
52 struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
56 enum DirectionalNoiseState {
61 ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
62 re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
63 temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
69 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
70 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
82 pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
83 their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
85 noise_state: NoiseState,
88 impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
89 pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
90 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
92 sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
93 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
95 PeerChannelEncryptor {
96 their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
97 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
98 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
99 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
102 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
110 pub fn new_inbound<C: secp256k1::Signing>(our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
111 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
113 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
114 sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
115 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
117 PeerChannelEncryptor {
119 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
120 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
121 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
126 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
135 fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
136 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
137 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
139 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
140 let mut tag = [0; 16];
141 chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
142 res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
146 fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
147 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
148 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
150 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
151 if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
152 return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
158 fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
159 let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
165 fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
166 let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
168 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
170 sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
171 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
173 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
174 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
176 let mut res = [0; 50];
177 res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
178 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
180 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
182 sha.input(&res[34..]);
183 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
189 fn inbound_noise_act(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], our_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), LightningError> {
190 assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
193 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
196 let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
197 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Invalid public key {}", &act[1..34].to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
201 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
203 sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
204 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
206 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, &our_key);
207 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
209 let mut dec = [0; 0];
210 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
212 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
214 sha.input(&act[34..]);
215 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
217 Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
220 pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
221 match self.noise_state {
222 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
223 match directional_state {
224 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
225 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
226 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
229 let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
230 *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
233 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
235 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
239 pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
240 &mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
241 -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> {
242 assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
244 match self.noise_state {
245 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
246 match directional_state {
247 &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
248 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
249 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
252 let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, &our_node_secret)?;
253 ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
255 re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
258 PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
259 *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
260 *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
263 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
265 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
269 pub fn process_act_two<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
270 &mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
271 -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> {
272 assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
276 let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
277 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
278 match directional_state {
279 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
280 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
281 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
284 let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
286 let mut res = [0; 66];
287 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
289 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
291 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
292 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
293 sha.input(&res[1..50]);
294 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
296 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&re, our_node_secret);
297 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
299 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
300 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
301 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
304 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
306 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
309 let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
310 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
319 Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
322 pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, LightningError> {
323 assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
327 match self.noise_state {
328 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
329 match directional_state {
330 &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
331 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
332 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
334 if act_three[0] != 0 {
335 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act_three[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
338 let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
339 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
340 self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
342 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Bad node_id from peer, {}", &their_node_id.to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
345 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
346 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
347 sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
348 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
350 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
351 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
353 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
354 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
355 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
357 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
359 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
362 let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
363 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
372 Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
375 /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version
376 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
377 pub fn encrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
378 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
379 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
382 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
383 res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
385 match self.noise_state {
386 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
388 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
394 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
397 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
400 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
406 /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
407 /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
408 pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, LightningError> {
409 assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
411 match self.noise_state {
412 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
414 let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
420 let mut res = [0; 2];
421 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
423 Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
425 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
429 /// Decrypts the given message.
430 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
431 pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LightningError> {
432 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16 {
433 panic!("Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!");
436 match self.noise_state {
437 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
438 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
439 res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
440 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
445 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
449 pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
450 match self.noise_state {
451 NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
453 &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
454 &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
455 &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
458 NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
462 pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
463 match self.noise_state {
464 NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
465 NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
472 use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
474 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
475 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
479 use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
481 fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
482 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
483 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
485 let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
486 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
490 fn get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
491 // transport-responder successful handshake
492 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
493 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
494 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
496 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
498 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
499 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
501 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
502 // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
503 // from transport-initiator successful handshake
504 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
506 match inbound_peer.noise_state {
507 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
508 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
510 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
511 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
513 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
522 fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
523 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
524 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
527 // transport-initiator successful handshake
528 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
530 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
531 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
533 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
534 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
535 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
537 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
538 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
540 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
546 // transport-initiator act2 short read test
547 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
550 // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
551 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
553 let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
554 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
558 // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
559 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
561 let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
562 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
566 // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
567 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
569 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
570 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
575 fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
576 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
577 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
578 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
581 let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
584 // transport-responder act1 short read test
585 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
588 // transport-responder act1 bad version test
589 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
591 let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
592 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
595 // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
596 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
598 let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
599 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
602 // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
603 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
605 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
606 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
609 // transport-responder act3 bad version test
610 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
612 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
613 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
615 let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
616 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
619 // transport-responder act3 short read test
620 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
623 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
624 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
626 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
627 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
629 let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
630 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
633 // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
634 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
636 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
637 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
639 let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
640 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
643 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
644 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
646 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
647 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
649 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
650 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
656 fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
657 // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
658 // here and use them to encrypt.
659 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
660 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
663 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
665 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
666 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
668 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
669 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
670 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
672 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
673 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
675 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
681 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
684 let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
685 let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
686 assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
688 let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
689 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
690 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
693 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
695 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
697 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
699 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
700 } else if i == 1000 {
701 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
702 } else if i == 1001 {
703 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
709 fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
710 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
711 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
715 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!")]
716 fn max_message_len_encryption() {
717 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
718 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1];
719 outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
723 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!")]
724 fn max_message_len_decryption() {
725 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
727 // MSG should not exceed LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16
728 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 17];
729 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&msg).unwrap();