1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::configurations::UserConfigurations;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
113 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
114 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
115 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
116 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
134 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
135 err: msgs::HandleError,
136 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
138 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
140 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
144 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
145 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
147 data: err.to_string()
151 needs_channel_force_close: false,
155 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
159 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
160 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
162 data: err.to_string()
166 needs_channel_force_close: true,
170 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
171 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
179 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
180 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
181 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
182 /// probably increase this significantly.
183 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
185 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
186 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
188 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
191 struct ChannelHolder {
192 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
193 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
194 next_forward: Instant,
195 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
196 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
197 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
198 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
199 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
200 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
201 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
203 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
205 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
206 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
207 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
208 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
209 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
210 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
213 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
215 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
216 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
217 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
218 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
219 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
224 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
225 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
227 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
228 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
230 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
231 /// to individual Channels.
232 pub struct ChannelManager {
233 configuration : UserConfigurations,
234 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
235 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
236 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
237 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
238 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
240 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
241 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
242 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
243 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
245 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
246 our_network_key: SecretKey,
248 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
253 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
255 macro_rules! secp_call {
256 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
259 Err(_) => return Err($err),
266 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
268 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
269 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
274 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
275 pub struct ChannelDetails {
276 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
277 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
278 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
279 /// lifetime of the channel.
280 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
281 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
282 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
283 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
284 /// The node_id of our counterparty
285 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
286 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
287 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
288 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
292 impl ChannelManager {
293 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
295 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
296 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
298 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
299 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
301 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
302 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
303 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
305 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
306 configuration : UserConfigurations::new(),
307 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
308 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
309 monitor: monitor.clone(),
313 announce_channels_publicly,
314 fee_proportional_millionths,
315 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
318 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
319 by_id: HashMap::new(),
320 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
321 next_forward: Instant::now(),
322 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
323 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
327 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
331 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
332 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
336 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
338 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
339 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
340 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
341 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
343 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
344 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
346 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
347 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
348 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
350 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
351 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
352 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
353 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
354 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
355 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
356 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
357 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
360 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
361 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
362 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
364 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
368 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.configuration)?;
369 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
370 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
371 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
372 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
376 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
377 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
378 node_id: their_network_key,
384 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
385 /// more information.
386 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
387 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
388 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
389 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
390 res.push(ChannelDetails {
391 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
392 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
393 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
394 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
395 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
401 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
402 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
403 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
404 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
405 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
406 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
407 if channel.is_usable() {
408 res.push(ChannelDetails {
409 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
410 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
411 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
412 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
413 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
420 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
421 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
422 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
424 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
425 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
426 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
428 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
429 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
431 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
432 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
433 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
434 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
436 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
437 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
442 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
443 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
446 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
447 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
452 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
453 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
454 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
458 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
467 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
468 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
469 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
470 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
471 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
473 for tx in local_txn {
474 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
476 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
477 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
478 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
479 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
480 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
481 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
482 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
485 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
486 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
487 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
489 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
490 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
491 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
492 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
493 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
500 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
501 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
502 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
503 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
509 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
510 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
511 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
512 for chan in self.list_channels() {
513 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
518 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
520 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
521 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
522 let mut res = [0; 32];
523 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
527 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
528 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
529 let mut res = [0; 32];
530 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
536 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
537 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
538 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
539 let mut res = [0; 32];
540 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
545 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
546 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
547 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
548 let mut res = [0; 32];
549 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
553 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
555 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
556 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
557 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
559 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
560 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
562 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
563 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
564 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
565 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
566 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
568 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
570 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
571 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
573 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
579 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
580 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
583 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
584 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
590 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
600 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
601 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
602 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
603 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
604 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
605 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
606 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
607 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
609 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
610 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
611 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
612 // the intended recipient).
613 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
614 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
615 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
617 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
618 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
619 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
620 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
624 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
625 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
626 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
628 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
629 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
630 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
632 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
634 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
638 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
640 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
648 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
649 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
651 for i in 0..dst.len() {
656 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
657 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
658 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
659 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
662 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
663 let end_len = iters * 65;
664 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
665 res.resize(end_len, 0);
667 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
668 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
669 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
670 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
671 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
676 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
677 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
679 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
680 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
681 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
682 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
684 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
685 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
686 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
689 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
692 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
693 hmac.input(&packet_data);
694 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
695 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
700 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
701 hop_data: packet_data,
706 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
707 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
708 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
709 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
711 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
712 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
713 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
714 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
715 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
716 data: packet_crypted,
720 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
721 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
723 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
726 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
727 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
728 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
729 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
733 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
734 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
737 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
739 failuremsg: failuremsg,
743 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
744 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
745 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
751 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
752 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
753 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
756 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
757 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
760 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
761 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
762 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
763 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
769 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
770 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
771 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
772 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
773 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
774 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
775 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
776 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
779 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
780 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
782 let mut channel_state = None;
783 macro_rules! return_err {
784 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
786 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
787 if channel_state.is_none() {
788 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
790 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
791 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
792 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
793 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
794 })), channel_state.unwrap());
799 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
800 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
801 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
802 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
803 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
804 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
805 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
806 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
809 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
810 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
811 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
812 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
813 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
816 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
817 let next_hop_data = {
818 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
819 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
820 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
822 let error_code = match err {
823 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
824 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
826 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
832 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
834 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
836 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
837 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
839 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
840 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
843 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
844 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
845 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
846 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
848 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
850 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
852 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
853 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
854 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
857 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
858 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
859 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
861 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
863 let blinding_factor = {
864 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
865 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
866 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
867 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
868 sha.result(&mut res);
869 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
871 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
877 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
878 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
881 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
883 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
884 hop_data: new_packet_data,
885 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
888 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
889 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
890 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
891 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
892 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
893 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
894 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
898 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
899 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
900 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
901 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
902 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
904 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
906 Some(id) => id.clone(),
908 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
909 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
911 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
913 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
914 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
915 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
917 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
918 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
925 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
930 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
933 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
934 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
935 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
936 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
940 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
942 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
943 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
944 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
945 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
946 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
947 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
948 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
949 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
950 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
951 excess_data: Vec::new(),
954 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
955 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
957 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
963 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
965 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
966 /// fields for more info.
968 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
969 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
970 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
971 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
972 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
973 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
975 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
977 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
978 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
979 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
980 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
981 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
983 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
984 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
985 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
986 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
990 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
991 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
992 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
994 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
996 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
998 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
999 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1000 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1001 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1003 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1005 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1007 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1008 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1009 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1013 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1014 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1015 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1017 if !chan.is_live() {
1018 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1020 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1021 route: route.clone(),
1022 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1023 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1026 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1029 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1030 None => return Ok(()),
1034 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1038 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1039 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1040 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1041 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1042 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1043 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1044 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1045 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1052 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1054 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1056 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1057 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1058 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1060 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1064 pending_events.push($event);
1069 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1070 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1071 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1073 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1074 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1075 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1078 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1079 mem::drop(channel_state);
1080 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1081 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1090 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1091 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1094 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1095 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1099 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1100 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1102 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1110 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1111 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1113 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1115 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1117 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1118 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1120 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1121 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1122 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1123 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1124 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1128 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1130 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1131 /// Will likely generate further events.
1132 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1133 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1134 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1136 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1137 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1139 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1143 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1144 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1145 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1146 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1148 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1149 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1150 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1151 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1152 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1155 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1160 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1162 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1163 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1164 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1165 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1166 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1167 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1169 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1171 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1172 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1177 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1179 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1180 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1181 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1182 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1183 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1184 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1185 // this channel currently :/.
1192 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1193 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1196 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1197 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1199 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1201 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1205 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1206 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1207 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1208 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1209 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1210 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1211 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1212 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1217 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1218 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1219 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1220 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1221 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1223 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1227 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1228 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1229 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1236 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1238 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1239 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1243 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1245 new_events.retain(|event| {
1246 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1247 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1248 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1254 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1255 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1256 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1257 events.push(event.1);
1261 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1262 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1263 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1264 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1265 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1266 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1267 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1274 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1275 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1276 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1277 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1278 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1279 /// still-available channels.
1280 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1282 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1283 mem::drop(channel_state);
1285 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1286 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1287 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1290 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1291 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1292 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1293 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1294 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1296 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1297 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1301 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1302 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1303 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1307 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1308 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1309 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1311 //TODO: Do something with e?
1318 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1319 mem::drop(channel_state);
1321 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1322 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1325 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1326 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1328 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1329 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1330 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1332 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1343 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1344 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1345 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1347 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1348 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1349 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1350 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1351 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1352 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1354 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1355 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1356 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1357 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1358 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1359 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1364 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1366 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1367 mem::drop(channel_state);
1368 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1369 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1373 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1374 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1375 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1376 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1377 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1379 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1380 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1386 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1387 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1388 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1390 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1391 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1392 //TODO: Do something with e?
1398 mem::drop(channel_state);
1399 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1400 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1401 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1405 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1406 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1407 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1409 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1410 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1412 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1413 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1414 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1422 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1423 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1427 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1428 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1430 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1434 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1435 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1438 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1439 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1443 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1445 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1446 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1447 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1448 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1449 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1450 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1451 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1452 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1455 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1456 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1457 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1459 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1463 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.configuration).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1464 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1465 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1469 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1470 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1471 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1472 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1474 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1475 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1478 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1479 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1481 //TODO: same as above
1482 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1485 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1486 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1487 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1488 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1489 output_script: output_script, user_channel_id: user_id,
1494 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1495 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1496 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1499 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1500 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1503 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1504 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1505 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1508 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1514 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1515 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1516 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1517 // for a bogus channel.
1518 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1521 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1522 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1533 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1534 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1535 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1536 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1538 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1539 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1542 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1543 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1545 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1548 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1551 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1552 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1553 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1554 user_channel_id: user_id,
1559 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1560 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1561 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1563 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1564 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1567 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1568 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1570 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1574 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1575 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1576 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1577 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1579 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1581 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1582 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1585 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1586 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1587 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1588 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1590 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1591 } else { (res, None) }
1593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1596 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1597 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1600 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1601 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1602 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1603 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1611 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1612 let (res, chan_option) = {
1613 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1614 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1617 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1618 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1621 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1622 if res.1.is_some() {
1623 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1624 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1625 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1626 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1627 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1628 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1629 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1631 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1632 } else { (res, None) }
1634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1637 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1638 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1640 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1641 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1642 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1643 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1651 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1652 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1653 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1654 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1656 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1657 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1658 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1659 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1661 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1662 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1664 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1666 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1667 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1668 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1670 if !chan.is_usable() {
1671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1673 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1675 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1679 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1680 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1681 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1683 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1684 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1687 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1689 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1691 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1695 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1696 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1697 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1699 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1700 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1703 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1705 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1709 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1710 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1711 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1713 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1714 if res.is_some() { return; }
1716 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1718 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1719 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1720 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1721 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1722 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1724 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1725 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1726 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1728 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1729 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1730 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1731 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1732 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1733 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1734 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1735 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1736 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1737 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1738 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1739 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1740 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1741 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1749 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1750 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1751 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1752 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1755 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1767 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1768 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1769 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1771 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1772 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1775 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1778 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1782 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1783 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1784 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1785 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1787 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1788 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1791 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1793 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1796 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1800 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1803 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1804 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1805 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1806 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1808 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1809 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1812 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1814 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1817 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1820 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1821 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1824 let mut forward_event = None;
1825 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1826 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1828 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1829 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1831 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1832 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1834 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1837 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1842 match forward_event {
1844 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1845 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1846 time_forwardable: time
1855 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1856 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1857 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1859 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1860 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1861 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1863 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1865 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1869 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1870 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1871 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1872 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1874 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1877 if !chan.is_usable() {
1878 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1881 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1882 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1883 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1885 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1886 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1887 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1888 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1889 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1891 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1893 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1894 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1895 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1896 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1897 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1898 contents: announcement,
1899 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1901 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1904 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1905 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1909 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1910 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1911 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1912 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1914 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1917 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1918 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1920 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1923 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1924 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1932 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1933 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1935 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1936 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1941 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1942 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1943 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1944 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1946 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1947 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1948 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1949 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1950 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1951 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1952 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1953 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1954 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1955 msg: funding_locked,
1956 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1958 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1959 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1960 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1961 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1964 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1968 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1969 for tx in txn_matched {
1970 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1971 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1972 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1973 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1975 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1976 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1977 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1978 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1979 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1980 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1989 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1990 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1991 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1993 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1994 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1995 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1996 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1997 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1998 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1999 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2008 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2009 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2011 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2012 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2013 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2015 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2018 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2019 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2020 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2021 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2023 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2025 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2026 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2027 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2028 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2029 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2031 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2032 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2033 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2043 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2044 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2046 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2047 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2048 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2049 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2052 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2056 macro_rules! handle_error {
2057 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2060 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2061 if needs_channel_force_close {
2063 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2064 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2065 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2067 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2070 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2071 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2072 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2073 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2074 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2076 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2088 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2089 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2090 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2091 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2094 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2095 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2098 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2099 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2102 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2103 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2106 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2107 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2110 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2111 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2114 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2115 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2118 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2119 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2122 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2123 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2126 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2127 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2130 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2131 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2134 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2135 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2138 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2139 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2142 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2143 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2146 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2147 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2150 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2151 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2154 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2155 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2156 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2157 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2161 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2162 if no_connection_possible {
2163 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2164 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2165 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2166 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2168 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2169 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2170 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2180 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2181 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2182 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2183 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2184 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2185 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2186 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2188 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2189 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2190 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2199 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2200 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2202 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2203 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2204 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2205 pending_events.push(event);
2208 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2209 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2210 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2215 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2216 let mut res = Vec::new();
2217 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2218 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2219 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2220 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2221 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2222 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2223 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2227 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2232 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2236 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2237 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2238 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2239 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2240 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2244 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2251 use chain::chaininterface;
2252 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2253 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2254 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2255 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2257 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2258 use util::test_utils;
2259 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2260 use util::errors::APIError;
2261 use util::logger::Logger;
2262 use util::ser::Writeable;
2264 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2265 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2266 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2267 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2268 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2269 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2270 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2274 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2275 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2277 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2278 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2280 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2282 use std::cell::RefCell;
2283 use std::collections::HashMap;
2284 use std::default::Default;
2286 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2287 use std::time::Instant;
2290 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2291 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2292 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2297 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2298 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2301 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2302 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2305 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2306 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2309 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2310 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2313 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2314 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2319 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2321 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2322 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2327 fn onion_vectors() {
2328 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2329 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2331 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2332 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2333 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2334 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2338 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2340 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2344 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2345 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2346 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2350 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2351 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2352 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2356 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2357 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2358 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2359 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2361 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2362 let payloads = vec!(
2363 msgs::OnionHopData {
2365 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2366 short_channel_id: 0,
2368 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2372 msgs::OnionHopData {
2374 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2375 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2376 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2377 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2381 msgs::OnionHopData {
2383 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2384 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2385 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2386 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2390 msgs::OnionHopData {
2392 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2393 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2394 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2395 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2399 msgs::OnionHopData {
2401 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2402 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2403 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2404 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2410 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2411 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2413 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
2417 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2418 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2420 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2421 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2422 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2424 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2425 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2427 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2428 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2430 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2431 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2433 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2434 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2436 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2437 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2440 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2441 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2442 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2443 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2445 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2446 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2451 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2452 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2453 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2454 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2456 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2457 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2459 impl Drop for Node {
2460 fn drop(&mut self) {
2461 // Check that we processed all pending events
2462 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2463 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2467 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2468 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2470 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2471 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2472 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2473 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2474 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2475 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2480 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2482 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2486 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2487 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2489 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2490 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2491 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2493 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2494 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2496 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2498 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2499 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2500 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2501 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2502 added_monitors.clear();
2504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2507 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2508 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2509 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2510 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2511 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2512 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2513 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2514 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2515 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2516 added_monitors.clear();
2519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2522 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2524 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2525 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2527 added_monitors.clear();
2530 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2531 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2533 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2534 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2535 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2540 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2541 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2542 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2544 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2545 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2546 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2547 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2554 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2555 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2556 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2557 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2558 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2559 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2560 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2561 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2562 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2563 as_announcement_sigs
2565 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2568 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2569 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2570 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2571 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2577 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2578 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2579 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2580 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2581 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2582 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2588 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2590 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2593 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2594 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2596 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2597 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2598 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2600 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2603 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2604 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2605 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2608 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2609 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2610 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2611 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2612 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2613 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2619 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2620 if !close_inbound_first {
2621 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2623 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2624 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2625 if close_inbound_first {
2626 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2627 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2628 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2629 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2631 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2632 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2633 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2634 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2636 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2637 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2638 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2640 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2641 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2642 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2643 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2645 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2646 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2647 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2648 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2650 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2651 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2652 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2653 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2659 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2660 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2661 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2662 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2668 (as_update, bs_update)
2673 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2674 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2677 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2679 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2680 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2681 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2682 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2683 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2690 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2691 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2694 let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2695 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2697 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2699 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2700 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2701 added_monitors.clear();
2704 let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2705 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
2707 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2709 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2710 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2711 added_monitors.clear();
2713 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2714 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2716 let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2717 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2718 added_monitors.clear();
2720 if $fail_backwards {
2721 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2723 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2725 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2726 if $fail_backwards {
2727 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2728 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2730 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2732 added_monitors.clear();
2738 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2739 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2740 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2741 let our_payment_hash = {
2742 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2743 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2744 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2745 sha.result(&mut ret);
2749 let mut payment_event = {
2750 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2752 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2754 added_monitors.clear();
2757 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2759 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2761 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2763 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2764 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2766 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2768 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2769 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2772 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2774 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2775 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2777 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2781 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2782 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2784 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2785 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2786 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2788 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2789 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2790 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2797 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2798 added_monitors.clear();
2800 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2801 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2807 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2810 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2811 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2813 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2814 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2815 added_monitors.clear();
2818 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2819 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2820 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2822 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2824 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2826 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2828 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2830 added_monitors.clear();
2832 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2837 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2838 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2839 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2840 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2841 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2842 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2845 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2846 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2847 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2849 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2850 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2851 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2852 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2853 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2854 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2855 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2860 assert!(events.is_empty());
2862 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2863 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2870 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2871 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2874 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2875 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2882 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2883 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2886 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2888 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2889 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2890 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2891 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2892 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2895 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2898 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2899 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2900 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2901 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2902 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2905 let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2906 *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2907 let our_payment_hash = {
2908 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2909 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2910 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2911 sha.result(&mut ret);
2915 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2917 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2918 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2922 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2923 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2924 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2927 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2928 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2930 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2931 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2932 added_monitors.clear();
2935 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2936 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2937 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2939 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2940 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2945 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2946 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2947 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2948 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2949 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2950 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2951 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2952 // second-to-last node!
2953 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2956 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2957 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2960 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2961 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2964 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2966 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2971 assert!(events.is_empty());
2973 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2974 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2981 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2983 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2986 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2987 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2994 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2995 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2998 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2999 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3000 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3001 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3002 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3004 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3005 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3007 for _ in 0..node_count {
3008 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3009 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3010 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3011 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3013 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3014 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3015 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3017 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3018 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3019 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3020 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3021 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3029 fn fake_network_test() {
3030 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3031 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3032 let nodes = create_network(4);
3034 // Create some initial channels
3035 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3036 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3037 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3039 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3040 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3041 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3042 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3043 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3045 // Send some more payments
3046 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3047 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3048 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3050 // Test failure packets
3051 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3052 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3054 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3055 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3057 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3058 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3059 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3060 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3061 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3062 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3063 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3065 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3066 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3067 hops.push(RouteHop {
3068 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3069 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3071 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3073 hops.push(RouteHop {
3074 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3075 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3077 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3079 hops.push(RouteHop {
3080 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3081 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3083 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3085 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3086 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3087 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3089 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3090 hops.push(RouteHop {
3091 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3092 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3094 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3096 hops.push(RouteHop {
3097 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3098 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3100 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3102 hops.push(RouteHop {
3103 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3104 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3106 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3108 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3109 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3110 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3112 // Claim the rebalances...
3113 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3114 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3116 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3117 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3119 // Send some payments across both channels
3120 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3121 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3122 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3124 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3126 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3128 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3129 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3130 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3132 // Close down the channels...
3133 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3134 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3135 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3136 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3137 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3141 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3142 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3143 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3144 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3146 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3147 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3148 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3150 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3151 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3153 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3155 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3156 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3158 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3159 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3161 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3162 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3163 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3166 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3167 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3168 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3170 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3171 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3172 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3174 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3175 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3177 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3179 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3180 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3181 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3183 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3184 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3185 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3186 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3187 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3188 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3189 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3190 res.push(tx.clone());
3195 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3196 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3199 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3201 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3202 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3203 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3204 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3205 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3206 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3207 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3208 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3210 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3212 res.push(tx.clone());
3216 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3219 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3223 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3224 /// HTLC transaction.
3225 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3226 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3227 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3228 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3229 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3230 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3231 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3232 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3236 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3239 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3240 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3242 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3243 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3244 let mut found_prev = false;
3246 for tx in prev_txn {
3247 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3248 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3249 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3250 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3252 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3253 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3259 assert!(found_prev);
3261 let mut res = Vec::new();
3262 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3266 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3267 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3268 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3269 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3270 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3277 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3278 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3279 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3287 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3292 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3293 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3294 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3295 let nodes = create_network(5);
3297 // Create some initial channels
3298 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3299 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3300 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3301 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3303 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3305 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3306 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3307 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3309 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3310 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3312 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3313 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3314 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3315 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3317 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3318 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3319 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3321 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3322 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3324 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3325 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3327 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3328 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3329 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3330 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3332 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3333 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3334 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3336 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3337 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3339 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3341 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3342 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3343 added_monitors.clear();
3346 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3349 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3350 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3351 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3352 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3360 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3361 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3362 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3364 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3366 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3367 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3369 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3370 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3372 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3374 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3375 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3376 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3378 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3379 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3382 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3383 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3384 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3385 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3386 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3389 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3391 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3392 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3394 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3395 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3396 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3397 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3398 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3401 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3403 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3404 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3406 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3408 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3409 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3410 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3412 // Create some new channels:
3413 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3415 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3416 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3417 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3418 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3419 // Revoke the old state
3420 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3423 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3424 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3426 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3427 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3428 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3429 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3431 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3432 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3433 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3434 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3436 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3438 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3439 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3440 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3441 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3442 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3444 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3445 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3446 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3450 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3451 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3452 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3453 let nodes = create_network(2);
3454 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3456 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3457 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3459 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3462 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3463 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3470 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3472 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3473 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3476 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3479 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3480 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3486 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3487 // registering new transactions
3488 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3492 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3493 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3494 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3495 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3496 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3498 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3500 let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3501 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3502 let our_payment_hash = {
3503 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3504 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
3505 let mut ret = [0; 32];
3506 sha.result(&mut ret);
3510 let mut payment_event = {
3511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3513 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3514 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3515 added_monitors.clear();
3518 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3520 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3523 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3526 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3527 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3529 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3534 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3536 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3537 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3538 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3539 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3542 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3543 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3544 added_monitors.clear();
3547 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3548 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3551 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3552 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3553 added_monitors.clear();
3556 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3557 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3558 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3560 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3561 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3562 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3564 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3565 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3571 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3572 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3573 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3574 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3575 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3579 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3580 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3582 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3583 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3584 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3586 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3587 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3592 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3594 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3595 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3596 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3598 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3599 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3600 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3601 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3602 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3603 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3604 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3605 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3606 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3607 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3611 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3612 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3613 let nodes = create_network(2);
3614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3616 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3617 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3618 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3619 mem::drop(channel_state);
3621 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3622 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3623 headers.push(header.clone());
3625 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3626 headers.push(header.clone());
3628 while !headers.is_empty() {
3629 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3632 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3635 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3636 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3641 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3642 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3643 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3646 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3647 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3648 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3650 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3651 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3652 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3655 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3656 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3657 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3659 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3661 added_monitors.clear();
3664 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3665 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3666 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3669 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3670 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3671 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3673 assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
3675 added_monitors.clear();
3678 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3679 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3681 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3683 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3684 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3686 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3688 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3689 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3690 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3691 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3692 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3693 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3694 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3695 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3696 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3698 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3699 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3702 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3704 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3708 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3710 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3711 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3713 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3715 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3716 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3717 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3718 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3719 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3720 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3721 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3722 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3723 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3725 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3726 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3729 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3731 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3737 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3738 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3739 let nodes = create_network(3);
3740 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3741 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3743 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3747 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3748 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3749 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3750 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3752 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3753 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3754 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3756 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3757 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3758 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3759 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3761 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3762 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3764 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3765 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3767 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3769 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3770 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3772 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3773 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3779 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3786 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3790 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3791 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3793 let nodes = create_network(2);
3795 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3797 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3798 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3799 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3800 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3802 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3804 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3805 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3807 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3808 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3810 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3812 let mut chan_announcement;
3814 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3816 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3817 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3818 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3819 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3820 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3821 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3822 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3823 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3824 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3829 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3830 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3831 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3832 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3833 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3834 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3835 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3836 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3837 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3838 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3839 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3840 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3841 contents: $unsigned_msg
3846 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3847 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3849 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3851 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3852 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3853 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3854 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3855 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3857 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3858 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3859 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3860 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());