1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
8 use bitcoin::network::serialize::{BitcoinHash, RawDecoder, RawEncoder};
9 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusEncodable, ConsensusDecodable};
11 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
12 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
15 use crypto::digest::Digest;
18 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, HandleError};
19 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
20 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder};
21 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
23 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
26 use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
27 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
28 use util::sha2::Sha256;
29 use util::logger::Logger;
30 use util::errors::APIError;
33 use std::default::Default;
35 use std::time::Instant;
39 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
40 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
41 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
43 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
49 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
50 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
51 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
55 enum InboundHTLCState {
56 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
57 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
58 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
59 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
60 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
61 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
62 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
63 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
64 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
65 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
66 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
67 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
69 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
72 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
74 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
75 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
76 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
77 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
78 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
79 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
80 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
81 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
84 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
88 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
89 state: InboundHTLCState,
92 enum OutboundHTLCState {
93 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
94 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
95 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
96 /// revoke, but we dont really care about that:
97 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
98 /// money back (though we wont), and,
99 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
100 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
101 /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
102 /// we'll never get out of sync).
103 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
104 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
105 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
107 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
108 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
110 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
111 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
112 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
113 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
114 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
115 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
116 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
117 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
118 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
120 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
121 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
124 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
128 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
129 state: OutboundHTLCState,
131 /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
132 fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
135 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
136 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
137 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
139 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
140 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
141 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
142 transaction_output_index: 0
147 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
148 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
153 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
155 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
156 time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
159 payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
164 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
168 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
169 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
170 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
171 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
172 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
173 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
174 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
176 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
177 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
178 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
179 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
180 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
181 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
182 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
184 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
185 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
186 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
188 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
189 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
190 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
191 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
192 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
193 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
195 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
196 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
198 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
199 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
200 /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
201 /// messages until they've managed to do so.
202 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
203 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
204 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
205 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
206 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
208 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
209 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
210 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
211 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
212 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
213 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
214 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
215 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
216 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
217 /// us their shutdown.
218 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
219 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
220 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
221 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
223 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
224 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
226 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
228 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
229 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
230 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
232 pub(super) struct Channel {
235 channel_id: [u8; 32],
237 channel_outbound: bool,
238 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
239 announce_publicly: bool,
240 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
242 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
243 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
245 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
246 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
247 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
249 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
250 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
251 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
252 /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
253 /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
254 /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
255 /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
256 /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
257 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
262 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
263 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
264 monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
265 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
266 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>,
268 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
269 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
270 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
272 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
273 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
274 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
275 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
276 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
277 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
278 // commitment_signed.
279 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
280 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
281 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
282 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
283 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
284 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
285 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
286 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
287 channel_update_count: u32,
290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
291 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
292 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
293 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
294 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
295 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
298 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
299 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
301 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
303 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
305 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
306 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
307 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
308 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
309 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
310 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
311 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
312 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
313 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
314 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
316 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
317 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
318 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
319 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
320 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
321 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
322 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
323 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
324 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
325 their_to_self_delay: u16,
326 //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
327 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
328 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
330 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
331 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
332 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
334 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
335 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
337 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
338 their_node_id: PublicKey,
340 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
342 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
347 const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
348 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
349 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
350 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
351 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
352 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
353 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
354 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
355 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
356 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
357 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
358 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
359 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
360 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
361 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
363 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
365 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
366 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
367 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
368 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 Ignore(&'static str),
373 macro_rules! secp_call {
374 ( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
377 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
382 macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
383 ( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
384 secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
388 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
389 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
390 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
393 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
395 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
396 fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
397 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
398 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
401 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
402 at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000 //TODO
405 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
409 fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
410 // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
412 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
416 fn derive_maximum_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
417 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
422 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
423 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
425 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
429 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
434 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
435 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
436 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
439 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
441 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
442 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
443 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
444 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
449 channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
450 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
451 channel_outbound: true,
453 announce_publicly: announce_publicly,
454 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
456 local_keys: chan_keys,
457 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
458 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
459 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
460 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
461 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
463 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
464 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
465 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
466 pending_update_fee: None,
467 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
468 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
469 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
470 channel_update_count: 1,
472 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
473 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
474 monitor_pending_order: None,
475 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
476 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
478 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
479 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
483 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
485 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
487 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
488 short_channel_id: None,
489 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
490 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
492 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
493 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
494 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
495 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
496 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
497 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
498 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
499 their_to_self_delay: 0,
500 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
502 their_funding_pubkey: None,
503 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
504 their_payment_basepoint: None,
505 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
506 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
507 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
509 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
510 their_node_id: their_node_id,
512 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
514 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
520 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
521 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
524 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
525 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
530 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
531 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
532 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
533 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
535 // Check sanity of message fields:
536 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
537 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
539 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
542 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
543 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
545 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
548 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
551 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value"));
554 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
556 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
559 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
562 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
566 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
568 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
569 if require_announce && !their_announce {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones"));
572 if !allow_announce && their_announce {
573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones"));
576 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
578 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
579 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
580 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitalbe channel reserve not found. aborting"));
583 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
586 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
590 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
591 // for full fee payment
592 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
593 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
594 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
597 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
598 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
599 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
603 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
604 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
605 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
606 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
607 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
608 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
610 let mut chan = Channel {
613 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
614 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
615 channel_outbound: false,
617 announce_publicly: their_announce,
619 local_keys: chan_keys,
620 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
621 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
622 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
623 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
624 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
626 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
627 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
628 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
629 pending_update_fee: None,
630 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
631 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
632 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
633 channel_update_count: 1,
635 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
636 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
637 monitor_pending_order: None,
638 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
639 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
641 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
642 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
643 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
644 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
646 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
648 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
650 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
651 short_channel_id: None,
652 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
653 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
655 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
656 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
657 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
658 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
659 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
660 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
661 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
662 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
663 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
664 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
666 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
667 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
668 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
669 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
670 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
671 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
673 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
674 their_node_id: their_node_id,
676 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
678 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
683 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
684 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
689 // Utilities to derive keys:
691 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
692 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
693 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).unwrap()
696 // Utilities to build transactions:
698 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
699 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
700 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
702 if self.channel_outbound {
703 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
704 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
706 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
707 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
709 let mut res = [0; 32];
710 sha.result(&mut res);
712 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
713 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
714 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
715 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
716 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
717 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
720 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
721 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
722 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
723 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
724 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
726 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
727 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
728 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
729 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
730 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
731 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
732 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
734 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
735 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
738 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
740 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
741 script_sig: Script::new(),
742 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
748 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
750 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
751 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
752 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
753 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
755 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
756 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr) => {
757 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
758 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
759 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
761 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
762 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
763 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
766 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
767 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
768 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
769 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
770 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
771 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
777 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
778 let include = match htlc.state {
779 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local,
780 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local,
781 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true,
782 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
783 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local,
787 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false);
788 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
791 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
792 if generated_by_local {
793 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
794 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
803 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
804 let include = match htlc.state {
805 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
806 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
807 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
808 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
809 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
813 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true);
814 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
817 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
818 if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
819 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
822 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
823 if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
824 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
833 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
834 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
836 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
838 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
839 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
840 // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
842 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
843 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
845 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
847 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
848 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
849 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
850 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
853 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
854 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
855 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
857 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
860 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
861 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
863 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
865 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
866 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
867 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
868 value: value_to_a as u64
872 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
874 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
875 .push_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
877 value: value_to_b as u64
881 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
883 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
884 let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
885 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
887 if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
888 htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
889 htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
895 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
902 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
903 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
904 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
908 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
909 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
913 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
915 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
917 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
918 script_sig: Script::new(),
919 sequence: 0xffffffff,
925 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
926 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
927 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
929 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
930 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
931 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
933 if value_to_self < 0 {
934 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
935 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
936 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
937 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
938 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
941 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
943 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
944 value: value_to_remote as u64
948 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
950 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
951 value: value_to_self as u64
955 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
957 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
958 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
967 }, total_fee_satoshis)
971 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
972 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
973 /// our counterparty!)
974 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
975 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
976 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
977 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
978 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
979 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
981 Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
985 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
986 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
987 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
988 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
989 //may see payments to it!
990 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
991 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
992 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
994 Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
997 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
998 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
999 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1000 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1001 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1002 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1003 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1004 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1005 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1006 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1008 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1009 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1010 }.push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1013 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1014 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1015 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1017 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1018 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1021 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1023 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1024 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1026 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1028 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1029 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1030 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1031 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1032 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1034 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1035 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1037 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1038 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1040 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1045 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1046 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1047 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1048 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1049 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1052 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), HandleError> {
1053 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1054 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1057 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1059 let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
1060 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1061 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1062 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1065 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1066 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
1067 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
1068 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1069 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1071 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1072 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1075 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1077 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1079 if local_tx { // b, then a
1080 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1081 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1083 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1084 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1086 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1087 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1090 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1092 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
1095 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1100 /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
1101 /// debug_assertions are turned on
1102 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
1103 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
1104 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1105 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1107 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1108 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1110 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1112 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1113 sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
1114 let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
1115 sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
1117 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1118 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1119 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1120 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1121 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1123 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1124 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1130 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1131 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1132 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1135 // Now update local state:
1137 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1138 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1139 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1141 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1142 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1143 match pending_update {
1144 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1145 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1146 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a pending fulfill for");
1147 return Ok((None, None));
1150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1151 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1152 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a holding-cell failure on");
1153 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1159 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1160 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1162 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1166 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1167 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1169 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1170 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1172 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1175 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1176 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1177 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1178 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1179 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1182 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
1183 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1184 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1185 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1186 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1188 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1189 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1193 /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
1194 /// debug_assertions are turned on
1195 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
1196 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1197 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1199 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1201 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1202 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1203 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1204 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1206 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to fail before it was fully committed to");
1207 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1212 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1213 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1214 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1217 // Now update local state:
1218 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1219 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1220 match pending_update {
1221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1223 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1224 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1227 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1228 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1229 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that we already had a pending failure for");
1236 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1237 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1244 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1245 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1248 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1249 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1250 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1255 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
1256 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
1257 Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
1258 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1259 Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
1265 // Message handlers:
1267 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1268 // Check sanity of message fields:
1269 if !self.channel_outbound {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1272 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1275 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1278 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1281 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1284 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1287 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1290 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1293 if msg.minimum_depth > Channel::derive_maximum_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("minimum_depth too large"));
1296 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1299 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1302 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
1306 // TODO: Optional additional constraints mentioned in the spec
1307 // MAY fail the channel if
1308 // funding_satoshi is too small
1309 // htlc_minimum_msat too large
1310 // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat too small
1311 // channel_reserve_satoshis too large
1312 // max_accepted_htlcs too small
1313 // dust_limit_satoshis too small
1315 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1317 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1318 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1319 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1320 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1321 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1322 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1323 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1324 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1325 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1326 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1327 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1328 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1330 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1331 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1332 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1334 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1339 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Signature), HandleError> {
1340 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1342 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1343 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1344 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1346 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1347 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1349 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1350 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1351 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1353 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1354 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
1357 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1358 if self.channel_outbound {
1359 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_string()}})});
1361 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1362 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1363 // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1365 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_string()}})});
1367 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1368 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1369 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1370 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1373 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1374 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1375 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1377 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1380 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1385 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1387 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
1388 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1389 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1390 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1391 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1393 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1394 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1395 signature: our_signature
1396 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1399 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1400 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1401 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
1402 if !self.channel_outbound {
1403 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", action: None});
1405 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1406 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
1408 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1409 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1410 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1411 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1414 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1416 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1417 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1418 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1420 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1421 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1423 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1424 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1425 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1426 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1427 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1429 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1432 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1433 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1437 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1439 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1440 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1441 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1442 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1443 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1444 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1445 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1446 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1447 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
1448 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1451 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1457 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1458 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1462 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1463 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1464 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1465 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1466 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1468 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1471 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1472 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1473 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1474 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1475 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1478 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1481 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1482 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1483 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1485 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1486 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1488 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1489 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
1491 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1492 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
1495 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1496 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1497 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
1499 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1500 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1501 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1502 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
1504 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1505 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1506 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1507 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
1508 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
1510 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1511 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
1513 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1514 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
1517 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1519 // Now update local state:
1520 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1521 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1522 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1523 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1524 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1525 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1526 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1532 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1534 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1535 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1536 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1537 match check_preimage {
1539 Some(payment_hash) =>
1540 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1545 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1547 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1548 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
1549 htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
1551 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1554 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1557 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1560 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1561 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1564 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1568 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1569 sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
1570 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1571 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1573 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)
1576 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1577 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1580 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1584 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1587 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1588 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1591 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1595 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1598 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1599 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1600 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1602 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1603 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1606 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1608 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1610 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1611 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1616 let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1617 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1618 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1619 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1621 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
1622 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
1625 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
1626 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1627 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1629 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
1630 for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
1631 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1632 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1633 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1634 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
1635 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1636 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
1637 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1640 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1642 htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
1645 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1646 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1648 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1649 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1650 if !self.channel_outbound {
1651 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1652 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1653 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1654 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1655 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1656 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1657 need_our_commitment = true;
1658 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1662 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1663 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1664 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1665 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1668 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1670 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1671 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1672 Some(forward_info.clone())
1674 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1675 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1676 need_our_commitment = true;
1679 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1680 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
1681 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
1682 need_our_commitment = true;
1686 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1687 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1688 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
1690 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1691 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1692 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
1693 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1696 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1697 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1698 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1699 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1700 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1701 (Some(msg), monitor)
1702 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone()) };
1704 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1705 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1706 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1707 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1708 }, our_commitment_signed, monitor_update))
1711 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1712 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1713 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
1714 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1715 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1716 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1717 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1718 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1719 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1720 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1722 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1723 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1724 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1725 // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1726 // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1727 // to rebalance channels.
1728 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1729 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1731 match &htlc_update {
1732 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1733 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1734 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1741 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1742 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1744 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
1746 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1751 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1752 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1753 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1755 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
1757 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1764 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1768 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
1769 //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
1772 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
1773 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
1774 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
1775 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
1778 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
1779 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
1780 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1781 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1782 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
1787 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1788 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1790 update_fulfill_htlcs,
1792 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1793 update_fee: update_fee,
1795 }, monitor_update)))
1804 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
1805 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
1806 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
1807 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
1808 /// revoke_and_ack message.
1809 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1810 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1811 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1813 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1814 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1817 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
1818 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
1819 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
1822 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret, Some((self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1, msg.next_per_commitment_point)))?;
1824 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1825 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
1826 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
1827 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
1828 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
1829 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1830 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1831 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1832 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
1833 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1834 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1835 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1836 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1839 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
1840 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
1841 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
1842 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
1843 let mut require_commitment = false;
1844 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
1845 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
1846 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1847 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
1848 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1849 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1854 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1855 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
1856 if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
1857 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
1859 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
1860 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1865 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1866 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
1868 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
1872 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1873 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
1875 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
1876 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
1877 require_commitment = true;
1878 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
1879 match forward_info {
1880 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
1881 require_commitment = true;
1883 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
1884 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
1885 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
1887 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
1888 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
1889 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
1893 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
1894 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
1895 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1901 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1902 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
1903 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
1904 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
1905 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
1906 require_commitment = true;
1909 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
1911 if self.channel_outbound {
1912 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
1913 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1916 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
1917 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a
1918 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
1919 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
1920 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
1921 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
1922 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
1923 require_commitment = true;
1924 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1929 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
1930 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
1931 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
1932 if require_commitment {
1933 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1935 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
1936 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
1937 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.channel_monitor.clone()));
1940 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
1941 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
1942 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
1943 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
1944 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
1946 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
1947 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
1950 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
1953 if require_commitment {
1954 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1955 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1956 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1957 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1959 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
1962 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
1964 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1971 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
1972 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
1973 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
1974 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
1975 if !self.channel_outbound {
1976 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
1978 if !self.is_usable() {
1979 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
1981 if !self.is_live() {
1982 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
1985 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
1986 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
1990 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1991 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
1993 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1994 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1995 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
1999 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
2000 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2001 Some(update_fee) => {
2002 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2003 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2009 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2010 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2011 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2012 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2013 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2015 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])> {
2016 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2018 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2019 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2020 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2021 return outbound_drops;
2024 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2025 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2027 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2028 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2029 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2030 // this HTLC accordingly
2031 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2034 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2035 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2036 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2037 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2040 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2041 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2042 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2043 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2044 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2045 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2050 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2052 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2053 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
2054 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2055 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2056 // the update upon reconnection.
2057 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2061 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2063 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2064 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2067 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2070 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2071 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2075 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2076 /// updates are partially paused.
2077 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2078 /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
2079 /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
2080 /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
2081 /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2082 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder) {
2083 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2085 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2086 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2087 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2089 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2090 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2091 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2094 self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
2095 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2098 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2099 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2100 /// to the remote side.
2101 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>) {
2102 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2103 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2105 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2106 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2107 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2108 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2110 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2111 // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
2112 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2113 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2114 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
2117 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2118 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2120 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2121 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2124 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2125 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2126 (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
2129 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2130 if self.channel_outbound {
2131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2133 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2136 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2138 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2139 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2143 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2144 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2145 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2146 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2147 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2148 per_commitment_secret,
2149 next_per_commitment_point,
2153 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2154 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2155 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2156 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2157 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2159 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2160 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2161 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2162 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2163 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2164 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2165 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2166 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2167 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2172 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2173 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2175 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2176 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2177 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2178 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2179 reason: err_packet.clone()
2182 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2183 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2184 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2185 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2186 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2187 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2190 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2191 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2192 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2193 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2194 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2201 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2202 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2203 update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
2204 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2208 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2209 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2210 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder), ChannelError> {
2211 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2212 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2213 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2214 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2218 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2222 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2223 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2224 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2226 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2227 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2228 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst));
2231 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 {
2232 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a pre-funding channel_reestablish after we exchanged funding_locked"));
2235 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2236 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2237 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2238 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2239 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2240 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2241 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst));
2244 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2245 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2246 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2248 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2249 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2250 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2253 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2259 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2260 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2261 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2262 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2263 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2265 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2266 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2267 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2268 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2269 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2270 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2271 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2275 let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
2276 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
2278 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
2281 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2282 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2283 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2285 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2288 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
2289 self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
2290 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2291 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2292 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2294 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2296 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(_)}) = &e.action {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
2298 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: _}) = &e.action {
2299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
2301 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs");
2304 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order)),
2305 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order)),
2308 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order));
2310 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2311 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2312 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2314 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2317 // If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
2318 debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());
2320 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2321 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2322 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order));
2325 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order));
2327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2331 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), HandleError> {
2332 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2333 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
2335 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2336 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2337 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2338 return Ok((None, None, Vec::new()));
2340 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2341 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2342 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", action: None});
2345 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
2346 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message", action: None});
2348 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2350 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2351 // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2352 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2353 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer", action: None});
2356 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2357 if !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh()) && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh())
2358 && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()) && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()){
2359 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an invalid scriptpubkey from remote peer", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
2362 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2363 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2364 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey", action: None});
2367 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2370 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2372 let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2373 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2374 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2375 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2377 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&our_closing_script, &msg.scriptpubkey);
2378 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2380 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2381 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2382 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2384 (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
2385 } else { (None, None, None) };
2387 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2389 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2390 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2392 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2393 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2394 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2395 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2396 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2398 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2399 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2405 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2406 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2407 return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
2411 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2414 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2415 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2416 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
2420 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2421 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2422 if self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
2423 // There are no more HTLCs and we're the funder, this means we start the closing_signed
2424 // dance with an initial fee proposal!
2425 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate.unwrap(), proposed_fee.unwrap()));
2426 Ok((our_shutdown, Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2427 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2428 fee_satoshis: proposed_fee.unwrap(),
2429 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2430 }), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2432 Ok((our_shutdown, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2436 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
2437 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2438 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
2440 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2441 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
2443 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2444 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
2446 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2447 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
2450 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2451 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2452 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2453 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
2455 let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2457 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2460 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2461 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2462 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2463 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2464 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
2468 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2469 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2470 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2471 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2472 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2473 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2477 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2478 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2479 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2480 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2481 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2482 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2483 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2484 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2485 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2486 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2492 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2493 if self.channel_outbound {
2494 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2495 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2496 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2497 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2498 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
2501 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2504 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2505 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2506 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2507 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2508 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
2511 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2515 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2516 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2517 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2519 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2520 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2521 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2523 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2526 // Public utilities:
2528 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2532 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2533 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2534 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2538 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2539 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2540 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2541 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2543 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2546 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2547 /// is_usable() returns true).
2548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2549 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2550 self.short_channel_id
2553 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2554 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2555 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2556 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2559 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2560 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2564 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2565 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2566 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2569 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2570 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2571 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2574 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2575 self.channel_value_satoshis
2579 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2583 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2584 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2587 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2588 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2591 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2592 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2595 //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
2597 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2602 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2604 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2605 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2606 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2607 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2608 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2609 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2611 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2613 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2621 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2625 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2626 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2627 self.channel_update_count
2630 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2631 self.announce_publicly
2634 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2635 self.channel_outbound
2638 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2640 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2641 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2642 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2644 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2645 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2647 if self.channel_outbound {
2648 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2649 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2652 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2653 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2658 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2659 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2660 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2663 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2664 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2665 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2666 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2667 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2670 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2671 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2672 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2673 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2674 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2677 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2678 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2679 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2680 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2683 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2684 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2685 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2688 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2689 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2690 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2691 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2692 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2693 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2698 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2699 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2700 /// the channel_monitor.
2701 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2702 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2703 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2704 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
2705 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2706 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2707 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2708 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2709 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2710 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2711 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 {
2712 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2713 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2715 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2716 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2717 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2719 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2720 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2721 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2723 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2724 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2726 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2727 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2730 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
2732 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
2733 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
2734 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
2735 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
2736 if need_commitment_update {
2737 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2738 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2739 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2740 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2741 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2747 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2748 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
2749 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
2750 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
2751 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
2752 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
2753 if self.channel_outbound {
2754 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
2755 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
2756 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
2757 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
2758 // channel and move on.
2759 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2760 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2762 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2763 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2764 return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
2766 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
2767 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
2768 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
2769 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
2777 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
2778 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
2779 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
2780 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
2781 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2782 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
2783 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
2787 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
2788 self.funding_tx_confirmations = Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 - 1;
2790 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2791 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2795 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
2796 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
2798 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
2799 if !self.channel_outbound {
2800 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
2802 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2803 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
2806 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2807 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2810 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2813 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2814 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2815 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2816 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
2817 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2818 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2819 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2820 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2821 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
2822 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2823 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2824 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2825 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2826 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2827 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2828 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2829 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2830 channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
2831 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2835 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
2836 if self.channel_outbound {
2837 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
2839 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2840 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
2842 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2843 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2846 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2848 msgs::AcceptChannel {
2849 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2850 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2851 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2852 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2853 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2854 minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat),
2855 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2856 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2857 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2858 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2859 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2860 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2861 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2862 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2863 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2867 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
2868 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2870 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2871 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
2872 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2874 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2875 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
2878 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
2879 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
2880 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
2881 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
2882 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
2883 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
2884 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
2885 if !self.channel_outbound {
2886 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
2888 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2889 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
2891 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2892 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2893 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2894 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2897 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2898 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
2900 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
2903 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
2904 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
2909 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
2911 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2912 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
2913 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
2914 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2915 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2917 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
2918 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2919 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
2920 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
2921 signature: our_signature
2922 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2925 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
2926 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
2927 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
2928 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
2929 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
2931 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
2932 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
2933 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
2934 if !self.announce_publicly {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
2937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
2940 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
2944 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
2945 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2947 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2948 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
2949 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2950 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2951 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
2952 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
2953 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
2954 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
2955 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2958 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2959 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2964 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
2965 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
2966 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2967 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2968 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2969 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2970 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
2971 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -
2972 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) { 1 } else { 0 },
2973 data_loss_protect: None,
2978 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
2980 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
2981 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
2982 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
2983 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
2984 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
2985 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2986 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
2987 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2988 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
2991 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2992 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
2994 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
2995 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
2998 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2999 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3000 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3001 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3002 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3003 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3004 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3005 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
3008 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3009 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3010 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
3012 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
3013 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3014 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3015 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
3018 let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
3019 for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3020 match holding_htlc {
3021 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => {
3022 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat;
3028 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3029 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3030 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3031 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", action: None});
3034 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3036 // Now update local state:
3037 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3038 //TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs!
3039 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3040 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3041 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3042 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3044 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3045 time_created: Instant::now(),
3050 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3051 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3052 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3053 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3054 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3055 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3060 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3061 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3062 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3063 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3064 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3065 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3066 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3068 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3073 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3074 /// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3075 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3076 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3077 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
3078 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3079 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3081 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3082 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3084 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3085 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3088 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3090 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3091 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3092 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3093 have_updates = true;
3095 if have_updates { break; }
3098 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3100 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3102 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3103 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
3104 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3105 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3107 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3108 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3109 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3111 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3115 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3116 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
3117 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
3121 match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3122 Ok((res, remote_commitment_tx)) => {
3123 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3124 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
3125 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3126 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3132 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3133 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3134 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)), HandleError> {
3135 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3137 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3138 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3139 if self.channel_outbound {
3140 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3144 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3145 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3146 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3147 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3148 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3150 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
3152 for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
3153 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3154 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3155 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3156 let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
3157 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3160 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3161 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3163 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3164 }, remote_commitment_tx))
3167 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3168 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3169 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3171 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
3172 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3173 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3174 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3175 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3181 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3182 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3183 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), APIError> {
3184 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3185 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3189 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3190 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3191 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3193 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3194 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3197 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3198 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3199 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3202 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3204 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3205 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3206 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3208 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3210 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3212 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3213 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3214 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3215 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3216 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3219 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3226 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3227 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3228 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3229 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3232 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
3233 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3234 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3235 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3236 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3237 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>) {
3238 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3240 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3241 // return them to fail the payment.
3242 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3243 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3245 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3246 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3252 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3253 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3254 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3258 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3259 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3260 let mut res = Vec::new();
3261 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3262 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3266 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3267 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3269 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3270 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3272 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3274 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3276 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3278 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3279 err_code.write(writer)?;
3281 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3283 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3290 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3291 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3292 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3293 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3294 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3295 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3296 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3301 impl Writeable for Channel {
3302 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3303 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3304 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3306 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3307 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3309 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3311 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3312 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3313 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3314 self.announce_publicly.write(writer)?;
3315 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3317 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3318 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3320 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3321 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3322 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3324 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;
3326 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3327 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3328 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3329 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3332 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3333 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3334 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3335 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3336 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3337 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3339 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3340 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3342 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3344 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3346 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3348 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3351 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3353 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3358 macro_rules! write_option {
3361 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3370 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3371 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3372 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3373 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3374 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3375 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3376 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3377 write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
3379 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3381 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3383 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3386 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
3389 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
3392 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
3398 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3399 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3401 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
3403 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3404 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3405 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3406 source.write(writer)?;
3407 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3408 // time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
3410 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3412 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3413 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3415 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3417 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3418 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3423 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3424 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3425 match self.monitor_pending_order {
3426 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3427 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3428 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
3431 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3432 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3433 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3434 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3437 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3438 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3439 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3440 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3441 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3444 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3445 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3447 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3448 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3449 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3450 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3452 (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3453 for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
3454 if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
3456 network::serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
3457 _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
3462 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3463 Some((feerate, fee)) => {
3465 feerate.write(writer)?;
3468 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3471 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3472 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3474 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3475 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3477 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3478 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3479 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3480 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3481 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3482 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3483 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3484 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3486 write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
3487 write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
3488 write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
3489 write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
3490 write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
3491 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3493 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3494 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3496 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3498 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3503 impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
3504 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3505 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3506 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3507 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3508 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3511 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3513 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3514 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3515 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let announce_publicly = Readable::read(reader)?;
3517 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3520 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3522 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3523 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3524 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3526 let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;
3528 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3529 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3530 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3531 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3532 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3533 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3534 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3535 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3536 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3537 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3538 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3539 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3540 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3541 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3546 macro_rules! read_option { () => {
3547 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3549 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3550 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3554 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3555 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3556 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3557 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3558 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3559 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3560 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3561 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3562 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3563 fail_reason: read_option!(),
3564 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3565 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3566 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3567 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
3568 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
3569 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
3570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3575 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3576 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3577 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3578 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3579 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3580 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3581 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3582 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3583 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3584 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3585 time_created: Instant::now(),
3587 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3588 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3589 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3591 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3592 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3593 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3595 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3599 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3600 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3602 let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3604 1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
3605 2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
3606 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3609 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3610 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3611 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3612 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3615 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3616 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3617 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3618 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3621 let pending_update_fee = read_option!();
3622 let holding_cell_update_fee = read_option!();
3624 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3625 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3626 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3627 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3629 let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3630 let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
3631 for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
3632 last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
3634 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3638 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3640 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3641 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3644 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = read_option!();
3645 let short_channel_id = read_option!();
3647 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3648 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3650 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3651 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3652 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3653 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3654 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3655 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3656 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3657 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3659 let their_funding_pubkey = read_option!();
3660 let their_revocation_basepoint = read_option!();
3661 let their_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
3662 let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
3663 let their_htlc_basepoint = read_option!();
3664 let their_cur_commitment_point = read_option!();
3666 let their_prev_commitment_point = read_option!();
3667 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3669 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = read_option!();
3670 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3671 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3672 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3673 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3674 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3683 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3685 channel_value_satoshis,
3690 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3691 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3694 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
3695 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3696 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3697 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
3699 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
3700 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
3701 monitor_pending_order,
3702 monitor_pending_forwards,
3703 monitor_pending_failures,
3706 holding_cell_update_fee,
3708 next_remote_htlc_id,
3709 channel_update_count,
3712 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3713 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3714 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3715 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3717 last_local_commitment_txn,
3719 last_sent_closing_fee,
3721 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
3723 last_block_connected,
3724 funding_tx_confirmations,
3726 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
3727 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3728 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3729 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
3730 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
3731 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3732 their_to_self_delay,
3733 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
3735 their_funding_pubkey,
3736 their_revocation_basepoint,
3737 their_payment_basepoint,
3738 their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
3739 their_htlc_basepoint,
3740 their_cur_commitment_point,
3742 their_prev_commitment_point,
3745 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
3756 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
3757 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3758 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3759 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3760 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3761 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3763 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
3764 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
3765 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
3767 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
3768 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3769 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3770 use util::test_utils;
3771 use util::logger::Logger;
3772 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
3773 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3774 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3775 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3778 struct TestFeeEstimator {
3781 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
3782 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
3788 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
3789 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
3790 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
3794 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
3796 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
3797 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
3798 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
3799 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
3800 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3801 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
3802 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
3805 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
3806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
3807 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3808 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
3811 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
3815 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
3816 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
3817 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
3818 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3819 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3821 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
3822 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3823 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3824 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3825 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3827 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
3828 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3829 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
3831 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
3832 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
3833 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
3835 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
3836 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
3837 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
3838 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
3840 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
3841 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
3843 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3844 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3845 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3847 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3848 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3849 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
3851 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3852 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3853 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3855 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
3857 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
3858 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
3859 // build_commitment_transaction.
3860 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
3861 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3862 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
3863 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
3864 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
3866 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
3868 macro_rules! test_commitment {
3869 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
3870 unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3871 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3872 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3873 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
3875 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
3877 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
3878 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
3882 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
3883 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
3884 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3886 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
3887 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3888 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
3889 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3890 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
3892 let mut preimage: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
3895 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3896 sha.input(&[i; 32]);
3898 let mut out = [0; 32];
3899 sha.result(&mut out);
3901 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
3902 preimage = Some([i; 32]);
3906 assert!(preimage.is_some());
3909 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
3910 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
3911 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
3916 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
3917 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
3919 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
3920 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
3921 "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");
3924 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3925 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3927 amount_msat: 1000000,
3929 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3930 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3932 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3933 sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
3934 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3937 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3938 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3940 amount_msat: 2000000,
3942 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3943 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3945 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3946 sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
3947 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3950 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
3951 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
3953 amount_msat: 2000000,
3955 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3956 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3957 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
3960 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3961 sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3962 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3965 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
3966 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
3968 amount_msat: 3000000,
3970 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3971 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3972 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
3975 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3976 sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
3977 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3980 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3981 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3983 amount_msat: 4000000,
3985 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3986 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3988 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3989 sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
3990 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3995 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3996 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3997 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
3999 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4000 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4001 "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");
4003 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4005 test_htlc_output!(0,
4006 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4007 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4008 "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");
4010 test_htlc_output!(1,
4011 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4012 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4013 "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");
4015 test_htlc_output!(2,
4016 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4017 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4018 "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");
4020 test_htlc_output!(3,
4021 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4022 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4023 "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");
4025 test_htlc_output!(4,
4026 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4027 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4028 "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");
4032 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4033 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4034 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4036 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4037 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4038 "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");
4040 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4042 test_htlc_output!(0,
4043 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4044 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4045 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb60000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab3437400147304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000");
4047 test_htlc_output!(1,
4048 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4049 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4050 "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");
4052 test_htlc_output!(2,
4053 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4054 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4055 "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");
4057 test_htlc_output!(3,
4058 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4059 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4060 "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");
4062 test_htlc_output!(4,
4063 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4064 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4065 "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");
4069 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4070 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4071 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4073 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4074 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4075 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431104e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de01473044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b05701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4077 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4079 test_htlc_output!(0,
4080 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4081 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4082 "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");
4084 test_htlc_output!(1,
4085 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4086 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4087 "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");
4089 test_htlc_output!(2,
4090 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4091 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4092 "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");
4094 test_htlc_output!(3,
4095 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4096 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4097 "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");
4101 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4102 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4103 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4105 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4106 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4107 "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");
4109 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4111 test_htlc_output!(0,
4112 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4113 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4114 "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");
4116 test_htlc_output!(1,
4117 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4118 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4119 "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");
4121 test_htlc_output!(2,
4122 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4123 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4124 "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");
4126 test_htlc_output!(3,
4127 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4128 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4129 "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");
4133 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4134 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4135 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4137 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4138 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4139 "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");
4141 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4143 test_htlc_output!(0,
4144 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4145 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4146 "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");
4148 test_htlc_output!(1,
4149 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4150 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4151 "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");
4153 test_htlc_output!(2,
4154 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4155 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4156 "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");
4160 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4161 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4162 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4164 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4165 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4166 "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");
4168 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4170 test_htlc_output!(0,
4171 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4172 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4173 "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");
4175 test_htlc_output!(1,
4176 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4177 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4178 "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");
4180 test_htlc_output!(2,
4181 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4182 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4183 "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");
4187 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4188 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4189 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4191 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4192 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4193 "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");
4195 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4197 test_htlc_output!(0,
4198 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4199 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4200 "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");
4202 test_htlc_output!(1,
4203 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4204 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4205 "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");
4209 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4210 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4211 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4213 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4214 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4215 "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");
4217 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4219 test_htlc_output!(0,
4220 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4221 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4222 "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");
4224 test_htlc_output!(1,
4225 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4226 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4227 "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");
4231 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4232 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4233 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4235 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4236 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4237 "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");
4239 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4241 test_htlc_output!(0,
4242 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4243 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4244 "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");
4248 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4249 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4250 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4252 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4253 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4254 "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");
4256 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4258 test_htlc_output!(0,
4259 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4260 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4261 "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");
4265 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4266 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4267 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4269 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4270 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4271 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de843110fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b90147304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f876555201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4273 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4277 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4278 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4279 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4281 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4282 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4283 "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");
4285 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4289 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4290 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4291 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4293 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4294 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4295 "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");
4297 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4301 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4302 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4303 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4305 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4306 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4307 "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");
4309 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4314 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4315 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4317 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4318 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4319 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4320 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4322 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4323 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4324 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4326 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4327 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4329 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
4330 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4332 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4333 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
4334 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4338 fn test_key_derivation() {
4339 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4340 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4342 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4343 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4345 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4346 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4348 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4349 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4351 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4352 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4354 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4355 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4357 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4358 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4360 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4361 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());