1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
35 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
65 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
66 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
68 short_channel_id: u64,
69 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
70 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
75 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
76 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
79 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
82 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
86 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
87 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
88 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
89 short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
97 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
100 session_priv: SecretKey,
101 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
102 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
103 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
108 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
110 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
111 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
112 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
120 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
129 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
130 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
131 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
132 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
133 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
135 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
137 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
138 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
139 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
140 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
141 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
206 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
207 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
208 /// probably increase this significantly.
209 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
211 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
213 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
215 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
219 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
223 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
224 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
225 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
226 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
227 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
228 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
229 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
231 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
235 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
236 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
237 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
238 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
239 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
240 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
243 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
244 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
245 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
246 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
248 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
249 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
250 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
251 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
253 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
254 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
255 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
256 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
257 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
258 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
259 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
262 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
264 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
265 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
266 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
267 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
268 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
269 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
274 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
275 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
277 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
278 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
280 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
281 /// to individual Channels.
283 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
284 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
285 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
286 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
288 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
289 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
290 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
291 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
292 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
293 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
294 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
296 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
297 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
298 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
299 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
301 pub struct ChannelManager {
302 default_configuration: UserConfig,
303 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
304 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
305 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
306 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
307 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
310 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
317 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
319 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
320 our_network_key: SecretKey,
322 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
323 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
324 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
325 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
326 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
328 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
333 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
334 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
335 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
336 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
337 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
338 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
339 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
341 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
342 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
343 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
344 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
345 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
348 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
350 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
351 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
354 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
356 macro_rules! secp_call {
357 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
360 Err(_) => return Err($err),
365 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
366 pub struct ChannelDetails {
367 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
368 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
369 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
370 /// lifetime of the channel.
371 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
372 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
373 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
374 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
375 /// The node_id of our counterparty
376 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
377 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
378 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
379 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
383 macro_rules! handle_error {
384 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
387 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
388 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
389 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
390 if let Some(update) = update_option {
391 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
392 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
403 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
404 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
407 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
408 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
410 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
411 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
412 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
413 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
414 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
416 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
422 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
423 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
426 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
429 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
430 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
431 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
432 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
433 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
441 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
442 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
443 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
445 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
446 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
447 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
450 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
452 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
454 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
455 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
456 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
457 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
459 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
460 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
461 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
462 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
463 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
464 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
465 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
466 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
467 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
470 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
471 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
478 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
479 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
480 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
482 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
483 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
484 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
485 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
487 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
489 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
490 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
496 impl ChannelManager {
497 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
499 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
500 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
502 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
504 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
505 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
508 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
509 default_configuration: config.clone(),
510 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
511 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
512 monitor: monitor.clone(),
516 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
517 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
520 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
521 by_id: HashMap::new(),
522 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
523 next_forward: Instant::now(),
524 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
525 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
526 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
528 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
530 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
531 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
537 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
538 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
542 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
544 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
545 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
546 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
547 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
549 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
550 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
552 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
553 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
554 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
555 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
556 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
559 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
560 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
562 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
563 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
564 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
566 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
569 panic!("RNG is bad???");
572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
575 node_id: their_network_key,
581 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
582 /// more information.
583 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
584 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
585 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
586 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
587 res.push(ChannelDetails {
588 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
589 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
590 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
591 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
592 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
598 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
599 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
600 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
601 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
602 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
603 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
604 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
605 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
606 // really wanted anyway.
607 if channel.is_live() {
608 res.push(ChannelDetails {
609 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
610 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
611 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
612 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
613 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
620 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
621 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
622 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
624 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
625 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
626 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
628 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
629 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
630 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
633 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
635 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
638 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
640 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
642 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
643 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
648 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
651 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
652 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
657 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
668 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
669 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
670 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
671 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
674 for tx in local_txn {
675 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
679 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
680 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
681 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
682 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
685 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
686 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
687 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
688 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
689 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
696 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
697 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
698 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
700 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
706 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
707 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
708 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
709 for chan in self.list_channels() {
710 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
714 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
715 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
716 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
717 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
719 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
720 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
721 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
722 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
723 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
724 failure_code: $err_code,
725 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
730 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
731 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
734 let shared_secret = {
735 let mut arr = [0; 32];
736 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
739 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
741 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
742 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
743 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
744 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
745 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
746 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
747 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
748 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
751 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
752 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
753 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
754 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
755 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
758 let mut channel_state = None;
759 macro_rules! return_err {
760 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
762 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
763 if channel_state.is_none() {
764 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
766 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
767 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
768 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
769 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
770 })), channel_state.unwrap());
775 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
776 let next_hop_data = {
777 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
778 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
779 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
781 let error_code = match err {
782 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
783 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
785 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
791 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
793 // final_expiry_too_soon
794 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
795 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
797 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
798 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
799 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
801 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
802 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
803 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
806 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
807 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
808 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
809 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
811 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
813 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
815 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
816 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
817 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
820 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
821 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
822 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
824 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
826 let blinding_factor = {
827 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
828 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
829 sha.input(&shared_secret);
830 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
833 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
835 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
837 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
840 hop_data: new_packet_data,
841 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
844 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
845 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
846 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
847 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
848 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
849 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
850 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
854 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
855 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
856 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
857 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
858 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
859 None => { // unknown_next_peer
860 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
862 Some(id) => id.clone(),
864 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
865 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
867 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
868 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
869 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
870 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
871 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
872 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
873 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
875 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
876 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
878 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
879 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
880 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
882 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
883 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
885 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
886 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
887 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
888 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
890 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
891 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
896 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
897 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
898 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
899 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
901 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
902 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
904 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
905 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
907 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
909 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
914 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
917 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
918 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
919 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
920 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
921 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
925 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
927 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
928 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
929 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
930 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
931 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
932 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
933 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
934 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
935 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
936 excess_data: Vec::new(),
939 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
940 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
942 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
948 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
950 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
951 /// fields for more info.
953 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
954 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
955 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
956 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
957 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
958 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
960 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
962 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
963 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
964 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
965 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
966 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
967 /// relevant updates.
969 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
970 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
971 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
972 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
973 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
974 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
975 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
976 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
978 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
979 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
980 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
981 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
985 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
987 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
989 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
990 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
991 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
992 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
994 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
996 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
997 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
999 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1000 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1001 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1004 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1005 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1007 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1008 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1010 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1011 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1013 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1014 route: route.clone(),
1015 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1016 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1017 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1019 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1020 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1021 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1022 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1023 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1024 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1025 // something else in case we will resend later!
1026 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1030 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1031 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1032 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1033 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1034 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1035 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1043 } else { unreachable!(); }
1047 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1048 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1050 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1052 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1053 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1054 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1055 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1059 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1064 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1066 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1067 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1069 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1071 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1072 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1073 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1074 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1076 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1078 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1079 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1081 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1082 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1083 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1084 } else { unreachable!(); })
1090 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1091 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1092 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1095 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1096 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1097 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1098 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1105 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1106 // lock before add_update_monitor
1107 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1113 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1116 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1118 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1126 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1127 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1129 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1131 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1133 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1134 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1136 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1137 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1138 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1139 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1140 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1144 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1146 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1147 /// Will likely generate further events.
1148 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1149 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1151 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1152 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1154 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1155 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1157 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1161 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1162 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1163 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1164 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1166 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1167 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1168 match forward_info {
1169 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1170 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1171 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1172 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1175 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1177 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1178 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1179 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1180 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1181 // problem, not ours.
1188 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1190 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1191 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1192 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1193 match forward_info {
1194 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1195 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1196 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1197 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1201 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1203 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1204 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1206 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1208 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1209 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1214 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1216 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1217 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1218 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1219 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1220 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1221 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1222 // this channel currently :/.
1228 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1229 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1230 match forward_chan.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1232 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1233 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1237 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1238 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1239 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1242 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1244 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1245 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1246 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1247 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1248 // messages when we can.
1249 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1250 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1251 // update_fail_htlc in time, its not our problem.
1258 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1259 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1262 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1263 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1265 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1269 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1272 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1273 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1274 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1275 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1276 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1277 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1278 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1280 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1285 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1286 match forward_info {
1287 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1288 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1289 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1290 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1291 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1293 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1297 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1298 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1299 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1302 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1303 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1311 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1313 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1314 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1318 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1319 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1320 events.append(&mut new_events);
1323 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1324 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1325 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1326 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1327 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1328 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1330 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1331 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1332 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1333 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1334 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1335 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1336 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1337 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1343 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1344 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1345 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1346 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1347 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1348 /// still-available channels.
1349 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1350 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1351 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1352 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1355 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1356 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1357 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1358 match &onion_error {
1359 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1361 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1363 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1364 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1365 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1366 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1367 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1368 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1369 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1374 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1375 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1377 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1379 error_code: onion_error_code
1383 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1387 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1388 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1389 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1390 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1392 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1393 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1394 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1395 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1396 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1397 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1399 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1405 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1406 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1407 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1408 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1409 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1410 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1412 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1413 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1414 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1418 let mut forward_event = None;
1419 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1420 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1421 channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1423 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1425 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1428 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1431 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1432 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1433 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1434 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1435 time_forwardable: time
1442 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1443 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1444 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1446 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1447 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1448 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1450 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1452 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1453 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1454 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1455 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1456 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1457 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1462 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1464 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1465 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1467 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1471 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1472 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1473 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1475 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1476 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1478 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1479 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1485 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1486 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1487 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1488 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1489 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1490 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1493 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1495 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1496 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1497 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1498 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1499 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1500 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1508 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1509 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1510 //TODO: Do something with e?
1518 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1519 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1520 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1523 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1524 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1526 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1527 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1528 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1529 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1530 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1533 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1534 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1535 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1536 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1537 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1538 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1539 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1540 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1542 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1543 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1544 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1545 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1546 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1547 // on-chain confirmations.
1548 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1549 // should be written.
1550 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1551 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1553 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1554 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1561 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1564 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1565 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1566 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1568 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1570 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1571 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1573 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1578 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1579 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1581 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1582 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1587 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1591 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1602 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1603 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1605 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1607 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1608 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1612 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1613 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1617 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1618 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1619 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1620 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1621 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1624 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1625 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1626 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1628 entry.insert(channel);
1634 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1635 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1636 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1637 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1640 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1641 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1644 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1645 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1647 //TODO: same as above
1648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1651 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1652 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1653 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1654 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1655 output_script: output_script,
1656 user_channel_id: user_id,
1661 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1662 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1663 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1664 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1665 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1667 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1668 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1671 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1676 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1677 // lock before add_update_monitor
1678 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1681 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1682 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1683 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1689 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1698 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1699 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1700 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1701 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1702 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1704 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1705 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1706 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1708 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1709 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1712 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1717 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1719 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1720 user_channel_id: user_id,
1725 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1726 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1730 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1731 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1735 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1736 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1737 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1738 msg: announcement_sigs,
1743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1747 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1748 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1749 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1750 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1752 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1754 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1755 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1758 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1759 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1761 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1765 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1767 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1771 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1772 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1773 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1775 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1776 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1781 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1782 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1784 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1785 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1786 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1787 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1795 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1796 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1797 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1798 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1801 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1802 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1805 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1806 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1808 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1813 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1814 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1815 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1816 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1817 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1818 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1819 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1821 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1822 } else { (tx, None) }
1824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1827 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1828 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1830 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1831 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1832 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1841 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1842 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1843 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1844 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1846 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1847 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1848 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1849 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1851 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1852 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1856 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1857 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1858 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1860 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1861 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1862 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1863 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1864 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1865 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1866 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1867 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1868 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1869 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1870 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1871 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1872 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1873 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1875 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1876 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1877 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1878 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1882 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1883 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1884 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1885 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1886 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1887 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1899 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1905 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1906 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1909 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1914 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1918 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1919 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1923 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1927 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
1929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1934 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1935 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1936 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1939 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1940 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1943 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
1944 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
1946 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1953 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1958 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1959 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1962 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
1963 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
1964 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1965 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
1966 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
1968 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1969 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1970 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1972 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
1973 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1974 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1975 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1976 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1977 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1978 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1979 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1981 commitment_signed: msg,
1985 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1987 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1998 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
1999 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2000 let mut forward_event = None;
2001 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2002 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2003 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2004 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2005 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2007 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2008 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2010 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2013 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2018 match forward_event {
2020 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2021 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2022 time_forwardable: time
2030 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2033 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2036 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2037 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2040 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2041 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2042 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2043 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2045 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2047 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2051 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2053 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2057 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2062 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2065 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2070 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2071 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2072 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2073 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2075 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2076 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2079 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2086 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2087 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2088 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2090 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2092 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2093 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2095 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2099 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2100 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2101 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2103 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2104 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2105 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2106 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2107 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2110 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2113 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2114 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2115 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2116 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2117 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2118 contents: announcement,
2120 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2128 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2129 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2130 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2132 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2133 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2134 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2137 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2138 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2139 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2140 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2141 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2142 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2143 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2144 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2145 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2147 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2148 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2150 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2151 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2154 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2156 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2160 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2161 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2163 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2168 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2169 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2171 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2181 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2186 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2188 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2198 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2199 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2200 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2201 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2203 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2204 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2206 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2208 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2210 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2213 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2214 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2216 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2217 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2219 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2220 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2222 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2223 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2224 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2226 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2230 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2231 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2232 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2233 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2234 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2235 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2236 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2246 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2247 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2249 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2251 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2252 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2254 node_id: their_node_id,
2258 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2264 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2265 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2266 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2267 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2268 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2270 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2271 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2272 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2273 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2274 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2276 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2282 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2283 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2284 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2289 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2290 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2291 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2292 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2293 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2295 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2296 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2297 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2298 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2299 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2301 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2307 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2308 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2309 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2314 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2315 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2316 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2317 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2318 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2319 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2321 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2322 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2323 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2324 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2325 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2326 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2327 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2329 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2330 msg: funding_locked,
2332 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2333 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2334 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2335 msg: announcement_sigs,
2338 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2339 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2341 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2342 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2346 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2347 for tx in txn_matched {
2348 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2349 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2350 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2351 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2352 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2354 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2355 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2356 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2357 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2358 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2368 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2369 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2370 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2372 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2373 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2374 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2375 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2376 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2377 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2378 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2387 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2388 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2390 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2391 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2394 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2395 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2396 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2397 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2399 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2400 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2401 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2402 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2403 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2404 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2405 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2406 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2408 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2409 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2410 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2420 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2421 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2423 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2424 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2428 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2429 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2430 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2431 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2432 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2435 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2436 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2437 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2440 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2441 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2442 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2445 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2446 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2447 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2450 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2451 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2452 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2455 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2456 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2457 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2460 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2462 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2465 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2466 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2467 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2470 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2471 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2472 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2475 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2476 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2477 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2480 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2481 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2482 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2485 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2486 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2487 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2490 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2491 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2492 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2495 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2497 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2500 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2502 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2505 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2506 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2507 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2510 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2511 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2512 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2513 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2515 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2516 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2517 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2518 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2519 if no_connection_possible {
2520 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2521 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2522 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2523 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2524 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2526 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2527 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2528 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2538 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2539 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2540 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2541 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2542 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2543 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2544 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2545 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2547 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2548 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2549 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2558 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2559 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2561 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2562 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2568 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2569 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2571 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2573 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2574 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2575 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2576 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2577 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2578 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2579 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2580 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2585 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2586 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2592 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2595 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2596 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2598 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2599 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2600 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2601 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2605 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2610 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2611 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2613 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2614 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2615 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2617 onion.write(writer)?;
2621 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2622 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2623 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2624 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2625 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2630 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2631 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2632 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2634 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2635 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2637 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2639 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2640 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2641 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2642 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2643 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2648 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2651 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2653 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2655 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2657 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2664 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2665 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2666 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2667 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2668 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2669 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2674 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2675 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2677 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2679 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2681 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2683 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2690 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2691 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2692 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2693 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2694 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2695 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2700 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2703 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2706 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2707 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2709 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2711 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2713 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2715 route.write(writer)?;
2716 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2717 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2724 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2725 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2726 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2727 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2728 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2729 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2730 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2731 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2733 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2738 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2739 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2741 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2745 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2747 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2748 data.write(writer)?;
2755 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2756 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2757 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2758 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2759 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2760 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2761 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2763 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2768 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2769 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2771 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2773 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2774 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2775 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2777 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2779 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2780 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2787 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2788 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2789 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2790 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2791 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2792 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2793 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2795 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2796 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2797 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2799 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2804 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2806 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2808 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2809 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2811 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2812 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2813 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2815 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2816 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2817 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2818 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2819 unfunded_channels += 1;
2822 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2823 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2824 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2825 channel.write(writer)?;
2829 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2830 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2831 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2832 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2833 for forward in pending_forwards {
2834 forward.write(writer)?;
2838 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2839 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2840 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2841 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2842 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2843 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2851 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2853 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2855 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2856 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2857 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2858 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2859 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2860 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2861 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2862 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2863 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2864 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2865 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2866 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2867 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2868 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2869 /// deserialization.
2870 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2872 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2874 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2875 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2876 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2878 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2879 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2880 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2881 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2882 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2884 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2885 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2886 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2887 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2888 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2889 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2890 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2891 /// deserialization.
2892 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2893 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2894 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2895 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2897 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2898 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2900 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2901 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
2902 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2903 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2905 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2907 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2910 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2911 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2912 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2913 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2914 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2915 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2918 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2919 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2920 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2922 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
2924 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2925 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2926 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2927 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2928 for _ in 0..channel_count {
2929 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
2930 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
2931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2934 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2935 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
2936 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
2937 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
2938 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
2939 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
2940 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
2941 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
2942 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
2944 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2945 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
2947 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
2950 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2954 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
2955 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
2956 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
2960 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2961 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2962 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
2963 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2964 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2965 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
2966 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
2967 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2969 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
2972 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2973 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2974 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
2975 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2976 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2977 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
2978 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
2979 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2981 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
2984 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
2986 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
2987 monitor: args.monitor,
2988 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
2989 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
2991 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
2992 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
2993 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2995 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
2998 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3001 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3003 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3005 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3006 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3007 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3008 logger: args.logger,
3009 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3012 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3013 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3014 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3015 //connection or two.
3018 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))