1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use ln::channel::Channel;
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::Route;
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
24 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
25 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
27 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
29 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
30 use std::collections::HashMap;
31 use std::collections::hash_map;
33 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
35 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
36 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
37 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
38 payment_hash: [u8; 32],
39 short_channel_id: u64,
40 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
42 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
44 //TODO: This is public, and needed to call Channel::update_add_htlc, so there needs to be a way to
45 //initialize it usefully...probably make it optional in Channel instead).
46 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
47 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
50 payment_hash: [0; 32],
52 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
54 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
59 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
61 source_short_channel_id: u64,
62 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
67 /// Used for channel rebalancing
69 source_short_channel_id: u64,
70 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 enum HTLCFailReason<'a> {
77 err: &'a msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
85 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
86 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
87 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
88 /// probably increase this significantly.
89 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
91 struct ChannelHolder {
92 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
93 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
94 next_forward: Instant,
95 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
96 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
97 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
99 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
100 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
101 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
102 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
103 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
104 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
105 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
108 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
110 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
111 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
112 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
113 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
114 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
115 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
120 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
121 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
122 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
123 /// to individual Channels.
124 pub struct ChannelManager {
125 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
126 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
127 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
128 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
129 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
131 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
132 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
135 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
136 our_network_key: SecretKey,
138 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
141 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
143 macro_rules! secp_call {
147 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
148 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
155 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
157 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
158 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
163 impl ChannelManager {
164 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
165 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
166 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
167 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
168 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
169 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
170 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
172 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
173 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
174 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
175 monitor: monitor.clone(),
179 announce_channels_publicly,
180 fee_proportional_millionths,
183 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
184 by_id: HashMap::new(),
185 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
186 next_forward: Instant::now(),
187 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
188 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
192 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
194 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
195 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
199 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
200 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
201 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
202 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
203 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
204 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
210 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
212 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
213 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
214 let mut res = [0; 32];
215 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
219 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
220 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
221 let mut res = [0; 32];
222 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
228 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
229 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
230 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
231 let mut res = [0; 32];
232 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
236 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
237 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
238 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
239 let mut res = [0; 32];
240 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
244 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
245 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
246 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
247 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
248 let mut first_iteration = true;
250 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
251 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
253 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
254 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
255 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
256 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
257 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
260 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
261 first_iteration = false;
263 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
265 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
266 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
268 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
272 shared_secret: shared_secret,
274 blinding_factor: blinding_factor,
275 ephemeral_pubkey: ephemeral_pubkey,
284 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
285 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
286 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
287 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
288 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
289 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
290 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
291 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
293 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
294 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
295 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
296 // the intended recipient).
297 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
298 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
299 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
301 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
302 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
303 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
304 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
308 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
309 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
310 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
312 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
313 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
314 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
316 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
318 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
322 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
324 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
332 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
333 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
335 for i in 0..dst.len() {
340 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
341 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
342 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
343 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
346 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
347 let end_len = iters * 65;
348 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
349 res.resize(end_len, 0);
351 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
352 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
353 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
354 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
355 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
360 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
361 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
363 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
364 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
365 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
366 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
368 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
369 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
370 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
373 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
376 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
377 hmac.input(&packet_data);
378 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
379 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
382 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
384 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
385 hop_data: packet_data,
390 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
391 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
392 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
393 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
395 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
396 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
397 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
398 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
399 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
400 data: packet_crypted,
404 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
405 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
407 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
410 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
411 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
412 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
413 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
417 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
418 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
421 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
423 failuremsg: failuremsg,
427 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
428 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
429 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
434 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
435 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
436 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
439 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
440 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &mut Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
441 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
442 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
446 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
448 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
449 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
450 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
451 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
452 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
453 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
454 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
455 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
456 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
459 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
460 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
462 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
468 /// Sends a payment along a given route, returning the UpdateAddHTLC message to give to the
469 /// first hop in route. Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see
470 /// documentation for RouteHop fields for more info.
471 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
472 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
473 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
474 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
476 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
477 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
478 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
479 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
483 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
484 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
485 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
489 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
491 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
492 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
493 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
495 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
496 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
497 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
498 Some(id) => id.clone()
501 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
502 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
503 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
505 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
508 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
511 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
512 // third-party might make this happen:
513 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
519 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
520 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
521 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16)) {
523 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
524 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
526 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo.0, funding_txo.1) {
531 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
538 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
539 let chan_monitor = chan.channel_monitor();
540 match self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
543 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents?
549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
550 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
551 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
556 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
557 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
560 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
561 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
563 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
564 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
565 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
567 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
568 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
569 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
570 node_signature: our_node_sig,
571 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
575 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
576 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
577 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
579 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
580 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
582 if Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
586 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
587 if short_chan_id != 0 {
588 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
589 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
591 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
592 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
593 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
595 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
599 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
601 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
602 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
603 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
605 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
606 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
611 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
613 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
614 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
615 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
616 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
617 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
618 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
619 // this channel currently :/.
626 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
627 let commitment_msg = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
630 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
634 new_events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
635 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
637 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
641 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
642 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
643 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
644 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
651 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
652 match failed_forward.2 {
653 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: &[0;0] }),
654 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: &chan_update.encode()[..] }),
658 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
660 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
661 events.reserve(new_events.len());
662 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
667 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
668 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
669 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: &[0;0] })
672 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
673 let mut pending_htlc = {
674 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
675 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
676 None => return false,
681 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. } => {
682 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
688 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
689 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
690 //TODO: DECRYPT route from OutboundRoute
691 mem::drop(channel_state);
692 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
693 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
694 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
698 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
699 let err_packet = match onion_error {
700 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
701 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, data).encode();
702 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
704 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
705 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
709 let (node_id, fail_msg) = {
710 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
711 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
715 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
716 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet) {
717 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
719 //TODO: Do something with e?
725 mem::drop(channel_state);
726 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
727 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
737 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
738 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
739 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
740 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
741 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
743 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
744 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
745 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
746 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
747 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 let mut pending_htlc = {
751 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
752 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
753 None => return false,
758 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route } => {
759 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
760 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
761 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route });
762 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
763 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
764 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route };
765 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
772 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
773 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
775 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
777 mem::drop(channel_state);
778 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
779 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
784 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
785 let (node_id, fulfill_msg) = {
786 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
787 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
791 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
792 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
793 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
795 //TODO: Do something with e?
801 mem::drop(channel_state);
802 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
803 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
813 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
814 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
815 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
819 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
820 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
821 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
822 let mut ret = Vec::new();
823 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
828 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
829 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
830 let mut new_funding_locked_messages = Vec::new();
832 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
833 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
834 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
835 match channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
836 Some(funding_locked) => {
837 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
840 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
844 new_funding_locked_messages.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
845 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
847 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
849 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
854 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
855 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
858 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
859 for funding_locked in new_funding_locked_messages.drain(..) {
860 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
864 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
865 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
866 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
867 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
868 //TODO Close channel here
874 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
875 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
876 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
877 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
878 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
880 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
881 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
882 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
884 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
885 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
886 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
890 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
891 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
892 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
893 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
895 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
896 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
898 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
899 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
901 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
904 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
905 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
906 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
907 channel_value_satoshis: value,
908 output_script: output_script,
909 user_channel_id: user_id,
914 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
915 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
916 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
917 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
919 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
920 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
922 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
923 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
925 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
934 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
936 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
937 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
938 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
939 // for a bogus channel.
940 let chan_monitor = chan.0.channel_monitor();
941 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor)?;
942 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
943 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.1.channel_id, chan.0);
947 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
948 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
949 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
950 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
952 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
953 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
955 chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
956 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
958 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
961 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
962 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
963 funding_txo: funding_txo,
964 user_channel_id: user_id,
969 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
970 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
971 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
973 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
974 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
976 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
977 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
979 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
983 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
985 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
987 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
989 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
990 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
992 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
993 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
994 chan_entry.remove_entry();
998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1001 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1002 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1003 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: &[0; 0] });
1008 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1010 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1011 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1013 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1014 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1016 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1017 if res.1.is_some() {
1018 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1019 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1020 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1021 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1022 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1023 chan_entry.remove_entry();
1027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1030 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1031 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1036 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1037 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1038 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1039 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1041 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1042 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1043 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1044 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1046 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1047 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1049 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1051 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1054 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1055 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1056 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1057 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1063 macro_rules! return_err {
1064 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1065 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1067 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage::UpdateFailHTLC {
1068 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1069 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1070 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1071 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1078 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1079 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1080 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1081 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1082 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1083 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1084 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1085 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1088 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1089 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1090 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1091 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1092 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1095 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1096 let next_hop_data = {
1097 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1098 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1099 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1101 let error_code = match err {
1102 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1103 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1105 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1111 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1113 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1114 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1116 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1117 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1120 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1121 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1122 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1123 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1125 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1127 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1128 short_channel_id: 0,
1129 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1130 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1131 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1134 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1135 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1136 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1138 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1140 let blinding_factor = {
1141 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1142 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1143 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1144 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1145 sha.result(&mut res);
1146 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1148 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1150 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1156 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1158 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1160 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1165 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1167 public_key: new_pubkey,
1168 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1169 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1172 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1174 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1175 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1176 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1177 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1178 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1179 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1180 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1184 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1185 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1187 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1188 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1190 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1192 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1194 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1195 if !chan.is_live() {
1196 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1197 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 10, &chan_update.encode()[..]);
1201 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1203 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1204 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1205 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1206 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1207 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1208 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1209 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1211 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1212 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1216 if !acceptable_cycle {
1217 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1223 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1225 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1226 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1228 if !chan.is_usable() {
1229 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1231 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1232 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1233 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1235 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1238 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1240 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1241 let route = match outbound_route {
1242 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route } => {
1245 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1247 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1248 source_short_channel_id,
1249 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1254 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1255 source_short_channel_id,
1256 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1264 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1266 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1267 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1269 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1270 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1272 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?;
1274 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1277 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1278 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1282 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1283 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1286 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1287 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1289 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg)?
1291 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1293 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: &msg.reason });
1297 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1298 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1299 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1301 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1302 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1304 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg)?
1306 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1308 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: &[0;0] });
1312 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<msgs::RevokeAndACK, HandleError> {
1313 let mut forward_event = None;
1314 let (res, monitor) = {
1315 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1317 let ((res, mut forwarding_infos), monitor) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1319 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1320 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1322 (chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1324 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1327 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1328 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1329 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1331 for forward_info in forwarding_infos.drain(..) {
1332 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1334 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1337 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1344 //TODO: Only if we store HTLC sigs
1345 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1347 match forward_event {
1349 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1350 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1351 time_forwardable: time
1360 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
1361 let (res, monitor) = {
1362 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1365 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1366 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1368 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?, chan.channel_monitor())
1370 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1373 self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor)?;
1377 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1381 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1382 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1384 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1386 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1390 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1391 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1392 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1395 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1396 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1398 if !chan.is_usable() {
1399 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1402 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1403 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1405 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1406 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1407 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1408 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1410 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1412 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1413 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1414 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1415 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1416 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1417 contents: announcement,
1418 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1420 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1423 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1424 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1431 use chain::chaininterface;
1432 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1433 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1435 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1436 use util::test_utils;
1437 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1439 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1440 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1441 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1442 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1443 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1444 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1445 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1447 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1448 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1450 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1451 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1453 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1456 use std::default::Default;
1457 use std::time::Instant;
1459 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1460 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1466 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1467 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1470 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1471 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1474 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1475 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1478 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1479 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1482 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1483 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1488 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1490 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1491 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1496 fn onion_vectors() {
1497 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1498 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1500 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1501 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1502 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1503 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1504 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1506 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1507 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1508 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1509 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1510 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1512 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1513 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1514 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1515 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1516 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1518 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1519 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1520 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1521 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1522 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1524 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1525 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1526 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1527 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1528 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1530 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1531 let payloads = vec!(
1532 msgs::OnionHopData {
1534 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1535 short_channel_id: 0,
1537 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1541 msgs::OnionHopData {
1543 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1544 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1545 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1546 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1550 msgs::OnionHopData {
1552 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1553 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1554 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1555 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1559 msgs::OnionHopData {
1561 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1562 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1563 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1564 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1568 msgs::OnionHopData {
1570 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1571 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1572 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1573 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1579 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1580 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1582 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1586 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1587 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1589 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1590 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1591 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1593 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1594 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("a5e6bd0c74cb347f10cce367f949098f2457d14c046fd8a22cb96efb30b0fdcda8cb9168b50f2fd45edd73c1b0c8b33002df376801ff58aaa94000bf8a86f92620f343baef38a580102395ae3abf9128d1047a0736ff9b83d456740ebbb4aeb3aa9737f18fb4afb4aa074fb26c4d702f42968888550a3bded8c05247e045b866baef0499f079fdaeef6538f31d44deafffdfd3afa2fb4ca9082b8f1c465371a9894dd8c243fb4847e004f5256b3e90e2edde4c9fb3082ddfe4d1e734cacd96ef0706bf63c9984e22dc98851bcccd1c3494351feb458c9c6af41c0044bea3c47552b1d992ae542b17a2d0bba1a096c78d169034ecb55b6e3a7263c26017f033031228833c1daefc0dedb8cf7c3e37c9c37ebfe42f3225c326e8bcfd338804c145b16e34e4").unwrap());
1596 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1597 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
1599 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1600 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1602 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1603 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1605 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1606 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1609 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u16 = 0;
1610 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction) {
1611 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1612 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1613 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id as u32; 1]);
1615 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1616 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1620 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &ChannelManager, chain_a: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, node_b: &ChannelManager, chain_b: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
1621 let open_chan = node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
1622 let accept_chan = node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
1623 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
1625 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
1626 let tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1627 let funding_output = (Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), chan_id);
1629 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1630 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1632 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, output_script: _, user_channel_id } => {
1633 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
1634 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1636 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output.clone());
1637 //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_a!
1639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1642 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1643 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1644 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
1645 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1646 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1647 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1648 //TODO: Check that we got added to chan_monitor_b!
1650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1653 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
1655 let events_3 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1656 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
1658 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
1659 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1660 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
1662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1665 confirm_transaction(&chain_a, &tx);
1666 let events_4 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1667 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
1669 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1670 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
1671 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
1672 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
1674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1677 confirm_transaction(&chain_b, &tx);
1678 let events_5 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1679 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
1680 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
1681 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
1682 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
1683 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
1684 node_a.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
1685 as_announcement_sigs
1687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1690 let events_6 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1691 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
1692 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
1693 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1699 node_b.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
1700 let events_7 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1701 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
1702 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
1703 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
1704 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
1707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1714 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
1719 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1720 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
1723 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
1725 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
1726 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
1728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
1733 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
1734 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &ChannelManager, route: Route, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
1735 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
1736 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
1737 let our_payment_hash = {
1738 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1739 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
1740 let mut ret = [0; 32];
1741 sha.result(&mut ret);
1745 let mut payment_event = {
1746 let msgs = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap().unwrap();
1748 node_id: expected_route[0].get_our_node_id(),
1750 commitment_msg: msgs.1,
1753 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
1755 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
1756 assert_eq!(node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
1758 node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
1759 let revoke_and_ack = node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
1760 assert!(prev_node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
1762 let events_1 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1763 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
1765 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
1766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1769 node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
1770 node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
1772 let mut events_2 = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1773 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
1774 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
1776 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
1777 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
1778 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
1780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1783 for event in events_2.drain(..) {
1784 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(event);
1786 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
1792 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
1795 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1796 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
1798 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id();
1799 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
1800 let mut next_msg = None;
1801 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
1802 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
1805 node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
1809 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1812 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1813 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
1814 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
1816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1822 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
1823 origin_node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
1825 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1828 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
1829 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
1831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1835 fn route_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
1836 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
1837 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
1838 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
1839 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
1842 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
1845 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) {
1846 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, 142).unwrap();
1847 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
1848 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
1849 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
1852 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
1853 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
1854 let our_payment_hash = {
1855 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1856 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
1857 let mut ret = [0; 32];
1858 sha.result(&mut ret);
1862 let err = origin_node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
1863 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
1866 fn send_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager], recv_value: u64) {
1867 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(origin_node, origin_router, expected_route, recv_value).0;
1868 claim_payment(origin_node, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
1871 fn send_failed_payment(origin_node: &ChannelManager, origin_router: &Router, expected_route: &[&ChannelManager]) {
1872 let route = origin_router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), 1000000, 142).unwrap();
1873 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
1874 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
1875 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.get_our_node_id());
1877 let our_payment_hash = send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, 1000000).1;
1879 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
1881 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().get_our_node_id();
1882 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
1883 let mut next_msg = None;
1884 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
1885 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.get_our_node_id());
1888 node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&prev_node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
1892 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1895 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
1896 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
1897 next_msg = Some(msg.clone());
1899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1905 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.get_our_node_id());
1906 origin_node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&expected_route.first().unwrap().get_our_node_id(), &next_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
1908 let events = origin_node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1911 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
1912 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
1914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1919 fn fake_network_test() {
1920 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1921 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1922 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1923 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1925 let feeest_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1926 let chain_monitor_1 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1927 let chan_monitor_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1928 let tx_broadcaster_1 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{});
1930 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1931 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1932 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1934 let node_1 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_1.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_1.clone(), chan_monitor_1.clone(), chain_monitor_1.clone(), tx_broadcaster_1.clone()).unwrap();
1935 let router_1 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_1).unwrap());
1937 let feeest_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1938 let chain_monitor_2 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1939 let chan_monitor_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1940 let tx_broadcaster_2 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{});
1942 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1943 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1944 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1946 let node_2 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_2.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_2.clone(), chan_monitor_2.clone(), chain_monitor_2.clone(), tx_broadcaster_2.clone()).unwrap();
1947 let router_2 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_2).unwrap());
1949 let feeest_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1950 let chain_monitor_3 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1951 let chan_monitor_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1952 let tx_broadcaster_3 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{});
1954 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1955 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1956 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1958 let node_3 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_3.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_3.clone(), chan_monitor_3.clone(), chain_monitor_3.clone(), tx_broadcaster_3.clone()).unwrap();
1959 let router_3 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_3).unwrap());
1961 let feeest_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
1962 let chain_monitor_4 = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
1963 let chan_monitor_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor{});
1964 let tx_broadcaster_4 = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{});
1966 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
1967 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
1968 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
1970 let node_4 = ChannelManager::new(node_id_4.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest_4.clone(), chan_monitor_4.clone(), chain_monitor_4.clone(), tx_broadcaster_4.clone()).unwrap();
1971 let router_4 = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id_4).unwrap());
1973 // Create some initial channels
1974 let chan_announcement_1 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_1, &chain_monitor_1, &node_2, &chain_monitor_2);
1975 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1976 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_1.0).unwrap());
1977 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.1).unwrap();
1978 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_1.2).unwrap();
1980 let chan_announcement_2 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_3, &chain_monitor_3);
1981 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1982 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_2.0).unwrap());
1983 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.1).unwrap();
1984 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_2.2).unwrap();
1986 let chan_announcement_3 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_3, &chain_monitor_3, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4);
1987 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
1988 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_3.0).unwrap());
1989 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.1).unwrap();
1990 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_3.2).unwrap();
1993 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1994 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000);
1995 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000);
1996 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000);
1997 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000);
1998 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2000 // Send some more payments
2001 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4)[..], 1000000);
2002 send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2, &*node_1)[..], 1000000);
2003 send_payment(&node_4, &router_4, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_2)[..], 1000000);
2005 // Test failure packets
2006 send_failed_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_3, &*node_4)[..]);
2008 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2009 let chan_announcement_4 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4);
2010 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2011 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_4.0).unwrap());
2012 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.1).unwrap();
2013 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_4.2).unwrap();
2016 send_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 1000000);
2017 send_payment(&node_3, &router_3, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 1000000);
2018 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2021 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2022 send_payment(&node_2, &router_2, &vec!(&*node_4)[..], 8000000);
2024 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2026 hops.push(RouteHop {
2027 pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(),
2028 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2030 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2032 hops.push(RouteHop {
2033 pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(),
2034 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2036 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_4.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2038 hops.push(RouteHop {
2039 pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(),
2040 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2042 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2044 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_4.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2045 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2046 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&node_2, Route { hops }, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4, &*node_2)[..], 1000000).0;
2048 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2049 hops.push(RouteHop {
2050 pubkey: node_4.get_our_node_id(),
2051 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_4.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2053 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_3.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2055 hops.push(RouteHop {
2056 pubkey: node_3.get_our_node_id(),
2057 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_3.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2059 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_announcement_2.2.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2061 hops.push(RouteHop {
2062 pubkey: node_2.get_our_node_id(),
2063 short_channel_id: chan_announcement_2.1.contents.short_channel_id,
2065 cltv_expiry_delta: 142,
2067 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_2.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2068 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_announcement_3.2.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2069 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&node_2, Route { hops }, &vec!(&*node_4, &*node_3, &*node_2)[..], 1000000).0;
2071 // Claim the rebalances...
2072 claim_payment(&node_2, &vec!(&*node_4, &*node_3, &*node_2)[..], payment_preimage_2);
2073 claim_payment(&node_2, &vec!(&*node_3, &*node_4, &*node_2)[..], payment_preimage_1);
2075 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2076 let chan_announcement_5 = create_chan_between_nodes(&node_2, &chain_monitor_2, &node_4, &chain_monitor_4);
2077 for router in vec!(&router_1, &router_2, &router_3, &router_4) {
2078 assert!(router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement_5.0).unwrap());
2079 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.1).unwrap();
2080 router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement_5.2).unwrap();
2083 // Send some payments across both channels
2084 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0;
2085 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0;
2086 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000).0;
2088 route_over_limit(&node_1, &router_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], 3000000);
2090 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2092 claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_3);
2093 claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_4);
2094 claim_payment(&node_1, &vec!(&*node_2, &*node_4)[..], payment_preimage_5);
2096 // Check that we processed all pending events
2097 for node in vec!(&node_1, &node_2, &node_3, &node_4) {
2098 assert_eq!(node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);