1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
19 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures};
20 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
21 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
24 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
25 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
26 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
27 use util::transaction_utils;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
29 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
30 use util::errors::APIError;
31 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
34 use std::default::Default;
39 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
40 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
41 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
43 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
49 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
50 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
51 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
52 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
55 enum InboundHTLCState {
56 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
57 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
58 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
59 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
60 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
61 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
62 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
63 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
64 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
65 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
66 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
67 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
69 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
72 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
74 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
75 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
76 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
77 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
78 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
79 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
80 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
81 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
84 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
88 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
89 state: InboundHTLCState,
92 enum OutboundHTLCState {
93 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
94 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
95 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
96 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
97 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
98 /// money back (though we won't), and,
99 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
100 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
101 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
102 /// we'll never get out of sync).
103 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
104 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
105 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
107 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
108 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
109 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
110 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
111 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
112 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
113 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
114 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
115 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
116 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
117 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
118 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
120 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
121 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
124 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
128 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 state: OutboundHTLCState,
133 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
134 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
135 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
139 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
141 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
144 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
149 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
153 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
154 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
155 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
156 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
157 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
158 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
159 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
161 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
162 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
163 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
164 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
165 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
166 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
167 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
169 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
170 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
171 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
173 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
174 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
175 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
176 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
177 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
178 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
180 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
181 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
183 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
184 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
185 /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
186 /// messages until they've managed to do so.
187 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
188 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
189 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
190 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
191 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
193 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
194 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
195 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
196 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
197 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
198 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
199 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
200 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
201 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
202 /// us their shutdown.
203 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
204 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
205 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
206 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
208 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
209 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
211 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
213 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
214 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
215 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
217 pub(super) struct Channel {
218 config: ChannelConfig,
222 channel_id: [u8; 32],
224 channel_outbound: bool,
225 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
226 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
228 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
229 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
231 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
232 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
233 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
235 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
236 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
237 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
238 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
239 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
240 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
242 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
243 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
244 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
245 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
246 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
247 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
249 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
251 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
252 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
253 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
254 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
256 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
257 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
258 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
260 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
261 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
262 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
263 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
264 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
265 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
266 // commitment_signed.
267 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
268 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
269 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
270 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
271 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
272 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
273 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
274 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
275 channel_update_count: u32,
278 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
279 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
280 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
281 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
282 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
283 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
286 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
287 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
289 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
291 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
293 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
294 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
295 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
296 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
297 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
298 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
299 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
300 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
301 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
302 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
304 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
306 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
308 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
310 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
312 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
313 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
314 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
315 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
316 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
317 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
318 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
319 their_to_self_delay: u16,
320 //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
322 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
324 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
325 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
328 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
329 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
330 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
331 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
332 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
335 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
336 their_node_id: PublicKey,
338 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
340 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
345 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
346 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
347 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
348 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
349 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
350 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
351 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
353 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
355 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
357 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
358 /// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
359 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
360 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
361 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
362 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
363 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
365 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
368 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
370 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
371 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
373 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
374 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
375 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
377 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
378 Ignore(&'static str),
382 macro_rules! secp_check {
383 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
386 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
392 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
393 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
394 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
397 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
399 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
400 fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
401 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
402 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
405 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
406 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
409 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
414 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
415 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
417 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
421 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
422 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
426 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
427 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
428 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
431 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
434 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
435 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
436 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
440 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
442 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
443 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
444 channel_outbound: true,
446 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
448 local_keys: chan_keys,
449 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
450 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
451 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
452 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
454 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
455 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
456 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
457 pending_update_fee: None,
458 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
459 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
460 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
461 channel_update_count: 1,
463 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
465 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
466 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
467 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
468 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
470 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
471 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
472 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
473 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
475 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
477 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
479 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
480 short_channel_id: None,
481 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
482 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
484 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
485 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
486 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
487 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
488 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
489 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
490 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
491 their_to_self_delay: 0,
492 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
493 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
495 their_funding_pubkey: None,
496 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
497 their_payment_basepoint: None,
498 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
499 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
500 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
502 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
503 their_node_id: their_node_id,
505 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
507 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
513 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
514 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
517 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
523 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
524 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
525 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
526 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
527 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
529 // Check sanity of message fields:
530 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
531 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
533 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
536 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
537 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
539 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
542 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
543 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
545 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
548 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
550 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
553 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
556 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
560 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
561 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
564 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
567 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
570 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
573 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
576 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
579 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
583 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
585 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
586 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
587 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
591 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
592 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
594 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
596 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
597 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
598 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
601 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
604 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
608 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
609 // for full fee payment
610 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
611 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
615 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
616 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
617 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
621 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
622 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
623 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
624 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
625 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
626 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
628 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
629 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
630 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
631 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
632 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
634 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
635 } else if script.len() == 0 {
637 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
642 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
643 &OptionalField::Absent => {
644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
649 let mut chan = Channel {
651 config: local_config,
653 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
654 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
655 channel_outbound: false,
658 local_keys: chan_keys,
659 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
660 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
661 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
662 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
664 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
665 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
666 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
667 pending_update_fee: None,
668 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
669 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
670 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
671 channel_update_count: 1,
673 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
675 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
676 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
677 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
678 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
681 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
682 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
683 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
685 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
687 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
689 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
690 short_channel_id: None,
691 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
692 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
694 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
695 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
696 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
697 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
698 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
699 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
700 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
701 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
702 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
703 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
704 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
706 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
707 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
708 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
709 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
710 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
711 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
713 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
714 their_node_id: their_node_id,
716 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
718 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
723 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
724 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
729 // Utilities to derive keys:
731 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
732 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
733 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
736 // Utilities to build transactions:
738 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
739 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
740 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
742 if self.channel_outbound {
743 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
744 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
746 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
747 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
749 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
751 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
752 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
753 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
754 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
755 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
756 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
759 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
760 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
761 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
762 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
763 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
765 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
766 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
767 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
768 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
769 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
770 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
771 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
772 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
773 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
774 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
775 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
777 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
778 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
781 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
783 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
784 script_sig: Script::new(),
785 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
791 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
792 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
794 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
795 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
796 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
797 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
799 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
801 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
802 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
803 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
805 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
806 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
807 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
808 transaction_output_index: None
813 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
814 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
815 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
816 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
817 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
818 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
820 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
821 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
822 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
824 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
825 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
828 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
829 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
830 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
831 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
832 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
833 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
834 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
836 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
837 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
843 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
844 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
845 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
846 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
847 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
848 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
849 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
853 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
854 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
856 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
858 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
859 if generated_by_local {
860 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
861 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
870 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
871 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
872 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
873 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
874 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
875 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
876 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
880 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
881 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
883 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
885 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
886 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
888 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
889 if !generated_by_local {
890 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
898 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
899 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
900 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
901 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
902 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
903 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
904 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
905 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
907 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
909 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
910 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
911 // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
913 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
914 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
916 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
918 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
919 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
920 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
921 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
924 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
925 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
926 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
928 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
931 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
932 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
934 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
935 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
937 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
938 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
939 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
940 value: value_to_a as u64
944 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
945 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
947 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
948 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
950 value: value_to_b as u64
954 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
955 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
956 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
957 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
958 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
959 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
961 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
962 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
963 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
964 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
965 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
968 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
969 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
970 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
972 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
973 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
974 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
977 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
978 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
982 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
985 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
989 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
990 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
991 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
995 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
996 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1000 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1002 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1004 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1005 script_sig: Script::new(),
1006 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1007 witness: Vec::new(),
1012 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1013 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1014 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1016 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1017 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1018 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1020 if value_to_self < 0 {
1021 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1022 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1023 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1024 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1025 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1028 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1029 txouts.push((TxOut {
1030 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1031 value: value_to_remote as u64
1035 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1036 txouts.push((TxOut {
1037 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1038 value: value_to_self as u64
1042 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1044 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1045 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1046 outputs.push(out.0);
1054 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1058 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1059 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1060 /// our counterparty!)
1061 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1062 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1063 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1064 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1065 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
1066 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1068 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1072 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1073 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1074 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1075 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1076 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1077 //may see payments to it!
1078 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
1079 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
1080 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1082 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1085 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1086 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1087 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1088 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1089 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1090 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1091 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1092 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1093 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1094 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1096 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1097 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1098 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1101 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1102 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1103 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1105 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1106 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1109 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1111 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1112 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1114 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1116 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1117 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1118 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1119 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1120 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1122 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1123 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1125 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1126 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1128 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1133 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1134 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1135 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1136 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1137 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1140 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
1141 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1142 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1145 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1147 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
1148 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1149 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1150 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1153 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1154 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
1155 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
1156 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1157 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1159 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1160 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1163 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1165 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1167 if local_tx { // b, then a
1168 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1169 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1171 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1172 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1174 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1175 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1178 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1180 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1183 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1188 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1189 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1190 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1191 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1192 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1193 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1194 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1196 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1197 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1199 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1201 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1203 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1204 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1205 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1207 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1208 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1209 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1210 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1212 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1213 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1214 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1216 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1218 return Ok((None, None));
1221 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1222 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1229 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1233 // Now update local state:
1235 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1236 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1237 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1239 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1240 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1241 match pending_update {
1242 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1243 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1244 return Ok((None, None));
1247 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1248 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1249 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1250 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1251 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1252 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1258 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1259 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1260 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1262 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1266 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1267 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1269 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1270 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1272 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1273 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1276 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1277 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1278 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1279 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1280 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1283 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1284 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1285 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1286 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1287 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1289 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1290 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1294 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1295 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1296 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1297 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1298 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1299 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1301 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1303 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1304 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1305 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1307 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1308 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1309 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1311 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1312 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1316 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1317 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1323 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1324 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1327 // Now update local state:
1328 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1329 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1330 match pending_update {
1331 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1332 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1333 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1336 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1337 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1344 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1345 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1352 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1353 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1356 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1357 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1358 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1363 // Message handlers:
1365 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1366 // Check sanity of message fields:
1367 if !self.channel_outbound {
1368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1370 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1373 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1376 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1379 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1382 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1385 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1388 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1391 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1394 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1397 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1401 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1402 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1403 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1405 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1408 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1411 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1414 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1417 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1420 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1424 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1425 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1426 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1427 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1428 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1429 Some(script.clone())
1430 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1431 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1433 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1438 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1439 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1445 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1447 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1448 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1449 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1450 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1451 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1452 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1453 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1454 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1455 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1456 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1457 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1458 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1459 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1460 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1462 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1463 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1464 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1466 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1471 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1472 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1474 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1475 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1476 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1478 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1479 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1481 // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
1482 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
1484 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1485 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1486 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1488 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1489 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
1492 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1493 if self.channel_outbound {
1494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1496 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1497 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1498 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1502 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1503 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1504 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1505 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1508 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1509 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1510 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1512 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1515 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1520 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1522 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1523 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
1524 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1525 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1526 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1527 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1528 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1530 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1531 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1532 signature: our_signature
1533 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1536 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1537 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1538 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
1539 if !self.channel_outbound {
1540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1542 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1543 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1545 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1546 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1547 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1548 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1551 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1553 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1554 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1555 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1557 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1558 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
1560 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1561 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1562 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1563 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1564 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1566 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1569 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1570 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1574 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1576 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1577 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1578 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1579 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1580 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1581 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1582 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1583 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1584 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
1585 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1588 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1594 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1595 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1599 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1600 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1601 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1602 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1603 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1605 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1608 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1610 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1611 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1612 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1613 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1616 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1617 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1618 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1619 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1620 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1624 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1627 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1628 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1629 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1630 /// corner case properly.
1631 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1632 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1633 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1634 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1637 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1638 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1641 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1644 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1647 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1651 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1652 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1655 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1656 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1657 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1658 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
1660 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1661 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1662 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1663 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1664 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1665 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1666 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1667 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1668 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1669 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1670 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1672 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1673 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1674 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1675 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1676 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1677 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1680 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1683 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1686 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1690 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1692 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1693 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1694 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1698 // Now update local state:
1699 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1700 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1701 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1702 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1703 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1704 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1705 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1710 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1712 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1713 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1714 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1715 match check_preimage {
1717 Some(payment_hash) =>
1718 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1723 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1725 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1726 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1728 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1731 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1734 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1737 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1738 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1741 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1745 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1746 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1749 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1750 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1753 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1757 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1761 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1762 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1765 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1769 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1773 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1774 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1777 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1780 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1784 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1786 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1788 let mut update_fee = false;
1789 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1791 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1796 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1797 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1798 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1799 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1801 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1802 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1803 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1804 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
1806 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1808 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1809 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1811 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
1816 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
1820 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
1821 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1822 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1824 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1825 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1826 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1827 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1828 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1829 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1830 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1831 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
1832 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1833 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
1834 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1837 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1839 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
1841 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1845 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1846 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1848 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1849 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1850 if !self.channel_outbound {
1851 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1852 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1853 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1854 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1855 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1856 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1857 need_our_commitment = true;
1858 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1863 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1865 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1866 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1867 Some(forward_info.clone())
1869 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1870 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1871 need_our_commitment = true;
1874 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1875 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1876 Some(fail_reason.take())
1878 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1879 need_our_commitment = true;
1883 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1884 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1885 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1886 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1887 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1889 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1890 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1891 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1892 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1893 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1894 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1895 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1896 // includes the right HTLCs.
1897 // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
1898 // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
1899 // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
1900 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1901 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1903 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1904 // re-send the message on restoration)
1905 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
1908 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1909 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1910 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1911 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1912 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1913 (Some(msg), monitor, None)
1914 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1915 (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1916 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
1918 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1919 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1920 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1921 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1922 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1925 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1926 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1927 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1928 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1929 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1930 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1932 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1933 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1934 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1935 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1936 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1938 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1939 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1940 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1941 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1942 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1943 // to rebalance channels.
1944 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1945 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1947 match &htlc_update {
1948 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1949 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1950 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1953 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1954 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1957 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1965 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1966 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1968 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1970 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1975 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1976 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1977 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1979 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1981 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1988 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1989 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
1990 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
1991 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
1997 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
1998 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2001 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2002 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2003 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2004 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2007 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2008 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2009 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2010 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2011 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2016 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2017 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2019 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2021 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2022 update_fee: update_fee,
2024 }, monitor_update)))
2033 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2034 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2035 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2036 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2037 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2038 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
2039 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2042 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2045 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2049 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2050 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2054 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2055 .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
2057 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2058 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2059 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2060 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2061 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2062 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2063 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2064 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2066 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2067 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2068 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2069 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2070 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2071 let mut require_commitment = false;
2072 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2075 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2076 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2077 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2078 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2080 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2081 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2082 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2083 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2084 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2085 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2090 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2091 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2092 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2093 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2094 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2096 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2097 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2102 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2103 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2104 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2106 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2107 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2111 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2112 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2114 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2115 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2116 require_commitment = true;
2117 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2118 match forward_info {
2119 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2120 require_commitment = true;
2122 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2123 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2124 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2126 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2127 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2128 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2132 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2133 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2134 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2140 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2141 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2142 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2143 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2145 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2146 Some(fail_reason.take())
2148 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2149 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2150 require_commitment = true;
2154 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2156 if self.channel_outbound {
2157 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2158 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2161 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2162 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2163 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2164 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2165 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2166 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2167 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2168 require_commitment = true;
2169 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2174 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2175 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2176 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2177 if require_commitment {
2178 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2179 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2180 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2181 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2182 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2184 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2185 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2186 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
2189 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2190 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
2191 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2192 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2193 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2195 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2196 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2197 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2199 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
2202 if require_commitment {
2203 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2204 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2205 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2206 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2208 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2211 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2213 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2220 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2221 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2222 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2223 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2224 if !self.channel_outbound {
2225 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2227 if !self.is_usable() {
2228 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2230 if !self.is_live() {
2231 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2234 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2235 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2239 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2240 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2242 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2243 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2244 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2248 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
2249 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2250 Some(update_fee) => {
2251 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2252 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2258 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2259 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2260 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2261 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2262 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2264 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2265 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2267 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2268 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2269 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2270 return outbound_drops;
2272 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2273 // will be retransmitted.
2274 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2276 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2277 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2279 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2280 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2281 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2282 // this HTLC accordingly
2283 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2287 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2288 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2289 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2292 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2293 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2294 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2295 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2296 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2297 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2302 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2304 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2305 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2306 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2307 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2308 // the update upon reconnection.
2309 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2313 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2315 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2316 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2319 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2322 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2323 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2327 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2328 /// updates are partially paused.
2329 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2330 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2331 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2332 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2333 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2334 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2335 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2336 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2337 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2338 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2339 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2340 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2341 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2344 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2345 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2346 /// to the remote side.
2347 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2348 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2349 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2351 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2352 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2353 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2354 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2356 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2357 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2358 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2359 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
2362 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2363 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2365 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2366 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2369 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2370 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2371 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2372 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2373 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2374 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2375 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2376 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures)
2379 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2380 if self.channel_outbound {
2381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2383 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2386 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2387 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2388 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2392 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2393 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2394 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2395 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2396 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2397 per_commitment_secret,
2398 next_per_commitment_point,
2402 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2403 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2404 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2405 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2406 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2408 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2409 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2410 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2411 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2412 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2413 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2414 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2415 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2416 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2421 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2422 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2424 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2425 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2426 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2427 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2428 reason: err_packet.clone()
2431 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2432 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2433 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2434 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2435 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2436 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2439 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2440 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2441 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2442 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2443 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2450 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2451 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2452 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2453 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2454 update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
2455 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2459 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2460 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2461 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2462 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2463 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2464 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2465 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2469 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2470 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2474 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2475 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2476 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2478 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2479 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2480 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2481 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2485 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2486 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
2487 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2490 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2491 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2494 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2495 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2496 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2497 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2498 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2499 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2500 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2503 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2504 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2505 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2507 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2508 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2509 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2512 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2518 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2519 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2520 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2521 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2522 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2524 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2525 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2526 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2527 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2528 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2529 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2530 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2534 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2535 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2536 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2538 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2541 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2542 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2543 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2544 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2546 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2547 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2548 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2549 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2550 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2553 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2555 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2556 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2557 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2559 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2562 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2563 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2564 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2567 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2573 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2574 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2575 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2576 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2580 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2581 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2582 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2584 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2585 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2587 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2588 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2589 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2591 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
2592 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2593 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2594 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2595 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2599 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
2600 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2603 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2604 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2605 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2606 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2609 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2610 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2614 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2616 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2617 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2618 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2622 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2623 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2624 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2627 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2628 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2632 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2635 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2637 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2638 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2640 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2641 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2642 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2643 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2644 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2645 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2647 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2648 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2654 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2655 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2656 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2658 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2661 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2662 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2663 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2667 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2668 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2669 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2672 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
2673 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2674 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2676 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2679 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2682 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2686 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2687 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2688 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2691 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2693 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2696 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2697 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2698 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2699 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2700 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2704 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2705 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2706 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2707 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2708 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2709 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2713 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2714 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2715 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2716 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2717 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2718 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2719 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2720 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2721 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2722 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2728 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2729 if self.channel_outbound {
2730 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2731 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2732 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2733 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2734 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2737 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2740 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2741 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2742 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2743 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2747 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2751 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2752 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2753 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2755 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2756 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2757 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2759 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2762 // Public utilities:
2764 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2768 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2769 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2770 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2774 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2775 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2776 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2777 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2779 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2782 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2783 /// is_usable() returns true).
2784 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2785 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2786 self.short_channel_id
2789 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2790 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2791 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2792 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2795 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2796 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2800 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2801 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2802 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2805 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2806 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2807 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2810 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2811 self.channel_value_satoshis
2814 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2815 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2819 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2823 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2824 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2827 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2828 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2831 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2832 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2835 //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
2837 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2842 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2844 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2845 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2846 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2847 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2848 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2849 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2851 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2853 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2861 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2865 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2866 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2867 self.channel_update_count
2870 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2871 self.config.announced_channel
2874 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2875 self.channel_outbound
2878 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2879 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2880 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2881 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2882 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2884 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2885 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2887 if self.channel_outbound {
2888 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2889 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2892 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2893 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2898 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2899 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2900 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2903 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2904 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2905 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2906 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2907 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2910 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2911 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2912 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2913 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2914 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2917 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2919 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2920 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2923 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2924 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2925 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2928 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2929 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2930 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2931 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2932 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2933 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2938 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2939 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2940 /// the channel_monitor.
2941 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2942 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2943 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2944 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
2945 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2946 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2947 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2948 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2949 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2950 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2951 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
2952 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2953 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2955 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2956 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2957 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2959 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2960 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2961 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2963 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2964 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2966 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2967 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2970 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
2972 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
2973 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
2974 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
2975 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
2976 if need_commitment_update {
2977 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2978 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2979 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2980 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2981 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2987 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2988 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
2989 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
2990 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
2991 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
2992 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
2993 if self.channel_outbound {
2994 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
2995 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
2996 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
2997 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
2998 // channel and move on.
2999 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3000 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3002 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3003 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3004 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3006 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3009 if self.channel_outbound {
3010 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3011 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3012 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3013 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3014 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3015 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3019 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3020 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3021 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3022 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3030 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3031 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3032 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3033 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3034 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3035 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3036 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3040 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3041 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3043 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3044 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3048 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3049 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3051 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3052 if !self.channel_outbound {
3053 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3055 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3056 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3059 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3060 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3063 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3066 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3067 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3068 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3069 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3070 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3071 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3072 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3073 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3074 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3075 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
3076 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3077 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3078 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3079 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3080 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3081 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3082 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3083 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3084 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3088 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3089 if self.channel_outbound {
3090 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3092 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3093 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3095 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3096 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3099 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3101 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3102 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3103 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3104 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3105 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3106 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3107 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3108 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
3109 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3110 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3111 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3112 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3113 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3114 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3115 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3116 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3120 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3121 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3122 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3124 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3125 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3126 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3128 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3129 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3132 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3133 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3134 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3135 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3136 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3137 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3138 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3139 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3140 if !self.channel_outbound {
3141 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3143 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3144 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3146 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3147 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3148 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3149 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3152 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3153 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3155 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3158 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3159 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
3164 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3166 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3167 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3168 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3169 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3170 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3172 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3173 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3174 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3175 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3176 signature: our_signature
3177 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3180 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3181 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3182 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3183 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3184 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3186 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3187 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3188 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3189 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3190 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3192 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3195 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3196 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3199 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3200 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3202 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3203 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3204 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3205 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3206 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3207 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3208 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
3209 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3210 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3213 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
3214 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3219 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3220 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3221 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3222 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3223 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3224 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3225 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3226 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3227 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3228 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3229 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3230 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3231 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3233 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3234 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3235 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3236 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3237 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3238 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3239 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3240 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3241 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3243 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3244 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
3249 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3251 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3252 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3253 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3254 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3255 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3256 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3257 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3258 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3259 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3260 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3263 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3266 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3267 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3270 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3271 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3272 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3273 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3274 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3275 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3276 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3277 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3280 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3281 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3284 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
3285 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3286 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight"));
3290 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3291 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3292 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3293 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"));
3296 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3298 // Now update local state:
3299 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3300 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3301 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3302 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3303 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3305 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3310 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3311 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3312 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3313 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3314 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3315 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3319 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3320 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3321 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3322 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3323 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3324 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3325 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3327 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3332 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3333 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3334 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3335 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3336 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3337 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3338 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3340 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3341 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3343 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3344 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3346 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3347 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3349 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3350 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3351 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3352 have_updates = true;
3354 if have_updates { break; }
3356 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3357 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3358 have_updates = true;
3360 if have_updates { break; }
3363 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3365 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3367 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3368 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3369 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3370 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3372 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3373 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3374 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3376 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3380 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3381 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3382 Some(fail_reason.take())
3384 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3387 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3389 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3390 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3391 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3392 let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3393 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3395 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3398 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3399 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3400 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3403 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3404 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3405 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3406 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3408 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3409 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3410 if self.channel_outbound {
3411 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3415 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3416 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3417 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3418 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3419 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3420 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3422 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
3423 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3424 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3425 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3426 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3427 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
3428 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
3429 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3430 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
3434 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3435 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3437 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3438 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3441 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3442 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3443 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3445 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
3446 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3447 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3448 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3449 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3455 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3456 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3457 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3458 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3459 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3463 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3464 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3465 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3467 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3471 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3472 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3473 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3476 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3478 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3479 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3480 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3482 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3484 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3486 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3487 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3488 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3489 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3490 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3492 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3493 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3500 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3501 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3502 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3503 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3506 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3507 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3508 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3509 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3510 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3511 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3512 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3514 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3515 // return them to fail the payment.
3516 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3517 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3519 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3520 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3526 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3527 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3528 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3532 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3533 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3534 let mut res = Vec::new();
3535 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3536 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3540 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3541 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3543 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3544 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3546 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3548 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3550 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3552 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3553 err_code.write(writer)?;
3555 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3557 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3564 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3565 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3566 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3567 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3568 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3569 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3575 impl Writeable for Channel {
3576 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3577 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3578 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3580 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3581 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3583 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3584 self.config.write(writer)?;
3586 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3587 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3588 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3589 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3591 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3592 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3594 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3595 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3596 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3598 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3599 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3600 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3601 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3604 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3605 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3606 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3607 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3608 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3609 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3611 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3612 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3614 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3616 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3618 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3620 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3623 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3625 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3630 macro_rules! write_option {
3633 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3642 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3643 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3644 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3645 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3646 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3647 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3648 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3650 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3652 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3654 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3657 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3659 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3661 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3663 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3665 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3667 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3672 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3673 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3675 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3677 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3678 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3679 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3680 source.write(writer)?;
3681 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3683 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3685 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3686 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3688 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3690 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3691 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3696 match self.resend_order {
3697 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3698 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3701 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3702 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3704 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3705 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3706 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3707 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3710 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3711 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3712 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3713 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3714 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3717 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3718 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3720 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3721 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3722 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3723 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3725 (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3726 for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
3727 if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
3729 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
3730 _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
3735 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3736 Some((feerate, fee)) => {
3738 feerate.write(writer)?;
3741 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3744 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3745 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3747 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3748 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3750 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3751 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3752 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3753 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3754 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3755 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3756 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3757 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3758 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3760 write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
3761 write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
3762 write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
3763 write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
3764 write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
3765 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3767 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3768 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3770 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3772 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3777 impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
3778 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3779 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3780 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3781 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3782 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3785 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3786 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3788 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3789 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3790 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3791 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3793 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3794 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3796 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3797 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3798 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3800 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3801 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3802 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3803 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3804 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3805 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3806 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3807 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3808 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3809 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3810 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3811 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3812 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3813 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3818 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3819 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3820 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3821 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3822 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3823 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3824 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3825 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3826 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3827 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3828 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3829 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3830 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3831 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
3832 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3833 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3838 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3839 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3840 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3841 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3842 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3843 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3844 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3845 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3846 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3847 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3849 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3850 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3851 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3853 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3854 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3855 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3857 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3861 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3862 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3863 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3864 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3867 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3868 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3870 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3871 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3872 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3873 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3876 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3877 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3878 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3879 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3882 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3883 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3885 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3886 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3887 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3888 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3890 let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3891 let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
3892 for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
3893 last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3895 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3899 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3901 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3902 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3905 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
3906 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3908 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3909 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3911 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3912 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3913 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3914 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3915 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3916 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3917 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3918 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3919 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
3921 let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3922 let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3923 let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3924 let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3925 let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3926 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3928 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3929 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3931 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3932 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3933 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3934 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3935 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3936 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3947 channel_value_satoshis,
3952 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3953 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3956 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3957 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3958 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
3962 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
3963 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
3964 monitor_pending_forwards,
3965 monitor_pending_failures,
3968 holding_cell_update_fee,
3970 next_remote_htlc_id,
3971 channel_update_count,
3974 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3975 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3976 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3977 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3979 last_local_commitment_txn,
3981 last_sent_closing_fee,
3983 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
3985 last_block_connected,
3986 funding_tx_confirmations,
3988 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
3989 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3990 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3991 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
3992 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
3993 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3994 their_to_self_delay,
3995 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
3998 their_funding_pubkey,
3999 their_revocation_basepoint,
4000 their_payment_basepoint,
4001 their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
4002 their_htlc_basepoint,
4003 their_cur_commitment_point,
4005 their_prev_commitment_point,
4008 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4019 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4020 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4021 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4022 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
4023 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4024 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4026 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4027 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4028 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4030 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4031 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
4032 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4033 use util::config::UserConfig;
4034 use util::test_utils;
4035 use util::logger::Logger;
4036 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
4037 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4038 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4039 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4040 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4041 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4044 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4047 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4048 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4054 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4055 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4056 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4060 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
4062 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4063 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4064 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4065 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4066 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4067 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4068 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4071 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4073 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4074 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4077 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
4078 fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4079 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4083 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4084 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4085 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4086 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4087 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4089 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
4090 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4091 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4092 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4093 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4095 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4096 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4097 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4099 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
4100 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4101 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4103 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4104 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4105 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4106 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4107 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4108 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4110 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4111 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
4113 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4114 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4115 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4117 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4118 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4119 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4121 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4122 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4123 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4125 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4127 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4128 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4129 // build_commitment_transaction.
4130 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
4131 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4132 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4133 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
4134 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
4136 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4138 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4139 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4141 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4142 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4143 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4147 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4148 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4149 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
4151 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
4153 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
4154 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4158 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4159 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4160 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4162 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4163 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4164 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4165 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4166 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4168 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4171 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4172 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4173 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4177 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4180 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
4181 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4182 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4187 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4188 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4190 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4191 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4192 "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");
4195 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4196 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4198 amount_msat: 1000000,
4200 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4201 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4203 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4206 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4207 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4209 amount_msat: 2000000,
4211 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4212 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4214 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4217 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4218 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4220 amount_msat: 2000000,
4222 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4223 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4224 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4226 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4229 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4230 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4232 amount_msat: 3000000,
4234 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4235 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4236 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4238 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4241 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4242 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4244 amount_msat: 4000000,
4246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4247 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4249 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4254 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4255 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4256 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4258 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4259 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4260 "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");
4262 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4264 test_htlc_output!(0,
4265 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4266 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4267 "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");
4269 test_htlc_output!(1,
4270 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4271 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4272 "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");
4274 test_htlc_output!(2,
4275 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4276 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4277 "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");
4279 test_htlc_output!(3,
4280 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4281 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4282 "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");
4284 test_htlc_output!(4,
4285 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4286 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4287 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219704000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d014730440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4291 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4292 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4293 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4295 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4296 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4297 "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");
4299 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4301 test_htlc_output!(0,
4302 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4303 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4304 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab3437400147304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000");
4306 test_htlc_output!(1,
4307 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4308 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4309 "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");
4311 test_htlc_output!(2,
4312 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4313 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4314 "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");
4316 test_htlc_output!(3,
4317 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4318 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4319 "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");
4321 test_htlc_output!(4,
4322 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4323 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4324 "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");
4328 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4329 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4330 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4332 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4333 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4334 "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");
4336 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4338 test_htlc_output!(0,
4339 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4340 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4341 "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");
4343 test_htlc_output!(1,
4344 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4345 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4346 "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");
4348 test_htlc_output!(2,
4349 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4350 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4351 "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");
4353 test_htlc_output!(3,
4354 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4355 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4356 "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");
4360 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4361 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4362 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4364 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4365 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4366 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de84311077956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea01473044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4368 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4370 test_htlc_output!(0,
4371 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4372 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4373 "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");
4375 test_htlc_output!(1,
4376 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4377 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4378 "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");
4380 test_htlc_output!(2,
4381 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4382 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4383 "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");
4385 test_htlc_output!(3,
4386 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4387 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4388 "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");
4392 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4393 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4394 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4396 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4397 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4398 "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");
4400 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4402 test_htlc_output!(0,
4403 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4404 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4405 "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");
4407 test_htlc_output!(1,
4408 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4409 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4410 "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");
4412 test_htlc_output!(2,
4413 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4414 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4415 "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");
4419 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4420 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4421 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4423 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4424 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4425 "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");
4427 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4429 test_htlc_output!(0,
4430 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4431 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4432 "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");
4434 test_htlc_output!(1,
4435 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4436 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4437 "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");
4439 test_htlc_output!(2,
4440 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4441 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4442 "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");
4446 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4447 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4448 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4450 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4451 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4452 "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");
4454 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4456 test_htlc_output!(0,
4457 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4458 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4459 "020000000001014e16c488fa158431c1a82e8f661240ec0a71ba0ce92f2721a6538c510226ad5c0000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc01483045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc70439001008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4461 test_htlc_output!(1,
4462 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4463 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4464 "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");
4468 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4469 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4470 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4472 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4473 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4474 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431106f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b001483045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c101475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4476 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4478 test_htlc_output!(0,
4479 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4480 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4481 "02000000000101b8de11eb51c22498fe39722c7227b6e55ff1a94146cf638458cb9bc6a060d3a30000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb0147304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4483 test_htlc_output!(1,
4484 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4485 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4486 "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");
4490 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4491 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4492 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4494 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4495 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4496 "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");
4498 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4500 test_htlc_output!(0,
4501 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4502 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4503 "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");
4507 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4508 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4509 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4511 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4512 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4513 "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");
4515 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4517 test_htlc_output!(0,
4518 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4519 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4520 "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");
4524 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4525 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4526 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4528 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4529 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4530 "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");
4532 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4536 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4537 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4538 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4540 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4541 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4542 "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");
4544 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4548 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4549 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4550 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4552 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4553 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4554 "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");
4556 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4560 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4561 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4562 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4564 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4565 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4566 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431100400473044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b101473044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4568 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4573 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4574 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4576 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4577 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4578 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4579 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4581 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4582 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4583 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4585 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4586 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4588 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
4589 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4591 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4592 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
4593 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4597 fn test_key_derivation() {
4598 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4599 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4601 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4602 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4604 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4605 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4607 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4608 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4610 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4611 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4613 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4614 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4616 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4617 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4619 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4620 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());