1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::Duration;
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
251 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
252 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
253 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
254 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
256 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
270 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
273 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
275 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
278 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
279 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
311 pub struct ChannelManager {
312 default_configuration: UserConfig,
313 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
314 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
315 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
316 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
317 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
320 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
327 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
329 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 our_network_key: SecretKey,
332 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
333 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
334 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
335 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
336 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
338 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
343 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
344 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
345 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
346 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
347 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
348 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
349 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
351 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
352 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
353 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
354 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
355 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
356 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
359 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
361 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
362 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
365 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
367 macro_rules! secp_call {
368 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
371 Err(_) => return Err($err),
376 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
377 pub struct ChannelDetails {
378 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
379 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
380 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
381 /// lifetime of the channel.
382 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
383 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
384 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
385 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
386 /// The node_id of our counterparty
387 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
388 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
389 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
390 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
392 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
393 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
394 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
395 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
396 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
397 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
398 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
399 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
400 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
401 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
402 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
403 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
404 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
408 macro_rules! handle_error {
409 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
412 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
413 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
414 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
415 if let Some(update) = update_option {
416 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
417 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
428 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
429 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
432 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
433 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
435 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
436 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
437 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
438 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
439 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
441 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
447 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
448 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
451 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
454 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
455 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
456 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
457 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
458 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
460 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
466 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
467 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
468 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
470 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
472 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
473 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
474 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
475 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
476 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
478 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
479 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
480 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
481 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
482 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
483 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
484 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
485 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
486 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
487 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
490 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
491 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
492 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
493 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
495 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
496 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
498 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
499 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
501 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
502 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
503 if !$resend_commitment {
504 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
507 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
509 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
510 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
516 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
517 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
518 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
520 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
521 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
525 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
526 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
527 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
528 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
529 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
532 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
537 impl ChannelManager {
538 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
540 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
541 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
543 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
545 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
546 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
549 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
550 default_configuration: config.clone(),
551 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
552 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
553 monitor: monitor.clone(),
557 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
558 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
561 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
562 by_id: HashMap::new(),
563 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
564 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
565 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
566 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
568 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
570 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
571 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
577 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
578 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
582 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
584 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
585 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
586 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
587 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
589 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
590 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
592 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
593 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
594 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
595 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
599 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
600 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
603 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
604 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
606 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
607 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
609 panic!("RNG is bad???");
612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
615 node_id: their_network_key,
621 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
622 /// more information.
623 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
624 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
625 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
626 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
627 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
628 res.push(ChannelDetails {
629 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
630 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
631 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
632 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
633 inbound_capacity_msat,
634 outbound_capacity_msat,
635 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
636 is_live: channel.is_live(),
642 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
643 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
645 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
646 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
647 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
648 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
649 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
650 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
651 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
652 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
653 // really wanted anyway.
654 if channel.is_live() {
655 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
656 res.push(ChannelDetails {
657 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
658 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
659 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
660 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
661 inbound_capacity_msat,
662 outbound_capacity_msat,
663 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
671 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
672 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
673 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
675 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
676 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
677 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
679 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
680 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
682 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
684 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
686 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
689 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
690 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
691 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
693 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
694 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
699 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
700 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
702 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
703 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
708 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
719 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
720 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
721 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
722 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
725 for tx in local_txn {
726 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
730 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
731 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
732 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
733 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
736 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
737 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
738 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
739 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
740 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
747 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
748 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
749 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
750 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
757 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
758 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
759 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
760 for chan in self.list_channels() {
761 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
765 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
766 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
767 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
768 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
770 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
771 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
772 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
773 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
774 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
775 failure_code: $err_code,
776 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
781 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
782 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
785 let shared_secret = {
786 let mut arr = [0; 32];
787 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
790 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
792 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
793 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
794 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
795 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
796 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
797 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
798 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
799 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
802 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
803 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
804 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
805 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
806 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
809 let mut channel_state = None;
810 macro_rules! return_err {
811 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
813 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
814 if channel_state.is_none() {
815 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
817 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
818 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
819 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
820 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
821 })), channel_state.unwrap());
826 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
827 let next_hop_data = {
828 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
829 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
830 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
832 let error_code = match err {
833 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
834 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
836 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
842 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
844 // final_expiry_too_soon
845 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
846 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
848 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
849 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
850 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
852 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
853 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
854 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
857 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
858 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
859 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
860 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
862 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
864 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
866 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
867 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
868 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
871 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
872 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
873 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
875 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
877 let blinding_factor = {
878 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
879 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
880 sha.input(&shared_secret);
881 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
884 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
886 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
888 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
891 hop_data: new_packet_data,
892 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
895 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
896 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
897 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
898 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
899 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
900 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
901 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
905 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
906 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
907 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
908 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
909 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
910 None => { // unknown_next_peer
911 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
913 Some(id) => id.clone(),
915 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
916 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
918 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
919 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
920 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
921 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
922 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
923 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
924 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
926 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
927 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
929 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
930 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
931 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
933 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
934 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
936 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
937 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
938 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
939 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
941 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
942 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
947 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
948 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
949 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
950 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
952 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
953 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
955 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
956 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
958 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
960 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
965 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
968 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
969 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
970 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
971 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
972 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
976 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
978 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
979 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
980 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
981 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
982 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
983 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
984 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
985 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
986 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
987 excess_data: Vec::new(),
990 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
991 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
993 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
999 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1001 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1002 /// fields for more info.
1004 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1005 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1006 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1007 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1008 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1009 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1011 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1013 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1014 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1015 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1016 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1017 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1018 /// relevant updates.
1020 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1021 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1022 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1023 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1024 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1025 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1026 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1027 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1029 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1030 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1031 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1032 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1036 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1038 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1040 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1041 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1042 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1043 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1045 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1047 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1048 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1050 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1051 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1052 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1055 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1056 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1058 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1059 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1061 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1062 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1064 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1065 route: route.clone(),
1066 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1067 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1068 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1070 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1071 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1072 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1073 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1074 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1075 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1076 // something else in case we will resend later!
1077 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1081 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1082 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1083 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1084 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1085 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1086 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1094 } else { unreachable!(); }
1098 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1099 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1101 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1103 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1104 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1105 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1106 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1110 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1115 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1117 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1118 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1120 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1122 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1123 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1124 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1125 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1127 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1129 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1130 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1132 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1133 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1134 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1135 } else { unreachable!(); })
1141 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1142 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1143 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1146 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1147 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1148 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1149 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1156 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1157 // lock before add_update_monitor
1158 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1162 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1163 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1164 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1167 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1169 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1177 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1178 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1180 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1182 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1184 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1185 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1187 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1188 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1189 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1190 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1191 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1195 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1197 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1198 /// Will likely generate further events.
1199 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1200 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1202 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1203 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1204 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1209 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1210 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1211 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1212 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1214 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1216 match forward_info {
1217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1218 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1219 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1220 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1221 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1223 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1225 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1226 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1227 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1228 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1229 // problem, not ours.
1236 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1237 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1238 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1239 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1240 match forward_info {
1241 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1242 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1243 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1244 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1245 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1246 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1248 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1250 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1251 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1253 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1255 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1256 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1261 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1263 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1264 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1265 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1266 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1267 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1268 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1269 // this channel currently :/.
1275 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1276 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1277 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1279 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1280 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1282 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1284 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1285 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1286 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1289 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1291 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1292 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1293 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1294 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1295 // messages when we can.
1296 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1297 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1298 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1305 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1306 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1309 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1310 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1312 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1316 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1317 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1321 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1322 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1323 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1324 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1325 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1326 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1336 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1337 match forward_info {
1338 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1339 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1340 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1341 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1342 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1344 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1348 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1349 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1350 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1353 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1354 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1362 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1364 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1365 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1369 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1370 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1373 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1375 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1377 node_id: their_node_id,
1385 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1386 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1387 events.append(&mut new_events);
1390 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1391 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1392 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1393 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1394 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1395 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1396 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1398 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1399 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1400 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1401 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1402 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1403 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1404 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1405 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1411 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1412 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1413 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1414 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1415 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1416 /// still-available channels.
1417 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1418 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1419 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1420 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1423 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1424 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1425 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1426 match &onion_error {
1427 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1429 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1431 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1432 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1433 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1434 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1435 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1436 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1437 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1442 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1443 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1444 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1445 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1447 error_code: onion_error_code
1451 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1455 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1456 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1457 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1458 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1460 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1461 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1462 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1463 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1464 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1465 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1467 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1473 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1474 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1475 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1476 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1477 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1478 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1480 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1481 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1482 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1486 let mut forward_event = None;
1487 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1488 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1490 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1492 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1495 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1498 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1499 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1500 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1501 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1502 time_forwardable: time
1509 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1510 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1511 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1513 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1514 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1515 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1517 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1519 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1520 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1521 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1522 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1523 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1524 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1525 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1526 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1527 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1532 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1533 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1535 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1536 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1537 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1538 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1542 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1543 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1544 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1546 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1547 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1549 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1550 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1551 // why it's missing.
1556 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1557 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1558 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1559 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1560 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1561 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1562 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1563 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1565 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1569 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1570 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1571 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1572 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1573 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1574 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1575 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1576 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1584 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1585 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1586 //TODO: Do something with e?
1590 } else { unreachable!(); }
1596 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1599 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1601 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1602 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1603 node_id: their_node_id,
1611 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1612 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1613 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1616 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1617 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1619 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1620 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1621 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1622 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1623 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1626 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1627 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1628 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1629 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1630 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1631 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1632 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1633 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1636 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1637 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1638 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1639 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1640 // on-chain confirmations.
1641 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1642 // should be written.
1643 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1644 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1646 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1647 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1654 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1657 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1658 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1659 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1661 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1663 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1664 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1665 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1666 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1671 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1672 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1674 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1675 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1680 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1684 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1695 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1696 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1698 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1700 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1701 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1705 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1706 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1710 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1711 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1712 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1713 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1718 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1719 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1721 entry.insert(channel);
1727 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1728 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1729 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1733 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1734 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1735 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1737 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1738 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1740 //TODO: same as above
1741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1745 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1746 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1747 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1748 output_script: output_script,
1749 user_channel_id: user_id,
1754 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1755 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1756 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1757 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1758 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1760 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1761 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1764 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1769 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1770 // lock before add_update_monitor
1771 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1774 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1776 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1781 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1782 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1791 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1792 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1793 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1794 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1797 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1798 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1801 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1802 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1805 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1810 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1811 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1812 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1813 user_channel_id: user_id,
1818 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1819 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1823 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1824 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1825 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1827 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1828 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1829 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1830 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1831 msg: announcement_sigs,
1836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1840 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1841 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1842 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1843 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1847 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1848 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1849 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1851 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1852 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1854 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1858 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1860 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1864 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1865 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1866 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1868 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1869 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1874 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1875 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1877 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1878 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1879 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1888 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1889 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1891 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1892 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1894 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1895 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1898 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1899 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1901 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1906 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1907 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1908 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1909 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1910 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1911 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1912 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1914 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1915 } else { (tx, None) }
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1920 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1921 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1923 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1924 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1925 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1926 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1934 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1935 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1936 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1937 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1939 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1940 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1941 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1942 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1944 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1945 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1947 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1949 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1950 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1951 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1953 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1954 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1955 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1956 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1957 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1958 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1959 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1960 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1961 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1962 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1963 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1964 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1965 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1966 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1968 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1969 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1970 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1971 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1975 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1976 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1977 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1978 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1979 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1980 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1985 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1992 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1993 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1995 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1996 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1998 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1999 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2000 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2002 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2007 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2011 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2012 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2013 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2014 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2016 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2017 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2020 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2027 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2028 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2029 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2030 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2032 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2033 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2034 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2036 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2037 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2039 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2046 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2047 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2049 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2051 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2052 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2055 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2056 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2057 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2058 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2059 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2061 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2062 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2063 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2065 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2067 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2068 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2069 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2070 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2071 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2072 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2074 commitment_signed: msg,
2078 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2080 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2091 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2092 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2093 let mut forward_event = None;
2094 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2095 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2096 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2097 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2099 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2100 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2102 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2105 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2110 match forward_event {
2112 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2113 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2114 time_forwardable: time
2122 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2123 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2124 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2128 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2129 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2132 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2133 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2134 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2135 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2136 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2137 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2140 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2143 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2144 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2145 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2149 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2150 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2151 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2155 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2160 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2163 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2168 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2169 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2170 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2173 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2174 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2184 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2186 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2188 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2190 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2193 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2197 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2198 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2199 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2201 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2202 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2203 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2204 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2205 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2208 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2211 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2212 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2213 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2214 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2215 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2216 contents: announcement,
2218 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2226 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2227 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2228 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2230 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2232 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2235 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2236 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2237 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2238 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2239 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2240 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2241 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2242 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2243 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2245 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2246 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2248 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2249 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2252 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2254 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2258 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2259 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2261 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2266 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2267 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2269 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2275 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2279 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2284 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2286 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2296 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2297 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2298 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2299 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2301 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2302 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2304 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2305 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2306 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2308 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2311 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2312 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2314 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2315 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2317 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2318 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2320 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2321 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2322 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2324 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2328 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2329 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2330 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2331 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2332 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2333 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2334 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2344 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2345 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2347 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2349 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2350 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2352 node_id: their_node_id,
2356 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2362 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2363 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2364 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2365 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2366 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2368 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2369 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2370 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2371 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2372 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2374 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2375 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2380 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2381 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2382 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2387 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2388 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2389 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2390 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2391 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2393 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2394 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2395 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2396 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2397 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2399 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2405 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2406 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2407 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2412 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2413 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2414 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2415 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2416 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2417 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2419 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2420 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2421 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2422 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2423 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2424 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2425 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2427 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2428 msg: funding_locked,
2430 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2432 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2433 msg: announcement_sigs,
2436 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2437 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2439 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2440 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2444 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2445 for tx in txn_matched {
2446 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2447 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2448 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2449 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2450 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2452 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2453 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2454 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2455 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2456 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2466 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2467 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2468 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2470 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2471 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2472 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2473 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2474 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2475 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2485 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2486 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2488 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2489 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2492 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2493 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2494 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2495 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2497 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2499 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2500 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2501 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2502 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2503 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2504 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2506 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2507 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2518 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2519 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2521 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2522 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2526 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2527 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2528 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2529 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2530 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2533 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2534 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2535 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2538 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2539 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2540 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2543 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2544 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2545 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2548 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2549 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2550 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2553 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2554 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2555 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2558 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2559 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2560 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2563 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2564 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2565 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2568 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2570 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2573 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2574 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2575 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2578 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2580 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2583 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2584 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2585 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2588 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2589 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2590 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2593 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2594 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2595 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2598 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2599 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2600 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2603 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2604 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2605 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2608 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2609 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2610 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2611 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2613 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2614 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2615 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2616 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2617 if no_connection_possible {
2618 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2619 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2620 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2621 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2622 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2624 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2625 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2636 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2637 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2638 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2639 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2640 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2641 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2642 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2643 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2645 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2646 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2647 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2655 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2660 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2663 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2668 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2669 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2670 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2671 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2675 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2676 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2678 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2679 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2685 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2686 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2688 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2689 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2690 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2691 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2692 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2693 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2694 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2695 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2696 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2697 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2702 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2703 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2709 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2712 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2713 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2715 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2716 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2717 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2718 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2722 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2727 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2728 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2730 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2731 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2732 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2733 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2734 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2735 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2736 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2737 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2742 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2743 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2744 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2745 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2746 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2747 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2748 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2749 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2750 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2755 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2756 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2758 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2760 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2762 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2764 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2771 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2772 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2773 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2774 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2775 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2776 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2781 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2782 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2784 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2786 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2788 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2790 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2797 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2798 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2799 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2800 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2801 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2802 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2807 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2810 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2813 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2816 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2818 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2820 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2822 route.write(writer)?;
2823 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2824 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2831 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2832 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2833 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2834 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2835 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2836 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2837 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2838 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2840 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2845 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2846 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2848 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2852 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2854 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2855 data.write(writer)?;
2862 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2863 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2864 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2865 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2866 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2867 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2868 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2870 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2875 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2876 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2878 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2880 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2881 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2882 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2884 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2886 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2887 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2894 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2895 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2896 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2897 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2898 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2899 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2900 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2902 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2903 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2904 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2906 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2911 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2912 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2913 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2915 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2916 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2918 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2919 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2920 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2922 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2923 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2924 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2925 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2926 unfunded_channels += 1;
2929 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2930 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2931 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2932 channel.write(writer)?;
2936 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2937 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2938 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2939 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2940 for forward in pending_forwards {
2941 forward.write(writer)?;
2945 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2946 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2947 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2948 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2949 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2950 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2951 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2959 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2961 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2963 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2964 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2965 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2966 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2967 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2968 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2969 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2970 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2971 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2972 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2973 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2974 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2975 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2976 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2977 /// deserialization.
2978 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2980 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2982 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2983 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2984 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2986 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2987 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2988 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2989 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2990 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2992 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2993 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2994 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2995 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2996 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2997 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2998 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2999 /// deserialization.
3000 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3001 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3002 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3003 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3005 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3006 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3008 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3009 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3010 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3011 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3013 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3015 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3018 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3019 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3020 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3021 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3022 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3023 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3026 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3027 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3028 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3032 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3033 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3034 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3035 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3036 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3037 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3038 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3039 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3042 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3043 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3044 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3045 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3046 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3047 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3048 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3049 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3050 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3052 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3053 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3055 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3058 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3062 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3063 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3064 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3068 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3070 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3071 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3072 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3074 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3075 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3077 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3080 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3081 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3082 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3083 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3084 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3085 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3086 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3087 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3089 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3092 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3094 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3095 monitor: args.monitor,
3096 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3097 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3099 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3100 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3103 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3108 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3110 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3112 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3113 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3114 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3115 logger: args.logger,
3116 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3119 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3120 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3121 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3122 //connection or two.
3125 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))