1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
123 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134 err: msgs::HandleError,
135 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
143 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
146 data: err.to_string()
150 needs_channel_force_close: false,
154 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
158 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
161 data: err.to_string()
165 needs_channel_force_close: true,
169 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
177 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
180 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
184 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: msg.to_string()
194 needs_channel_force_close: false,
198 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
201 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
205 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
208 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
210 data: msg.to_string()
215 needs_channel_force_close: true,
220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
223 /// probably increase this significantly.
224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
227 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
229 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
232 struct ChannelHolder {
233 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235 next_forward: Instant,
236 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
244 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
254 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
256 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
257 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
258 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
259 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
260 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
272 /// to individual Channels.
273 pub struct ChannelManager {
274 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
275 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
276 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
277 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
278 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
280 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
281 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
282 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
283 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
285 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
286 our_network_key: SecretKey,
288 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
293 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
294 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
295 const FINAL_NODE_TIMEOUT: u16 = 3; //TODO?
297 macro_rules! secp_call {
298 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
301 Err(_) => return Err($err),
308 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
310 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
311 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
316 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
317 pub struct ChannelDetails {
318 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
319 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
320 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
321 /// lifetime of the channel.
322 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
323 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
324 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
325 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
326 /// The node_id of our counterparty
327 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
328 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
329 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
330 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
334 impl ChannelManager {
335 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
337 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
338 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
340 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
341 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
343 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
344 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
345 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
347 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
348 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
349 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
350 monitor: monitor.clone(),
354 announce_channels_publicly,
355 fee_proportional_millionths,
356 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
359 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
360 by_id: HashMap::new(),
361 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
362 next_forward: Instant::now(),
363 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
368 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
372 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
373 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
377 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
379 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
380 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
381 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
382 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
384 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
385 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
387 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
388 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
389 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
391 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
392 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
393 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
394 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
395 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
396 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
397 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
398 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
401 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
402 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
403 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
405 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
409 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
410 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
411 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
412 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
414 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
417 panic!("RNG is bad???");
420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
423 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
424 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
425 node_id: their_network_key,
431 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
432 /// more information.
433 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
434 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
435 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
436 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
437 res.push(ChannelDetails {
438 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
439 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
440 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
441 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
442 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
448 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
449 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
450 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
451 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
452 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
453 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
454 if channel.is_usable() {
455 res.push(ChannelDetails {
456 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
457 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
458 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
459 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
460 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
467 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
468 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
469 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
471 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
472 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
473 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
474 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
475 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
478 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
479 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
480 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
481 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
483 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
484 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
489 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
490 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
491 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
493 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
494 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
499 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
500 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
501 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
505 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
514 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
515 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
516 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
517 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
520 for tx in local_txn {
521 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
523 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
524 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
525 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
526 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
527 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
528 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
529 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
532 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
533 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
534 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
536 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
537 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
538 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
539 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
540 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
547 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
548 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
549 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
550 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
556 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
557 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
558 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
559 for chan in self.list_channels() {
560 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
565 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
567 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
568 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
569 let mut res = [0; 32];
570 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
574 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
575 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
576 let mut res = [0; 32];
577 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
583 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
584 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
585 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
586 let mut res = [0; 32];
587 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
592 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
593 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
594 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
595 let mut res = [0; 32];
596 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
600 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
602 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
603 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
604 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
606 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
607 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
609 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
610 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
611 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
612 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
613 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
615 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
617 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
618 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
620 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
626 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
627 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
628 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
630 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
631 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
637 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
647 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
648 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
649 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
650 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
651 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
652 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
653 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
654 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
656 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
657 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
658 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
659 // the intended recipient).
660 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
661 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
662 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
664 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
665 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
666 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
667 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
671 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
672 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
673 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
675 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
676 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
677 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
679 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
681 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
685 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
687 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
695 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
696 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
698 for i in 0..dst.len() {
703 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
704 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
705 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
706 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
709 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
710 let end_len = iters * 65;
711 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
712 res.resize(end_len, 0);
714 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
715 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
716 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
717 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
718 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
723 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
724 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
726 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
727 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
728 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
729 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
731 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
732 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
733 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
736 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
739 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
740 hmac.input(&packet_data);
741 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
742 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
747 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
748 hop_data: packet_data,
753 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
754 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
755 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
756 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
758 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
759 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
760 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
761 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
762 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
763 data: packet_crypted,
767 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
768 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
770 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
773 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
774 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
775 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
776 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
780 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
781 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
784 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
786 failuremsg: failuremsg,
790 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
791 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
792 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
798 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
799 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
800 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
803 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
804 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
807 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
808 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
809 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
810 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
816 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
817 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
818 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
819 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
820 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
821 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
822 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
823 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
826 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
827 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
829 let mut channel_state = None;
830 macro_rules! return_err {
831 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
833 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
834 if channel_state.is_none() {
835 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
837 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
838 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
839 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
840 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
841 })), channel_state.unwrap());
846 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
847 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
848 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
849 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
850 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
851 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
852 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
853 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
856 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
857 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
858 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
859 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
860 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
863 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
864 let next_hop_data = {
865 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
866 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
867 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
869 let error_code = match err {
870 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
871 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
873 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
879 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
881 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
883 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + FINAL_NODE_TIMEOUT as u64 { // final_expiry_too_soon
884 return_err!("The CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
886 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
887 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
889 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
890 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
893 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
894 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
895 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
896 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
898 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
900 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
902 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
903 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
904 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
907 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
908 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
909 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
911 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
913 let blinding_factor = {
914 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
915 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
916 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
917 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
918 sha.result(&mut res);
919 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
921 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
927 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
928 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
931 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
933 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
934 hop_data: new_packet_data,
935 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
938 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
939 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
940 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
941 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
942 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
943 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
944 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
948 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
949 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
950 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
951 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
952 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
953 None => { // unknown_next_peer
954 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
956 Some(id) => id.clone(),
958 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
959 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
961 if !chan.is_live() { // temporary_channel_failure
962 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
964 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
965 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
967 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
968 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
969 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
971 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
972 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
974 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
975 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + 3 as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
976 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
978 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
979 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 0x1000 | 21, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
984 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
985 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
986 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amt_to_forward));
988 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
989 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
991 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
992 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
997 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1000 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1001 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1002 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1003 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1007 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1009 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1010 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1011 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1012 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1013 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1014 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1015 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1016 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1017 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1018 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1021 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1022 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
1024 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1030 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1032 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1033 /// fields for more info.
1035 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1036 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1037 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1038 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1039 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1040 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1042 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1044 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1045 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1046 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1047 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1048 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1050 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1051 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1052 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1053 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1057 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1058 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1059 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1061 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1063 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1065 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1066 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1067 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1068 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1070 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1072 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1074 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1075 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1076 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1080 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1081 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1082 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1084 if !chan.is_live() {
1085 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1087 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1088 route: route.clone(),
1089 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1090 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1093 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1096 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1097 None => return Ok(()),
1101 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1105 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1106 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1107 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1108 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1109 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1110 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1111 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1112 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1120 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1122 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1124 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1125 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1126 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1128 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1132 pending_events.push($event);
1137 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1138 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1139 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1141 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1142 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1143 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1146 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1147 mem::drop(channel_state);
1148 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1149 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1158 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1159 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1162 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1163 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1167 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1170 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1178 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1179 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1181 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1183 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1185 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1186 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1188 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1189 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1190 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1191 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1192 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1196 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1198 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1199 /// Will likely generate further events.
1200 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1201 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1202 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1205 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1207 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1211 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1212 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1213 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1214 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1216 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1217 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1218 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1219 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1220 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1221 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1223 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1228 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1230 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1231 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1232 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1233 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1234 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1235 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1237 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1239 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1240 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1245 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1247 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1248 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1249 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1250 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1251 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1252 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1253 // this channel currently :/.
1260 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1261 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1264 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1265 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1267 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1269 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1273 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1274 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1275 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1276 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1277 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1278 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1279 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1281 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1286 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1287 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1288 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1289 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1290 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1292 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1296 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1297 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1298 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1305 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1307 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1308 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1312 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1314 new_events.retain(|event| {
1315 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1316 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1317 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1323 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1324 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1325 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1326 events.push(event.1);
1330 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1331 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1332 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1333 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1334 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1335 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1336 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1343 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1344 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1345 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1346 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1347 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1348 /// still-available channels.
1349 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1352 mem::drop(channel_state);
1354 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1355 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1356 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1359 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1360 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1361 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1362 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1363 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1365 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1366 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1370 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1371 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1372 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1376 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1377 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1378 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1380 //TODO: Do something with e?
1387 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1388 mem::drop(channel_state);
1390 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1391 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1394 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1395 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1397 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1398 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1400 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1401 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1403 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1413 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1414 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1415 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1417 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1418 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1419 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1420 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1421 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1422 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1424 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1425 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1426 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1427 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1428 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1429 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1434 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1436 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1437 mem::drop(channel_state);
1438 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1439 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1443 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1444 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1445 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1446 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1447 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1449 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1450 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1456 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1457 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1458 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1460 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1461 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1462 //TODO: Do something with e?
1468 mem::drop(channel_state);
1469 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1470 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1471 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1475 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1476 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1477 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1479 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1480 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1481 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1482 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1485 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1493 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1494 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1495 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1498 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1499 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1501 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1505 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1506 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1509 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1510 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1514 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1516 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1517 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1518 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1519 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1520 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1521 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1522 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1523 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1526 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1527 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1528 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1530 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1534 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1535 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1536 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1537 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1541 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1542 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1543 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1546 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1547 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1550 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1551 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1552 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1554 //TODO: same as above
1555 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1558 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1559 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1560 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1561 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1562 output_script: output_script,
1563 user_channel_id: user_id,
1568 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1569 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1573 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1574 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1575 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1577 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1578 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1579 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1582 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1588 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1589 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1590 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1591 // for a bogus channel.
1592 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1595 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1598 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1607 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1608 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1609 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1610 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1612 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1613 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1616 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1617 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1619 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1622 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1625 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1626 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1627 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1628 user_channel_id: user_id,
1633 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1634 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1637 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1638 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1639 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1641 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1642 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1643 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1645 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1649 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1650 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1651 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1652 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1654 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1656 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1657 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1658 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1660 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1661 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1662 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1663 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1665 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1666 } else { (res, None) }
1668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1671 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1672 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1673 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1675 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1677 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1678 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1686 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1687 let (res, chan_option) = {
1688 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1689 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1692 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1693 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1694 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1696 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1697 if res.1.is_some() {
1698 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1699 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1700 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1701 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1702 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1703 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1704 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1706 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1707 } else { (res, None) }
1709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1712 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1713 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1715 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1716 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1717 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1726 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1727 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1728 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1729 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1731 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1732 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1733 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1734 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1736 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1737 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1739 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1741 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1742 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1745 if !chan.is_usable() {
1746 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1748 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1750 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1754 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1755 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1758 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1759 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1762 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1763 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1765 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1767 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1771 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1772 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1775 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1776 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1779 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1780 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1782 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1786 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1787 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1788 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1790 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1791 if res.is_some() { return; }
1793 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1795 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1796 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1797 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1798 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1799 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1801 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1802 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1803 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1805 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1806 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1807 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1808 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1809 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1810 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1811 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1812 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1813 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1814 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1815 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1816 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1817 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1818 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1826 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1827 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1828 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1829 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1833 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1845 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1846 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1849 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1850 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1853 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1856 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1857 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1860 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1864 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1865 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1866 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1869 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1870 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1873 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1875 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1878 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1882 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1885 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1886 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1887 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1888 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1890 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1891 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1894 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1896 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1899 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1902 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1906 let mut forward_event = None;
1907 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1910 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1911 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1913 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1914 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1916 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1919 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1924 match forward_event {
1926 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1927 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1928 time_forwardable: time
1937 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1939 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1941 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1942 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1945 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1947 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1951 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1952 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1953 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1954 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1956 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1957 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1959 if !chan.is_usable() {
1960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1963 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1964 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1965 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1967 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1968 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1969 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1970 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1971 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1973 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1975 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1976 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1977 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1978 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1979 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1980 contents: announcement,
1981 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1983 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1986 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1987 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1991 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1992 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1993 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1996 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1997 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1999 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2000 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2001 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
2003 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2006 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
2007 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2014 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2015 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2016 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2017 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2019 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2020 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2022 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2024 if !chan.is_usable() {
2025 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
2027 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2030 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2031 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2034 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2035 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2036 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2037 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2038 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2039 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2040 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2041 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2042 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2053 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2054 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2055 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2056 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2057 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2062 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2063 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2064 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2065 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2067 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2068 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2069 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2070 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2071 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2072 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2073 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2074 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2075 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2076 msg: funding_locked,
2077 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2079 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2080 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2081 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2082 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2085 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2089 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2090 for tx in txn_matched {
2091 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2092 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2093 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2094 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2096 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2097 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2098 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2099 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2100 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2101 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2110 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2111 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2112 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2114 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2115 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2116 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2117 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2118 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2119 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2120 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2129 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2130 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2132 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2133 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2134 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2136 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2139 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2140 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2141 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2142 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2144 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2145 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2146 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2147 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2148 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2149 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2150 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2152 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2153 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2154 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2164 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2165 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2167 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2168 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2169 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2170 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2173 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2177 macro_rules! handle_error {
2178 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2181 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2182 if needs_channel_force_close {
2184 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2185 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2186 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2188 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2191 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2192 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2193 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2194 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2195 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2197 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2209 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2210 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2211 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2212 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2215 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2216 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2219 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2220 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2223 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2224 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2227 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2228 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2231 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2232 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2235 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2236 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2239 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2240 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2243 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2244 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2247 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2248 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2251 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2252 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2255 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2256 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2259 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2260 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2263 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2264 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2267 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2268 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2271 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2272 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2275 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2276 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2277 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2278 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2280 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2281 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2282 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2283 if no_connection_possible {
2284 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2285 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2286 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2287 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2289 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2290 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2291 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2301 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2302 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2303 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2304 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2305 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2306 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2307 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2309 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2310 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2311 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2320 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2321 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2323 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2324 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2325 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2326 pending_events.push(event);
2329 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2330 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2331 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2336 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2337 let mut res = Vec::new();
2338 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2339 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2340 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2341 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2342 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2343 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2344 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2348 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2353 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2357 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2358 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2359 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2360 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2361 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2365 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2372 use chain::chaininterface;
2373 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2374 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2375 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2376 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2378 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2379 use util::test_utils;
2380 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2381 use util::errors::APIError;
2382 use util::logger::Logger;
2383 use util::ser::Writeable;
2385 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2386 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2387 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2388 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2389 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2390 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2391 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2395 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2396 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2398 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2399 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2401 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2403 use std::cell::RefCell;
2404 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2405 use std::default::Default;
2407 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2408 use std::time::Instant;
2411 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2412 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2413 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2418 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2419 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, channel_update_timestamp: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2422 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2423 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, channel_update_timestamp: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2426 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2427 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, channel_update_timestamp: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2430 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2431 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, channel_update_timestamp: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2434 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2435 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, channel_update_timestamp: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2440 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2442 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2443 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2448 fn onion_vectors() {
2449 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2450 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2455 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2456 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2458 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2459 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2461 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2462 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2465 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2466 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2467 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2468 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2471 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2472 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2473 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2474 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2476 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2477 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2478 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2479 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2480 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2482 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2483 let payloads = vec!(
2484 msgs::OnionHopData {
2486 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2487 short_channel_id: 0,
2489 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2493 msgs::OnionHopData {
2495 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2496 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2497 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2498 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2502 msgs::OnionHopData {
2504 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2505 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2506 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2507 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2511 msgs::OnionHopData {
2513 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2514 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2515 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2516 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2520 msgs::OnionHopData {
2522 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2523 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2524 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2525 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2531 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2532 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2534 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2538 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2539 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2541 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2542 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2543 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2545 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2546 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2548 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2549 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2551 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2552 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2554 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2555 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2557 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2558 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2561 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2562 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2563 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2564 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2566 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2567 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2572 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2573 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2574 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2575 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2577 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2578 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2580 impl Drop for Node {
2581 fn drop(&mut self) {
2582 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2583 // Check that we processed all pending events
2584 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2585 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2590 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2591 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2594 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2595 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2597 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2598 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2599 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2600 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2601 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2602 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2607 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2609 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2613 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2614 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2616 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2617 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2618 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2620 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2621 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2623 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2625 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2626 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2628 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2629 added_monitors.clear();
2631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2634 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2635 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2636 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2637 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2638 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2639 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2640 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2641 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2642 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2643 added_monitors.clear();
2646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2649 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2651 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2652 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2653 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2654 added_monitors.clear();
2657 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2658 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2660 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2661 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2662 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2667 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2668 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2669 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2671 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2672 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2673 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2674 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2681 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2682 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2683 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2684 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2685 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2686 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2687 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2688 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2689 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2690 as_announcement_sigs
2692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2695 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2696 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2697 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2698 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2704 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2705 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2706 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2707 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2708 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2709 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2715 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2717 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2720 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2721 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2724 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2725 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2727 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2728 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2729 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2731 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2734 macro_rules! check_spends {
2735 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2737 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2738 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2739 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2740 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2745 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2746 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2747 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2750 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2751 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2752 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2753 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2754 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2755 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2762 if !close_inbound_first {
2763 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2765 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2766 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2767 if close_inbound_first {
2768 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2769 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2770 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2771 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2773 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2774 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2775 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2776 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2778 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2780 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2782 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2783 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2784 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2785 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2787 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2788 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2790 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2791 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2792 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2793 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2799 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2800 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2801 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2802 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2808 (as_update, bs_update)
2813 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2814 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2817 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2819 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2820 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2821 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2823 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2824 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2831 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2832 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2834 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2835 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2836 added_monitors.clear();
2841 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2842 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2844 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2845 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2846 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2847 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2848 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2849 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2850 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2851 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2852 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2853 if $fail_backwards {
2854 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2856 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2858 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2859 if $fail_backwards {
2860 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2861 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2863 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2865 added_monitors.clear();
2871 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2874 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2875 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2876 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2877 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2878 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2879 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2880 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2885 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2886 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2888 let mut payment_event = {
2889 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2890 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2892 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2894 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2896 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2898 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2899 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2901 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2902 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2903 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2905 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2906 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2908 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2912 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2913 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2915 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2916 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2917 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2919 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2920 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2921 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2926 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2927 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2928 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2934 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2937 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2938 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2939 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2941 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2942 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2943 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2945 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2947 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2949 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2951 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2956 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2957 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2958 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2959 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2960 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2961 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2964 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2965 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2968 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2969 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2971 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2972 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2974 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2975 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980 assert!(events.is_empty());
2982 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2983 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2990 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2991 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2994 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2995 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2997 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3002 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3003 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3006 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3008 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3009 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3010 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3011 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3012 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3015 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3018 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3019 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3020 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3021 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3022 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3025 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3027 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3029 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3030 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3034 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3035 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3036 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3039 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3040 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3041 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3043 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3044 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3045 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3047 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3048 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3053 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3054 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3055 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3056 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3057 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3058 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3059 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3060 // second-to-last node!
3061 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3064 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3065 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3068 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3069 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3070 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3071 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3072 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3073 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3074 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3075 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3080 assert!(events.is_empty());
3082 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3083 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3090 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3092 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3095 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3096 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3103 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3104 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3107 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3108 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3109 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3110 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3111 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3113 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3114 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3116 for _ in 0..node_count {
3117 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3118 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3119 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3120 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3122 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3123 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3124 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3126 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3127 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3128 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3129 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3130 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3138 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3139 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3140 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3141 let channel_id = chan.2;
3143 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3145 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3146 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3152 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3156 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3157 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3158 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3159 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3160 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3161 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3162 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3163 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3164 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3165 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3167 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3169 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3171 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3172 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3175 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3176 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3177 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3178 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3179 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3186 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3187 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3188 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3191 let payment_event = {
3192 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3193 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3194 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3196 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3197 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3199 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3201 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3202 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3205 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3206 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3207 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3210 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3211 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3212 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3213 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3214 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3215 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3218 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3219 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3220 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3221 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3222 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3223 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3226 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3227 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3230 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3231 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3234 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3237 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3238 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3240 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3249 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3250 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3251 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3252 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3253 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3254 let channel_id = chan.2;
3256 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3258 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3259 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3265 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3267 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3268 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3271 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3272 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3273 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3274 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3282 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3283 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3284 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3287 let payment_event = {
3288 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3289 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3290 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3292 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3293 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3295 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3296 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3297 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3298 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3301 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3304 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3308 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3309 let nodes = create_network(2);
3310 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3311 let channel_id = chan.2;
3313 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3315 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3316 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3322 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3323 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3324 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3325 // (3) update_fee ->
3326 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3327 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3328 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3329 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3330 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3331 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3332 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3333 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3334 // revoke_and_ack ->
3335 // B should send no response here
3336 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3337 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3338 // revoke_and_ack ->
3340 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3341 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3342 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3347 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3348 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3349 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3354 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3356 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3359 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3361 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3362 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3364 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3365 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3366 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3367 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3372 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3374 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3376 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3377 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3379 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3380 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3381 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3382 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3383 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3384 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3385 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3387 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3388 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3390 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3392 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3396 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3399 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3403 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3406 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3411 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3412 let nodes = create_network(2);
3413 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3414 let channel_id = chan.2;
3416 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3418 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3419 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3424 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3425 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3427 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3428 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3429 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3430 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3431 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3435 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3437 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3438 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3442 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3443 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3446 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3447 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3450 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3451 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3456 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3457 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3458 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3459 let channel_id = chan.2;
3461 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3463 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3464 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3470 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3472 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3473 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3475 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3476 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3477 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3478 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3479 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3483 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3485 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3486 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3489 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3491 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3493 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3494 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3496 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3497 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3498 added_monitors.clear();
3500 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3502 // node[1] has nothing to do
3504 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3505 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3508 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3509 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3511 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3512 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3514 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3515 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3516 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3517 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3518 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3519 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3521 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3522 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3525 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3526 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3528 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3530 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3532 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3533 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3535 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3537 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3538 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3540 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3543 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3544 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3546 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3547 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3549 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3553 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3555 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3556 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3557 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3561 fn test_update_fee() {
3562 let nodes = create_network(2);
3563 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3564 let channel_id = chan.2;
3566 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3568 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3569 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3575 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3576 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3577 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3578 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3579 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3580 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3581 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3582 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3583 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3584 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3585 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3586 // revoke_and_ack ->
3588 // Create and deliver (1)...
3589 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3590 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3592 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3593 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3594 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3595 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3596 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3602 // Generate (2) and (3):
3603 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3604 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3609 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3610 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3613 // Create and deliver (4)...
3614 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3615 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3616 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3617 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3618 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3619 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3625 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3627 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3631 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3632 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3633 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3637 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3638 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3641 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3642 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3643 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3647 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3648 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3650 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3651 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3654 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3655 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3656 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3660 fn fake_network_test() {
3661 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3662 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3663 let nodes = create_network(4);
3665 // Create some initial channels
3666 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3667 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3668 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3670 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3671 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3672 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3676 // Send some more payments
3677 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3678 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3679 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3681 // Test failure packets
3682 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3683 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3685 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3686 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3688 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3689 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3690 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3691 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3692 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3693 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3694 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3696 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3697 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3698 hops.push(RouteHop {
3699 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3700 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3702 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
3703 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3705 hops.push(RouteHop {
3706 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3707 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3709 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
3710 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3712 hops.push(RouteHop {
3713 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3714 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3716 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3717 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3719 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3720 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3721 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3723 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3724 hops.push(RouteHop {
3725 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3726 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3728 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
3729 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3731 hops.push(RouteHop {
3732 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3733 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3735 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
3736 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3738 hops.push(RouteHop {
3739 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3740 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3742 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3743 channel_update_timestamp: 0,
3745 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3746 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3747 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3749 // Claim the rebalances...
3750 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3751 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3753 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3754 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3756 // Send some payments across both channels
3757 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3758 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3759 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3761 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3763 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3765 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3766 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3767 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3769 // Close down the channels...
3770 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3771 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3772 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3773 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3774 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3778 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3779 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3780 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3781 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3783 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3785 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3786 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3787 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3788 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3790 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3792 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3793 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3795 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3796 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3798 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3799 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3800 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3803 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3804 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3805 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3807 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3808 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3809 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3811 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3812 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3814 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3816 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3817 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3818 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3820 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3821 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3822 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3823 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3824 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3825 res.push(tx.clone());
3830 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3831 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3834 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3836 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3837 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3838 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3839 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3840 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3841 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3843 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3845 res.push(tx.clone());
3849 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3852 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3856 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3857 /// HTLC transaction.
3858 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3859 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3860 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3861 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3862 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3863 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3867 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3870 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3871 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3873 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3874 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3875 let mut found_prev = false;
3877 for tx in prev_txn {
3878 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3879 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3880 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3881 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3887 assert!(found_prev);
3889 let mut res = Vec::new();
3890 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3894 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3895 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3896 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3897 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3898 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3904 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3905 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3906 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3907 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3914 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3915 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3920 fn channel_reserve_test() {
3922 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3923 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3925 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3926 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3927 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3928 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3929 chan.get_value_stat()
3933 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3934 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3935 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3937 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3938 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3940 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3941 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3943 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3944 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3945 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3946 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3947 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3951 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3953 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3956 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3959 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3960 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3964 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3966 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3968 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3969 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3974 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3975 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3976 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3977 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3979 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3980 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3981 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3988 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
3989 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
3991 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
3993 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3995 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
3996 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
3997 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3999 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4000 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4004 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4005 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4006 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4008 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4009 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4012 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4015 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4016 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4017 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4018 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4019 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4022 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4023 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4024 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4025 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4026 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4030 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4031 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4032 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4033 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4035 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4036 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4040 // adding pending output
4041 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4042 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4044 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4045 let payment_event_1 = {
4046 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4049 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4051 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4055 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4056 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4058 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4059 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4060 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4061 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4066 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4067 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4069 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4070 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4071 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4072 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4073 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4075 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4077 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4078 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4079 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4080 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4081 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4082 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4084 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4085 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4086 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4087 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4090 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4092 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4096 // split the rest to test holding cell
4097 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4098 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4100 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4101 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4104 // now see if they go through on both sides
4105 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4106 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4107 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4109 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4112 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4114 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4115 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4116 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4117 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4121 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4122 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4123 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4125 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4128 // flush the pending htlc
4129 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4132 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4134 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4135 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4137 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4142 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4143 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4147 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4149 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4150 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4151 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4152 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4156 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4157 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4158 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4164 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4167 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4168 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4169 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4174 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4175 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4176 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4181 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4182 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4183 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4185 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4186 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4187 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4188 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4190 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4191 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4195 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4196 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4197 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4198 let nodes = create_network(5);
4200 // Create some initial channels
4201 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4202 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4203 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4204 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4206 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4208 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4212 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4213 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4215 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4216 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4217 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4218 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4220 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4221 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4222 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4224 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4225 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4227 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4228 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4230 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4231 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4233 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4234 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4235 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4236 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4238 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4239 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4240 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4242 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4243 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4245 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4246 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4248 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4251 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4252 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4253 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4254 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4262 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4263 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4264 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4266 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4271 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4272 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4274 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4276 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4277 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4278 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4280 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4281 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4284 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4285 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4286 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4287 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4288 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4291 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4293 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4294 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4296 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4297 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4298 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4299 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4300 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4303 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4305 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4306 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4308 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4310 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4311 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4312 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4314 // Create some new channels:
4315 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4317 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4318 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4319 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4320 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4321 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4322 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4323 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4324 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4325 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4326 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4327 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4328 // Revoke the old state
4329 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4332 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4333 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4335 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4336 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4337 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4338 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4340 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4341 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4343 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4345 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4346 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4347 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4348 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4349 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4351 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4352 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4353 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4357 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4358 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4359 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4360 let nodes = create_network(2);
4361 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4362 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4363 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4365 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4367 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4368 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4370 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4371 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4372 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4373 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4374 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4376 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4378 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4379 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4381 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4382 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4383 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4387 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4388 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4389 let nodes = create_network(2);
4391 // Create some new channel:
4392 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4394 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4395 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4396 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4397 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4398 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4400 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4401 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4406 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4407 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4408 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4410 //Revoke the old state
4411 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4414 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4416 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4418 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4419 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4420 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4422 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4423 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4425 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4427 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4428 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4429 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4430 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4431 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4432 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4433 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4434 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4436 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4438 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4440 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4441 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4442 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4443 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4444 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4445 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4447 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4448 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4449 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4453 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4454 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4455 let nodes = create_network(2);
4457 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4459 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4460 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4461 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4462 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4463 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4464 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4466 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4467 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4469 //Revoke the old state
4470 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4473 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4475 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4477 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4478 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4482 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4483 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4484 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4485 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4486 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4487 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4489 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4490 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4491 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4493 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4494 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4495 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4496 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4497 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4499 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4500 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4501 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4502 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4503 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4504 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4505 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4506 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4508 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4509 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4511 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4512 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4513 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4514 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4515 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4516 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4518 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4519 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4520 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4524 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4525 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4526 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4527 let nodes = create_network(2);
4528 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4530 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4531 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4533 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4534 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4536 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4537 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4543 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4544 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4546 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4547 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4550 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4553 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4554 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4560 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4561 // registering new transactions
4562 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4566 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4567 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4568 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4569 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4570 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4572 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4574 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4576 let mut payment_event = {
4577 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4580 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4582 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4586 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4588 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4589 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4591 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4595 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4596 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4598 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4599 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4600 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4601 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4604 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4605 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4608 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4609 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4610 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4612 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4613 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4614 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4616 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4617 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4623 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4624 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4625 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4626 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4627 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4631 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4632 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4634 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4635 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4636 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4638 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4639 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4644 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4646 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4647 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4648 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4650 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4651 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4652 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4653 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4654 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4655 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4656 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4658 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4662 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4663 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4664 let nodes = create_network(2);
4665 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4667 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4668 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4669 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4670 mem::drop(channel_state);
4672 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4673 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4674 headers.push(header.clone());
4676 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4677 headers.push(header.clone());
4679 while !headers.is_empty() {
4680 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4686 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4687 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4692 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4693 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4694 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4697 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
4698 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4699 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4701 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4702 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4703 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4705 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4706 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4708 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4711 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4712 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4713 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4715 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4716 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4718 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4721 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4722 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4724 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4726 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4727 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4729 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4731 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4732 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4733 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4734 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4735 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4736 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4737 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4738 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4739 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4741 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4742 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4745 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4747 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4751 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4753 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4754 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4756 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4758 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4759 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4760 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4761 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4762 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4763 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4764 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4765 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4766 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4768 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4769 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4772 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4774 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4780 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4781 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4782 let nodes = create_network(3);
4783 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4786 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4787 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4788 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4790 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4791 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4792 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4793 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4795 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4796 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4797 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4799 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4800 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4801 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4802 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4804 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4805 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4807 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4808 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4810 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
4812 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4813 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4815 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4816 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4821 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4822 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4829 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4833 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
4834 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
4835 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4836 let nodes = create_network(2);
4838 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4840 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4841 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4842 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4843 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4845 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
4847 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4848 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4850 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
4851 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
4853 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
4855 let mut chan_announcement;
4857 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4859 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4860 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4861 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4862 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4863 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4864 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4865 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4866 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4867 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4872 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4873 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4874 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4875 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4876 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4877 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4878 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4879 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4880 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4881 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4882 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4883 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4884 contents: $unsigned_msg
4889 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4890 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4891 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4892 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
4894 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4895 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4896 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4897 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4898 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4900 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4901 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4902 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4903 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());