1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
43 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
48 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use util::logger::Logger;
51 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use util::events::Event;
57 use io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
83 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
84 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
90 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
91 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
92 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
93 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
95 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
97 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
98 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
99 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
100 self.update_id.write(w)?;
101 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
102 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
103 update_step.write(w)?;
105 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
109 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
110 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
111 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
112 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
113 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
114 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
116 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
120 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
121 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
125 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
126 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
127 pub enum MonitorEvent {
128 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
129 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
131 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
132 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
134 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
135 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
137 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
139 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
140 funding_txo: OutPoint,
141 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
142 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
144 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
145 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
146 monitor_update_id: u64,
149 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
150 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
152 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
153 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
155 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
156 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
157 // generated only in ChainMonitor
158 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
159 (0, funding_txo, required),
160 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
164 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
168 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
169 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
170 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
171 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
172 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
173 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
174 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
175 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
176 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
178 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
179 (0, payment_hash, required),
180 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
181 (2, source, required),
182 (4, payment_preimage, option),
185 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
186 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
187 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
188 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
189 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
190 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
191 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
193 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
194 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
195 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
196 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
197 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
198 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
199 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
200 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
201 /// accurate block height.
202 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
203 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
204 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
205 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
206 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
207 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
210 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
211 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
212 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
213 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
214 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
215 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
216 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
217 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
218 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
219 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
221 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
222 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
223 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
225 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
226 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
228 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
229 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
231 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
232 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
233 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
234 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
236 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
238 struct HolderSignedTx {
239 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
241 revocation_key: PublicKey,
242 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
243 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
244 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
245 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
246 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
247 to_self_value_sat: u64,
250 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
252 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
253 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
254 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
255 (2, revocation_key, required),
256 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
257 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
258 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
259 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
260 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
261 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
264 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
265 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
267 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
268 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
269 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
270 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
273 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
276 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
277 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
278 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
279 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
284 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
285 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
286 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
287 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
288 // used. Read it for compatibility.
289 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
290 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
291 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
292 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
293 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
294 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
299 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
300 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
301 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
302 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
303 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
304 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
306 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
307 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
308 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
309 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
312 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
316 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
317 /// transaction causing it.
319 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
321 struct OnchainEventEntry {
325 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
328 impl OnchainEventEntry {
329 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
330 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
332 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
333 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
335 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
336 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
337 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
339 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
340 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
341 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
342 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
343 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
350 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
351 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
355 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
357 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
358 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
360 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
361 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
364 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
365 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
366 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
367 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
368 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
369 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
372 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
373 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
374 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
375 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
376 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
378 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
379 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
381 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
383 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
385 FundingSpendConfirmation {
386 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
387 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
388 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
389 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
390 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
392 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
393 /// counterparty output.
394 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
396 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
397 /// is constructed. This is used when
398 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
399 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
400 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
401 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
402 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
404 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
405 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
407 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
408 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
409 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
410 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
411 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
412 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
413 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
414 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
418 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
419 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
420 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
421 (0, self.txid, required),
422 (1, self.transaction, option),
423 (2, self.height, required),
424 (4, self.event, required),
430 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
431 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
432 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
433 let mut transaction = None;
435 let mut event = None;
436 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
438 (1, transaction, option),
439 (2, height, required),
440 (4, event, ignorable),
442 if let Some(ev) = event {
443 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
452 (0, source, required),
453 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
454 (2, payment_hash, required),
455 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
457 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
458 (0, descriptor, required),
460 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
461 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
462 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
464 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
465 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
466 (2, preimage, option),
467 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
472 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
474 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
475 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
476 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
477 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
479 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
480 commitment_txid: Txid,
481 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
482 commitment_number: u64,
483 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
492 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
493 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
495 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
496 /// think we've fallen behind!
497 should_broadcast: bool,
500 scriptpubkey: Script,
504 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
505 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
507 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
508 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
510 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
512 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
518 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
519 (0, commitment_tx, required),
520 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
522 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
523 (0, commitment_txid, required),
524 (2, commitment_number, required),
525 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
526 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
528 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
529 (0, payment_preimage, required),
531 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
533 (2, secret, required),
535 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
536 (0, should_broadcast, required),
538 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
539 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
543 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
545 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
550 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
551 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
552 /// force-closed now.
553 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
554 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
555 /// required to do so.
556 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
558 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
559 /// we consider it spendable.
560 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
561 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
562 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
563 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
564 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
566 confirmation_height: u32,
568 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
569 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
570 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
572 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
573 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
574 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
575 ContentiousClaimable {
576 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
577 /// required to do so.
578 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
579 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
583 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
584 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
585 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
586 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
587 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
588 /// which will be required to do so.
589 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
590 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
592 claimable_height: u32,
594 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
595 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
596 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
597 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
598 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
599 /// which will be required to do so.
600 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
601 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
602 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
605 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
608 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
609 /// following amount.
610 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
611 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
613 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
614 /// were already spent.
615 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
619 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
621 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
622 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
623 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
624 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
626 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
627 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
628 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
631 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
632 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
633 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
634 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
635 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
636 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
637 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
638 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
639 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
640 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
641 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
647 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
648 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
649 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
650 let mut resolving_txid = None;
651 let mut payment_preimage = None;
652 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
653 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
654 (1, resolving_txid, option),
655 (2, payment_preimage, option),
658 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
665 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
666 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
668 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
669 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
671 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
672 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
673 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
674 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
676 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
677 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
678 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
679 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
680 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
681 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
683 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
685 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
688 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
689 latest_update_id: u64,
690 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
692 destination_script: Script,
693 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
694 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
695 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
697 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
698 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
699 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
700 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
701 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
703 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
704 funding_redeemscript: Script,
705 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
706 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
707 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
709 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
711 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
712 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
713 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
714 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
715 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
716 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
717 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
718 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
719 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
720 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
721 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
722 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
723 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
724 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
725 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
726 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
728 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
729 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
730 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
731 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
732 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
733 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
735 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
737 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
738 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
740 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
742 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
743 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
744 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
746 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
748 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
749 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
750 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
751 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
752 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
753 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
754 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
755 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
756 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
757 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
759 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
761 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
762 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
763 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
764 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
766 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
767 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
768 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
769 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
770 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
773 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
775 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
777 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
778 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
779 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
780 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
782 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
783 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
784 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
786 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
787 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
788 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
789 holder_tx_signed: bool,
791 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
792 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
793 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
794 funding_spend_seen: bool,
796 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
797 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
798 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
799 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
800 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
801 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
803 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
804 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
805 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
806 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
807 // the full block_connected).
808 best_block: BestBlock,
810 /// The node_id of our counterparty
811 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
813 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
816 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
817 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
819 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
820 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
822 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
823 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
824 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
825 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
830 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
831 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
833 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
834 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
835 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
836 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
837 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
838 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
839 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
840 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
841 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
842 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
843 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
844 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
845 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
846 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
847 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
848 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
849 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
850 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
851 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
852 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
853 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
854 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
855 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
856 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
857 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
858 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
859 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
860 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
861 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
862 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
863 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
864 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
865 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
866 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
867 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
868 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
877 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
878 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
879 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
883 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
884 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
885 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
887 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
888 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
889 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
891 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
893 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
894 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
896 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
897 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
898 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
899 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
900 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
901 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
903 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
906 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
907 match &self.shutdown_script {
908 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
909 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
912 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
913 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
914 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
916 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
917 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
918 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
920 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
921 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
922 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
924 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
925 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
926 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
927 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
928 match second_option {
929 Some(second_pubkey) => {
930 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
933 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
942 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
944 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
946 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
947 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
948 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
949 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
951 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
952 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
956 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
957 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
958 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
960 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
961 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
962 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
963 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
964 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
965 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
969 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
970 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
971 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
976 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
977 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
981 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
982 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
983 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
985 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
988 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
990 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
991 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
993 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
994 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
995 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
998 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
999 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1000 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1002 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1003 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1005 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1009 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1010 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1014 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1015 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1016 event.write(writer)?;
1019 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1020 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
1022 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1023 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1024 entry.write(writer)?;
1027 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1028 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1029 txid.write(writer)?;
1030 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1031 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1033 script.write(writer)?;
1036 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1038 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1039 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1041 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1042 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1043 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1044 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1045 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1046 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1047 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1054 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1055 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1056 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1057 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1058 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1059 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1062 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1063 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1064 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1065 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1066 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1067 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1068 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1070 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1071 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1072 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1074 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1075 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1076 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1077 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1079 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1080 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1082 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1083 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1084 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1085 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1087 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1088 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1090 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1091 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1092 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1093 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1094 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1095 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1096 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1097 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1099 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1102 let onchain_tx_handler =
1103 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1104 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1106 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1107 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1109 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1110 latest_update_id: 0,
1111 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1113 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1114 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1115 counterparty_payment_script,
1119 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1121 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1122 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1124 counterparty_commitment_params,
1125 funding_redeemscript,
1126 channel_value_satoshis,
1127 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1129 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1131 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1132 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1133 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1134 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1136 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1137 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1138 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1139 current_holder_commitment_number,
1141 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1142 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1143 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1145 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1150 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1151 holder_tx_signed: false,
1152 funding_spend_seen: false,
1153 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1154 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1155 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1158 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1165 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1166 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1169 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1170 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1171 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1172 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1173 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1176 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1177 commitment_number: u64,
1178 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1180 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1181 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1182 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1186 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1187 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1188 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1189 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1190 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1193 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1194 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1195 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1197 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1198 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1200 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1203 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1207 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1208 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1211 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1216 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1219 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1222 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1225 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1226 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1228 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1234 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1235 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1238 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1241 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1243 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1244 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1247 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1248 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1249 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1252 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1253 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1254 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1255 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1256 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1259 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1260 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1261 /// have been registered.
1262 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1263 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1264 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1265 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1266 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1267 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1268 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1270 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1271 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1277 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1278 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1279 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1280 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1283 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1286 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1287 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1288 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1289 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1290 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1293 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1294 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1297 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1298 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1301 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1302 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1305 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1307 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1309 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1310 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1313 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1314 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1315 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1316 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1317 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1318 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1319 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1320 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1321 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1322 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1323 where L::Target: Logger {
1324 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1327 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1328 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1329 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1330 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1331 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1332 where L::Target: Logger {
1333 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1336 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1337 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1338 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1339 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1340 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1341 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1343 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1344 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1346 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1347 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1349 header: &BlockHeader,
1350 txdata: &TransactionData,
1355 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1357 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1361 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1362 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1365 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1367 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1369 header: &BlockHeader,
1375 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1379 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1380 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1383 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1384 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1386 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1387 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1389 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1390 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1392 header: &BlockHeader,
1393 txdata: &TransactionData,
1398 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1400 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1401 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1404 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1405 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1406 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1409 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1411 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1412 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1414 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1415 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1422 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1426 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1427 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1428 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1431 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1432 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1434 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1435 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1437 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1438 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1440 header: &BlockHeader,
1445 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1447 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1451 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1452 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1453 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1456 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1457 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1458 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1459 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1461 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1462 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1464 txids.sort_unstable();
1469 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1470 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1471 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1472 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1476 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1477 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1478 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1479 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1480 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1481 -> Option<Balance> {
1482 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1483 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1485 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1486 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1487 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1488 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1489 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1491 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1492 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1493 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1494 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1495 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1496 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1497 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1499 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1500 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1501 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1502 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1503 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1504 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1506 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1507 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1508 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1509 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1510 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1515 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1516 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1517 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1518 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1521 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1523 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1524 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1526 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1527 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1528 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1530 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1532 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1534 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1535 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1536 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1537 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1538 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1540 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1541 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1542 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1543 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1544 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1545 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1546 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1547 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1548 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1549 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1550 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1552 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1553 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1554 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1555 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1557 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1558 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1560 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1565 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1566 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1567 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1568 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1569 // need to do so again here.
1571 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1572 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1573 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1574 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1575 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1576 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1579 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1580 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1581 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1582 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1583 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1584 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1585 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1586 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1589 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1590 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1591 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1594 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1595 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1596 // we know the preimage.
1597 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1598 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1599 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1600 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1601 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1602 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1603 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1604 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1607 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1608 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1609 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1612 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1613 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1614 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1615 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1622 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1623 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1624 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1627 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1628 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1629 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1630 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1632 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1633 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1634 /// a revoked state.
1636 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1637 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1638 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1639 let mut res = Vec::new();
1640 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1642 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1643 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1644 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1645 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1646 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1649 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1650 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1653 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1654 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1655 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1656 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1657 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1660 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1661 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1662 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1663 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1665 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1673 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1674 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1675 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1676 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1677 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1678 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1679 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1680 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1682 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1685 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1686 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1687 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1690 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1691 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1692 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1695 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1696 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1698 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1699 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1700 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1701 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1702 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1703 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1704 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1705 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1706 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1708 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1709 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1710 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1712 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1713 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1714 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1715 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1716 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1722 if spent_counterparty_output {
1723 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1724 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1725 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1726 if output_spendable {
1727 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1728 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1732 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1733 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1736 found_commitment_tx = true;
1737 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1738 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1739 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1740 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1741 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1742 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1745 found_commitment_tx = true;
1746 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1747 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1748 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1749 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1750 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1751 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1752 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1755 found_commitment_tx = true;
1758 if !found_commitment_tx {
1759 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1760 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1761 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1762 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1763 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1764 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1765 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1770 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1771 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1772 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1774 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1775 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1776 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1778 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1779 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1781 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1782 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1783 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1784 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1785 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1789 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1790 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1797 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1798 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1799 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1800 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1801 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1803 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1804 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1805 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1806 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1807 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1808 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1810 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1811 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1812 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1813 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1814 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1815 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1816 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1817 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1818 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1819 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1820 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1821 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1822 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1823 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1824 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1825 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1827 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1830 if !htlc_update_confd {
1831 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1838 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1839 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1840 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1841 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1842 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1843 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1848 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1849 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1850 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1851 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1852 Some((a, &**source))
1855 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1856 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1857 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1859 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1860 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1861 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1862 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1867 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1868 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1869 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1870 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1872 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1873 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1874 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1875 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1881 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1882 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1884 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1885 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1892 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1893 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1897 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1898 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1899 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1901 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1902 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1903 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1904 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1905 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1906 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1908 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1909 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1910 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1911 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1912 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1913 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1914 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1915 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1917 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1918 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1919 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1920 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1921 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1922 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1923 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1924 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1925 // payment_preimage.
1926 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1927 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1928 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1929 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1931 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1933 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1934 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1935 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1936 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1937 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1938 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1939 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1940 matched_htlc = true;
1944 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1945 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1946 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1948 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1949 *update_source != **source
1954 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1955 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1956 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1957 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1958 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1959 source: (**source).clone(),
1960 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1961 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1962 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1965 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1966 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1967 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1968 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1974 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1975 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1977 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1978 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1983 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1984 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1985 // in-line tests later.
1988 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1989 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1990 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1991 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1992 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1993 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1994 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
1999 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2000 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2003 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2004 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2005 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2006 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2007 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2008 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2009 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2012 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2013 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2014 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2015 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2020 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2021 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2022 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2023 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2024 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2026 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2027 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2028 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2032 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2033 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2034 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2039 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2046 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2055 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2056 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2057 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2058 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2060 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2061 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2064 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2065 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2066 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2067 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2068 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2069 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2070 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2071 Some(old_points) => {
2072 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2073 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2074 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2075 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2076 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2078 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2081 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2085 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2088 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2089 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2090 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2096 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2097 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2098 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2099 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2100 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2101 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2102 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2103 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2104 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2105 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2106 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2107 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2110 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2111 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2112 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2113 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2114 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2116 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2117 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2120 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2121 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2122 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2123 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2124 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2129 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2130 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2131 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2132 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2133 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2134 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2138 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2140 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2141 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2142 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2143 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2144 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2145 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2148 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2149 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2150 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2154 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2155 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2156 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2161 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2162 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2163 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2164 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2165 // holder commitment transactions.
2166 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2167 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2168 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2170 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2171 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2172 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2173 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2174 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2179 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2180 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2183 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2184 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2185 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2187 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2190 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2191 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2195 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2196 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2197 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2198 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2199 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2200 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2201 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2202 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2203 match updates.updates[0] {
2204 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2206 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2207 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2210 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2211 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2213 let mut ret = Ok(());
2214 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2216 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2217 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2218 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2219 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2220 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2221 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2225 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2226 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2227 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2229 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2230 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2231 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2232 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2234 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2235 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2236 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2237 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2238 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2242 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2243 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2244 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2245 if *should_broadcast {
2246 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2247 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2248 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2250 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2251 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2252 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2253 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2256 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2257 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2258 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2259 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2264 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2266 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2267 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2272 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2273 self.latest_update_id
2276 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2280 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2281 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2282 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2283 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2284 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2285 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2287 &self.outputs_to_watch
2290 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2291 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2292 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2296 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2297 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2298 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2302 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2303 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2304 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2307 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2308 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2311 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2312 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2315 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2316 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2319 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2320 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2321 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2322 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2324 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2325 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2327 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2328 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2329 where L::Target: Logger {
2330 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2331 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2332 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2333 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2334 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2336 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2337 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2339 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2340 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2343 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2348 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2349 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2350 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2351 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2352 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2353 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2354 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2356 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2357 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2359 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2360 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2361 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2362 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2363 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2364 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2365 to_counterparty_output_info =
2366 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2370 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2371 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2372 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2373 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2374 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2375 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2376 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2377 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2378 to_counterparty_output_info);
2380 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2381 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2382 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2387 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2388 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2389 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2390 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2391 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2392 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2394 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2396 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2397 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2398 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2399 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2402 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2403 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2404 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2407 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2408 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2409 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2410 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2411 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2412 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2413 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2415 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2416 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2418 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2420 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2421 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2422 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2423 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2426 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2427 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2428 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2429 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2430 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2434 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2437 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2438 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2439 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2440 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2441 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2443 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2444 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2445 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2447 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2448 Some(points) => points,
2449 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2452 let per_commitment_point =
2453 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2454 // per-commitment point
2455 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2456 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2457 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2458 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2459 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2460 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2462 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2463 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2465 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2466 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2467 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2468 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2470 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2471 &per_commitment_point,
2472 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2474 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2475 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2476 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2478 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2482 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2485 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2486 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2487 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2488 to_counterparty_output_info =
2489 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2495 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2496 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2497 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2498 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2499 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2500 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2501 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2504 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2505 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2506 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2507 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2508 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2509 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2510 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2511 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2513 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2514 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2515 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2516 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2519 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2520 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2521 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2526 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2529 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2530 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2531 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2532 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2533 return (Vec::new(), None)
2536 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2537 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2540 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2545 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2546 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2547 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2549 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2550 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2551 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2552 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2553 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2554 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2557 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2558 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2559 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2560 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2561 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2563 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2564 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2566 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2567 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2568 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2569 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2571 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2574 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2577 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2579 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2580 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2584 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2587 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2588 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2589 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2590 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2591 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2592 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2598 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2599 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2600 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2601 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2602 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2603 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2604 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2605 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2607 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2608 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2609 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2610 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2611 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2615 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2616 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2618 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2619 is_holder_tx = true;
2620 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2621 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2622 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2623 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2624 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2625 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2626 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2627 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2628 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2629 is_holder_tx = true;
2630 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2631 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2632 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2633 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2634 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2635 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2641 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2647 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2648 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2649 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2650 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2651 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2652 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2653 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2654 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2655 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2656 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2657 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2660 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2661 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2662 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2663 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2664 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2665 // confirmed in the next block.
2668 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2669 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2670 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2674 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2675 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2679 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2680 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2681 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2682 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2683 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2684 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2685 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2686 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2687 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2688 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2689 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2690 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2694 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2695 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2696 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2703 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2704 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2708 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2709 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2711 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2712 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2715 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2717 header: &BlockHeader,
2720 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2722 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2724 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2728 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2730 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2731 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2732 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2733 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2734 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2735 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2736 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2738 } else { Vec::new() }
2741 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2743 header: &BlockHeader,
2744 txdata: &TransactionData,
2747 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2749 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2751 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2752 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2755 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2756 for tx in &txn_matched {
2757 let mut output_val = 0;
2758 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2759 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2760 output_val += out.value;
2761 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2765 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2767 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2768 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2769 for tx in &txn_matched {
2770 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2771 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2772 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2773 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2775 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2776 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2777 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2778 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2779 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2780 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2781 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2782 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2783 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2784 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2785 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2786 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2787 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2789 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2790 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2791 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2792 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2793 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2794 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2795 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2797 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2798 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2802 let txid = tx.txid();
2803 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2805 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2807 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2808 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2809 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2813 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2814 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2815 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2816 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2817 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2822 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2823 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2824 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2825 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2827 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2830 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2831 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2834 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2837 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2838 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2839 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2840 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2842 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2843 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2844 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2847 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2848 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2849 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2851 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2853 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2855 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2859 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2860 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2862 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2863 if should_broadcast {
2864 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2865 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2866 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2867 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2868 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2869 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2870 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2871 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2872 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2873 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2874 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2875 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2876 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2878 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2881 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2882 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2883 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2884 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2885 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2886 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2887 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2889 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2893 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2894 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2895 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2897 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2898 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2902 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2903 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2905 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2906 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2908 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2909 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2910 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2913 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2914 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2915 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2916 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2918 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2919 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2920 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2921 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2922 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2925 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2926 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2927 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2929 payment_preimage: None,
2930 source: source.clone(),
2931 htlc_value_satoshis,
2933 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2934 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2935 payment_preimage: None,
2938 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2939 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2940 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2941 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2944 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2945 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2946 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2947 payment_preimage: preimage,
2950 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2951 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2952 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2957 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2959 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2960 // updating the latter in the process.
2961 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2962 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2963 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2967 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2968 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2969 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2970 for tx in &txn_matched {
2971 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2972 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2973 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2974 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2982 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2983 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2984 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2987 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2990 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2991 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2992 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2994 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2995 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2997 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3000 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3004 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3007 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3008 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3011 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
3012 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
3015 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3018 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3019 /// transactions thereof.
3020 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3021 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3022 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3023 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3024 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3025 if matches { break; }
3026 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3031 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3034 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3037 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3038 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3039 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3040 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3041 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3042 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3045 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3046 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3047 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3048 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3049 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3050 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3051 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3052 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3056 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3057 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3058 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3059 } else { panic!(); }
3070 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3071 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3072 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3073 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3074 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3075 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3076 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3077 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3078 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3079 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3080 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3081 let height = self.best_block.height();
3082 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3083 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3084 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3085 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3086 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3087 // time out the HTLC first.
3088 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3089 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3090 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3091 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3092 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3093 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3094 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3095 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3096 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3097 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3098 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3099 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3100 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3101 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3102 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3103 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3104 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3105 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3106 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3107 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3108 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3109 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3110 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3111 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3118 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3120 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3121 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3122 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3125 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3126 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3127 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3134 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3135 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3136 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3137 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3138 let mut payment_data = None;
3139 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
3140 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
3141 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
3142 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
3143 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
3144 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
3145 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
3146 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3147 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
3148 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
3149 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
3151 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3152 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
3154 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3155 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3156 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3157 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3158 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3161 macro_rules! log_claim {
3162 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3163 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3164 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3166 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3167 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3168 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3169 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3170 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3171 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3172 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3173 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3174 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3175 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3176 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3177 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3178 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3179 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3180 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3181 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3183 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3184 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3185 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3186 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3191 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3192 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3193 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3194 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3195 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3196 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3197 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3198 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3207 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3208 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3209 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3210 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3211 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3212 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3213 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3214 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3215 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3216 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3217 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3218 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3219 } else if !$holder_tx {
3220 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3221 if payment_data.is_none() {
3222 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3225 if payment_data.is_none() {
3226 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3227 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3228 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3229 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3230 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3231 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3232 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3233 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3234 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3235 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3236 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3237 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3238 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3239 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3242 continue 'outer_loop;
3249 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3250 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3251 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3253 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3254 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3255 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3256 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3259 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3260 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3261 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3264 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3265 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3266 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3267 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3268 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3269 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3270 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3273 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3274 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3275 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3276 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3277 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3280 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3282 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3284 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3287 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3288 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3289 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3290 upd.source == source
3292 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3294 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3296 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3297 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3298 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3299 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3302 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3304 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3306 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3310 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3311 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3313 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3314 *htlc_source != source
3319 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3321 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3323 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3324 source, payment_hash,
3325 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3326 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3329 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3330 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3336 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3337 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3338 let mut spendable_output = None;
3339 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3340 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3341 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3342 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3343 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3344 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3345 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3346 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3347 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3348 // non-standard due to their size.
3349 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3350 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3351 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3354 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3355 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3356 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3357 output: outp.clone(),
3361 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3362 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3363 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3364 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3365 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3366 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3367 output: outp.clone(),
3368 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3369 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3370 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3375 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3376 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3377 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3378 output: outp.clone(),
3379 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3380 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3384 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3385 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3386 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3387 output: outp.clone(),
3392 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3393 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3395 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3397 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3399 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3400 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3405 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3407 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3408 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3411 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3412 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3415 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3416 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3420 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3426 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3427 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3430 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3431 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3434 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3435 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3438 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3439 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3443 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3445 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3446 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3447 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3448 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3452 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3457 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3459 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3460 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3462 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3463 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3465 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3466 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3467 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3468 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3471 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3473 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3474 let shutdown_script = {
3475 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3476 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3479 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3480 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3481 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3482 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3483 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3484 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3485 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3487 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3488 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3489 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3491 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3492 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3493 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3495 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3496 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3500 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3501 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3502 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3503 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3505 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3510 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3512 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3514 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3517 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3518 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3520 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3521 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3523 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3524 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3530 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3531 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3532 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3533 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3534 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3535 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3536 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3537 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3539 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3540 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3544 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3545 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3546 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3547 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3548 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3549 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3554 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3555 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3556 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3557 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3558 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3559 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3564 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3565 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3568 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3572 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3574 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3575 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3577 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3578 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3579 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3580 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3581 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3582 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3587 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3588 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3589 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3590 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3591 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3592 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3593 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3594 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3596 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3599 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3600 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3601 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3602 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3603 pending_events.push(event);
3607 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3609 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3610 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3611 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3612 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3613 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3617 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3618 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3619 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3620 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3621 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3622 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3623 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3624 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3626 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3630 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3632 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3633 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3635 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3636 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3637 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3638 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3639 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3640 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3645 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3646 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3647 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3648 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3652 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3653 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3654 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3655 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3656 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3657 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3658 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3659 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3660 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3661 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3662 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3663 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3666 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3667 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3669 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3671 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3674 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3675 counterparty_payment_script,
3679 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3681 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3682 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3684 counterparty_commitment_params,
3685 funding_redeemscript,
3686 channel_value_satoshis,
3687 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3692 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3693 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3694 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3696 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3697 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3698 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3699 current_holder_commitment_number,
3702 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3705 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3710 lockdown_from_offchain,
3712 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3713 funding_spend_confirmed,
3714 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3715 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3718 counterparty_node_id,
3727 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3728 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3729 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3730 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3731 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3732 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3733 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3734 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3735 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3736 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3737 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3738 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3739 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3743 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3745 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3746 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3747 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3748 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3749 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3750 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3751 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3752 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3754 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3755 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3756 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3757 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3758 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3759 use util::errors::APIError;
3760 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3761 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3762 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3763 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3765 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3768 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3769 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3770 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3771 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3772 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3773 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3774 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3775 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3776 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3778 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3779 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3783 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3784 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3785 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3786 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3787 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3789 // Rebalance somewhat
3790 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3792 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3793 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3794 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3796 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3797 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3798 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3799 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3800 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3801 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3802 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3804 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3805 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3806 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3807 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3808 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3809 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3810 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3811 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3812 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3814 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3815 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3816 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3818 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3819 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3820 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3821 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3822 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3823 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3825 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3826 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3828 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3829 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3830 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3831 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3832 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3833 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3834 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3835 } else { panic!(); }
3836 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3837 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3839 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3841 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3843 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3845 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3846 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3847 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3848 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3849 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3850 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3851 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3852 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3853 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3856 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3857 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3858 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3862 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3864 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3865 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3866 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3868 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3869 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3871 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3874 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3875 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3876 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3880 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3881 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3883 let mut res = Vec::new();
3884 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3885 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3889 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3890 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3897 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3898 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3900 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3901 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3907 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3908 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3909 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3910 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3915 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3917 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3918 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3919 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3920 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3921 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3922 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3928 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3929 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3930 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3931 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3932 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3933 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3935 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3936 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3937 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3938 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3939 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3940 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3941 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3942 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3944 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3947 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3949 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3950 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3951 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3952 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3953 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3954 &channel_parameters,
3955 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3956 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3958 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3959 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3960 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3961 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3962 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3963 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3964 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3965 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3966 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3969 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3970 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3971 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3973 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3974 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3975 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3977 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3978 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3979 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3980 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3981 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3982 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3984 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3985 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3986 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3987 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3989 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3990 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3991 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3993 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3994 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3995 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3997 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3998 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4002 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4003 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4004 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4007 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4008 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4010 macro_rules! sign_input {
4011 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4012 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4013 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4015 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4016 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4017 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4019 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4020 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4021 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4022 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4023 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4024 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4025 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4026 witness.push(ser_sig);
4027 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4028 witness.push(vec!(1));
4029 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4030 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4031 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4032 witness.push(vec![0]);
4034 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4036 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4037 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4038 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4039 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4040 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4044 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4045 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4047 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4048 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4049 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4050 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4052 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4053 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4057 script_sig: Script::new(),
4058 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4059 witness: Witness::new(),
4062 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4063 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4066 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4067 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4068 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4070 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4071 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4072 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4073 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4076 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4079 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4080 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4081 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4082 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4084 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4085 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4089 script_sig: Script::new(),
4090 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4091 witness: Witness::new(),
4094 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4095 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4098 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4099 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4100 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4102 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4103 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4104 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4105 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4108 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4111 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4112 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4113 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4114 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4115 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4116 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4120 script_sig: Script::new(),
4121 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4122 witness: Witness::new(),
4124 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4125 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4128 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4129 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4130 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4132 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4133 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4134 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4135 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4138 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4142 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.