1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
19 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures};
20 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
21 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
22 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
24 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
25 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
26 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
27 use util::transaction_utils;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
29 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
30 use util::errors::APIError;
31 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
34 use std::default::Default;
39 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
40 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
41 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
43 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
49 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
50 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
51 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
52 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
55 enum InboundHTLCState {
56 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
57 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
58 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
59 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
60 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
61 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
62 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
63 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
64 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
65 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
66 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
67 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
69 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
72 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
74 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
75 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
76 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
77 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
78 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
79 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
80 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
81 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
84 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
88 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
89 state: InboundHTLCState,
92 enum OutboundHTLCState {
93 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
94 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
95 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
96 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
97 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
98 /// money back (though we won't), and,
99 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
100 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
101 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
102 /// we'll never get out of sync).
103 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
104 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
105 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
107 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
108 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
109 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
110 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
111 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
112 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
113 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
114 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
115 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
116 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
117 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
118 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
120 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
121 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
124 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
128 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 state: OutboundHTLCState,
133 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
134 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
135 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
139 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
141 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
144 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
149 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
153 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
154 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
155 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
156 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
157 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
158 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
159 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
161 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
162 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
163 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
164 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
165 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
166 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
167 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
169 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
170 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
171 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
173 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
174 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
175 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
176 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
177 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
178 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
180 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
181 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
183 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
184 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
185 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
186 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
187 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
188 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
189 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
190 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
191 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
193 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
194 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
195 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
196 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
197 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
198 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
199 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
200 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
201 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
202 /// us their shutdown.
203 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
204 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
205 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
206 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
208 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
209 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
211 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
213 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
214 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
215 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
217 pub(super) struct Channel {
218 config: ChannelConfig,
222 channel_id: [u8; 32],
224 channel_outbound: bool,
225 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
226 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
228 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
229 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
231 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
232 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
233 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
235 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
236 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
237 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
238 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
239 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
240 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
242 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
243 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
244 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
245 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
246 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
247 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
249 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
251 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
252 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
253 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
254 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
255 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
257 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
258 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
259 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
261 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
262 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
263 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
264 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
265 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
266 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
267 // commitment_signed.
268 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
269 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
270 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
271 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
272 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
273 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
274 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
275 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
276 channel_update_count: u32,
279 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
280 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
281 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
282 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
283 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
284 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
287 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
288 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
290 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
292 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
294 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
295 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
296 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
297 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
298 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
299 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
300 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
301 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
302 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
303 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
305 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
307 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
309 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
311 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
313 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
314 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
315 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
316 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
317 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
318 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
319 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
320 their_to_self_delay: u16,
321 our_to_self_delay: u16,
323 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
325 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
326 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
329 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
330 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
331 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
332 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
334 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
336 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
337 their_node_id: PublicKey,
339 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
341 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
346 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
347 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
348 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
349 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
350 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
351 /// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
352 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
353 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
354 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
355 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
356 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
358 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
361 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
363 pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
364 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
366 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
367 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
368 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
370 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
371 Ignore(&'static str),
375 macro_rules! secp_check {
376 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
379 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
385 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
386 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
387 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
390 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
392 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
393 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
394 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
395 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
398 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
399 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
402 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
407 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
408 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
410 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
411 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
414 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
417 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
422 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
423 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
424 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
427 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
430 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
431 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
432 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
436 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
438 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
439 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
440 channel_outbound: true,
442 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
444 local_keys: chan_keys,
445 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
446 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
447 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
448 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
450 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
451 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
452 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
453 pending_update_fee: None,
454 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
455 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
456 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
457 channel_update_count: 1,
459 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
461 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
462 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
463 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
464 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
465 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
467 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
468 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
469 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
470 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
472 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
474 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
476 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
477 short_channel_id: None,
478 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
479 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
481 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
482 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
483 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
484 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
485 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
486 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
487 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
488 their_to_self_delay: 0,
489 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
490 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
491 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
493 their_funding_pubkey: None,
494 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
495 their_payment_basepoint: None,
496 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
497 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
498 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
500 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
501 their_node_id: their_node_id,
503 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
505 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
511 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
512 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
515 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
521 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
522 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
523 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
524 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
525 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
527 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
531 // Check sanity of message fields:
532 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
533 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
535 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
538 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
541 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
544 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
547 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
550 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
552 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
553 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
555 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
558 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
562 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
563 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
566 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
569 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
572 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
575 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
578 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
581 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
585 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
587 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
588 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
589 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
593 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
594 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
596 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
598 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
599 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
600 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
603 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
606 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
610 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
611 // for full fee payment
612 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
613 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
617 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
618 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
619 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
623 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
624 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
625 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
626 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
627 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
628 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
630 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
631 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
632 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
633 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
634 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
636 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
637 } else if script.len() == 0 {
639 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
644 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
645 &OptionalField::Absent => {
646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
651 let mut chan = Channel {
653 config: local_config,
655 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
656 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
657 channel_outbound: false,
660 local_keys: chan_keys,
661 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
662 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
663 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
664 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
666 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
667 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
668 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
669 pending_update_fee: None,
670 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
671 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
672 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
673 channel_update_count: 1,
675 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
677 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
678 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
679 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
680 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
681 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
683 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
684 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
685 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
686 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
688 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
690 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
692 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
693 short_channel_id: None,
694 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
695 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
697 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
698 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
699 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
700 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
701 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
702 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
703 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
704 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
705 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
706 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
707 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
708 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
710 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
711 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
712 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
713 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
714 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
715 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
717 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
718 their_node_id: their_node_id,
720 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
722 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
727 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
728 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
733 // Utilities to derive keys:
735 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
736 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
737 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
740 // Utilities to build transactions:
742 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
743 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
744 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
746 if self.channel_outbound {
747 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
748 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
750 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
751 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
753 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
755 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
756 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
757 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
758 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
759 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
760 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
763 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
764 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
765 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
766 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
767 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
769 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
770 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
771 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
772 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
773 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
774 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
775 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
776 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
777 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
778 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
779 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
781 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
782 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
785 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
787 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
788 script_sig: Script::new(),
789 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
795 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
796 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
798 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
799 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
800 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
801 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
803 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
805 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
806 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
807 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
809 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
810 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
811 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
812 transaction_output_index: None
817 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
818 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
819 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
820 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
821 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
822 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
824 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
825 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
826 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
828 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
829 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
832 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
833 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
834 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
835 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
836 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
837 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
838 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
840 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
841 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
847 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
848 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
849 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
850 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
851 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
852 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
853 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
857 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
858 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
860 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
862 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
863 if generated_by_local {
864 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
865 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
874 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
875 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
876 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
877 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
878 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
879 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
880 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
884 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
885 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
887 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
889 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
890 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
892 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
893 if !generated_by_local {
894 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
902 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
903 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
904 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
905 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
906 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
907 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
908 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
909 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
911 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
913 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
914 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
915 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
916 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
918 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
920 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
921 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
922 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
923 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
926 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
927 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
928 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
930 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
933 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
934 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
936 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
937 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
939 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
940 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
941 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
942 value: value_to_a as u64
946 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
947 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
949 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
950 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
952 value: value_to_b as u64
956 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
957 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
958 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
959 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
960 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
961 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
963 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
964 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
965 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
966 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
967 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
970 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
971 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
972 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
974 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
975 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
976 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
979 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
980 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
984 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
987 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
991 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
992 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
993 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
997 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
998 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1002 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1004 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1006 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1007 script_sig: Script::new(),
1008 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1009 witness: Vec::new(),
1014 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1015 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1016 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1018 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1019 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1020 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1022 if value_to_self < 0 {
1023 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1024 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1025 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1026 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1027 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1030 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1031 txouts.push((TxOut {
1032 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1033 value: value_to_remote as u64
1037 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1038 txouts.push((TxOut {
1039 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1040 value: value_to_self as u64
1044 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1046 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1047 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1048 outputs.push(out.0);
1056 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1060 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1061 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1062 /// our counterparty!)
1063 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1064 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1065 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1066 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1067 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
1068 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1070 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1074 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1075 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1076 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1077 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1078 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1079 //may see payments to it!
1080 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
1081 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
1082 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1084 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1087 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1088 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1089 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1090 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1091 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1092 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1093 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1094 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1095 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1096 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1098 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1099 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1100 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1103 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1104 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1105 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1107 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1108 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1111 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1113 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1114 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1116 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1118 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1119 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1120 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1121 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1122 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1124 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1125 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1127 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1128 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1130 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1135 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1136 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1137 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1138 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1139 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1142 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
1143 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1144 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1147 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1149 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
1150 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1151 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1152 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1155 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1156 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
1157 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
1158 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1159 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1161 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1162 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1165 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1167 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1169 if local_tx { // b, then a
1170 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1171 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1173 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1174 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1176 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1177 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1180 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1182 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1185 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1190 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1191 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1192 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1193 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1194 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1195 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1196 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1198 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1199 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1201 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1203 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1205 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1206 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1207 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1209 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1210 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1211 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1212 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1214 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1215 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1216 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1218 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1220 return Ok((None, None));
1223 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1224 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1231 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1232 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1235 // Now update local state:
1237 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1238 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1239 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1241 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1242 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1243 match pending_update {
1244 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1245 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1246 return Ok((None, None));
1249 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1250 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1251 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1252 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1253 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1254 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1260 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1261 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1262 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1264 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1268 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1269 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1271 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1272 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1274 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1278 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1279 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1280 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1281 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1282 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1285 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1286 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1287 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1288 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1289 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1291 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1292 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1296 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1297 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1298 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1299 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1300 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1301 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1303 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1305 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1306 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1307 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1309 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1310 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1311 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1313 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1314 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1318 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1325 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1326 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1329 // Now update local state:
1330 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1331 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1332 match pending_update {
1333 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1334 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1339 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1346 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1347 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1354 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1355 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1358 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1359 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1360 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1365 // Message handlers:
1367 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1368 // Check sanity of message fields:
1369 if !self.channel_outbound {
1370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1372 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1375 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1378 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1381 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1384 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1387 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1390 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1393 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1396 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1399 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1403 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1404 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1407 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1410 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1413 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1416 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1419 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1422 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1426 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1427 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1428 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1429 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1430 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1431 Some(script.clone())
1432 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1433 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1435 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1440 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1441 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1447 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1449 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1450 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1451 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1452 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1453 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1454 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1455 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1456 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1457 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1458 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1459 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1460 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1461 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1462 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1464 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1465 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1466 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1468 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1473 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1474 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1476 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1477 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1478 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1480 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1481 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1483 // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
1484 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
1486 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1487 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1488 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1490 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1491 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
1494 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1495 if self.channel_outbound {
1496 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1498 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1499 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1500 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1504 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1505 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1506 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1507 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1510 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1511 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1512 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1514 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1517 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1522 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1524 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1525 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
1526 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1527 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1528 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1529 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1530 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1532 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1533 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1534 signature: our_signature
1535 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1538 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1539 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1540 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
1541 if !self.channel_outbound {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1544 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1547 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1548 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1549 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1550 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1553 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1555 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1556 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1557 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1559 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1560 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
1562 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1563 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1564 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1565 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
1566 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1568 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1569 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1571 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
1575 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1576 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1580 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1582 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1583 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1584 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1585 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1586 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1587 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1588 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1589 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1590 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1591 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1592 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1593 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1594 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1597 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1603 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1604 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1608 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1609 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1610 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1611 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1612 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1614 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1617 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1619 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1620 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1621 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1622 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1626 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1627 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1628 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1629 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1633 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1636 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1637 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1638 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1639 /// corner case properly.
1640 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1641 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1642 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1643 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1646 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1647 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1650 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1653 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1656 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1660 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1661 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1664 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1665 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1666 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
1669 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1670 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1671 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1672 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1673 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1674 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1675 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1676 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1677 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1678 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1679 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1681 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1682 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1683 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1684 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1685 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1686 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1689 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1692 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1695 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1696 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1699 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1701 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1702 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1703 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1707 // Now update local state:
1708 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1709 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1710 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1711 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1712 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1713 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1714 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1719 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1721 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1722 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1723 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1724 match check_preimage {
1726 Some(payment_hash) =>
1727 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1732 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1734 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1735 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1737 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1740 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1743 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1746 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1747 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1750 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1754 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1755 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1758 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1759 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1762 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1766 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1770 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1771 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1774 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1778 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1782 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1783 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1786 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1789 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1793 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1795 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1797 let mut update_fee = false;
1798 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1800 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1805 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1806 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1807 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1808 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1810 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1811 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1812 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1813 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
1815 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1817 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1818 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1820 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
1825 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
1829 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
1830 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1831 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1833 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1834 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1835 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1836 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1837 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1838 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1839 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1840 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
1841 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1842 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
1843 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1846 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1848 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
1850 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1854 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1855 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1857 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1858 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1859 if !self.channel_outbound {
1860 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1861 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1862 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1863 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1864 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1865 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1866 need_our_commitment = true;
1867 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1872 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1874 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1875 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1876 Some(forward_info.clone())
1878 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1879 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1880 need_our_commitment = true;
1883 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1884 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1885 Some(fail_reason.take())
1887 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1888 need_our_commitment = true;
1892 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1893 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1894 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1895 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1896 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1898 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1899 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1900 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1901 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1902 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1903 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1904 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1905 // includes the right HTLCs.
1906 // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
1907 // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
1908 // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
1909 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1910 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1912 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1913 // re-send the message on restoration)
1914 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
1917 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1918 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1919 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1920 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1921 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1922 (Some(msg), monitor, None)
1923 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1924 (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1925 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
1927 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1928 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1929 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1930 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1931 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1934 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1935 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1936 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1937 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1938 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1939 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1941 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1942 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1943 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1944 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1945 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1947 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1948 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1949 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1950 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1951 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1952 // to rebalance channels.
1953 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1954 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1956 match &htlc_update {
1957 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1958 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1959 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1962 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1963 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1966 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1974 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1975 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1977 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1979 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1985 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1986 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1988 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1990 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1997 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1998 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
1999 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2000 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2006 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2007 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2010 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2011 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2012 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2013 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2016 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2017 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2018 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2019 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2020 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2025 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2026 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2028 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2030 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2031 update_fee: update_fee,
2033 }, monitor_update)))
2042 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2043 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2044 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2045 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2046 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2047 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
2048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2054 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2058 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2059 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2063 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2064 .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
2066 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2067 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2068 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2069 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2070 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2071 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2072 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2073 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2075 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2076 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2077 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2078 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2079 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2080 let mut require_commitment = false;
2081 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2084 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2085 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2086 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2087 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2089 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2090 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2091 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2092 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2093 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2094 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2099 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2100 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2101 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2102 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2103 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2105 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2106 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2111 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2112 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2113 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2115 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2116 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2120 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2121 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2123 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2124 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2125 require_commitment = true;
2126 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2127 match forward_info {
2128 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2129 require_commitment = true;
2131 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2132 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2133 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2135 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2136 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2137 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2141 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2142 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2143 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2149 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2150 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2151 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2152 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2154 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2155 Some(fail_reason.take())
2157 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2158 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2159 require_commitment = true;
2163 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2165 if self.channel_outbound {
2166 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2167 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2170 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2171 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2172 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2173 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2174 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2175 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2176 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2177 require_commitment = true;
2178 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2183 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2184 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2185 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2186 if require_commitment {
2187 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2188 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2189 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2190 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2191 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2193 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2194 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2195 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
2198 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2199 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
2200 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2201 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2202 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2204 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2205 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2206 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2208 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
2211 if require_commitment {
2212 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2213 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2214 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2215 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2217 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2220 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2222 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2229 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2230 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2231 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2232 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2233 if !self.channel_outbound {
2234 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2236 if !self.is_usable() {
2237 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2239 if !self.is_live() {
2240 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2243 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2244 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2248 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2249 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2251 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2252 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2253 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2257 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
2258 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2259 Some(update_fee) => {
2260 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2261 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2267 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2268 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2269 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2270 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2271 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2273 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2274 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2276 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2277 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2278 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2279 return outbound_drops;
2281 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2282 // will be retransmitted.
2283 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2285 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2286 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2288 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2289 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2290 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2291 // this HTLC accordingly
2292 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2295 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2296 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2297 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2298 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2301 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2302 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2303 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2304 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2305 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2306 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2311 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2313 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2314 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2315 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2316 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2317 // the update upon reconnection.
2318 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2322 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2324 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2325 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2328 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2331 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2332 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2336 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2337 /// updates are partially paused.
2338 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2339 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2340 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2341 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2342 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2343 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2344 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2345 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2346 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2347 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2348 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2349 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2350 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2353 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2354 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2355 /// to the remote side.
2356 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2357 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2358 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2360 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2362 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2363 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2364 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2365 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2366 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2367 // monitor was persisted.
2368 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2369 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2370 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2371 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2372 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2373 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2374 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2375 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2379 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2380 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2381 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2382 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2384 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2385 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2386 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2387 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2390 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2391 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2393 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2394 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2397 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2398 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2399 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2400 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2401 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2402 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2403 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2404 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2405 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2408 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2409 if self.channel_outbound {
2410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2412 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2415 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2416 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2417 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2421 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2422 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2423 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2424 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2425 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2426 per_commitment_secret,
2427 next_per_commitment_point,
2431 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2432 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2433 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2434 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2435 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2437 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2438 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2439 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2440 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2441 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2442 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2443 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2444 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2445 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2450 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2451 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2453 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2454 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2455 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2456 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2457 reason: err_packet.clone()
2460 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2461 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2462 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2463 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2464 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2465 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2468 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2469 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2470 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2471 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2472 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2479 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2480 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2481 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2482 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2484 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2488 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2489 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2490 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2491 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2492 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2493 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2494 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2498 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2499 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2503 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2504 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2505 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2507 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2508 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2509 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2510 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2514 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2515 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2516 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2517 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2518 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2519 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2521 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2522 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2525 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2526 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2527 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2528 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2529 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2530 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2531 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2534 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2535 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2536 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2538 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2539 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2540 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2543 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2549 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2550 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2551 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2552 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2553 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2555 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2556 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2557 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2558 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2559 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2560 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2561 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2565 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2566 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2567 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2569 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2572 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2573 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2574 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2575 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2577 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2578 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2579 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2580 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2581 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2584 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2586 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2587 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2588 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2590 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2593 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2594 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2595 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2598 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2604 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2605 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2606 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2607 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2611 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2612 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2613 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2615 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2616 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2618 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2619 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2620 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2622 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
2623 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2624 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2625 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2626 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2630 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
2631 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2634 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2635 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2636 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2637 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2640 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2641 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2645 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2647 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2648 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2649 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2653 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2654 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2658 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2659 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2663 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2666 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2668 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2669 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2671 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2672 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2673 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2674 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2675 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2676 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2678 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2679 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2685 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2686 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2687 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2689 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2692 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2693 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2694 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2698 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2699 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2700 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2703 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
2704 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2707 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2710 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2713 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2717 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2718 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2719 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2722 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2724 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2727 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2728 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2729 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2730 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2731 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2735 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2736 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2737 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2738 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2739 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2740 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2744 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2745 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2746 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2747 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2748 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2749 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2750 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2751 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2752 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2753 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2759 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2760 if self.channel_outbound {
2761 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2762 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2763 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2764 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2768 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2771 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2772 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2773 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2774 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2778 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2782 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2783 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2784 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2786 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2787 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2788 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2790 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2793 // Public utilities:
2795 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2799 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2800 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2801 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2805 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2806 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2807 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2808 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2810 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2813 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2814 /// is_usable() returns true).
2815 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2816 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2817 self.short_channel_id
2820 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2821 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2822 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2823 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2826 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2827 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2831 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2832 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2833 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2836 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2837 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2838 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2841 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2842 self.channel_value_satoshis
2845 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2846 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2850 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2854 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2855 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2858 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2859 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2862 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2863 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2867 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2872 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2874 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2875 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2876 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2877 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2878 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2879 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2881 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2891 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2895 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2896 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2897 self.channel_update_count
2900 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2901 self.config.announced_channel
2904 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2905 self.channel_outbound
2908 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2910 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2911 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2912 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2914 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2915 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2917 if self.channel_outbound {
2918 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2919 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2922 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2923 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2928 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2929 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2930 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2933 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2934 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2935 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2936 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2937 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2940 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2941 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2942 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2943 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2944 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2947 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2949 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2950 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2953 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2954 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2955 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2958 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2959 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2960 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2961 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2962 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2963 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2968 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2969 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2970 /// the channel_monitor.
2971 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2972 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2973 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2974 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
2975 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2976 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2977 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2978 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2979 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2980 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2981 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
2982 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2983 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2985 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2986 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2987 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2989 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2990 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2991 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2993 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2994 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2996 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2997 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3000 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3002 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3003 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3004 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3005 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3006 if need_commitment_update {
3007 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3008 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3009 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3010 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3011 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3012 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3015 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3022 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3023 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3024 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
3025 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
3026 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3027 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3028 if self.channel_outbound {
3029 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3030 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3031 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3032 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3033 // channel and move on.
3034 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3035 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3037 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3038 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3039 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3040 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3041 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3044 if self.channel_outbound {
3045 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3046 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3047 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3048 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3049 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3050 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3054 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3055 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3056 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3057 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3065 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3066 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3067 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3068 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3069 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3070 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3071 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3075 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3076 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3078 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3079 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3083 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3084 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3086 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3087 if !self.channel_outbound {
3088 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3090 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3091 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3094 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3095 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3098 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3101 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3102 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3103 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3104 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3105 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3106 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3107 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3108 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3109 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3110 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3111 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3112 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3113 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3114 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3115 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3116 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3117 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3118 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3119 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3123 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3124 if self.channel_outbound {
3125 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3127 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3128 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3130 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3131 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3134 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3136 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3137 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3138 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3139 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3140 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3141 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3142 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3143 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3144 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3145 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
3146 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
3147 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
3148 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
3149 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
3150 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3151 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3155 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3156 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3157 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3159 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3160 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3161 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3163 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3164 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3167 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3168 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3169 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3170 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3171 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3172 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3173 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3174 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3175 if !self.channel_outbound {
3176 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3178 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3179 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3181 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3182 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3183 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3184 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3187 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3188 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3190 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3193 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3194 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
3199 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3201 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3202 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3203 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3204 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3205 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3207 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3208 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3209 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3210 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3211 signature: our_signature
3212 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3215 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3216 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3217 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3218 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3219 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3221 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3222 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3223 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3224 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3227 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3228 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3230 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3231 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3234 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3235 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3237 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3238 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3239 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3240 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3241 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3242 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3243 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
3244 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3245 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3248 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
3249 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3254 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3255 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3256 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3257 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3258 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3259 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3260 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3261 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3262 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3263 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3264 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3265 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3266 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3268 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3269 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3270 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3271 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3272 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3273 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3274 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3275 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3276 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3278 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3279 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
3284 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3286 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3287 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3288 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3289 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3290 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3291 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3292 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3293 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3294 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3295 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3298 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3301 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3302 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3305 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3306 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3307 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3308 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3309 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3310 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3311 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3312 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3315 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3316 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3317 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3319 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
3320 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3321 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight"));
3325 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3326 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3327 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"));
3331 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3333 // Now update local state:
3334 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3335 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3336 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3337 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3338 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3340 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3345 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3346 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3347 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3348 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3349 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3350 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3354 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3355 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3356 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3357 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3358 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3359 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3360 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3362 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3367 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3368 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3369 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3370 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3371 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3372 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3373 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3375 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3376 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3378 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3379 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3381 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3382 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3384 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3385 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3386 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3387 have_updates = true;
3389 if have_updates { break; }
3391 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3392 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3393 have_updates = true;
3395 if have_updates { break; }
3398 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3400 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3402 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3403 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3404 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3405 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3407 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3408 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3409 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3411 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3415 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3416 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3417 Some(fail_reason.take())
3419 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3422 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3424 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3425 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3426 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3427 let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3428 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3430 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3433 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3434 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3435 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3438 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3439 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3440 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3441 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3443 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3444 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3445 if self.channel_outbound {
3446 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3450 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3451 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3452 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3453 let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
3454 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3455 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3457 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
3458 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3459 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3460 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3461 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3462 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
3463 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
3464 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3465 log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
3469 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3470 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3472 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3473 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3476 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3477 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3478 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3480 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
3481 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3482 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3483 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3484 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3490 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3491 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3492 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3493 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3494 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3495 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3498 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3499 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3500 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3502 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3503 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3506 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3507 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3508 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3511 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3513 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3514 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3515 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3517 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3519 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3521 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3522 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3523 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3524 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3525 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3527 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3528 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3535 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3536 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3537 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3538 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3541 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3542 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3543 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3544 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3545 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3546 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3547 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3549 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3550 // return them to fail the payment.
3551 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3552 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3554 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3555 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3561 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3562 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3563 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3567 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3568 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3569 let mut res = Vec::new();
3570 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3571 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3575 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3576 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3578 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3579 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3581 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3583 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3585 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3587 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3588 err_code.write(writer)?;
3590 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3592 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3599 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3600 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3601 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3602 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3603 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3604 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3605 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3610 impl Writeable for Channel {
3611 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3612 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3613 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3615 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3616 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3618 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3619 self.config.write(writer)?;
3621 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3622 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3623 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3624 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3626 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3627 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3629 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3630 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3631 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3633 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3634 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3635 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3636 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3639 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3640 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3641 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3642 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3643 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3644 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3646 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3647 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3649 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3651 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3653 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3655 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3658 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3660 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3665 macro_rules! write_option {
3668 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3677 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3678 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3679 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3680 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3681 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3682 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3683 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3685 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3687 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3689 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3692 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3694 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3696 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3698 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3700 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3702 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3707 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3708 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3710 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3712 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3713 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3714 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3715 source.write(writer)?;
3716 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3718 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3720 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3721 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3723 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3725 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3726 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3731 match self.resend_order {
3732 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3733 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3736 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3737 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3738 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3740 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3741 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3742 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3743 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3746 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3747 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3748 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3749 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3750 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3753 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3754 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3756 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3757 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3758 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3759 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3761 (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3762 for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
3763 if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
3765 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
3766 _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
3771 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3772 Some((feerate, fee)) => {
3774 feerate.write(writer)?;
3777 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3780 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3781 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3783 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3784 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3786 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3787 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3788 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3789 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3790 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3791 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3792 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3793 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3794 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3795 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3797 write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
3798 write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
3799 write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
3800 write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
3801 write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
3802 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3804 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3805 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3807 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3809 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3814 impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
3815 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3816 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3817 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3818 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3819 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3822 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3823 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3825 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3826 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3827 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3828 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3830 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3831 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3833 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3834 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3835 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3837 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3838 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3839 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3840 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3841 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3842 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3843 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3844 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3845 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3846 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3847 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3848 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3849 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3850 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3855 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3856 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3857 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3858 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3859 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3860 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3861 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3862 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3863 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3864 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3865 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3866 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3867 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3868 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
3869 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3870 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3875 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3876 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3877 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3878 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3879 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3880 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3881 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3882 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3883 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3884 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3886 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3887 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3890 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3891 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3892 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3898 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3899 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3900 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3901 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3904 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
3905 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3906 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3908 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3909 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3910 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3911 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3914 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3915 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3916 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3917 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3920 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3921 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3923 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3924 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3925 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3926 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3928 let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3929 let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
3930 for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
3931 last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3933 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3937 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3939 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3940 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3943 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
3944 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3947 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3949 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3950 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3951 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3952 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3953 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3954 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3955 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3956 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3957 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3958 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
3960 let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3961 let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3962 let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3963 let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3964 let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3965 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3967 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3968 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3970 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3971 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3972 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3973 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3974 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3975 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3985 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3986 channel_value_satoshis,
3991 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3992 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3995 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3996 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3997 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4001 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4002 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4003 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4004 monitor_pending_forwards,
4005 monitor_pending_failures,
4008 holding_cell_update_fee,
4010 next_remote_htlc_id,
4011 channel_update_count,
4014 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4015 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4016 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4017 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4019 last_local_commitment_txn,
4021 last_sent_closing_fee,
4023 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4025 last_block_connected,
4026 funding_tx_confirmations,
4028 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4029 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4030 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4031 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4032 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4033 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4034 their_to_self_delay,
4036 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4039 their_funding_pubkey,
4040 their_revocation_basepoint,
4041 their_payment_basepoint,
4042 their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
4043 their_htlc_basepoint,
4044 their_cur_commitment_point,
4046 their_prev_commitment_point,
4049 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4060 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4061 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4062 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4063 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
4064 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4065 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4067 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4068 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4069 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4071 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4072 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
4073 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4074 use util::config::UserConfig;
4075 use util::test_utils;
4076 use util::logger::Logger;
4077 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
4078 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4079 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4080 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4081 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4082 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4085 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4088 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4089 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4095 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4096 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4097 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4101 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
4103 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4104 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4105 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4106 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4107 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4108 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4109 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4112 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4113 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4114 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4115 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4118 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
4119 fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4120 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4124 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4125 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4126 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4127 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4128 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4130 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
4131 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4132 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4133 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4134 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4136 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4137 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4138 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4140 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
4141 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4142 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4144 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4145 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4146 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4147 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4148 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4149 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4151 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4152 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
4154 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4155 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4156 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4158 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4159 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4160 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4162 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
4163 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
4164 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4166 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4168 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4169 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4170 // build_commitment_transaction.
4171 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
4172 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4173 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4174 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
4175 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
4177 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4179 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4180 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4182 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4183 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4184 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4188 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4189 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4190 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
4192 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
4194 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
4195 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4199 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4200 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4201 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4203 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4204 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4205 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4206 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4207 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4209 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4212 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4213 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4214 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4218 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4221 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
4222 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4223 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4228 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4229 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4231 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4232 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4233 "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");
4236 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4237 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4239 amount_msat: 1000000,
4241 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4242 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4244 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4247 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4248 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4250 amount_msat: 2000000,
4252 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4253 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4255 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4258 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4259 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4261 amount_msat: 2000000,
4263 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4264 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4265 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4267 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4270 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4271 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4273 amount_msat: 3000000,
4275 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4276 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4277 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4279 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4282 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4283 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4285 amount_msat: 4000000,
4287 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4288 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4290 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4295 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4296 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4297 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4299 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4300 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4301 "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");
4303 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4305 test_htlc_output!(0,
4306 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4307 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4308 "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");
4310 test_htlc_output!(1,
4311 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4312 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4313 "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");
4315 test_htlc_output!(2,
4316 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4317 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4318 "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");
4320 test_htlc_output!(3,
4321 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4322 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4323 "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");
4325 test_htlc_output!(4,
4326 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4327 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4328 "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");
4332 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4333 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4334 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4336 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4337 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4338 "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");
4340 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4342 test_htlc_output!(0,
4343 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4344 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4345 "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");
4347 test_htlc_output!(1,
4348 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4349 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4350 "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");
4352 test_htlc_output!(2,
4353 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4354 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4355 "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");
4357 test_htlc_output!(3,
4358 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4359 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4360 "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");
4362 test_htlc_output!(4,
4363 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4364 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4365 "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");
4369 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4370 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4371 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4373 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4374 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4375 "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");
4377 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4379 test_htlc_output!(0,
4380 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4381 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4382 "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");
4384 test_htlc_output!(1,
4385 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4386 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4387 "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");
4389 test_htlc_output!(2,
4390 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4391 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4392 "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");
4394 test_htlc_output!(3,
4395 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4396 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4397 "02000000000101579c183eca9e8236a5d7f5dcd79cfec32c497fdc0ec61533cde99ecd436cadd103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f0147304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4401 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4402 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4403 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4405 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4406 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4407 "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");
4409 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4411 test_htlc_output!(0,
4412 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4413 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4414 "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");
4416 test_htlc_output!(1,
4417 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4418 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4419 "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");
4421 test_htlc_output!(2,
4422 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4423 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4424 "02000000000101ca94a9ad516ebc0c4bdd7b6254871babfa978d5accafb554214137d398bfcf6a020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef180147304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4426 test_htlc_output!(3,
4427 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4428 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4429 "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");
4433 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4434 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4435 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4437 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4438 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4439 "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");
4441 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4443 test_htlc_output!(0,
4444 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4445 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4446 "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");
4448 test_htlc_output!(1,
4449 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4450 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4451 "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");
4453 test_htlc_output!(2,
4454 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4455 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4456 "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");
4460 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4461 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4462 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4464 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4465 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4466 "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");
4468 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4470 test_htlc_output!(0,
4471 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4472 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4473 "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");
4475 test_htlc_output!(1,
4476 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4477 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4478 "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");
4480 test_htlc_output!(2,
4481 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4482 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4483 "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");
4487 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4488 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4489 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4491 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4492 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4493 "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");
4495 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4497 test_htlc_output!(0,
4498 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4499 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4500 "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");
4502 test_htlc_output!(1,
4503 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4504 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4505 "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");
4509 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4510 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4511 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4513 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4514 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4515 "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");
4517 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4519 test_htlc_output!(0,
4520 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4521 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4522 "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");
4524 test_htlc_output!(1,
4525 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4526 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4527 "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");
4531 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4532 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4533 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4535 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4536 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4537 "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");
4539 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4541 test_htlc_output!(0,
4542 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4543 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4544 "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");
4548 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4549 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4550 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4552 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4553 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4554 "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");
4556 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4558 test_htlc_output!(0,
4559 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4560 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4561 "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");
4565 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4566 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4567 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4569 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4570 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4571 "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");
4573 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4577 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4578 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4579 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4581 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4582 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4583 "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");
4585 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4589 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4590 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4591 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4593 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4594 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4595 "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");
4597 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4601 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4602 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4603 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4605 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4606 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4607 "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");
4609 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4614 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4615 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4617 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4618 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4619 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4620 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4622 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4623 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4624 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4626 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4627 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4629 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
4630 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4632 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4633 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
4634 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4638 fn test_key_derivation() {
4639 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4642 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4643 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4645 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4646 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4648 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4649 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4651 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4652 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4654 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4655 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4657 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4658 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4660 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4661 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());