1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
9 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
13 use crypto::digest::Digest;
16 use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
17 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
18 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg};
19 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
21 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
22 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
23 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
24 use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
25 use util::ser::Writeable;
26 use util::sha2::Sha256;
27 use util::logger::Logger;
28 use util::errors::APIError;
31 use std::default::Default;
33 use std::time::Instant;
37 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
38 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
39 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
40 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
41 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
42 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
43 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
47 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
48 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
49 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
53 enum InboundHTLCState {
54 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
55 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
56 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
57 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
58 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
59 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
60 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
61 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
62 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
63 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
64 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
65 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
67 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
69 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
70 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
72 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
73 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
74 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
75 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
76 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
77 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
78 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
79 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
82 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
86 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
87 state: InboundHTLCState,
90 enum OutboundHTLCState {
91 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
92 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
93 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
94 /// revoke, but we dont really care about that:
95 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
96 /// money back (though we wont), and,
97 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
98 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
99 /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
100 /// we'll never get out of sync).
101 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
102 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
103 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
105 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
106 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
108 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
109 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
110 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
111 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
112 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
113 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
114 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
115 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
116 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
117 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
118 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
119 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
122 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
126 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
127 state: OutboundHTLCState,
129 /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
130 fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
133 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
134 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
135 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
137 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
138 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
139 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
140 transaction_output_index: 0
145 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
146 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
151 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
153 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
154 time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
157 payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
162 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
166 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
167 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
168 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
169 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
170 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
171 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
172 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
174 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
175 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
176 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
177 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
178 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
179 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
180 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
182 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
183 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
184 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
186 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
187 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
188 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
189 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
190 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
191 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
193 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
194 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
196 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
197 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
198 /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
199 /// messages until they've managed to do so.
200 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
201 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
202 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
203 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
204 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
206 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
207 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
208 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
209 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
210 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
211 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
212 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
213 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
214 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
215 /// us their shutdown.
216 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
217 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
218 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
219 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
221 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
222 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
224 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
226 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
227 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
228 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
230 pub(super) struct Channel {
233 channel_id: [u8; 32],
235 channel_outbound: bool,
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
237 announce_publicly: bool,
238 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
240 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
242 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
243 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
244 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
246 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
247 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
248 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
249 /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
250 /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
251 /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
252 /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
253 /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
254 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
255 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
256 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
257 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
259 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
260 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
261 monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
262 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
263 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>,
265 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
266 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
267 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
269 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
270 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
271 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
272 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
273 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
274 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
275 // commitment_signed.
276 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
277 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
278 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
279 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
280 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
281 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
282 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
283 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
284 channel_update_count: u32,
287 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
288 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
289 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
291 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
292 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
295 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
296 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
298 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
300 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
302 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
303 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
304 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
305 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
306 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
307 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
308 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks
309 last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
310 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
312 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
313 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
314 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
315 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
316 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
317 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
318 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
319 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
320 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
321 their_to_self_delay: u16,
322 //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
323 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
324 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
326 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
327 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
328 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
329 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
330 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
331 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 their_node_id: PublicKey,
336 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
338 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
343 const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
344 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
345 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
346 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
347 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
348 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
349 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
350 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
351 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
352 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
353 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
354 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
355 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
356 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
357 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
359 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
365 Ignore(&'static str),
369 macro_rules! secp_call {
370 ( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
373 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
378 macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
379 ( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
380 secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
384 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
385 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
386 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
389 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
391 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
392 fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
393 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
394 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
397 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
398 at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000 //TODO
401 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
405 fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
406 // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
408 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
412 fn derive_maximum_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
413 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
418 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
419 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
421 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
422 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
425 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
430 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
431 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
432 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
435 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
437 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
438 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
439 let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
440 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
441 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
442 BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
447 channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
448 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
449 channel_outbound: true,
451 announce_publicly: announce_publicly,
452 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
454 local_keys: chan_keys,
455 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
456 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
457 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
458 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
460 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
461 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
462 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
463 pending_update_fee: None,
464 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
465 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
466 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
467 channel_update_count: 1,
469 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
470 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
471 monitor_pending_order: None,
472 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
473 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
475 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
476 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
477 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
478 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
480 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
482 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
484 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
485 short_channel_id: None,
486 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
487 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
489 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
490 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
491 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
492 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
493 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
494 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
495 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
496 their_to_self_delay: 0,
497 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
499 their_funding_pubkey: None,
500 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
501 their_payment_basepoint: None,
502 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
503 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
504 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
506 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
507 their_node_id: their_node_id,
509 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
511 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
517 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
518 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
519 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
521 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
527 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
528 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
529 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
530 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
532 // Check sanity of message fields:
533 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
536 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
537 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
539 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
542 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
543 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
545 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
548 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value"));
551 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
553 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
556 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
559 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
563 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
565 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
566 if require_announce && !their_announce {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones"));
569 if !allow_announce && their_announce {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones"));
573 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
575 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
576 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
577 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitalbe channel reserve not found. aborting"));
580 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
583 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
587 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
588 // for full fee payment
589 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
590 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
594 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
595 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
596 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
600 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
601 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
602 let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
603 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
604 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
605 BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
606 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
607 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
609 let mut chan = Channel {
612 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
613 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
614 channel_outbound: false,
616 announce_publicly: their_announce,
618 local_keys: chan_keys,
619 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
620 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
621 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
622 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
624 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
625 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
626 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
627 pending_update_fee: None,
628 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
629 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
630 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
631 channel_update_count: 1,
633 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
634 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
635 monitor_pending_order: None,
636 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
637 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
639 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
640 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
641 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
642 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
644 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
646 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
648 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
649 short_channel_id: None,
650 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
651 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
653 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
654 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
655 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
656 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
657 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
658 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
659 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
660 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
661 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
662 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
664 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
665 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
666 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
667 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
668 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
669 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
671 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
672 their_node_id: their_node_id,
674 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
676 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
681 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
682 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
687 // Utilities to derive keys:
689 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
690 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
691 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).unwrap()
694 // Utilities to build transactions:
696 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
697 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
698 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
700 if self.channel_outbound {
701 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
702 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
704 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
705 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
707 let mut res = [0; 32];
708 sha.result(&mut res);
710 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
711 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
712 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
713 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
714 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
715 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
718 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
719 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
720 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
721 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
722 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
724 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
725 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
726 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
727 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
728 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
729 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
730 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
732 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
733 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
736 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
738 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
739 script_sig: Script::new(),
740 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
746 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
748 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
749 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
750 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
751 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
753 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
754 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr) => {
755 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
756 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
757 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
759 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
760 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
761 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
764 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
765 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
766 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
767 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
768 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
769 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
775 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
776 let include = match htlc.state {
777 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local,
778 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local,
779 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true,
780 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
781 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local,
785 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false);
786 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
789 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
790 if generated_by_local {
791 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
792 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
801 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
802 let include = match htlc.state {
803 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
804 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
805 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
806 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
807 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
811 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true);
812 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
815 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
816 if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
817 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
820 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
821 if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
822 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
831 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
832 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
834 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
836 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
837 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
838 // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
840 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
841 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
843 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
845 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
846 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
847 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
848 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
851 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
852 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
853 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
855 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
858 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
859 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
861 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
863 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
864 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
865 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
866 value: value_to_a as u64
870 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
872 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
873 .push_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
875 value: value_to_b as u64
879 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
881 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
882 let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
883 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
885 if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
886 htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
887 htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
893 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
900 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
901 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).serialize());
902 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
906 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
907 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
911 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
913 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
915 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
916 script_sig: Script::new(),
917 sequence: 0xffffffff,
923 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
924 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
925 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
927 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
928 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
929 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
931 if value_to_self < 0 {
932 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
933 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
934 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
935 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
936 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
939 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
941 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
942 value: value_to_remote as u64
946 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
948 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
949 value: value_to_self as u64
953 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
955 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
956 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
965 }, total_fee_satoshis)
969 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
970 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
971 /// our counterparty!)
972 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
973 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
974 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
975 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
976 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
977 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
979 Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
983 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
984 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
985 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
986 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
987 //may see payments to it!
988 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
989 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
990 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
992 Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
995 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
996 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
997 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
998 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
999 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1000 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1001 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1002 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1003 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1004 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1006 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1007 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1008 }.push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1011 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1012 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1013 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1015 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1016 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1019 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1021 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1022 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1024 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1026 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1027 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1028 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1029 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1030 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1032 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1033 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1035 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1036 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1038 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1043 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1044 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1045 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1046 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1047 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1050 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), HandleError> {
1051 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1052 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1055 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1057 let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
1058 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1059 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1060 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1063 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1064 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
1065 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
1066 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1067 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1069 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1070 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1073 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1075 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1077 if local_tx { // b, then a
1078 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1079 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1081 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1082 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1084 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1085 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1088 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1090 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
1093 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1098 /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
1099 /// debug_assertions are turned on
1100 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
1101 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
1102 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1103 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1105 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1106 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1108 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1110 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1111 sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
1112 let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
1113 sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
1115 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1116 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1117 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1118 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1119 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1121 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1122 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1128 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1129 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1130 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1133 // Now update local state:
1135 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1136 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1137 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1139 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1140 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1141 match pending_update {
1142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1143 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1144 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a pending fulfill for");
1145 return Ok((None, None));
1148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1149 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1150 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a holding-cell failure on");
1151 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1157 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1158 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1160 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1164 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1165 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1167 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1168 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1170 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1173 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1174 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1175 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1176 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1177 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1180 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
1181 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1182 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1183 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1184 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1186 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1187 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1191 /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
1192 /// debug_assertions are turned on
1193 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
1194 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1195 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1197 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1199 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1200 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1201 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1202 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1204 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to fail before it was fully committed to");
1205 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1210 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1211 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1212 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1215 // Now update local state:
1216 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1217 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1218 match pending_update {
1219 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1220 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1221 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1222 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1225 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1226 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1227 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that we already had a pending failure for");
1234 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1235 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1242 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1243 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1246 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1247 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1248 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1253 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
1254 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
1255 Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
1256 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1257 Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
1263 // Message handlers:
1265 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1266 // Check sanity of message fields:
1267 if !self.channel_outbound {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1270 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1273 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1276 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1279 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1285 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1288 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1291 if msg.minimum_depth > Channel::derive_maximum_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("minimum_depth too large"));
1294 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1297 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1300 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
1304 // TODO: Optional additional constraints mentioned in the spec
1305 // MAY fail the channel if
1306 // funding_satoshi is too small
1307 // htlc_minimum_msat too large
1308 // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat too small
1309 // channel_reserve_satoshis too large
1310 // max_accepted_htlcs too small
1311 // dust_limit_satoshis too small
1313 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1315 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1316 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1317 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1318 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1319 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1320 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1321 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1322 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1323 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1324 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1325 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1326 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1328 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1329 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1330 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1332 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1337 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Signature), HandleError> {
1338 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1340 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1341 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1342 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1344 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1345 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1347 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1348 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1349 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1351 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1352 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
1355 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1356 if self.channel_outbound {
1357 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_string()}})});
1359 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1360 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1361 // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1363 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_string()}})});
1365 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1366 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1367 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1368 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1371 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1372 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1373 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1375 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1378 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1383 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1385 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
1386 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1387 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1388 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1389 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1391 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1392 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1393 signature: our_signature
1394 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1397 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1398 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1399 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
1400 if !self.channel_outbound {
1401 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", action: None});
1403 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1404 return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
1406 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1407 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1408 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1409 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1412 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1414 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1415 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1416 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1418 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1419 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1421 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1422 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1423 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1424 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1425 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1427 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1430 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1431 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1435 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1437 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1438 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1439 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1440 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1441 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1442 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1443 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1444 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1445 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
1446 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1449 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1455 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1456 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1460 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1461 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1462 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1463 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1464 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1466 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1469 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1470 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1471 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1472 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1473 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1476 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1479 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1480 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1481 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1483 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1484 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1486 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1487 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
1489 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1490 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
1493 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1494 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1495 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
1497 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1498 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1499 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1500 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
1502 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1503 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1504 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1505 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
1506 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
1508 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1509 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
1511 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1512 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
1515 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1517 // Now update local state:
1518 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1519 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1520 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1521 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1522 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1523 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1524 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1530 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1532 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1533 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1534 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1535 match check_preimage {
1537 Some(payment_hash) =>
1538 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1543 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1545 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1546 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
1547 htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
1549 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
1550 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1552 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1555 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1558 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1559 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1562 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1566 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1567 sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
1568 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1569 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1571 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)
1574 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1575 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1578 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1582 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1585 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1586 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1589 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1593 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1596 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1597 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1598 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1600 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1601 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1604 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1606 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1608 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1609 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1614 let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1615 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1616 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1617 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
1619 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
1620 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
1623 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
1624 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1625 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1627 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
1628 for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
1629 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1630 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1631 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1632 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
1633 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1634 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
1635 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1638 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1640 htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
1643 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1644 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1646 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1647 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1648 if !self.channel_outbound {
1649 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1650 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1651 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1652 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1653 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1654 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1655 need_our_commitment = true;
1656 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1660 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1661 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1662 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1663 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1666 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1668 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1669 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1670 Some(forward_info.clone())
1672 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1673 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1674 need_our_commitment = true;
1677 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1678 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
1679 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
1680 need_our_commitment = true;
1684 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1685 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1686 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
1688 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1689 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1690 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
1691 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
1694 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1695 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1696 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1697 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1698 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1699 (Some(msg), monitor)
1700 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone()) };
1702 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1703 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1704 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1705 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1706 }, our_commitment_signed, monitor_update))
1709 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1710 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1711 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
1712 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1713 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1714 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1715 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1716 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1717 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1718 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1720 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1721 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1722 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1723 // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1724 // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1725 // to rebalance channels.
1726 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1727 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1729 match &htlc_update {
1730 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1731 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1732 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1738 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1739 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1740 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1742 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
1744 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1749 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1750 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1751 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1753 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
1755 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1762 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1766 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
1767 //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
1770 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
1771 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
1772 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
1773 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
1776 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
1777 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
1778 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1779 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1780 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
1785 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1786 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1788 update_fulfill_htlcs,
1790 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1791 update_fee: update_fee,
1793 }, monitor_update)))
1802 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
1803 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
1804 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
1805 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
1806 /// revoke_and_ack message.
1807 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
1808 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1809 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1811 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1812 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1815 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
1816 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
1817 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
1820 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret, Some((self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1, msg.next_per_commitment_point)))?;
1822 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1823 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
1824 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
1825 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
1826 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
1827 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1828 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1829 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1830 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
1831 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1832 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1833 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1834 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1837 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
1838 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
1839 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
1840 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
1841 let mut require_commitment = false;
1842 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
1843 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
1844 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1845 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
1846 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1847 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1852 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1853 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
1854 if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
1855 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
1857 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
1858 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1863 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1864 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
1866 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
1870 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1871 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
1873 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
1874 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
1875 require_commitment = true;
1876 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
1877 match forward_info {
1878 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
1879 require_commitment = true;
1881 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
1882 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
1883 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
1885 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
1886 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
1887 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
1891 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
1892 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
1893 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1899 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1900 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
1901 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
1902 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
1903 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
1904 require_commitment = true;
1907 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
1909 if self.channel_outbound {
1910 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
1911 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1914 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
1915 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a
1916 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
1917 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
1918 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
1919 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
1920 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
1921 require_commitment = true;
1922 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1927 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
1928 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
1929 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
1930 if require_commitment {
1931 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1933 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
1934 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
1935 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.channel_monitor.clone()));
1938 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
1939 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
1940 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
1941 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
1944 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
1945 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1946 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
1948 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
1951 if require_commitment {
1952 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1953 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1954 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1955 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1957 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
1960 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
1962 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1969 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
1970 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
1971 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
1972 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
1973 if !self.channel_outbound {
1974 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
1976 if !self.is_usable() {
1977 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
1979 if !self.is_live() {
1980 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
1983 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
1984 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
1988 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1989 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
1991 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1992 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1993 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
1997 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
1998 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
1999 Some(update_fee) => {
2000 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2001 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2007 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2008 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2009 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2010 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2011 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2013 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])> {
2014 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2016 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2017 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2018 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2019 return outbound_drops;
2022 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2023 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2025 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2026 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2027 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2028 // this HTLC accordingly
2029 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2032 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2033 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2034 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2035 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2038 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2039 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2040 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2041 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2042 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2043 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2049 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2050 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
2051 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2052 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2053 // the update upon reconnection.
2054 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2058 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2060 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2061 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2064 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2067 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2068 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2072 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2073 /// updates are partially paused.
2074 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2075 /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
2076 /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
2077 /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
2078 /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2079 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder) {
2080 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2082 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2083 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2084 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2086 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2087 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2088 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2091 self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
2092 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2095 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2096 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2097 /// to the remote side.
2098 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>) {
2099 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2100 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2102 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2103 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2104 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2105 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2107 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2108 // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
2109 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2110 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2111 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
2114 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2115 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2117 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2118 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2121 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2122 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2123 (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
2126 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2127 if self.channel_outbound {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2130 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2133 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2135 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2136 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2140 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2141 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2142 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2143 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2144 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2145 per_commitment_secret,
2146 next_per_commitment_point,
2150 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2151 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2152 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2153 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2154 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2156 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2157 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2158 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2159 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2160 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2161 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2162 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2163 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2164 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2169 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2170 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2172 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2173 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2174 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2175 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2176 reason: err_packet.clone()
2179 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2180 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2181 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2182 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2183 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2184 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2187 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2188 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2189 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2190 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2191 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2198 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2199 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2200 update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
2201 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2205 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2206 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2207 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder), ChannelError> {
2208 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2209 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2210 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2211 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2215 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2216 msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2220 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2221 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2222 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2224 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2225 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2226 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2228 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2229 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2230 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2233 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2239 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2240 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2241 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2242 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2243 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2245 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2246 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2247 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2248 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2249 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2250 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2251 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2255 let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
2256 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
2258 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
2261 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2262 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2263 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2265 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2268 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
2269 self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
2270 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2271 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2272 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2274 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2276 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(_)}) = &e.action {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
2278 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: _}) = &e.action {
2279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
2281 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs");
2284 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order)),
2285 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order)),
2288 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order));
2290 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2291 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2292 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2294 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2297 // If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
2298 debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());
2300 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2301 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2302 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order));
2305 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order));
2307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2311 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), HandleError> {
2312 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2313 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
2315 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2316 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2317 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2318 return Ok((None, None, Vec::new()));
2320 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2321 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2322 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", action: None});
2325 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
2326 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message", action: None});
2328 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2330 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2331 // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2332 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2333 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer", action: None});
2336 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2337 if !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh()) && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh())
2338 && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()) && !(msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()){
2339 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an invalid scriptpubkey from remote peer", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
2342 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2343 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2344 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey", action: None});
2347 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2350 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2352 let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2353 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2354 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2355 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2357 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&our_closing_script, &msg.scriptpubkey);
2358 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2360 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2361 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2362 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2364 (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
2365 } else { (None, None, None) };
2367 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2369 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2370 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2372 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2373 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2374 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2375 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2376 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2378 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2379 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2385 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2386 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2387 return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
2391 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2394 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2395 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2396 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
2400 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2401 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2402 if self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
2403 // There are no more HTLCs and we're the funder, this means we start the closing_signed
2404 // dance with an initial fee proposal!
2405 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate.unwrap(), proposed_fee.unwrap()));
2406 Ok((our_shutdown, Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2407 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2408 fee_satoshis: proposed_fee.unwrap(),
2409 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2410 }), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2412 Ok((our_shutdown, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2416 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
2417 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2418 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
2420 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2421 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
2423 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2424 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
2426 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2427 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
2430 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2431 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2432 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2433 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
2435 let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2437 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2440 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2441 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2442 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2443 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2444 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
2448 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2449 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2450 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2451 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2452 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2453 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2457 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2458 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2459 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2460 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2461 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2462 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2463 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2464 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2465 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2466 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2472 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2473 if self.channel_outbound {
2474 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2475 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2476 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2477 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2478 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
2481 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2484 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2485 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2486 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2487 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2488 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
2491 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2495 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2496 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2497 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2499 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2500 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2501 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2503 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2506 // Public utilities:
2508 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2512 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2513 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2514 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2518 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2519 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2520 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2521 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2523 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2526 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2527 /// is_usable() returns true).
2528 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2529 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2530 self.short_channel_id
2533 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2534 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2535 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2536 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2539 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2540 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2544 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2545 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2546 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2549 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2550 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2551 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2554 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2555 self.channel_value_satoshis
2559 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2563 //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
2565 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2570 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2572 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2573 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2574 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2575 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2576 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2577 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2579 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2581 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2589 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2593 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2594 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2595 self.channel_update_count
2598 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2599 self.announce_publicly
2602 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2603 self.channel_outbound
2606 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2607 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2608 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2609 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2610 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2612 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2613 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2615 if self.channel_outbound {
2616 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2617 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2620 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2621 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2626 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2627 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2628 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2631 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2632 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2633 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2634 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2635 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2638 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2639 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2640 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2641 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2642 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2645 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2647 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2648 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2651 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2652 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2653 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2656 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2657 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2658 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2659 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2660 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2661 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2666 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2667 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2668 /// the channel_monitor.
2669 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2670 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2671 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2672 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
2673 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2674 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2675 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2676 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2677 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2678 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 {
2679 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2680 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2682 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2683 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2684 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2686 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2687 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2688 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2690 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2691 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2693 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2694 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2697 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
2699 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
2700 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
2701 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
2702 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
2703 if need_commitment_update {
2704 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2705 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2706 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2707 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2708 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2714 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2715 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
2716 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
2717 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
2718 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
2719 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
2720 if self.channel_outbound {
2721 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
2722 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
2723 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
2724 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
2725 // channel and move on.
2726 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2727 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2729 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2730 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2731 return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
2733 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
2734 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
2735 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
2736 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
2744 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
2745 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
2746 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
2747 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
2748 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2749 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
2750 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
2754 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
2755 self.funding_tx_confirmations = Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 - 1;
2760 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
2761 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
2763 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
2764 if !self.channel_outbound {
2765 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
2767 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2768 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
2771 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2772 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2775 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2778 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2779 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2780 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2781 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
2782 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2783 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2784 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2785 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2786 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
2787 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2788 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2789 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2790 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2791 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2792 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2793 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2794 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2795 channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
2796 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2800 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
2801 if self.channel_outbound {
2802 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
2804 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2805 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
2807 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2808 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2811 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2813 msgs::AcceptChannel {
2814 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2815 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2816 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2817 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2818 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2819 minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat),
2820 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2821 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2822 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2823 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2824 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2825 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2826 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2827 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2828 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2832 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
2833 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2835 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2836 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
2837 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2839 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2840 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
2843 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
2844 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
2845 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
2846 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
2847 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
2848 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
2849 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
2850 if !self.channel_outbound {
2851 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
2853 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2854 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
2856 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2857 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2858 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2859 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2862 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2863 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
2865 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
2868 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
2869 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
2874 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
2876 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2877 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
2878 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
2879 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2880 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2882 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
2883 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2884 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
2885 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
2886 signature: our_signature
2887 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2890 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
2891 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
2892 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
2893 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
2894 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
2896 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
2897 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
2898 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
2899 if !self.announce_publicly {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
2902 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
2903 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
2905 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
2909 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
2910 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2912 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2913 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
2914 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2915 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2916 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
2917 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
2918 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
2919 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
2920 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2923 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2924 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2929 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
2930 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
2931 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2932 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2933 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2934 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2935 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
2936 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
2937 data_loss_protect: None,
2942 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
2944 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
2945 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
2946 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
2947 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
2948 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
2949 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2950 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
2951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2952 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
2955 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2956 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
2958 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
2959 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
2962 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2963 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
2964 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
2965 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
2966 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
2967 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
2968 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
2969 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
2972 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2973 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2974 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
2976 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
2977 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2978 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2979 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
2982 let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
2983 for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2984 match holding_htlc {
2985 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => {
2986 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat;
2992 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
2993 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
2994 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
2995 return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", action: None});
2998 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3000 // Now update local state:
3001 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3002 //TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs!
3003 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3004 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3005 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3006 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3008 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3009 time_created: Instant::now(),
3014 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3015 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3016 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3017 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3018 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3019 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3024 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3025 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3026 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3027 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3028 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3029 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3030 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3032 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3037 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3038 /// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3039 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3040 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3041 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
3042 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3043 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3045 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3046 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3049 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3051 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3052 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3054 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3055 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3056 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3057 have_updates = true;
3059 if have_updates { break; }
3062 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3064 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3066 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3067 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
3068 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3069 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3071 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3072 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3073 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3075 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3079 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3080 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
3081 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
3085 match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3086 Ok((res, remote_commitment_tx)) => {
3087 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3088 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
3089 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3090 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3096 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3097 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3098 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)), HandleError> {
3099 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3101 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3102 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3103 if self.channel_outbound {
3104 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3108 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3109 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3110 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3111 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3112 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3114 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
3116 for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
3117 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3118 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3119 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3120 let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
3121 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3124 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3125 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3127 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3128 }, remote_commitment_tx))
3131 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3132 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3133 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3135 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
3136 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3137 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3138 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3139 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3145 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3146 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3147 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), APIError> {
3148 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3149 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3150 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3153 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3154 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3155 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3157 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3158 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3161 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3162 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3163 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3166 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3168 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3169 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3170 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3172 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3174 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3176 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3177 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3178 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3179 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3180 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3182 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3183 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3190 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3191 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3192 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3193 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3196 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
3197 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3198 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3199 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3200 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3201 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>) {
3202 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3204 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3205 // return them to fail the payment.
3206 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3207 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3209 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3210 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3216 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3217 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3218 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3222 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3223 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3224 let mut res = Vec::new();
3225 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3226 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3232 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
3233 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3234 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3235 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
3236 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3238 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
3239 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
3240 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
3242 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
3243 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3244 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3245 use util::test_utils;
3246 use util::logger::Logger;
3247 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
3248 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3249 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3250 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3253 struct TestFeeEstimator {
3256 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
3257 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
3263 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
3264 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
3265 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
3269 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
3271 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
3272 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
3273 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { panic!(); }
3274 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey { panic!(); }
3275 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
3279 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
3280 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
3281 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
3282 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3285 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
3286 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3287 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3288 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3289 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3291 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
3292 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3293 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3294 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3295 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
3297 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
3298 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
3299 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
3301 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
3302 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
3303 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
3304 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
3306 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
3307 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
3309 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3310 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3311 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3313 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3314 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3315 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
3317 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3318 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3319 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3321 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
3323 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
3324 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
3325 // build_commitment_transaction.
3326 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
3327 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3328 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
3329 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
3330 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
3332 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
3334 macro_rules! test_commitment {
3335 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
3336 unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3337 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3338 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3339 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
3341 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
3343 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
3344 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
3348 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
3349 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
3350 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3352 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
3353 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3354 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
3355 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3356 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
3358 let mut preimage: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
3361 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3362 sha.input(&[i; 32]);
3364 let mut out = [0; 32];
3365 sha.result(&mut out);
3367 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
3368 preimage = Some([i; 32]);
3372 assert!(preimage.is_some());
3375 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
3376 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
3377 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
3382 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
3383 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
3385 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
3386 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
3387 "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");
3390 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3391 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3393 amount_msat: 1000000,
3395 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3396 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3398 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3399 sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
3400 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3403 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3404 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3406 amount_msat: 2000000,
3408 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3409 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3411 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3412 sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
3413 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3416 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
3417 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
3419 amount_msat: 2000000,
3421 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3422 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3423 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
3426 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3427 sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3428 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3431 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
3432 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
3434 amount_msat: 3000000,
3436 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3437 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3438 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
3441 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3442 sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
3443 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3446 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
3447 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
3449 amount_msat: 4000000,
3451 payment_hash: [0; 32],
3452 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3454 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3455 sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
3456 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
3461 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3462 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3463 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
3465 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
3466 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
3467 "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");
3469 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
3471 test_htlc_output!(0,
3472 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
3473 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
3474 "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");
3476 test_htlc_output!(1,
3477 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
3478 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
3479 "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");
3481 test_htlc_output!(2,
3482 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
3483 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
3484 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219702000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f20201483045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
3486 test_htlc_output!(3,
3487 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
3488 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
3489 "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");
3491 test_htlc_output!(4,
3492 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
3493 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
3494 "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");
3498 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3499 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3500 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
3502 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
3503 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
3504 "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");
3506 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
3508 test_htlc_output!(0,
3509 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
3510 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
3511 "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");
3513 test_htlc_output!(1,
3514 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
3515 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
3516 "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");
3518 test_htlc_output!(2,
3519 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
3520 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
3521 "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");
3523 test_htlc_output!(3,
3524 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
3525 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
3526 "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");
3528 test_htlc_output!(4,
3529 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
3530 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
3531 "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");
3535 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3536 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3537 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
3539 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
3540 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
3541 "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");
3543 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
3545 test_htlc_output!(0,
3546 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
3547 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
3548 "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");
3550 test_htlc_output!(1,
3551 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
3552 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
3553 "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");
3555 test_htlc_output!(2,
3556 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
3557 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
3558 "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");
3560 test_htlc_output!(3,
3561 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
3562 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
3563 "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");
3567 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3568 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3569 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
3571 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
3572 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
3573 "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");
3575 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
3577 test_htlc_output!(0,
3578 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
3579 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
3580 "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");
3582 test_htlc_output!(1,
3583 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
3584 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
3585 "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");
3587 test_htlc_output!(2,
3588 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
3589 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
3590 "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");
3592 test_htlc_output!(3,
3593 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
3594 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
3595 "02000000000101ca94a9ad516ebc0c4bdd7b6254871babfa978d5accafb554214137d398bfcf6a03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c0147304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
3599 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3600 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3601 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
3603 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
3604 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
3605 "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");
3607 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
3609 test_htlc_output!(0,
3610 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
3611 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
3612 "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");
3614 test_htlc_output!(1,
3615 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
3616 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
3617 "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");
3619 test_htlc_output!(2,
3620 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
3621 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
3622 "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");
3626 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3627 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3628 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
3630 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
3631 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
3632 "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");
3634 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
3636 test_htlc_output!(0,
3637 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
3638 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
3639 "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");
3641 test_htlc_output!(1,
3642 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
3643 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
3644 "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");
3646 test_htlc_output!(2,
3647 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
3648 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
3649 "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");
3653 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3654 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3655 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
3657 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
3658 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
3659 "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");
3661 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
3663 test_htlc_output!(0,
3664 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
3665 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
3666 "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");
3668 test_htlc_output!(1,
3669 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
3670 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
3671 "020000000001014e16c488fa158431c1a82e8f661240ec0a71ba0ce92f2721a6538c510226ad5c0100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92014730440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
3675 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3676 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3677 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
3679 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
3680 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
3681 "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");
3683 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
3685 test_htlc_output!(0,
3686 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
3687 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
3688 "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");
3690 test_htlc_output!(1,
3691 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
3692 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
3693 "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");
3697 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3698 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3699 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
3701 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
3702 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
3703 "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");
3705 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
3707 test_htlc_output!(0,
3708 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
3709 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
3710 "020000000001011c076aa7fb3d7460d10df69432c904227ea84bbf3134d4ceee5fb0f135ef206d0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd01483045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
3714 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3715 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3716 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
3718 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
3719 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
3720 "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");
3722 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
3724 test_htlc_output!(0,
3725 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
3726 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
3727 "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");
3731 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3732 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3733 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
3735 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
3736 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
3737 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de843110fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b90147304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f876555201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
3739 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
3743 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
3744 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3745 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
3747 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
3748 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
3749 "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");
3751 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
3755 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
3756 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3757 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
3759 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
3760 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
3761 "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");
3763 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
3767 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
3768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
3769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
3771 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
3772 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
3773 "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");
3775 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
3780 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
3781 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
3783 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3784 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
3785 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
3786 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
3788 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
3789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
3790 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
3792 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
3793 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
3795 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
3796 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
3798 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
3799 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
3800 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
3804 fn test_key_derivation() {
3805 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
3806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3808 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3809 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3811 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
3812 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
3814 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
3815 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
3817 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
3818 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
3820 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
3821 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
3823 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
3824 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
3826 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
3827 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());