1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
34 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
35 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
36 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
38 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
39 use lightning::events;
40 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
41 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
42 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
43 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
44 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
45 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
46 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
47 use lightning::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
48 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
49 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
50 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
51 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
52 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
53 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
54 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
56 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
57 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
59 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
60 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
61 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
62 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
65 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
66 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
67 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
68 use std::sync::atomic;
70 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
72 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
73 struct FuzzEstimator {
74 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
76 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
77 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
78 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
79 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
80 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
81 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
83 ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => MAX_FEE * 10,
84 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
85 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => 253,
86 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
93 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
95 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
96 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
97 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
98 Err(msgs::LightningError {
99 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
100 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
105 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
106 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
107 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
110 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
111 impl Writer for VecWriter {
112 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
113 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
118 struct TestChainMonitor {
119 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
120 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
121 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
122 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
123 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
124 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
125 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
126 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
127 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
128 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
130 impl TestChainMonitor {
131 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
133 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
137 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
141 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
142 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
143 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
144 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
145 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
146 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
148 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
151 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
152 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
153 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
157 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
158 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
159 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
160 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
161 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
162 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
163 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
166 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
167 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
172 node_secret: SecretKey,
173 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
174 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
177 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
178 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
179 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
180 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
181 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
186 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
187 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
188 let node_secret = match recipient {
189 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
190 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
192 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
195 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
196 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
197 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
198 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
200 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
201 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
203 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
206 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
207 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
210 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
214 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
215 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
216 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
220 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
221 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
222 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
226 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
227 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
228 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
229 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
233 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
234 type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
236 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
237 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
241 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
242 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
243 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
244 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
246 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
247 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
248 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
249 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
250 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
251 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
252 channel_value_satoshis,
256 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
257 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
260 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
261 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
263 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
264 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
266 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
269 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
270 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
274 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
275 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
276 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
277 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
278 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
281 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
282 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
283 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
284 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
285 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
290 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
291 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
292 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
293 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
295 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
301 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
303 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
304 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
305 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
306 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
307 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
308 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
309 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
311 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
312 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
313 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
314 _ => panic!("{}", err),
316 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
318 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
319 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
321 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
325 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
327 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
328 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
329 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
331 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
332 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
334 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
335 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
337 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
341 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
344 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
345 let mut payment_hash;
347 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).into_inner());
348 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
349 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
351 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
357 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
358 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
359 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
360 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
361 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
363 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
364 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
366 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
368 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
369 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
370 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
371 node_features: dest.node_features(),
372 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
373 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
375 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
376 maybe_announced_channel: true,
377 }], blinded_tail: None }],
379 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
380 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
383 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
384 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
385 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
386 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
391 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
392 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
393 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
394 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
395 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
397 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
398 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
400 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
402 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
403 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
404 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
405 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
406 node_features: middle.node_features(),
407 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
408 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
409 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
410 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
411 maybe_announced_channel: true,
413 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
414 node_features: dest.node_features(),
415 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
416 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
418 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
419 maybe_announced_channel: true,
420 }], blinded_tail: None }],
422 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
423 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
424 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
427 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
428 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
429 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
430 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
436 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
437 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
438 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
439 let router = FuzzRouter {};
441 macro_rules! make_node {
442 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
443 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
444 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
445 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
446 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
447 Arc::new(TestPersister {
448 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
449 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
451 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
452 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
453 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
455 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
456 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
458 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
459 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
460 let params = ChainParameters {
462 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
464 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
465 monitor, keys_manager)
469 macro_rules! reload_node {
470 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
471 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
472 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
473 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
474 Arc::new(TestPersister {
475 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
476 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
478 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
479 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
480 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
482 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
483 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
486 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
487 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
488 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
489 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
490 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
492 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
493 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
494 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
497 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
498 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
499 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
500 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
501 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
502 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
503 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
506 default_config: config,
507 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
510 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
511 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
512 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
513 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
519 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
520 macro_rules! make_channel {
521 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
522 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
523 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
525 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
526 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
529 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
531 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
533 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
535 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
538 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
539 let accept_channel = {
541 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
542 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
543 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
544 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
546 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
547 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
548 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
549 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
550 temporary_channel_id,
551 counterparty_node_id,
554 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
556 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
558 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
560 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
563 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
566 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
568 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
569 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
570 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
572 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
573 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
574 channel_txn.push(tx);
575 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
578 let funding_created = {
579 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
581 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
583 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
585 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
587 let funding_signed = {
588 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
590 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
592 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
594 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
596 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
597 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
598 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
600 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
601 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
603 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
604 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
605 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
611 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
613 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
614 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
615 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
616 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
618 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
620 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
624 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
625 ($nodes: expr) => { {
626 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
627 for node in $nodes.iter() {
628 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
630 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
631 for event in node_event {
632 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
633 for node in $nodes.iter() {
634 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
635 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
638 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
642 for node in $nodes.iter() {
643 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
644 for event in events {
645 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
646 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
652 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
653 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
654 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
655 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
656 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
657 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
659 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
661 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
662 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
663 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
665 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
667 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
668 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
670 for node in nodes.iter() {
674 lock_fundings!(nodes);
676 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
677 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
679 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
680 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
682 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
683 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
684 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
685 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
686 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
687 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
689 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
690 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
691 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
692 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
693 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
694 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
696 macro_rules! test_return {
698 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
699 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
700 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
705 let mut read_pos = 0;
706 macro_rules! get_slice {
709 let slice_len = $len as usize;
710 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
713 read_pos += slice_len;
714 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
720 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
721 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
722 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
723 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
724 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
725 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
726 for event in $excess_events {
727 let push_a = match event {
728 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
729 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
732 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
733 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
736 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
737 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
740 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
741 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
742 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
743 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
744 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
747 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
749 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
754 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
755 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
758 enum ProcessMessages {
759 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
760 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
762 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
763 /// message (which may already be queued).
765 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
766 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
767 /// provides potentially more coverage.
771 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
772 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
773 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
774 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
775 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
776 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
779 } else if $node == 0 {
780 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
781 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
784 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
785 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
788 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
789 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
790 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
792 let mut had_events = false;
793 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
794 let mut extra_ev = None;
795 for event in &mut events_iter {
798 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
799 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
800 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
801 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
802 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
803 if !$corrupt_forward {
804 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
806 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
807 // check will fail and we generate a
808 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
809 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
810 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
811 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
812 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
813 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
816 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
817 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
818 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
820 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
821 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
822 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
824 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
825 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
826 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
828 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
829 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
830 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
832 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
833 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
834 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
835 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
836 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
837 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
838 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
839 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
840 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
846 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
847 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
852 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
853 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
854 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
855 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
856 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
860 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
861 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
862 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
863 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
864 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
868 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
869 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
871 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
872 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
874 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
875 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
876 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
877 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
878 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
879 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
880 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
881 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
883 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
886 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
889 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
894 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
895 } else if $node == 0 {
896 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
897 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
899 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
900 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
906 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
907 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
908 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
909 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
911 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
912 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
913 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
914 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
915 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
916 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
917 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
919 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
922 panic!("Unhandled message event")
926 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
930 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
932 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
933 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
934 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
935 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
936 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
937 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
938 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
940 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
943 panic!("Unhandled message event")
947 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
954 macro_rules! process_events {
955 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
956 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
957 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
958 // deduplicate the calls here.
959 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
960 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
961 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
962 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
963 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
964 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
965 // our claim_set deduplication).
966 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
967 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
968 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
970 } else { Ordering::Equal }
971 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
972 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
974 } else { Ordering::Equal }
975 } else { Ordering::Equal }
977 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
978 for event in events.drain(..) {
980 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
981 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
983 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
985 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
989 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
990 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
991 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
992 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
993 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
994 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
995 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
996 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
997 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
998 // looking like probes.
1000 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1001 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1002 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1003 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1005 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1006 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1009 panic!("Unhandled event")
1017 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1018 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1020 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1021 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1022 // harm in doing so.
1024 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1025 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1026 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1027 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1028 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1029 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1032 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1033 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1034 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1038 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1039 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1040 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1044 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1045 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1046 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1050 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1051 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1052 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1057 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1058 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1059 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1060 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1061 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1065 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1066 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1067 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1068 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1069 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1073 if chan_a_disconnected {
1074 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1075 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1077 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1078 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1080 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1084 if chan_b_disconnected {
1085 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1086 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1088 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1089 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1091 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1095 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1096 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1097 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1098 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1099 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1100 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1102 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1103 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1105 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1106 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1107 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1108 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1109 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1110 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1112 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1113 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1115 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1116 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1117 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1118 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1119 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1120 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1122 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1123 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1126 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1127 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1128 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1129 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1133 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1134 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1135 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1138 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1139 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1140 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1141 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1146 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1147 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1148 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1152 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1153 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1154 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1157 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1158 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1159 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1160 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1164 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1165 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1166 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1169 // 1/10th the channel size:
1170 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1171 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1172 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1173 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1174 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1175 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1177 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1178 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1179 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1180 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1181 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1182 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1184 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1185 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1186 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1187 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1188 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1189 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1191 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1192 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1193 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1194 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1195 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1196 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1198 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1199 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1201 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1203 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1210 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1217 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1224 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1227 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1229 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1231 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1232 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1234 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1236 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1239 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1241 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1243 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1244 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1246 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1248 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1251 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1253 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1255 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1256 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1258 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1260 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1263 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1264 // after we resolve all pending events.
1265 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1266 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1267 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1268 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1269 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1271 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1272 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1273 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1275 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1276 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1277 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1279 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1280 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1281 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1283 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1284 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1285 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1288 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1289 if chan_a_disconnected {
1290 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1291 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1293 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1294 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1296 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1298 if chan_b_disconnected {
1299 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1300 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1302 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1303 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1305 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1308 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1309 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1310 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1311 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1312 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1313 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1314 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1315 // payments claimed.
1316 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1317 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1318 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1322 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1324 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1325 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1327 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1328 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1330 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1331 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1332 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1334 _ => test_return!(),
1337 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1338 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1339 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1341 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1342 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1343 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1345 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1346 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1347 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1352 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1353 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1355 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1357 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1359 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1360 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1361 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1362 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1363 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1365 self.output.locked_write(data)
1368 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1369 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1370 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1374 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1375 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1376 do_test(data, out, true);
1380 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1381 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1382 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);