1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
30 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
36 mod channel_held_info {
39 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
40 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
41 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
42 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
43 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
44 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
46 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
49 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
50 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
51 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
54 payment_hash: [0; 32],
56 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
58 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
66 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
74 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
76 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
77 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
78 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
83 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
84 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
85 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
86 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
88 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
90 source_short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
95 session_priv: SecretKey,
97 /// Used for channel rebalancing
99 source_short_channel_id: u64,
100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
106 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
107 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
108 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
109 /// probably increase this significantly.
110 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
112 struct ChannelHolder {
113 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
114 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
115 next_forward: Instant,
116 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
117 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
118 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
120 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
121 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
122 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
123 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
124 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
125 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
126 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
129 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
131 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
132 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
133 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
134 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
135 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
136 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
141 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
142 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
143 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
144 /// to individual Channels.
145 pub struct ChannelManager {
146 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
147 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
148 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
149 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
150 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
152 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
153 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
156 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
157 our_network_key: SecretKey,
159 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
162 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
164 macro_rules! secp_call {
168 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
169 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
176 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
178 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
179 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
184 pub struct ChannelDetails {
185 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
186 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
187 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
188 /// lifetime of the channel.
189 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
192 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
193 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
194 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
195 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
199 impl ChannelManager {
200 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
201 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
202 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
203 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
204 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
205 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
208 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
209 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
210 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
211 monitor: monitor.clone(),
215 announce_channels_publicly,
216 fee_proportional_millionths,
219 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
220 by_id: HashMap::new(),
221 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
222 next_forward: Instant::now(),
223 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
224 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
230 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
231 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
235 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
236 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
237 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
238 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
239 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
240 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
241 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
242 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
243 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
245 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
246 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
247 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
248 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
249 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
250 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
251 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
252 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
255 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
256 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
257 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
259 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
263 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
264 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
265 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
266 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
267 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
271 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
272 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
273 node_id: their_network_key,
279 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
280 /// more information.
281 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
282 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
283 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
284 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
285 res.push(ChannelDetails {
286 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
287 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
288 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
289 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
290 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
296 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
297 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
298 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
299 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
300 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
301 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
302 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
303 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
306 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
307 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
308 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
309 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
311 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
312 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
317 for payment_hash in res.1 {
318 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
319 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
321 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
322 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
327 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
328 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
329 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
333 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
342 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
344 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
345 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
346 let mut res = [0; 32];
347 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
351 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
352 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
353 let mut res = [0; 32];
354 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
360 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
361 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
362 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
363 let mut res = [0; 32];
364 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
369 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
370 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
371 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
372 let mut res = [0; 32];
373 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
377 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
379 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
380 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
381 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
382 let mut first_iteration = true;
384 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
385 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
387 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
388 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
389 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
390 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
391 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
394 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
395 first_iteration = false;
397 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
399 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
400 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
402 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
408 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
409 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
410 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
412 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
413 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
419 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
429 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
430 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
431 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
432 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
433 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
434 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
435 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
436 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
438 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
439 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
440 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
441 // the intended recipient).
442 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
443 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
444 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
446 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
447 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
448 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
449 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
453 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
454 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
455 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
457 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
458 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
459 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
461 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
463 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
467 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
469 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
477 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
478 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
480 for i in 0..dst.len() {
485 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
486 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
487 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
488 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
491 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
492 let end_len = iters * 65;
493 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
494 res.resize(end_len, 0);
496 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
497 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
498 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
499 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
500 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
505 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
506 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
508 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
509 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
510 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
511 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
513 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
514 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
515 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
518 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
521 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
522 hmac.input(&packet_data);
523 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
524 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
527 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
529 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
530 hop_data: packet_data,
535 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
536 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
537 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
538 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
540 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
541 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
542 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
543 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
544 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
545 data: packet_crypted,
549 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
550 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
552 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
555 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
556 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
557 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
558 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
562 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
563 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
566 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
568 failuremsg: failuremsg,
572 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
573 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
574 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
580 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
581 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
582 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
585 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
586 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
587 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
588 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
592 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
594 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
595 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
596 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
597 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
598 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
599 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
600 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
601 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
602 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
605 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
606 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
608 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
614 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
615 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
616 /// fields for more info.
617 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
618 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
619 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
620 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
621 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
623 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
624 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
625 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
626 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
630 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
631 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
632 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
636 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
638 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
639 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
640 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
642 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
643 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
644 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
645 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
646 Some(id) => id.clone()
649 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
650 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
651 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
653 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
656 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
658 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
662 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
663 // third-party might make this happen:
664 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
668 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
669 None => return Ok(()),
673 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
674 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
677 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
678 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
679 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
680 msgs: vec![update_add],
681 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
686 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
687 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
688 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
689 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
690 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
691 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
693 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
695 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
698 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
705 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
706 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
707 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
710 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
711 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
712 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
717 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
718 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
721 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
722 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
724 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
725 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
726 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
728 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
729 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
730 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
731 node_signature: our_node_sig,
732 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
736 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
737 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
738 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
741 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
743 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
747 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
748 if short_chan_id != 0 {
749 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
750 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
752 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
753 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
754 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
759 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
761 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
762 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
763 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
765 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
766 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
771 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
773 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
774 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
775 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
776 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
777 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
778 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
779 // this channel currently :/.
786 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
787 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
790 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
794 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
795 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
797 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
801 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
802 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
803 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
804 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
811 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
812 match failed_forward.2 {
813 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
814 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
818 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
820 new_events.retain(|event| {
821 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
822 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
823 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
829 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
830 events.reserve(new_events.len());
831 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
832 events.push(event.1);
836 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
837 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
838 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
841 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
842 let mut pending_htlc = {
843 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
844 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
845 None => return false,
850 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
851 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
855 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
861 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
862 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
863 mem::drop(channel_state);
865 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
866 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
867 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
871 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
872 let err_packet = match onion_error {
873 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
874 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
875 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
877 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
878 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
882 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
883 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
884 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
888 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
889 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
890 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
892 //TODO: Do something with e?
899 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
900 mem::drop(channel_state);
902 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
903 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
906 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
907 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
910 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
921 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
922 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
923 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
924 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
925 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
926 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
928 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
929 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
930 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
931 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
932 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
934 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
935 let mut pending_htlc = {
936 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
937 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
938 None => return false,
943 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
944 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
945 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
946 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
947 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
948 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
949 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
950 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
957 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
958 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
960 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
962 mem::drop(channel_state);
963 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
964 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
969 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
970 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
971 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
972 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
976 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
977 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
978 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
980 //TODO: Do something with e?
986 mem::drop(channel_state);
988 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
989 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
990 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
993 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
994 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1007 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1008 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1009 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1012 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1013 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1015 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1020 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1021 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1022 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1023 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1024 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1029 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1030 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1031 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1033 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1034 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1035 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1036 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1037 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1038 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1041 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1045 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1046 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1047 msg: funding_locked,
1048 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1050 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1052 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1053 for tx in txn_matched {
1054 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1055 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1056 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1057 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1059 channel.force_shutdown();
1060 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1061 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1070 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1071 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1072 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1074 channel.force_shutdown();
1075 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1076 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1084 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1085 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1087 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1088 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1091 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1092 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1093 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1097 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1098 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1099 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1100 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1101 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1102 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1103 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1104 let tx = v.force_shutdown();
1105 for broadcast_tx in tx {
1106 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1108 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1109 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1119 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1120 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1121 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1122 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1123 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1125 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1126 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1127 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1130 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1132 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1133 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1134 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1135 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1136 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1137 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1138 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1139 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1142 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1143 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1144 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1146 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1150 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1151 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1152 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1156 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1157 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1158 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1159 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1161 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1162 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1164 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1165 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1167 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1170 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1171 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1172 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1173 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1174 output_script: output_script,
1175 user_channel_id: user_id,
1180 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1181 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1182 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1183 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1184 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1185 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1186 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1188 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1189 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1191 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1192 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1193 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1200 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1202 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1203 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1204 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1205 // for a bogus channel.
1206 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1209 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1210 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1214 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1215 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1216 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1217 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1219 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1220 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1222 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1223 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1225 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1228 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1231 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1232 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1233 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1234 user_channel_id: user_id,
1239 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1240 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1241 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1243 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1244 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1246 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1247 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1249 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1253 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1254 let (res, chan_option) = {
1255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1258 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1260 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1261 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1263 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1264 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1265 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1266 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1268 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1269 } else { (res, None) }
1271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1274 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1275 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1278 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1279 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1280 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1281 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1289 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1290 let (res, chan_option) = {
1291 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1292 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1293 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1295 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1296 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1298 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1299 if res.1.is_some() {
1300 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1301 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1302 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1303 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1304 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1305 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1306 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1308 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1309 } else { (res, None) }
1311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1314 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1315 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1317 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1318 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1319 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1320 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1328 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1329 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1330 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1331 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1333 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1334 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1335 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1336 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1338 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1339 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1341 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1343 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1346 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1347 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1348 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1349 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1355 macro_rules! return_err {
1356 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1357 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1359 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1360 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1361 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1362 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1363 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1370 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1371 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1372 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1373 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1374 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1375 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1376 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1377 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1380 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1381 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1382 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1383 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1384 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1387 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1388 let next_hop_data = {
1389 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1390 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1391 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1393 let error_code = match err {
1394 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1395 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1397 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1403 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1405 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1406 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1408 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1409 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1412 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1413 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1414 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1415 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1417 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1419 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1420 short_channel_id: 0,
1421 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1422 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1423 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1426 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1427 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1428 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1430 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1432 let blinding_factor = {
1433 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1434 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1435 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1436 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1437 sha.result(&mut res);
1438 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1440 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1442 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1448 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1450 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1452 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1457 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1459 public_key: new_pubkey,
1460 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1461 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1464 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1466 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1467 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1468 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1469 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1470 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1471 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1472 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1476 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1477 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1479 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1480 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1482 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1484 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1486 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1487 if !chan.is_live() {
1488 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1489 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1493 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1495 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1496 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1497 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1498 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1499 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1500 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1501 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1503 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1504 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1508 if !acceptable_cycle {
1509 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1515 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1517 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1518 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1520 if !chan.is_usable() {
1521 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1523 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1524 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1525 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1527 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), //TODO: panic?
1530 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1532 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1533 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1534 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1535 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1537 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1539 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1540 source_short_channel_id,
1541 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1547 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1548 source_short_channel_id,
1549 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1557 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1558 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1559 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1560 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1561 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1564 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1565 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1567 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1568 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1570 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1572 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1575 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1581 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1582 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1583 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1585 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1586 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1588 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1590 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1593 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1594 match pending_htlc {
1595 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1596 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1597 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1599 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1600 if res.is_some() { return; }
1602 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1604 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1605 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1606 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1607 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1608 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1610 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1611 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1612 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1614 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1615 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1616 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1617 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1618 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1619 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1620 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1621 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1622 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1623 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1624 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1625 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1626 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1627 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1635 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1636 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1637 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1638 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1641 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1656 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1657 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1658 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1660 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1661 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1663 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1665 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1669 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1670 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1671 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1672 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1674 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1675 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1677 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1679 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1682 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1686 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1689 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1690 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1691 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1694 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1695 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1697 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1699 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1702 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1705 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1709 let mut forward_event = None;
1710 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1711 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1712 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1713 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1714 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1716 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1717 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1719 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1722 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1727 match forward_event {
1729 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1730 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1731 time_forwardable: time
1740 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1741 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1742 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1744 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1745 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1747 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1749 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1753 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1754 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1755 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1758 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1759 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1761 if !chan.is_usable() {
1762 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1765 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1766 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1768 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1769 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1770 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1771 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1773 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1775 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1776 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1777 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1778 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1779 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1780 contents: announcement,
1781 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1783 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1786 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1787 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1791 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1792 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1796 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1797 if no_connection_possible {
1798 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1799 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1800 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1801 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1803 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1804 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1805 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1808 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1818 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1819 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1820 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1821 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1827 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1828 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1829 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1830 pending_events.push(event);
1838 use chain::chaininterface;
1839 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1840 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1841 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1842 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1844 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1845 use util::test_utils;
1846 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1848 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1849 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1850 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
1851 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1852 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1853 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1854 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1856 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1857 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1859 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1860 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1862 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1864 use std::collections::HashMap;
1865 use std::default::Default;
1866 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1867 use std::time::Instant;
1870 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1871 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1877 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1878 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1881 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1882 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1885 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1886 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1889 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1890 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1893 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1894 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1899 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1901 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1902 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1907 fn onion_vectors() {
1908 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1909 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1911 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1912 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1913 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1914 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1915 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1917 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1918 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1919 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1920 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1921 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1923 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1924 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1925 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1926 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1927 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1929 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1930 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1931 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1932 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1933 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1935 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1936 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1937 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1938 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1939 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1941 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1942 let payloads = vec!(
1943 msgs::OnionHopData {
1945 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1946 short_channel_id: 0,
1948 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1952 msgs::OnionHopData {
1954 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1955 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1956 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1957 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1961 msgs::OnionHopData {
1963 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1964 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1965 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1966 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1970 msgs::OnionHopData {
1972 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1973 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1974 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1975 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1979 msgs::OnionHopData {
1981 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1982 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1983 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1984 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1990 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1991 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1993 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1997 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1998 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2000 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2001 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2002 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
2004 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2005 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2007 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2008 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2010 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2011 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2013 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2014 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2016 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2017 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2020 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2021 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2022 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2023 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2025 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2026 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2031 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2032 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2033 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2034 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2036 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2040 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2041 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2042 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2044 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2045 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2046 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2047 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2048 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2049 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2054 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2056 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2060 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2061 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2063 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2064 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2065 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2067 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2068 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2070 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2072 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2073 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2074 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2075 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2076 added_monitors.clear();
2078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2081 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2082 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2083 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2084 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2085 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2086 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2087 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2088 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2089 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2090 added_monitors.clear();
2093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2096 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2098 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2099 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2100 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2101 added_monitors.clear();
2104 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2105 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2107 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2108 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2109 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2114 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2115 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2116 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2118 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2119 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2120 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2121 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2128 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2129 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2130 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2131 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2132 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2133 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2134 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2135 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2136 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2137 as_announcement_sigs
2139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2142 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2143 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2144 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2145 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2151 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2152 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2153 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2154 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2155 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2156 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2166 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2169 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2170 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2172 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2173 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2174 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2176 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2179 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2180 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2181 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2184 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2185 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2186 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2187 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2188 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2189 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2195 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2196 if !close_inbound_first {
2197 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2199 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2200 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2201 if close_inbound_first {
2202 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2203 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2204 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2205 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2207 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2208 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2209 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2210 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2212 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2213 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2214 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2216 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2217 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2218 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2219 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2221 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2222 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2223 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2224 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2226 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2227 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2228 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2229 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2235 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2236 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2237 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2238 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2244 (as_update, bs_update)
2249 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2250 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2253 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2255 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2256 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2263 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2264 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2265 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2266 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2267 let our_payment_hash = {
2268 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2269 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2270 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2271 sha.result(&mut ret);
2275 let mut payment_event = {
2276 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2278 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2279 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2280 added_monitors.clear();
2283 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2285 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2287 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2289 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2290 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2292 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2294 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2295 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2298 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2300 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2301 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2302 added_monitors.clear();
2304 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2305 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2307 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2308 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2309 added_monitors.clear();
2311 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2312 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2314 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2315 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2316 added_monitors.clear();
2319 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2320 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2322 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2327 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2329 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2330 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2331 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2333 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2334 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2335 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2341 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2342 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2343 added_monitors.clear();
2345 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2346 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2352 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2355 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2356 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2358 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2359 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2360 added_monitors.clear();
2363 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2364 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2365 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2367 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2369 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2371 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2373 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2374 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2376 added_monitors.clear();
2378 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2380 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2381 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2382 added_monitors.clear();
2384 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2385 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2386 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2388 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2389 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2390 added_monitors.clear();
2392 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2394 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2396 added_monitors.clear();
2402 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2403 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2404 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2405 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2406 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2407 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2410 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2411 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2413 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2414 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2415 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2423 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2424 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2426 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2429 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2430 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2436 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2438 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2439 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2440 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2441 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2442 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2445 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2448 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2449 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2450 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2451 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2452 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2455 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2456 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2457 let our_payment_hash = {
2458 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2459 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2460 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2461 sha.result(&mut ret);
2465 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2466 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2469 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2470 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2471 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2474 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2475 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2477 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2478 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2479 added_monitors.clear();
2482 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2483 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2484 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2486 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2487 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2490 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2491 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2492 added_monitors.clear();
2494 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2496 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2497 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2498 added_monitors.clear();
2500 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2502 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2503 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2504 added_monitors.clear();
2506 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2507 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2508 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2510 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2512 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2514 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2515 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2517 added_monitors.clear();
2523 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2524 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2525 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2526 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2527 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2528 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2531 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2534 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2535 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2536 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2544 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2545 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2547 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2550 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2551 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2557 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2558 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2559 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2562 for _ in 0..node_count {
2563 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2564 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2565 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2566 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2568 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2569 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2570 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2572 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2573 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2574 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2581 fn fake_network_test() {
2582 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2583 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2584 let nodes = create_network(4);
2586 // Create some initial channels
2587 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2588 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2589 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2591 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2592 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2593 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2594 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2595 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2597 // Send some more payments
2598 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2599 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2600 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2602 // Test failure packets
2603 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2604 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2606 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2607 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2609 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2610 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2611 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2612 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2613 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2614 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2615 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2617 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2618 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2619 hops.push(RouteHop {
2620 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2621 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2623 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2625 hops.push(RouteHop {
2626 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2627 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2629 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2631 hops.push(RouteHop {
2632 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2633 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2635 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2637 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2638 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2639 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2641 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2642 hops.push(RouteHop {
2643 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2644 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2646 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2648 hops.push(RouteHop {
2649 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2650 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2652 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2654 hops.push(RouteHop {
2655 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2656 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2658 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2660 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2661 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2662 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2664 // Claim the rebalances...
2665 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2666 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2668 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2669 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2671 // Send some payments across both channels
2672 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2673 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2674 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2676 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2678 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2680 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2681 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2682 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2684 // Close down the channels...
2685 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2686 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2687 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2688 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2689 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2691 // Check that we processed all pending events
2693 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2694 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2698 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2699 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2700 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2701 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2702 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2704 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2706 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2707 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2709 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2710 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2711 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2712 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2713 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2714 res.push(tx.clone());
2718 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2720 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2721 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2722 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2723 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2724 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2725 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2726 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2727 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2729 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2731 res.push(tx.clone());
2735 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2741 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2742 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2744 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2745 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2746 let mut found_prev = false;
2748 for tx in prev_txn {
2749 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2750 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2751 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2752 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2754 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2755 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2761 assert!(found_prev);
2763 let mut res = Vec::new();
2764 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2768 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2769 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2770 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2771 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2772 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2779 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2780 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2781 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2788 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2789 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2794 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2795 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2796 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2797 let nodes = create_network(5);
2799 // Create some initial channels
2800 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2801 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2802 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2803 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2805 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2806 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2807 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2808 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2809 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2811 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2812 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2814 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2815 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2816 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2819 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2820 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2821 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2823 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2824 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2826 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2827 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2829 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2830 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2831 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2832 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2834 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2835 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2836 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2838 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2839 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2841 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2843 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2844 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2845 added_monitors.clear();
2848 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2851 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2852 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2860 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2861 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2862 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2864 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2866 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2867 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2869 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2870 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2872 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2874 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2875 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2876 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2878 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2879 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2882 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2883 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2884 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2885 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2886 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2889 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2891 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2892 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2894 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2895 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2896 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2897 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2898 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2901 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2903 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2904 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2906 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2908 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2909 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2910 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2912 // Create some new channels:
2913 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2915 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2916 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2917 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2918 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2919 // Revoke the old state
2920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2923 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2924 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2926 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2927 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2928 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2930 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2931 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2932 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2936 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2937 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2938 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2939 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
2941 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2942 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2944 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2945 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2946 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2948 // Check that we processed all pending events
2950 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2951 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2956 fn test_unconf_chan() {
2957 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
2958 let nodes = create_network(2);
2959 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2961 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
2963 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
2964 mem::drop(channel_state);
2966 let mut headers = Vec::new();
2967 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2968 headers.push(header.clone());
2970 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2971 headers.push(header.clone());
2973 while !headers.is_empty() {
2974 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
2976 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2977 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
2978 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);