1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash, Hash160};
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
9 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
13 use crypto::digest::Digest;
16 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, HandleError};
17 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
18 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder};
19 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
21 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
22 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
23 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
24 use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
25 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
26 use util::sha2::Sha256;
27 use util::logger::Logger;
28 use util::errors::APIError;
29 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
32 use std::default::Default;
34 use std::time::Instant;
38 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
39 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
40 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
41 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
42 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
43 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
44 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
48 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
49 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
50 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
54 enum InboundHTLCState {
55 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
56 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
57 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
58 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
59 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
60 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
61 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
62 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
63 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
64 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
65 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
66 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
68 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
70 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
71 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
73 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
74 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
75 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
76 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
77 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
78 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
79 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
80 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
83 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
87 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
88 state: InboundHTLCState,
91 enum OutboundHTLCState {
92 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
93 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
94 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
95 /// revoke, but we dont really care about that:
96 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
97 /// money back (though we wont), and,
98 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
99 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
100 /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
101 /// we'll never get out of sync).
102 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
103 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
104 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
106 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
107 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
109 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
110 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
111 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
112 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
113 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
114 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
115 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
116 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
117 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
118 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
119 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
120 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
123 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
127 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
128 state: OutboundHTLCState,
130 /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
131 fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
134 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
135 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
136 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
138 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
139 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
140 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
141 transaction_output_index: 0
146 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
147 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
152 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
154 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
155 time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
158 payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
168 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
169 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
170 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
171 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
172 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
173 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
175 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
176 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
177 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
178 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
179 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
180 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
181 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
183 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
184 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
185 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
187 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
188 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
189 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
190 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
191 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
192 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
194 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
195 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
197 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
198 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
199 /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
200 /// messages until they've managed to do so.
201 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
202 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
203 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
204 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
205 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
207 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
208 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
209 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
210 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
211 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
212 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
213 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
214 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
215 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
216 /// us their shutdown.
217 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
218 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
219 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
220 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
222 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
223 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
225 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
227 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
228 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
229 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
231 pub(super) struct Channel {
232 config: ChannelConfig,
236 channel_id: [u8; 32],
238 channel_outbound: bool,
239 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
240 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
242 local_keys: ChannelKeys,
243 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
245 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
246 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
247 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
249 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
250 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
251 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
252 /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
253 /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
254 /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
255 /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
256 /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
257 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
262 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
263 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
264 monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
265 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
266 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>,
268 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
269 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
270 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
272 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
273 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
274 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
275 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
276 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
277 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
278 // commitment_signed.
279 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
280 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
281 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
282 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
283 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
284 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
285 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
286 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
287 channel_update_count: u32,
290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
291 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
292 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
293 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
294 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
295 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
298 // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
299 pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
301 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
303 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
305 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
306 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
307 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
308 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
309 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
310 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
311 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
312 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
313 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
314 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
316 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
317 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
318 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
319 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
320 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
321 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
322 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
323 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
324 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
325 their_to_self_delay: u16,
326 //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
327 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
328 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
331 their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
332 their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
333 their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
334 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
335 their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
336 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
338 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
339 their_node_id: PublicKey,
341 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
343 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
348 const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
349 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
350 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
351 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
352 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
353 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
354 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
355 const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
357 const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
358 /// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
359 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
360 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
361 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
362 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
363 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
365 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
367 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
368 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
369 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
371 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
372 Ignore(&'static str),
376 macro_rules! secp_call {
377 ( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
380 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
385 macro_rules! secp_check {
386 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
389 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
395 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
396 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
397 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
400 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
402 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
403 fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
404 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
405 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
408 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
409 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
412 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
416 fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
417 // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
419 const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
424 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
425 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
427 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
428 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
431 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
436 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
437 if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
438 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
441 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
443 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
444 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
445 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
446 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
450 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
452 channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
453 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
454 channel_outbound: true,
456 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
458 local_keys: chan_keys,
459 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
460 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
461 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
462 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
463 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
465 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
466 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
467 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
468 pending_update_fee: None,
469 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
470 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
471 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
472 channel_update_count: 1,
474 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
475 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
476 monitor_pending_order: None,
477 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
478 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
483 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
485 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
487 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
489 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
490 short_channel_id: None,
491 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
492 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
494 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
495 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
496 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
497 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
498 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
499 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
500 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
501 their_to_self_delay: 0,
502 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
503 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
505 their_funding_pubkey: None,
506 their_revocation_basepoint: None,
507 their_payment_basepoint: None,
508 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
509 their_htlc_basepoint: None,
510 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
512 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
513 their_node_id: their_node_id,
515 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
517 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
523 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
524 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
525 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
527 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
533 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
534 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
535 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
536 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
537 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
539 // Check sanity of message fields:
540 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
543 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
546 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
549 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
550 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
552 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
553 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
555 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value"));
558 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
560 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
563 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
566 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
570 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
571 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
574 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
577 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
580 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
583 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
586 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
589 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
593 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
595 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
596 if config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
597 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
601 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
602 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
604 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
606 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
607 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
608 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
611 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
614 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
618 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
619 // for full fee payment
620 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
621 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
625 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
626 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
627 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
633 &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
634 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
635 channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
636 channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
638 let mut chan = Channel {
640 config: local_config,
642 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
643 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
644 channel_outbound: false,
647 local_keys: chan_keys,
648 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
649 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
650 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
651 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
652 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
654 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
655 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
656 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
657 pending_update_fee: None,
658 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
659 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
660 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
661 channel_update_count: 1,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
665 monitor_pending_order: None,
666 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
667 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
669 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
670 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
671 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
672 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
674 last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
676 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
678 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
679 short_channel_id: None,
680 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
681 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
683 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
684 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
685 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
686 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
687 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
688 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
689 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
690 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
691 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
692 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
693 minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(msg.funding_satoshis*1000, msg.push_msat),
695 their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
696 their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
697 their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
698 their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
699 their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
700 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
702 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
703 their_node_id: their_node_id,
705 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
707 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
712 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
713 chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
718 // Utilities to derive keys:
720 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
721 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
722 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).unwrap()
725 // Utilities to build transactions:
727 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
728 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
729 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
731 if self.channel_outbound {
732 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
733 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
735 sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
736 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
738 let mut res = [0; 32];
739 sha.result(&mut res);
741 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
742 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
743 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
744 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
745 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
746 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
749 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
750 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
751 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
752 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
753 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
755 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
756 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
757 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
758 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
759 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
760 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
761 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
763 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
764 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
767 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
769 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
770 script_sig: Script::new(),
771 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
777 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
779 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
780 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
781 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
782 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
784 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
785 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr) => {
786 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
787 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
788 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
790 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
791 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
792 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
795 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
796 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
797 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
798 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
799 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
800 }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
806 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
807 let include = match htlc.state {
808 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local,
809 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local,
810 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true,
811 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
812 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local,
816 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false);
817 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
820 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
821 if generated_by_local {
822 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
823 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
832 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
833 let include = match htlc.state {
834 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
835 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
836 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
837 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
838 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
842 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true);
843 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
846 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
847 if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
848 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
851 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
852 if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
853 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
862 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
863 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
865 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
867 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
868 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
869 // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
871 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
872 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
874 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
876 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
877 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
878 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
879 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
882 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
883 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
884 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
886 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
889 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
890 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
892 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
894 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
895 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
896 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
897 value: value_to_a as u64
901 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
903 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
904 .push_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
906 value: value_to_b as u64
910 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
912 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
913 let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
914 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
916 if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
917 htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
918 htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
924 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
931 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
932 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
933 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
937 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
938 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
942 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
944 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
946 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
947 script_sig: Script::new(),
948 sequence: 0xffffffff,
954 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
955 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
956 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
958 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
959 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
960 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
962 if value_to_self < 0 {
963 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
964 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
965 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
966 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
967 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
970 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
972 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
973 value: value_to_remote as u64
977 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
979 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
980 value: value_to_self as u64
984 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
986 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
987 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
996 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1000 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1001 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1002 /// our counterparty!)
1003 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1004 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1005 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1006 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1007 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
1008 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1010 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1014 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1015 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1016 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1017 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1018 //may see payments to it!
1019 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
1020 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
1021 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
1023 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1026 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1027 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1028 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1029 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1030 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
1031 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1032 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
1033 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1034 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1035 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1037 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
1038 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
1039 }.push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1042 fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
1043 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1044 panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
1046 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1047 panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
1050 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1052 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1053 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
1055 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1057 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
1058 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
1059 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
1060 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1061 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1063 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1064 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1066 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1067 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1069 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1074 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1075 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1076 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1077 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1078 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1081 fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
1082 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1083 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1086 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1088 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
1089 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1090 let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
1091 Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
1094 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
1095 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
1096 fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
1097 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
1098 panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
1100 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
1101 panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
1104 let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
1106 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1108 if local_tx { // b, then a
1109 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1110 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1112 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1113 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1115 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1116 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1119 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1121 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
1124 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
1129 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1130 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1131 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1132 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1133 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
1134 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1135 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1137 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1138 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1140 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1142 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1143 sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
1144 let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
1145 sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
1147 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1148 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1149 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1150 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1151 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1153 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1154 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1160 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1161 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1165 // Now update local state:
1167 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1168 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1169 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1171 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1172 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1173 match pending_update {
1174 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1175 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1176 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a pending fulfill for");
1177 return Ok((None, None));
1180 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1181 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1182 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a holding-cell failure on");
1183 // Return the new channel monitor in a last-ditch effort to hit the
1184 // chain and claim the funds
1185 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1191 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1192 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1194 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1198 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1199 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1201 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1202 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1204 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1207 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1208 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1209 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1210 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1211 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1214 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1215 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1216 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1217 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1218 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1220 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1221 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1225 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1226 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1227 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1228 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1229 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1230 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1232 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1234 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1235 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1236 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1237 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1239 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to fail before it was fully committed to");
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1245 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1246 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1250 // Now update local state:
1251 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1252 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1253 match pending_update {
1254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1255 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1256 debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1260 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1261 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1262 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that we already had a pending failure for");
1269 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1270 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1277 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1278 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1281 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1282 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1283 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1288 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1289 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
1290 Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
1291 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1292 Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
1298 // Message handlers:
1300 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1301 // Check sanity of message fields:
1302 if !self.channel_outbound {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1305 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1308 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1311 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1314 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1317 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1320 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1323 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1326 if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1329 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1332 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
1336 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1337 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1340 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1343 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1346 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1349 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1352 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1355 if msg.minimum_depth > config.channel_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1359 self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1361 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1362 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1363 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1364 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1365 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1366 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1367 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1368 self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
1369 self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
1370 self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
1371 self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
1372 self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
1373 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1375 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1376 self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
1377 self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
1379 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1384 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1385 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1387 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1388 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1389 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1391 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1392 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1394 // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
1395 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
1397 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1398 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1399 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1401 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1402 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
1405 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1406 if self.channel_outbound {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1409 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1410 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1411 // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1415 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1416 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1417 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1418 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1421 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1422 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1423 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1425 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1428 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1433 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1435 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1436 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
1437 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1438 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1439 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1440 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1441 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1443 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1444 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1445 signature: our_signature
1446 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1449 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1450 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1451 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
1452 if !self.channel_outbound {
1453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1455 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1458 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1459 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1460 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1461 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1464 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1466 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1467 let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1468 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1470 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1471 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
1473 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
1474 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1475 self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
1476 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1477 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1479 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1482 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1483 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1487 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1489 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1490 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1491 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1492 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1493 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1494 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1495 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1496 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1497 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
1498 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1501 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1504 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1507 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1508 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1512 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1513 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1514 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1515 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1518 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1521 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1522 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1523 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1524 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1525 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1531 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1532 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1533 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
1535 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1536 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
1538 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1539 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
1541 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1542 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
1545 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1546 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1547 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
1549 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
1550 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1551 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1552 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
1554 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1555 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1556 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1557 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
1558 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
1560 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1561 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
1563 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1564 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
1567 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1569 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1570 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1571 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1575 // Now update local state:
1576 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1577 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1578 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1579 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1580 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1581 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1582 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1588 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1590 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1591 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1592 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1593 match check_preimage {
1595 Some(payment_hash) =>
1596 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1601 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1603 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1604 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
1605 htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
1607 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1610 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1613 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1616 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1617 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1620 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1624 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1625 sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
1626 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1627 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1629 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)
1632 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1633 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1636 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1640 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1643 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1644 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1647 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1651 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
1654 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1655 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1658 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1661 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1665 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1667 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1669 let mut update_fee = false;
1670 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1672 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1677 let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1678 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1679 let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
1680 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
1682 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1684 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1.len();
1685 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1687 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
1692 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
1693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
1696 let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
1697 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
1698 new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
1700 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
1701 for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
1702 let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1703 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1704 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
1705 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
1706 let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
1707 let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
1708 new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
1711 self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
1713 htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
1716 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1717 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1719 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1720 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1721 if !self.channel_outbound {
1722 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1723 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1724 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1725 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1726 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1727 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1728 need_our_commitment = true;
1729 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1734 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1735 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1736 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1737 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1740 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1742 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1743 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1744 Some(forward_info.clone())
1746 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1747 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1748 need_our_commitment = true;
1751 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1752 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
1753 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
1754 need_our_commitment = true;
1758 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1759 self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
1760 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
1762 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1763 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1764 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
1765 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
1768 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1769 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1770 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1771 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1772 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1773 (Some(msg), monitor, None)
1774 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1775 (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1776 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
1778 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1779 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1780 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1781 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1782 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1785 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1786 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1787 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1788 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1789 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1790 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1791 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1792 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1793 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1794 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1796 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1797 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1798 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1799 // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1800 // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1801 // to rebalance channels.
1802 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1803 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1805 match &htlc_update {
1806 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1807 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1808 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1814 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1815 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1816 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1818 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1820 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1825 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1826 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1827 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1829 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1831 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1838 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1842 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
1843 //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
1846 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
1847 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
1848 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
1849 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
1852 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
1853 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
1854 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1855 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1856 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
1861 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1862 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1864 update_fulfill_htlcs,
1866 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1867 update_fee: update_fee,
1869 }, monitor_update)))
1878 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
1879 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
1880 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
1881 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
1882 /// revoke_and_ack message.
1883 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1884 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1887 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1890 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1894 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
1895 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
1896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
1899 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
1900 .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
1902 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1903 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
1904 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
1905 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
1906 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
1907 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1908 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1909 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1910 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
1911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1912 // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
1913 // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
1914 self.monitor_pending_order = None;
1917 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
1918 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
1919 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
1920 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
1921 let mut require_commitment = false;
1922 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
1923 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
1924 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1925 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
1926 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1927 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1932 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
1933 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
1934 if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
1935 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
1937 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
1938 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1943 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1944 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
1946 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
1950 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1951 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
1953 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
1954 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
1955 require_commitment = true;
1956 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
1957 match forward_info {
1958 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
1959 require_commitment = true;
1961 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
1962 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
1963 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
1965 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
1966 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
1967 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
1971 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
1972 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
1973 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
1979 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1980 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
1981 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
1982 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
1983 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
1984 require_commitment = true;
1987 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
1989 if self.channel_outbound {
1990 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
1991 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1994 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
1995 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a
1996 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
1997 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
1998 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
1999 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2000 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2001 require_commitment = true;
2002 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2007 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2008 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2009 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2010 if require_commitment {
2011 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2013 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2014 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2015 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
2018 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2019 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
2020 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2021 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2022 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2024 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2025 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2026 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2028 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
2031 if require_commitment {
2032 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2033 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2034 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2035 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2037 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2040 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2042 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2049 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2050 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2051 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2052 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2053 if !self.channel_outbound {
2054 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2056 if !self.is_usable() {
2057 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2059 if !self.is_live() {
2060 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2063 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2064 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2068 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2069 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2071 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2072 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2073 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2077 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
2078 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2079 Some(update_fee) => {
2080 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2081 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2087 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2088 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2089 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2090 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2091 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2093 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])> {
2094 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2096 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2097 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2098 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2099 return outbound_drops;
2101 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2102 // will be retransmitted.
2103 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2105 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2106 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2108 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2109 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2110 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2111 // this HTLC accordingly
2112 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2115 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2116 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2117 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2118 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2121 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2122 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2123 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2124 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2125 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2126 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2131 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2133 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2134 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
2135 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2136 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2137 // the update upon reconnection.
2138 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2142 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2144 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2145 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2151 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2152 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2156 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2157 /// updates are partially paused.
2158 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2159 /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
2160 /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
2161 /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
2162 /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2163 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder) {
2164 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2166 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2167 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2168 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2170 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2171 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2172 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2175 self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
2176 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2179 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2180 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2181 /// to the remote side.
2182 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>) {
2183 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2184 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2186 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2187 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2188 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2189 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2191 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2192 // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
2193 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2194 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2195 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
2198 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2199 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2201 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2202 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2205 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2206 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2207 (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
2210 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2211 if self.channel_outbound {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2214 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2217 Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2218 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2219 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2223 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2224 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2225 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2226 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2227 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2228 per_commitment_secret,
2229 next_per_commitment_point,
2233 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2234 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2235 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2236 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2237 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2239 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2240 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2241 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2242 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2243 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2244 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2245 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2246 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2247 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2252 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2253 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2255 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2256 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2257 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2258 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2259 reason: err_packet.clone()
2262 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2263 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2264 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2265 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2266 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2267 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2270 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2271 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2272 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2273 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2274 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2281 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2282 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2283 update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
2284 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2288 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2289 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2290 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2291 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2292 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2293 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2294 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2298 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2302 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2303 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2304 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2306 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2307 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2308 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2309 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2313 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2314 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2315 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2318 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 {
2319 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a pre-funding channel_reestablish after we exchanged funding_locked"));
2322 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2323 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2324 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2325 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2326 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2327 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2328 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2331 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2332 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2333 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2335 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2336 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2337 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2340 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2346 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2347 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2348 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2349 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2350 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2352 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2353 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2354 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2355 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2356 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2357 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2358 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2362 let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
2363 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
2365 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
2368 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2369 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2370 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2372 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2375 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
2376 self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
2377 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2378 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2379 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2381 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2382 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2383 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2384 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
2385 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
2388 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
2390 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2391 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2392 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2394 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2397 // If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
2398 debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());
2400 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2401 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2402 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
2405 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
2407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2411 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2412 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2413 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2414 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() ||
2415 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number{
2419 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2420 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2421 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2423 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2424 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2426 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2427 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2428 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2430 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
2431 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2432 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2433 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2434 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2438 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), ChannelError> {
2439 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2442 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2443 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2444 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2445 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2448 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2449 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2450 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2453 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2455 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2456 // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2457 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2461 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2462 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2466 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2467 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2471 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2474 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2476 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2477 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2479 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2480 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2481 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2482 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2483 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2484 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2486 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2487 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2493 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2494 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2495 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2497 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2500 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2501 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2502 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2506 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2507 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2508 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2511 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
2512 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2513 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
2515 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2516 return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
2518 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2519 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
2521 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2522 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
2525 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2526 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2527 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2528 return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
2530 let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2532 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
2535 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2536 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2537 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2538 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2539 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
2543 if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2544 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2545 self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2546 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2547 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2548 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2552 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2553 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2554 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2555 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2556 sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2557 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
2558 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
2559 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2560 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2561 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2567 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
2568 if self.channel_outbound {
2569 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2570 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2571 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2572 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2573 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
2576 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2579 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2580 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2581 if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2582 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2583 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
2586 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2590 let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
2591 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2592 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2594 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2595 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2596 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2598 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2601 // Public utilities:
2603 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2607 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2608 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2609 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2613 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2614 pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
2615 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2616 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2618 self.channel_monitor.clone()
2621 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2622 /// is_usable() returns true).
2623 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2624 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2625 self.short_channel_id
2628 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2629 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2630 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2631 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2634 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2635 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2640 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2641 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2644 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2645 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2646 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2649 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2650 self.channel_value_satoshis
2653 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2654 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2658 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2662 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2663 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2666 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2667 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2670 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2671 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2674 //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
2676 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
2681 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2683 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2684 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2685 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2686 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2687 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2688 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2690 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2692 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2700 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2704 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2705 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2706 self.channel_update_count
2709 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2710 self.config.announced_channel
2713 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2714 self.channel_outbound
2717 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2718 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2719 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2720 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2721 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2723 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2724 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2726 if self.channel_outbound {
2727 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2728 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2731 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2732 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2737 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2738 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2739 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2742 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2743 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2744 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2745 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2746 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2749 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2750 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2751 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2752 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2753 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2756 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2757 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2758 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2759 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2762 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2763 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2764 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2767 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2768 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2769 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2770 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2771 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2772 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2777 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2778 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2779 /// the channel_monitor.
2780 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2781 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2782 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2783 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
2784 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2785 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2786 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2787 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2788 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2789 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2790 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
2791 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2792 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2794 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2795 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2796 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2798 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2799 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2800 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2802 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2803 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2805 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2806 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2809 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
2811 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
2812 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
2813 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
2814 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
2815 if need_commitment_update {
2816 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2817 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2818 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2819 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2820 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2826 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2827 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
2828 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
2829 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
2830 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
2831 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
2832 if self.channel_outbound {
2833 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
2834 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
2835 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
2836 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
2837 // channel and move on.
2838 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2839 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2841 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2842 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2843 return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
2845 if self.channel_outbound {
2846 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2847 if input.witness.is_empty() {
2848 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
2849 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
2850 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2851 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
2855 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
2856 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
2857 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
2858 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
2866 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
2867 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
2868 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
2869 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
2870 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2871 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
2872 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
2876 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
2877 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
2879 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2880 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2884 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
2885 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
2887 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
2888 if !self.channel_outbound {
2889 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
2891 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2892 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
2895 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2896 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2899 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2902 chain_hash: chain_hash,
2903 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2904 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2905 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
2906 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2907 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2908 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2909 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2910 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
2911 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2912 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2913 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2914 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2915 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2916 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2917 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2918 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2919 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
2920 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2924 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
2925 if self.channel_outbound {
2926 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
2928 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2929 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
2931 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2932 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
2935 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2937 msgs::AcceptChannel {
2938 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
2939 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
2940 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2941 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2942 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
2943 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
2944 to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
2945 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
2946 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
2947 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
2948 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
2949 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
2950 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
2951 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
2952 shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2956 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
2957 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2959 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2960 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
2961 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
2963 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2964 Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
2967 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
2968 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
2969 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
2970 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
2971 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
2972 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
2973 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
2974 if !self.channel_outbound {
2975 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
2977 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2978 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
2980 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2981 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2982 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2983 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2986 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2987 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
2989 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
2992 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
2993 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
2998 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3000 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3001 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3002 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3003 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3004 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3006 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3007 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3008 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3009 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3010 signature: our_signature
3011 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3014 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3015 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3016 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3017 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3018 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3020 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3021 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3022 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3023 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3026 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3029 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3033 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3034 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3036 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3037 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3038 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3039 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3040 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3041 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3042 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
3043 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3044 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3047 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3048 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3053 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3054 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3055 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3056 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3057 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3058 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3059 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3060 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -
3061 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) { 1 } else { 0 },
3062 data_loss_protect: None,
3067 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3069 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3070 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3071 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3072 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3073 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3074 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3075 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3076 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3080 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3083 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3084 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3088 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3089 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3090 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3091 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3092 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3093 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3097 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3098 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3101 //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
3102 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3103 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3104 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"));
3107 let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
3108 for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3109 match holding_htlc {
3110 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => {
3111 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat;
3117 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3118 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3119 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"));
3123 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3125 // Now update local state:
3126 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3127 //TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs!
3128 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3129 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3130 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3131 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3133 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3134 time_created: Instant::now(),
3139 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3140 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3141 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3142 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3143 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3144 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3149 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3150 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3151 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3152 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3153 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3154 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3155 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3157 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3162 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3163 /// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3164 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3165 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3166 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3167 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3168 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3170 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3171 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3173 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3174 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3176 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3177 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3179 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3180 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3181 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3182 have_updates = true;
3184 if have_updates { break; }
3187 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3189 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3191 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3192 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3193 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3194 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3196 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3197 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3198 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3200 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3204 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3205 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
3206 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
3210 match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3211 Ok((res, remote_commitment_tx)) => {
3212 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3213 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3214 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3215 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3221 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3222 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3223 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)), ChannelError> {
3224 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3226 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3227 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3228 if self.channel_outbound {
3229 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3233 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3234 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3235 let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
3236 let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3237 let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
3239 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
3241 for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
3242 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
3243 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
3244 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3245 let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
3246 htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
3249 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3250 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3252 htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
3253 }, remote_commitment_tx))
3256 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3257 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3258 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3260 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
3261 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3262 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3263 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3264 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3270 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3271 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3272 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), APIError> {
3273 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3274 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3275 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3278 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3279 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3280 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3282 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3283 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3286 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3287 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3288 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3291 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3293 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3294 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3297 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3299 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3301 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3302 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3303 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3304 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3305 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3307 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3308 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3315 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3316 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3317 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3318 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3321 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
3322 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3323 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3324 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3325 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3326 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>) {
3327 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3329 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3330 // return them to fail the payment.
3331 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3332 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3334 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3335 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3341 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3342 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3343 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3347 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3348 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3349 let mut res = Vec::new();
3350 mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
3351 (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3355 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3356 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3358 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3359 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3361 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3363 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3365 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3367 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3368 err_code.write(writer)?;
3370 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3372 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3379 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3380 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3381 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3382 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3383 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3384 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3385 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3390 impl Writeable for Channel {
3391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3392 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3393 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3395 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3396 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3398 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3399 self.config.write(writer)?;
3401 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3402 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3403 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3404 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3406 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3407 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3409 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3410 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3411 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3413 self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;
3415 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3416 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3417 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3418 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3421 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3422 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3423 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3424 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3425 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3426 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3428 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3429 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3431 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3433 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3435 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3437 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3440 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3442 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3447 macro_rules! write_option {
3450 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3459 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3460 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3461 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3462 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3463 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3464 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3465 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3466 write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
3468 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3470 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3472 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3475 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
3478 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
3481 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
3487 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3488 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3490 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
3492 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3493 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3494 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3495 source.write(writer)?;
3496 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3497 // time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
3499 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3501 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3502 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3504 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3506 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3507 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3512 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3513 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3514 match self.monitor_pending_order {
3515 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3516 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3517 Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
3520 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3521 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3522 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3523 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3526 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3527 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3528 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3529 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3530 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3533 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3534 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3536 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3537 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3538 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3539 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3541 (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3542 for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
3543 if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
3545 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
3546 _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
3551 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3552 Some((feerate, fee)) => {
3554 feerate.write(writer)?;
3557 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3560 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3561 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3563 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3564 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3566 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3567 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3568 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3569 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3570 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3571 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3572 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3573 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3574 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3576 write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
3577 write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
3578 write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
3579 write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
3580 write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
3581 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3583 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3584 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3586 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3588 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3593 impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
3594 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3595 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3596 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3597 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3598 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3601 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3602 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3604 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3605 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3606 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3607 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3609 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3610 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3612 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3613 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3614 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3616 let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;
3618 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3619 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3620 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3621 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3622 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3623 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3624 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3625 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3626 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3627 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3628 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3629 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3630 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3631 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3636 macro_rules! read_option { () => {
3637 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3639 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3644 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3645 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3646 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3647 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3648 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3649 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3650 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3651 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3652 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3653 fail_reason: read_option!(),
3654 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3655 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3656 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3657 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
3658 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
3659 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
3660 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3665 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3666 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3667 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3668 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3669 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3670 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3671 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3672 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3673 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3674 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3675 time_created: Instant::now(),
3677 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3678 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3679 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3681 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3682 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3683 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3685 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3689 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3690 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3692 let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3694 1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
3695 2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
3696 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3699 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3700 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3701 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3702 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3705 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3706 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3707 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3708 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3711 let pending_update_fee = read_option!();
3712 let holding_cell_update_fee = read_option!();
3714 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3715 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3716 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3717 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3719 let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3720 let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
3721 for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
3722 last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
3724 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3728 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3730 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3731 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3734 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = read_option!();
3735 let short_channel_id = read_option!();
3737 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3738 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3740 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3741 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3742 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3743 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3744 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3745 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3746 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3747 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3748 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
3750 let their_funding_pubkey = read_option!();
3751 let their_revocation_basepoint = read_option!();
3752 let their_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
3753 let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
3754 let their_htlc_basepoint = read_option!();
3755 let their_cur_commitment_point = read_option!();
3757 let their_prev_commitment_point = read_option!();
3758 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3760 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = read_option!();
3761 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3762 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3763 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3764 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3775 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3776 channel_value_satoshis,
3781 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3782 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3785 received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
3786 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3787 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3788 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
3790 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
3791 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
3792 monitor_pending_order,
3793 monitor_pending_forwards,
3794 monitor_pending_failures,
3797 holding_cell_update_fee,
3799 next_remote_htlc_id,
3800 channel_update_count,
3803 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3804 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3805 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3806 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
3808 last_local_commitment_txn,
3810 last_sent_closing_fee,
3812 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
3814 last_block_connected,
3815 funding_tx_confirmations,
3817 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
3818 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3819 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3820 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
3821 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
3822 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3823 their_to_self_delay,
3824 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
3827 their_funding_pubkey,
3828 their_revocation_basepoint,
3829 their_payment_basepoint,
3830 their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
3831 their_htlc_basepoint,
3832 their_cur_commitment_point,
3834 their_prev_commitment_point,
3837 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
3848 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
3849 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3850 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
3851 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3852 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3853 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3855 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
3856 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
3857 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
3859 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
3860 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3861 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3862 use util::config::UserConfig;
3863 use util::test_utils;
3864 use util::logger::Logger;
3865 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
3866 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3867 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3868 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3871 struct TestFeeEstimator {
3874 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
3875 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
3881 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
3882 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
3883 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
3887 chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
3889 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
3890 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
3891 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
3892 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
3893 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3894 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
3895 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
3898 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
3899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
3900 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3901 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
3904 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
3908 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
3909 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
3910 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
3911 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3912 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3914 let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
3915 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3916 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3917 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3918 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3920 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
3921 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3922 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
3924 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
3925 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
3926 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
3928 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
3929 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
3930 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
3931 let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
3932 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
3933 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
3935 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
3936 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
3938 chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3939 assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3940 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3942 chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3943 assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3944 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
3946 chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
3947 assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
3948 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
3950 chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
3952 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
3953 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
3954 // build_commitment_transaction.
3955 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
3956 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3957 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
3958 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
3959 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
3961 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
3963 macro_rules! test_commitment {
3964 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
3965 unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3966 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3967 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
3968 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
3970 chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
3972 assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
3973 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
3977 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
3978 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
3979 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3981 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
3982 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
3983 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
3984 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
3985 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
3987 let mut preimage: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
3990 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3991 sha.input(&[i; 32]);
3993 let mut out = [0; 32];
3994 sha.result(&mut out);
3996 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
3997 preimage = Some([i; 32]);
4001 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4004 chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
4005 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4006 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4011 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4012 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4014 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4015 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4016 "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");
4019 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4020 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4022 amount_msat: 1000000,
4024 payment_hash: [0; 32],
4025 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4027 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4028 sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4029 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
4032 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4033 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4035 amount_msat: 2000000,
4037 payment_hash: [0; 32],
4038 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4040 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4041 sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4042 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
4045 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4046 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4048 amount_msat: 2000000,
4050 payment_hash: [0; 32],
4051 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4052 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4055 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4056 sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
4057 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
4060 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4061 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4063 amount_msat: 3000000,
4065 payment_hash: [0; 32],
4066 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4067 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4070 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4071 sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
4072 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
4075 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4076 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4078 amount_msat: 4000000,
4080 payment_hash: [0; 32],
4081 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4083 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4084 sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
4085 sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
4090 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4091 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4092 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4094 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4095 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4096 "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");
4098 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4100 test_htlc_output!(0,
4101 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4102 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4103 "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");
4105 test_htlc_output!(1,
4106 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4107 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4108 "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");
4110 test_htlc_output!(2,
4111 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4112 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4113 "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");
4115 test_htlc_output!(3,
4116 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4117 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4118 "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");
4120 test_htlc_output!(4,
4121 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4122 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4123 "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");
4127 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4128 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4129 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4131 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4132 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4133 "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");
4135 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4137 test_htlc_output!(0,
4138 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4139 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4140 "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");
4142 test_htlc_output!(1,
4143 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4144 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4145 "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");
4147 test_htlc_output!(2,
4148 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4149 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4150 "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");
4152 test_htlc_output!(3,
4153 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4154 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4155 "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");
4157 test_htlc_output!(4,
4158 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4159 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4160 "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");
4164 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4165 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4166 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4168 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4169 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4170 "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");
4172 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4174 test_htlc_output!(0,
4175 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4176 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4177 "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");
4179 test_htlc_output!(1,
4180 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4181 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4182 "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");
4184 test_htlc_output!(2,
4185 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4186 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4187 "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");
4189 test_htlc_output!(3,
4190 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4191 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4192 "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");
4196 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4197 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4198 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4200 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4201 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4202 "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");
4204 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4206 test_htlc_output!(0,
4207 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4208 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4209 "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");
4211 test_htlc_output!(1,
4212 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4213 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4214 "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");
4216 test_htlc_output!(2,
4217 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4218 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4219 "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");
4221 test_htlc_output!(3,
4222 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4223 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4224 "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");
4228 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4229 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4230 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4232 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4233 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4234 "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");
4236 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4238 test_htlc_output!(0,
4239 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4240 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4241 "0200000000010140a83ce364747ff277f4d7595d8d15f708418798922c40bc2b056aca5485a2180000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f89101483045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4243 test_htlc_output!(1,
4244 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4245 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4246 "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");
4248 test_htlc_output!(2,
4249 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4250 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4251 "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");
4255 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4256 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4257 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4259 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4260 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4261 "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");
4263 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4265 test_htlc_output!(0,
4266 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4267 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4268 "02000000000101fb824d4e4dafc0f567789dee3a6bce8d411fe80f5563d8cdfdcc7d7e4447d43a0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf4401473044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000");
4270 test_htlc_output!(1,
4271 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4272 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4273 "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");
4275 test_htlc_output!(2,
4276 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4277 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4278 "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");
4282 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4283 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4284 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4286 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4287 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4288 "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");
4290 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4292 test_htlc_output!(0,
4293 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4294 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4295 "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");
4297 test_htlc_output!(1,
4298 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4299 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4300 "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");
4304 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4305 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4306 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4308 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4309 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4310 "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");
4312 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4314 test_htlc_output!(0,
4315 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4316 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4317 "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");
4319 test_htlc_output!(1,
4320 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4321 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4322 "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");
4326 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4327 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4328 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4330 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4331 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4332 "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");
4334 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4336 test_htlc_output!(0,
4337 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4338 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4339 "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");
4343 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4344 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4345 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4347 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4348 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4349 "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");
4351 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4353 test_htlc_output!(0,
4354 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4355 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4356 "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");
4360 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4361 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4362 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4364 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4365 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4366 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de843110fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b90147304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f876555201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4368 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4372 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4373 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4374 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4376 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4377 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4378 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de84311004004730440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b901473044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4380 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4384 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4385 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4386 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4388 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4389 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4390 "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");
4392 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4396 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4397 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4398 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4400 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4401 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4402 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431100400473044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b101473044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4404 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4409 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4410 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4412 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4413 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4414 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4415 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4417 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4418 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
4419 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4421 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4422 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4424 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
4425 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4427 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4428 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
4429 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4433 fn test_key_derivation() {
4434 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4437 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4438 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4440 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4441 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4443 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4444 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4446 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4447 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4449 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4450 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4452 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4453 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4455 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4456 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());