1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
23 use util::logger::Logger;
24 use util::errors::APIError;
27 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
28 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
29 use crypto::digest::Digest;
30 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
33 use std::collections::HashMap;
34 use std::collections::hash_map;
35 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
36 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
37 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
39 mod channel_held_info {
42 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
43 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
44 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
45 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
46 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
47 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
48 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
49 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
50 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
53 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
54 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
55 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
56 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
59 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
60 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
61 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
62 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
66 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
67 impl PendingHTLCStatus {
68 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
69 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 payment_hash: [0; 32],
73 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
75 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
83 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
91 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
93 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
94 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
95 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
100 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
101 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
102 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
103 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
105 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
106 IntermediaryHopData {
107 source_short_channel_id: u64,
108 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
112 session_priv: SecretKey,
114 /// Used for channel rebalancing
116 source_short_channel_id: u64,
117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
119 session_priv: SecretKey,
123 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
124 err: msgs::HandleError,
125 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
127 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
129 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
133 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
136 data: err.to_string()
140 needs_channel_force_close: false,
144 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
145 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
149 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
150 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
151 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
152 /// probably increase this significantly.
153 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
155 struct ChannelHolder {
156 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
157 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
158 next_forward: Instant,
159 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
160 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
161 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
162 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
163 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
164 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
165 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
167 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
169 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
170 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
171 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
172 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
173 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
174 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
177 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
179 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
180 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
181 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
182 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
183 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
188 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
189 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
191 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
192 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
193 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
194 /// to individual Channels.
195 pub struct ChannelManager {
196 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
197 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
198 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
199 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
200 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
202 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
203 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
204 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
205 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
207 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
208 our_network_key: SecretKey,
210 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
215 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
217 macro_rules! secp_call {
218 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
221 Err(_) => return Err($err),
228 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
230 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
231 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
236 pub struct ChannelDetails {
237 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
238 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
239 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
240 /// lifetime of the channel.
241 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
242 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
243 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
244 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
245 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
246 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
247 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
251 impl ChannelManager {
252 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
253 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
254 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
255 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
256 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
257 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
258 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
260 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
261 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
262 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
263 monitor: monitor.clone(),
267 announce_channels_publicly,
268 fee_proportional_millionths,
269 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
272 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
273 by_id: HashMap::new(),
274 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
275 next_forward: Instant::now(),
276 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
277 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
281 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
285 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
286 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
290 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
291 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
292 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
293 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
294 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
295 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
296 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
297 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
298 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
299 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
301 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
302 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
303 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
304 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
305 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
306 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
307 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
308 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
311 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
312 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
313 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
315 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
319 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
320 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
321 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
322 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
323 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
327 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
328 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
329 node_id: their_network_key,
335 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
336 /// more information.
337 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
338 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
339 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
340 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
341 res.push(ChannelDetails {
342 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
343 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
344 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
345 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
346 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
352 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
353 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
354 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
355 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
356 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
357 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
358 if channel.is_usable() {
359 res.push(ChannelDetails {
360 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
361 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
362 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
363 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
364 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
371 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
372 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
373 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
374 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
375 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
376 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
378 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
379 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
381 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
382 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
383 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
384 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
386 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
387 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
392 for payment_hash in res.1 {
393 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
396 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
397 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
402 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
403 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
404 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
408 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
417 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
418 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
419 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
420 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
423 for tx in local_txn {
424 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
426 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
427 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
428 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
429 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
430 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
433 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
434 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
435 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
437 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
438 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
439 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
440 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
441 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
448 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
449 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
450 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
451 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
457 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
458 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
459 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
460 for chan in self.list_channels() {
461 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
466 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
468 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
469 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
470 let mut res = [0; 32];
471 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
475 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
476 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
477 let mut res = [0; 32];
478 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
484 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
485 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
486 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
487 let mut res = [0; 32];
488 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
493 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
494 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
495 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
496 let mut res = [0; 32];
497 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
501 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
503 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
504 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
505 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
507 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
508 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
510 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
511 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
512 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
513 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
514 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
516 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
518 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
519 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
521 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
527 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
528 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
529 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
531 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
532 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
538 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
548 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
549 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
550 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
551 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
552 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
553 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
554 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
555 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
557 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
558 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
559 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
560 // the intended recipient).
561 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
562 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
563 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
565 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
566 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
567 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
568 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
572 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
573 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
574 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
576 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
577 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
578 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
580 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
582 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
586 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
588 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
596 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
597 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
599 for i in 0..dst.len() {
604 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
605 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
606 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
607 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
610 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
611 let end_len = iters * 65;
612 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
613 res.resize(end_len, 0);
615 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
616 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
617 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
618 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
619 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
624 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
625 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
627 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
628 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
629 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
630 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
632 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
633 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
634 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
637 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
640 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
641 hmac.input(&packet_data);
642 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
643 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
646 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
648 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
649 hop_data: packet_data,
654 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
655 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
656 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
657 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
659 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
660 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
661 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
662 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
663 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
664 data: packet_crypted,
668 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
669 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
671 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
674 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
675 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
676 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
677 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
681 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
682 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
685 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
687 failuremsg: failuremsg,
691 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
692 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
693 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
699 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
700 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
701 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
704 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, Option<SharedSecret>, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
705 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
708 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
709 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
710 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
711 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
717 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
718 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
719 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
720 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
721 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
722 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
723 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
724 })), None, self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
727 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
728 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
730 let mut channel_state = None;
731 macro_rules! return_err {
732 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
734 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
735 if channel_state.is_none() {
736 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
738 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
739 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
740 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
741 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
742 })), Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap());
747 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
748 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
749 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
750 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
751 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
752 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
753 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
754 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
757 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
758 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
759 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
760 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
761 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
764 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
765 let next_hop_data = {
766 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
767 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
768 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
770 let error_code = match err {
771 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
772 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
774 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
780 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
782 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
784 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
785 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
787 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
788 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
791 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
792 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
793 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
794 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
796 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
798 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
800 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
801 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
802 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
805 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
806 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
807 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
809 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
811 let blinding_factor = {
812 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
813 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
814 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
815 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
816 sha.result(&mut res);
817 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
819 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
825 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
826 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
829 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
831 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
832 hop_data: new_packet_data,
833 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
836 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
837 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
838 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
839 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
840 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
841 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
842 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
846 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
847 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
848 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
849 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
850 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
852 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
854 Some(id) => id.clone(),
856 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
857 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
859 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
861 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
862 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
863 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
865 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
866 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
873 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
878 (pending_forward_info, Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap())
881 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
882 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
883 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
884 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
888 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
890 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
891 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
892 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
893 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
894 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
895 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
896 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
897 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
898 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
899 excess_data: Vec::new(),
902 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
903 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
905 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
911 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
912 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
913 /// fields for more info.
914 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
915 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
916 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
917 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
918 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
919 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
920 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
921 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
922 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
923 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
924 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
926 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
927 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
928 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
929 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
933 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
934 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
935 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
937 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
939 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
941 //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for
943 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
944 HandleError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
945 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
946 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
948 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
949 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
950 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
952 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
953 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
954 Some(id) => id.clone()
957 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
958 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
959 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
963 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
964 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
965 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
967 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
970 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
972 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
978 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
979 None => return Ok(()),
983 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
984 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
987 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
988 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
989 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
990 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
991 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
992 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
994 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1001 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1002 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1003 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1004 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1005 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1007 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1010 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1011 pending_events.push($event);
1016 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1017 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1018 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1020 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1021 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1022 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1025 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1026 mem::drop(channel_state);
1027 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1028 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1037 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1038 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1039 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1041 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1042 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1047 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1049 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1057 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1058 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1060 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1062 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1064 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1065 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1067 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1068 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1069 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1070 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1071 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1075 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1076 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1077 /// Will likely generate further events.
1078 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1079 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1080 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1082 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1083 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1085 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1089 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1090 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1091 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1092 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1094 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1095 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1096 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1101 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1103 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1104 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1105 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1107 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1108 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1113 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1115 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1116 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1117 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1118 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1119 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1120 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1121 // this channel currently :/.
1128 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1129 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1132 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1136 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1137 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1138 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1139 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1140 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1141 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1142 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1143 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1148 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1149 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1150 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1151 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1158 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1159 match failed_forward.2 {
1160 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
1161 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1165 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1167 new_events.retain(|event| {
1168 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1169 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1170 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1176 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1177 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1178 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1179 events.push(event.1);
1183 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1184 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1185 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
1188 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1189 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1190 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1191 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1192 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1193 /// still-available channels.
1194 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
1195 let mut pending_htlc = {
1196 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
1197 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1198 None => return false,
1202 match pending_htlc {
1203 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1204 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
1208 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1213 match pending_htlc {
1214 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1215 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1216 mem::drop(channel_state);
1218 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1219 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1220 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1224 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
1225 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1226 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1227 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1228 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1230 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1231 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1235 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1236 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1237 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1238 None => return false
1241 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1242 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1243 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1245 //TODO: Do something with e?
1252 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1253 mem::drop(channel_state);
1255 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1256 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1259 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1260 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1262 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1263 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1264 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1265 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1266 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1267 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1279 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1280 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1281 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1282 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1283 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1284 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1286 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1287 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1288 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1289 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1290 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1292 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1293 let mut pending_htlc = {
1294 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1295 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1296 None => return false,
1300 match pending_htlc {
1301 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1302 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1303 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1304 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1305 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1306 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1307 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1308 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1314 match pending_htlc {
1315 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1316 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1318 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1320 mem::drop(channel_state);
1321 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1322 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1327 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1328 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1329 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1330 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1332 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1333 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1339 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1340 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1341 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1343 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1344 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1345 //TODO: Do something with e?
1351 mem::drop(channel_state);
1352 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1353 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1354 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1358 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1359 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1360 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1362 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1363 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1364 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1365 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1366 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1376 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1377 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1378 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1381 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1382 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1384 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1388 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1389 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1390 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1392 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1397 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1399 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1400 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1401 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1402 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1403 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1404 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1405 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1406 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1409 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1410 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1411 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1413 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1417 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1418 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1419 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1424 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1425 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1426 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1427 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1428 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1433 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1434 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1435 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1436 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1438 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1439 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1440 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1441 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1442 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1443 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1444 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1445 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1446 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1447 msg: funding_locked,
1448 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1450 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1451 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1452 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1453 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1456 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1460 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1461 for tx in txn_matched {
1462 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1463 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1464 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1465 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1467 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1468 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1469 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1470 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1472 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1481 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1482 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1483 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1485 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1486 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1487 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1488 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1489 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1490 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1491 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1500 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1501 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1503 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1504 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1505 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1507 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1510 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1511 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1512 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1513 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1515 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1516 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1517 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1518 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1519 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1520 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1521 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1523 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1524 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1525 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1535 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1536 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1538 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1539 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1540 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1541 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1544 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1548 macro_rules! handle_error {
1549 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
1552 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
1553 if needs_channel_force_close {
1555 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
1556 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1557 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1559 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1562 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
1563 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
1564 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
1565 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1566 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1568 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1580 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1581 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1582 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1583 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1586 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1587 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1588 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1591 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1592 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1594 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1595 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1597 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1602 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1603 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1604 output_script: output_script,
1605 user_channel_id: user_id,
1610 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1611 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1612 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1615 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1616 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1618 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1619 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1620 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1623 //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
1628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1630 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1631 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1632 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1633 // for a bogus channel.
1634 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1637 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1640 return Err(HandleError {
1641 err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
1642 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
1645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1652 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1653 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1654 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1655 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1657 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1658 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1660 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1661 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1663 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1666 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1669 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1670 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1671 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1672 user_channel_id: user_id,
1677 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1679 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1681 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1682 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1684 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1685 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1687 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1691 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1692 let (res, chan_option) = {
1693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1694 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1698 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1699 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1701 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1702 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1703 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1704 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1706 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1707 } else { (res, None) }
1709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1712 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1713 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1716 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1717 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1718 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1719 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1727 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1728 let (res, chan_option) = {
1729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1733 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1734 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1736 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1737 if res.1.is_some() {
1738 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1739 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1740 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1741 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1742 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1743 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1744 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1746 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1747 } else { (res, None) }
1749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1752 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1753 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1755 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1757 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1758 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1766 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1767 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1768 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1769 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1771 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1772 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1773 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1774 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1776 let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1777 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1779 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1781 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1782 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1783 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1784 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1785 let mut will_forward = false;
1786 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1787 if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1788 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1789 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1790 acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
1792 if !acceptable_cycle {
1793 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
1794 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1795 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1796 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1797 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret.unwrap(), 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1800 will_forward = true;
1803 will_forward = true;
1807 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1809 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1810 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1812 if !chan.is_usable() {
1813 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1815 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1816 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
1817 forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1819 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1821 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1825 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1827 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1828 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1829 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1830 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1832 _ => unreachable!(),
1834 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1835 source_short_channel_id,
1836 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1842 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1843 source_short_channel_id,
1844 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1853 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1854 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1855 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1856 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1857 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1859 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1860 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1862 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1863 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1865 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1867 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1871 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1872 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1873 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1875 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1876 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1878 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1880 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1883 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1884 match pending_htlc {
1885 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1886 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1887 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1889 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1890 if res.is_some() { return; }
1892 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1894 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1895 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1896 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1897 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1898 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1900 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1901 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1902 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1904 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1905 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1906 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1907 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1908 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1909 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1910 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1911 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1912 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1913 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1914 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1915 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1916 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1917 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1925 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1926 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1927 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1928 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1931 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1946 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1947 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1948 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1950 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1951 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1953 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1955 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1959 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1960 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1961 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1962 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1964 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1965 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1967 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1969 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1972 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1976 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1979 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1980 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1981 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1982 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1984 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1985 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1987 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1989 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1992 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1995 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1999 let mut forward_event = None;
2000 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2001 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2003 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2004 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2006 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2007 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2009 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
2011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2012 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
2017 match forward_event {
2019 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2020 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2021 time_forwardable: time
2030 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2031 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2032 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2034 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2035 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2037 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
2039 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2043 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2044 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
2045 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2048 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2049 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) })
2051 if !chan.is_usable() {
2052 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
2055 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2056 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
2058 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2059 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2060 let bad_sig_action = msgs::HandleError {err: "Invalid signature in announcement_signatures", action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: msg.channel_id.clone(), data: "Invalid signature in announcement_signatures".to_string()}}};
2061 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2062 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2064 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2066 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2067 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2068 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2069 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2070 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2071 contents: announcement,
2072 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2074 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})
2077 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2078 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2082 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2083 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2084 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2086 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2087 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2088 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2089 if no_connection_possible {
2090 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2091 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2092 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2093 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2095 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2096 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2097 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2107 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
2108 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2109 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
2110 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
2116 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2117 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2119 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2120 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2121 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2122 pending_events.push(event);
2127 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2128 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2129 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2130 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2131 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2135 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2142 use chain::chaininterface;
2143 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2144 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2145 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2146 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2148 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2149 use util::test_utils;
2150 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2151 use util::logger::Logger;
2153 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2154 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2155 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2156 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2157 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2158 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2159 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2163 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2164 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2166 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2167 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2169 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2171 use std::collections::HashMap;
2172 use std::default::Default;
2173 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2174 use std::time::Instant;
2177 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2178 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2179 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2184 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2185 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2188 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2189 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2192 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2193 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2196 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2197 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2200 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2201 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2206 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2208 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2209 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2214 fn onion_vectors() {
2215 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2216 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2218 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2219 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2220 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2221 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2222 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2224 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2225 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2226 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2227 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2228 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2230 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2231 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2232 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2233 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2234 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2236 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2237 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2238 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2239 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2240 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2242 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2243 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2244 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2245 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2246 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2248 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2249 let payloads = vec!(
2250 msgs::OnionHopData {
2252 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2253 short_channel_id: 0,
2255 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2259 msgs::OnionHopData {
2261 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2262 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2263 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2264 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2268 msgs::OnionHopData {
2270 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2271 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2272 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2273 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2277 msgs::OnionHopData {
2279 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2280 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2281 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2282 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2286 msgs::OnionHopData {
2288 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2289 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2290 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2291 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2297 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2298 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2300 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2304 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2305 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2307 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2308 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2309 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2311 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2312 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2314 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2315 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2317 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2318 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2320 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2321 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap());
2323 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2324 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2327 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2328 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2329 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2330 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2332 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2333 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2338 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2339 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2340 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2341 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2345 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2346 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2347 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2349 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2350 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2351 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2352 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2353 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2354 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2359 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2361 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2365 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2366 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2368 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2369 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2370 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2372 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2373 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2375 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2377 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2378 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2379 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2380 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2381 added_monitors.clear();
2383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2386 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2387 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2388 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2389 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2390 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2391 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2392 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2393 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2394 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2395 added_monitors.clear();
2398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2401 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2403 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2404 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2405 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2406 added_monitors.clear();
2409 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2410 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2412 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2413 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2414 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2419 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2420 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2421 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2423 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2424 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2425 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2426 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2433 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2434 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2435 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2436 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2437 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2438 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2439 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2440 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2441 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2442 as_announcement_sigs
2444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2447 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2448 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2449 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2450 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2456 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2457 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2458 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2459 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2460 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2461 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2471 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2474 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2475 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2477 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2478 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2479 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2481 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2484 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2485 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2486 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2489 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2490 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2491 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2492 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2493 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2494 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2500 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2501 if !close_inbound_first {
2502 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2504 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2505 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2506 if close_inbound_first {
2507 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2508 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2509 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2510 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2512 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2513 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2514 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2515 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2517 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2518 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2519 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2521 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2522 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2523 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2524 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2526 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2527 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2528 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2529 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2531 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2532 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2533 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2534 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2540 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2541 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2542 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2543 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2549 (as_update, bs_update)
2554 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2555 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2558 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2560 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2561 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2562 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2563 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2564 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2571 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2572 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2573 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2574 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2575 let our_payment_hash = {
2576 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2577 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2578 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2579 sha.result(&mut ret);
2583 let mut payment_event = {
2584 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2586 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2587 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2588 added_monitors.clear();
2591 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2593 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2595 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2597 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2598 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2600 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2602 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2603 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2606 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2608 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2609 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2610 added_monitors.clear();
2612 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2613 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2615 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2616 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2617 added_monitors.clear();
2619 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2620 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2622 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2623 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2624 added_monitors.clear();
2627 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2628 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2630 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2634 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2635 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2637 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2638 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2639 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2641 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2642 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2643 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2649 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2650 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2651 added_monitors.clear();
2653 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2654 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2660 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2663 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2664 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2666 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2667 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2668 added_monitors.clear();
2671 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2672 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2673 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2675 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2677 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2679 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2681 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2683 added_monitors.clear();
2685 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2687 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2688 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2689 added_monitors.clear();
2691 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2692 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2693 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2695 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2696 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2697 added_monitors.clear();
2699 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2701 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2702 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2703 added_monitors.clear();
2709 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2710 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2711 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2712 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2713 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2714 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2717 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2718 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2720 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2721 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2722 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2723 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2724 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2725 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2726 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2734 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2735 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2737 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2740 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2741 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2747 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2749 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2750 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2751 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2752 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2753 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2756 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2759 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2760 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2761 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2762 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2763 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2766 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2767 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2768 let our_payment_hash = {
2769 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2770 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2771 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2772 sha.result(&mut ret);
2776 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2777 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2780 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2781 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2782 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2785 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2786 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2788 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2789 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2790 added_monitors.clear();
2793 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2794 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2795 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2797 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2798 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2801 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2802 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2803 added_monitors.clear();
2805 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2807 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2808 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2809 added_monitors.clear();
2811 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2813 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2814 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2815 added_monitors.clear();
2817 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2818 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2819 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2821 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2823 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2825 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2826 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2828 added_monitors.clear();
2834 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2835 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2836 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2837 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2838 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2839 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2842 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2845 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2846 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2847 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2848 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2849 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2850 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2851 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2853 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2859 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2860 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2862 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2865 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2866 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2872 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2873 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2874 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2875 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2876 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2878 for _ in 0..node_count {
2879 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2880 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2881 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2882 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2884 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2885 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2886 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2888 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2889 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2890 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
2897 fn fake_network_test() {
2898 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2899 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2900 let nodes = create_network(4);
2902 // Create some initial channels
2903 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2904 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2905 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2907 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2908 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2909 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2910 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2911 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2913 // Send some more payments
2914 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2915 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2916 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2918 // Test failure packets
2919 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2920 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2922 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2923 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2925 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2926 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2927 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2928 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2929 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2930 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2931 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2933 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2934 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2935 hops.push(RouteHop {
2936 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2937 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2939 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2941 hops.push(RouteHop {
2942 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2943 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2945 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2947 hops.push(RouteHop {
2948 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2949 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2951 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2953 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2954 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2955 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2957 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2958 hops.push(RouteHop {
2959 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2960 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2962 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2964 hops.push(RouteHop {
2965 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2966 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2968 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2970 hops.push(RouteHop {
2971 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2972 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2974 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2976 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2977 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2978 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2980 // Claim the rebalances...
2981 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2982 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2984 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2985 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2987 // Send some payments across both channels
2988 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2989 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2990 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2992 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2994 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2996 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3000 // Close down the channels...
3001 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3002 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3003 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3004 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3005 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3007 // Check that we processed all pending events
3009 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3010 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3014 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3015 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3016 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3017 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3018 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3020 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3022 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3023 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3025 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3026 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3027 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3028 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3029 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3030 res.push(tx.clone());
3034 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3036 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3037 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3038 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3039 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3040 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3041 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3042 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3043 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3045 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3047 res.push(tx.clone());
3051 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3057 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3058 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3060 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3061 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3062 let mut found_prev = false;
3064 for tx in prev_txn {
3065 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3066 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3067 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3068 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3070 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3071 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3077 assert!(found_prev);
3079 let mut res = Vec::new();
3080 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3084 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3085 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3086 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3087 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3088 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3094 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3096 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3097 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3104 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3105 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3110 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3111 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3112 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3113 let nodes = create_network(5);
3115 // Create some initial channels
3116 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3117 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3118 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3119 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3121 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3122 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3124 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3125 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3127 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3128 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3130 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3131 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3132 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3133 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3135 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3136 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3137 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3139 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3140 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3142 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3143 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3145 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3146 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3147 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3148 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3150 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3151 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3152 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3154 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3155 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3157 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3159 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3160 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3161 added_monitors.clear();
3164 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3167 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3168 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3169 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3170 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3179 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3180 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3182 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3184 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3185 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3187 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3188 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3190 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3192 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3193 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3194 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3196 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3197 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3200 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3201 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3202 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3203 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3204 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3207 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3209 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3210 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3212 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3213 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3214 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3215 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3216 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3219 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3221 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3222 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3224 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3226 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3227 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3228 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3230 // Create some new channels:
3231 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3233 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3234 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3235 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3236 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3237 // Revoke the old state
3238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3241 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3242 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3244 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3245 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3246 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3248 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3249 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3250 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3251 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3253 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3255 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3256 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3257 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3258 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3260 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3261 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3263 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3267 // Check that we processed all pending events
3269 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3270 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3275 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3276 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3277 let nodes = create_network(2);
3278 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3280 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3281 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3282 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3283 mem::drop(channel_state);
3285 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3286 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3287 headers.push(header.clone());
3289 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3290 headers.push(header.clone());
3292 while !headers.is_empty() {
3293 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3295 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3296 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3297 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3301 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3302 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3303 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3304 let nodes = create_network(2);
3306 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3308 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3310 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3311 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3313 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3315 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3316 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3318 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3319 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3321 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3323 let mut chan_announcement;
3325 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3327 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3328 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3329 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3330 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3331 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3332 node_id_2: if !were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3333 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3334 bitcoin_key_2: if !were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3335 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3340 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3341 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3342 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3343 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3344 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3345 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3346 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3347 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3348 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3349 node_signature_2 : if !were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3350 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3351 bitcoin_signature_2 : if !were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3352 contents: $unsigned_msg
3357 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3358 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3359 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3360 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3362 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3363 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3364 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3365 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3366 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3368 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3369 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3370 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3371 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());