git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
  30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  34 use util::logger::Logger;
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36
  37 use crypto;
  38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  42
  43 use std::{ptr, mem};
  44 use std::collections::HashMap;
  45 use std::collections::hash_map;
  46 use std::io::Cursor;
  47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  50
  51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  52 ///
  53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  56 ///
  57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  63 mod channel_held_info {
  64         use ln::msgs;
  65         use ln::router::Route;
  66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  68
  69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  84         }
  85
  86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  91         }
  92
  93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  94         #[derive(Clone)]
  95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  99         }
 100
 101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 102         #[derive(Clone)]
 103         pub enum HTLCSource {
 104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 105                 OutboundRoute {
 106                         route: Route,
 107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 108                 },
 109         }
 110         #[cfg(test)]
 111         impl HTLCSource {
 112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 116                         }
 117                 }
 118         }
 119
 120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 122                 ErrorPacket {
 123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 124                 },
 125                 Reason {
 126                         failure_code: u16,
 127                         data: Vec<u8>,
 128                 }
 129         }
 130 }
 131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 132
 133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 134         err: msgs::HandleError,
 135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 136 }
 137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 138         #[inline]
 139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 140                 Self {
 141                         err: HandleError {
 142                                 err,
 143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 145                                                 channel_id,
 146                                                 data: err.to_string()
 147                                         },
 148                                 }),
 149                         },
 150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 151                 }
 152         }
 153         #[inline]
 154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 155                 Self {
 156                         err: HandleError {
 157                                 err,
 158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 160                                                 channel_id,
 161                                                 data: err.to_string()
 162                                         },
 163                                 }),
 164                         },
 165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 166                 }
 167         }
 168         #[inline]
 169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 175         }
 176         #[inline]
 177         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 178                 Self {
 179                         err: match err {
 180                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 181                                         err: msg,
 182                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 183                                 },
 184                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 185                                         err: msg,
 186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 187                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 188                                                         channel_id,
 189                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 190                                                 },
 191                                         }),
 192                                 },
 193                         },
 194                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 195                 }
 196         }
 197         #[inline]
 198         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 199                 Self {
 200                         err: match err {
 201                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 202                                         err: msg,
 203                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 204                                 },
 205                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 206                                         err: msg,
 207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 208                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 209                                                         channel_id,
 210                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 211                                                 },
 212                                         }),
 213                                 },
 214                         },
 215                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 216                 }
 217         }
 218 }
 219
 220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 223 /// probably increase this significantly.
 224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 225
 226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 227         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 228         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 229         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 230 }
 231
 232 struct ChannelHolder {
 233         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 234         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 235         next_forward: Instant,
 236         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 237         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 238         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 239         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 240         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 242         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 243         /// go to read them!
 244         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 245 }
 246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 247         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 248         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 249         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 250         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 251         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 252 }
 253 impl ChannelHolder {
 254         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 255                 MutChannelHolder {
 256                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 257                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 258                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 259                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 260                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 261                 }
 262         }
 263 }
 264
 265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 267
 268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 270 ///
 271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 272 /// to individual Channels.
 273 pub struct ChannelManager {
 274         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 275         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 276         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 277         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 278         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 279
 280         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 281         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 282         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 283         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 284
 285         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 286         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 287
 288         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 289
 290         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 291 }
 292
 293 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
 294 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
 295 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
 296 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
 297 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
 298 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 299
 300 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
 301 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
 302 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
 303 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
 304 #[deny(const_err)]
 305 #[allow(dead_code)]
 306 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 307
 308 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
 309 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
 310 #[deny(const_err)]
 311 #[allow(dead_code)]
 312 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 313
 314 macro_rules! secp_call {
 315         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 316                 match $res {
 317                         Ok(key) => key,
 318                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 319                 }
 320         };
 321 }
 322
 323 struct OnionKeys {
 324         #[cfg(test)]
 325         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 326         #[cfg(test)]
 327         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 328         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 329         rho: [u8; 32],
 330         mu: [u8; 32],
 331 }
 332
 333 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 334 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 335         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 336         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 337         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 338         /// lifetime of the channel.
 339         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 340         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 341         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 342         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 343         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 344         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 345         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 346         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 347         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 348         pub user_id: u64,
 349 }
 350
 351 impl ChannelManager {
 352         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 353         ///
 354         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 355         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 356         ///
 357         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 358         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 359         ///
 360         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 361         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 362                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 363
 364                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 365                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 366                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 367                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 368                         chain_monitor,
 369                         tx_broadcaster,
 370
 371                         announce_channels_publicly,
 372                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 373                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 374                         secp_ctx,
 375
 376                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 377                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 378                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 379                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 380                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 381                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 382                         }),
 383                         our_network_key,
 384
 385                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 386
 387                         logger,
 388                 });
 389                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 390                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 391                 Ok(res)
 392         }
 393
 394         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 395         ///
 396         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 397         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 398         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 399         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 400         ///
 401         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 402         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 403         ///
 404         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 405         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 406                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 407                         ChannelKeys {
 408                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 409                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 410                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 411                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 412                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 413                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 414                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 415                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 416                         }
 417                 } else {
 418                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 419                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 420                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 421                                 Ok(key) => key,
 422                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 423                         }
 424                 };
 425
 426                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 427                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 428                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 429                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 430                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 431                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 432                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 433                                 } else {
 434                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 435                                 }
 436                         },
 437                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 438                 }
 439
 440                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 441                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 442                         node_id: their_network_key,
 443                         msg: res,
 444                 });
 445                 Ok(())
 446         }
 447
 448         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 449         /// more information.
 450         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 451                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 452                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 453                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 454                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 455                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 456                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 457                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 458                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 459                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 460                         });
 461                 }
 462                 res
 463         }
 464
 465         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 466         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 467         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 468                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 469                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 470                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 471                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
 472                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
 473                         // really wanted anyway.
 474                         if channel.is_live() {
 475                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 476                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 477                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 478                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 479                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 480                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 481                                 });
 482                         }
 483                 }
 484                 res
 485         }
 486
 487         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 488         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 489         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 490         ///
 491         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 492         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 493                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 494                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 495                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 496                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 497                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 498                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 499                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 500                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 501                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 502                                                 }
 503                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 504                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 505                                 },
 506                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
 507                         }
 508                 };
 509                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 510                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 511                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 512                 }
 513                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 514                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 515                                 Some(update)
 516                         } else { None }
 517                 } else { None };
 518
 519                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 520                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 521                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 522                                 msg: update
 523                         });
 524                 }
 525                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 526                         node_id,
 527                         msg: res.0
 528                 });
 529
 530                 Ok(())
 531         }
 532
 533         #[inline]
 534         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 535                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 536                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 537                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 538                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 539                 }
 540                 for tx in local_txn {
 541                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 542                 }
 543                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 544                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 545                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 546                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 547                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 548                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 549                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 550         }
 551
 552         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 553         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 554         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 555                 let mut chan = {
 556                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 557                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 558                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 559                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 560                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 561                                 }
 562                                 chan
 563                         } else {
 564                                 return;
 565                         }
 566                 };
 567                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 568                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 569                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 570                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 571                                 msg: update
 572                         });
 573                 }
 574         }
 575
 576         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 577         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 578         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 579                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 580                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 581                 }
 582         }
 583
 584         #[inline]
 585         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 586                 ({
 587                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 588                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 589                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 590                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 591                         res
 592                 },
 593                 {
 594                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 595                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 596                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 597                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 598                         res
 599                 })
 600         }
 601
 602         #[inline]
 603         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 604                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 605                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 606                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 607                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 608                 res
 609         }
 610
 611         #[inline]
 612         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 613                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 614                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 615                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 616                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 617                 res
 618         }
 619
 620         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 621         #[inline]
 622         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 623                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 624                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 625
 626                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 627                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 628
 629                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 630                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 631                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 632                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 633                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 634
 635                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 636
 637                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 638                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 639
 640                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 641                 }
 642
 643                 Ok(())
 644         }
 645
 646         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 647         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 648                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 649
 650                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 651                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 652
 653                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 654                                 #[cfg(test)]
 655                                 shared_secret,
 656                                 #[cfg(test)]
 657                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 658                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 659                                 rho,
 660                                 mu,
 661                         });
 662                 })?;
 663
 664                 Ok(res)
 665         }
 666
 667         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 668         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 669                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 670                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 671                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 672                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 673                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 674                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 675
 676                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 677                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 678                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 679                         // the intended recipient).
 680                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 681                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 682                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 683                                 realm: 0,
 684                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 685                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 686                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 687                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 688                                 },
 689                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 690                         };
 691                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 692                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 693                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 694                         }
 695                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 696                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 697                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 698                         }
 699                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 700                 }
 701                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 702         }
 703
 704         #[inline]
 705         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 706                 unsafe {
 707                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 708                 }
 709                 for i in 0..65 {
 710                         arr[i] = 0;
 711                 }
 712         }
 713
 714         #[inline]
 715         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 716                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 717
 718                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 719                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 720                 }
 721         }
 722
 723         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 724         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 725                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 726                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 727
 728                 let filler = {
 729                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 730                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 731                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 732                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 733
 734                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 735                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 736                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 737                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 738                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 739                         }
 740                         res
 741                 };
 742
 743                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 744                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 745
 746                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 747                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 748                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 749                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 750
 751                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 752                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 753                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 754
 755                         if i == 0 {
 756                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 757                         }
 758
 759                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 760                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 761                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 762                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 763                 }
 764
 765                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 766                         version: 0,
 767                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 768                         hop_data: packet_data,
 769                         hmac: hmac_res,
 770                 }
 771         }
 772
 773         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 774         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 775         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 776                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 777
 778                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 779                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 780                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 781                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 782                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 783                         data: packet_crypted,
 784                 }
 785         }
 786
 787         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 788                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 789
 790                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 791
 792                 let failuremsg = {
 793                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 794                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 795                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 796                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 797                         res
 798                 };
 799                 let pad = {
 800                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 801                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 802                         res
 803                 };
 804                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 805                         hmac: [0; 32],
 806                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 807                         pad: pad,
 808                 };
 809
 810                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 811                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 812                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 813
 814                 packet
 815         }
 816
 817         #[inline]
 818         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 819                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 820                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 821         }
 822
 823         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 824                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 825                         () => {
 826                                 {
 827                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 828                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 829                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 830                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 831                                         onion_hash
 832                                 }
 833                         }
 834                 }
 835
 836                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 837                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 838                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 839                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 840                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 841                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 842                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 843                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 844                 }
 845
 846                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 847                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 848
 849                 let mut channel_state = None;
 850                 macro_rules! return_err {
 851                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 852                                 {
 853                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 854                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 855                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 856                                         }
 857                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 858                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 859                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 860                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 861                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 862                                 }
 863                         }
 864                 }
 865
 866                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 867                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 868                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 869                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 870                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 871                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 872                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 873                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 874                 }
 875
 876                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 877                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 878                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 879                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 880                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 881                 }
 882
 883                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 884                 let next_hop_data = {
 885                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 886                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 887                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 888                                 Err(err) => {
 889                                         let error_code = match err {
 890                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 891                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 892                                         };
 893                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 894                                 },
 895                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 896                         }
 897                 };
 898
 899                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 900
 901                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 902                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 903                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 904                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 905                                 }
 906                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 907                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 908                                 }
 909
 910                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 911                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 912                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 913                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 914
 915                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 916                                         onion_packet: None,
 917                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 918                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 919                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 920                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 921                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 922                                 })
 923                         } else {
 924                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 925                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 926                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 927
 928                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 929
 930                                 let blinding_factor = {
 931                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 932                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 933                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 934                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 935                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 936                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 937                                                 Err(_) => {
 938                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 939                                                 },
 940                                                 Ok(key) => key
 941                                         }
 942                                 };
 943
 944                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 945                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 946                                 }
 947
 948                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 949                                         version: 0,
 950                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 951                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 952                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 953                                 };
 954
 955                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 956                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 957                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 958                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 959                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 960                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 961                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 962                                 })
 963                         };
 964
 965                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 966                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 967                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 968                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 969                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 970                                         None => {
 971                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 972                                         },
 973                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 974                                 };
 975                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 976                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 977                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 978                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 979                                         } else {
 980                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 981                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 982                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 983                                                 } else {
 984                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 985                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 986                                                         } else {
 987                                                                 None
 988                                                         }
 989                                                 }
 990                                         }
 991                                 } {
 992                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 993                                 }
 994                         }
 995                 }
 996
 997                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 998         }
 999
1000         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1001         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1002                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1003                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1004                         Some(id) => id,
1005                 };
1006
1007                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1008
1009                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1010                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1011                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1012                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1013                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1014                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1015                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1016                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1017                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1018                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1019                 };
1020
1021                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1022                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1023
1024                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1025                         signature: sig,
1026                         contents: unsigned
1027                 })
1028         }
1029
1030         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1031         ///
1032         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1033         /// fields for more info.
1034         ///
1035         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1036         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1037         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1038         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1039         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1040         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1041         ///
1042         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1043         ///
1044         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1045         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1046         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1047                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1048                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1049                 }
1050                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1051                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1052                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1053                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1054                         }
1055                 }
1056
1057                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1058                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1059                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1060                         session_key
1061                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1062
1063                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1064
1065                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1066                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1067                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1068                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1069
1070                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1071                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1072                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1073
1074                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1075                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1076                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1077                         };
1078
1079                         let res = {
1080                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1081                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1082                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1083                                 }
1084                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1085                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1086                                 }
1087                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1088                                         route: route.clone(),
1089                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1090                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1091                         };
1092
1093                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1094
1095                         match res {
1096                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1097                                 None => return Ok(()),
1098                         }
1099                 };
1100
1101                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1102                         unimplemented!();
1103                 }
1104
1105                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1106                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1107                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1108                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1109                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1110                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1111                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1112                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1113                                 update_fee: None,
1114                                 commitment_signed,
1115                         },
1116                 });
1117                 Ok(())
1118         }
1119
1120         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1121         ///
1122         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1123         ///
1124         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1125         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1126         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1127                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1128                         ($event: expr) => {
1129                                 {
1130                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1131                                         pending_events.push($event);
1132                                 }
1133                         }
1134                 }
1135
1136                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1137                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1138                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1139                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1140                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1141                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1142                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1143                                                 },
1144                                                 Err(e) => {
1145                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1146                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1147                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1148                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1149                                                                 action: e.action,
1150                                                         });
1151                                                         return;
1152                                                 },
1153                                         }
1154                                 },
1155                                 None => return
1156                         }
1157                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1158                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1159                         unimplemented!();
1160                 }
1161                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1162                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1163                         msg: msg,
1164                 });
1165
1166                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1167                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1168                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1169                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1170                         },
1171                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1172                                 e.insert(chan);
1173                         }
1174                 }
1175         }
1176
1177         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1178                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1179
1180                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1181                         Ok(res) => res,
1182                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1183                 };
1184                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1185                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1186
1187                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1188                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1189                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1190                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1191                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1192                 })
1193         }
1194
1195         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1196         ///
1197         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1198         /// Will likely generate further events.
1199         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1200                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1201                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1202                 {
1203                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1204                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1205
1206                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1207                                 return;
1208                         }
1209
1210                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1211                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1212                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1213                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1214                                                 None => {
1215                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1216                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1217                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1218                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1219                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1220                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1221                                                                 });
1222                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1223                                                         }
1224                                                         continue;
1225                                                 }
1226                                         };
1227                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1228
1229                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1230                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1231                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1232                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1233                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1234                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1235                                                 });
1236                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1237                                                         Err(_e) => {
1238                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1239                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1240                                                                 continue;
1241                                                         },
1242                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1243                                                                 match update_add {
1244                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1245                                                                         None => {
1246                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1247                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1248                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1249                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1250                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1251                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1252                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1253                                                                         }
1254                                                                 }
1255                                                         }
1256                                                 }
1257                                         }
1258
1259                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1260                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1261                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1262                                                         Err(e) => {
1263                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1264                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1265                                                                 } else {
1266                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1267                                                                 }
1268                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1269                                                                 continue;
1270                                                         },
1271                                                 };
1272                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1273                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1274                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1275                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1276                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1277                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1278                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1279                                                                 update_fee: None,
1280                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1281                                                         },
1282                                                 }));
1283                                         }
1284                                 } else {
1285                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1286                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1287                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1288                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1289                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1290                                                 };
1291                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1292                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1293                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1294                                                 };
1295                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1296                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1297                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1298                                                 }));
1299                                         }
1300                                 }
1301                         }
1302                 }
1303
1304                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1305                         match update {
1306                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1307                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1308                         };
1309                 }
1310
1311                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1312
1313                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1314                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1315                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1316                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1317                                 }
1318                         }
1319                         true
1320                 });
1321
1322                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1323                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1324                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1325                         events.push(event.1);
1326                 }
1327         }
1328
1329         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1330         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1331                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1332                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1333                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1334                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1335                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1336                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1337                         }
1338                         true
1339                 } else { false }
1340         }
1341
1342         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1343         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1344         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1345         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1346         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1347         /// still-available channels.
1348         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1349                 match source {
1350                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1351                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1352
1353                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1354                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1355                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1356                                 });
1357                         },
1358                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1359                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1360                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1361                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1362                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1363                                         },
1364                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1365                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1366                                         }
1367                                 };
1368
1369                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1370                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1371                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1372                                                 None => return
1373                                         };
1374
1375                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1376                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1377                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1378                                                 Err(_e) => {
1379                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1380                                                         return;
1381                                                 },
1382                                         }
1383                                 };
1384
1385                                 match fail_msgs {
1386                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1387                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1388
1389                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1390                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1391                                                 }
1392
1393                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1394                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1395                                                         node_id,
1396                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1397                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1398                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1400                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1401                                                                 update_fee: None,
1402                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1403                                                         },
1404                                                 });
1405                                         },
1406                                         None => {},
1407                                 }
1408                         },
1409                 }
1410         }
1411
1412         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1413         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1414         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1415         ///
1416         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1417         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1418                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1419                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1420                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1421                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1422
1423                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1424                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1425                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1426                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1427                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1428                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1429                         }
1430                         true
1431                 } else { false }
1432         }
1433         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1434                 match source {
1435                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1436                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1437                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1438                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1439                                         payment_preimage
1440                                 });
1441                         },
1442                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1443                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1444                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1445                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1446                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1447                                                 None => {
1448                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1449                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1450                                                         // why its missing.
1451                                                         return
1452                                                 }
1453                                         };
1454
1455                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1456                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1457                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1458                                                 Err(_e) => {
1459                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1460                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1461                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1462                                                         return
1463                                                 },
1464                                         }
1465                                 };
1466
1467                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1468                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1469                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1470                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1471                                         }
1472                                 }
1473
1474                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1475                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1476                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1477                                                 node_id: node_id,
1478                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1479                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1481                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1482                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483                                                         update_fee: None,
1484                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1485                                                 }
1486                                         });
1487                                 }
1488                         },
1489                 }
1490         }
1491
1492         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1493         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1494                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1495         }
1496
1497         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1498         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1499         /// operation.
1500         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1501                 unimplemented!();
1502         }
1503
1504         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1505                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1506                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1507                 }
1508                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1509                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1510                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1511                 }
1512
1513                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1514                         ChannelKeys {
1515                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1516                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1517                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1518                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1519                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1520                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1521                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1522                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1523                         }
1524                 } else {
1525                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1526                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1527                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1528                                 Ok(key) => key,
1529                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1530                         }
1531                 };
1532
1533                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1534                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1535                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1536                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1537                 Ok(accept_msg)
1538         }
1539
1540         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1541                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1542                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1543                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1544                                 Some(chan) => {
1545                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1546                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1547                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1548                                         }
1549                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1550                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1551                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1552                                 },
1553                                 //TODO: same as above
1554                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1555                         }
1556                 };
1557                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1558                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1559                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1560                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1561                         output_script: output_script,
1562                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1563                 });
1564                 Ok(())
1565         }
1566
1567         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1568                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1569                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1570                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1571                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1572                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1573                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1574                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1575                                         }
1576                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1577                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1578                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1579                                                 },
1580                                                 Err(e) => {
1581                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1582                                                 }
1583                                         }
1584                                 },
1585                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1586                         }
1587                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1588                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1589                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1590                    // for a bogus channel.
1591                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1592                         unimplemented!();
1593                 }
1594                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1595                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1596                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1597                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1598                         },
1599                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1600                                 e.insert(chan);
1601                         }
1602                 }
1603                 Ok(funding_msg)
1604         }
1605
1606         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1607                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1608                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1610                                 Some(chan) => {
1611                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1612                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1613                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1614                                         }
1615                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1616                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1617                                 },
1618                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1619                         }
1620                 };
1621                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1622                         unimplemented!();
1623                 }
1624                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1625                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1626                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1627                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1628                 });
1629                 Ok(())
1630         }
1631
1632         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1633                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1634                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1635                         Some(chan) => {
1636                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1637                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1638                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1639                                 }
1640                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1641                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1642                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1643                         },
1644                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1645                 };
1646         }
1647
1648         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1649                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1650                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1651                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1652
1653                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1654                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1655                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1656                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1657                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1658                                         }
1659                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1660                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1661                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1662                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1663                                                 }
1664                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1665                                         } else { (res, None) }
1666                                 },
1667                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1668                         }
1669                 };
1670                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1671                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1672                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1673                 }
1674                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1675                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1676                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1677                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1678                                         msg: update
1679                                 });
1680                         }
1681                 }
1682                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1683         }
1684
1685         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1686                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1687                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1688                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1689                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1690                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1691                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1692                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1693                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1694                                         }
1695                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1696                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1697                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1698                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1699                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1700                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1701                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1702                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1703                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1704                                                 }
1705                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1706                                         } else { (res, None) }
1707                                 },
1708                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1709                         }
1710                 };
1711                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1712                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1713                 }
1714                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1715                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1716                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1717                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1718                                         msg: update
1719                                 });
1720                         }
1721                 }
1722                 Ok(res.0)
1723         }
1724
1725         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1726                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1727                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1728                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1729                 //
1730                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1731                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1732                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1733                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1734
1735                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1736                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1737
1738                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1739                         Some(chan) => {
1740                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1743                                 }
1744                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1745                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1746                                 }
1747                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1748                         },
1749                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1750                 }
1751         }
1752
1753         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1754                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1755                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1756                         Some(chan) => {
1757                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1758                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1759                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1760                                 }
1761                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1762                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1763                         },
1764                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1765                 };
1766                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1767                 Ok(())
1768         }
1769
1770         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1771                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1772                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1773                         Some(chan) => {
1774                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1775                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1776                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1777                                 }
1778                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1779                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1780                         },
1781                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1782                 }?;
1783
1784                 match htlc_source {
1785                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1786                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1787                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1788                                 let mut res = None;
1789                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1790                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1791
1792                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1793
1794                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1795                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1796                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1797                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1798                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1799
1800                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1801                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1802                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1803
1804                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1805                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1806                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1807                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1808                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1809                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1810                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1811                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1812                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1813                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1814                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1815                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1816                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1817                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1818                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1819                                                                                                         });
1820                                                                                                 }
1821                                                                                         }
1822                                                                                 }
1823                                                                         },
1824                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1825                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1826                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1827                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1828                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1829                                                                                 });
1830                                                                         },
1831                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1832                                                                 }
1833                                                         }
1834                                                 }
1835                                         }
1836                                 }).unwrap();
1837                                 Ok(res)
1838                         },
1839                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1840                 }
1841         }
1842
1843         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1844                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1845                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1846                         Some(chan) => {
1847                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1848                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1849                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1850                                 }
1851                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1852                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1853                                 }
1854                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1855                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1856                                 Ok(())
1857                         },
1858                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1859                 }
1860         }
1861
1862         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1863                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1864                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1866                                 Some(chan) => {
1867                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1868                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1869                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1870                                         }
1871                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1872                                 },
1873                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1874                         }
1875                 };
1876                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1877                         unimplemented!();
1878                 }
1879
1880                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1881         }
1882
1883         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1884                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1885                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1886                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1887                                 Some(chan) => {
1888                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1889                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1890                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1891                                         }
1892                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1893                                 },
1894                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1895                         }
1896                 };
1897                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1898                         unimplemented!();
1899                 }
1900                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1901                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1902                 }
1903
1904                 let mut forward_event = None;
1905                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1906                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1907                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1908                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1909                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1910                         }
1911                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1912                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1913                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1914                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1915                                         },
1916                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1917                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1918                                         }
1919                                 }
1920                         }
1921                 }
1922                 match forward_event {
1923                         Some(time) => {
1924                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1925                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1926                                         time_forwardable: time
1927                                 });
1928                         }
1929                         None => {},
1930                 }
1931
1932                 Ok(res)
1933         }
1934
1935         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1936                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1937                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1938                         Some(chan) => {
1939                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1940                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1941                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1942                                 }
1943                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1944                         },
1945                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1946                 }
1947         }
1948
1949         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1950                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1951                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1952                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1953                                 Some(chan) => {
1954                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1955                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1956                                         }
1957                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1958                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1959                                         }
1960
1961                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1962                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1963                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1964
1965                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1966                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1967                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1968                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1969                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1970
1971                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1972
1973                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1974                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1975                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1976                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1977                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1978                                                 contents: announcement,
1979                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1980                                 },
1981                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1982                         }
1983                 };
1984                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1985                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1986                 Ok(())
1987         }
1988
1989         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1990                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1991                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1993                                 Some(chan) => {
1994                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1995                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1996                                         }
1997                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
1998                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1999                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
2000                                 },
2001                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2002                         }
2003                 };
2004                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
2005                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2006                                 unimplemented!();
2007                         }
2008                 }
2009                 res
2010         }
2011
2012         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2013         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2014         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2015         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2016         #[doc(hidden)]
2017         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2018                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2019                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2020                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2021                         Some(chan) => {
2022                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2023                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2024                                 }
2025                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2026                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2027                                 }
2028                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2029                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2030                                                 unimplemented!();
2031                                         }
2032                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2033                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2034                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2035                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2036                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2037                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2038                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2039                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2040                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2041                                                         commitment_signed,
2042                                                 },
2043                                         });
2044                                 }
2045                         },
2046                 }
2047                 Ok(())
2048         }
2049 }
2050
2051 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2052         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2053                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2054                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2055                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2056                 ret
2057         }
2058 }
2059
2060 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2061         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2062                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2063                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2064                 {
2065                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2066                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2067                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2068                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2069                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2070                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2071                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2072                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2073                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2074                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2075                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2076                                         });
2077                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2078                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2079                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2080                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2081                                                 action: e.action,
2082                                         });
2083                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2084                                                 return false;
2085                                         }
2086                                 }
2087                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2088                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2089                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2090                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2091                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2092                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2093                                                                 }
2094                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2095                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2096                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2097                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2098                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2099                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2100                                                                                 msg: update
2101                                                                         });
2102                                                                 }
2103                                                                 return false;
2104                                                         }
2105                                                 }
2106                                         }
2107                                 }
2108                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2109                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2110                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2111                                         }
2112                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2113                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2114                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2115                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2116                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2117                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2118                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2119                                                         msg: update
2120                                                 });
2121                                         }
2122                                         return false;
2123                                 }
2124                                 true
2125                         });
2126                 }
2127                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2128                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2129                 }
2130                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2131                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2132                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2133                 }
2134                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2135         }
2136
2137         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2138         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2139                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2140                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2141                 {
2142                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2143                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2144                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2145                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2146                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2147                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2148                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2149                                         }
2150                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2151                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2152                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2153                                                         msg: update
2154                                                 });
2155                                         }
2156                                         false
2157                                 } else {
2158                                         true
2159                                 }
2160                         });
2161                 }
2162                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2163                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2164                 }
2165                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2166                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2167                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2168                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2169                         }
2170                 }
2171                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2172         }
2173 }
2174
2175 macro_rules! handle_error {
2176         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2177                 match $internal {
2178                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2179                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2180                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2181                                         match &err.action {
2182                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2183                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2184                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2185                                                         } else {
2186                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2187                                                         }
2188                                                 },
2189                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2190                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2191                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2192                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2193                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2194                                                         } else {
2195                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2196                                                         }
2197                                                 },
2198                                                 &None => {},
2199                                         }
2200                                 }
2201                                 Err(err)
2202                         },
2203                 }
2204         }
2205 }
2206
2207 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2208         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2209         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2210                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2211         }
2212
2213         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2214                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2215         }
2216
2217         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2218                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2219         }
2220
2221         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2222                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2223         }
2224
2225         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2226                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2227         }
2228
2229         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2230                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2231         }
2232
2233         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2234                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2235         }
2236
2237         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2238                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2239         }
2240
2241         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2242                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2243         }
2244
2245         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2246                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2247         }
2248
2249         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2250                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2251         }
2252
2253         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2254                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2255         }
2256
2257         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2258                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2259         }
2260
2261         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2262                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2263         }
2264
2265         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2266                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2267         }
2268
2269         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2270                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2271         }
2272
2273         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2274                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2275                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2276                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2277                 {
2278                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2279                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2280                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2281                         if no_connection_possible {
2282                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2283                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2284                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2285                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2286                                                 }
2287                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2288                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2289                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2290                                                                 msg: update
2291                                                         });
2292                                                 }
2293                                                 false
2294                                         } else {
2295                                                 true
2296                                         }
2297                                 });
2298                         } else {
2299                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2300                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2301                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2302                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2303                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2304                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2305                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2306                                                 }
2307                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2308                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2309                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2310                                                         }
2311                                                         return false;
2312                                                 }
2313                                         }
2314                                         true
2315                                 })
2316                         }
2317                 }
2318                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2319                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2320                 }
2321                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2322                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2323                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2324                                 pending_events.push(event);
2325                         }
2326                 }
2327                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2328                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2329                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2330                         }
2331                 }
2332         }
2333
2334         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2335                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2336                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2337                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2338                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2339                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2340                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2341                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2342                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2343                                         // drop it.
2344                                         false
2345                                 } else {
2346                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2347                                         true
2348                                 }
2349                         } else { true }
2350                 });
2351                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2352                 res
2353         }
2354
2355         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2356                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2357                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2358                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2359                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2360                                 }
2361                         }
2362                 } else {
2363                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2364                 }
2365         }
2366 }
2367
2368 #[cfg(test)]
2369 mod tests {
2370         use chain::chaininterface;
2371         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2372         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2373         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2374         use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2375         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2376         use ln::msgs;
2377         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2378         use util::test_utils;
2379         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2380         use util::errors::APIError;
2381         use util::logger::Logger;
2382         use util::ser::Writeable;
2383
2384         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2385         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2386         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2387         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2388         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2389         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2390         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2391
2392         use hex;
2393
2394         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2395         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2396
2397         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2398         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2399
2400         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2401
2402         use std::cell::RefCell;
2403         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2404         use std::default::Default;
2405         use std::rc::Rc;
2406         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2407         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2408         use std::time::Instant;
2409         use std::mem;
2410
2411         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2412                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2413                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414
2415                 let route = Route {
2416                         hops: vec!(
2417                                         RouteHop {
2418                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2419                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2420                                         },
2421                                         RouteHop {
2422                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2423                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2424                                         },
2425                                         RouteHop {
2426                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2427                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2428                                         },
2429                                         RouteHop {
2430                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2431                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2432                                         },
2433                                         RouteHop {
2434                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2435                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2436                                         },
2437                         ),
2438                 };
2439
2440                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2441
2442                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2443                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2444                 onion_keys
2445         }
2446
2447         #[test]
2448         fn onion_vectors() {
2449                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2450                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2451
2452                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2453                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2454                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2455                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2456                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2457
2458                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2459                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2460                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2461                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2462                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2463
2464                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2465                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2466                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2467                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2468                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2469
2470                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2471                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2472                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2473                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2474                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2475
2476                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2477                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2478                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2479                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2480                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2481
2482                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2483                 let payloads = vec!(
2484                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2485                                 realm: 0,
2486                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2487                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2488                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2489                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2490                                 },
2491                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2492                         },
2493                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2494                                 realm: 0,
2495                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2496                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2497                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2498                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2499                                 },
2500                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2501                         },
2502                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2503                                 realm: 0,
2504                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2505                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2506                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2507                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2508                                 },
2509                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2510                         },
2511                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2512                                 realm: 0,
2513                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2514                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2515                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2516                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2517                                 },
2518                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2519                         },
2520                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2521                                 realm: 0,
2522                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2523                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2524                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2525                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2526                                 },
2527                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2528                         },
2529                 );
2530
2531                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2532                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2533                 // anyway...
2534                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2535         }
2536
2537         #[test]
2538         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2539                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2540
2541                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2542                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2543                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2544
2545                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2546                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2547
2548                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2549                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2550
2551                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2552                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2553
2554                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2555                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2556
2557                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2558                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2559         }
2560
2561         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2562                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2563                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2564                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2565                 for i in 2..100 {
2566                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2567                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2568                 }
2569         }
2570
2571         struct Node {
2572                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2573                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2574                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2575                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2576                 router: Router,
2577                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2578                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2579         }
2580         impl Drop for Node {
2581                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2582                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2583                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2584                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2585                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2586                         }
2587                 }
2588         }
2589
2590         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2591                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2592         }
2593
2594         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2595                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2596                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2597                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2598         }
2599
2600         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2601                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2602
2603                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2604                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2605                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2606                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2607                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2608                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2609                         },
2610                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2611                 };
2612
2613                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2614
2615                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2616                 let tx;
2617                 let funding_output;
2618
2619                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2620                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2621                 match events_2[0] {
2622                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2623                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2624                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2625
2626                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2627                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2628                                 }]};
2629                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2630
2631                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2632                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2633                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2634                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2635                                 added_monitors.clear();
2636                         },
2637                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2638                 }
2639
2640                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2641                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2642                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2643                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2644                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2645                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2646                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2647                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2648                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2649                                 added_monitors.clear();
2650                                 res
2651                         },
2652                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2653                 };
2654
2655                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2656                 {
2657                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2658                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2659                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2660                         added_monitors.clear();
2661                 }
2662
2663                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2664                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2665                 match events_4[0] {
2666                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2667                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2668                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2669                         },
2670                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2671                 };
2672
2673                 tx
2674         }
2675
2676         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2677                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2678                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2679                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2680                 match events_5[0] {
2681                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2682                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2683                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2684                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2685                         },
2686                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2687                 };
2688
2689                 let channel_id;
2690
2691                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2692                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2693                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2694                 (match events_6[0] {
2695                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2696                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2697                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2698                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2699                         },
2700                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2701                 }, channel_id)
2702         }
2703
2704         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2705                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2706                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2707                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2708         }
2709
2710         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2711                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2712                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2713                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2714                         bs_announcement_sigs
2715                 };
2716
2717                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2718                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2719                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2720                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2721                                 (msg, update_msg)
2722                         },
2723                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2724                 };
2725
2726                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2727                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2728                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2729                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2730                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2731                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2732                                 update_msg
2733                         },
2734                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2735                 };
2736
2737                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2738
2739                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2740         }
2741
2742         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2743                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2744         }
2745
2746         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2747                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2748                 for node in nodes {
2749                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2750                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2751                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2752                 }
2753                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2754         }
2755
2756         macro_rules! check_spends {
2757                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2758                         {
2759                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2760                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2761                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2762                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2763                         }
2764                 }
2765         }
2766
2767         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2768                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2769                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2770                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2771
2772                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2773                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2774                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2775                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2776                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2777                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2778                                 msg.clone()
2779                         },
2780                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781                 };
2782
2783                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2784                 if !close_inbound_first {
2785                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2786                 }
2787                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2788                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2789                 if close_inbound_first {
2790                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2791                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2792                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2793                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2794
2795                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2796                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2797                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2798                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2799                 } else {
2800                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2801                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2802                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2803
2804                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2805                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2806                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2807                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2808                 }
2809                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2810                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2811
2812                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2813                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2814                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2815                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2816                                 msg.clone()
2817                         },
2818                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2819                 };
2820
2821                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2822                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2823                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2824                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2825                                 msg.clone()
2826                         },
2827                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2828                 };
2829
2830                 (as_update, bs_update)
2831         }
2832
2833         struct SendEvent {
2834                 node_id: PublicKey,
2835                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2836                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2837         }
2838         impl SendEvent {
2839                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2840                         match event {
2841                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2842                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2843                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2844                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2845                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2846                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2847                                 },
2848                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2849                         }
2850                 }
2851         }
2852
2853         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2854                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2855                         {
2856                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2857                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2858                                 added_monitors.clear();
2859                         }
2860                 }
2861         }
2862
2863         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2864                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2865                         {
2866                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2867                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2868                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2869                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2870                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2871                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2872                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2873                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2874                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2875                                 if $fail_backwards {
2876                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2877                                 }
2878                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2879                                 {
2880                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2881                                         if $fail_backwards {
2882                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2883                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2884                                         } else {
2885                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2886                                         }
2887                                         added_monitors.clear();
2888                                 }
2889                         }
2890                 }
2891         }
2892
2893         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2894                 ($node: expr) => {
2895                         {
2896                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2897                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2898                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2899                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2900                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2901                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2902                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2903                         }
2904                 }
2905         }
2906
2907         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2908                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2909
2910                 let mut payment_event = {
2911                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2912                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2913
2914                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2915                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2916                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2917                 };
2918                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2919
2920                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2921                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2922
2923                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2924                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2925                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2926
2927                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2928                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2929                         match events_1[0] {
2930                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2931                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2932                         };
2933
2934                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2935                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2936
2937                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2938                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2939                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2940                                 match events_2[0] {
2941                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2942                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2943                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2944                                         },
2945                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2946                                 }
2947                         } else {
2948                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2949                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2950                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2951                         }
2952
2953                         prev_node = node;
2954                 }
2955
2956                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2957         }
2958
2959         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2960                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2961                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2962
2963                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2964                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2965                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2966                                 {
2967                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2968                                         if $last_node {
2969                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2970                                         } else {
2971                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2972                                         }
2973                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2974                                 }
2975                         }
2976                 }
2977
2978                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2979                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2980                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2981                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2982                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2983                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2984                         }
2985
2986                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2987                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2988                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2989                                 match events[0] {
2990                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2991                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2992                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2993                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2994                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2996                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2997                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2998                                         },
2999                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3000                                 }
3001                         } else {
3002                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3003                         }
3004                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3005                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3006                         }
3007
3008                         prev_node = node;
3009                 }
3010
3011                 if !skip_last {
3012                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3013                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3014                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3015                         match events[0] {
3016                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3017                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3018                                 },
3019                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3020                         }
3021                 }
3022         }
3023
3024         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3025                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3026         }
3027
3028         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3029
3030         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3031                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3032                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3033                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3034                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3035                 }
3036
3037                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3038         }
3039
3040         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3041                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3042                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3043                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3044                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3045                 }
3046
3047                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3048
3049                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3050                 match err {
3051                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3052                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3053                 };
3054         }
3055
3056         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3057                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3058                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3059         }
3060
3061         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3062                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3063                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3064
3065                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3066                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3067                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3068                                 {
3069                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3070                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3071                                 }
3072                         }
3073                 }
3074
3075                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3076                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3077                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3078                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3079                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3080                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3081                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3082                                 // second-to-last node!
3083                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3084                         }
3085
3086                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3087                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3088                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3089                                 match events[0] {
3090                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3091                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3094                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3095                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3096                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3097                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3098                                         },
3099                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3100                                 }
3101                         } else {
3102                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3103                         }
3104                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3105                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3106                         }
3107
3108                         prev_node = node;
3109                 }
3110
3111                 if !skip_last {
3112                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3113
3114                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3115                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3116                         match events[0] {
3117                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3118                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3119                                 },
3120                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121                         }
3122                 }
3123         }
3124
3125         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3126                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3127         }
3128
3129         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3130                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3131                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3132                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3133                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3134
3135                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3136                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3137
3138                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3139                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3140                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3141                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3142                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3143                         let node_id = {
3144                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3145                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3146                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3147                         };
3148                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3149                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3150                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3151                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3152                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3153                         });
3154                 }
3155
3156                 nodes
3157         }
3158
3159         #[test]
3160         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3161                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3162                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3163                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3164
3165                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3166                         ($node: expr) => {{
3167                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3168                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3169                                 chan.get_feerate()
3170                         }}
3171                 }
3172
3173                 // balancing
3174                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3175
3176                 // A                                        B
3177                 // update_fee                            ->
3178                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3179                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3180                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3181                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3182                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3183                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3184                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3185                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3186                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3187                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3188                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3189                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3190                 //                                       <- RAA
3191                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3192
3193                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3194                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3196
3197                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3198                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3199                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3200                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3201                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3202                         },
3203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204                 };
3205
3206                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3207
3208                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3209                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3210                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3212
3213                 let payment_event = {
3214                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3215                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3216                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3217                 };
3218                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3219                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3220
3221                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3222                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3223                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3224                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3225                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3226
3227                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3228                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3229                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3230                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3231
3232                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3233                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3234                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3235                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3236                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3237                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3238                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3239
3240                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3241                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3242                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3243                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3244                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3245                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3246                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3247
3248                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3249                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3251
3252                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3253                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3255
3256                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3258
3259                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3260                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3261                 match events_2[0] {
3262                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3263                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264                 }
3265
3266                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268         }
3269
3270         #[test]
3271         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3272                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3273                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3274                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3275                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3276                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3277
3278                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3279                         ($node: expr) => {{
3280                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3281                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3282                                 chan.get_feerate()
3283                         }}
3284                 }
3285
3286                 // balancing
3287                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3288
3289                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3290                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3291                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3292
3293                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3294                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3295                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3296                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3297                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3298                         },
3299                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3300                 };
3301
3302                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3303
3304                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3305                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3306                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3308
3309                 let payment_event = {
3310                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3311                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3312                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3313                 };
3314                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3315                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3316
3317                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3318                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3319                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3320                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3321                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3322
3323                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3325
3326                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3327         }
3328
3329         #[test]
3330         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3331                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3332                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3333                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3334
3335                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3336                         ($node: expr) => {{
3337                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3338                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3339                                 chan.get_feerate()
3340                         }}
3341                 }
3342
3343                 // A                                        B
3344                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3345                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3346                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3347                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3348                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3349                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3350                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3351                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3352                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3353                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3354                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3355                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3356                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3357                 //                                          B should send no response here
3358                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3359                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3360                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3361
3362                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3363                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3364                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3366
3367                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3368                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3369                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3370                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3371                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3372                         },
3373                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3374                 };
3375
3376                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3377                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3378                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3379                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3380
3381                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3382                 // transaction:
3383                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3384                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3385
3386                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3387                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3388                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3389                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3390                 };
3391
3392                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3393
3394                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3395                 // Deliver (3)
3396                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3397
3398                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3399                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3401                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3402                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3403                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3404                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3405                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3406                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3407                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3408
3409                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3410                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3411                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3412                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3413
3414                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3416
3417                 // Delever (4)
3418                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3420
3421                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3422                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3423
3424                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3425                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3426                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3427
3428                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3429                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430         }
3431
3432         #[test]
3433         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3434                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3435                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3436                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3437
3438                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3439                         ($node: expr) => {{
3440                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3441                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3442                                 chan.get_feerate()
3443                         }}
3444                 }
3445
3446                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3447                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3448
3449                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3450                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3451                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3452                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3453                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3454                         },
3455                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3456                 };
3457                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3458
3459                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3460                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3461                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3463
3464                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3465                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3466                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3467
3468                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3469                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3470                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3471
3472                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3473                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3474                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3475         }
3476
3477         #[test]
3478         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3479                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3480                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3481                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3482
3483                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3484                         ($node: expr) => {{
3485                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3487                                 chan.get_feerate()
3488                         }}
3489                 }
3490
3491                 // balancing
3492                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3493
3494                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3495                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3496
3497                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3498                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3499                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3500                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3501                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3502                         },
3503                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3504                 };
3505                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3506                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3507                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3508                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3509                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3510
3511                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3512
3513                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3514
3515                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3516                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3517                 {
3518                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3519                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3520                         added_monitors.clear();
3521                 }
3522                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3523                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3524                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3525
3526                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3527                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3528                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3529
3530                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3531                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3533                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3534                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3535
3536                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3537                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3538                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3539                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3540                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3541                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3542
3543                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3544                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3547                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3548                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3550                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3551
3552                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3553                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3554                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3555                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3557                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3558
3559                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3560                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3561                 match events[0] {
3562                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564                 };
3565                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3566                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3567
3568                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3569                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3570                 match events[0] {
3571                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3573                 };
3574
3575                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3576
3577                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3578                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3579                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3580         }
3581
3582         #[test]
3583         fn test_update_fee() {
3584                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3585                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3586                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3587
3588                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3589                         ($node: expr) => {{
3590                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3591                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3592                                 chan.get_feerate()
3593                         }}
3594                 }
3595
3596                 // A                                        B
3597                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3598                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3599                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3600                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3601                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3602                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3603                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3604                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3605                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3606                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3607                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3608                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3609
3610                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3611                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3612                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3613
3614                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3615                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3616                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3617                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3618                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3619                         },
3620                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3621                 };
3622                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3623
3624                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3625                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3626                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3628                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3629
3630                 // Deliver (2):
3631                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3632                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3633                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3634
3635                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3636                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3637                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3638                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3639                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3640                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3641                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3642                         },
3643                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3644                 };
3645                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3646
3647                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3648                 // ... creating (5)
3649                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3652
3653                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3654                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3655                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3656                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657
3658                 // Deliver (5):
3659                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3660                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3661                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3662
3663                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3664                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3665                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3666                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667
3668                 // Deliver (7)
3669                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3670                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3671                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3672                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3673                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3675
3676                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3677                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3678                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3679         }
3680
3681         #[test]
3682         fn fake_network_test() {
3683                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3684                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3685                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3686
3687                 // Create some initial channels
3688                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3689                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3690                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3691
3692                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3693                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3694                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3695                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3696                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3697
3698                 // Send some more payments
3699                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3700                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3701                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3702
3703                 // Test failure packets
3704                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3705                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3706
3707                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3708                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3709
3710                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3711                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3712                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3713                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3714                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3715                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3716                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3717
3718                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3719                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3720                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3721                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3722                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3723                         fee_msat: 0,
3724                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3725                 });
3726                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3727                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3728                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3729                         fee_msat: 0,
3730                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3731                 });
3732                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3733                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3734                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3735                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3736                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3737                 });
3738                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3739                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3740                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3741
3742                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3743                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3744                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3745                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3746                         fee_msat: 0,
3747                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3748                 });
3749                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3750                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3751                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3752                         fee_msat: 0,
3753                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3754                 });
3755                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3756                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3757                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3758                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3759                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3760                 });
3761                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3762                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3763                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3764
3765                 // Claim the rebalances...
3766                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3767                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3768
3769                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3770                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3771
3772                 // Send some payments across both channels
3773                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3774                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3775                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3776
3777                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3778
3779                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3780
3781                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3782                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3783                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3784
3785                 // Close down the channels...
3786                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3787                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3788                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3789                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3790                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3791         }
3792
3793         #[test]
3794         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3795                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3796                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3797                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3798
3799                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3800                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3801                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3802                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3803                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3804                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3805
3806                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3807
3808                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3809                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3810
3811                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3812                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3813
3814                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3815                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3816                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3817         }
3818
3819         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3820         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3821         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3822         ///
3823         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3824         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3825         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3826         ///
3827         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3828         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3829         ///
3830         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3831         /// also fail.
3832         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3833                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3834                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3835
3836                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3837                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3838                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3839                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3840                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3841                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3842                                 }
3843                                 false
3844                         } else { true }
3845                 });
3846                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3847                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3848                 }
3849
3850                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3851
3852                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3853                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3854                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3855                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3856                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3857                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3858                                         } else {
3859                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3860                                         }
3861                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3862                                         false
3863                                 } else { true }
3864                         });
3865                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3866                 }
3867
3868                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3869                 res
3870         }
3871
3872         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3873         /// HTLC transaction.
3874         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3875                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3876                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3877                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3878                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3879                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3880                                 false
3881                         } else { true }
3882                 });
3883                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3884         }
3885
3886         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3887                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3888
3889                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3891                 let mut found_prev = false;
3892
3893                 for tx in prev_txn {
3894                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3895                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3896                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3897                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3898
3899                                 found_prev = true;
3900                                 break;
3901                         }
3902                 }
3903                 assert!(found_prev);
3904
3905                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3906                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3907                 res
3908         }
3909
3910         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3911                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3912                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3913                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3914                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3915                                 msg.clone()
3916                         },
3917                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3918                 };
3919
3920                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3921                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3922                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3923                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3924                                 msg.clone()
3925                         },
3926                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3927                 };
3928
3929                 for node in nodes {
3930                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3931                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3932                 }
3933         }
3934
3935         #[test]
3936         fn channel_reserve_test() {
3937                 use util::rng;
3938                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3939                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3940
3941                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3942                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3943                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3944                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3945                                 chan.get_value_stat()
3946                         }}
3947                 }
3948
3949                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3950                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3951                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3952
3953                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3954                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3955
3956                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3957                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3958
3959                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3960                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3961                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3962                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3963                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3964                         }}
3965                 };
3966
3967                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3968                         ($node: expr) => {{
3969                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3970                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3971                                 match events[0] {
3972                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3973                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3974                                 };
3975                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3976                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3977                         }}
3978                 };
3979
3980                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3981                         ($node: expr) => {{
3982                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3983                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3984                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3985                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3986                                 payment_event
3987                         }}
3988                 }
3989
3990                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3991                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3992                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3993                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3994                                 match events[0] {
3995                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3996                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3997                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3998                                         },
3999                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4000                                 }
4001                         }
4002                 };
4003
4004                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4005                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4006
4007                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4008
4009                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4010                 {
4011                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4012                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4013                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4014                         match err {
4015                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4016                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4017                         }
4018                 }
4019
4020                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4021                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4022                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4023                 loop {
4024                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4025                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4026                                 break;
4027                         }
4028                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4029                         htlc_id += 1;
4030
4031                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4032                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4033                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4034                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4035                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4036                         );
4037
4038                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4039                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4040                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4041                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4042                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4043                 }
4044
4045                 {
4046                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4047                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4048                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4049                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4050                         match err {
4051                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4052                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4053                         }
4054                 }
4055
4056                 // adding pending output
4057                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4058                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4059
4060                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4061                 let payment_event_1 = {
4062                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4063                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4064
4065                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4066                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4067                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4068                 };
4069                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4070
4071                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4072                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4073                 {
4074                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4075                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4076                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4077                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4078                         }
4079                 }
4080
4081                 {
4082                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4083                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4084
4085                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4086                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4087                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4088                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4089                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4090                                 session_key
4091                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4092
4093                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4094                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4095                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4096                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4097                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4098                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4099                                 htlc_id,
4100                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4101                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4102                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4103                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4104                         };
4105
4106                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4107                         match err {
4108                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4109                         }
4110                 }
4111
4112                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4113                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4114                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4115                 {
4116                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4117                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4118                 }
4119
4120                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4121                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4122                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4123                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4124                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4125                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4126                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4127
4128                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4129                 {
4130                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4131                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4132                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4133                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4134                         }
4135                 }
4136
4137                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4138                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4139                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4140                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4141                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4142                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4143
4144                 // flush the pending htlc
4145                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147
4148                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4150                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4151                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4152                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4153                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4154                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4155
4156                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4157
4158                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4160                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4161
4162                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4163                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4164
4165                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4166                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4167                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4168                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4169                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4170                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4171
4172                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4173                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4174                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4175                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4176
4177                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4178                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4179
4180                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4181                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4182                 match events[0] {
4183                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4184                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4185                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4186                         },
4187                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4188                 }
4189                 match events[1] {
4190                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4191                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4192                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4193                         },
4194                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4195                 }
4196
4197                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4198                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4199                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4200
4201                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4202                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4203                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4204                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4205
4206                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4207                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4208         }
4209
4210         #[test]
4211         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4212                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4213                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4214                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4215
4216                 // Create some initial channels
4217                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4218                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4219                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4220                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4221
4222                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4223                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4224                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4225                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4226                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4227
4228                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4229                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4230                 {
4231                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4232                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4233                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4234                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4235                 }
4236                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4237                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4238                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4239
4240                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4241                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4242
4243                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4244                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4245                 {
4246                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4247                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4248                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4249                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4250                 }
4251                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4252                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4253                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4254
4255                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4256                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4257                                 {
4258                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4259                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4260
4261                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4262                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4263                                         match events[0] {
4264                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4265                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4266                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4267                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4268                                                 },
4269                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4270                                         };
4271                                 }
4272                         }
4273                 }
4274
4275                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4276                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4277                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4278                 {
4279                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4280
4281                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4282                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4283
4284                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4285                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4286
4287                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4288                 }
4289                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4290                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4291                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4292
4293                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4294                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4295                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4296                 }
4297
4298                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4299                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4300                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4301                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4302                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4303                 // buffer space).
4304
4305                 {
4306                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4307                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4308                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4309                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4310                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4311                         }
4312
4313                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4314
4315                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4316                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4317
4318                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4319                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4320                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4321                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4322                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4323                         }
4324
4325                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4326
4327                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4328                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4329
4330                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4331                 }
4332                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4333                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4334                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4335
4336                 // Create some new channels:
4337                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4338
4339                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4340                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4341                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4342                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4343                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4344                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4345                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4346                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4347                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4348                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4349                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4350                 // Revoke the old state
4351                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4352
4353                 {
4354                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4355                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4356                         {
4357                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4358                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4359                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4360                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4361
4362                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4363                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4364                         }
4365                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4366
4367                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4368                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4369                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4370                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4371                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4372                 }
4373                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4374                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4375                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4376         }
4377
4378         #[test]
4379         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4380                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4381                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4382                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4383                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4384                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4385                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4386                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4387                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4388                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4389                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4390                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4391
4392                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4393                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4394                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4395                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4396                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4397
4398                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4399
4400                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4401                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4402
4403                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4404                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4405                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4406         }
4407
4408         #[test]
4409         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4410                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4411                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4412
4413                 // Create some new channel:
4414                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4415
4416                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4417                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4418                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4419                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4420                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4421
4422                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4423                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4424                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4425                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4426                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4427                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4428                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4429                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4430                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4431
4432                 //Revoke the old state
4433                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4434
4435                 {
4436                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4437
4438                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4439
4440                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4441                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4442                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4443
4444                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4445                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4446
4447                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4448
4449                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4450                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4451                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4452                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4453                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4454                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4455                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4456                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4457
4458                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4459                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4460                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4461
4462                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4463                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4464                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4465                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4466                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4467                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4468                 }
4469                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4470                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4471                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4472         }
4473
4474         #[test]
4475         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4476                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4477                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4478
4479                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4480
4481                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4482                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4483                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4484                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4485                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4486                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4487
4488                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4489                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4490
4491                 //Revoke the old state
4492                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4493
4494                 {
4495                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4496
4497                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4498
4499                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4500                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4501                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4502
4503                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4504                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4505                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4506                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4507                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4508                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4509                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4510
4511                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4512                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4513                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4514
4515                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4516                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4517                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4518                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4519                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4520
4521                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4522                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4523                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4524                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4525                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4526                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4527                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4528                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4529
4530                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4531                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4532
4533                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4534                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4535                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4536                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4537                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4538                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4539                 }
4540                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4541                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4542                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4543         }
4544
4545         #[test]
4546         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4547                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4548                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4549                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4550                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4551
4552                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4553                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4554                 {
4555                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4556                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4557                         match events[0] {
4558                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4559                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4560                                 },
4561                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4562                         }
4563                 }
4564
4565                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4566                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4567
4568                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4569                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4570
4571                 {
4572                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4573                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4574                         match events[0] {
4575                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4576                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4577                                 },
4578                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4579                         }
4580                 }
4581
4582                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4583                 // registering new transactions
4584                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4585         }
4586
4587         #[test]
4588         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4589                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4590                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4591                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4592                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4593
4594                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4595
4596                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4597
4598                 let mut payment_event = {
4599                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4600                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4601
4602                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4603                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4604                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4605                 };
4606
4607                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4608                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4609
4610                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4611                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4612                 match events_1[0] {
4613                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4614                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4615                 };
4616
4617                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4618                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4619
4620                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4621                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4622                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4623                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4624
4625                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4626                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4627                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4628                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4629
4630                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4631                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4632                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4633
4634                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4635                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4636                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4637                 match events_3[0] {
4638                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4639                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4640                         },
4641                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4642                 }
4643
4644                 let tx = {
4645                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4646                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4647                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4648                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4649                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4650                         node_txn.remove(0)
4651                 };
4652
4653                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4654                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4655
4656                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4657                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4658                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4659                 match events_4[0] {
4660                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4661                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4662                         },
4663                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4664                 }
4665
4666                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4667                 {
4668                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4669                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4670                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4671                 }
4672                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4673                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4674                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4675                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4676                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4677                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4678                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4679
4680                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4681         }
4682
4683         #[test]
4684         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4685                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4686                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4687                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4688
4689                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4690                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4691                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4692                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4693
4694                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4695                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4696                 headers.push(header.clone());
4697                 for _i in 2..100 {
4698                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4699                         headers.push(header.clone());
4700                 }
4701                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4702                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4703                 }
4704                 {
4705                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4706                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4707                         match events[0] {
4708                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4709                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4710                                 },
4711                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712                         }
4713                 }
4714                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4715                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4716                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4717         }
4718
4719         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4720         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4721         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4722                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4723                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4724
4725                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4726                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4727                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4728                 }
4729                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4730                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4731                 } else {
4732                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4733                 }
4734
4735                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4736                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4737                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4738                 }
4739                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4740                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4741                 } else {
4742                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4743                 }
4744
4745                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4746                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4747                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4748
4749                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4750                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4751                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4752                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4753                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4754                         } else {
4755                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4756                         }
4757                         if pending_raa.0 {
4758                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4759                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4760                         } else {
4761                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4762                         }
4763                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4764                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4765                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4766                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4767                                 } else {
4768                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4769                                 }
4770                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4771                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4772                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4773                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4774                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4775                                 }
4776                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4777                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4778                                 }
4779                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4780                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4781                                 }
4782
4783                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4784                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4785                                 } else {
4786                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4787                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4788                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4789                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4790                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4791                                 }
4792                         } else {
4793                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4794                         }
4795                 }
4796
4797                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4798                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4799                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4800                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4801                         } else {
4802                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4803                         }
4804                         if pending_raa.1 {
4805                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4806                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4807                         } else {
4808                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4809                         }
4810                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4811                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4812                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4813                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
4814                                 }
4815                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4816                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4817                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4818                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4819                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4820                                 }
4821                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4822                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4823                                 }
4824                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4825                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4826                                 }
4827
4828                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4829                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4830                                 } else {
4831                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4832                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4833                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4834                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4835                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4836                                 }
4837                         } else {
4838                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4839                         }
4840                 }
4841         }
4842
4843         #[test]
4844         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4845                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4846                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4847                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4848                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4849
4850                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4851                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4852                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4853
4854                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4855                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4856                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4857                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4858
4859                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4860                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4861                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4862
4863                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4864                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4865                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4866                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4867
4868                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4869                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4870
4871                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4872                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4873
4874                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
4875                 {
4876                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4877                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4878                         match events[0] {
4879                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4880                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4881                                 },
4882                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4883                         }
4884                         match events[1] {
4885                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4886                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4887                                 },
4888                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4889                         }
4890                 }
4891
4892                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4893                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4894         }
4895
4896         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
4897                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
4898                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4899                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
4900                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
4901                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
4902                 } else {
4903                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4904                 }
4905
4906                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4907                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4908
4909                 let payment_event = {
4910                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4911                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4912
4913                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4914                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4915                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4916                 };
4917                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4918
4919                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4920                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
4921                 } else {
4922                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4923                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4924                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925
4926                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4927                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4928                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4929
4930                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4931                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4932                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4933                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4934
4935                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4936                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4937                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4938                                         }
4939                                 }
4940                         }
4941                 }
4942
4943                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4944                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4945                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4946                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
4947                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
4948                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4949                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4950                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4951                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
4952                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4953                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4954                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4955                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4956                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4957                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
4958                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4959                         // Everything was delivered...
4960                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4961                 }
4962
4963                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4964                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4965                 match events_1[0] {
4966                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4967                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4968                 };
4969
4970                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4971                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4972                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4973
4974                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4975                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4976
4977                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4978                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4979                 match events_2[0] {
4980                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4981                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4982                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
4983                         },
4984                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4985                 }
4986
4987                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4988                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4989
4990                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4991                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4992                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4993                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4994                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4995                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4996                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4997                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4998                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4999                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5000                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5001                         },
5002                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5003                 };
5004
5005                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5006                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5007
5008                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5009                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5010                         match events_4[0] {
5011                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5012                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5013                                 },
5014                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5015                         }
5016
5017                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5018                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5019                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5020
5021                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5022                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5023                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5024
5025                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5026                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5027                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5028                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029
5030                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5031                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5032                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5033                                                 }
5034                                         }
5035                                 }
5036                         }
5037                 }
5038
5039                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5040                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5041                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5042                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5043                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5044                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5045                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5046                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5047                                 match events_4[0] {
5048                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5049                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5050                                         },
5051                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5052                                 }
5053                         //}
5054                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5055                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5056                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5057                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5058                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5059                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5060                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5061                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5062                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5063                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5064                         // Everything was delivered...
5065                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5066                 }
5067
5068                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5069                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5070                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5071
5072                 // Channel should still work fine...
5073                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5074                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5075         }
5076
5077         #[test]
5078         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5079                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5080                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5081                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5082         }
5083
5084         #[test]
5085         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5086                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5087                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5088                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5089         }
5090
5091         #[test]
5092         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5093                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5094                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5095                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5096
5097                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5098                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5099
5100                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5101                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5102                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5103                 match events_1[0] {
5104                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5105                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5106                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5107                         },
5108                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5109                 }
5110
5111                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5112                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5113                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5114                 match events_2[0] {
5115                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5116                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5117                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5118                         },
5119                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5120                 }
5121
5122                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5123                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5124                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5125                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5126
5127                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5128                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5129
5130                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5131                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5132                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5133         }
5134
5135         #[test]
5136         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5137                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5138                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5139                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5140
5141                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5142
5143                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5144                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5145                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5146                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5147
5148                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5149
5150                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5151                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5152
5153                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5154                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5155
5156                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5157
5158                 let mut chan_announcement;
5159
5160                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5161                         () => {
5162                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5163                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5164                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5165                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5166                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5167                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5168                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5169                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5170                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5171                                 };
5172                         }
5173                 }
5174
5175                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5176                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5177                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5178                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5179                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5180                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5181                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5182                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5183                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5184                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5185                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5186                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5187                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
5188                                 }
5189                         }
5190                 }
5191
5192                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5193                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5194                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5195                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5196
5197                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5198                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5199                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5200                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5201                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5202
5203                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5204                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5205                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5206                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5207         }
5208 }