1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
272 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
277 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
278 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
279 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
280 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
281 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
282 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
287 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
288 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
290 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
291 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
293 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
294 /// to individual Channels.
296 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
297 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
298 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
299 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
301 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
302 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
303 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
304 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
305 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
306 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
307 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
309 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
310 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
311 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
312 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
314 pub struct ChannelManager {
315 default_configuration: UserConfig,
316 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
317 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
318 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
319 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
320 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
323 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
325 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
326 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
327 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
330 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
332 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
333 our_network_key: SecretKey,
335 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
336 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
337 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
338 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
339 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
341 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
346 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
347 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
348 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
349 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
350 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
351 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
352 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
354 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
355 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
356 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
357 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
358 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
363 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
364 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
367 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
369 macro_rules! secp_call {
370 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
373 Err(_) => return Err($err),
378 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
379 pub struct ChannelDetails {
380 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
381 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
382 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
383 /// lifetime of the channel.
384 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
385 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
386 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
387 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
388 /// The node_id of our counterparty
389 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
390 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
391 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
392 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
396 macro_rules! handle_error {
397 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
400 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
401 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
402 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
403 if let Some(update) = update_option {
404 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
416 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
417 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
420 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
421 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
423 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
424 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
425 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
426 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
427 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
429 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
435 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
436 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
439 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
442 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
443 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
444 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
445 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
446 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
454 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
455 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
456 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
458 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
460 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
461 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
462 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
463 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
464 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
466 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
467 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
468 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
469 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
470 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
471 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
472 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
473 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
474 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
475 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
478 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
479 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
480 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
481 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
483 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
484 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
486 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
487 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
489 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
490 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
491 if !$resend_commitment {
492 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
495 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
497 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
498 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
504 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
505 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
506 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
508 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
509 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
513 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
514 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
515 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
516 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
517 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
520 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
525 impl ChannelManager {
526 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
528 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
529 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
531 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
533 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
534 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
535 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
537 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
538 default_configuration: config.clone(),
539 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
540 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
541 monitor: monitor.clone(),
545 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
546 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
549 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
550 by_id: HashMap::new(),
551 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
552 next_forward: Instant::now(),
553 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
554 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
555 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
557 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
559 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
560 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
566 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
567 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
571 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
573 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
574 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
575 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
576 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
578 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
579 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
581 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
582 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
583 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
584 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
588 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
589 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
591 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
592 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
593 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
595 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
598 panic!("RNG is bad???");
601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
604 node_id: their_network_key,
610 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
611 /// more information.
612 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
613 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
614 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
615 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
616 res.push(ChannelDetails {
617 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
618 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
619 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
620 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
621 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
627 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
628 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
629 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
630 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
631 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
632 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
633 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
634 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
635 // really wanted anyway.
636 if channel.is_live() {
637 res.push(ChannelDetails {
638 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
639 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
640 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
641 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
642 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
649 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
650 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
651 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
653 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
654 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
655 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
657 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
658 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
659 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
660 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
662 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
664 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
667 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
668 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
669 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
671 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
672 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
677 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
678 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
680 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
681 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
686 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
687 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
697 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
698 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
699 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
700 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
703 for tx in local_txn {
704 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
708 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
709 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
710 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
715 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
716 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
717 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
718 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
725 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
726 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
727 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
728 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
729 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
735 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
736 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
737 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
738 for chan in self.list_channels() {
739 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
743 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
744 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
745 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
746 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
748 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
749 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
750 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
751 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
752 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
753 failure_code: $err_code,
754 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
759 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
760 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
763 let shared_secret = {
764 let mut arr = [0; 32];
765 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
768 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
770 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
771 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
772 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
773 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
774 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
775 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
776 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
777 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
780 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
781 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
782 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
783 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
784 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
787 let mut channel_state = None;
788 macro_rules! return_err {
789 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
791 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
792 if channel_state.is_none() {
793 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
795 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
796 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
797 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
798 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
799 })), channel_state.unwrap());
804 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
805 let next_hop_data = {
806 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
807 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
808 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
810 let error_code = match err {
811 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
812 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
814 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
820 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
822 // final_expiry_too_soon
823 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
824 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
826 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
827 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
828 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
830 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
831 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
832 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
835 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
836 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
837 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
838 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
840 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
842 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
844 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
845 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
846 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
849 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
850 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
851 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
853 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
855 let blinding_factor = {
856 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
857 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
858 sha.input(&shared_secret);
859 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
862 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
864 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
866 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
869 hop_data: new_packet_data,
870 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
873 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
874 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
875 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
876 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
877 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
878 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
879 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
883 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
884 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
885 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
886 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
887 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
888 None => { // unknown_next_peer
889 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
891 Some(id) => id.clone(),
893 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
894 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
896 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
897 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
898 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
899 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
900 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
901 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
902 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
904 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
905 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
907 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
908 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
909 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
911 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
912 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
914 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
915 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
916 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
917 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
919 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
920 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
925 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
926 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
927 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
928 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
930 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
931 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
933 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
934 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
936 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
938 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
943 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
946 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
947 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
948 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
949 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
950 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
954 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
956 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
957 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
958 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
959 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
960 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
961 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
962 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
963 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
964 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
965 excess_data: Vec::new(),
968 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
969 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
971 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
977 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
979 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
980 /// fields for more info.
982 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
983 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
984 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
985 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
986 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
987 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
989 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
991 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
992 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
993 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
994 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
995 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
996 /// relevant updates.
998 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
999 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1000 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1001 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1002 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1003 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1004 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1005 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1007 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1008 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1009 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1010 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1014 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1016 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1018 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1019 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1020 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1021 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1023 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1025 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1026 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1028 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1029 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1030 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1033 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1034 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1036 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1037 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1039 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1040 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1042 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1043 route: route.clone(),
1044 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1045 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1046 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1048 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1049 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1050 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1051 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1052 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1053 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1054 // something else in case we will resend later!
1055 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1059 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1060 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1061 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1062 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1063 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1064 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1072 } else { unreachable!(); }
1076 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1077 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1079 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1081 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1082 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1084 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1088 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1093 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1095 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1096 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1098 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1100 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1101 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1102 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1103 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1105 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1108 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1110 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1111 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1112 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1113 } else { unreachable!(); })
1119 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1120 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1121 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1124 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1125 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1126 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1127 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1134 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1135 // lock before add_update_monitor
1136 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1140 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1141 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1142 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1147 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1155 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1156 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1158 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1160 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1162 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1163 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1165 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1166 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1167 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1168 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1169 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1173 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1175 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1176 /// Will likely generate further events.
1177 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1178 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1180 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1181 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1182 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1184 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1185 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1187 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1191 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1192 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1193 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1194 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1196 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1197 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1198 match forward_info {
1199 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1200 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1201 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1202 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1203 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1205 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1207 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1208 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1209 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1210 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1211 // problem, not ours.
1218 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1219 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1220 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1221 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1222 match forward_info {
1223 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1224 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1227 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1228 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1230 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1232 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1233 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1237 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1238 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1243 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1245 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1246 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1247 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1248 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1249 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1250 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1251 // this channel currently :/.
1257 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1258 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1259 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1261 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1262 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1264 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1266 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1267 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1268 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1271 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1273 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1274 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1275 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1276 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1277 // messages when we can.
1278 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1279 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1280 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1287 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1288 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1291 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1292 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1294 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1298 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1299 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1303 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1304 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1305 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1306 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1307 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1308 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1318 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1319 match forward_info {
1320 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1321 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1322 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1323 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1324 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1326 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1330 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1331 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1332 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1335 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1336 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1344 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1346 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1347 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1351 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1352 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1355 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1357 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1359 node_id: their_node_id,
1367 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1368 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1369 events.append(&mut new_events);
1372 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1373 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1374 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1375 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1376 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1377 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1378 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1380 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1381 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1382 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1383 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1384 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1386 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1387 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1393 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1394 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1395 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1396 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1397 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1398 /// still-available channels.
1399 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1400 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1401 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1402 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1405 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1406 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1407 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1408 match &onion_error {
1409 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1411 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1413 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1414 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1415 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1416 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1417 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1418 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1419 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1424 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1425 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1426 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1427 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1429 error_code: onion_error_code
1433 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1437 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1438 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1439 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1440 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1442 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1443 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1444 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1445 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1446 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1447 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1449 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1455 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1456 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1457 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1458 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1459 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1460 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1462 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1463 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1464 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1468 let mut forward_event = None;
1469 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1470 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1471 channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1473 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1475 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1478 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1481 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1482 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1483 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1484 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1485 time_forwardable: time
1492 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1493 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1494 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1496 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1497 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1498 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1500 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1502 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1503 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1504 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1505 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1506 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1507 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1508 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1509 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1510 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1515 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1516 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1518 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1519 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1520 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1521 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1525 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1526 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1527 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1529 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1530 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1532 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1533 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1534 // why it's missing.
1539 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1540 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1541 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1542 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1543 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1544 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1545 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1546 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1548 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1552 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1553 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1554 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1555 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1556 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1557 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1558 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1559 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1567 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1568 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1569 //TODO: Do something with e?
1573 } else { unreachable!(); }
1579 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1582 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1584 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1586 node_id: their_node_id,
1594 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1595 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1596 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1599 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1600 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1602 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1603 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1604 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1605 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1606 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1610 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1611 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1612 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1613 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1614 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1615 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1616 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1618 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1619 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1620 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1621 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1622 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1623 // on-chain confirmations.
1624 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1625 // should be written.
1626 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1627 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1629 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1630 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1631 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1637 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1640 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1641 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1642 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1644 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1646 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1647 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1649 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1654 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1655 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1657 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1658 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1663 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1667 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1678 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1681 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1683 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1684 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1688 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1689 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1690 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1693 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1694 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1695 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1697 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1700 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1701 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1702 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1704 entry.insert(channel);
1710 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1711 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1712 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1713 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1716 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1717 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1720 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1721 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1723 //TODO: same as above
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1727 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1728 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1729 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1730 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1731 output_script: output_script,
1732 user_channel_id: user_id,
1737 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1738 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1741 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1743 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1744 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1747 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1752 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1753 // lock before add_update_monitor
1754 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1757 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1758 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1764 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1765 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1774 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1775 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1776 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1777 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1780 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1781 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1784 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1785 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1788 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1793 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1794 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1795 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1796 user_channel_id: user_id,
1801 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1806 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1807 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1810 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1811 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1813 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1814 msg: announcement_sigs,
1819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1823 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1824 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1830 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1831 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1832 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1834 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1835 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1837 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1841 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1843 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1847 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1848 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1849 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1851 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1852 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1857 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1860 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1861 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1862 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1871 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1872 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1873 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1875 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1877 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1878 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1881 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1882 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1884 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1889 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1890 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1891 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1892 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1893 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1894 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1895 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1897 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1898 } else { (tx, None) }
1900 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1903 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1904 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1906 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1917 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1919 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1920 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1922 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1923 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1924 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1925 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1927 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1928 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1932 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1933 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1936 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1937 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1938 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1939 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1940 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1941 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1942 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1943 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1944 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1945 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1946 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1947 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1948 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1949 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1951 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1952 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1953 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1954 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1958 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1959 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1960 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1961 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1962 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1963 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1968 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1975 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1976 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1978 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1981 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1982 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1985 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1990 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1994 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1995 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1996 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1997 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1998 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1999 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2000 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2010 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2011 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2015 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2016 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2017 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2019 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2020 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2022 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2029 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2030 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2031 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2032 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2034 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2035 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2036 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2038 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2039 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2040 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2041 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2042 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2045 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2046 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2048 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2050 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2051 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2052 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2053 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2054 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2055 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2057 commitment_signed: msg,
2061 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2063 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2074 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2075 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2076 let mut forward_event = None;
2077 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2078 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2079 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2080 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2081 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2083 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2084 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2086 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2089 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2094 match forward_event {
2096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2097 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2098 time_forwardable: time
2106 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2107 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2108 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2109 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2110 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2112 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2113 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2116 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2117 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2118 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2119 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2120 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2121 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2124 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2127 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2128 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2129 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2133 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2134 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2135 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2139 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2144 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2145 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2147 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2152 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2153 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2157 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2158 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2161 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2168 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2169 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2170 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2174 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2177 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2181 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2182 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2183 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2185 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2186 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2187 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2188 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2189 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2192 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2194 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2195 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2196 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2197 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2198 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2199 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2200 contents: announcement,
2202 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2210 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2211 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2212 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2214 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2216 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2219 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2220 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2221 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2222 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2223 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2224 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2225 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2226 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2227 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2229 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2230 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2232 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2233 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2236 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2237 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2238 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2242 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2243 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2245 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2250 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2251 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2252 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2253 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2259 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2263 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2268 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2280 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2281 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2282 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2283 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2285 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2286 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2288 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2289 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2290 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2292 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2295 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2296 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2298 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2299 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2301 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2302 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2304 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2305 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2306 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2308 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2311 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2312 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2313 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2314 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2315 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2316 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2317 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2318 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2328 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2329 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2331 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2333 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2334 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2335 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2336 node_id: their_node_id,
2340 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2346 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2347 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2348 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2349 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2350 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2352 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2353 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2354 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2355 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2356 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2358 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2364 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2365 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2366 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2371 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2372 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2373 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2374 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2375 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2377 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2378 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2379 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2380 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2381 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2383 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2384 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2389 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2390 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2391 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2396 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2397 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2398 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2399 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2400 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2401 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2404 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2405 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2406 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2407 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2408 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2409 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2410 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2411 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2412 msg: funding_locked,
2414 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2416 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2417 msg: announcement_sigs,
2420 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2421 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2423 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2424 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2428 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2429 for tx in txn_matched {
2430 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2431 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2432 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2433 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2434 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2436 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2437 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2438 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2439 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2440 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2450 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2451 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2452 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2454 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2455 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2456 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2457 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2458 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2459 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2469 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2470 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2472 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2473 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2476 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2477 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2478 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2479 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2481 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2482 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2483 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2484 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2485 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2486 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2487 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2488 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2490 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2491 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2492 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2502 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2503 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2505 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2506 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2510 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2511 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2512 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2513 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2514 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2517 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2518 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2519 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2522 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2523 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2524 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2527 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2528 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2529 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2532 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2533 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2534 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2537 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2539 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2542 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2543 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2544 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2547 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2548 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2549 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2552 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2553 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2557 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2559 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2562 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2564 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2567 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2568 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2572 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2574 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2577 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2578 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2579 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2582 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2584 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2587 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2588 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2589 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2592 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2593 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2594 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2595 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2598 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2599 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2600 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2601 if no_connection_possible {
2602 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2603 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2604 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2605 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2606 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2608 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2610 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2620 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2621 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2622 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2623 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2624 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2625 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2626 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2627 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2629 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2630 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2631 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2639 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2647 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2648 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2652 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2653 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2654 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2655 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2659 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2660 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2662 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2663 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2664 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2669 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2670 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2674 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2675 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2676 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2677 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2678 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2679 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2680 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2681 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2686 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2687 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2693 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2696 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2699 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2700 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2701 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2702 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2706 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2711 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2712 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2714 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2716 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2717 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2718 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2719 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2720 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2721 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2726 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2727 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2728 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2729 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2730 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2731 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2732 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2733 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2734 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2739 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2742 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2744 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2746 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2748 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2755 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2756 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2757 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2758 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2759 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2760 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2765 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2766 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2768 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2770 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2772 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2774 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2781 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2782 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2783 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2784 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2785 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2786 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2791 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2794 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2797 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2798 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2800 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2802 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2804 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2806 route.write(writer)?;
2807 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2808 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2815 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2816 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2817 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2818 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2819 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2820 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2821 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2822 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2824 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2829 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2830 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2832 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2836 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2838 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2839 data.write(writer)?;
2846 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2847 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2848 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2849 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2850 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2851 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2852 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2854 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2859 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2862 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2864 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2865 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2866 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2868 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2870 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2871 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2878 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2879 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2880 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2881 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2882 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2883 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2884 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2886 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2887 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2888 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2890 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2895 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2896 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2897 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2899 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2900 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2902 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2903 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2904 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2906 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2907 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2908 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2909 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2910 unfunded_channels += 1;
2913 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2914 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2915 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2916 channel.write(writer)?;
2920 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2921 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2922 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2923 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2924 for forward in pending_forwards {
2925 forward.write(writer)?;
2929 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2930 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2931 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2932 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2933 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2934 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2935 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2943 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2945 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2947 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2948 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2949 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2950 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2951 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2952 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2953 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2954 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2955 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2956 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2957 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2958 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2959 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2960 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2961 /// deserialization.
2962 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2964 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2966 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2967 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2968 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2970 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2971 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2972 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2973 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2974 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2976 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2977 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2978 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2979 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2980 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2981 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2982 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2983 /// deserialization.
2984 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2985 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2986 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2987 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2989 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2990 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2992 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2993 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
2994 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2995 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2997 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2999 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3002 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3003 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3004 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3005 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3006 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3007 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3010 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3011 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3012 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3014 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3016 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3017 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3018 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3019 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3020 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3021 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3022 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3023 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3026 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3027 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3028 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3029 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3030 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3031 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3032 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3033 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3034 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3036 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3037 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3039 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3042 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3046 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3047 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3048 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3052 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3053 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3054 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3055 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3056 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3058 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3059 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3061 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3064 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3065 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3066 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3067 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3070 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3071 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3073 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3076 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3078 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3079 monitor: args.monitor,
3080 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3081 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3083 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3084 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3085 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3087 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3090 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3093 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3095 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3097 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3098 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3099 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3100 logger: args.logger,
3101 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3104 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3105 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3106 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3107 //connection or two.
3110 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))