1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::HandleError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
200 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
204 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
212 shutdown_finish: None,
217 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
218 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
219 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
220 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
221 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
223 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
225 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
227 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
231 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
235 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
236 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
237 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
238 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
240 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
241 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
243 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
247 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
248 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
249 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
294 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
295 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
296 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
297 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
299 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
300 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
301 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
302 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
303 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
304 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
305 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
307 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
308 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
309 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
310 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
312 pub struct ChannelManager {
313 default_configuration: UserConfig,
314 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
315 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
316 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
317 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
318 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
324 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
325 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
328 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
331 our_network_key: SecretKey,
333 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
334 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
335 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
336 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
339 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
344 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
345 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
346 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
347 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
348 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
350 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
351 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
352 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
353 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
354 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
355 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
356 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
358 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
359 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
360 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
361 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
362 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
363 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
366 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
368 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
369 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
372 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
374 macro_rules! secp_call {
375 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
378 Err(_) => return Err($err),
383 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
384 pub struct ChannelDetails {
385 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
386 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
387 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
388 /// lifetime of the channel.
389 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
390 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
391 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
392 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
393 /// The node_id of our counterparty
394 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
395 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
396 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
397 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
399 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
400 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
401 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
402 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
403 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
404 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
405 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
406 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
407 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
408 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
409 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
410 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
411 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
415 macro_rules! handle_error {
416 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
419 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
420 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
421 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
422 if let Some(update) = update_option {
423 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
424 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
435 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
436 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
439 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
440 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
442 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
443 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
444 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
445 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
446 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
448 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
454 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
458 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
461 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
462 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
463 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
464 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
465 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
473 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
474 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
475 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
477 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
480 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
481 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
482 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
483 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
485 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
486 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
487 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
488 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
489 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
490 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
491 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
492 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
493 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
494 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
498 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
499 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
500 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
502 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
503 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
505 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
506 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
508 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
509 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
510 if !$resend_commitment {
511 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
514 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
516 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
517 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
523 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
524 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
525 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
527 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
528 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
532 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
533 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
534 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
535 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
536 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
539 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
544 impl ChannelManager {
545 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
547 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
548 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
550 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
552 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
553 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
554 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
556 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
557 default_configuration: config.clone(),
558 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
559 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
560 monitor: monitor.clone(),
564 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
565 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
568 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
569 by_id: HashMap::new(),
570 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
571 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
572 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
573 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
575 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
577 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
578 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
584 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
585 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
589 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
591 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
592 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
593 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
594 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
596 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
597 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
599 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
600 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
601 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
602 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
606 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
607 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
609 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
610 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
613 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
614 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
616 panic!("RNG is bad???");
619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
622 node_id: their_network_key,
628 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
629 /// more information.
630 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
631 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
632 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
633 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
634 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
635 res.push(ChannelDetails {
636 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
637 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
638 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
639 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
640 inbound_capacity_msat,
641 outbound_capacity_msat,
642 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
643 is_live: channel.is_live(),
649 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
650 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
652 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
653 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
654 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
655 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
657 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
658 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
659 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
660 // really wanted anyway.
661 if channel.is_live() {
662 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
663 res.push(ChannelDetails {
664 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
665 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
666 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
667 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
668 inbound_capacity_msat,
669 outbound_capacity_msat,
670 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
678 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
679 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
680 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
682 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
683 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
686 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
687 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
691 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
693 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
696 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
697 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
698 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
700 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
701 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
706 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
709 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
715 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
726 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
727 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
728 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
729 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
732 for tx in local_txn {
733 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
737 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
738 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
739 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
744 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
745 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
746 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
747 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
754 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
755 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
757 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
764 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
765 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
766 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
767 for chan in self.list_channels() {
768 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
772 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
773 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
774 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
775 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
777 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
778 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
779 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
780 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
781 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
782 failure_code: $err_code,
783 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
788 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
789 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
792 let shared_secret = {
793 let mut arr = [0; 32];
794 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
797 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
799 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
800 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
801 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
802 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
803 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
804 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
805 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
806 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
809 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
810 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
811 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
812 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
813 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
816 let mut channel_state = None;
817 macro_rules! return_err {
818 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
820 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
821 if channel_state.is_none() {
822 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
824 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
825 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
826 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
827 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
828 })), channel_state.unwrap());
833 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
834 let next_hop_data = {
835 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
836 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
837 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
839 let error_code = match err {
840 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
841 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
843 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
849 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
851 // final_expiry_too_soon
852 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
853 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
855 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
856 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
857 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
859 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
860 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
861 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
864 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
865 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
866 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
867 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
869 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
871 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
873 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
874 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
875 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
878 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
879 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
880 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
882 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
884 let blinding_factor = {
885 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
886 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
887 sha.input(&shared_secret);
888 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
891 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
893 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
895 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
898 hop_data: new_packet_data,
899 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
902 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
903 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
904 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
905 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
906 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
907 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
908 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
912 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
913 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
914 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
915 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
916 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
917 None => { // unknown_next_peer
918 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
920 Some(id) => id.clone(),
922 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
923 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
925 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
926 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
927 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
928 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
929 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
930 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
931 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
933 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
934 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
936 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
937 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
938 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
940 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
941 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
943 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
944 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
945 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
946 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
948 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
949 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
954 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
955 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
956 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
957 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
959 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
960 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
962 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
963 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
965 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
967 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
972 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
975 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
976 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
977 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
978 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
979 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
983 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
985 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
986 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
987 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
988 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
989 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
990 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
991 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
992 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
993 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
994 excess_data: Vec::new(),
997 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
998 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1000 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1006 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1008 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1009 /// fields for more info.
1011 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1012 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1013 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1014 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1015 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1016 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1018 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1020 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1021 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1022 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1023 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1024 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1025 /// relevant updates.
1027 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1028 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1029 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1030 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1031 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1032 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1033 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1034 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1036 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1037 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1038 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1039 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1043 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1045 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1047 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1048 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1049 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1050 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1052 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1054 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1055 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1057 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1058 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1059 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1062 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1063 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1065 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1066 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1068 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1069 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1071 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1072 route: route.clone(),
1073 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1074 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1075 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1077 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1078 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1079 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1080 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1081 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1082 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1083 // something else in case we will resend later!
1084 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1088 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1089 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1090 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1091 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1092 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1101 } else { unreachable!(); }
1105 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1106 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1108 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1110 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1113 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1117 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1122 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1124 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1125 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1127 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1129 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1130 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1131 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1132 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1134 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1136 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1137 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1139 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1140 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1141 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1142 } else { unreachable!(); })
1148 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1149 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1150 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1153 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1154 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1156 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1163 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1164 // lock before add_update_monitor
1165 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1167 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1168 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
1170 log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
1171 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1172 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1173 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1178 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1181 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1182 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1183 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1184 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1186 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1191 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1192 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1193 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1198 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1206 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1207 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1209 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1211 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1213 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1214 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1216 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1217 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1218 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1219 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1220 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1224 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1226 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1227 /// Will likely generate further events.
1228 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1229 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1231 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1232 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1233 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1236 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1238 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1239 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1240 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1241 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1243 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1244 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1245 match forward_info {
1246 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1247 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1248 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1249 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1250 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1252 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1254 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1255 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1256 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1257 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1258 // problem, not ours.
1265 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1266 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1267 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1268 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269 match forward_info {
1270 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1271 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1272 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1273 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1274 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1275 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1277 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1279 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1280 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1282 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1284 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1285 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1290 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1292 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1293 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1294 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1295 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1296 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1297 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1298 // this channel currently :/.
1304 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1305 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1306 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1308 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1309 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1311 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1313 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1314 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1315 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1318 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1320 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1321 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1322 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1323 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1324 // messages when we can.
1325 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1326 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1327 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1334 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1335 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1338 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1339 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1341 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1345 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1346 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1350 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1351 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1352 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1353 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1354 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1357 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1365 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1366 match forward_info {
1367 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1368 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1369 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1370 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1371 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1373 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1377 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1378 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1379 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1382 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1383 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1391 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1393 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1394 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1398 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1399 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1402 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1404 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1406 node_id: their_node_id,
1414 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1415 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1416 events.append(&mut new_events);
1419 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1420 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1421 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1422 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1423 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1424 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1425 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1427 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1428 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1429 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1430 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1431 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1432 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1433 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1434 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1440 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1441 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1442 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1443 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1444 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1445 /// still-available channels.
1446 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1447 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1448 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1449 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1452 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1453 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1454 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1455 match &onion_error {
1456 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1458 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1460 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1461 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1462 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1463 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1464 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1465 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1466 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1471 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1472 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1473 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1474 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1476 error_code: onion_error_code
1480 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1484 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1485 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1486 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1487 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1489 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1490 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1491 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1492 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1493 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1494 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1496 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1502 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1503 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1504 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1505 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1506 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1507 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1509 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1510 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1511 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1515 let mut forward_event = None;
1516 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1517 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1519 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1521 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1524 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1527 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1528 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1529 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1530 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1531 time_forwardable: time
1538 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1539 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1540 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1542 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1543 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1544 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1546 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1548 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1549 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1550 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1551 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1552 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1553 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1554 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1555 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1556 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1561 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1562 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1564 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1565 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1566 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1567 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1571 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1572 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1573 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1575 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1576 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1578 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1579 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1580 // why it's missing.
1585 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1586 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1587 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1588 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1589 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1590 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1591 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1592 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1594 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1598 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1600 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1601 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1602 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1603 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1604 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1605 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1613 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1614 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1615 //TODO: Do something with e?
1619 } else { unreachable!(); }
1625 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1628 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1630 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1632 node_id: their_node_id,
1640 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1641 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1642 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1645 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1646 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1648 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1649 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1650 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1651 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1652 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1653 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1656 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1657 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1658 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1659 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1660 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1661 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1662 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1663 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1665 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1666 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1667 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1668 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1669 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1670 // on-chain confirmations.
1671 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1672 // should be written.
1673 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1674 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1676 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1678 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1684 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1687 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1688 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1689 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1691 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1693 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1694 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1696 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1701 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1702 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1703 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1704 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1705 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1710 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1714 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1719 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1720 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1721 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1722 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1731 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1733 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1736 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1738 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1739 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1743 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1744 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1748 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1749 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1751 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1752 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1756 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1757 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1759 entry.insert(channel);
1765 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1766 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1771 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1772 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1775 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1776 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1778 //TODO: same as above
1779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1782 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1783 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1784 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1785 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1786 output_script: output_script,
1787 user_channel_id: user_id,
1792 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1793 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1798 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1799 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1800 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1802 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1807 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1808 // lock before add_update_monitor
1809 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1816 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1819 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1820 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1829 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1830 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1831 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1832 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1835 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1836 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1839 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1840 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1841 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1843 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1848 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1849 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1850 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1851 user_channel_id: user_id,
1856 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1857 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1858 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1859 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1861 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1862 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1863 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1865 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1866 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1868 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1869 msg: announcement_sigs,
1874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1878 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1879 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1881 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1885 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1886 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1887 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1889 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1890 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1892 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1896 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1898 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1902 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1903 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1904 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1906 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1907 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1912 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1913 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1915 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1917 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1926 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1927 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1929 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1932 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1933 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1936 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1937 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1939 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1944 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1945 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1946 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1947 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1948 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1949 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1950 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1952 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1953 } else { (tx, None) }
1955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1958 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1959 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1961 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1962 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1963 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1972 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1973 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1974 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1975 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1977 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1978 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1979 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1980 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1982 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1983 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1987 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1988 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1989 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1991 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1992 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1993 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1994 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1995 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1996 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1997 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1998 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1999 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2000 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2001 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2002 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2003 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2004 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2006 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2007 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2008 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2009 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2013 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2014 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2015 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2016 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2017 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2018 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2023 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2030 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2033 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2036 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2037 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2040 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2045 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2049 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2050 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2051 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2052 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2054 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2055 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2058 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2065 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2066 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2067 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2068 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2070 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2071 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2074 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2075 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2077 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2084 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2085 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2086 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2087 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2089 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2090 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2093 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2094 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2095 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2096 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2097 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2099 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2100 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2101 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2103 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2105 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2106 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2107 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2108 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2109 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2110 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2112 commitment_signed: msg,
2116 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2118 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2129 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2130 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2131 let mut forward_event = None;
2132 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2133 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2134 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2135 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2137 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2138 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2140 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2143 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2148 match forward_event {
2150 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2151 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2152 time_forwardable: time
2160 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2161 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2162 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2163 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2164 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2166 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2167 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2170 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2171 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2172 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2173 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2174 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2175 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2178 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2181 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2182 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2183 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2187 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2188 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2189 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2193 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2198 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2199 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2201 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2206 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2207 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2208 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2209 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2211 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2212 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2215 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2222 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2224 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2226 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2228 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2231 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2235 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2236 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2237 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2239 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2240 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2241 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2242 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2243 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2246 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2248 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2249 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2250 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2251 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2252 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2253 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2254 contents: announcement,
2256 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2264 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2265 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2266 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2268 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2270 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2273 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2274 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2275 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2276 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2277 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2278 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2279 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2280 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2281 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2283 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2284 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2286 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2287 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2290 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2292 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2296 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2297 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2298 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2299 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2304 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2305 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2307 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2313 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2317 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2322 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2324 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2334 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2335 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2336 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2337 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2339 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2340 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2342 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2343 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2344 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2349 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2350 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2352 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2353 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2355 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2356 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2358 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2359 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2360 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2362 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2366 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2367 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2368 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2369 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2370 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2371 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2372 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2382 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2383 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2385 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2387 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2388 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2390 node_id: their_node_id,
2394 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2400 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2401 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2402 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2403 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2404 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2406 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2407 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2408 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2409 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2410 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2412 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2418 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2419 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2420 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2425 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2426 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2427 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2428 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2429 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2431 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2432 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2433 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2434 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2435 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2437 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2443 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2444 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2445 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2450 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2451 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2452 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2453 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2454 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2455 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2457 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2458 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2459 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2460 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2461 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2462 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2463 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2465 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2466 msg: funding_locked,
2468 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2470 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2471 msg: announcement_sigs,
2474 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2475 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2477 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2478 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2482 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2483 for tx in txn_matched {
2484 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2485 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2486 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2487 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2488 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2490 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2491 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2492 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2493 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2494 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2504 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2505 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2506 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2508 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2509 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2510 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2511 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2512 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2513 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2523 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2524 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2526 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2527 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2530 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2531 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2532 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2533 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2535 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2536 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2537 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2538 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2539 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2540 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2541 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2542 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2544 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2545 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2546 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2556 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2557 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2559 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2560 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2564 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2565 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2566 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2567 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2568 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2571 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2572 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2573 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2576 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2577 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2578 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2581 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2582 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2583 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2586 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2587 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2588 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2591 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2592 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2593 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2596 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2597 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2598 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2601 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2603 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2606 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2607 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2608 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2611 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2612 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2613 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2616 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2617 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2618 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2621 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2622 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2623 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2626 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2627 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2628 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2631 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2632 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2633 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2636 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2637 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2638 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2641 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2642 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2643 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2646 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2647 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2648 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2649 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2651 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2652 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2653 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2654 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2655 if no_connection_possible {
2656 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2657 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2658 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2659 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2660 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2662 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2663 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2664 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2674 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2675 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2676 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2677 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2678 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2679 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2680 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2681 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2683 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2684 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2685 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2693 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2699 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2701 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2705 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2706 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2707 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2708 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2709 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2713 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2714 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2716 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2717 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2723 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2724 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2727 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2728 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2729 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2730 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2731 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2732 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2733 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2734 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2735 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2739 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2740 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2741 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2747 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2750 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2751 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2753 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2754 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2755 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2756 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2760 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2765 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2766 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2768 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2769 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2770 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2771 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2772 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2773 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2774 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2775 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2780 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2781 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2782 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2783 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2784 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2785 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2786 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2787 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2788 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2793 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2796 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2798 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2800 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2802 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2809 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2810 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2811 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2812 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2813 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2814 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2819 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2820 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2822 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2824 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2826 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2828 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2835 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2836 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2837 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2838 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2839 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2840 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2845 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2848 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2851 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2852 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2854 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2856 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2858 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2860 route.write(writer)?;
2861 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2862 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2869 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2870 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2871 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2872 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2873 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2874 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2875 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2876 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2878 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2883 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2884 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2886 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2890 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2892 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2893 data.write(writer)?;
2900 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2901 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2902 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2903 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2904 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2905 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2906 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2908 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2913 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2914 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2916 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2918 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2919 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2920 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2922 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2924 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2925 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2932 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2933 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2934 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2935 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2936 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2937 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2938 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2940 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2941 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2942 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2944 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2949 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2950 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2951 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2953 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2954 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2956 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2957 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2958 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2960 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2962 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2963 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2964 unfunded_channels += 1;
2967 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2968 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2969 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2970 channel.write(writer)?;
2974 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2975 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2976 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2977 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2978 for forward in pending_forwards {
2979 forward.write(writer)?;
2983 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2984 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2985 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2986 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2987 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2988 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2989 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2997 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2999 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3001 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3002 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3003 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3004 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3005 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3006 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3007 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3008 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3009 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3010 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3011 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3012 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3013 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3014 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3015 /// deserialization.
3016 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3018 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3020 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3021 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3022 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3024 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3025 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3026 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3027 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3028 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3030 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3031 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3032 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3033 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3034 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3035 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3036 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3037 /// deserialization.
3038 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3039 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3040 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3041 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3043 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3044 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3046 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3047 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3048 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3049 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3051 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3053 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3056 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3057 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3058 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3059 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3060 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3061 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3064 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3065 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3066 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3070 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3071 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3072 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3073 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3074 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3075 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3076 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3080 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3081 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3082 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3083 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3084 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3085 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3086 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3087 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3088 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3090 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3091 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3093 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3100 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3101 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3102 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3106 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3107 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3108 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3109 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3110 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3111 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3112 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3113 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3115 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3118 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3120 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3121 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3122 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3123 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3124 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3125 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3127 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3130 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3132 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3133 monitor: args.monitor,
3134 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3135 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3137 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3138 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3139 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3141 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3146 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3148 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3150 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3151 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3152 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3153 logger: args.logger,
3154 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3157 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3158 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3159 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3160 //connection or two.
3163 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))