1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::Duration;
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
251 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
252 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
253 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
254 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
256 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
257 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
258 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
260 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
261 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
262 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
263 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
266 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
267 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
268 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
270 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
273 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
275 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
278 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
279 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
311 pub struct ChannelManager {
312 default_configuration: UserConfig,
313 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
314 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
315 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
316 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
317 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
320 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
327 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
329 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 our_network_key: SecretKey,
332 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
333 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
334 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
335 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
336 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
338 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
343 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
344 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
345 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
346 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
347 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
348 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
349 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
351 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
352 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
353 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
354 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
355 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
358 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
360 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
361 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
364 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
366 macro_rules! secp_call {
367 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
370 Err(_) => return Err($err),
375 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
376 pub struct ChannelDetails {
377 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
378 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
379 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
380 /// lifetime of the channel.
381 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
382 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
383 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
384 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
385 /// The node_id of our counterparty
386 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
387 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
388 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
389 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
393 macro_rules! handle_error {
394 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
397 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
398 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
399 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
400 if let Some(update) = update_option {
401 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
402 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
413 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
414 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
417 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
418 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
420 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
421 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
422 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
423 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
424 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
426 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
432 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
433 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
436 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
439 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
440 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
441 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
442 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
443 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
445 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
451 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
453 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
455 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
457 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
458 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
459 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
460 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
461 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
463 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
464 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
465 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
466 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
467 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
468 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
469 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
470 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
471 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
472 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
475 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
476 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
477 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
478 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
480 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
481 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
483 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
484 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
486 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
487 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
488 if !$resend_commitment {
489 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
492 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
494 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
495 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
501 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
503 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
505 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
506 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
510 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
511 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
512 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
513 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
514 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
517 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
522 impl ChannelManager {
523 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
525 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
526 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
528 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
530 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
531 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
532 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
534 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
535 default_configuration: config.clone(),
536 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
537 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
538 monitor: monitor.clone(),
542 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
543 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
546 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
547 by_id: HashMap::new(),
548 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
549 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
550 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
551 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
553 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
555 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
556 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
562 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
563 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
567 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
569 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
570 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
571 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
572 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
574 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
575 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
577 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
578 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
579 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
580 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
584 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
585 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
587 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
588 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
591 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
594 panic!("RNG is bad???");
597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
600 node_id: their_network_key,
606 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
607 /// more information.
608 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
609 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
610 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
611 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
612 res.push(ChannelDetails {
613 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
614 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
615 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
616 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
617 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
623 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
624 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
625 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
626 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
627 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
628 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
629 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
630 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
631 // really wanted anyway.
632 if channel.is_live() {
633 res.push(ChannelDetails {
634 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
635 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
636 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
637 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
638 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
645 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
646 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
647 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
649 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
650 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
651 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
653 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
654 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
655 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
656 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
658 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
660 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
663 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
664 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
665 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
667 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
668 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
673 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
676 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
682 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
683 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
693 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
694 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
695 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
696 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
699 for tx in local_txn {
700 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
704 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
705 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
706 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
707 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
710 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
712 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
713 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
714 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
721 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
722 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
723 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
724 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
725 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
731 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
732 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
733 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
734 for chan in self.list_channels() {
735 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
739 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
740 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
741 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
742 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
744 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
745 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
746 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
747 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
748 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
749 failure_code: $err_code,
750 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
755 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
756 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
759 let shared_secret = {
760 let mut arr = [0; 32];
761 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
764 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
766 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
767 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
768 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
769 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
770 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
771 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
772 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
773 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
776 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
777 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
778 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
779 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
780 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
783 let mut channel_state = None;
784 macro_rules! return_err {
785 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
787 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
788 if channel_state.is_none() {
789 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
791 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
792 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
793 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
794 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
795 })), channel_state.unwrap());
800 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
801 let next_hop_data = {
802 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
803 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
804 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
806 let error_code = match err {
807 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
808 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
810 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
816 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
818 // final_expiry_too_soon
819 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
820 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
822 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
823 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
824 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
826 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
827 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
828 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
831 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
832 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
833 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
834 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
836 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
838 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
840 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
841 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
842 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
845 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
846 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
847 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
849 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
851 let blinding_factor = {
852 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
853 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
854 sha.input(&shared_secret);
855 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
858 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
860 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
862 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
865 hop_data: new_packet_data,
866 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
869 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
870 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
871 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
872 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
873 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
874 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
875 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
879 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
880 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
881 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
882 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
883 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
884 None => { // unknown_next_peer
885 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
887 Some(id) => id.clone(),
889 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
890 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
892 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
893 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
894 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
895 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
896 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
897 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
898 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
900 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
901 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
903 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
904 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
905 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
907 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
908 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
910 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
911 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
912 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
913 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
915 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
916 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
921 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
922 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
923 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
924 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
926 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
927 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
929 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
930 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
932 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
934 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
939 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
942 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
943 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
944 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
945 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
946 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
950 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
952 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
953 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
954 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
955 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
956 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
957 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
958 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
959 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
960 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
961 excess_data: Vec::new(),
964 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
965 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
967 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
973 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
975 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
976 /// fields for more info.
978 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
979 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
980 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
981 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
982 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
983 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
985 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
987 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
988 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
989 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
990 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
991 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
992 /// relevant updates.
994 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
995 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
996 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
997 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
998 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
999 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1000 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1001 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1003 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1004 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1005 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1006 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1010 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1012 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1014 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1015 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1016 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1017 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1019 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1021 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1022 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1024 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1025 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1026 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1029 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1030 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1032 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1033 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1035 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1036 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1038 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1039 route: route.clone(),
1040 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1041 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1042 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1044 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1045 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1046 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1047 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1048 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1049 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1050 // something else in case we will resend later!
1051 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1054 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1055 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1056 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1057 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1058 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1059 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1060 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1068 } else { unreachable!(); }
1072 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1073 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1075 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1077 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1078 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1080 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1084 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1089 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1091 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1092 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1094 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1096 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1097 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1098 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1099 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1101 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1104 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1106 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1107 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1108 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1109 } else { unreachable!(); })
1115 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1116 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1117 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1120 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1121 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1122 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1123 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1130 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1131 // lock before add_update_monitor
1132 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1136 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1138 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1141 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1143 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1151 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1152 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1154 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1156 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1158 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1159 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1161 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1162 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1163 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1164 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1165 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1169 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1171 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1172 /// Will likely generate further events.
1173 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1174 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1176 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1177 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1178 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1180 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1181 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1183 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1184 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1185 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1186 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1188 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1189 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1190 match forward_info {
1191 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1192 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1193 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1194 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1197 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1199 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1200 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1201 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1202 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1203 // problem, not ours.
1210 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1211 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1212 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1213 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1214 match forward_info {
1215 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1216 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1217 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1218 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1219 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1220 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1222 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1224 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1225 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1227 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1229 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1230 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1235 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1237 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1238 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1239 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1240 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1241 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1242 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1243 // this channel currently :/.
1249 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1250 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1251 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1253 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1254 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1256 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1258 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1259 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1260 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1263 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1265 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1266 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1267 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1268 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1269 // messages when we can.
1270 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1271 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1272 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1279 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1280 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1283 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1284 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1286 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1290 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1291 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1295 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1296 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1297 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1298 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1300 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1302 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1310 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1311 match forward_info {
1312 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1313 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1314 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1315 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1318 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1322 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1323 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1324 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1327 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1328 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1336 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1338 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1339 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1343 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1344 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1347 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1349 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1351 node_id: their_node_id,
1359 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1360 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1361 events.append(&mut new_events);
1364 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1365 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1366 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1367 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1368 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1369 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1370 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1372 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1373 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1374 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1375 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1376 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1378 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1379 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1385 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1386 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1387 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1388 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1389 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1390 /// still-available channels.
1391 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1392 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1393 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1394 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1397 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1398 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1399 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1400 match &onion_error {
1401 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1403 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1405 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1406 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1407 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1408 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1409 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1410 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1411 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1416 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1417 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1418 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1419 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1421 error_code: onion_error_code
1425 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1429 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1430 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1431 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1432 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1434 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1435 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1436 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1437 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1438 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1439 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1441 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1447 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1448 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1449 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1450 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1451 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1452 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1454 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1455 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1456 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1460 let mut forward_event = None;
1461 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1462 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1464 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1466 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1469 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1472 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1473 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1475 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1476 time_forwardable: time
1483 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1484 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1485 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1487 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1488 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1489 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1491 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1493 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1494 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1495 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1496 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1497 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1498 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1499 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1500 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1501 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1506 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1507 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1509 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1510 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1511 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1512 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1516 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1517 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1518 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1520 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1521 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1523 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1524 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1525 // why it's missing.
1530 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1531 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1532 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1533 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1534 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1535 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1536 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1537 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1539 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1543 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1544 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1545 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1546 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1547 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1548 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1549 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1550 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1558 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1559 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1560 //TODO: Do something with e?
1564 } else { unreachable!(); }
1570 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1573 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1575 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1576 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1577 node_id: their_node_id,
1585 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1586 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1587 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1590 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1591 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1593 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1594 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1595 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1596 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1597 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1600 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1601 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1602 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1603 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1604 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1605 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1606 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1607 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1609 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1610 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1611 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1612 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1613 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1614 // on-chain confirmations.
1615 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1616 // should be written.
1617 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1618 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1620 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1621 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1628 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1631 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1632 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1633 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1635 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1637 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1638 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1640 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1645 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1646 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1648 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1649 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1654 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1658 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1669 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1672 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1674 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1675 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1679 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1680 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1684 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1685 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1686 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1687 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1688 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1691 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1692 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1693 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1695 entry.insert(channel);
1701 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1702 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1703 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1704 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1705 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1707 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1708 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1711 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1712 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1714 //TODO: same as above
1715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1718 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1719 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1720 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1721 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1722 output_script: output_script,
1723 user_channel_id: user_id,
1728 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1729 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1730 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1731 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1732 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1734 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1735 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1738 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1743 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1744 // lock before add_update_monitor
1745 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1748 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1749 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1756 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1765 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1771 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1772 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1775 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1776 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1779 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1784 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1785 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1786 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1787 user_channel_id: user_id,
1792 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1793 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1794 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1797 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1798 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1801 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1802 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1804 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1805 msg: announcement_sigs,
1810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1814 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1815 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1817 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1821 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1822 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1825 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1826 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1828 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1832 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1834 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1838 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1839 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1840 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1842 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1843 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1848 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1849 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1851 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1852 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1853 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1862 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1863 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1864 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1868 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1869 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1870 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1872 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1873 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1874 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1875 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1880 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1881 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1882 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1883 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1884 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1885 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1886 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1888 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1889 } else { (tx, None) }
1891 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1894 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1895 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1897 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1898 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1899 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1908 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1909 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1910 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1911 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1913 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1914 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1915 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1916 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1918 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1919 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1923 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1927 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1928 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1929 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1930 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1931 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1932 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1933 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1934 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1935 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1936 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1937 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1938 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1939 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1940 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1942 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1943 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1944 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1945 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1949 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1950 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1951 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1952 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1953 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1954 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1959 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1966 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1967 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1970 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1972 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1973 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1976 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1981 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1985 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1986 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1987 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1988 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1990 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1991 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1992 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1994 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
1996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2001 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2002 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2003 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2004 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2006 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2007 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2010 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2011 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2013 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2021 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2023 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2025 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2026 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2029 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2030 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2031 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2032 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2033 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2036 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2037 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2039 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2041 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2042 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2043 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2044 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2045 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2046 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2048 commitment_signed: msg,
2052 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2053 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2054 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2065 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2066 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2067 let mut forward_event = None;
2068 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2069 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2071 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2073 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2074 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2076 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2079 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2084 match forward_event {
2086 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2087 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2088 time_forwardable: time
2096 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2097 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2098 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2099 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2100 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2102 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2103 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2106 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2107 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2109 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2110 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2111 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2114 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2117 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2118 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2119 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2123 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2125 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2129 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2134 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2135 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2137 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2142 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2143 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2144 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2147 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2148 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2149 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2151 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2158 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2162 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2164 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2167 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2171 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2172 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2173 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2175 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2176 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2177 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2178 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2179 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2182 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2184 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2185 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2186 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2187 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2188 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2189 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2190 contents: announcement,
2192 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2200 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2201 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2202 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2209 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2210 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2211 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2212 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2213 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2214 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2215 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2216 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2217 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2219 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2220 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2222 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2223 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2226 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2228 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2232 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2233 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2235 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2240 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2241 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2242 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2243 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2249 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2253 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2258 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2260 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2270 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2271 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2272 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2273 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2275 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2276 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2278 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2279 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2280 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2282 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2285 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2286 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2288 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2289 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2291 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2292 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2294 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2295 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2296 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2298 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2301 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2302 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2303 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2304 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2305 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2306 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2307 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2308 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2318 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2319 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2321 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2323 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2324 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2325 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2326 node_id: their_node_id,
2330 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2336 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2337 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2338 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2339 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2340 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2342 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2343 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2344 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2345 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2346 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2348 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2349 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2354 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2355 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2356 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2361 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2362 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2363 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2364 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2365 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2367 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2368 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2369 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2370 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2371 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2373 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2374 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2379 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2381 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2386 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2387 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2388 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2389 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2390 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2393 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2395 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2396 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2397 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2398 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2399 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2401 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2402 msg: funding_locked,
2404 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2406 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2407 msg: announcement_sigs,
2410 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2411 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2413 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2414 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2418 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2419 for tx in txn_matched {
2420 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2421 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2422 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2423 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2424 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2426 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2427 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2428 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2429 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2430 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2440 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2441 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2442 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2444 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2445 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2446 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2447 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2448 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2449 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2459 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2460 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2462 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2463 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2466 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2467 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2468 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2469 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2471 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2472 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2473 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2474 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2475 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2476 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2477 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2478 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2480 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2481 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2492 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2493 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2495 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2496 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2500 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2501 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2502 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2503 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2504 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2507 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2508 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2509 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2512 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2513 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2514 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2517 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2518 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2519 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2522 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2523 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2524 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2527 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2528 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2529 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2532 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2533 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2534 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2537 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2539 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2542 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2543 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2544 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2547 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2548 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2552 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2557 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2559 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2562 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2567 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2568 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2572 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2574 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2577 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2579 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2582 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2584 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2585 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2588 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2589 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2590 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2591 if no_connection_possible {
2592 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2593 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2594 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2595 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2596 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2598 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2599 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2610 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2611 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2612 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2613 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2614 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2615 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2616 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2617 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2619 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2620 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2621 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2629 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2637 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2642 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2643 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2644 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2645 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2649 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2650 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2652 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2653 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2659 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2660 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2662 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2663 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2664 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2665 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2666 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2667 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2668 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2669 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2670 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2671 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2676 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2677 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2683 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2686 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2689 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2690 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2691 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2692 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2696 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2701 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2702 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2704 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2705 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2706 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2707 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2708 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2709 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2710 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2711 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2716 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2717 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2718 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2719 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2720 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2721 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2722 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2723 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2724 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2729 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2730 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2732 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2734 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2736 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2738 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2745 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2746 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2747 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2748 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2749 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2750 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2755 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2756 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2758 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2760 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2762 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2764 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2771 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2772 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2773 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2774 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2775 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2776 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2781 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2784 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2787 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2788 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2790 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2792 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2794 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2796 route.write(writer)?;
2797 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2798 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2805 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2806 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2807 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2808 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2809 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2810 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2811 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2812 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2814 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2819 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2820 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2822 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2826 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2828 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2829 data.write(writer)?;
2836 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2837 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2838 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2839 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2840 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2841 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2842 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2844 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2849 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2850 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2852 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2854 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2855 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2856 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2858 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2860 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2861 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2868 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2869 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2870 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2871 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2872 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2873 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2874 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2876 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2877 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2878 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2880 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2885 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2886 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2887 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2889 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2890 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2892 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2893 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2894 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2896 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2897 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2898 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2899 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2900 unfunded_channels += 1;
2903 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2904 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2905 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2906 channel.write(writer)?;
2910 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2911 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2912 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2913 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2914 for forward in pending_forwards {
2915 forward.write(writer)?;
2919 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2920 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2921 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2922 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2923 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2924 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2925 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2933 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2935 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2937 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2938 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2939 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2940 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2941 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2942 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2943 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2944 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2945 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2946 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2947 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2948 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2949 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2950 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2951 /// deserialization.
2952 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2954 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2956 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2957 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2958 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2960 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2961 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2962 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2963 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2964 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2966 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2967 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2968 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2969 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2970 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2971 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2972 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2973 /// deserialization.
2974 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2975 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2976 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2977 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2979 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2980 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2982 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2983 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
2984 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2985 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2987 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2989 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2992 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2993 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2994 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2995 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2996 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2997 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3000 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3001 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3002 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3004 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3006 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3007 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3008 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3009 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3010 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3011 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3012 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3013 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3016 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3017 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3018 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3019 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3020 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3021 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3022 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3023 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3024 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3026 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3027 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3029 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3036 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3037 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3038 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3042 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3043 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3044 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3045 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3046 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3047 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3048 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3049 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3051 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3054 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3056 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3057 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3058 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3059 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3060 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3061 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3063 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3066 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3068 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3069 monitor: args.monitor,
3070 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3071 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3073 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3074 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3075 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3077 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3082 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3084 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3086 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3087 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3088 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3089 logger: args.logger,
3090 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3093 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3094 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3095 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3096 //connection or two.
3099 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))