1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::HandleError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
200 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
204 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
212 shutdown_finish: None,
217 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
218 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
219 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
220 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
221 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
223 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
225 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
227 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
231 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
235 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
236 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
237 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
238 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
240 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
241 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
243 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
247 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
248 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
249 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
294 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
295 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
296 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
297 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
299 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
300 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
301 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
302 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
303 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
304 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
305 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
307 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
308 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
309 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
310 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
312 pub struct ChannelManager {
313 default_configuration: UserConfig,
314 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
315 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
316 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
317 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
318 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
324 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
325 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
328 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
331 our_network_key: SecretKey,
333 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
334 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
335 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
336 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
339 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
344 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
345 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
346 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
347 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
348 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
350 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
351 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
352 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
353 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
354 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
355 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
356 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
358 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
359 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
360 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
361 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
362 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
363 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
366 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
368 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
369 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
372 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
374 macro_rules! secp_call {
375 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
378 Err(_) => return Err($err),
383 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
384 pub struct ChannelDetails {
385 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
386 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
387 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
388 /// lifetime of the channel.
389 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
390 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
391 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
392 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
393 /// The node_id of our counterparty
394 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
395 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
396 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
397 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
399 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
400 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
401 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
402 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
403 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
404 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
405 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
406 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
407 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
408 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
409 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
410 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
411 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
415 macro_rules! handle_error {
416 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
419 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
420 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
421 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
422 if let Some(update) = update_option {
423 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
424 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
435 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
436 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
439 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
440 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
442 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
443 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
444 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
445 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
446 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
448 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
454 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
458 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
461 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
462 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
463 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
464 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
465 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
473 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
474 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
475 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
477 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
480 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
481 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
482 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
483 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
485 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
486 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
487 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
488 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
489 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
490 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
491 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
492 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
493 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
494 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
498 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
499 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
500 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
502 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
503 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
505 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
506 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
508 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
509 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
510 if !$resend_commitment {
511 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
514 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
516 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
517 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
523 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
524 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
525 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
527 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
528 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
532 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
533 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
534 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
535 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
536 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
539 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
544 impl ChannelManager {
545 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
547 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
548 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
550 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
552 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
553 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
554 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
556 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
557 default_configuration: config.clone(),
558 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
559 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
560 monitor: monitor.clone(),
564 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
565 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
568 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
569 by_id: HashMap::new(),
570 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
571 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
572 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
573 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
575 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
577 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
578 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
584 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
585 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
589 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
591 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
592 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
593 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
594 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
596 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
597 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
599 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
600 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
601 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
602 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
606 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
607 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
609 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
610 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
613 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
614 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
616 panic!("RNG is bad???");
619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
622 node_id: their_network_key,
628 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
629 /// more information.
630 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
631 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
632 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
633 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
634 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
635 res.push(ChannelDetails {
636 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
637 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
638 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
639 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
640 inbound_capacity_msat,
641 outbound_capacity_msat,
642 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
643 is_live: channel.is_live(),
649 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
650 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
652 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
653 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
654 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
655 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
657 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
658 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
659 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
660 // really wanted anyway.
661 if channel.is_live() {
662 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
663 res.push(ChannelDetails {
664 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
665 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
666 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
667 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
668 inbound_capacity_msat,
669 outbound_capacity_msat,
670 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
678 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
679 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
680 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
682 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
683 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
686 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
691 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
693 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
696 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
697 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
698 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
700 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
701 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
706 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
709 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
715 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
726 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
727 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
728 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
729 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
732 for tx in local_txn {
733 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
737 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
738 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
739 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
744 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
745 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
746 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
747 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
754 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
755 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
757 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
764 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
765 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
766 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
767 for chan in self.list_channels() {
768 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
772 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
773 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
774 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
775 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
777 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
778 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
779 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
780 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
781 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
782 failure_code: $err_code,
783 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
788 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
789 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
792 let shared_secret = {
793 let mut arr = [0; 32];
794 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
797 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
799 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
800 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
801 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
802 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
803 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
804 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
805 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
806 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
809 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
810 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
811 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
812 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
813 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
816 let mut channel_state = None;
817 macro_rules! return_err {
818 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
820 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
821 if channel_state.is_none() {
822 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
824 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
825 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
826 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
827 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
828 })), channel_state.unwrap());
833 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
834 let next_hop_data = {
835 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
836 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
837 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
839 let error_code = match err {
840 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
841 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
843 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
849 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
851 // final_expiry_too_soon
852 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
853 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
855 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
856 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
857 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
859 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
860 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
861 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
864 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
865 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
866 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
867 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
869 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
871 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
873 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
874 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
875 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
878 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
879 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
880 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
882 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
884 let blinding_factor = {
885 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
886 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
887 sha.input(&shared_secret);
888 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
891 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
893 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
895 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
898 hop_data: new_packet_data,
899 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
902 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
903 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
904 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
905 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
906 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
907 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
908 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
912 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
913 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
914 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
915 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
916 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
917 None => { // unknown_next_peer
918 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
920 Some(id) => id.clone(),
922 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
923 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
925 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
926 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
927 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
928 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
929 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
930 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
931 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
933 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
934 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
936 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
937 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
938 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
940 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
941 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
943 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
944 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
945 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
946 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
948 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
949 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
954 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
955 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
956 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
957 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
959 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
960 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
962 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
963 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
965 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
967 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
972 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
975 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
976 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
977 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
978 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
979 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
983 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
985 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
986 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
987 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
988 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
989 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
990 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
991 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
992 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
993 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
994 excess_data: Vec::new(),
997 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
998 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1000 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1006 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1008 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1009 /// fields for more info.
1011 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1012 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1013 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1014 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1015 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1016 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1018 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1020 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1021 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1022 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1023 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1024 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1025 /// relevant updates.
1027 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1028 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1029 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1030 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1031 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1032 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1033 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1034 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1036 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1037 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1038 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1039 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1043 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1045 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1047 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1048 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1049 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1050 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1052 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1054 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1055 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1057 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1058 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1059 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1062 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1063 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1065 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1066 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1068 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1069 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1071 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1072 route: route.clone(),
1073 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1074 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1075 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1077 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1078 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1079 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1080 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1081 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1082 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1083 // something else in case we will resend later!
1084 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1088 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1089 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1090 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1091 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1092 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1101 } else { unreachable!(); }
1105 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1106 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1108 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1110 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1113 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1117 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1122 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1124 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1125 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1127 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1129 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1130 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1131 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1132 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1134 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1136 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1137 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1139 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1140 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1141 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1142 } else { unreachable!(); })
1148 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1149 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1150 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1153 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1154 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1156 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1163 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1164 // lock before add_update_monitor
1165 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1169 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1171 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1174 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1176 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1184 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1185 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1187 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1189 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1191 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1192 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1194 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1195 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1196 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1197 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1198 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1202 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1204 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1205 /// Will likely generate further events.
1206 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1207 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1209 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1210 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1211 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1213 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1214 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1216 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1217 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1218 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1219 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1221 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1222 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1223 match forward_info {
1224 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1227 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1228 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1230 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1232 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1233 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1234 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1235 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1236 // problem, not ours.
1243 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1244 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1245 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1246 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1247 match forward_info {
1248 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1249 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1250 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1251 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1252 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1253 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1255 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1257 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1258 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1260 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1262 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1263 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1268 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1270 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1271 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1272 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1273 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1274 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1275 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1276 // this channel currently :/.
1282 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1283 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1284 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1286 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1287 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1289 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1291 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1292 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1293 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1296 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1298 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1299 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1300 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1301 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1302 // messages when we can.
1303 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1304 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1305 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1312 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1313 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1316 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1317 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1319 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1323 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1324 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1328 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1329 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1330 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1331 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1332 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1333 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1343 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1344 match forward_info {
1345 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1346 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1347 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1348 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1349 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1351 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1355 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1356 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1357 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1360 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1361 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1369 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1371 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1372 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1376 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1377 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1380 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1384 node_id: their_node_id,
1392 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1393 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1394 events.append(&mut new_events);
1397 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1398 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1399 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1400 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1401 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1402 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1403 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1405 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1406 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1407 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1408 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1409 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1410 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1411 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1412 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1418 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1419 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1420 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1421 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1422 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1423 /// still-available channels.
1424 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1425 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1426 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1427 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1430 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1431 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1432 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1433 match &onion_error {
1434 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1436 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1438 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1439 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1440 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1441 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1442 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1443 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1444 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1449 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1450 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1451 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1452 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1454 error_code: onion_error_code
1458 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1462 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1463 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1464 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1465 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1467 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1468 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1469 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1470 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1471 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1472 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1474 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1481 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1482 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1483 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1484 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1485 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1487 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1488 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1489 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1493 let mut forward_event = None;
1494 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1495 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1497 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1499 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1502 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1505 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1506 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1507 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1508 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1509 time_forwardable: time
1516 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1517 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1518 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1520 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1521 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1522 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1524 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1526 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1527 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1528 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1529 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1530 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1531 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1532 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1533 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1534 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1539 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1540 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1542 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1543 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1544 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1545 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1549 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1550 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1551 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1553 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1554 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1556 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1557 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1558 // why it's missing.
1563 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1564 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1565 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1566 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1567 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1568 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1569 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1570 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1572 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1576 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1578 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1579 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1580 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1581 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1582 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1583 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1591 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1592 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1593 //TODO: Do something with e?
1597 } else { unreachable!(); }
1603 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1606 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1608 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1610 node_id: their_node_id,
1618 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1619 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1620 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1623 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1624 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1626 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1627 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1628 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1629 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1630 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1633 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1634 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1635 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1636 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1637 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1638 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1639 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1640 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1642 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1643 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1644 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1645 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1646 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1647 // on-chain confirmations.
1648 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1649 // should be written.
1650 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1651 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1653 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1661 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1664 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1665 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1666 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1668 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1670 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1671 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1673 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1678 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1679 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1681 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1682 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1687 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1691 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1702 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1705 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1707 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1708 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1712 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1713 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1714 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1717 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1718 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1725 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1726 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1728 entry.insert(channel);
1734 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1735 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1736 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1738 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1740 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1744 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1745 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1747 //TODO: same as above
1748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1751 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1752 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1753 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1754 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1755 output_script: output_script,
1756 user_channel_id: user_id,
1761 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1762 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1763 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1764 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1765 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1767 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1768 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1771 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1776 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1777 // lock before add_update_monitor
1778 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1789 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1798 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1799 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1800 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1801 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1802 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1803 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1804 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1805 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1808 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1809 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1812 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1817 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1818 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1819 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1820 user_channel_id: user_id,
1825 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1826 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1830 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1831 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1832 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1834 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1835 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1837 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1838 msg: announcement_sigs,
1843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1847 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1848 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1850 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1854 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1855 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1858 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1859 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1861 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1865 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1866 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1867 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1871 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1872 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1873 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1875 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1876 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1881 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1884 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1885 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1886 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1895 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1896 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1897 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1901 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1902 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1903 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1905 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1906 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1908 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1913 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1914 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1915 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1916 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1917 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1918 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1919 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1921 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1922 } else { (tx, None) }
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1927 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1928 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1930 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1941 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1942 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1943 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1944 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1946 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1947 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1948 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1949 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1951 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1952 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1954 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1956 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1957 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1960 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1961 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1962 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1963 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1964 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1965 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1966 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1967 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1968 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1969 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1970 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1971 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1972 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1973 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1975 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1976 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1977 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1978 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1982 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1983 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1984 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1985 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1986 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1987 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1992 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1999 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2000 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2003 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2005 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2006 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2007 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2009 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2014 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2018 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2019 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2020 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2023 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2024 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2025 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2027 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2034 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2035 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2039 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2040 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2043 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2044 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2046 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2053 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2054 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2055 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2056 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2058 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2059 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2062 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2063 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2064 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2065 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2066 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2068 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2069 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2070 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2072 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2073 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2074 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2075 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2076 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2077 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2078 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2079 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2081 commitment_signed: msg,
2085 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2087 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2098 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2099 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2100 let mut forward_event = None;
2101 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2102 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2103 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2104 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2106 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2107 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2109 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2112 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2117 match forward_event {
2119 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2120 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2121 time_forwardable: time
2129 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2130 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2132 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2135 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2136 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2139 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2140 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2141 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2142 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2143 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2144 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2147 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2150 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2152 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2156 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2157 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2158 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2162 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2167 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2170 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2175 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2176 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2177 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2178 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2180 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2181 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2184 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2186 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2191 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2192 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2193 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2197 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2200 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2204 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2205 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2206 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2208 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2209 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2210 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2211 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2212 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2215 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2218 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2219 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2220 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2221 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2222 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2223 contents: announcement,
2225 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2233 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2239 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2242 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2243 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2244 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2245 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2246 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2247 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2248 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2249 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2250 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2252 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2253 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2255 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2256 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2259 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2261 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2265 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2266 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2267 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2268 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2273 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2274 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2275 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2276 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2282 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2286 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2291 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2292 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2293 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2303 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2304 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2305 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2306 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2308 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2309 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2311 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2312 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2313 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2315 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2318 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2319 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2321 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2322 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2324 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2325 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2327 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2328 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2329 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2331 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2335 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2336 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2337 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2338 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2339 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2341 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2351 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2352 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2354 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2356 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2357 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2359 node_id: their_node_id,
2363 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2369 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2370 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2371 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2372 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2373 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2375 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2376 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2377 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2378 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2379 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2381 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2382 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2387 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2388 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2389 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2394 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2395 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2396 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2397 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2398 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2400 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2401 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2402 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2403 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2404 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2406 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2407 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2412 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2413 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2414 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2419 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2420 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2421 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2422 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2423 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2424 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2426 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2427 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2428 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2429 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2430 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2431 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2432 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2434 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2435 msg: funding_locked,
2437 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2439 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2440 msg: announcement_sigs,
2443 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2444 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2446 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2447 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2451 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2452 for tx in txn_matched {
2453 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2454 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2455 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2456 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2457 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2459 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2460 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2461 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2462 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2463 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2473 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2474 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2475 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2477 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2478 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2479 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2480 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2481 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2482 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2492 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2493 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2495 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2496 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2499 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2500 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2502 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2504 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2505 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2506 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2507 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2508 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2509 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2510 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2511 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2513 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2514 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2525 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2526 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2528 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2529 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2533 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2534 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2535 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2536 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2537 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2540 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2541 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2542 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2545 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2546 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2547 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2550 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2551 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2552 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2555 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2556 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2557 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2560 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2561 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2562 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2565 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2566 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2567 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2570 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2571 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2572 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2575 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2576 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2577 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2580 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2581 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2582 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2585 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2586 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2587 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2590 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2591 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2592 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2595 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2596 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2597 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2600 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2601 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2602 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2605 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2606 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2607 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2610 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2611 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2612 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2615 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2616 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2617 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2618 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2620 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2621 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2622 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2623 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2624 if no_connection_possible {
2625 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2626 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2627 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2628 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2629 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2631 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2632 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2633 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2643 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2644 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2645 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2646 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2647 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2648 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2649 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2650 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2652 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2653 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2654 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2662 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2670 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2675 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2676 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2677 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2678 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2682 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2683 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2685 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2686 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2687 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2692 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2693 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2697 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2698 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2699 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2700 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2701 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2702 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2703 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2704 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2708 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2709 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2710 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2716 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2719 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2722 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2723 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2724 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2725 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2729 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2734 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2735 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2737 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2738 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2739 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2740 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2741 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2742 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2743 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2744 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2749 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2750 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2751 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2752 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2753 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2754 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2755 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2756 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2757 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2762 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2763 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2765 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2767 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2769 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2771 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2778 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2779 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2780 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2781 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2782 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2783 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2788 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2789 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2791 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2793 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2795 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2797 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2804 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2805 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2806 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2807 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2808 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2809 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2814 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2817 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2820 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2823 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2825 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2827 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2829 route.write(writer)?;
2830 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2831 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2838 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2839 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2840 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2841 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2842 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2843 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2844 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2845 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2847 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2852 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2853 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2855 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2859 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2861 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2862 data.write(writer)?;
2869 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2870 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2871 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2872 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2873 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2874 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2875 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2877 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2882 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2885 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2887 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2888 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2889 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2891 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2893 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2894 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2901 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2902 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2903 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2904 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2905 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2906 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2907 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2909 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2910 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2911 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2913 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2918 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2920 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2922 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2923 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2925 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2926 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2927 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2929 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2930 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2931 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2932 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2933 unfunded_channels += 1;
2936 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2937 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2938 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2939 channel.write(writer)?;
2943 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2944 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2945 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2946 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2947 for forward in pending_forwards {
2948 forward.write(writer)?;
2952 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2953 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2954 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2955 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2956 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2957 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2958 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2966 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2968 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2970 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2971 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2972 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2973 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2974 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2975 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2976 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2977 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2978 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2979 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2980 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2981 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2982 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2983 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2984 /// deserialization.
2985 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2987 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2989 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2990 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2991 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2993 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2994 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2995 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2996 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2997 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2999 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3000 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3001 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3002 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3003 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3004 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3005 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3006 /// deserialization.
3007 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3008 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3009 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3010 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3012 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3013 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3015 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3016 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3017 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3018 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3020 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3022 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3025 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3026 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3027 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3028 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3029 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3030 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3033 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3034 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3035 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3037 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3039 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3040 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3041 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3042 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3043 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3044 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3045 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3049 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3050 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3051 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3052 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3053 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3054 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3055 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3056 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3057 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3059 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3060 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3062 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3065 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3069 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3070 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3071 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3075 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3076 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3077 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3078 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3079 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3080 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3081 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3082 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3084 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3087 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3088 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3089 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3090 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3091 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3092 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3093 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3094 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3096 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3099 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3101 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3102 monitor: args.monitor,
3103 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3104 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3106 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3107 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3108 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3110 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3115 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3117 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3119 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3120 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3121 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3122 logger: args.logger,
3123 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3126 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3127 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3128 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3129 //connection or two.
3132 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))