1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::config::UserConfig;
32 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
33 use util::sha2::Sha256;
34 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
35 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
41 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
42 use crypto::digest::Digest;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
225 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
228 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
234 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
235 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
236 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
237 /// probably increase this significantly.
238 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
241 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 struct ChannelHolder {
259 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
260 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
261 next_forward: Instant,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
279 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
280 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
281 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
284 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
286 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
287 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
288 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
289 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
290 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
291 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
300 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
302 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
303 /// to individual Channels.
305 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
306 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
307 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
308 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
310 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
311 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
312 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
313 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
314 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
315 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
316 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
318 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
319 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
320 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
321 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
323 pub struct ChannelManager {
324 default_configuration: UserConfig,
325 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
326 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
327 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
328 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
329 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
331 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
333 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
335 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
336 our_network_key: SecretKey,
338 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
339 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
340 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
341 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
344 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
349 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
350 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
351 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
352 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
353 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
354 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
355 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
357 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
358 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
359 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
360 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
363 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
365 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
366 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
369 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
371 macro_rules! secp_call {
372 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
375 Err(_) => return Err($err),
382 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
384 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
385 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
390 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
391 pub struct ChannelDetails {
392 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
393 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
394 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
395 /// lifetime of the channel.
396 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
397 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
398 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
399 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
400 /// The node_id of our counterparty
401 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
402 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
403 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
404 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
408 impl ChannelManager {
409 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
411 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
412 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
414 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
416 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
417 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
420 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
421 default_configuration: config.clone(),
422 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
423 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
424 monitor: monitor.clone(),
428 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
429 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
432 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
433 by_id: HashMap::new(),
434 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
435 next_forward: Instant::now(),
436 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
437 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
438 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
440 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
442 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
443 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
449 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
450 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
454 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
456 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
457 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
458 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
459 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
461 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
462 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
464 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
465 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
466 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
467 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
471 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
472 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
474 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
475 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
478 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
481 panic!("RNG is bad???");
484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
487 node_id: their_network_key,
493 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
494 /// more information.
495 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
496 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
497 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
498 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
499 res.push(ChannelDetails {
500 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
501 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
502 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
503 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
504 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
510 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
511 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
512 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
513 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
514 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
515 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
516 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
517 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
518 // really wanted anyway.
519 if channel.is_live() {
520 res.push(ChannelDetails {
521 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
522 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
523 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
524 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
525 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
532 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
533 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
534 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
536 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
537 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
540 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
541 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
542 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
543 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
545 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
547 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
550 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
551 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
552 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
554 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
555 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
560 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
561 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
564 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
565 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
570 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
581 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
582 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
583 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
584 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
587 for tx in local_txn {
588 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
590 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
591 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
592 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
593 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
594 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
595 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
596 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
599 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
600 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
601 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
606 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
607 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
608 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
609 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
616 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
617 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
618 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
625 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
626 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
627 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
628 for chan in self.list_channels() {
629 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
633 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
644 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
645 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
647 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
648 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
653 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
654 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
655 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
661 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
662 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
664 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
665 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
666 let mut res = [0; 32];
667 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
671 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
672 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
673 let mut res = [0; 32];
674 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
680 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
681 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
682 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
683 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
684 let mut res = [0; 32];
685 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
690 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
691 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
692 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
693 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
694 let mut res = [0; 32];
695 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
699 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
701 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
702 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
703 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
705 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
706 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
708 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
709 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
710 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
711 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
712 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
714 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
716 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
717 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
719 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
725 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
726 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
727 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
729 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
730 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
736 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
746 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
747 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
748 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
749 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
750 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
751 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
752 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
753 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
755 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
756 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
757 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
758 // the intended recipient).
759 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
760 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
761 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
763 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
764 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
765 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
766 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
770 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
771 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
772 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
774 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
775 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
776 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
778 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
780 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
784 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
786 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
794 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
795 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
797 for i in 0..dst.len() {
802 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
803 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
804 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
805 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
808 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
809 let end_len = iters * 65;
810 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
811 res.resize(end_len, 0);
813 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
814 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
815 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
816 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
817 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
822 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
823 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
825 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
826 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
827 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
828 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
830 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
831 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
832 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
835 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
838 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
839 hmac.input(&packet_data);
840 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
841 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
846 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
847 hop_data: packet_data,
852 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
853 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
854 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
855 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
857 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
858 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
859 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
860 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
861 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
862 data: packet_crypted,
866 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
867 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
868 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
870 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
873 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
874 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
875 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
876 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
881 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
884 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
886 failuremsg: failuremsg,
890 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
891 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
892 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
898 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
899 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
900 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
903 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
904 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
907 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
908 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
909 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
910 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
916 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
917 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
918 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
919 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
920 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
921 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
922 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
923 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
926 let shared_secret = {
927 let mut arr = [0; 32];
928 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
931 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
933 let mut channel_state = None;
934 macro_rules! return_err {
935 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
937 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
938 if channel_state.is_none() {
939 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
941 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
942 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
943 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
944 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
945 })), channel_state.unwrap());
950 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
951 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
952 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
953 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
954 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
955 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
956 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
957 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
960 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
961 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
962 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
963 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
964 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
967 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
968 let next_hop_data = {
969 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
970 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
971 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
973 let error_code = match err {
974 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
975 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
977 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
983 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
985 // final_expiry_too_soon
986 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
987 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
989 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
990 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
991 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
993 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
994 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
995 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
998 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
999 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1000 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1001 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1003 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1005 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1006 short_channel_id: 0,
1007 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1008 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1009 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1012 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1013 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1014 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1016 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1018 let blinding_factor = {
1019 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1020 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1021 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1022 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1023 sha.result(&mut res);
1024 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1026 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1032 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1033 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1036 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1038 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1039 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1040 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1043 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1044 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1045 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1046 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1047 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1048 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1049 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1053 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1054 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1055 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1056 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1057 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1058 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1059 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1061 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1063 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1064 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1066 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1067 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1068 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1069 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1070 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1071 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1072 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1074 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1075 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1077 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1078 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1079 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1081 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1082 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1084 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1085 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1086 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1087 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1089 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1090 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1095 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1096 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1097 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1099 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1100 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1102 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1103 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1105 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1110 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1113 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1114 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1115 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1116 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1117 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1121 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1123 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1124 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1125 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1126 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1127 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1128 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1129 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1130 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1131 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1132 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1135 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1136 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1138 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1144 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1146 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1147 /// fields for more info.
1149 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1150 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1151 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1152 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1153 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1154 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1156 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1158 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1159 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1160 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1161 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1162 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1164 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1165 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1166 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1167 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1171 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1172 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1173 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1175 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1177 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1179 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1180 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1181 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1182 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1184 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1185 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1187 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1188 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1189 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1193 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1194 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1195 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1197 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1198 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1200 if !chan.is_live() {
1201 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1203 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1204 route: route.clone(),
1205 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1206 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1207 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1210 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1211 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1212 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1213 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1217 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1219 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1234 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1236 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1237 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1239 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1241 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1242 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1243 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1244 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1246 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1247 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1248 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1250 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1251 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1252 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1255 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1256 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1257 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1267 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1268 // lock before add_update_monitor
1269 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1273 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1275 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1278 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1280 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1288 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1289 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1291 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1293 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1295 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1296 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1298 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1299 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1300 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1301 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1302 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1306 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1308 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1309 /// Will likely generate further events.
1310 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1311 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1313 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1314 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1316 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1317 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1319 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1323 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1324 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1325 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1326 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1328 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1329 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1330 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1331 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1332 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1333 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1335 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1340 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1342 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1343 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1344 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1345 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1346 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1349 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1351 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1352 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1357 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1359 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1360 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1361 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1362 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1363 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1364 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1365 // this channel currently :/.
1372 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1373 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1376 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1377 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1379 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1381 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1385 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1386 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1389 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1390 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1391 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1392 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1394 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1396 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1401 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1402 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1403 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1404 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1407 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1411 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1412 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1413 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1420 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1422 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1423 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1427 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1428 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1429 events.append(&mut new_events);
1432 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1433 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1434 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1436 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1437 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1438 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1439 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1440 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1441 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1447 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1448 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1449 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1450 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1451 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1452 /// still-available channels.
1453 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1455 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1456 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1457 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1458 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1459 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1460 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1461 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1466 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1467 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1468 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1471 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1474 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1475 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1476 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1477 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1478 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1480 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1481 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1485 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1487 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1488 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1492 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1493 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1494 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1495 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1499 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1500 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1501 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1502 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1503 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1504 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1506 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1512 //TODO: Do something with e?
1520 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1521 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1522 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1524 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1525 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1526 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1527 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1528 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1529 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1531 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1533 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1534 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1535 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1536 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1537 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1538 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1543 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1545 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1546 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1548 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1552 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1553 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1554 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1556 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1557 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1559 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1560 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1566 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1567 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1568 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1569 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1570 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1571 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1574 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1576 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1577 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1578 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1579 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1580 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1581 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1589 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1590 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1591 //TODO: Do something with e?
1599 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1600 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1601 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1604 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1605 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1607 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1608 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1609 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1610 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1611 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1614 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1615 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1616 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1617 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1618 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1619 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1620 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1621 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1623 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1624 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1625 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1627 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1628 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1638 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1639 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1640 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1642 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1644 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1645 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1647 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1652 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1653 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1655 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1656 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1661 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1665 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1676 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1679 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1681 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1682 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1686 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1687 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1691 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1692 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1694 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1699 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1700 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1702 entry.insert(channel);
1708 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1709 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1711 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1713 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1714 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1717 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1718 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1719 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1721 //TODO: same as above
1722 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1725 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1726 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1727 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1728 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1729 output_script: output_script,
1730 user_channel_id: user_id,
1735 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1737 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1738 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1740 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1744 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1745 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1746 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1749 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1756 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1757 // lock before add_update_monitor
1758 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1762 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1763 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1768 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1769 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1778 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1779 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1780 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1781 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1783 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1784 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1787 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1788 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1791 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1793 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1796 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1797 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1798 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1799 user_channel_id: user_id,
1804 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1806 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1807 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1809 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1810 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1813 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1814 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1815 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1817 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1818 msg: announcement_sigs,
1823 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1827 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1828 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1829 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1830 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1834 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1835 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1838 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1839 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1841 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1845 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1846 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1847 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1851 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1852 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1853 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1855 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1856 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1861 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1862 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1865 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1867 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1876 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1877 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1878 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1882 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1886 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1887 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1889 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1894 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1895 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1896 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1897 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1898 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1899 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1900 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1902 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1903 } else { (tx, None) }
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1909 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1911 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1912 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1913 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1922 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1923 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1924 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1925 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1927 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1928 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1929 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1930 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1932 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1933 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1935 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1937 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1938 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1941 if !chan.is_usable() {
1942 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1944 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1946 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1950 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1951 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1952 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1954 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1955 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1956 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1958 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1959 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1961 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1963 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1967 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1968 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1969 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1970 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1971 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1972 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1973 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1975 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1976 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1980 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1981 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1982 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1985 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1987 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1988 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1989 if res.is_some() { return; }
1991 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1992 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1993 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1995 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1997 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1998 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1999 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2000 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2001 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2003 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2005 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2006 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2007 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2008 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2009 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2010 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2012 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2013 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2014 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2015 // definitely came from the peer in question
2016 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2018 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2020 match error_code & 0xff {
2022 // either from an intermediate or final node
2023 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2024 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2025 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2026 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2027 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2028 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2029 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2030 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2031 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2032 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2033 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2039 if is_from_final_node {
2040 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2041 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2042 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2043 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2044 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2045 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2048 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2049 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2053 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2054 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2055 // does not coform to the spec.
2056 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2057 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2058 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2064 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2068 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2070 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2071 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2072 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2076 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2077 let offset = match error_code {
2078 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2079 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2080 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2081 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2082 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2083 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2085 // node sending unknown code
2086 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2087 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2094 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2095 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2096 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2097 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2098 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2099 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2100 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2101 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2104 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2105 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2106 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2107 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2109 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2110 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2111 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2112 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2113 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2115 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2116 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2117 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2118 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2120 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2121 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2122 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2123 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2125 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2126 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2129 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2130 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2134 res = Some((msg, true));
2140 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2143 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2144 res = Some((None, true));
2148 // node sending unknown code
2149 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2150 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2159 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2160 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2161 } else { ((None, true)) }
2164 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2165 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2166 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2168 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2169 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2172 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2173 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2175 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2180 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2181 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2182 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2184 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2185 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2186 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2188 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2191 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2192 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2195 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2199 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2200 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2201 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2202 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2204 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2205 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2206 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2208 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2209 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2213 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2214 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2216 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2218 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2219 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2220 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2221 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2222 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2223 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2225 commitment_signed: msg,
2231 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2236 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2237 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2238 let mut forward_event = None;
2239 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2240 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2241 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2242 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2243 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2245 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2246 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2248 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2251 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2256 match forward_event {
2258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2259 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2260 time_forwardable: time
2268 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2269 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2272 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2274 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2275 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2276 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2278 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2279 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2282 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2284 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2288 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2290 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2293 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2296 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2301 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2305 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2306 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2309 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2311 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2315 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2316 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2317 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2319 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2321 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2324 if !chan.is_usable() {
2325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2328 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2329 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2330 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2332 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2333 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2334 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2335 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2336 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2338 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2340 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2341 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2342 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2343 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2344 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2345 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2346 contents: announcement,
2348 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2351 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2356 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2357 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2358 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2360 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2362 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2365 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2366 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2367 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2368 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2372 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2374 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2378 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2379 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2380 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2381 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2386 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2387 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2389 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2395 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2399 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2406 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2410 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2411 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2412 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2413 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2415 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2416 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2417 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2418 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2420 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2421 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2423 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2426 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2427 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2429 if !chan.is_live() {
2430 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2432 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2433 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2436 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2437 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2438 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2439 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2440 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2441 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2442 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2443 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2454 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2455 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2456 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2457 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2458 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2463 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2464 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2465 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2467 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2472 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2473 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2474 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2475 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2477 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2478 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2479 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2480 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2481 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2482 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2483 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2485 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2486 msg: funding_locked,
2488 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2490 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2491 msg: announcement_sigs,
2494 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2495 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2496 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2497 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2500 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2504 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2505 for tx in txn_matched {
2506 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2507 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2508 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2509 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2511 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2512 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2513 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2514 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2525 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2526 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2527 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2529 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2530 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2531 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2532 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2533 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2544 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2545 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2547 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2548 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2551 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2552 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2553 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2554 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2556 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2557 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2558 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2559 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2560 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2561 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2562 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2563 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2565 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2566 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2577 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2578 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2580 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2581 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2585 macro_rules! handle_error {
2586 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2589 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2590 if needs_channel_force_close {
2592 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2593 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2594 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2596 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2599 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2600 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2601 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2602 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2603 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2605 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2617 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2618 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2619 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2620 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2621 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2624 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2625 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2626 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2629 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2630 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2631 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2634 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2635 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2636 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2639 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2640 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2641 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2644 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2645 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2646 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2649 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2650 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2651 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2654 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2655 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2656 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2659 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2660 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2661 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2664 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2665 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2666 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2669 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2670 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2671 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2674 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2675 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2676 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2679 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2680 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2681 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2684 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2685 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2686 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2689 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2690 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2691 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2694 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2699 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2700 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2701 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2702 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2704 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2705 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2706 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2707 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2708 if no_connection_possible {
2709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2710 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2711 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2712 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2714 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2716 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2726 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2727 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2728 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2729 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2730 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2731 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2732 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2734 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2735 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2736 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2745 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2746 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2748 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2749 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2750 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2755 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2756 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2757 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2758 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2759 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2760 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2761 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2762 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2763 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2764 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2765 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2769 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2770 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2771 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2777 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2780 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2781 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2783 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2784 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2785 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2786 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2790 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2795 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2796 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2798 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2800 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2802 onion.write(writer)?;
2806 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2807 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2808 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2809 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2810 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2815 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2816 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2817 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2819 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2822 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2824 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2825 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2826 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2827 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2828 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2833 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2834 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2836 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2838 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2840 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2842 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2849 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2850 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2851 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2852 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2853 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2854 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2859 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2862 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2864 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2866 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2868 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2875 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2876 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2877 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2878 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2879 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2880 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2885 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2888 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2891 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2892 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2894 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2896 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2898 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2900 route.write(writer)?;
2901 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2902 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2909 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2910 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2911 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2912 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2913 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2914 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2915 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2916 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2918 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2923 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2924 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2926 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2930 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2932 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2933 data.write(writer)?;
2940 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2941 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2942 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2943 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2944 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2945 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2946 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2948 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2953 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2954 prev_short_channel_id,
2959 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2960 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2961 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2963 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2964 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2966 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2967 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2968 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2970 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2971 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2972 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2973 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2974 unfunded_channels += 1;
2977 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2978 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2979 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2980 channel.write(writer)?;
2984 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2985 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2986 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2987 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2988 for forward in pending_forwards {
2989 forward.write(writer)?;
2993 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2994 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2995 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2996 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2997 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2998 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3006 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3008 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3010 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3011 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3012 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3013 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3014 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3015 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3016 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3017 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3018 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3019 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3020 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3021 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3022 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3023 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3024 /// deserialization.
3025 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3027 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3029 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3030 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3031 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3033 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3034 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3035 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3036 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3037 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3039 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3040 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3041 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3042 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3043 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3044 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3045 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3046 /// deserialization.
3047 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3048 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3049 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3050 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3052 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3053 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3055 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3056 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3057 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3058 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3060 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3062 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3065 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3066 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3067 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3070 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3073 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3074 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3075 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3077 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3079 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3080 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3081 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3082 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3083 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3084 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3085 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3089 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3090 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3091 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3092 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3093 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3094 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3095 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3096 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3097 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3099 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3100 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3102 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3105 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3109 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3110 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3111 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3115 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3117 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3118 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3120 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3121 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3122 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3124 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3127 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3128 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3129 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3130 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3131 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3132 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3133 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3134 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3136 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3139 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3141 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3142 monitor: args.monitor,
3143 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3144 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3146 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3147 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3148 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3150 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3153 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3156 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3158 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3160 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3161 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3162 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3163 logger: args.logger,
3164 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3167 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3168 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3169 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3170 //connection or two.
3173 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3179 use chain::chaininterface;
3180 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3181 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3182 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3183 use chain::keysinterface;
3184 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3185 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3186 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3188 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3189 use util::test_utils;
3190 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3191 use util::errors::APIError;
3192 use util::logger::Logger;
3193 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3194 use util::config::UserConfig;
3196 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
3197 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3198 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
3199 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3200 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3201 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3202 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
3206 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3207 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3209 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3210 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3212 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3214 use std::cell::RefCell;
3215 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3216 use std::default::Default;
3218 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3219 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3220 use std::time::Instant;
3223 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3224 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3230 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3231 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3234 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3235 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3238 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3239 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3242 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3243 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3246 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3247 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3252 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3254 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3255 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3260 fn onion_vectors() {
3261 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3262 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3264 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3265 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3266 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3267 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3268 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3270 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3271 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3272 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3273 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3274 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3276 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3277 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3278 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3279 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3280 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3282 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3283 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3284 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3285 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3286 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3288 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3289 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3290 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3291 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3292 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3294 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3295 let payloads = vec!(
3296 msgs::OnionHopData {
3298 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3299 short_channel_id: 0,
3301 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3305 msgs::OnionHopData {
3307 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3308 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3309 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3310 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3314 msgs::OnionHopData {
3316 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3317 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3318 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3319 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3323 msgs::OnionHopData {
3325 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3326 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3327 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3328 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3332 msgs::OnionHopData {
3334 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3335 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3336 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3337 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3343 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3344 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3346 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3350 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3351 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3353 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3354 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3355 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3357 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3358 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3360 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3361 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3363 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3364 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3366 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3367 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3369 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3370 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
3373 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3374 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3375 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3376 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3378 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3379 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3384 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3385 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3386 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3387 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3389 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3390 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3391 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3393 impl Drop for Node {
3394 fn drop(&mut self) {
3395 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3396 // Check that we processed all pending events
3397 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3398 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3399 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3404 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3405 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3408 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3409 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3410 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3411 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3414 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3415 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3417 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3420 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3421 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3425 }, match events[1] {
3426 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3427 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3428 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3429 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3430 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3431 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3432 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3433 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3441 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3442 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3444 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3447 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3448 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3457 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3458 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3460 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3463 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3464 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3473 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3474 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3475 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3476 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3478 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3482 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3483 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3485 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3486 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3487 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3489 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3490 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3492 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3494 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3495 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3496 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3497 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3498 added_monitors.clear();
3500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3503 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3505 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3506 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3507 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3508 added_monitors.clear();
3511 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3513 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3514 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3515 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3516 added_monitors.clear();
3519 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3520 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3522 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3523 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3524 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3532 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3533 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3534 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3538 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3539 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3540 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3541 ((match events_6[0] {
3542 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3543 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3544 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3548 }, match events_6[1] {
3549 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3550 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3557 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3558 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3559 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3563 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3564 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3565 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3566 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3568 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3569 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3570 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3571 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3578 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3579 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3580 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3581 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3582 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3588 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3590 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3593 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3594 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3597 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3598 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3600 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3601 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3602 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3604 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3607 macro_rules! check_spends {
3608 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3610 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3611 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3612 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3613 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3618 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3619 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3620 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3623 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3624 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3626 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3627 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3628 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3629 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3630 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3636 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3637 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3640 Some(match events_1[1] {
3641 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3642 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3649 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3650 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3652 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3653 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3654 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3655 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3659 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3661 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3662 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3672 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3673 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3674 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3675 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3676 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3677 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3678 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3680 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3681 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3682 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3683 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3684 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3685 (as_update, bs_update)
3687 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3689 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3690 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3691 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3692 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3694 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3695 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3696 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3697 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3698 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3699 (as_update, bs_update)
3701 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3702 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3704 (as_update, bs_update)
3709 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3710 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3713 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3714 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3715 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3716 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3717 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3718 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3721 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3723 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3729 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3730 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3732 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3734 added_monitors.clear();
3739 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3740 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3742 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3743 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3744 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3745 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3746 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3747 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3748 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3749 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3750 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3751 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3752 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3753 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3754 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3755 if $fail_backwards {
3756 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3757 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3759 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3760 if $fail_backwards {
3761 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3762 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3763 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3764 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3765 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3767 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3770 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3771 if $fail_backwards {
3772 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3773 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3775 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3777 added_monitors.clear();
3783 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3786 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3787 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3788 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3789 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3790 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3791 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3792 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3797 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3798 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3800 let mut payment_event = {
3801 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3802 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3804 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3806 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3808 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3810 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3811 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3813 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3814 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3815 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3817 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3818 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3820 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3825 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3827 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3828 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3829 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3831 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3832 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3833 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3838 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3839 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3840 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3841 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3842 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3848 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3851 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3852 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3853 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3855 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3856 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3857 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3860 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3863 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3864 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3865 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3866 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3867 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3868 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3869 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3870 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3878 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3879 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3881 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3882 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3883 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3884 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3888 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3889 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3891 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3892 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3893 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3894 get_next_msgs!($node)
3896 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3899 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3900 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3905 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3906 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3907 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3908 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3909 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3910 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3911 } else if update_next_msgs {
3912 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3914 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3916 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3917 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3924 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3925 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3928 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3929 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3936 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3937 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3940 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3942 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3943 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3944 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3945 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3946 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3949 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3952 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3953 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3954 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3955 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3956 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3959 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3961 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3963 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3964 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3968 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3969 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3970 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3973 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3974 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3975 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3977 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3978 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3979 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3981 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3982 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3987 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3988 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3989 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3990 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3991 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3992 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3993 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3994 // second-to-last node!
3995 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3998 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3999 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4000 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4002 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4003 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4006 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4007 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4008 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4009 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4014 assert!(events.is_empty());
4016 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4017 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4024 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4026 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4029 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4030 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4031 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4038 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4039 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4042 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4043 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4044 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4046 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4048 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4049 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4051 for _ in 0..node_count {
4052 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4053 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4054 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4055 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4056 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4057 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4058 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4059 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4060 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4061 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4062 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4063 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4064 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4065 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4066 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4074 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4075 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4076 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4077 let channel_id = chan.2;
4079 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4081 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4082 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4088 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4092 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4093 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4094 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4095 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4096 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4097 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4098 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4099 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4100 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4101 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4103 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4105 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4107 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4108 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4111 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4112 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4113 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4114 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4115 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4120 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4122 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4123 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4124 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4127 let payment_event = {
4128 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4129 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4130 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4132 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4133 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4135 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4137 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4138 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4139 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4142 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4144 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4145 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4148 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4149 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4150 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4151 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4152 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4153 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4154 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4157 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4158 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4159 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4160 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4161 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4162 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4163 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4166 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4167 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4168 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4171 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4172 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4178 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4179 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4181 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4185 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4190 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4191 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4192 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4193 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4194 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4195 let channel_id = chan.2;
4197 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4199 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4200 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4206 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4208 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4209 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4213 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4214 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4215 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4223 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4224 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4225 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4228 let payment_event = {
4229 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4230 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4231 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4233 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4234 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4236 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4238 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4239 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4240 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4243 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4246 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4250 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4251 let nodes = create_network(2);
4252 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4253 let channel_id = chan.2;
4255 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4257 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4258 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4264 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4265 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4266 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4267 // (3) update_fee ->
4268 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4269 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4270 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4271 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4272 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4273 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4274 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4275 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4276 // revoke_and_ack ->
4277 // B should send no response here
4278 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4279 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4280 // revoke_and_ack ->
4282 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4283 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4284 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4287 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4288 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4289 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4290 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4291 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4296 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4297 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4298 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4299 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4304 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4305 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4306 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4308 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4309 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4310 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4311 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4314 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4316 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4318 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4320 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4321 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4322 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4324 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4325 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4326 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4327 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4328 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4329 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4330 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4332 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4333 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4334 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4336 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4338 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4339 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4344 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4347 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4351 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4352 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4353 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4356 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4357 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4362 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4363 let nodes = create_network(2);
4364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4365 let channel_id = chan.2;
4367 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4369 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4370 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4375 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4376 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4379 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4380 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4381 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4382 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4383 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4387 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4389 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4390 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4393 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4394 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4397 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4398 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4399 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4402 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4403 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4408 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4409 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4410 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4411 let channel_id = chan.2;
4413 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4415 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4416 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4422 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4424 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4425 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4428 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4429 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4430 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4432 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4437 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4438 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4441 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4443 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4445 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4446 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4448 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4449 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4450 added_monitors.clear();
4452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4454 // node[1] has nothing to do
4456 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4457 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4460 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4461 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4466 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4468 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4469 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4470 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4471 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4472 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4473 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4475 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4476 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4478 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4480 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4482 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4484 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4486 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4487 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4489 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4491 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4493 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4496 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4499 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4500 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4502 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4505 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4509 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4511 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4512 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4513 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4517 fn test_update_fee() {
4518 let nodes = create_network(2);
4519 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4520 let channel_id = chan.2;
4522 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4524 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4531 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4532 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4533 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4534 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4535 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4536 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4537 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4538 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4539 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4540 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4541 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4542 // revoke_and_ack ->
4544 // Create and deliver (1)...
4545 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4546 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4549 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4550 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4551 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4552 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4553 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4559 // Generate (2) and (3):
4560 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4561 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4565 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4569 // Create and deliver (4)...
4570 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4572 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4573 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4574 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4576 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4581 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4582 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4585 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4586 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4588 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4589 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4591 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4592 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4595 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4596 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4599 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4601 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4602 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4603 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4604 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4605 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4606 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4610 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4615 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4619 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4620 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4621 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4625 fn fake_network_test() {
4626 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4627 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4628 let nodes = create_network(4);
4630 // Create some initial channels
4631 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4632 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4633 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4635 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4636 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4637 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4638 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4639 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4641 // Send some more payments
4642 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4643 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4644 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4646 // Test failure packets
4647 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4648 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4650 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4651 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4653 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4654 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4655 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4656 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4657 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4658 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4659 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4661 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4662 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4663 hops.push(RouteHop {
4664 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4665 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4667 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4669 hops.push(RouteHop {
4670 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4671 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4673 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4675 hops.push(RouteHop {
4676 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4677 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4679 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4681 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4682 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4683 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4685 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4686 hops.push(RouteHop {
4687 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4688 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4690 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4692 hops.push(RouteHop {
4693 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4694 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4696 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4698 hops.push(RouteHop {
4699 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4700 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4702 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4704 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4705 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4706 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4708 // Claim the rebalances...
4709 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4710 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4712 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4713 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4715 // Send some payments across both channels
4716 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4717 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4718 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4720 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4722 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4724 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4725 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4726 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4728 // Close down the channels...
4729 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4730 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4731 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4732 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4733 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4737 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4738 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4739 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4740 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4742 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4743 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4744 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4745 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4747 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4749 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4751 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4752 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4754 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4755 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4758 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4759 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4762 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4763 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4764 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4766 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4767 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4768 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4770 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4771 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4773 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4775 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4776 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4777 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4779 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4780 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4781 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4782 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4783 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4784 res.push(tx.clone());
4789 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4790 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4793 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4795 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4796 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4797 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4798 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4799 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4800 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4802 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4804 res.push(tx.clone());
4808 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4811 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4815 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4816 /// HTLC transaction.
4817 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4818 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4820 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4821 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4822 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4826 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4829 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4830 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4832 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4833 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4834 let mut found_prev = false;
4836 for tx in prev_txn {
4837 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4838 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4839 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4840 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4846 assert!(found_prev);
4848 let mut res = Vec::new();
4849 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4853 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4854 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4855 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4856 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4857 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4863 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4864 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4865 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4866 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4873 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4874 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4878 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4880 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4883 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4886 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4887 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4892 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4894 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4895 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4897 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4898 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4899 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4900 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4901 chan.get_value_stat()
4905 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4906 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4907 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4909 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4910 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4912 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4913 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4915 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4916 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4917 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4918 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4919 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4923 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4925 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4927 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4928 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4933 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4934 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4935 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4936 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4938 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4939 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4940 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4947 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4948 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4950 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4952 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4954 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4955 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4956 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4958 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4959 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4963 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4964 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4965 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4967 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4968 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4971 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4974 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4975 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4976 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4977 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4978 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4981 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4982 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4983 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4984 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4985 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4989 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4990 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4991 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4992 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4994 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4995 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4999 // adding pending output
5000 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5001 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5003 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5004 let payment_event_1 = {
5005 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5008 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5010 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5014 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5015 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5017 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5018 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5019 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5020 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5025 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5026 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5028 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5029 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5030 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5031 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5032 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5034 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5036 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5037 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5038 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5039 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5040 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5041 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5043 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5044 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5045 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5046 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5049 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5051 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5055 // split the rest to test holding cell
5056 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5057 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5059 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5060 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5063 // now see if they go through on both sides
5064 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5065 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5066 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5071 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5073 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5074 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5075 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5076 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5080 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5081 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5082 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5084 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5085 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5087 // flush the pending htlc
5088 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5089 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5092 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5094 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5096 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5097 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5101 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5102 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5107 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5108 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5112 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5114 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5115 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5116 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5117 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5118 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5121 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5122 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5123 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5124 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5129 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5132 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5133 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5134 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5139 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5140 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5141 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5147 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5148 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5150 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5151 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5152 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5153 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5155 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5156 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5160 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5161 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5162 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5163 let nodes = create_network(5);
5165 // Create some initial channels
5166 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5167 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5168 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5169 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5171 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5172 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5173 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5174 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5175 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5177 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5178 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5180 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5181 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5182 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5183 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5185 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5186 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5187 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5189 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5190 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5192 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5193 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5195 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5196 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5197 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5198 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5200 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5201 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5202 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5204 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5205 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5207 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5208 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5210 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5211 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5216 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5224 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5225 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5226 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5228 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5230 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5231 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5233 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5234 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5236 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5238 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5239 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5240 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5242 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5243 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5244 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5247 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5248 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5249 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5250 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5251 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5255 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5256 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5257 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5258 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5259 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5262 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5264 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5265 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5267 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5268 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5269 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5270 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5271 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5274 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5276 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5277 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5279 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5281 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5282 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5283 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5285 // Create some new channels:
5286 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5288 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5289 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5290 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5291 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5292 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5293 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5294 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5295 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5296 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5297 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5298 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5299 // Revoke the old state
5300 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5303 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5304 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5306 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5307 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5308 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5309 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5311 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5312 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5314 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5316 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5318 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5319 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5320 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5322 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5323 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5324 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5328 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5329 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5330 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5331 let nodes = create_network(2);
5332 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5333 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5334 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5335 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5336 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5337 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5338 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5339 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5341 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5342 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5343 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5344 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5345 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5347 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5349 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5350 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5352 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5353 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5354 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5358 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5359 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5360 let nodes = create_network(2);
5362 // Create some new channel:
5363 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5365 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5366 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5367 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5368 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5369 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5371 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5372 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5378 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5379 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5381 //Revoke the old state
5382 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5385 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5387 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5389 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5390 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5391 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5393 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5394 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5398 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5399 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5400 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5401 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5402 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5403 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5404 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5405 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5407 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5408 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5409 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5411 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5412 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5413 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5414 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5415 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5416 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5418 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5419 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5420 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5424 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5425 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5426 let nodes = create_network(2);
5428 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5430 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5431 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5432 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5433 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5434 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5435 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5437 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5438 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5440 //Revoke the old state
5441 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5444 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5446 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5448 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5449 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5450 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5452 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5453 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5454 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5455 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5456 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5457 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5458 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5461 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5462 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5464 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5465 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5466 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5467 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5468 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5470 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5471 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5472 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5473 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5474 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5475 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5476 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5477 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5479 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5480 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5482 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5483 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5484 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5485 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5486 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5487 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5489 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5490 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5495 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5496 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5497 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5498 let nodes = create_network(2);
5499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5501 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5502 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5504 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5505 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5507 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5508 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5514 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5515 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5517 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5518 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5521 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5524 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5525 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5531 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5532 // registering new transactions
5533 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5537 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5538 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5539 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5540 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5541 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5543 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5545 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5547 let mut payment_event = {
5548 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5551 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5553 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5557 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5559 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5560 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5562 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5566 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5567 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5569 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5570 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5571 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5572 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5575 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5576 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5578 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5580 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5581 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5582 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5584 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5585 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5586 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5588 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5589 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5595 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5596 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5597 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5598 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5599 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5603 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5604 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5606 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5607 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5608 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5610 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5611 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5616 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5618 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5619 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5620 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5622 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5623 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5627 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5628 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5630 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5634 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5635 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5636 let nodes = create_network(2);
5637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5639 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5640 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5641 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5642 mem::drop(channel_state);
5644 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5645 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5646 headers.push(header.clone());
5648 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5649 headers.push(header.clone());
5651 while !headers.is_empty() {
5652 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5655 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5658 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5659 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5664 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5665 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5666 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5669 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5670 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5672 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5673 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5674 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5675 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5676 res.push(msg.clone());
5678 panic!("Unexpected event")
5686 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5687 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5689 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5691 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5693 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5699 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5700 let mut commitment_update = None;
5701 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5704 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5705 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5706 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5707 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5709 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5710 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5711 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5712 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5717 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5720 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5722 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5723 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5724 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5725 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5727 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5728 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5729 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5730 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5736 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5741 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5742 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5743 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5744 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5745 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5746 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5747 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5749 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5750 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5751 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5752 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5754 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5755 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5757 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5760 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5761 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5762 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5763 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5765 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5766 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5768 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5771 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5772 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5773 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5775 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5777 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5778 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5779 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5780 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5781 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5782 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5783 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5786 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5789 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5790 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5791 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5792 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5794 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5796 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5797 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5798 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5801 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5804 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5805 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5806 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5807 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5809 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5810 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5812 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5813 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5816 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5817 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5819 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5820 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5821 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5822 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5823 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5824 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5825 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5828 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5832 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5834 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5835 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5836 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5837 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5838 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5839 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5840 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5843 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5846 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5847 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5848 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5849 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5851 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5853 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5854 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5855 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5856 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5858 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5859 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5860 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5861 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5862 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5864 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5865 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5867 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5868 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5871 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5872 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5874 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5875 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5876 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5877 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5878 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5879 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5880 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5883 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5889 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5890 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5891 let nodes = create_network(3);
5892 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5893 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5895 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5896 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5897 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5899 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5900 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5901 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5902 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5904 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5905 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5906 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5908 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5909 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5910 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5911 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5913 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5914 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5916 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5917 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5919 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5921 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5924 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5925 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5930 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5931 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5932 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5934 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5938 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5939 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5942 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5943 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5944 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5945 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5946 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5947 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5949 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5952 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5953 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5955 let payment_event = {
5956 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5959 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5961 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5963 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5965 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5966 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5968 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5969 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5972 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5974 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5975 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5976 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5979 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5980 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5981 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5982 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5985 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
5986 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5987 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5995 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5996 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5997 if messages_delivered < 3 {
5998 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5999 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6000 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6001 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6002 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6003 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6004 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6005 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6006 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6007 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6008 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6009 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6010 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6011 // Everything was delivered...
6012 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6015 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6016 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6018 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6022 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6023 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6024 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6026 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6027 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6029 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6030 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6032 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6033 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6034 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6039 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6043 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6044 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6045 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6046 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6047 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6048 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6049 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6050 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6051 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6052 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6057 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6058 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6060 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6061 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6063 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6064 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6069 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6070 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6072 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6074 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6075 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6076 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6079 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6080 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6081 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6082 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6086 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6087 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6095 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6096 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6097 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6098 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6099 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6100 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6101 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6102 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6104 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6105 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6110 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6111 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6112 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6113 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6114 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6115 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6116 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6117 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6118 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6119 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6120 // Everything was delivered...
6121 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6124 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6125 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6126 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6128 // Channel should still work fine...
6129 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6130 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6134 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6135 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6136 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6137 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6138 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6142 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6143 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6144 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6145 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6149 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6150 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6151 let nodes = create_network(2);
6152 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6154 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6155 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6157 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6158 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6161 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6162 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6167 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6168 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6169 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6171 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6172 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6177 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6178 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6179 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6180 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6182 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6183 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6185 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6186 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6187 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6191 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6192 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6193 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6194 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6195 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6197 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6199 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6200 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6201 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6203 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6206 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6207 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6216 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6217 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6219 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6220 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6221 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6222 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6223 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6224 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6225 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6228 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6229 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6231 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6232 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6237 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6238 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6239 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6245 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6246 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6248 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6249 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6250 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6251 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6252 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6253 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6255 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6256 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6257 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6258 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6260 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6261 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6263 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6264 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6266 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6268 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6269 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6270 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6271 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6272 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6273 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6275 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6276 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6279 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6280 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6281 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6282 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6283 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6284 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6285 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6288 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6289 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6290 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6291 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6292 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6293 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6294 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6297 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6298 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6299 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6303 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6304 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6308 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6312 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6314 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6318 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6319 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6321 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6322 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6324 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6325 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6330 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6331 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6334 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6338 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6339 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6340 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6343 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6344 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6346 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6347 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6351 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6353 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6357 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6358 // PaymentFailed event
6360 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6363 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6364 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6365 // a disconnect in between
6366 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6367 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6369 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6370 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6372 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6373 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6376 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6377 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6378 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6381 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6386 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6387 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6390 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6391 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6392 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6393 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6394 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6395 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6397 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6399 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6400 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6402 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6403 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6404 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6409 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6411 // Now set it to failed again...
6412 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6413 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6414 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6417 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6418 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6419 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6422 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6423 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6424 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6427 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6428 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6429 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6433 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6435 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6439 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6440 // PaymentFailed event
6442 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6446 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6447 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6448 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6451 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6452 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6454 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6455 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6456 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6457 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6458 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6459 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6460 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6461 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6462 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6463 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6464 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6465 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6466 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6467 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6468 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6469 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6470 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6471 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6472 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6474 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6476 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6477 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6478 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6480 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6481 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6485 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6486 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6488 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6489 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6490 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6492 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6493 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6494 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6495 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6496 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6497 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6498 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6499 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6500 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6501 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6503 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6504 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6505 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6506 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6508 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6509 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6511 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6514 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6515 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6516 } else { panic!(); }
6519 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6524 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6525 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6526 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6529 // Now fix monitor updating...
6530 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6531 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6534 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6535 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6536 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6538 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6539 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6540 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6541 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6542 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6543 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6545 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6546 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6547 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6548 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6550 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6551 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6553 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6556 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6557 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6558 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6560 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6561 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6562 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6563 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6564 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6565 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6567 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6569 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6570 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6572 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6574 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6575 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6577 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6578 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6579 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6581 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6582 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6583 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6585 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6586 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6587 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6588 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6589 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6590 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6592 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6594 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6595 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6596 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6598 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6599 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6604 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6605 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6606 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6609 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6613 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6614 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6616 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6617 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6618 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6620 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6621 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6624 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6626 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6627 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6628 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6629 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6630 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6637 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6640 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6641 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6642 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6645 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6646 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6648 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6649 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6651 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6652 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6655 let as_commitment_update;
6656 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6658 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6659 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6660 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6661 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6662 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6663 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6664 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6665 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6670 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6671 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6672 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6673 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6674 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6675 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6676 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6680 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6683 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6684 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6686 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6687 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6689 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6690 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6692 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6695 handle_initial_raa!();
6697 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6698 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6700 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6701 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6703 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6704 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6707 handle_initial_raa!();
6709 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6710 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6712 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6713 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6715 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6716 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6718 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6723 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6724 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6726 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6727 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6729 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6730 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6734 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6735 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6736 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6739 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6740 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6741 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6744 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6745 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6748 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6749 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6752 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6754 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6755 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6757 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6758 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6759 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6764 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6768 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6769 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6770 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6771 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6772 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6773 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6774 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6778 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6779 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6780 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6781 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6782 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6786 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6787 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6788 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6789 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6790 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6791 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6795 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6796 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6797 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6798 let nodes = create_network(2);
6800 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6802 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6803 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6804 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6805 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6807 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6809 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6810 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6812 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6813 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6815 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6817 let mut chan_announcement;
6819 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6821 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6822 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6823 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6824 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6825 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6826 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6827 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6828 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6829 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6834 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6835 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6836 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6837 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6838 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6839 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6840 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6841 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6842 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6843 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6844 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6845 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6846 contents: $unsigned_msg
6851 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6852 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6853 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6854 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6856 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6857 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6858 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6859 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6860 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6862 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6863 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6864 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6865 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6868 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
6869 impl Writer for VecWriter {
6870 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
6871 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
6874 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
6875 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
6880 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6881 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6883 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6885 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6887 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6888 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6889 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6891 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6892 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6893 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6894 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6896 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6897 let config = UserConfig::new();
6898 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6899 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6900 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6901 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6902 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6903 default_config: config,
6905 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6906 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6907 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
6908 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
6909 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
6910 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
6913 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
6915 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
6916 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
6917 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
6918 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
6919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6924 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6925 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6928 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6929 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6930 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6932 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
6933 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
6934 for node in nodes.iter() {
6935 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
6936 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
6937 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
6940 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6944 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6945 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6946 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6948 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6949 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6951 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6953 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6954 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6955 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6957 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6958 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6959 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6960 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6962 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6963 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6964 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6965 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6966 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6967 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6968 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
6970 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6971 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6972 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
6973 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
6974 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
6975 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
6978 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
6980 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
6981 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
6982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6984 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6986 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
6987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
6991 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
6992 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
6993 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
6994 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
6996 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
6998 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7000 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7001 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7003 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7004 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7005 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7006 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7008 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7010 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7011 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7012 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7013 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7014 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7017 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7018 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7019 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7020 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7021 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7022 assert!(read.is_empty());
7023 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7026 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7027 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7028 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7029 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7031 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7032 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7033 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7034 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7035 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7036 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7038 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7040 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7041 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7042 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7043 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7044 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7047 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7048 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7051 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7053 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7054 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7055 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7056 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7057 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7059 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7060 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7061 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7062 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7063 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7064 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }