1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
300 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
302 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
304 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
308 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
311 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
315 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
316 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
318 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
322 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
323 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
329 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
332 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
334 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
336 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
339 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
340 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
342 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
343 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
344 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
345 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
346 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
347 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
348 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
349 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
351 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
353 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
355 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
356 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
358 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
360 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
362 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
363 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
365 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
366 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
368 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
369 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
374 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
377 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
378 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
379 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
380 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
381 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
382 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
383 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
384 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
385 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
386 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
387 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
388 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
389 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
390 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
394 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
396 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
397 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
398 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
399 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
400 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
401 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
402 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
403 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
404 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
405 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
406 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
407 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
408 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
409 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
414 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
415 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
416 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
417 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
418 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
419 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
424 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
425 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
426 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
427 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
428 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
429 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
430 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
431 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
432 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
433 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
434 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
435 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
436 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
437 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
442 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
443 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
444 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
445 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
446 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
447 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
448 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
449 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
453 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
454 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
455 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
457 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
458 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
459 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
460 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
461 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
463 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
464 /// funding transaction to confirm.
465 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
466 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
468 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
469 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
470 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
474 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
475 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
477 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
480 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
489 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
491 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
495 fn $clear(&mut self) {
498 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
500 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
504 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
505 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
507 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
508 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
513 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
515 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
516 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
518 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
519 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
520 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
521 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
522 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
523 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
524 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
525 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
533 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
535 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
536 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
537 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
538 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
539 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
543 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
544 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
547 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
548 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
551 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
553 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
554 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
555 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
559 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
561 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
562 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
563 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
564 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
566 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
572 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
573 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
574 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
575 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
576 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
577 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
578 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
579 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
582 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
584 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
586 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
587 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
588 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
589 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
593 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
595 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
597 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
599 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
600 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
601 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
602 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
603 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
605 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
606 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
608 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
610 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
611 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
613 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
614 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
615 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
616 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
617 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
618 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
620 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
621 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
623 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
624 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
625 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
626 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
627 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
629 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
630 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
632 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
633 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
635 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
636 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
637 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
638 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
644 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
645 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
647 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
648 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
649 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
654 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
655 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
657 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
658 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
659 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
664 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
666 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
667 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
670 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
671 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
672 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
673 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
674 self.logger.log(record)
678 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
679 where L::Target: Logger {
680 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
681 where S::Target: SignerProvider
685 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
686 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
691 macro_rules! secp_check {
692 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
695 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
700 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
701 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
702 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
703 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
704 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
705 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
706 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
707 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
709 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
711 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
713 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
717 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
719 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
720 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
721 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
723 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
724 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
726 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
727 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
728 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
729 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
730 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
732 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
733 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
737 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
743 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
746 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
747 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
748 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
749 holding_cell_msat: u64,
750 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
753 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
754 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
755 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
756 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
757 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
758 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
759 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
760 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
761 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
762 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
763 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
766 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
767 struct HTLCCandidate {
769 origin: HTLCInitiator,
773 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
781 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
783 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
785 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
786 htlc_value_msat: u64,
787 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
792 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
793 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
794 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
795 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
796 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
798 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
799 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
800 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
801 htlc_value_msat: u64,
803 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
804 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
808 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
809 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
810 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
811 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
812 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
813 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
814 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
815 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
816 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
817 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
818 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
821 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
823 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
824 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
825 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
826 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
830 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
831 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
832 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
833 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
834 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
835 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
836 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
839 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
841 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
842 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
843 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
844 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
845 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
846 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
847 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
848 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
849 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
850 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
851 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
852 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
853 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
854 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
855 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
858 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
859 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
860 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
861 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
862 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
863 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
864 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
865 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
866 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
867 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
868 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
869 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
870 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
871 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
872 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
874 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
875 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
876 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
877 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
879 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
880 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
881 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
882 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
884 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
885 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
886 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
887 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
888 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
890 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
891 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
892 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
893 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
895 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
896 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
897 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
899 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
900 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
901 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
902 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
903 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
905 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
906 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
909 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
910 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
912 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
913 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
914 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
915 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
917 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
918 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
920 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
921 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
925 (0, update, required),
928 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
929 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
930 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
931 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
932 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
936 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
937 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
938 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
940 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
942 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
943 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
944 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
948 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
950 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
951 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
957 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
958 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
959 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
960 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
961 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
963 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
964 /// in a timely manner.
965 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
968 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
969 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
970 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
972 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
973 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
974 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
975 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
979 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
980 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
981 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
983 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
984 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
985 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
986 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
988 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
992 /// The current channel ID.
993 channel_id: ChannelId,
994 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
995 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
996 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
997 channel_state: ChannelState,
999 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1000 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1002 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1003 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1004 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1006 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1007 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1008 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1011 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1012 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1014 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1016 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1017 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1018 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1020 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1021 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1022 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1024 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1025 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1026 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1027 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1028 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1029 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1031 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1032 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1033 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1034 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1035 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1036 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1038 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1040 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1041 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1042 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1044 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1045 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1046 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1047 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1048 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1049 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1050 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1052 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1053 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1054 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1056 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1057 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1058 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1059 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1060 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1061 /// outbound or inbound.
1062 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1064 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1066 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1067 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1068 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1069 // HTLCs with similar state.
1070 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1071 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1072 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1073 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1074 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1075 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1076 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1077 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1078 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1079 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1081 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1082 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1083 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1085 update_time_counter: u32,
1087 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1088 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1089 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1090 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1091 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1092 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1094 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1095 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1097 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1098 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1099 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1100 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1102 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1103 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1105 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1107 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1109 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1110 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1111 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1112 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1113 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1115 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1116 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1118 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1119 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1120 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1122 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1123 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1124 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1125 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1126 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1127 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1128 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1129 channel_creation_height: u32,
1131 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1134 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1136 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1139 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1141 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1144 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1146 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1148 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1149 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1152 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1154 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1156 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1157 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1159 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1161 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1162 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1163 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1165 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1167 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1168 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1169 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1171 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1172 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1173 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1175 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1177 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1179 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1180 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1181 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1182 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1184 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1185 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1186 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1188 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1189 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1190 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1192 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1193 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1194 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1195 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1196 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1197 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1201 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1202 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1203 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1204 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1205 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1207 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1208 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1210 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1211 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1212 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1213 /// unblock the state machine.
1215 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1216 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1217 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1219 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1220 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1221 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1224 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1225 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1226 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1227 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1228 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1229 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1230 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1232 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1233 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1235 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1236 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1237 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1239 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1240 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1241 // associated channel mapping.
1243 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1244 // to store all of them.
1245 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1247 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1248 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1249 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1250 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1251 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1253 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1254 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1256 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1257 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1259 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1260 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1262 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1263 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1264 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1266 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1267 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1268 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1271 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1272 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1273 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1274 self.update_time_counter
1277 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1278 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1281 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1282 self.config.announced_channel
1285 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1286 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1289 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1290 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1291 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1292 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1295 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1296 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1297 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1300 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1301 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1302 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1303 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1304 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1305 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1306 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1309 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1310 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1311 match self.channel_state {
1312 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1313 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1314 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1315 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1316 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1317 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1318 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1320 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1322 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1323 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1327 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1328 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1329 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1330 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1331 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1332 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1335 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1336 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1337 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1341 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1342 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1343 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1344 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1345 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1348 // Public utilities:
1350 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1354 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1356 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1357 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1358 self.temporary_channel_id
1361 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1365 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1366 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1367 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1371 /// Gets the channel's type
1372 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1376 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1378 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1379 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1380 self.short_channel_id
1383 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1384 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1385 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1388 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1389 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1390 self.outbound_scid_alias
1393 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1395 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1396 return &self.holder_signer
1399 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1400 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1401 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1402 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1403 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1404 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1407 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1408 /// get_funding_created.
1409 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1410 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1413 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1414 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1415 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1416 if conf_height > 0 {
1423 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1424 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1425 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1428 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1429 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1430 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1431 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1435 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1438 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1439 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1442 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1443 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1446 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1447 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1448 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1451 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1452 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1455 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1456 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1457 self.counterparty_node_id
1460 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1461 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1462 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1465 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1466 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1467 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1470 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1471 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1473 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1474 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1475 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1476 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1478 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1482 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1483 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1484 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1487 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1488 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1489 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1492 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1493 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1494 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1496 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1497 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1502 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1503 self.channel_value_satoshis
1506 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1507 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1510 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1511 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1514 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1515 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1516 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1518 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1519 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1520 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1521 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1522 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1524 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1528 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1529 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1530 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1533 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1534 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1535 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1538 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1539 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1540 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1543 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1544 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1545 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1548 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1549 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1550 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1553 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1554 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1555 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1558 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1559 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1560 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1561 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1562 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1565 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1567 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1568 self.prev_config = None;
1572 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1573 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1577 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1578 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1579 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1580 let did_channel_update =
1581 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1582 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1583 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1584 if did_channel_update {
1585 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1586 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1587 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1588 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1590 self.config.options = *config;
1594 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1595 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1596 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1597 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1598 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1601 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1602 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1603 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1604 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1605 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1607 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1608 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1609 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1610 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1611 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1612 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1613 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1615 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1616 where L::Target: Logger
1618 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1619 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1620 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1622 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1623 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1624 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1625 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1627 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1628 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1629 if match update_state {
1630 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1631 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1632 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1633 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1634 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1636 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1640 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1641 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1642 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1644 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1646 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1647 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1648 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1650 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1651 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1652 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1653 transaction_output_index: None
1658 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1659 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1660 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1661 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1662 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1665 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1667 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1668 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1669 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1671 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1672 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1675 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1676 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1679 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1681 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1682 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1683 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1685 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1686 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1692 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1694 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1695 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1696 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1697 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1698 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1699 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1700 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1704 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1705 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1707 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1709 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1710 if generated_by_local {
1711 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1712 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1723 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1725 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1726 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1727 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1728 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1729 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1730 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1731 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1734 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1735 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1736 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1737 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1741 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1742 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1746 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1747 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1749 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1751 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1752 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1754 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1755 if !generated_by_local {
1756 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1764 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1765 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1766 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1767 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1768 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1769 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1770 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1771 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1773 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1775 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1776 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1777 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1778 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1780 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1782 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1783 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1784 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1785 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1788 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1789 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1790 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1791 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1793 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1796 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1797 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1798 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1799 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1801 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1804 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1805 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1810 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1811 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1816 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1818 let channel_parameters =
1819 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1820 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1821 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1828 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1831 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1832 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1833 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1834 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1842 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1843 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1844 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1845 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1850 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1851 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1852 /// our counterparty!)
1853 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1854 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1855 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1856 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1857 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1858 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1859 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1861 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1865 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1866 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1867 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1868 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1869 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1870 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1871 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1873 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1876 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1877 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1878 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1879 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1880 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1883 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1884 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1887 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1891 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1892 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1893 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1894 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1895 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1896 // which are near the dust limit.
1897 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1898 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1899 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1900 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1901 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1903 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1904 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1906 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1907 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1910 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1911 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1912 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1915 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1916 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1918 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1919 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1920 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1921 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1922 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1923 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1924 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1927 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1930 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1931 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1932 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1934 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1935 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1937 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1939 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1942 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1948 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1949 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1951 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1952 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1953 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1954 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1955 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1956 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1957 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1960 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1963 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1964 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1965 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1967 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1968 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1969 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1970 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1972 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1974 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1975 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1979 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1980 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1981 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1982 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1983 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1984 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1985 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1987 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1988 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1990 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1997 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1998 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1999 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2000 /// corner case properly.
2001 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2002 -> AvailableBalances
2003 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2005 let context = &self;
2006 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2007 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2008 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2010 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2011 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2012 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2013 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2016 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2018 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2019 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2021 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2023 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2025 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2026 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2030 if context.is_outbound() {
2031 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2032 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2034 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2035 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2037 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2038 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2039 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2040 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2043 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2044 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2045 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2046 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2047 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2048 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2049 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2052 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2053 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2054 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2055 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2056 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2057 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2058 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2059 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2060 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2061 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2062 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2064 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2067 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2068 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2069 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2070 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2074 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2075 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2077 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2078 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2079 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2081 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2082 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2083 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2084 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2088 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2090 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2091 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2092 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2093 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2094 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2095 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2096 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2098 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2099 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2101 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2102 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2103 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2105 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2106 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2107 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2108 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2109 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2112 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2113 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2114 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2115 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2116 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2117 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2120 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2121 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2122 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2124 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2128 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2129 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2131 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2132 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2136 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2137 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2138 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2139 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2141 outbound_capacity_msat,
2142 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2143 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2148 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2149 let context = &self;
2150 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2153 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2154 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2156 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2157 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2159 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2160 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2162 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2163 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2164 let context = &self;
2165 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2167 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2170 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2171 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2173 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2174 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2176 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2177 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2179 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2180 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2184 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2185 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2191 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2192 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2193 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2196 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2197 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2198 included_htlcs += 1;
2201 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2202 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2206 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2207 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2208 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2209 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2210 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2211 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2216 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2219 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2224 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2225 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2229 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2230 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2231 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2234 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2235 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2237 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2238 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2239 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2241 total_pending_htlcs,
2242 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2243 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2244 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2246 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2247 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2248 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2250 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2252 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2257 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2258 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2260 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2261 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2263 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2264 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2266 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2267 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2268 let context = &self;
2269 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2271 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2274 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2275 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2277 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2278 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2280 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2281 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2283 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2284 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2288 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2289 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2295 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2296 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2297 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2298 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2299 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2300 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2303 included_htlcs += 1;
2306 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2307 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2310 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2311 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2313 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2314 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2315 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2320 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2321 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2322 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2325 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2326 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2328 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2329 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2331 total_pending_htlcs,
2332 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2333 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2334 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2336 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2337 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2338 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2340 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2342 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2347 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2348 match self.channel_state {
2349 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2350 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2351 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2352 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2362 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2364 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2365 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2368 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2370 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2371 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2372 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2376 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2377 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2378 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2381 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2383 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2384 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2387 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2388 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2389 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2390 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2391 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2392 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2393 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2394 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2395 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2396 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2397 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2399 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2400 // return them to fail the payment.
2401 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2402 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2403 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2405 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2406 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2411 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2412 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2413 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2414 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2415 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2416 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2417 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2418 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2419 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
2420 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2421 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2422 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2423 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2424 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2425 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2429 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2430 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2433 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2437 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2438 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2439 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2440 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2441 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2442 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2443 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2444 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2448 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2449 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2450 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2451 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2453 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2454 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2456 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2458 match &self.holder_signer {
2459 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2460 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2461 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2462 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2463 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2466 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2470 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2471 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2472 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2474 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2475 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2476 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2478 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2479 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2480 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2483 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2484 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2486 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2493 // Internal utility functions for channels
2495 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2496 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2497 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2499 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2501 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2502 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2503 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2505 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2508 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2510 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2513 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2514 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2515 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2517 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2519 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2520 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2521 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2522 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2523 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2526 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2527 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2528 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2529 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2530 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2531 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2532 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2535 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2536 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2538 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2539 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2542 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2543 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2544 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2545 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2546 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2547 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2550 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2551 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2552 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2553 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2556 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2557 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2559 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2560 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2561 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2565 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2566 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2567 trait FailHTLCContents {
2568 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2569 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2570 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2571 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2573 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2574 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2575 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2576 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2578 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2579 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2581 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2582 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2585 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2586 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2587 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2588 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2591 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2592 failure_code: self.1
2595 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2596 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2598 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2599 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2601 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2602 failure_code: self.1
2607 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2608 fn name() -> &'static str;
2610 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2611 fn name() -> &'static str {
2615 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2616 fn name() -> &'static str {
2617 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2621 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2622 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2623 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2625 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2626 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2627 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2628 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2630 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2631 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2633 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2635 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2636 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2637 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2638 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2640 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2641 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2651 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2652 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2653 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2654 // outside of those situations will fail.
2655 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2659 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2664 1 + // script length (0)
2668 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2669 2 + // witness marker and flag
2670 1 + // witness element count
2671 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2672 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2673 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2674 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2675 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2676 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2678 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2679 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2680 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2686 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2687 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2688 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2689 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2691 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2692 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2693 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2695 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2696 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2697 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2698 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2699 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2700 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2703 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2704 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2707 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2708 value_to_holder = 0;
2711 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2712 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2713 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2714 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2716 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2717 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2720 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2721 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2724 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2727 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2728 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2730 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2732 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2733 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2734 where L::Target: Logger {
2735 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2736 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2737 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
2738 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2739 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2740 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2741 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2742 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2746 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2747 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2748 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2749 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2751 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2752 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2755 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2756 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2757 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2759 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2760 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2761 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2762 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2763 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2764 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2765 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2767 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2768 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2769 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2771 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2772 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2774 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2777 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2778 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2782 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2786 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2787 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2788 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2789 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2790 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2791 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2794 // Now update local state:
2796 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2797 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2798 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2799 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2800 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2801 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2802 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2803 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2805 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
2808 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
2809 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2810 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2811 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2812 // do not not get into this branch.
2813 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2814 match pending_update {
2815 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2816 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2817 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2818 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2819 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2820 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2821 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2824 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2825 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2827 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2828 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2829 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2830 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2831 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2832 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2838 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2839 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2843 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2844 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2846 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2847 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2850 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2851 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2853 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2854 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2856 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2857 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2860 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2863 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2864 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2865 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2866 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2871 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2872 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2873 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2874 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2875 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2876 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2877 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2878 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2879 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2880 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2881 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2882 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2883 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2884 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2885 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2887 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2888 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2889 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2890 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2891 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2894 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2895 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2896 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2902 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2903 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2905 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2909 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2910 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2911 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2912 /// before we fail backwards.
2914 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2915 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2916 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2917 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2918 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2919 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2920 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2923 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2924 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2926 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2927 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2928 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2929 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2930 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
2931 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2934 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2935 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2936 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2937 /// before we fail backwards.
2939 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2940 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2941 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2942 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2943 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2945 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2946 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2947 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2950 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2951 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2952 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2954 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2955 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2956 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2958 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2959 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2960 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2962 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2967 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2968 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2974 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2975 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2976 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2977 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2978 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2982 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
2983 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2984 force_holding_cell = true;
2987 // Now update local state:
2988 if force_holding_cell {
2989 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2990 match pending_update {
2991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2992 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2994 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2998 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2999 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3001 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3002 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3009 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3010 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3014 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3015 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3017 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3018 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3021 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3024 // Message handlers:
3025 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3026 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3027 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3028 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3029 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3030 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3031 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3034 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3036 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3038 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3039 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3040 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3041 debug_assert!(matches!(
3042 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3044 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3045 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3048 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3049 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3051 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3052 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3053 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3054 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3056 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3059 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3060 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3064 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3065 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3066 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3067 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3068 // when routing outbound payments.
3069 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3073 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3074 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3075 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3076 match &self.context.channel_state {
3077 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3078 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3079 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3080 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3081 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3082 check_reconnection = true;
3083 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3084 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3085 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3086 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3087 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3089 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3090 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3093 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3094 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3095 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3097 if check_reconnection {
3098 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3099 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3100 let expected_point =
3101 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3102 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3104 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3105 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3106 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3107 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3108 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3109 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3111 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3112 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3113 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3114 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3115 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3117 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3123 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3124 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3126 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3128 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3131 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3132 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3133 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3134 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3135 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3136 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3138 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3141 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3142 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3143 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3145 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3146 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3149 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3152 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3155 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3158 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3162 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3163 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3164 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3167 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3171 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3172 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3173 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3174 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3175 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3176 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3177 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3178 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3179 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3180 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3181 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3183 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3184 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3185 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3186 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3187 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3188 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3192 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3193 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3196 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3197 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3198 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3200 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3201 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3202 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3203 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3204 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3205 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3206 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3210 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3211 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3212 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3213 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3214 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3215 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3216 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3220 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3221 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3222 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3223 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3224 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3228 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3229 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3231 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3232 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3233 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3235 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3236 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3240 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3243 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3248 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3249 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3253 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3254 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3255 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3256 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3257 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3258 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3259 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3260 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3261 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3263 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3264 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3265 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3266 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3267 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3270 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3271 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3272 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3273 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3277 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3280 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3284 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3285 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3286 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3290 // Now update local state:
3291 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3292 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3293 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3294 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3295 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3296 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3297 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3302 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3304 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3305 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3306 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3307 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3308 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3309 None => fail_reason.into(),
3310 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3311 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3312 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3315 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3319 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3321 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3322 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3330 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3333 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
3334 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3337 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3341 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
3344 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3345 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3352 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3356 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3357 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3360 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3364 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3368 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3369 where L::Target: Logger
3371 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3374 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3377 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3381 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3383 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3385 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3386 let commitment_txid = {
3387 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3388 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3389 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3391 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3392 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3393 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3394 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3395 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3400 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3402 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3403 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3404 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3405 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3408 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3409 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3410 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3416 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3417 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3418 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3419 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3420 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3421 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3422 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3423 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3424 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3425 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3426 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3432 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3436 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3437 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3438 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3439 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3440 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3441 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3442 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3443 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3444 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3445 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3446 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3447 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3448 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3451 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3452 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3453 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3454 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3455 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3456 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3457 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3459 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3460 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3461 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3462 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3463 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3464 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3465 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3468 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3469 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3472 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3474 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3475 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3476 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3479 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3482 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3483 commitment_stats.tx,
3485 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3486 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3487 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3490 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3491 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3493 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3494 let mut need_commitment = false;
3495 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3496 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3497 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3498 need_commitment = true;
3502 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3503 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3504 Some(forward_info.clone())
3506 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3507 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3508 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3509 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3510 need_commitment = true;
3513 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3514 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3515 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3517 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3518 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3519 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3520 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3521 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3522 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3523 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3524 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3525 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3526 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3528 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3530 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3531 need_commitment = true;
3535 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3536 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3537 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3538 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3539 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3540 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3541 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3543 nondust_htlc_sources,
3545 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3548 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3549 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3550 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3551 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3552 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3554 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3555 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3556 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3557 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3558 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3559 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3560 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3561 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3562 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3563 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3564 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3565 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3566 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3567 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3569 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3570 &self.context.channel_id);
3571 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3574 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3575 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3576 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3577 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3578 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3579 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3580 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3581 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3582 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3586 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3587 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3588 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3589 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3592 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3593 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3594 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3595 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3596 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3597 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3598 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3600 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3601 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3602 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3605 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3606 /// for our counterparty.
3607 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3608 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3609 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3610 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3612 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3613 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3614 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3615 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3617 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3618 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3619 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3620 updates: Vec::new(),
3621 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3624 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3625 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3626 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3627 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3628 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3629 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3630 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3631 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3632 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3633 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3634 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3635 // to rebalance channels.
3636 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3638 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3639 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3641 match self.send_htlc(
3642 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3643 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3645 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3648 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3649 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3650 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3651 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3652 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3653 // into the holding cell without ever being
3654 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3655 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3656 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3659 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3666 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3667 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3668 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3669 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3670 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3671 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3672 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3673 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3674 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3675 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3676 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3677 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3680 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3681 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3682 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3684 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3685 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
3686 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3689 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3691 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3692 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3693 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3694 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3695 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3696 // for a full revocation before failing.
3697 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3698 update_fail_count += 1;
3700 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3702 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3707 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3708 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3710 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3711 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3716 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3717 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3718 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3719 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3720 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3722 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3723 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3724 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3726 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3727 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3733 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3734 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3735 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3736 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3737 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3738 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3739 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3740 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3741 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3743 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3746 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3749 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3753 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3755 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3756 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3761 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3762 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3763 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3764 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3765 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3766 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3767 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3768 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3772 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3774 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3775 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3778 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3779 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3780 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3781 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3783 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3785 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3790 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3791 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3792 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3793 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3794 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3795 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3796 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3797 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3798 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3800 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3803 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3804 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3805 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3806 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3807 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3808 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3809 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3810 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3811 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3813 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3814 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3817 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3818 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3819 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 let mut require_commitment = false;
3824 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3827 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3828 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3829 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3830 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3832 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3833 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3834 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3835 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3836 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3837 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3839 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3843 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3844 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3845 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3846 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3847 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3849 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3850 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3851 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3856 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3857 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3859 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3863 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3864 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3866 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3867 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3868 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3869 require_commitment = true;
3870 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3871 match forward_info {
3872 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 require_commitment = true;
3876 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3877 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3878 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3880 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3881 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3882 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3886 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3887 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3888 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3889 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3895 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3896 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3897 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3898 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3899 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3901 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3902 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3903 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3904 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3905 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3906 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3907 require_commitment = true;
3911 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3913 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3914 match update_state {
3915 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3916 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3917 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3918 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3919 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3920 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3922 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3923 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3924 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3925 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3926 require_commitment = true;
3927 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3928 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3933 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3934 let release_state_str =
3935 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3936 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3937 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3938 if !release_monitor {
3939 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3940 update: monitor_update,
3942 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3944 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3949 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3950 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3951 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3952 if require_commitment {
3953 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3954 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3955 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3956 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3958 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3959 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3960 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3962 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3964 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3965 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3966 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3967 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3968 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3971 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3972 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3973 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3975 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3978 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3979 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3981 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3982 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3984 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3985 if require_commitment {
3986 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3988 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3989 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3990 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3991 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3993 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3994 &self.context.channel_id(),
3995 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3998 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3999 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4001 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4002 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4004 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4005 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4011 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4012 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4013 /// commitment update.
4014 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4015 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4016 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4018 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4019 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4022 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4023 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4024 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4025 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4027 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4028 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4029 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4030 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4031 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4032 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4033 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4035 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4036 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4038 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4039 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4041 if !self.context.is_live() {
4042 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4045 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4046 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4047 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4048 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4049 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4050 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4051 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4052 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4053 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4054 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4058 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4059 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4060 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4061 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4062 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4063 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4066 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4067 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4071 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4072 force_holding_cell = true;
4075 if force_holding_cell {
4076 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4080 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4081 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4083 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4084 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4089 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4090 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4092 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4094 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4095 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4096 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4097 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4101 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4102 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4103 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4107 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4108 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4111 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4112 // will be retransmitted.
4113 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4114 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4115 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4117 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4118 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4120 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4121 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4122 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4123 // this HTLC accordingly
4124 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4127 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4128 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4129 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4130 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4133 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4134 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4135 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4136 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4137 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4138 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4143 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4145 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4146 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4147 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4148 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4152 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4153 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4154 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4155 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4156 // the update upon reconnection.
4157 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4161 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4163 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4164 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4168 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4169 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4170 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4171 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4172 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4173 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4174 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4176 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4177 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4178 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4179 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4180 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4181 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4182 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4184 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4185 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4186 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4187 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4188 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4189 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4190 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4193 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4194 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4195 /// to the remote side.
4196 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4197 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4198 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4199 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4202 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4204 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4205 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4207 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4208 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4209 // first received the funding_signed.
4210 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4211 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4212 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4213 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4215 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4217 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4218 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4219 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4220 funding_broadcastable = None;
4223 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4224 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4225 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4226 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4227 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4228 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4229 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4230 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4231 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4232 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4233 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4234 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4235 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4236 next_per_commitment_point,
4237 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4241 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4243 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4244 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4245 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4246 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4247 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4248 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4250 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4251 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4252 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4253 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4254 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4255 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4259 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4260 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4262 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4263 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4265 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4266 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4269 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4270 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4271 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4272 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4273 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4274 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4275 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4276 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4277 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4281 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4282 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4284 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4287 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4290 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4292 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4293 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4294 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4295 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4296 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4297 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4298 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4299 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4300 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4301 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4303 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4305 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4307 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4313 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4315 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4316 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4317 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4318 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4320 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4321 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4323 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4324 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4327 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4328 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4329 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4330 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4332 SignerResumeUpdates {
4339 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4340 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4341 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4342 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4343 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4344 per_commitment_secret,
4345 next_per_commitment_point,
4347 next_local_nonce: None,
4351 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4352 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4353 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4354 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4355 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4356 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4358 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4359 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4360 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4361 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4362 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4363 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4364 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4365 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4366 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4367 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4368 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4373 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4374 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4376 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4377 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4378 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4379 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4380 reason: err_packet.clone()
4383 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4384 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4385 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4386 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4387 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4388 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4391 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4392 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4393 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4394 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4395 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4402 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4403 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4404 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4405 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4409 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4410 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4411 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4412 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4413 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4414 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4415 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4419 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4420 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4422 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4423 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4424 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4425 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4430 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4431 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4436 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4437 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4438 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4439 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4440 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4441 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4442 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4447 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4448 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4450 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4451 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4452 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4453 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4454 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4455 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4456 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4457 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4460 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4462 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4463 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4464 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4465 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4469 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4470 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4474 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4475 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4476 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4477 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4479 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4482 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4483 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4484 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4485 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4486 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4489 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4490 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4491 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4492 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4493 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4494 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4495 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4496 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4500 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4501 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4502 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4503 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4504 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4505 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4506 our_commitment_transaction
4510 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4511 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4512 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4513 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4515 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4517 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4519 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4520 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4521 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4522 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4523 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4524 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4526 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4527 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4528 channel_ready: None,
4529 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4530 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4531 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4535 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4536 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4537 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4538 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4539 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4540 next_per_commitment_point,
4541 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4543 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4544 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4545 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4549 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4550 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4551 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4553 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4554 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4555 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4558 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4561 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4563 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4564 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4565 our_commitment_transaction
4569 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4570 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4571 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4572 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4573 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4574 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4575 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4577 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4579 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4580 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4581 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4582 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4583 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4584 next_per_commitment_point,
4585 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4589 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4590 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4591 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4593 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4596 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4597 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4598 raa: required_revoke,
4599 commitment_update: None,
4600 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4602 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4603 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4604 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4606 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4609 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4610 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4611 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4612 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4613 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4614 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4617 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4618 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4619 raa: required_revoke,
4620 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4621 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4624 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4625 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4626 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4627 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4628 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4631 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4632 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4633 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4634 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4639 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4640 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4641 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4642 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4644 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4646 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4648 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4649 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4650 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4651 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4652 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4653 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4654 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4655 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4657 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4658 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4659 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4660 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4661 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4663 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4664 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4665 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4666 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4669 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4670 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4671 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4672 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4673 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4674 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4675 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4676 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4677 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4678 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4679 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4680 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4681 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4682 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4683 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4685 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4688 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4689 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4692 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4693 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4694 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4695 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4696 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4697 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4700 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4701 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4702 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4703 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4704 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4705 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4708 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4714 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4715 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4716 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4717 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4719 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4720 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4721 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4722 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4723 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4724 return Ok((None, None, None));
4727 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4728 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4729 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4731 return Ok((None, None, None));
4734 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4735 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4736 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4737 return Ok((None, None, None));
4740 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4742 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4743 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4744 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4745 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4747 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4748 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4750 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4751 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4753 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4754 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4755 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4756 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4758 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4759 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4760 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4764 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4770 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4771 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4773 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4774 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4777 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4778 /// within our expected timeframe.
4780 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4781 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4782 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4785 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4788 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4789 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4793 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4794 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4796 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4799 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4800 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4801 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4802 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4805 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4806 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4810 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4812 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4813 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4816 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4817 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4818 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4821 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4824 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4825 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4826 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4827 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4829 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4832 assert!(send_shutdown);
4833 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4834 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4835 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4837 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4840 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4845 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4847 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4848 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4850 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4851 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4852 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4853 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4854 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4855 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4856 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4858 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4860 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4861 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4863 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4864 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4865 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4866 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4870 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4871 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4872 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4873 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4874 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4875 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4877 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4878 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4885 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4886 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4888 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4891 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4892 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4894 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4896 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4897 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4898 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4899 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4900 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4901 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4902 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4903 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4904 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4906 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4907 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4910 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4914 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4915 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4916 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4917 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4919 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4922 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4925 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4928 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4932 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4936 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4937 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4938 return Ok((None, None, None));
4941 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4942 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4943 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4946 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4948 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4951 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4952 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4953 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4954 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4955 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4959 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4960 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4965 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
4966 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
4968 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
4971 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4972 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4973 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4974 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4976 monitor_update: None,
4977 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4978 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4979 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4980 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4981 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4982 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4983 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4984 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4986 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4987 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4988 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4989 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4993 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4995 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4996 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4997 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4998 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5000 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5003 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5004 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5006 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5007 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5008 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5009 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5011 monitor_update: None,
5012 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5013 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5014 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5015 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5016 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5017 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5018 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5019 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5021 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5022 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5023 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5024 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5029 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5030 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5031 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5032 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5034 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5035 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5036 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5038 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5040 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5047 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5048 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5051 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5052 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5054 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5055 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5058 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5059 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5060 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5061 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5062 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5064 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5066 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5068 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5069 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5072 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5073 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5074 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5075 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5076 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5077 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5078 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5079 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5084 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5085 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5086 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5087 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5093 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5094 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5095 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5096 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5098 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5104 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5105 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5106 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5107 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5108 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5109 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5110 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5112 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5113 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5116 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5118 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5119 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5125 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5126 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5127 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5128 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5129 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5130 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5131 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5133 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5134 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5141 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5142 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5145 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5146 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5149 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5150 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5154 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5155 &self.context.holder_signer
5159 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5161 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5162 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5163 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5164 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5165 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5166 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5168 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5170 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5178 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5179 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5183 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5184 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5185 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5186 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5189 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5190 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5191 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5192 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5195 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5196 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5197 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5198 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5199 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5200 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5203 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5204 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5205 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5206 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5207 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5208 if !release_monitor {
5209 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5218 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5219 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5222 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5223 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5224 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5226 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5227 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5229 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5230 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5232 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5233 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5234 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5237 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5238 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5239 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5240 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5241 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5242 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5244 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5245 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5246 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5248 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5249 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5250 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5251 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5252 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5253 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5259 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5260 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5261 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5262 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5265 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5266 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5267 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5270 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5271 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5272 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5275 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5276 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5277 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5280 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5281 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5282 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5283 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5284 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5287 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5288 self.context.channel_update_status
5291 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5292 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5293 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5296 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5298 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5299 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5300 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5304 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5305 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5306 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5309 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5313 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5314 // channel_ready yet.
5315 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5319 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5320 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5321 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5322 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5324 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5325 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5326 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5328 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5329 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5332 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5333 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5335 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5336 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5337 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5338 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5339 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5340 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5341 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5342 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5344 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5348 if need_commitment_update {
5349 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5350 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5351 let next_per_commitment_point =
5352 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5353 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5354 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5355 next_per_commitment_point,
5356 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5360 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5366 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5367 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5368 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5369 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5370 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5371 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5372 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5374 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5377 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5378 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5379 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5380 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5381 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5382 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5383 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5384 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5385 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5386 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5387 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5388 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5389 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5390 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5391 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5392 // channel and move on.
5393 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5394 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5396 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5397 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5398 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5400 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5401 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5402 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5403 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5404 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5405 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5406 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5407 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5412 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5413 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5414 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5415 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5416 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5419 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5420 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5421 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5422 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5423 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5424 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5427 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5428 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5429 // may have already happened for this block).
5430 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5431 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5432 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5433 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5436 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5437 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5438 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5439 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5447 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5448 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5449 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5450 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5452 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5453 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5456 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5458 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5459 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5460 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5461 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5463 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5466 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5469 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5470 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5471 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5472 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5474 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5477 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5478 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5479 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5481 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5482 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5484 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5485 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5486 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5494 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5496 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5497 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5498 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5500 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5501 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5504 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5505 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5506 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5507 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5508 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5509 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5510 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5511 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5514 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5515 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5516 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5517 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5519 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5520 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5521 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5523 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5524 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5525 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5526 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5528 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5529 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5530 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5531 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5532 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5533 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5534 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5537 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5538 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5540 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5543 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5544 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5545 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5546 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5547 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5548 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5549 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5550 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5551 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5552 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5553 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5554 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5555 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5556 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5557 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5558 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5559 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5565 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5570 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5571 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5573 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5574 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5575 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5576 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5578 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5581 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5583 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5584 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5585 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5586 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5587 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5588 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5590 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5591 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5594 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5595 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5596 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5597 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5598 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5599 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5601 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5602 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5605 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5606 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5607 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5608 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5609 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5615 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5616 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5617 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5618 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5620 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5623 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5627 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5631 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5632 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5636 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5640 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5641 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5644 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5648 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5650 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5655 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5656 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5657 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5659 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5664 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5666 None => return None,
5669 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5671 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5672 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5674 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5675 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5678 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5684 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5686 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5687 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5688 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5689 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5690 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5691 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5692 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5694 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5695 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5696 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5697 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5698 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5699 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5700 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5701 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5702 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5703 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5704 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5705 contents: announcement,
5708 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5713 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5717 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5718 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5719 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5720 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5721 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5722 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5723 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5724 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5726 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5728 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5730 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5731 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5733 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5734 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5735 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5736 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5739 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5740 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5741 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5742 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5745 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5748 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5749 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5750 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5751 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5752 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5753 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5756 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5758 Err(_) => return None,
5760 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5761 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5766 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5767 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5768 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5769 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5770 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5771 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5772 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5773 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5774 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5775 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5776 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5777 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5778 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5779 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5780 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5781 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5784 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5787 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5788 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5790 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5791 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5792 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5793 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5794 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5795 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5797 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5798 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5799 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5800 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5801 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5802 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5803 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5804 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5805 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5807 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5808 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5809 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5810 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5811 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5812 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5813 next_funding_txid: None,
5818 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5820 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5821 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5822 /// commitment update.
5824 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5825 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5826 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5827 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5828 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5829 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5830 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5833 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5834 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5835 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5837 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5838 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5843 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5844 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5846 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5848 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5849 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5851 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5852 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5853 /// regenerate them.
5855 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5856 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5858 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5859 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5860 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5861 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5862 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5863 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5864 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5865 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5867 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5868 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5869 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5871 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5873 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5874 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5875 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5878 if amount_msat == 0 {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5882 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5883 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5884 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5885 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5888 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5890 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5893 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5894 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5895 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5896 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5897 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5898 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5899 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5903 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
5904 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5905 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5906 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5907 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5908 else { "to peer" });
5910 if need_holding_cell {
5911 force_holding_cell = true;
5914 // Now update local state:
5915 if force_holding_cell {
5916 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5921 onion_routing_packet,
5928 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5929 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5931 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5933 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5939 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5940 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5941 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5945 onion_routing_packet,
5949 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5954 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5955 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5956 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5957 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5959 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5960 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5961 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5963 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5964 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5968 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5969 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5970 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5971 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5972 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5973 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5974 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5977 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5978 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5979 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5980 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5981 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5982 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5985 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5987 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5988 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5989 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5990 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5991 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5993 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5994 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5997 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5998 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5999 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6000 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6001 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6002 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6003 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6004 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6005 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6006 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6007 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6008 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6010 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6012 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6016 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6017 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6018 where L::Target: Logger
6020 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6021 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6022 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6024 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6026 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6027 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6028 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6029 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6030 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6031 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6032 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6033 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6034 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6035 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6036 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6042 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6045 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6046 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6047 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6048 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6050 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6052 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6053 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6054 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6056 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6057 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6058 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6061 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6062 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6066 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6067 &commitment_stats.tx,
6068 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6069 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6070 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6071 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6073 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6075 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6076 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6077 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6078 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6080 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6081 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6082 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6083 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6084 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6085 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6089 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6090 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6094 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6095 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6097 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6103 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6104 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6106 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6107 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6108 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6109 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6110 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6111 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6112 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6113 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6115 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6116 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6117 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6120 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6121 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6122 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6128 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6130 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6131 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6132 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6133 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6134 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6136 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6138 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6144 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6145 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6146 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6147 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6148 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6150 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6151 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6152 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6155 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6158 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6161 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6162 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6164 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6165 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6166 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6169 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6172 // use override shutdown script if provided
6173 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6174 Some(script) => script,
6176 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6177 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6178 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6179 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6183 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6184 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6186 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6191 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6192 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6193 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6194 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6195 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6197 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6198 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6199 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6200 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6201 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6202 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6203 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6205 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6207 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6208 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6210 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6211 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6212 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6215 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6216 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6217 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6218 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6219 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6222 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6229 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6230 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6232 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6235 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6236 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6237 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6239 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6240 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6244 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6248 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6249 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6250 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6251 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6254 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6255 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6256 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6257 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6258 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6259 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6260 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6261 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6263 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6264 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6265 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6266 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6268 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6269 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6271 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6272 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6274 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6275 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6276 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6278 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6279 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6281 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6282 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6283 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6284 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6285 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6288 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6289 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6291 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6292 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6294 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6296 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6298 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6299 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6300 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6301 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6304 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6305 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6307 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6308 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6309 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6310 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6314 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6315 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6316 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6320 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6321 Ok(script) => script,
6322 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6325 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6328 context: ChannelContext {
6331 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6332 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6333 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6334 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6339 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6341 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6342 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6343 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6344 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6346 channel_value_satoshis,
6348 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6350 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6351 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6354 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6355 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6358 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6359 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6360 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6361 pending_update_fee: None,
6362 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6363 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6364 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6365 update_time_counter: 1,
6367 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6369 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6370 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6371 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6372 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6373 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6374 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6376 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6377 signer_pending_funding: false,
6379 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6380 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6381 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6382 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6384 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6385 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6386 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6387 closing_fee_limits: None,
6388 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6390 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6391 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6392 short_channel_id: None,
6393 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6395 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6396 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6397 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6398 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6399 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6400 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6401 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6402 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6403 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6404 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6405 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6406 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6408 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6410 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6411 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6412 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6413 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6414 counterparty_parameters: None,
6415 funding_outpoint: None,
6416 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6418 funding_transaction: None,
6419 is_batch_funding: None,
6421 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6422 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6423 counterparty_node_id,
6425 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6427 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6429 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6430 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6432 announcement_sigs: None,
6434 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6435 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6436 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6437 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6439 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6440 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6442 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6443 outbound_scid_alias,
6445 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6446 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6448 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6449 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6454 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6455 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
6457 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6461 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6462 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6463 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6464 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6465 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6466 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6467 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6468 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6469 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6471 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6476 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6477 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6478 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6481 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6482 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6483 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6484 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6487 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6489 next_local_nonce: None,
6493 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6494 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6495 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6496 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6497 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6498 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6499 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6500 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6501 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6502 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6503 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6506 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6507 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6509 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6511 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6512 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6513 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6514 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6517 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6518 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6520 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6522 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6523 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6525 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6526 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6527 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6528 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6529 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6530 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6533 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6534 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6536 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6537 if funding_created.is_none() {
6538 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6539 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6541 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6542 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6543 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6544 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6552 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6553 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6554 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6555 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6556 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6557 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6558 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6559 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6560 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6561 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6564 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6565 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6566 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6567 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6568 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6569 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6575 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6576 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6577 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6578 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6579 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6580 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6582 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6584 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6586 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6587 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6592 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6593 // We've exhausted our options
6596 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6597 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6600 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6601 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6602 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6603 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6605 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6606 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6607 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6608 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6609 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6610 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6612 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6614 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6615 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6618 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6619 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6620 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6622 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6623 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6626 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6627 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6630 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6631 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6635 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6636 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6637 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6638 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6639 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6640 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6641 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6642 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6643 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6644 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6645 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6646 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6647 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6648 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6649 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6650 first_per_commitment_point,
6651 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6652 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6653 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6654 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6656 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6661 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6662 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6664 // Check sanity of message fields:
6665 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6668 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6671 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6674 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6677 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6680 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6682 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6684 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6685 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6688 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6689 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6690 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6692 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6695 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6699 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6700 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6703 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6706 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6709 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6712 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6715 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6716 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6718 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6722 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6723 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6726 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6727 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6729 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6730 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6733 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6734 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6737 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6738 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6739 &Some(ref script) => {
6740 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6741 if script.len() == 0 {
6744 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6747 Some(script.clone())
6750 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6757 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6758 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6759 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6760 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6761 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6763 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6764 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6766 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6769 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6770 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6771 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6772 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6773 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6774 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6777 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6778 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6779 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6782 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6783 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6785 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6786 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6788 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6793 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6794 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6795 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6796 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6797 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6801 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6802 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6804 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6805 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6807 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6808 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6809 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6810 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6813 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6815 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6816 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6817 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6818 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6820 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6821 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6823 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6824 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6826 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6827 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6828 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6829 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6830 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6831 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6835 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6836 initial_commitment_tx,
6839 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6840 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6844 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6845 if validated.is_err() {
6846 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6849 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6850 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6851 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6852 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6853 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6854 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6855 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6856 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6857 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6858 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6859 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6860 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6862 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
6863 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6864 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6865 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6866 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6867 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6868 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6869 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6871 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6872 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6873 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6875 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6877 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6878 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6880 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6882 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6884 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6885 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6886 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6889 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6891 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6892 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6893 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6894 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6895 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6900 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6901 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6902 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6903 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6906 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6907 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6908 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6909 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6910 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6911 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6912 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6913 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6917 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6918 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6919 // `static_remote_key`.
6920 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6923 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6924 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6927 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6928 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6931 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6933 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6934 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6941 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6942 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6943 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6944 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6945 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6946 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6947 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6948 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6949 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6950 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6954 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6955 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6957 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6958 // support this channel type.
6959 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6961 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6962 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6963 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6964 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6965 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6966 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6967 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6968 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6969 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6972 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6976 // Check sanity of message fields:
6977 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6980 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6983 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6986 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6987 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6990 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6993 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6996 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6998 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6999 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
7000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
7002 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7005 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7009 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7010 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
7011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
7013 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7016 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7019 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7022 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7025 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7028 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7032 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7034 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7035 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7040 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7041 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7042 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7043 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7046 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7049 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7050 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7051 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7053 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7057 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7058 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7059 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7060 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7064 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7065 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7066 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7070 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7071 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7072 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7073 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7077 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7078 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7079 &Some(ref script) => {
7080 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7081 if script.len() == 0 {
7084 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7087 Some(script.clone())
7090 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7097 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7098 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7099 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7100 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7104 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7105 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7110 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7111 Ok(script) => script,
7112 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7115 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7116 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7118 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7121 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7125 context: ChannelContext {
7128 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7129 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7131 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7136 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7138 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7139 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7140 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7141 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7143 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7146 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7148 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7149 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7152 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7153 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7154 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7156 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7157 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7158 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7159 pending_update_fee: None,
7160 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7161 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7162 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7163 update_time_counter: 1,
7165 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7167 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7168 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7169 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7170 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7171 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7172 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7174 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7175 signer_pending_funding: false,
7177 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7178 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7179 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7180 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7182 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7183 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7184 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7185 closing_fee_limits: None,
7186 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7188 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7189 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7190 short_channel_id: None,
7191 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7193 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7194 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7195 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7196 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7197 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7198 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7199 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7200 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7201 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7202 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7203 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7204 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7207 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7209 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7210 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7211 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7212 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7213 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7214 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7215 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7217 funding_outpoint: None,
7218 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7220 funding_transaction: None,
7221 is_batch_funding: None,
7223 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7224 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7225 counterparty_node_id,
7227 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7229 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7231 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7232 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7234 announcement_sigs: None,
7236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7237 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7238 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7239 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7241 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7242 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7244 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7245 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7247 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7248 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7251 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7256 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7258 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7260 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7266 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7267 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7269 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7270 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7271 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7272 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7275 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7276 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7278 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7280 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7281 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7284 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7287 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7288 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7289 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7291 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7292 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7293 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7294 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7296 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7297 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7298 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7299 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7300 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7301 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7302 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7303 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7304 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7305 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7306 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7307 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7308 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7309 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7310 first_per_commitment_point,
7311 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7312 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7313 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7315 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7317 next_local_nonce: None,
7321 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7322 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7324 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7326 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7327 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7330 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7331 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7333 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7334 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7335 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7336 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7337 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7338 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7339 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7340 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7341 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7342 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7343 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7345 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7348 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7349 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7350 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7354 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7355 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7358 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7359 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7361 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7362 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7364 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7366 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7367 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7368 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7369 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7372 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7373 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7374 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7375 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7376 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7378 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7380 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7381 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7382 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7385 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7386 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7387 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7391 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7392 initial_commitment_tx,
7395 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7396 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7399 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7400 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7403 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7405 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7406 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7407 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7408 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7410 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7412 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7413 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7414 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7415 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7416 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7417 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7418 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7419 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7420 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7421 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7422 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7424 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7425 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7426 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7427 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7428 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7429 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7430 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7432 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7433 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7435 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7436 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7437 let mut channel = Channel {
7438 context: self.context,
7440 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7441 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7443 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7447 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7448 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7456 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7457 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7458 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7459 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7460 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7462 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7463 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7464 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7465 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7471 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7472 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7473 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7474 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7475 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7476 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7481 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7482 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7483 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7484 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7486 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7487 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7488 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7489 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7494 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7495 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7496 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7497 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7498 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7499 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7504 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7505 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7506 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7509 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7511 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7512 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7513 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7514 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7515 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7517 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7518 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7519 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7520 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7522 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7524 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7525 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7526 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7528 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7530 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7532 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7536 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7537 // deserialized from that format.
7538 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7539 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7540 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7542 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7544 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7545 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7546 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7548 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7549 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7550 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7551 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7554 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7555 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7556 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7559 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7560 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7561 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7562 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7564 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7565 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7567 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7569 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7571 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7573 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7576 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7578 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7583 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7584 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7585 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7587 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7588 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7589 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7590 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7591 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7592 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7593 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7595 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7597 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7599 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7602 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7603 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7604 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7607 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7609 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7610 preimages.push(preimage);
7612 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7613 reason.write(writer)?;
7615 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7617 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7618 preimages.push(preimage);
7620 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7621 reason.write(writer)?;
7624 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7625 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7628 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7629 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7630 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7631 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7632 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7633 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7635 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7636 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7637 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7640 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7641 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7642 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7643 source.write(writer)?;
7644 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7646 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7647 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7649 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7651 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7652 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7654 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7656 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7657 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7659 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7660 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7662 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7663 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7664 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7666 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7668 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7669 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7674 match self.context.resend_order {
7675 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7676 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7679 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7680 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7681 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7683 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7684 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7685 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7686 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7689 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7690 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7691 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7692 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7693 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7696 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7697 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7698 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7699 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7701 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7702 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7703 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7705 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7707 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7708 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7709 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7710 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7712 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7713 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7714 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7715 // consider the stale state on reload.
7718 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7719 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7720 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7722 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7723 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7724 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7726 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7727 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7729 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7730 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7731 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7733 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7734 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7736 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7739 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7740 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7741 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7743 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7746 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7747 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7749 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7750 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7751 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7753 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7755 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7757 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7760 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7761 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7762 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7763 htlc.write(writer)?;
7766 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7767 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7768 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7770 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7771 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7773 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7774 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7775 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7776 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7777 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7778 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7779 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7781 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7782 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7783 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7784 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7785 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7787 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7788 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7790 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7791 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7792 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7793 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7795 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7797 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7798 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7799 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7800 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7801 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7802 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7803 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7805 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7806 (2, chan_type, option),
7807 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7808 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7809 (5, self.context.config, required),
7810 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7811 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7812 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7813 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7814 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7815 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7816 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7817 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7818 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7819 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7820 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7821 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7822 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7823 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7824 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7825 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7826 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7827 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7828 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7829 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7830 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7831 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7832 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
7839 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7840 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7842 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7843 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7845 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7846 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7847 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7849 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7850 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7851 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7852 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7854 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7856 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7857 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7859 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7860 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7862 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7863 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7868 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7870 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let mut keys_data = None;
7874 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7875 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7876 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7877 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7878 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7879 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7880 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7881 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7882 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7883 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7887 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7888 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7889 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7892 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7894 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7895 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7896 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7898 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7900 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7901 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7902 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7903 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7904 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7905 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7906 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7907 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7908 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7909 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7910 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7911 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7912 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7917 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7918 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7919 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7920 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7921 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7922 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7923 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7924 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7925 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7926 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7927 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7928 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7930 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7934 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7935 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7938 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7939 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7941 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7943 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7944 blinding_point: None,
7948 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7949 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7950 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7951 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7952 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7953 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7954 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7955 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7956 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7957 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7958 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7959 blinding_point: None,
7961 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7962 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7963 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7965 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7966 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7967 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7969 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7973 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7974 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7975 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7976 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7979 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7980 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7981 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7983 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7984 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7985 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7986 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7989 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7990 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7991 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7992 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7995 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7997 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7999 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8000 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8001 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8002 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8004 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8005 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8006 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8007 // consider the stale state on reload.
8008 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8011 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8012 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8013 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8018 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8019 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8020 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8022 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8023 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8024 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8025 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8027 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8028 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8030 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8031 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8033 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8034 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8035 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8037 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8039 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8040 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8042 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8043 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8046 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8048 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8049 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8050 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8051 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8056 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8057 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8059 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8061 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8062 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8064 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8065 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8067 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8070 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8073 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8074 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8075 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8079 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8080 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8081 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8083 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8089 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8090 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8091 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8092 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8093 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8094 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8095 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8096 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8097 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8098 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8100 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8101 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8102 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8103 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8104 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8105 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8106 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8108 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8109 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8110 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8111 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8113 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8115 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8116 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8118 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8120 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8122 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8123 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8125 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8127 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8128 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8129 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8130 (2, channel_type, option),
8131 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8132 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8133 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8134 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8135 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8136 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8137 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8138 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8139 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8140 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8141 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8142 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8143 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8144 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8145 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8146 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8147 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8148 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8149 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8150 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8151 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8152 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8153 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8154 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8155 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8156 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8159 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8160 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8161 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8162 // required channel parameters.
8163 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8164 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8166 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8168 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8169 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8170 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8171 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8174 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8175 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8176 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8178 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8179 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8181 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8182 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8187 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8188 if iter.next().is_some() {
8189 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8193 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8194 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8195 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8196 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8197 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8200 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8201 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8202 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8204 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8205 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8207 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8208 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8209 // separate u64 values.
8210 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8212 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8214 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8215 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8216 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8217 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8219 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8220 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8222 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8223 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8224 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8225 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8226 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8229 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8230 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8232 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8233 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8234 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8235 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8237 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8238 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8240 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8241 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8242 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8243 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8244 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8247 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8248 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8251 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8252 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8253 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8254 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8255 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8256 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8259 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8260 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8261 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8263 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8268 context: ChannelContext {
8271 config: config.unwrap(),
8275 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8276 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8277 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8280 temporary_channel_id,
8282 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8284 channel_value_satoshis,
8286 latest_monitor_update_id,
8288 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8289 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8292 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8293 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8296 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8297 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8298 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8299 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8303 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8304 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8305 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8306 monitor_pending_forwards,
8307 monitor_pending_failures,
8308 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8310 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8311 signer_pending_funding: false,
8314 holding_cell_update_fee,
8315 next_holder_htlc_id,
8316 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8317 update_time_counter,
8320 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8321 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8322 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8323 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8325 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8326 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8327 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8328 closing_fee_limits: None,
8329 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8331 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8332 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8334 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8336 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8337 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8338 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8339 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8340 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8341 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8342 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8343 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8344 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8347 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8349 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8350 funding_transaction,
8353 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8354 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8355 counterparty_node_id,
8357 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8361 channel_update_status,
8362 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8367 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8369 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8371 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8372 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8374 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8375 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8376 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8378 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8379 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8381 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8382 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8384 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8387 local_initiated_shutdown,
8389 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8398 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8399 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8400 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8401 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8402 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8403 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8404 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8405 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8406 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8407 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8408 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8409 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8410 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8411 use crate::ln::msgs;
8412 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8413 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8414 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8415 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8416 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8417 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8418 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8419 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8420 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8421 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8422 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8423 use crate::util::test_utils;
8424 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8425 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8426 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8427 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8428 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8429 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8430 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8431 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8432 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8433 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8434 use crate::prelude::*;
8437 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8438 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8439 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8440 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8442 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8443 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8444 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8445 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8448 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8451 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8452 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8458 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8459 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8460 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8461 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8465 signer: InMemorySigner,
8468 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8469 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8472 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8473 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8475 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8477 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8478 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8481 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8485 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8487 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8488 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8489 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8490 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8491 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8494 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8496 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8497 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8501 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8502 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8503 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8507 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8508 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8509 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8510 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8513 let seed = [42; 32];
8514 let network = Network::Testnet;
8515 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8516 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8517 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8521 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8522 let config = UserConfig::default();
8523 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8524 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8525 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8527 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8528 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8532 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8533 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8535 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8536 let original_fee = 253;
8537 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8538 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8539 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8540 let seed = [42; 32];
8541 let network = Network::Testnet;
8542 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8544 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8545 let config = UserConfig::default();
8546 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8548 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8549 // same as the old fee.
8550 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8551 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8552 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8556 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8557 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8558 // dust limits are used.
8559 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8561 let seed = [42; 32];
8562 let network = Network::Testnet;
8563 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8564 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8565 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8567 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8568 // they have different dust limits.
8570 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8571 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8572 let config = UserConfig::default();
8573 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8575 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8576 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8577 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8578 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8579 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8581 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8582 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8583 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8584 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8585 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8587 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8588 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8589 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8590 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8592 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8593 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8594 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8596 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8597 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8598 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8600 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8601 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8602 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8604 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8605 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8606 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8607 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8610 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8612 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8613 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8614 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8615 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8616 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8617 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8618 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8619 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8620 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8622 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8623 blinding_point: None,
8626 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8627 // the dust limit check.
8628 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8629 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8630 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8631 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8633 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8634 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8635 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8636 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8637 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8638 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8639 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8643 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8644 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8645 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8646 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8647 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8648 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8649 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8650 let seed = [42; 32];
8651 let network = Network::Testnet;
8652 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8654 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8655 let config = UserConfig::default();
8656 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8658 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8659 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8661 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8662 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8663 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8664 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8665 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8666 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8668 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8669 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8670 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8671 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8672 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8674 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8676 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8677 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8678 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8679 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8680 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8682 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8683 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8684 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8685 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8686 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8690 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8691 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8692 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8693 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8694 let seed = [42; 32];
8695 let network = Network::Testnet;
8696 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8697 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8698 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8700 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8702 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8703 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8704 let config = UserConfig::default();
8705 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8707 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8708 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8709 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8710 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8712 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8713 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8714 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8716 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8717 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8718 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8719 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8721 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8722 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8723 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8725 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8726 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8727 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8729 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8730 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8731 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8732 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8733 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8734 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8735 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8737 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8739 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8740 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8741 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8742 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8743 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8747 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8748 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8749 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8751 let seed = [42; 32];
8752 let network = Network::Testnet;
8753 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8754 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8755 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8757 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8758 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8759 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8760 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8761 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8762 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8763 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8764 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8766 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8767 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8768 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8769 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8770 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8771 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8773 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8774 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8775 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8776 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8778 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8780 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8781 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8782 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8783 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8784 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8785 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8787 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8788 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8789 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8790 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8792 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8793 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8794 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8795 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8796 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8798 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8799 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8801 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8802 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8803 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8805 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8806 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8807 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8808 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8809 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8811 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8812 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8814 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8815 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8816 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8820 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8822 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8823 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8824 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8826 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8827 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8828 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8829 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8831 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8832 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8833 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8835 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8837 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8838 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8841 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8842 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8843 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8844 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8845 let seed = [42; 32];
8846 let network = Network::Testnet;
8847 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8848 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8849 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8852 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8853 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8854 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8856 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8857 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8859 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8860 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8861 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8863 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8864 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8866 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8868 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8869 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8871 // Channel Negotiations failed
8872 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8873 assert!(result.is_err());
8878 fn channel_update() {
8879 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8880 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8881 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8882 let seed = [42; 32];
8883 let network = Network::Testnet;
8884 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8885 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8886 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8888 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8889 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8890 let config = UserConfig::default();
8891 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8893 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8894 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8895 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8896 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8897 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8899 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8900 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8901 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8902 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8903 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8905 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8906 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8907 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8908 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8910 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8911 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8912 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8914 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8915 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8916 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8918 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8919 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8920 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8922 short_channel_id: 0,
8925 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8926 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8927 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8929 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8930 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8932 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8934 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8936 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8937 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8938 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8939 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8941 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8942 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8943 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8945 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8948 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8952 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8953 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8955 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8956 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8957 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8958 let seed = [42; 32];
8959 let network = Network::Testnet;
8960 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8961 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8963 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8964 let config = UserConfig::default();
8965 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8966 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8967 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
8969 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8970 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8971 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
8973 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
8974 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8975 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
8977 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8978 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
8979 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
8980 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
8981 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
8984 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8986 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8987 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8988 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8989 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8993 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8994 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8995 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8997 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9000 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9002 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9003 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9004 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9005 blinding_point: None,
9007 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9008 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9010 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9013 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9016 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9018 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9021 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9022 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9023 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9025 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9026 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9029 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9030 blinding_point: None,
9032 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9033 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9036 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9037 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9039 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9040 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9042 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9045 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9046 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9047 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9048 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9049 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9050 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9051 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9052 } = &mut dummy_add {
9053 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9054 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9056 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9057 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9058 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9060 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9063 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9065 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9066 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9067 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9068 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9069 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9070 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9071 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9072 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9075 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9077 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9078 use bitcoin::sighash;
9079 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9080 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9081 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9082 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9083 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9084 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9085 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9086 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9087 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9088 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9089 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9090 use crate::sync::Arc;
9091 use core::str::FromStr;
9092 use hex::DisplayHex;
9094 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9095 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9096 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9099 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9101 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9102 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9103 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9104 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9105 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9107 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9108 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9114 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9115 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9116 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9118 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9119 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9120 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9121 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9122 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9123 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9125 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9127 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9128 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9129 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9130 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9131 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9132 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9134 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9135 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9136 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9137 selected_contest_delay: 144
9139 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9140 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9142 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9143 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9145 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9146 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9148 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9149 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9151 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9152 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9153 // build_commitment_transaction.
9154 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9155 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9156 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9157 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9158 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9160 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9161 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9162 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9163 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9167 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9168 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9169 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9170 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9174 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9175 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9176 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9178 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9179 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9181 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9182 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9184 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9186 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9187 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9188 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9189 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9190 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9191 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9192 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9194 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9195 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9196 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9197 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9199 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9200 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9201 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9203 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9205 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9206 commitment_tx.clone(),
9207 counterparty_signature,
9208 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9209 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9210 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9212 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9213 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9215 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9216 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9217 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9219 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9220 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9223 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9224 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9226 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9227 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9228 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9229 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9230 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9231 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9232 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9233 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9235 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9238 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9239 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9240 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9244 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9247 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9248 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9249 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9250 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9251 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9252 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9254 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9255 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9256 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9257 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9259 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9260 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9261 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9262 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9263 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9265 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9266 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9267 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9268 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9269 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9270 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9272 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9276 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9277 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9278 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9279 "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", {});
9281 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9282 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9284 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9285 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9286 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9288 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9289 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9290 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9291 "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", {});
9293 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9294 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9296 amount_msat: 1000000,
9298 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9299 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9301 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9304 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9305 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9307 amount_msat: 2000000,
9309 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9310 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9312 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9315 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9316 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9318 amount_msat: 2000000,
9320 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9321 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9322 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9323 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9324 blinding_point: None,
9326 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9329 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9330 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9332 amount_msat: 3000000,
9334 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9335 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9336 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9337 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9338 blinding_point: None,
9340 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9343 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9344 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9346 amount_msat: 4000000,
9348 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9349 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9351 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9355 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9356 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9357 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9359 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9360 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9361 "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", {
9364 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9365 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9366 "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" },
9369 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9370 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9371 "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" },
9374 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9375 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9376 "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" },
9379 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9380 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9381 "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" },
9384 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9385 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9386 "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" }
9389 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9390 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9391 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9393 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9394 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9395 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9398 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9399 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9400 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9403 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9404 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9405 "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" },
9408 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9409 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9410 "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" },
9413 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9414 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9415 "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" },
9418 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9419 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9420 "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" }
9423 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9424 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9425 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9427 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9428 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9429 "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", {
9432 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9433 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9434 "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" },
9437 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9438 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9439 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9442 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9443 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9444 "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" },
9447 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9448 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9449 "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" }
9452 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9455 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9457 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9458 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9459 "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", {
9462 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9463 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9464 "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" },
9467 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9468 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9469 "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" },
9472 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9473 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9474 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
9477 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9478 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9479 "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" }
9482 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9483 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9484 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9485 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9487 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9488 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9489 "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", {
9492 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9493 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9494 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9497 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9498 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9499 "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" },
9502 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9503 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9504 "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" },
9507 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9508 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9509 "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" }
9512 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9516 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9517 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9518 "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", {
9521 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9522 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9523 "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" },
9526 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9527 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9528 "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" },
9531 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9532 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9533 "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" }
9536 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9540 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9541 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9542 "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", {
9545 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9546 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9547 "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" },
9550 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9551 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9552 "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" },
9555 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9556 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9557 "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" }
9560 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9561 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9562 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9564 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9565 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9566 "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", {
9569 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9570 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9571 "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" },
9574 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9575 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9576 "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" }
9579 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9580 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9581 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9582 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9583 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9584 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9586 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9587 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9588 "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", {
9591 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9592 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9593 "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" },
9596 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9597 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9598 "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" }
9601 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9602 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9603 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9604 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9605 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9607 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9608 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9609 "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", {
9612 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9613 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9614 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9617 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9618 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9619 "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" }
9622 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9623 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9624 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9626 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9627 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9628 "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", {
9631 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9632 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9633 "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" }
9636 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9637 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9638 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9639 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9640 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9642 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9643 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9644 "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", {
9647 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9648 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9649 "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" }
9652 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9653 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9654 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9655 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9656 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9658 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9659 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9660 "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", {
9663 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9664 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9665 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9668 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9671 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9673 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9674 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9675 "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", {});
9677 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9678 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9679 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9680 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9681 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9683 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9684 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9685 "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", {});
9687 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9688 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9689 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9690 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9691 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9693 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9694 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9695 "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", {});
9697 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9698 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9699 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9701 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9702 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9703 "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", {});
9705 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9706 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9707 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9708 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9709 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9711 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9712 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9713 "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", {});
9715 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9716 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9717 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9718 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9719 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9721 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9722 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9723 "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", {});
9725 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9726 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9727 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9728 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9729 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9730 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9732 amount_msat: 2000000,
9734 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9735 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9737 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9740 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9741 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9742 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9744 amount_msat: 5000001,
9746 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9747 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9748 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9749 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9750 blinding_point: None,
9752 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9755 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9756 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9758 amount_msat: 5000000,
9760 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9761 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9762 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9763 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9764 blinding_point: None,
9766 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9770 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9771 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9772 "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", {
9775 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9776 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9777 "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" },
9779 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9780 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9781 "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" },
9783 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9784 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9785 "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" }
9788 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9789 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9790 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9791 "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", {
9794 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9795 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9796 "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" },
9798 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9799 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9800 "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" },
9802 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9803 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9804 "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" }
9809 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9810 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9812 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9813 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9814 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9815 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9817 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9818 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9819 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9821 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9822 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9824 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9825 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9827 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9828 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9829 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9833 fn test_key_derivation() {
9834 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9835 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9837 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9838 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9840 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9841 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9843 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9844 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9846 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9847 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9849 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9850 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9852 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9853 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9857 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9858 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9859 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9860 let seed = [42; 32];
9861 let network = Network::Testnet;
9862 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9863 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9865 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9866 let config = UserConfig::default();
9867 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9868 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9870 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9871 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9873 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9874 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9875 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9876 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9877 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9878 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9879 assert!(res.is_ok());
9883 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9884 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9885 // resulting `channel_type`.
9886 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9887 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9888 let network = Network::Testnet;
9889 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9890 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9892 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9893 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9895 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9896 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9898 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9899 // need to signal it.
9900 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9901 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9902 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9903 &config, 0, 42, None
9905 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9907 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9908 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9909 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9911 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9912 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9913 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9917 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9918 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9919 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9920 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9921 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9924 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9925 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9929 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9930 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9931 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9932 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9933 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9934 let network = Network::Testnet;
9935 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9936 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9938 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9939 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9941 let config = UserConfig::default();
9943 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9944 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9945 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9946 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9947 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9949 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9950 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9951 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9955 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9956 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9957 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9959 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9960 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9961 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9962 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9963 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9964 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9966 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9970 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9971 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9974 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9975 let network = Network::Testnet;
9976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9977 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9979 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9980 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9982 let config = UserConfig::default();
9984 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9985 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9986 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9987 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9988 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9989 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9990 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9991 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9993 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9994 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9995 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9996 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9997 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9998 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10002 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10003 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10005 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10006 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10007 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10008 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10010 assert!(res.is_err());
10012 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10013 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10014 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10016 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10017 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10018 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10021 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10023 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10024 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10025 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10026 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10029 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10030 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10032 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10033 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10035 assert!(res.is_err());
10039 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10040 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10041 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10042 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10043 let seed = [42; 32];
10044 let network = Network::Testnet;
10045 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10046 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10047 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10049 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10050 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10051 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10052 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10054 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10055 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10056 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10061 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10071 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10072 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10073 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10078 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10079 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10085 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10088 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10089 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10090 &accept_channel_msg,
10091 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10092 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10095 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10096 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10097 let tx = Transaction {
10099 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10103 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10106 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10109 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10110 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10111 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10112 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10113 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10114 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10118 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10119 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10127 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10128 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10129 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10130 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10132 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10133 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10140 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10141 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10142 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10143 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10144 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10146 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10147 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10148 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10156 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10157 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10160 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10161 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10162 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10163 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());