Switch Sha256 to using bitcoin_hashes and our own HKDF

[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channel.rs

use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};

use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;

use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1;

use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};

use std;
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem};
use std::time::Instant;
use std::sync::{Arc};

#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
        pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
        pub channel_value_msat: u64,
        pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
        pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
        pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
        pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
        pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
}

enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
        FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
        FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
        Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
}

enum InboundHTLCState {
        /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
        RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
        /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
        /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
        /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
        /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
        /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
        AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
        /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
        /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
        /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
        /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
        /// revoke_and_ack.
        AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
        Committed,
        /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
        /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
        /// we'll drop it.
        /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
        /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
        /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
        /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
        /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
        /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
        /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
        LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}

struct InboundHTLCOutput {
        htlc_id: u64,
        amount_msat: u64,
        cltv_expiry: u32,
        payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        state: InboundHTLCState,
}

enum OutboundHTLCState {
        /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
        /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
        /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
        /// revoke, but we dont really care about that:
        ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
        ///    money back (though we wont), and,
        ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
        ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
        ///    doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
        ///    we'll never get out of sync).
        /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
        /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
        LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
        Committed,
        /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
        /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
        RemoteRemoved,
        /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
        /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
        /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
        /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
        /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
        AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
        /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
        /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
        /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
        /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
        /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
        AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
}

struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
        htlc_id: u64,
        amount_msat: u64,
        cltv_expiry: u32,
        payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        state: OutboundHTLCState,
        source: HTLCSource,
        /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
        fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
}

macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
        ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
                HTLCOutputInCommitment {
                        offered: $offered,
                        amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
                        cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
                        payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
                        transaction_output_index: 0
                }
        }
}

/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
        AddHTLC {
                // always outbound
                amount_msat: u64,
                cltv_expiry: u32,
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
                source: HTLCSource,
                onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
                time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
        },
        ClaimHTLC {
                payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
                htlc_id: u64,
        },
        FailHTLC {
                htlc_id: u64,
                err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
        },
}

/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
/// move on to ChannelFunded.
/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
enum ChannelState {
        /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
        OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
        /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
        TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
        /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
        /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
        /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
        FundingCreated = 4,
        /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
        /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
        /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
        FundingSent = 8,
        /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
        /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
        TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
        /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
        /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
        OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
        ChannelFunded = 64,
        /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
        /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
        /// dance.
        PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
        /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
        /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
        /// messages until they've managed to do so.
        MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
        /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
        /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
        /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
        /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
        /// later.
        /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
        AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
        /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
        /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
        /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
        RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
        /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
        /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
        /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
        /// us their shutdown.
        LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
        /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
        /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
        ShutdownComplete = 4096,
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);

const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;

// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
// inbound channel.
pub(super) struct Channel {
        config: ChannelConfig,

        user_id: u64,

        channel_id: [u8; 32],
        channel_state: u32,
        channel_outbound: bool,
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
        channel_value_satoshis: u64,

        local_keys: ChannelKeys,
        shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,

        // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
        // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
        // cost of others, but should really just be changed.

        cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
        cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
        value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
        /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
        /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
        /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
        /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
        /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
        received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
        pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
        pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
        holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,

        monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
        monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
        monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
        monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
        monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,

        // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
        // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
        // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
        //
        // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
        // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
        // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
        // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
        // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
        // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
        // commitment_signed.
        pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
        // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
        // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
        // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
        // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
        holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
        next_local_htlc_id: u64,
        next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
        channel_update_count: u32,
        feerate_per_kw: u64,

        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
        /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
        max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
        /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
        max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,

        #[cfg(test)]
        // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
        pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
        #[cfg(not(test))]
        last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,

        last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)

        /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
        /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
        /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
        /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
        funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
        short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
        /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
        /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
        pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
        funding_tx_confirmations: u64,

        their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
        our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
        their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
        //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
        /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
        their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
        //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
        their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
        our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
        their_to_self_delay: u16,
        //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
        their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
        //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
        minimum_depth: u32,

        their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,

        their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
        their_node_id: PublicKey,

        their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,

        channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,

        logger: Arc<Logger>,
}

const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
/// it's 2^24.
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);

#[cfg(test)]
pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;

/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) enum ChannelError {
        Ignore(&'static str),
        Close(&'static str),
}

macro_rules! secp_check {
        ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
                match $res {
                        Ok(thing) => thing,
                        Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
                }
        };
}

impl Channel {
        // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
        fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
                channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
        }

        /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
        ///
        /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
        fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
                let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
                cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
        }

        fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
                cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
        }

        fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
                1000 // TODO
        }

        fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
                // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
                // be at least 6.
                const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
                CONF_TARGET
        }

        // Constructors:
        pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
                let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);

                if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
                }

                if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
                }


                let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
                if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
                        return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
                }

                let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);

                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
                                                          &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
                                                          keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());

                Ok(Channel {
                        user_id: user_id,
                        config: config.channel_options.clone(),

                        channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
                        channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
                        channel_outbound: true,
                        secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
                        channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,

                        local_keys: chan_keys,
                        shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
                        cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
                        cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
                        value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
                        received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,

                        pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                        pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                        holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
                        pending_update_fee: None,
                        holding_cell_update_fee: None,
                        next_local_htlc_id: 0,
                        next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
                        channel_update_count: 1,

                        monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
                        monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
                        monitor_pending_order: None,
                        monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
                        monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),

                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),

                        last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),

                        last_sent_closing_fee: None,

                        funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
                        short_channel_id: None,
                        last_block_connected: Default::default(),
                        funding_tx_confirmations: 0,

                        feerate_per_kw: feerate,
                        their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
                        our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
                        their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
                        their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
                        their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
                        our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
                        their_to_self_delay: 0,
                        their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
                        minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel

                        their_funding_pubkey: None,
                        their_revocation_basepoint: None,
                        their_payment_basepoint: None,
                        their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
                        their_htlc_basepoint: None,
                        their_cur_commitment_point: None,

                        their_prev_commitment_point: None,
                        their_node_id: their_node_id,

                        their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,

                        channel_monitor: channel_monitor,

                        logger,
                })
        }

        fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
                }
                if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
        /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
        pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
                let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
                let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();

                // Check sanity of message fields:
                if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
                }
                if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
                }
                if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Miminum htlc value is full channel value"));
                }
                Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;

                if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
                }

                // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
                if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
                }

                // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:

                let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
                if config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
                        if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
                        }
                }
                // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
                local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;

                let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);

                let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
                let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
                if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
                }
                if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
                }

                // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
                // for full fee payment
                let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
                if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
                }

                let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
                let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
                if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
                }

                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
                                                              &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
                                                              keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
                channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
                channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);

                let mut chan = Channel {
                        user_id: user_id,
                        config: local_config,

                        channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
                        channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
                        channel_outbound: false,
                        secp_ctx: secp_ctx,

                        local_keys: chan_keys,
                        shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
                        cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
                        cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
                        value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
                        received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,

                        pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                        pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                        holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
                        pending_update_fee: None,
                        holding_cell_update_fee: None,
                        next_local_htlc_id: 0,
                        next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
                        channel_update_count: 1,

                        monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
                        monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
                        monitor_pending_order: None,
                        monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
                        monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),

                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),

                        last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),

                        last_sent_closing_fee: None,

                        funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
                        short_channel_id: None,
                        last_block_connected: Default::default(),
                        funding_tx_confirmations: 0,

                        feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
                        channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
                        their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
                        our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
                        their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
                        their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
                        their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
                        our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
                        their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
                        their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
                        minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(msg.funding_satoshis*1000, msg.push_msat),

                        their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
                        their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
                        their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
                        their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
                        their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
                        their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),

                        their_prev_commitment_point: None,
                        their_node_id: their_node_id,

                        their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,

                        channel_monitor: channel_monitor,

                        logger,
                };

                let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
                chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);

                Ok(chan)
        }

        // Utilities to derive keys:

        fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
                let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
                SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).unwrap()
        }

        // Utilities to build transactions:

        fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
                let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
                let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);

                if self.channel_outbound {
                        sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
                        sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
                } else {
                        sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
                        sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
                }
                let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();

                ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
                ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
                ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
                ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
                ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
                ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
        }

        /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
        /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
        /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
        /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
        /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
        /// an HTLC to a).
        /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
        /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
        /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
        /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
        /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
        /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
        /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
        #[inline]
        fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
                let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);

                let txins = {
                        let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
                        ins.push(TxIn {
                                previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
                                script_sig: Script::new(),
                                sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
                                witness: Vec::new(),
                        });
                        ins
                };

                let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
                let mut unincluded_htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::new();

                let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
                let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
                let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
                let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;

                macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
                        ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr) => {
                                if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
                                        if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
                                                let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
                                                txouts.push((TxOut {
                                                        script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
                                                        value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
                                                }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
                                        } else {
                                                if let Some(source) = $source {
                                                        unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
                                                }
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
                                                let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
                                                txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
                                                        script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
                                                        value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
                                                }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
                                        } else {
                                                if let Some(source) = $source {
                                                        unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        let include = match htlc.state {
                                InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => !generated_by_local,
                                InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => !generated_by_local,
                                InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => true,
                                InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
                                InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => !generated_by_local,
                        };

                        if include {
                                add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None);
                                remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
                        } else {
                                match &htlc.state {
                                        &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
                                                if generated_by_local {
                                                        if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
                                                                value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        },
                                        _ => {},
                                }
                        }
                }

                for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        let include = match htlc.state {
                                OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
                                OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
                                OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
                                OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
                                OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
                        };

                        if include {
                                add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source));
                                local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
                        } else {
                                match htlc.state {
                                        OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
                                                if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
                                                        value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
                                                }
                                        },
                                        OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
                                                if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
                                                        value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
                                                }
                                        },
                                        _ => {},
                                }
                        }
                }


                let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
                let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;

                #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                {
                        // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
                        // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
                        // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
                        // yet!
                        let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
                                self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
                        } else {
                                self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
                        };
                        debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
                        max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
                        debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
                        max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
                }

                let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
                let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
                        (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
                } else {
                        (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
                };

                let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
                let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };

                if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
                        txouts.push((TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
                                                                                       if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
                                                                                       &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
                                value: value_to_a as u64
                        }, None));
                }

                if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
                        txouts.push((TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
                                                             .push_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
                                                             .into_script(),
                                value: value_to_b as u64
                        }, None));
                }

                transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);

                let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
                let mut htlcs_included: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
                let mut htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + unincluded_htlc_sources.len());
                for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
                        outputs.push(out.0);
                        if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1 {
                                htlc.transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
                                if let Some(source) = source_option {
                                        htlc_sources.push((htlc.payment_hash, source, Some(idx as u32)));
                                }
                                htlcs_included.push(htlc);
                        }
                }
                htlc_sources.append(&mut unincluded_htlc_sources);

                (Transaction {
                        version: 2,
                        lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
                        input: txins,
                        output: outputs,
                }, htlcs_included, htlc_sources)
        }

        #[inline]
        fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
                let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
                Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
        }

        #[inline]
        fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
                (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
        }

        #[inline]
        fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
                let txins = {
                        let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
                        ins.push(TxIn {
                                previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
                                script_sig: Script::new(),
                                sequence: 0xffffffff,
                                witness: Vec::new(),
                        });
                        ins
                };

                assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
                let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();

                let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
                let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
                let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };

                if value_to_self < 0 {
                        assert!(self.channel_outbound);
                        total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
                } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
                        assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
                        total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
                }

                if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        txouts.push((TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
                                value: value_to_remote as u64
                        }, ()));
                }

                if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        txouts.push((TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
                                value: value_to_self as u64
                        }, ()));
                }

                transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);

                let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
                for out in txouts.drain(..) {
                        outputs.push(out.0);
                }

                (Transaction {
                        version: 2,
                        lock_time: 0,
                        input: txins,
                        output: outputs,
                }, total_fee_satoshis)
        }

        #[inline]
        /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
        /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
        /// our counterparty!)
        /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
        /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
        fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
                let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
                let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
                let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);

                Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
        }

        #[inline]
        /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
        /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
        /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
        fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
                //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
                //may see payments to it!
                let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
                let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
                let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);

                Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
        }

        /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
        /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
        /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
        pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
                let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
                let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
                let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
                if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
                        builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
                                .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
                } else {
                        builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
                                .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
                }.push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
        }

        fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
                if tx.input.len() != 1 {
                        panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
                }
                if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
                        panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
                }

                let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);

                tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy

                let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
                let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
                if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                } else {
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                }
                tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
                tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);

                tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());

                our_sig
        }

        /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
        /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
        /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
        fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
                chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
        }

        fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
                if tx.input.len() != 1 {
                        panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
                }

                let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);

                let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
                let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
                let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
                Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
        }

        /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
        /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
        fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
                if tx.input.len() != 1 {
                        panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
                }
                if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
                        panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
                }

                let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;

                tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy

                if local_tx { // b, then a
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                } else {
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
                }
                tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
                tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);

                if htlc.offered {
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
                } else {
                        tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
                }

                tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());

                Ok(our_sig)
        }

        /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
        /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
        /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
        fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
                // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
                // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
                // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
                // either.
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
                }
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);

                let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());

                // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
                // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
                // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.

                let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
                for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
                        if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
                                assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
                                match htlc.state {
                                        InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
                                        InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
                                                if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
                                                } else {
                                                        log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                                                }
                                                return Ok((None, None));
                                        },
                                        _ => {
                                                debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
                                                // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
                                        }
                                }
                                pending_idx = idx;
                                break;
                        }
                }
                if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
                }

                // Now update local state:
                //
                // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
                // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
                self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);

                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
                        for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
                                match pending_update {
                                        &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
                                                if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
                                                        return Ok((None, None));
                                                }
                                        },
                                        &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
                                                if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
                                                        log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                                                        // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
                                                        // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
                                                        return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
                                                }
                                        },
                                        _ => {}
                                }
                        }
                        self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
                                payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
                        });
                        return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
                }

                {
                        let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
                        if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
                        } else {
                                debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
                                return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
                        }
                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
                }

                Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                        htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
                        payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
                }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
        }

        pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
                match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
                        (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
                                let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
                        },
                        (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
                        (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
                }
        }

        /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
        /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
        /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
        pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
                }
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);

                // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
                // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
                // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.

                let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
                for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
                        if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
                                match htlc.state {
                                        InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
                                        InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
                                                return Ok(None);
                                        },
                                        _ => {
                                                debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
                                                return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matchd the given HTLC ID"));
                                        }
                                }
                                pending_idx = idx;
                        }
                }
                if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
                }

                // Now update local state:
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
                        for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
                                match pending_update {
                                        &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
                                                if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
                                                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
                                                }
                                        },
                                        &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
                                                if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
                                                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
                                                }
                                        },
                                        _ => {}
                                }
                        }
                        self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
                                htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
                                err_packet,
                        });
                        return Ok(None);
                }

                {
                        let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
                }

                Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                        htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
                        reason: err_packet
                }))
        }

        pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
                match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
                        Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
                                let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
                        },
                        None => Ok(None)
                }
        }

        // Message handlers:

        pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                // Check sanity of message fields:
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
                }
                if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
                }
                if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
                }
                if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
                }

                // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
                if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
                }
                if msg.minimum_depth > config.channel_limits.max_minimum_depth {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
                }

                self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);

                self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
                self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
                self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
                self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
                self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
                self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
                self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
                self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
                self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
                self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
                self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
                self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
                self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);

                let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
                self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
                self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);

                self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;

                Ok(())
        }

        fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
                let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
                let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
                let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
                secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");

                // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
                self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);

                let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
                let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
                let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
                Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
        }

        pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_outbound {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
                }
                if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
                        // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
                        // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
                        // channel.
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
                }
                if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
                                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
                                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
                        panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
                }

                let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
                let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
                self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));

                let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(e) => {
                                self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
                                return Err(e);
                        }
                };

                // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:

                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
                self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
                self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
                self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;

                Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        signature: our_signature
                }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
        }

        /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
        /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
        pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
                }
                if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
                }
                if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
                                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
                                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
                        panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
                }

                let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
                let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
                let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
                secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");

                self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
                self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
                self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;

                Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
        }

        pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }

                let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);

                if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
                } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
                        self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
                        self.channel_update_count += 1;
                } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
                                // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
                                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
                                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
                        if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
                        }
                        // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
                        return Ok(());
                } else {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
                }

                self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
                self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
        fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
                let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
                for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
                }
                (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
        }

        /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
        fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
                let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
                for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
                }

                (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
        }

        pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
                }
                if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
                }

                let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
                if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
                }
                //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
                // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
                if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
                }
                // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
                // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
                // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
                if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
                }
                if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
                }
                if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
                }

                //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?

                if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
                        if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
                                panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
                        }
                }

                // Now update local state:
                self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
                self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
                        htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                        amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
                        payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
                        cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
                        state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
                });

                Ok(())
        }

        /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
        #[inline]
        fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
                                match check_preimage {
                                        None => {},
                                        Some(payment_hash) =>
                                                if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
                                                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
                                                }
                                };
                                match htlc.state {
                                        OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
                                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
                                        OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
                                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
                                                htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
                                        },
                                        OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
                                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
                                }
                                return Ok(&htlc.source);
                        }
                }
                Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
        }

        pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }

                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
                self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
        }

        pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }

                self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
                Ok(())
        }

        pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }

                self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
                Ok(())
        }

        pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
                }

                let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;

                let mut update_fee = false;
                let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
                        update_fee = true;
                        self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
                } else {
                        self.feerate_per_kw
                };

                let mut local_commitment_tx = {
                        let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
                        let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
                        (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
                };
                let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
                let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");

                //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
                if update_fee {
                        let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1.len();
                        let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;

                        if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
                        }
                }

                if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
                }

                let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
                self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
                new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());

                let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
                for (idx, htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.drain(..).enumerate() {
                        let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
                        let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
                        let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
                        secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
                        let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
                                let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
                                new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
                                htlc_sig
                        } else {
                                self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
                        };
                        htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
                }

                let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
                let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);

                // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
                let mut need_our_commitment = false;
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
                                self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
                                // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
                                // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
                                // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
                                if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
                                        need_our_commitment = true;
                                        self.pending_update_fee = None;
                                }
                        }
                }

                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
                        // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
                        // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
                        self.monitor_pending_order = None;
                }

                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs, local_commitment_tx.2);

                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
                                Some(forward_info.clone())
                        } else { None };
                        if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
                                htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
                                need_our_commitment = true;
                        }
                }
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
                                need_our_commitment = true;
                        }
                }

                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
                self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
                self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;

                if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
                        self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
                        self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
                }

                let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
                        // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
                        // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
                        // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
                        let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                        (Some(msg), monitor, None)
                } else if !need_our_commitment {
                        (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
                } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };

                Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
                        next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
                }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
        }

        /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
        /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
        fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
                if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
                        let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
                        mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
                        let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
                        let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
                        let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
                        let mut err = None;
                        for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
                                // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
                                // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
                                // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
                                // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
                                // to rebalance channels.
                                if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
                                        self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
                                } else {
                                        match &htlc_update {
                                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
                                                        match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
                                                                Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                        err = Some(e);
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                },
                                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
                                                        match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
                                                                Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                        if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
                                                                        else {
                                                                                panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
                                                                        }
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                },
                                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
                                                        match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
                                                                Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                        if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
                                                                        else {
                                                                                panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
                                                                        }
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                },
                                        }
                                        if err.is_some() {
                                                self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                        //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
                        //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
                        match err {
                                None => {
                                        if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
                                                // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
                                                // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
                                                // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
                                                return Ok(None);
                                        }
                                        let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
                                                        self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
                                                        Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
                                                                channel_id: self.channel_id,
                                                                feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
                                                        })
                                                } else {
                                                        None
                                                };
                                        let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                        Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                update_add_htlcs,
                                                update_fulfill_htlcs,
                                                update_fail_htlcs,
                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fee: update_fee,
                                                commitment_signed,
                                        }, monitor_update)))
                                },
                                Some(e) => Err(e)
                        }
                } else {
                        Ok(None)
                }
        }

        /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
        /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
        /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
        /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
        /// revoke_and_ack message.
        pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
                }

                if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
                        if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
                        }
                }
                self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
                        .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;

                // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
                // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
                // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
                // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
                self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
                self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
                self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
                self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
                        // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
                        // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
                        self.monitor_pending_order = None;
                }

                let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
                let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut require_commitment = false;
                let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
                // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
                self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
                        if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
                                if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
                                        value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
                                }
                                false
                        } else { true }
                });
                self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
                                if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
                                        revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
                                } else {
                                        // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
                                        value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
                                }
                                false
                        } else { true }
                });
                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
                                true
                        } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
                                true
                        } else { false };
                        if swap {
                                let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
                                mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);

                                if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
                                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
                                        require_commitment = true;
                                } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
                                        match forward_info {
                                                PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
                                                        require_commitment = true;
                                                        match fail_msg {
                                                                HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
                                                                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
                                                                        update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
                                                                },
                                                                HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
                                                                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
                                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
                                                                },
                                                        }
                                                },
                                                PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
                                                        to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
                                                        htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
                        } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
                                require_commitment = true;
                        }
                }
                self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;

                if self.channel_outbound {
                        if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
                                self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
                        }
                } else {
                        if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
                                // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signed's in a row without getting a
                                // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
                                // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
                                // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
                                // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
                                if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
                                        require_commitment = true;
                                        self.pending_update_fee = None;
                                }
                        }
                }

                if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
                        // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
                        // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
                        if require_commitment {
                                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
                        }
                        self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
                        self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
                        return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
                }

                match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
                        Some(mut commitment_update) => {
                                commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
                                for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
                                        commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
                                }
                                commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
                                for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                                        commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
                                }
                                Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
                        },
                        None => {
                                if require_commitment {
                                        let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                        Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fail_htlcs,
                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
                                                update_fee: None,
                                                commitment_signed
                                        }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
                                } else {
                                        Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
                                }
                        }
                }

        }

        /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
        /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
        /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
        fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
                }
                if !self.is_usable() {
                        panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
                }
                if !self.is_live() {
                        panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
                }

                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
                        self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
                        return None;
                }

                debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
                self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);

                Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
                })
        }

        pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
                match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
                        Some(update_fee) => {
                                let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
                        },
                        None => Ok(None)
                }
        }

        /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
        /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
        /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
        /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
        /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
        /// completed.
        pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
                let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();

                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
                if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                        return outbound_drops;
                }
                // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
                // will be retransmitted.
                self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;

                let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
                self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
                        match htlc.state {
                                InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
                                        // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
                                        // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
                                        // this HTLC accordingly
                                        inbound_drop_count += 1;
                                        false
                                },
                                InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
                                        // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
                                        // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
                                        // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
                                        true
                                },
                                InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
                                InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
                                        // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
                                        // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
                                        // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
                                        // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
                                        true
                                },
                        }
                });
                self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;

                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
                                // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
                                // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
                                // the update upon reconnection.
                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
                        }
                }

                self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
                        match htlc_update {
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
                                        outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
                                        false
                                },
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
                        }
                });
                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
                log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                outbound_drops
        }

        /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
        /// updates are partially paused.
        /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
        /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
        /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
        /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
        /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
        pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, raa_first_dropped_cs: bool) {
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
                match order {
                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
                                self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
                                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
                        },
                        RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
                                self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
                                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = raa_first_dropped_cs;
                        },
                }
                assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
                mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
                assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
                mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
                self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
        }

        /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
        /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
        /// to the remote side.
        pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
                self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);

                let mut forwards = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
                let mut failures = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);

                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
                        // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
                        self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
                        self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
                        return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
                }

                let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
                        Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
                } else { None };
                let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
                        Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
                } else { None };

                self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
                (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
        }

        pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_outbound {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
                self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                Ok(())
        }

        fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
                let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
                let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
                msgs::RevokeAndACK {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        per_commitment_secret,
                        next_per_commitment_point,
                }
        }

        fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();

                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
                                update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                        htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
                                        amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
                                        payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                                        cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                        onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
                                });
                        }
                }

                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
                                match reason {
                                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
                                                update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                                        htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
                                                        reason: err_packet.clone()
                                                });
                                        },
                                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
                                                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                                        htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
                                                        sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
                                                        failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
                                                });
                                        },
                                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
                                                update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
                                                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                                        htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
                                                        payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
                                                });
                                        },
                                }
                        }
                }

                msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                        update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
                        update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
                        commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
                }
        }

        /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
        /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
        pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
                        // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
                        // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
                        // just close here instead of trying to recover.
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
                }

                if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
                        msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
                }

                // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
                // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
                self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);

                let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
                        Some(msgs::Shutdown {
                                channel_id: self.channel_id,
                                scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
                        })
                } else { None };

                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
                                if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
                                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
                                }
                                // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
                                return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
                        }

                        // We have OurFundingLocked set!
                        let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
                        let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
                        return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
                                channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
                        }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
                }

                let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
                        // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
                        // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
                        None
                } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
                        if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
                                self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
                                None
                        } else {
                                Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
                        }
                } else {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
                };

                // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
                // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
                // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
                // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
                let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };

                let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
                        // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
                        let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
                        let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
                        Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
                                channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
                        })
                } else { None };

                let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
                                RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
                        } else {
                                RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
                        });

                if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
                        if required_revoke.is_some() {
                                log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                        } else {
                                log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                        }

                        if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
                                        self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
                                // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
                                // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
                                // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
                                // now!
                                match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
                                        Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
                                        Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
                                        Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
                                        Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
                                }
                        } else {
                                return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
                        }
                } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
                        if required_revoke.is_some() {
                                log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                        } else {
                                log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
                        }

                        // If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
                        debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());

                        if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
                                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
                                return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
                        }

                        return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
                } else {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
                }
        }

        fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
                if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
                                self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
                                self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
                        return None;
                }

                let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
                if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
                        proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
                }
                let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
                let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;

                let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
                let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
                let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
                Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
                        signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
                })
        }

        pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
                        // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
                        // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
                }
                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
                        }
                }
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);

                // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
                // 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
                if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
                }

                //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
                if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
                }

                if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
                        if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
                        }
                } else {
                        self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
                }

                // From here on out, we may not fail!

                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
                self.channel_update_count += 1;

                // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
                // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
                // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
                self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
                let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
                self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
                        match htlc_update {
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
                                        dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
                                        false
                                },
                                _ => true
                        }
                });
                // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
                // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
                // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.

                let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
                        None
                } else {
                        Some(msgs::Shutdown {
                                channel_id: self.channel_id,
                                scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
                        })
                };

                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
        }

        pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
                if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
                }
                if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
                }
                if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
                }

                let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
                let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
                if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
                }
                let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
                        Ok(_) => {},
                        Err(_e) => {
                                // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
                                // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
                                closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
                                sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                                secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
                        },
                };

                if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
                        if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
                                self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
                                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                                return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
                        }
                }

                macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
                        ($new_feerate: expr) => {
                                let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
                                let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
                                sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                                let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
                                self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
                                return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
                                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                                        fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
                                        signature: our_sig,
                                }), None))
                        }
                }

                let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
                if self.channel_outbound {
                        let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
                        if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
                                if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
                                        if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
                                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
                                        }
                                }
                                propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
                        }
                } else {
                        let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
                        if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
                                if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
                                        if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
                                                return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
                                        }
                                }
                                propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
                        }
                }

                let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                self.channel_update_count += 1;

                Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
                        signature: our_sig,
                }), Some(closing_tx)))
        }

        // Public utilities:

        pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
                self.channel_id
        }

        /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
        /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
        pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
                self.user_id
        }

        /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
        pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
                if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
                        panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
                }
                self.channel_monitor.clone()
        }

        /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
        /// is_usable() returns true).
        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
                self.short_channel_id
        }

        /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
        /// get_outbound_funding_created.
        pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
                self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
        }

        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
                self.their_node_id
        }

        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
                self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
        }

        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
                self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
        }

        pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
                self.channel_value_satoshis
        }

        pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
                self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
                self.feerate_per_kw
        }

        pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
        }

        pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
        }

        pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
        }

        //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
                &self.local_keys
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
                ChannelValueStat {
                        value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
                        channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
                        channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
                        pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
                        pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
                        holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
                                let mut res = 0;
                                for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
                                        match h {
                                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
                                                        res += amount_msat;
                                                }
                                                _ => {}
                                        }
                                }
                                res
                        },
                        their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
                }
        }

        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
                self.channel_update_count
        }

        pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
                self.config.announced_channel
        }

        pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
                self.channel_outbound
        }

        /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
                // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
                // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:

                // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
                let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;

                if self.channel_outbound {
                        // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
                        res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
                }

                // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
                res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;

                res as u32
        }

        /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
        pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
                self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
        }

        /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
                let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
                (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
        }

        /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
        /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
                self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
        }

        /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
        /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
        pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
                (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
        }

        /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
        pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
                self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
        }

        /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
        /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
        /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
        pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
                if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
                        assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
                        true
                } else { false }
        }

        /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
        /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
        /// the channel_monitor.
        /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
        /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
        /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
        pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
                let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
                if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
                        self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
                        self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
                        if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
                                self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
                                if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
                                        let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                                                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
                                                true
                                        } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
                                                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
                                                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                                                true
                                        } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
                                                // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
                                                // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
                                                false
                                        } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
                                                panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
                                        } else {
                                                // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
                                                // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
                                                false
                                        };
                                        self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());

                                        //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
                                        //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
                                        //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
                                        //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
                                        if need_commitment_update {
                                                let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
                                                let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
                                                return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
                                                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                                                        next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
                                                }));
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
                                if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
                                        let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
                                        if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
                                                        tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
                                                if self.channel_outbound {
                                                        // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
                                                        // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
                                                        // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
                                                        // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
                                                        // channel and move on.
                                                        #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
                                                        panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
                                                }
                                                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                                                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                                                return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                                                        data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
                                                });
                                        } else {
                                                if self.channel_outbound {
                                                        for input in tx.input.iter() {
                                                                if input.witness.is_empty() {
                                                                        // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
                                                                        // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
                                                                        #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
                                                                        panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
                                                self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
                                                self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)          << (5*8)) |
                                                                             ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
                                                                             ((txo_idx as u64)         << (0*8)));
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                Ok(None)
        }

        /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
        /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
        /// unconfirmation/reorg.
        pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
                if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
                        self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
                        if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
                                return true;
                        }
                }
                if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
                        self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
                }
                self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
                self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
                false
        }

        // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
        // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):

        pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
                }
                if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
                        panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
                }

                if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
                        panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
                }

                let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);

                msgs::OpenChannel {
                        chain_hash: chain_hash,
                        temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
                        push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
                        dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
                        max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
                        channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
                        htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
                        feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
                        to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
                        max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
                        funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
                        revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
                        payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
                        delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
                        htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
                        first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
                        channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
                        shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
                }
        }

        pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
                if self.channel_outbound {
                        panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
                }
                if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
                        panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
                }
                if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
                        panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
                }

                let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);

                msgs::AcceptChannel {
                        temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
                        max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
                        channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
                        htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
                        minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
                        to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
                        max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
                        funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
                        revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
                        payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
                        delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
                        htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
                        first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
                        shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
                }
        }

        /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
        fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
                let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
                let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
                let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();

                // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
                Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
        }

        /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
        /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
        /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
        /// or if called on an inbound channel.
        /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
        /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
        /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
        pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
                }
                if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
                        panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
                }
                if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
                                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
                                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
                        panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
                }

                let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
                self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));

                let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(e) => {
                                log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
                                self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
                                return Err(e);
                        }
                };

                let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;

                // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
                self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
                self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;

                Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
                        temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
                        funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
                        funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
                        signature: our_signature
                }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
        }

        /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
        /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
        /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
        /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
        /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
        /// closing).
        /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
        /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
        pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
                if !self.config.announced_channel {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
                }
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
                }
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
                }

                let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
                let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);

                let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
                        features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
                        chain_hash: chain_hash,
                        short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
                        node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
                        node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
                        bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
                        bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
                        excess_data: Vec::new(),
                };

                let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
                let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);

                Ok((msg, sig))
        }

        /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
        /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
        pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
                assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
                msgs::ChannelReestablish {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id(),
                        // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
                        // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
                        // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
                        // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
                        // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
                        // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...

                        // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
                        // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
                        next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
                        // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
                        // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
                        // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
                        // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
                        // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
                        // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
                        // overflow here.
                        next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
                        data_loss_protect: None,
                }
        }


        // Send stuff to our remote peers:

        /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
        /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
        /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
        /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
        /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
        /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
        pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
                }

                if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
                }
                if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
                }

                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
                        // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
                        // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
                        // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
                        // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
                        // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
                        // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
                }

                let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
                if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
                }
                //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
                // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
                if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"));
                }

                let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
                for holding_htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
                        match holding_htlc {
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } => {
                                        holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat += *amount_msat;
                                }
                                _ => {}
                        }
                }

                // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
                // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
                if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
                        return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"));
                }

                //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?

                // Now update local state:
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
                        //TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs!
                        self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
                                amount_msat: amount_msat,
                                payment_hash: payment_hash,
                                cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
                                source,
                                onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
                                time_created: Instant::now(),
                        });
                        return Ok(None);
                }

                self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
                        htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
                        amount_msat: amount_msat,
                        payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
                        cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
                        state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
                        source,
                        fail_reason: None,
                });

                let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
                        amount_msat: amount_msat,
                        payment_hash: payment_hash,
                        cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
                        onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
                };
                self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;

                Ok(Some(res))
        }

        /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
        /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
        /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
        /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
        pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
                        panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
                }
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
                        panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
                }
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
                        panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
                }
                if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
                        panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
                }
                let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
                                have_updates = true;
                        }
                        if have_updates { break; }
                }
                if !have_updates {
                        panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
                }
                self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
        }
        /// Only fails in case of bad keys
        fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
                // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
                // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
                // is acceptable.
                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
                                Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
                        } else { None };
                        if let Some(state) = new_state {
                                htlc.state = state;
                        }
                }
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
                                htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
                        }
                }

                let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
                        Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, mut htlc_sources))) => {
                                // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
                                let htlc_sources_no_ref = htlc_sources.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
                                (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources_no_ref)
                        },
                        Err(e) => return Err(e),
                };

                self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
                self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
                Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
        }

        /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
        /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
        fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)), ChannelError> {
                let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();

                let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
                if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
                        if self.channel_outbound {
                                feerate_per_kw = feerate;
                        }
                }

                let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
                let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
                let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
                let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);

                let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();

                for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
                        let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
                        let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
                        let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
                        let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
                        htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
                }

                Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        signature: our_sig,
                        htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
                }, remote_commitment_tx))
        }

        /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
        /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
        /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
        /// more info.
        pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
                match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
                        Some(update_add_htlc) => {
                                let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
                                Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
                        },
                        None => Ok(None)
                }
        }

        /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
        /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
        pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
                        }
                }
                if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
                        if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
                        }
                        else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
                                return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
                        }
                }
                assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
                if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
                        return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
                }

                let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();

                // From here on out, we may not fail!
                if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                } else {
                        self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
                }
                self.channel_update_count += 1;

                // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
                // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
                self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
                let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
                self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
                        match htlc_update {
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
                                        dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
                                        false
                                },
                                _ => true
                        }
                });

                Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                        scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
                }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
        }

        /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
        /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
        /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
        /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
        /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
        pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
                assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);

                // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
                // return them to fail the payment.
                let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
                for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
                        match htlc_update {
                                HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
                                        dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
                                },
                                _ => {}
                        }
                }

                for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
                        //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
                        //which correspond)
                }

                self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
                self.channel_update_count += 1;
                let mut res = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
                (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
        }
}

const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;

impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
                match self {
                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
                                0u8.write(writer)?;
                                error_packet.write(writer)?;
                        },
                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
                                1u8.write(writer)?;
                                onion_hash.write(writer)?;
                                err_code.write(writer)?;
                        },
                        &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
                                2u8.write(writer)?;
                                payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
                        },
                }
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
        fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                        0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
                        1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
                        2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                })
        }
}

impl Writeable for Channel {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
                // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
                // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).

                writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
                writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;

                self.user_id.write(writer)?;
                self.config.write(writer)?;

                self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
                (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
                self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
                self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;

                self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
                self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;

                self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
                self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
                self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;

                self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;

                let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
                                dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
                        }
                }
                (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
                for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
                        match &htlc.state {
                                &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
                                &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
                                        1u8.write(writer)?;
                                        htlc_state.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
                                        2u8.write(writer)?;
                                        htlc_state.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
                                        3u8.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
                                        4u8.write(writer)?;
                                        removal_reason.write(writer)?;
                                },
                        }
                }

                macro_rules! write_option {
                        ($thing: expr) => {
                                match &$thing {
                                        &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
                                        &Some(ref v) => {
                                                1u8.write(writer)?;
                                                v.write(writer)?;
                                        },
                                }
                        }
                }

                (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
                        htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
                        htlc.source.write(writer)?;
                        write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
                        match &htlc.state {
                                &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
                                        0u8.write(writer)?;
                                        onion_packet.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
                                        1u8.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
                                        2u8.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
                                        3u8.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
                                        4u8.write(writer)?;
                                },
                        }
                }

                (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
                        match update {
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
                                        0u8.write(writer)?;
                                        amount_msat.write(writer)?;
                                        cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
                                        payment_hash.write(writer)?;
                                        source.write(writer)?;
                                        onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
                                        // time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
                                },
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
                                        1u8.write(writer)?;
                                        payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
                                        htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
                                        2u8.write(writer)?;
                                        htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                                        err_packet.write(writer)?;
                                }
                        }
                }

                self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
                self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
                match self.monitor_pending_order {
                        None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
                        Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
                        Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
                }

                (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
                        pending_forward.write(writer)?;
                        htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                }

                (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
                        htlc_source.write(writer)?;
                        payment_hash.write(writer)?;
                        fail_reason.write(writer)?;
                }

                write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
                write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);

                self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
                self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
                self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;

                (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
                        if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
                                match e {
                                        encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
                                        _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
                                }
                        }
                }

                match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
                        Some((feerate, fee)) => {
                                1u8.write(writer)?;
                                feerate.write(writer)?;
                                fee.write(writer)?;
                        },
                        None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
                }

                write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
                write_option!(self.short_channel_id);

                self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
                self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;

                self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
                self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
                self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
                self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
                self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
                self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
                self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
                self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
                self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;

                write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
                write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
                write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
                write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
                write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
                write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);

                write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
                self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;

                write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);

                self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
        fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
                        return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
                }

                let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
                for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
                        pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
                                htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                                        1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
                                        2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
                                        3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
                                        4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
                                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                                },
                        });
                }

                macro_rules! read_option { () => {
                        match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                                0 => None,
                                1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
                                _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                        }
                } }

                let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
                for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
                        pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
                                htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                source: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                fail_reason: read_option!(),
                                state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                                        0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
                                        1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
                                        2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
                                        3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
                                        4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
                                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                                },
                        });
                }

                let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
                for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
                        holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                                0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
                                        amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        source: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        time_created: Instant::now(),
                                },
                                1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
                                        payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                },
                                2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
                                        htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                },
                                _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                        });
                }

                let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                        0 => None,
                        1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
                        2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                };

                let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
                for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
                        monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
                }

                let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
                for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
                        monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
                }

                let pending_update_fee = read_option!();
                let holding_cell_update_fee = read_option!();

                let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
                for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
                        last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
                                Ok(tx) => tx,
                                Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                        });
                }

                let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
                        0 => None,
                        1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                };

                let funding_tx_confirmed_in = read_option!();
                let short_channel_id = read_option!();

                let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let their_funding_pubkey = read_option!();
                let their_revocation_basepoint = read_option!();
                let their_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
                let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = read_option!();
                let their_htlc_basepoint = read_option!();
                let their_cur_commitment_point = read_option!();

                let their_prev_commitment_point = read_option!();
                let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = read_option!();
                let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
                // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
                // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
                if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
                        return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                }

                Ok(Channel {
                        user_id,

                        config,
                        channel_id,
                        channel_state,
                        channel_outbound,
                        secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
                        channel_value_satoshis,

                        local_keys,
                        shutdown_pubkey,

                        cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
                        cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
                        value_to_self_msat,

                        received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
                        pending_inbound_htlcs,
                        pending_outbound_htlcs,
                        holding_cell_htlc_updates,

                        monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
                        monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
                        monitor_pending_order,
                        monitor_pending_forwards,
                        monitor_pending_failures,

                        pending_update_fee,
                        holding_cell_update_fee,
                        next_local_htlc_id,
                        next_remote_htlc_id,
                        channel_update_count,
                        feerate_per_kw,

                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),

                        last_local_commitment_txn,

                        last_sent_closing_fee,

                        funding_tx_confirmed_in,
                        short_channel_id,
                        last_block_connected,
                        funding_tx_confirmations,

                        their_dust_limit_satoshis,
                        our_dust_limit_satoshis,
                        their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
                        their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
                        their_htlc_minimum_msat,
                        our_htlc_minimum_msat,
                        their_to_self_delay,
                        their_max_accepted_htlcs,
                        minimum_depth,

                        their_funding_pubkey,
                        their_revocation_basepoint,
                        their_payment_basepoint,
                        their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
                        their_htlc_basepoint,
                        their_cur_commitment_point,

                        their_prev_commitment_point,
                        their_node_id,

                        their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,

                        channel_monitor,

                        logger,
                })
        }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
        use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
        use bitcoin::util::bip143;
        use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
        use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
        use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
        use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
        use hex;
        use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
        use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
        use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
        use ln::chan_utils;
        use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
        use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
        use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
        use util::config::UserConfig;
        use util::test_utils;
        use util::logger::Logger;
        use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
        use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
        use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
        use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
        use std::sync::Arc;

        struct TestFeeEstimator {
                fee_est: u64
        }
        impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
                fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
                        self.fee_est
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
                assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
                        "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
        }

        struct Keys {
                chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
        }
        impl KeysInterface for Keys {
                fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
                fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
                        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
                        let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                        let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
                        Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
                }

                fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
                        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
                        let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                        PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
                }

                fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
                fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
        }

        #[test]
        fn outbound_commitment_test() {
                // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
                let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
                let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

                let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
                        funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                        payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                        delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                        htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),

                        // These aren't set in the test vectors:
                        revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                        commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
                };
                assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
                let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });

                let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
                let mut config = UserConfig::new();
                config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
                let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
                chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
                chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;

                let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
                chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));

                chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
                assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);

                chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
                assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);

                chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
                assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);

                chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());

                // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
                // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
                // build_commitment_transaction.
                let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
                let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
                let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
                let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();

                let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);

                macro_rules! test_commitment {
                        ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
                                unsigned_tx = {
                                        let res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
                                        (res.0, res.1)
                                };
                                let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                                let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
                                secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();

                                chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);

                                assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
                                                hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
                        };
                }

                macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
                        ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
                                let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();

                                let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
                                let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
                                let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
                                let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
                                secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();

                                let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
                                if !htlc.offered {
                                        for i in 0..5 {
                                                let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
                                                if out == htlc.payment_hash {
                                                        preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
                                                }
                                        }

                                        assert!(preimage.is_some());
                                }

                                chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
                                assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
                                                hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
                        };
                }

                {
                        // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;

                        test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
                                         "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
                                         "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");
                }

                chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
                        let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
                                htlc_id: 0,
                                amount_msat: 1000000,
                                cltv_expiry: 500,
                                payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
                                state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
                        };
                        out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
                        out
                });
                chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
                        let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
                                htlc_id: 1,
                                amount_msat: 2000000,
                                cltv_expiry: 501,
                                payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
                                state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
                        };
                        out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
                        out
                });
                chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
                        let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
                                htlc_id: 2,
                                amount_msat: 2000000,
                                cltv_expiry: 502,
                                payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
                                state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
                                source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
                                fail_reason: None,
                        };
                        out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
                        out
                });
                chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
                        let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
                                htlc_id: 3,
                                amount_msat: 3000000,
                                cltv_expiry: 503,
                                payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
                                state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
                                source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
                                fail_reason: None,
                        };
                        out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
                        out
                });
                chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
                        let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
                                htlc_id: 4,
                                amount_msat: 4000000,
                                cltv_expiry: 504,
                                payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
                                state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
                        };
                        out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
                        out
                });

                {
                        // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;

                        test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
                                         "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
                                          "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
                                          "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
                                          "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(3,
                                          "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
                                          "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(4,
                                          "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
                                          "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
                                          "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219704000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d014730440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;

                        test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
                                         "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
                                          "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
                                          "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
                                          "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(3,
                                          "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
                                          "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(4,
                                          "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
                                          "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;

                        test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
                                         "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
                                         "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431104e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de01473044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b05701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
                                          "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
                                          "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
                                          "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(3,
                                          "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
                                          "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
                                          "02000000000101579c183eca9e8236a5d7f5dcd79cfec32c497fdc0ec61533cde99ecd436cadd103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f0147304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;

                        test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
                                         "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
                                          "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
                                          "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
                                          "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(3,
                                          "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
                                          "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;

                        test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
                                         "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
                                          "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
                                          "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
                                          "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;

                        test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
                                         "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
                                          "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
                                          "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(2,
                                          "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
                                          "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;

                        test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
                                         "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
                                          "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
                                          "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;

                        test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
                                         "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
                                          "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
                                          "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");

                        test_htlc_output!(1,
                                          "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
                                          "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;

                        test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
                                         "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
                                          "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;

                        test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
                                         "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);

                        test_htlc_output!(0,
                                          "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
                                          "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
                                          "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");
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;

                        test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
                                         "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;

                        test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
                                         "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;

                        test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
                                         "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
                }

                {
                        // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
                        chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
                        chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;

                        test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
                                         "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
                                         "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");

                        assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
                // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:

                let mut seed = [0; 32];
                seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
                assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
                           hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);

                seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
                assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
                           hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
                           hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
                           hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);

                seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
                assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
                           hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_key_derivation() {
                // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

                let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();

                let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
                assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);

                let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
                assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
                                SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
                                hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
                                SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
        }
}