1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
225 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
228 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
234 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
235 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
236 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
237 /// probably increase this significantly.
238 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
241 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 struct ChannelHolder {
259 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
260 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
261 next_forward: Instant,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
279 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
280 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
281 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
284 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
286 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
287 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
288 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
289 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
290 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
291 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
300 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
302 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
303 /// to individual Channels.
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
306 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
307 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
308 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
309 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
311 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
312 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
313 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
321 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
326 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
327 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
328 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
329 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
330 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
331 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
332 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
334 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
335 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
336 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
337 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
340 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
342 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
343 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
346 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
348 macro_rules! secp_call {
349 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
352 Err(_) => return Err($err),
359 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
361 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
362 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
367 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
368 pub struct ChannelDetails {
369 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
370 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
371 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
372 /// lifetime of the channel.
373 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
374 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
375 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
376 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
377 /// The node_id of our counterparty
378 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
379 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
380 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
381 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
385 impl ChannelManager {
386 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
388 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
389 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
391 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
392 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
394 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
395 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
396 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
398 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
399 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
400 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
401 monitor: monitor.clone(),
405 announce_channels_publicly,
406 fee_proportional_millionths,
407 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
410 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
411 by_id: HashMap::new(),
412 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
413 next_forward: Instant::now(),
414 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
415 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
416 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
418 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
420 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
426 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
427 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
431 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
433 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
434 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
435 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
436 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
438 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
439 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
441 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
442 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
443 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
444 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
445 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
446 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
448 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
449 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
451 panic!("RNG is bad???");
454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
456 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
457 node_id: their_network_key,
463 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
464 /// more information.
465 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
466 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
467 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
468 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
469 res.push(ChannelDetails {
470 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
471 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
472 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
473 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
474 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
480 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
481 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
482 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
483 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
484 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
485 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
486 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
487 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
488 // really wanted anyway.
489 if channel.is_live() {
490 res.push(ChannelDetails {
491 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
492 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
493 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
494 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
495 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
502 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
503 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
504 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
506 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
507 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
508 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
509 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
510 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
513 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
515 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
518 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
519 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
520 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
522 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
523 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
528 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
529 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
530 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
532 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
533 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
538 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
539 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
549 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
550 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
551 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
552 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
553 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
555 for tx in local_txn {
556 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
558 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
559 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
560 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
561 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
562 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
563 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
564 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
567 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
568 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
569 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
571 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
572 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
573 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
582 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
583 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
584 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
591 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
592 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
593 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
594 for chan in self.list_channels() {
595 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
599 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
601 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
603 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
604 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
605 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
606 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
610 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
611 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
613 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
619 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
620 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
621 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
627 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
628 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
630 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
631 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
632 let mut res = [0; 32];
633 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
637 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
638 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
639 let mut res = [0; 32];
640 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
646 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
647 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
648 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
649 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
650 let mut res = [0; 32];
651 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
656 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
657 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
658 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
659 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
660 let mut res = [0; 32];
661 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
665 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
667 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
668 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
669 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
671 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
672 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
674 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
675 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
676 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
677 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
678 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
680 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
682 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
683 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
685 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
691 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
692 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
693 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
695 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
696 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
702 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
712 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
713 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
714 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
715 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
716 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
717 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
718 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
719 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
721 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
722 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
723 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
724 // the intended recipient).
725 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
726 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
727 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
729 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
730 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
731 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
732 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
736 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
737 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
738 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
740 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
741 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
742 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
744 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
746 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
750 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
752 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
760 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
761 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
763 for i in 0..dst.len() {
768 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
769 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
770 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
771 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
774 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
775 let end_len = iters * 65;
776 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
777 res.resize(end_len, 0);
779 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
780 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
781 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
782 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
783 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
788 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
789 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
791 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
792 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
793 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
794 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
796 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
797 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
798 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
801 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
804 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
805 hmac.input(&packet_data);
806 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
807 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
812 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
813 hop_data: packet_data,
818 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
819 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
820 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
821 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
823 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
824 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
825 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
826 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
827 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
828 data: packet_crypted,
832 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
833 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
834 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
836 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
839 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
840 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
841 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
842 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
846 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
847 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
850 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
852 failuremsg: failuremsg,
856 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
857 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
858 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
864 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
865 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
866 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
869 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
870 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
873 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
874 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
875 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
876 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
882 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
883 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
884 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
885 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
886 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
887 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
888 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
889 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
892 let shared_secret = {
893 let mut arr = [0; 32];
894 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
897 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
899 let mut channel_state = None;
900 macro_rules! return_err {
901 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
903 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
904 if channel_state.is_none() {
905 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
907 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
908 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
909 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
910 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
911 })), channel_state.unwrap());
916 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
917 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
918 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
919 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
920 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
921 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
922 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
923 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
926 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
927 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
928 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
929 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
930 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
933 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
934 let next_hop_data = {
935 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
936 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
937 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
939 let error_code = match err {
940 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
941 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
943 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
949 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
951 // final_expiry_too_soon
952 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
953 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
955 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
956 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
957 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
959 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
960 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
961 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
964 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
965 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
966 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
967 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
969 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
971 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
973 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
974 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
975 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
978 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
979 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
980 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
982 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
984 let blinding_factor = {
985 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
986 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
987 sha.input(&shared_secret);
988 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
989 sha.result(&mut res);
990 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
992 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
998 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
999 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1002 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1004 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1005 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1006 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1009 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1010 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1011 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1012 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1013 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1014 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1015 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1019 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1020 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1021 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1022 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1023 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1024 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1025 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1027 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1029 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1030 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1032 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1033 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1034 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1035 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1036 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1037 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1038 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1040 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1041 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1043 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1044 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1045 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1047 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1048 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1050 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1051 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1052 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1053 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1055 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1056 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1061 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1062 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1063 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1065 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1066 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1068 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1069 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1071 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1076 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1079 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1080 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1081 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1082 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1083 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1087 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1089 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1090 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1091 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1092 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1093 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1094 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1095 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1096 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1097 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1098 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1101 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1102 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1104 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1110 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1112 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1113 /// fields for more info.
1115 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1116 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1117 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1118 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1119 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1120 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1122 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1124 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1125 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1126 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1127 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1128 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1130 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1131 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1132 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1133 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1137 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1138 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1139 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1141 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1143 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1145 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1146 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1147 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1148 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1150 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1152 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1153 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1154 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1158 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1159 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1160 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1162 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1163 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1165 if !chan.is_live() {
1166 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1168 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1169 route: route.clone(),
1170 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1171 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1172 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1175 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1176 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1177 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1178 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1182 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1183 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1184 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1185 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1186 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1187 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1199 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1201 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1203 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1204 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1205 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1206 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1207 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1208 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1210 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1211 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1212 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1215 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1217 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1227 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1228 // lock before add_update_monitor
1229 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1233 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1235 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1240 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1248 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1249 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1251 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1253 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1255 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1256 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1258 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1259 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1260 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1261 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1262 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1266 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1268 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1269 /// Will likely generate further events.
1270 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1271 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1272 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1274 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1275 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1277 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1281 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1282 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1283 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1284 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1286 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1287 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1288 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1289 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1290 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1291 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1293 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1298 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1300 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1301 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1302 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1303 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1304 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1307 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1309 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1310 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1315 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1317 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1318 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1319 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1320 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1321 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1322 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1323 // this channel currently :/.
1330 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1331 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1334 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1335 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1337 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1339 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1343 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1344 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1347 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1348 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1349 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1350 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1351 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1352 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1354 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1359 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1360 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1361 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1362 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1363 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1365 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1369 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1370 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1371 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1378 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1380 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1381 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1385 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1386 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1387 events.append(&mut new_events);
1390 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1391 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1392 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1393 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1394 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1395 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1396 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1397 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1403 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1404 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1405 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1406 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1407 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1408 /// still-available channels.
1409 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1411 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1412 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1413 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1414 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1415 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1416 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1417 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1422 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1423 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1424 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1427 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1430 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1431 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1432 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1433 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1434 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1436 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1437 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1441 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1443 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1444 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1448 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1449 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1450 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1451 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1455 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1456 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1457 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1459 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1460 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1462 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1468 //TODO: Do something with e?
1476 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1477 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1478 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1480 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1481 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1482 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1483 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1484 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1485 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1487 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1488 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1489 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1490 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1491 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1492 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1497 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1499 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1500 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1502 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1506 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1507 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1508 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1510 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1511 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1513 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1514 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1520 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1521 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1522 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1523 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1524 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1525 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1528 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1530 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1531 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1532 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1533 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1534 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1535 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1543 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1544 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1545 //TODO: Do something with e?
1553 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1554 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1555 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1558 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1559 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1561 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1562 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1563 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1564 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1567 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1568 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1569 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1570 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1571 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1572 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1573 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1574 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1576 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1577 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1578 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1580 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1581 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1582 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1588 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1591 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1592 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1593 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1595 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1597 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1598 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1599 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1600 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1605 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1606 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1608 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1609 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1614 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1618 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1629 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1630 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1632 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1634 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1635 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1639 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1640 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1644 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1645 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1647 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1651 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1652 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1653 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1655 entry.insert(channel);
1661 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1662 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1663 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1664 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1666 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1667 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1668 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1670 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1671 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1672 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1674 //TODO: same as above
1675 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1678 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1679 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1680 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1681 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1682 output_script: output_script,
1683 user_channel_id: user_id,
1688 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1689 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1690 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1693 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1694 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1697 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1698 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1699 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1702 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1709 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1710 // lock before add_update_monitor
1711 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1721 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1722 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1731 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1732 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1733 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1734 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1736 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1737 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1740 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1741 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1744 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1746 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1749 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1750 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1751 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1752 user_channel_id: user_id,
1757 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1758 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1760 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1762 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1763 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1766 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1767 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1768 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1770 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1771 msg: announcement_sigs,
1776 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1780 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1781 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1787 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1788 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1791 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1792 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1794 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1798 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1800 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1804 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1805 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1806 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1808 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1809 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1814 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1815 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1818 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1819 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1820 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1829 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1830 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1832 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1835 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1836 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1839 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1840 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1842 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1847 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1848 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1849 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1850 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1851 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1852 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1853 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1855 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1856 } else { (tx, None) }
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1861 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1862 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1864 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1866 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1876 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1877 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1878 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1880 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1881 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1882 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1883 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1885 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1886 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1888 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1890 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1891 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1894 if !chan.is_usable() {
1895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1897 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1899 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1903 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1904 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1905 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1907 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1908 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1911 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1912 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1914 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1916 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1920 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1921 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1922 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1923 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1924 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1925 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1926 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1928 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1929 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1933 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1934 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1935 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1938 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1940 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1941 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1942 if res.is_some() { return; }
1944 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1945 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1946 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1948 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1950 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1951 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1952 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1953 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1954 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1956 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1958 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1959 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1960 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1961 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1962 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1963 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1965 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1966 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1967 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1968 // definitely came from the peer in question
1969 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1971 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1973 match error_code & 0xff {
1975 // either from an intermediate or final node
1976 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1977 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1978 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1979 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1980 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1981 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1982 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1983 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1984 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1985 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1986 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1992 if is_from_final_node {
1993 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1994 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1995 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1996 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1997 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1998 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2001 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2002 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2006 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2007 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2008 // does not coform to the spec.
2009 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2010 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2011 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2017 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2021 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2023 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2024 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2025 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2029 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2030 let offset = match error_code {
2031 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2032 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2033 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2034 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2035 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2036 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2038 // node sending unknown code
2039 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2040 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2047 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2048 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2049 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2050 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2051 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2052 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2053 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2054 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2057 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2058 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2059 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2060 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2062 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2063 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2064 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2065 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2066 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2068 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2069 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2070 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2071 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2073 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2074 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2075 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2076 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2078 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2079 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2082 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2083 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2087 res = Some((msg, true));
2093 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2096 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2097 res = Some((None, true));
2101 // node sending unknown code
2102 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2103 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2112 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2113 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2114 } else { ((None, true)) }
2117 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2118 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2119 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2121 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2122 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2125 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2126 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2128 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2133 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2134 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2135 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2137 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2138 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2139 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2141 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2144 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2145 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2148 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2152 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2153 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2155 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2157 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2158 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2161 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2162 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2165 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2166 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2167 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2169 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2171 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2172 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2173 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2174 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2175 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2176 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2178 commitment_signed: msg,
2184 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2189 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2190 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2191 let mut forward_event = None;
2192 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2193 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2194 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2195 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2196 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2198 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2199 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2201 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2204 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2209 match forward_event {
2211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2212 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2213 time_forwardable: time
2221 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2222 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2224 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2225 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2227 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2228 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2231 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2232 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2235 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2237 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2241 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2243 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2246 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2247 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2249 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2254 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2255 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2256 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2258 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2259 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2262 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2264 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2268 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2269 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2270 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2272 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2274 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2277 if !chan.is_usable() {
2278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2281 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2282 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2283 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2285 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2286 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2287 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2288 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2289 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2291 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2294 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2295 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2296 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2297 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2298 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2299 contents: announcement,
2301 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2304 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2309 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2311 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2313 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2315 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2316 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2318 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2319 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2320 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2321 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2325 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2327 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2331 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2332 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2333 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2334 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2339 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2340 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2341 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2342 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2348 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2352 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2359 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2363 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2364 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2365 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2366 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2368 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2369 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2370 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2372 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2373 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2375 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2376 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2378 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2379 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2381 if !chan.is_live() {
2382 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2384 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2385 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2389 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2390 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2391 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2392 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2393 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2394 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2395 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2406 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2407 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2408 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2409 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2415 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2416 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2417 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2418 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2419 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2424 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2425 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2426 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2428 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2429 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2430 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2431 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2432 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2433 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2434 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2436 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2437 msg: funding_locked,
2439 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2441 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2442 msg: announcement_sigs,
2445 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2446 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2448 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2451 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2455 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2456 for tx in txn_matched {
2457 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2458 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2459 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2460 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2462 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2463 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2464 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2465 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2476 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2477 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2478 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2480 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2481 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2482 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2483 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2484 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2485 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2495 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2496 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2498 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2501 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2502 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2503 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2505 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2506 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2507 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2508 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2509 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2510 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2511 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2512 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2514 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2526 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2527 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2529 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2533 macro_rules! handle_error {
2534 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2537 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2538 if needs_channel_force_close {
2540 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2541 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2542 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2544 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2547 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2548 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2549 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2550 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2551 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2553 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2565 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2566 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2567 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2568 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2571 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2572 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2575 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2576 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2579 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2580 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2583 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2584 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2587 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2588 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2591 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2592 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2595 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2596 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2599 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2600 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2603 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2604 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2607 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2608 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2611 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2612 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2615 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2616 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2619 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2620 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2623 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2624 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2627 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2628 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2631 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2632 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2633 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2635 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2636 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2637 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2638 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2639 if no_connection_possible {
2640 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2641 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2642 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2643 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2645 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2657 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2658 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2659 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2660 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2661 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2662 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2663 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2665 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2666 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2667 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2676 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2677 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2679 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2680 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2686 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2689 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2690 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2691 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2692 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2693 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2694 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2695 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2700 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2701 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2707 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2710 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2711 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2712 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2713 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2714 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2718 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2725 use chain::chaininterface;
2726 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2727 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2728 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2729 use chain::keysinterface;
2730 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
2731 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2732 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2734 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2735 use util::test_utils;
2736 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2737 use util::errors::APIError;
2738 use util::logger::Logger;
2739 use util::ser::Writeable;
2741 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2742 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2743 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2744 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2745 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2746 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2747 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2751 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2752 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2754 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2755 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2757 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2759 use std::cell::RefCell;
2760 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2761 use std::default::Default;
2763 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2764 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2765 use std::time::Instant;
2768 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2769 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2770 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2775 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2776 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2779 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2780 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2783 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2784 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2787 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2788 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2791 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2792 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2797 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2799 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2800 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2805 fn onion_vectors() {
2806 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2807 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2809 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2810 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2811 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2812 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2813 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2815 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2816 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2817 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2818 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2819 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2821 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2822 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2823 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2824 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2825 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2827 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2828 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2829 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2830 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2831 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2833 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2834 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2835 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2836 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2837 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2839 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2840 let payloads = vec!(
2841 msgs::OnionHopData {
2843 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2844 short_channel_id: 0,
2846 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2850 msgs::OnionHopData {
2852 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2853 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2854 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2855 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2859 msgs::OnionHopData {
2861 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2862 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2863 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2864 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2868 msgs::OnionHopData {
2870 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2871 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2872 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2873 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2877 msgs::OnionHopData {
2879 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2880 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2881 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2882 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2888 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2889 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2891 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2895 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2896 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2898 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2899 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2900 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2902 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2903 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2905 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2906 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2908 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2909 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2911 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2912 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2914 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2915 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2918 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2919 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2920 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2921 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2923 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2924 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2929 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2930 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2931 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2932 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2934 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2935 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2937 impl Drop for Node {
2938 fn drop(&mut self) {
2939 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2940 // Check that we processed all pending events
2941 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2942 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2943 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2948 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2949 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2952 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2953 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2954 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2955 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2958 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
2959 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
2961 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2962 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2964 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2965 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2969 }, match events[1] {
2970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
2971 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2972 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2974 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2976 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2977 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
2979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2985 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
2986 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
2988 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2991 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2992 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3001 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3002 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3004 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3007 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3008 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3018 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3019 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3020 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3022 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3026 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3027 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3029 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3030 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3031 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3033 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3034 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3036 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3038 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3039 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3040 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3041 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3042 added_monitors.clear();
3044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3047 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3049 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3050 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3051 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3052 added_monitors.clear();
3055 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3057 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3058 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3059 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3060 added_monitors.clear();
3063 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3064 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3066 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3067 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3068 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3076 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3077 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3078 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3082 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3083 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3084 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3085 ((match events_6[0] {
3086 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3087 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3088 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3092 }, match events_6[1] {
3093 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3094 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3101 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3102 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3103 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3107 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3108 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3109 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3110 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3112 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3113 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3114 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3122 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3123 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3124 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3125 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3126 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3132 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3134 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3137 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3138 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3141 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3142 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3144 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3145 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3146 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3148 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3151 macro_rules! check_spends {
3152 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3154 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3155 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3156 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3157 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3162 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3163 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3164 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3167 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3168 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3170 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3171 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3172 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3173 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3174 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3181 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3184 Some(match events_1[1] {
3185 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3186 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3194 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3196 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3197 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3198 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3199 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3205 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3206 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3217 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3218 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3219 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3220 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3221 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3222 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3224 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3225 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3226 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3227 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3228 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3229 (as_update, bs_update)
3231 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3233 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3234 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3235 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3236 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3238 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3239 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3240 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3241 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3242 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3243 (as_update, bs_update)
3245 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3246 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3248 (as_update, bs_update)
3253 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3254 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3257 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3258 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3259 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3261 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3262 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3265 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3267 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3273 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3274 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3276 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3277 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3278 added_monitors.clear();
3283 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3284 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3286 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3287 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3288 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3289 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3290 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3291 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3292 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3293 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3294 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3295 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3296 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3297 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3298 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3299 if $fail_backwards {
3300 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3301 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3303 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3304 if $fail_backwards {
3305 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3306 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3307 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3308 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3309 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3311 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3314 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3315 if $fail_backwards {
3316 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3317 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3319 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3321 added_monitors.clear();
3327 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3330 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3331 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3332 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3333 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3334 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3335 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3336 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3341 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3342 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3344 let mut payment_event = {
3345 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3346 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3348 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3350 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3352 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3354 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3355 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3357 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3358 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3359 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3361 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3362 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3364 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3368 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3369 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3371 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3372 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3373 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3375 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3376 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3377 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3382 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3383 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3384 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3385 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3386 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3392 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3395 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3396 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3397 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3399 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3400 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3401 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3404 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3407 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3408 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3409 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3410 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3411 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3412 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3413 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3414 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3423 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3425 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3426 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3427 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3428 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3432 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3433 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3435 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3436 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3437 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3438 get_next_msgs!($node)
3440 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3443 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3444 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3449 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3450 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3451 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3452 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3453 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3454 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3455 } else if update_next_msgs {
3456 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3458 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3460 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3461 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3468 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3469 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3470 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3472 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3473 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3480 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3481 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3484 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3486 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3487 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3488 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3489 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3490 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3493 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3496 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3497 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3498 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3499 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3500 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3503 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3505 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3507 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3508 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3512 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3513 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3514 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3517 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3518 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3519 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3521 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3522 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3523 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3525 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3526 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3531 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3532 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3533 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3534 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3535 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3536 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3537 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3538 // second-to-last node!
3539 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3542 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3543 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3546 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3547 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3548 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3549 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3550 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3551 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3552 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3553 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3558 assert!(events.is_empty());
3560 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3561 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3568 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3570 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3573 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3574 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3575 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3582 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3583 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3586 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3587 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3588 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3589 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3590 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3592 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3593 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3595 for _ in 0..node_count {
3596 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3597 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3598 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3599 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3600 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3601 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3602 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3603 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3604 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3605 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3606 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3607 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3615 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3616 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3617 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3618 let channel_id = chan.2;
3620 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3622 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3623 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3629 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3633 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3634 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3635 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3636 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3637 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3638 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3639 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3640 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3641 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3642 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3644 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3646 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3648 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3649 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3653 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3654 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3655 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3656 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3663 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3664 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3665 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3668 let payment_event = {
3669 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3671 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3673 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3674 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3676 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3677 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3678 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3679 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3680 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3683 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3684 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3685 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3686 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3689 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3690 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3691 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3692 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3693 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3694 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3695 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3698 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3699 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3700 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3701 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3702 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3703 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3704 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3707 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3708 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3709 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3712 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3713 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3716 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3719 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3720 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3722 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3726 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
3727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3731 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3732 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3733 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3734 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3735 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3736 let channel_id = chan.2;
3738 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3740 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3741 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3747 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3749 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3750 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3753 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3754 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3755 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3756 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3764 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3765 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3766 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3769 let payment_event = {
3770 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3771 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3772 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3774 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3775 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3777 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3779 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3780 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3781 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3784 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3787 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3791 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3792 let nodes = create_network(2);
3793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3794 let channel_id = chan.2;
3796 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3798 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3799 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3805 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3806 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3807 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3808 // (3) update_fee ->
3809 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3810 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3811 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3812 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3813 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3814 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3815 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3816 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3817 // revoke_and_ack ->
3818 // B should send no response here
3819 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3820 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3821 // revoke_and_ack ->
3823 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3824 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3825 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3828 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3829 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3830 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3831 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3832 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3837 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3838 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3839 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3840 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3843 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3845 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3846 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3847 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3849 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3850 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3851 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3852 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3855 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3857 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3859 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3861 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3862 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3863 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3865 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3866 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3867 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3868 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3869 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3870 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3871 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3873 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3874 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3875 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3877 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3879 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3880 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3884 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3885 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3888 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3889 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3892 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
3893 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3894 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3897 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
3898 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3903 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3904 let nodes = create_network(2);
3905 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3906 let channel_id = chan.2;
3908 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3910 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3911 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3916 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3917 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3920 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3921 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3922 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3923 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3924 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3930 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3931 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3934 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3935 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3938 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3939 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3940 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3949 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3950 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3951 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3952 let channel_id = chan.2;
3954 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3956 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3957 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3963 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3965 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3966 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3969 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3970 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3971 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3972 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3973 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3977 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3978 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3979 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3982 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3984 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3986 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3987 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3989 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3990 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3991 added_monitors.clear();
3993 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3994 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3995 // node[1] has nothing to do
3997 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3998 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4001 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4002 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4003 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4007 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4009 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4010 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4011 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4012 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4013 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4014 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4017 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4019 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4021 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4023 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4025 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4027 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4028 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4032 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4034 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4037 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4040 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4041 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4046 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4050 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4052 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4053 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4054 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4058 fn test_update_fee() {
4059 let nodes = create_network(2);
4060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4061 let channel_id = chan.2;
4063 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4065 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4066 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4072 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4073 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4074 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4075 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4076 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4077 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4078 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4079 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4080 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4081 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4082 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4083 // revoke_and_ack ->
4085 // Create and deliver (1)...
4086 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4087 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4090 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4091 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4092 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4094 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4100 // Generate (2) and (3):
4101 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4102 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4106 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4110 // Create and deliver (4)...
4111 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4114 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4115 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4116 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4117 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4123 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4126 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4127 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4129 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4130 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4132 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4133 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4137 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4140 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4141 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4142 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4143 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4145 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4146 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4147 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4151 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4153 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4154 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4160 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4161 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4162 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4166 fn fake_network_test() {
4167 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4168 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4169 let nodes = create_network(4);
4171 // Create some initial channels
4172 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4173 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4174 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4176 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4177 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4178 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4179 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4182 // Send some more payments
4183 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4184 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4185 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4187 // Test failure packets
4188 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4189 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4191 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4192 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4195 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4196 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4198 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4199 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4202 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4203 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4204 hops.push(RouteHop {
4205 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4206 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4208 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4210 hops.push(RouteHop {
4211 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4212 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4214 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4216 hops.push(RouteHop {
4217 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4218 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4220 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4222 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4223 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4224 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4226 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4227 hops.push(RouteHop {
4228 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4229 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4231 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4233 hops.push(RouteHop {
4234 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4235 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4237 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4239 hops.push(RouteHop {
4240 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4241 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4243 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4245 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4246 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4247 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4249 // Claim the rebalances...
4250 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4251 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4253 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4254 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4256 // Send some payments across both channels
4257 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4258 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4259 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4261 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4263 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4265 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4266 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4267 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4269 // Close down the channels...
4270 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4271 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4272 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4273 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4274 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4278 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4279 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4280 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4281 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4283 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4288 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4290 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4292 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4293 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4295 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4296 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4298 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4299 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4300 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4303 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4304 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4305 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4307 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4308 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4309 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4311 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4312 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4314 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4316 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4317 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4318 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4320 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4321 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4322 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4323 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4324 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4325 res.push(tx.clone());
4330 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4331 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4334 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4336 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4337 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4338 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4339 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4340 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4341 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4343 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4345 res.push(tx.clone());
4349 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4352 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4356 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4357 /// HTLC transaction.
4358 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4359 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4360 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4361 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4362 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4363 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4367 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4370 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4371 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4373 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4375 let mut found_prev = false;
4377 for tx in prev_txn {
4378 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4379 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4380 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4381 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4387 assert!(found_prev);
4389 let mut res = Vec::new();
4390 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4394 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4395 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4396 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4397 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4398 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4404 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4405 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4406 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4407 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4414 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4415 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4419 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4421 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4422 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4424 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4427 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4428 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4433 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4435 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4436 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4438 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4439 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4440 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4441 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4442 chan.get_value_stat()
4446 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4447 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4448 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4450 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4451 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4453 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4454 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4456 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4457 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4458 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4459 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4460 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4464 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4466 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4468 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4469 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4474 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4475 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4476 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4479 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4480 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4481 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4488 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4489 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4491 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4493 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4495 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4496 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4497 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4499 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4500 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4504 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4505 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4506 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4508 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4509 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4512 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4515 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4516 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4517 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4518 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4519 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4522 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4523 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4524 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4525 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4526 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4530 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4531 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4533 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4535 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4536 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4540 // adding pending output
4541 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4542 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4544 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4545 let payment_event_1 = {
4546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4551 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4555 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4556 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4558 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4559 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4560 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4561 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4566 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4569 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4571 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4572 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4573 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4575 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4577 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4578 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4579 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4580 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4581 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4582 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4584 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4585 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4586 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4587 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4590 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4592 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4596 // split the rest to test holding cell
4597 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4598 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4600 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4601 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4604 // now see if they go through on both sides
4605 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4606 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4607 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4609 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4610 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4612 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4615 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4616 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4617 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4621 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4622 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4623 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4626 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4628 // flush the pending htlc
4629 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4630 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4633 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4635 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4637 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4638 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4639 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4642 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4643 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4648 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4649 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4650 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4652 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4653 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4655 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4656 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4662 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4663 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4664 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4665 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4667 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4668 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4670 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4673 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4674 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4675 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4680 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4681 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4682 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4687 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4688 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4689 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4691 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4692 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4693 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4694 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4696 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4697 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4701 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4702 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4703 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4704 let nodes = create_network(5);
4706 // Create some initial channels
4707 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4708 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4709 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4710 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4712 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4713 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4714 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4715 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4716 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4718 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4719 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4721 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4722 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4723 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4724 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4726 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4727 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4728 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4730 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4731 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4733 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4736 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4737 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4738 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4739 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4741 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4742 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4743 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4745 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4746 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4748 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4749 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4751 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4752 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4754 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4755 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4756 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4757 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4765 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4766 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4767 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4769 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4771 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4772 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4775 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4777 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4779 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4780 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4781 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4783 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4784 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4785 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4788 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4789 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4790 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4791 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4792 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4796 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4797 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4798 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4799 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4800 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4803 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4805 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4806 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4808 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4809 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4810 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4811 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4812 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4815 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4817 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4818 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4820 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4822 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4823 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4824 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4826 // Create some new channels:
4827 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4829 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4830 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4831 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4832 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4833 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4834 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4835 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4837 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4838 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4839 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4840 // Revoke the old state
4841 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4844 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4845 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4847 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4848 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4849 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4850 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4852 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4853 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4855 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4857 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4858 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4859 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4860 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4861 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4863 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4864 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4865 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4869 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4870 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4871 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4872 let nodes = create_network(2);
4873 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4874 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4875 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4876 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4877 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4878 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4879 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4880 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4882 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4883 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4884 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4885 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4886 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4888 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4890 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4891 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4893 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4894 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4895 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4899 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4900 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4901 let nodes = create_network(2);
4903 // Create some new channel:
4904 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4906 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4907 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4908 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4909 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4910 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4912 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4913 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4915 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4916 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4919 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4920 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4922 //Revoke the old state
4923 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4926 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4928 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4930 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4931 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4934 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4935 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4937 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4939 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4940 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4941 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4942 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4943 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4944 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4945 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4946 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4948 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4949 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4950 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4952 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4953 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4954 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4955 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4956 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4957 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4959 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4965 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4966 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4967 let nodes = create_network(2);
4969 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4971 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4973 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4974 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4975 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4976 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4978 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4979 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4981 //Revoke the old state
4982 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4985 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4987 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4989 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4990 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4991 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4996 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4997 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4998 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4999 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5001 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5002 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5003 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5005 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5006 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5007 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5008 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5009 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5011 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5012 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5013 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5014 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5015 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5016 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5017 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5018 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5020 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5021 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5023 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5024 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5025 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5026 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5027 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5028 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5030 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5031 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5032 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5036 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5037 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5038 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5039 let nodes = create_network(2);
5040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5042 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5043 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5045 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5048 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5049 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5055 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5056 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5058 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5059 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5062 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5065 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5066 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5072 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5073 // registering new transactions
5074 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5078 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5079 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5080 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5081 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5082 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5084 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5086 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5088 let mut payment_event = {
5089 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5092 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5094 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5098 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5100 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5101 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5103 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5107 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5108 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5110 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5111 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5112 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5113 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5116 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5117 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5119 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5121 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5122 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5123 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5125 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5126 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5127 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5129 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5130 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5136 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5137 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5138 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5139 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5140 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5144 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5145 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5147 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5148 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5149 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5152 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5157 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5159 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5160 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5161 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5163 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5164 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5165 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5166 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5167 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5168 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5169 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5171 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5175 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5176 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5177 let nodes = create_network(2);
5178 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5180 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5181 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5182 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5183 mem::drop(channel_state);
5185 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5186 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5187 headers.push(header.clone());
5189 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5190 headers.push(header.clone());
5192 while !headers.is_empty() {
5193 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5196 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5199 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5200 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5205 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5206 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5207 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5210 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5211 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5213 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5214 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5215 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5216 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5217 res.push(msg.clone());
5219 panic!("Unexpected event")
5227 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5228 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5230 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5232 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5234 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5240 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5241 let mut commitment_update = None;
5242 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5245 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5246 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5247 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5248 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5250 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5251 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5252 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5253 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5258 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5261 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5263 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5264 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5265 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5266 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5268 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5269 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5270 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5271 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5277 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5282 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5283 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5284 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5285 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5286 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5287 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5288 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5290 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5291 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5292 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5293 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5295 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5296 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5298 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5301 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5302 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5303 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5304 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5306 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5307 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5309 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5312 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5313 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5314 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5316 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5318 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5319 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5320 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5321 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5322 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5323 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5324 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5327 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5330 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5331 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5332 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5333 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5335 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5337 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5338 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5339 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5340 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5342 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5344 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5345 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5346 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5347 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5348 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5350 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5351 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5353 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5354 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5357 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5358 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5360 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5361 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5362 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5363 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5364 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5365 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5366 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5369 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5373 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5375 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5376 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5378 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5379 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5380 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5381 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5384 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5387 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5388 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5389 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5390 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5392 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5394 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5395 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5396 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5397 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5399 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5400 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5401 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5402 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5403 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5405 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5406 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5408 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5409 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5412 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5413 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5415 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5416 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5417 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5418 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5419 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5420 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5421 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5424 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5430 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5431 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5432 let nodes = create_network(3);
5433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5434 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5436 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5437 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5438 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5440 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5441 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5442 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5443 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5445 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5446 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5449 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5450 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5451 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5452 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5454 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5455 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5457 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5458 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5460 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5462 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5465 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5466 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5471 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5472 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5473 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5479 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5480 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5483 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5484 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5485 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5486 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5487 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5488 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5490 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5493 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5494 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5496 let payment_event = {
5497 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5500 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5502 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5504 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5506 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5507 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5509 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5510 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5511 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5513 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5515 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5516 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5517 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5520 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5521 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5522 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5523 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5526 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
5527 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5528 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5536 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5537 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5538 if messages_delivered < 3 {
5539 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5540 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5541 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5542 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5543 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5544 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5545 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5546 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5547 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5548 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5549 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5550 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5551 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
5552 // Everything was delivered...
5553 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5556 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5557 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5559 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5563 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5564 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5565 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5567 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5568 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5570 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5571 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5573 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5574 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5575 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5580 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5583 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5584 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5585 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5586 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5587 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5588 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5589 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5590 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5591 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5592 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5593 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5598 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5599 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5601 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5602 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5604 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5605 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5610 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5611 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5613 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5615 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5616 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5620 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5621 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5622 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5623 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5626 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5627 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5628 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5636 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5637 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5638 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5639 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5640 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5641 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5642 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5643 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5645 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5646 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5651 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5652 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5653 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5654 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5655 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5656 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5657 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5658 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5659 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5660 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5661 // Everything was delivered...
5662 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5665 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5666 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5667 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5669 // Channel should still work fine...
5670 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5671 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5675 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5676 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5677 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5678 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5679 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5683 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5684 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5685 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5686 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
5690 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5691 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5692 let nodes = create_network(2);
5693 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5695 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5698 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5699 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5700 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5702 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5703 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5708 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5709 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5710 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5712 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5713 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5718 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5719 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5720 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5723 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5724 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5726 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5727 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5728 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5732 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5733 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5734 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5735 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5736 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5738 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5740 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5741 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5742 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5744 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5747 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5748 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5754 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5757 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5758 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5760 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5761 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5762 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5763 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5764 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5765 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5766 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5768 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5769 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5770 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5772 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5773 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5778 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5779 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5780 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5786 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5787 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5789 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5790 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
5791 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5792 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
5794 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5796 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5797 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
5798 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5799 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
5801 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5802 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5804 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5805 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5807 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5809 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5810 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5811 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5812 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5813 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5814 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5816 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5820 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
5821 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5822 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5823 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5824 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5825 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5826 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5829 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5830 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5831 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5832 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5833 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5834 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5835 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5839 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5840 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5843 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5844 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5845 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5848 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5849 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5852 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5853 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5855 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5856 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5859 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5860 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5862 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5863 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5865 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5866 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5871 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5872 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5875 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5879 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5880 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5881 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5882 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5884 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5885 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5887 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5888 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5891 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5892 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5894 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5898 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5899 // PaymentFailed event
5901 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5904 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5905 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5906 // a disconnect in between
5907 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5908 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5910 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5911 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5913 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5914 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5918 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5922 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5923 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5924 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5927 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5928 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5931 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5932 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5933 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5934 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5935 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5940 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5941 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5943 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5944 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5945 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5950 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5952 // Now set it to failed again...
5953 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5954 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5955 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5958 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5963 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5964 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5965 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5968 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5969 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5970 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5973 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5974 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5976 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5980 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5981 // PaymentFailed event
5983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5987 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5988 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5989 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5992 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5993 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5995 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5996 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5997 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5998 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5999 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6000 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6001 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6002 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6003 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6004 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6005 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6006 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6007 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6008 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6009 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6010 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6011 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6012 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6013 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6015 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6017 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6018 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6019 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6021 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6022 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6025 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6027 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6029 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6030 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6031 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6033 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6034 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6035 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6036 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6037 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6038 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6039 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6040 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6041 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6042 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6044 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6046 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6047 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6049 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6050 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6056 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6057 } else { panic!(); }
6060 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6065 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6066 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6067 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6070 // Now fix monitor updating...
6071 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6072 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6075 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6076 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6077 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6079 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6080 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6081 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6083 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6084 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6086 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6087 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6088 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6089 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6091 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6092 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6094 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6097 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6098 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6099 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6101 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6102 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6103 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6104 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6105 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6106 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6108 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6110 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6111 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6113 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6115 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6116 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6118 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6119 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6120 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6122 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6123 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6124 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6126 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6127 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6128 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6129 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6130 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6131 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6133 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6136 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6137 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6139 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6140 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6145 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6146 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6147 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6150 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6154 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6155 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6157 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6158 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6159 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6161 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6162 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6165 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6167 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6168 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6169 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6170 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6171 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6178 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6180 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6181 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6182 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6183 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6186 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6187 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6189 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6190 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6192 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6193 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6196 let as_commitment_update;
6197 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6199 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6200 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6201 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6202 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6203 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6204 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6205 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6206 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6210 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6211 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6212 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6213 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6214 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6215 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6216 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6217 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6221 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6224 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6225 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6227 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6228 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6230 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6231 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6233 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6236 handle_initial_raa!();
6238 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6239 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6241 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6242 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6244 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6245 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6248 handle_initial_raa!();
6250 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6251 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6253 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6254 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6256 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6257 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6259 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6264 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6265 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6267 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6268 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6270 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6271 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6275 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6276 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6277 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6280 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6281 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6285 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6286 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6290 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6293 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6295 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6296 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6298 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6299 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6300 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6309 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6310 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6311 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6312 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6313 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6314 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6315 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6319 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6320 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6321 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6322 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6323 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6327 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6328 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6329 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6330 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6331 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6332 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6336 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6337 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6339 let nodes = create_network(2);
6341 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6343 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6344 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6345 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6346 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6348 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6350 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6351 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6353 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6354 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6356 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6358 let mut chan_announcement;
6360 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6362 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6363 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6364 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6365 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6366 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6367 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6368 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6369 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6370 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6375 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6376 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6377 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6378 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6379 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6380 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6381 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6382 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6383 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6384 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6385 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6386 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6387 contents: $unsigned_msg
6392 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6393 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6394 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6395 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6397 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6398 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6399 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6400 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6401 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6403 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6404 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6405 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6406 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());