_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
   4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
   5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
   6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   7
   8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  11 use secp256k1;
  12
  13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
  16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  18 use ln::msgs;
  19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
  20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  23 use util::logger::Logger;
  24 use util::errors::APIError;
  25
  26 use crypto;
  27 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  28 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  29 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  30 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  31
  32 use std::{ptr, mem};
  33 use std::collections::HashMap;
  34 use std::collections::hash_map;
  35 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  36 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  37 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  38
  39 mod channel_held_info {
  40         use ln::msgs;
  41
  42         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  43         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  44         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  45                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  46                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  47                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  48                 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
  49                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  50                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  51         }
  52
  53         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  54         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  55                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  56                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  57         }
  58
  59         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  60         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  61         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  62                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  63                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  64         }
  65
  66         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
  67         impl PendingHTLCStatus {
  68                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
  69                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  70                                 onion_packet: None,
  71                                 payment_hash: [0; 32],
  72                                 short_channel_id: 0,
  73                                 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
  74                                 amt_to_forward: 0,
  75                                 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
  76                         })
  77                 }
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailReason {
  82                 ErrorPacket {
  83                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
  84                 },
  85                 Reason {
  86                         failure_code: u16,
  87                         data: Vec<u8>,
  88                 }
  89         }
  90
  91         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
  92         impl HTLCFailReason {
  93                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
  94                         HTLCFailReason::Reason {
  95                                 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
  96                         }
  97                 }
  98         }
  99 }
 100 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
 101 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
 102 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 103 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 104
 105 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
 106         IntermediaryHopData {
 107                 source_short_channel_id: u64,
 108                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 109         },
 110         OutboundRoute {
 111                 route: Route,
 112                 session_priv: SecretKey,
 113         },
 114         /// Used for channel rebalancing
 115         CycledRoute {
 116                 source_short_channel_id: u64,
 117                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 118                 route: Route,
 119                 session_priv: SecretKey,
 120         }
 121 }
 122
 123 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 124         err: msgs::HandleError,
 125         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 126 }
 127 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 128         #[inline]
 129         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 130                 Self {
 131                         err: HandleError {
 132                                 err,
 133                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 134                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 135                                                 channel_id,
 136                                                 data: err.to_string()
 137                                         },
 138                                 }),
 139                         },
 140                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 141                 }
 142         }
 143         #[inline]
 144         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 145                 Self {
 146                         err: HandleError {
 147                                 err,
 148                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 149                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 150                                                 channel_id,
 151                                                 data: err.to_string()
 152                                         },
 153                                 }),
 154                         },
 155                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 156                 }
 157         }
 158         #[inline]
 159         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 160                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 161         }
 162         #[inline]
 163         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 164                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 165         }
 166 }
 167
 168 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 169 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 170 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 171 /// probably increase this significantly.
 172 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 173
 174 struct ChannelHolder {
 175         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 176         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 177         next_forward: Instant,
 178         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 179         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 180         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 181         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 182         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
 183         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 184         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 185         /// go to read them!
 186         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
 187 }
 188 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 189         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 190         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 191         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 192         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
 193         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
 194 }
 195 impl ChannelHolder {
 196         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 197                 MutChannelHolder {
 198                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 199                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 200                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 201                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 202                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 203                 }
 204         }
 205 }
 206
 207 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 208 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 209
 210 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 211 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 212 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 213 /// to individual Channels.
 214 pub struct ChannelManager {
 215         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 216         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 217         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 218         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 219         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 220
 221         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 222         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 223         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 224         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 225
 226         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 227         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 228
 229         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 230
 231         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 232 }
 233
 234 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 235
 236 macro_rules! secp_call {
 237         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 238                 match $res {
 239                         Ok(key) => key,
 240                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 241                 }
 242         };
 243 }
 244
 245 struct OnionKeys {
 246         #[cfg(test)]
 247         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 248         #[cfg(test)]
 249         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 250         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 251         rho: [u8; 32],
 252         mu: [u8; 32],
 253 }
 254
 255 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 256         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 257         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 258         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 259         /// lifetime of the channel.
 260         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 261         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 262         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 263         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 264         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 265         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 266         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 267         pub user_id: u64,
 268 }
 269
 270 impl ChannelManager {
 271         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
 272         /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
 273         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 274         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 275         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 276         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 277                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 278
 279                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 280                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 281                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 282                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 283                         chain_monitor,
 284                         tx_broadcaster,
 285
 286                         announce_channels_publicly,
 287                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 288                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 289                         secp_ctx,
 290
 291                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 292                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 293                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 294                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 295                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 296                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 297                         }),
 298                         our_network_key,
 299
 300                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 301
 302                         logger,
 303                 });
 304                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 305                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 306                 Ok(res)
 307         }
 308
 309         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 310         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 311         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 312         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 313         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 314         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 315         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 316         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 317         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 318                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 319                         ChannelKeys {
 320                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 321                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 322                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 323                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 324                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 325                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 326                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 327                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 328                         }
 329                 } else {
 330                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 331                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 332                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 333                                 Ok(key) => key,
 334                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 335                         }
 336                 };
 337
 338                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 339                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
 340                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 341                 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
 342                         Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
 343                         None => {}
 344                 }
 345
 346                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 347                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 348                         node_id: their_network_key,
 349                         msg: res,
 350                 });
 351                 Ok(())
 352         }
 353
 354         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 355         /// more information.
 356         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 357                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 358                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 359                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 360                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 361                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 362                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 363                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 364                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 365                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 366                         });
 367                 }
 368                 res
 369         }
 370
 371         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 372         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 373         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 374                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 375                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 376                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 377                         if channel.is_usable() {
 378                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 379                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 380                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 381                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 382                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 383                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 384                                 });
 385                         }
 386                 }
 387                 res
 388         }
 389
 390         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 391         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 392         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 393         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 394         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 395                 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 396                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 397                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 398                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 399                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 400                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 401                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 402                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 403                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 404                                                 }
 405                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 406                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 407                                 },
 408                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 409                         }
 410                 };
 411                 for payment_hash in res.1 {
 412                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 413                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 414                 }
 415                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 416                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 417                                 Some(update)
 418                         } else { None }
 419                 } else { None };
 420
 421                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 422                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 423                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 424                                 msg: update
 425                         });
 426                 }
 427                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 428                         node_id,
 429                         msg: res.0
 430                 });
 431
 432                 Ok(())
 433         }
 434
 435         #[inline]
 436         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
 437                 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 438                 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
 439                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 440                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 441                 }
 442                 for tx in local_txn {
 443                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 444                 }
 445                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 446                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 447                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 448                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 449                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 450         }
 451
 452         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 453         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 454         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 455                 let mut chan = {
 456                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 457                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 458                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 459                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 460                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 461                                 }
 462                                 chan
 463                         } else {
 464                                 return;
 465                         }
 466                 };
 467                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 468                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 469                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 470                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 471                                 msg: update
 472                         });
 473                 }
 474         }
 475
 476         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 477         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 478         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 479                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 480                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 481                 }
 482         }
 483
 484         #[inline]
 485         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 486                 ({
 487                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 488                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 489                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 490                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 491                         res
 492                 },
 493                 {
 494                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 495                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 496                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 497                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 498                         res
 499                 })
 500         }
 501
 502         #[inline]
 503         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 504                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 505                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 506                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 507                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 508                 res
 509         }
 510
 511         #[inline]
 512         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 513                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 514                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 515                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 516                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 517                 res
 518         }
 519
 520         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 521         #[inline]
 522         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 523                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 524                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 525
 526                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 527                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 528
 529                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 530                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 531                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 532                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 533                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 534
 535                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 536
 537                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 538                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 539
 540                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 541                 }
 542
 543                 Ok(())
 544         }
 545
 546         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 547         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 548                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 549
 550                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 551                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 552
 553                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 554                                 #[cfg(test)]
 555                                 shared_secret,
 556                                 #[cfg(test)]
 557                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 558                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 559                                 rho,
 560                                 mu,
 561                         });
 562                 })?;
 563
 564                 Ok(res)
 565         }
 566
 567         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 568         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
 569                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 570                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 571                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 572                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 573                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 574                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 575
 576                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 577                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 578                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 579                         // the intended recipient).
 580                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 581                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 582                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 583                                 realm: 0,
 584                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 585                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 586                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 587                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 588                                 },
 589                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 590                         };
 591                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 592                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 593                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
 594                         }
 595                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 596                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 597                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
 598                         }
 599                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 600                 }
 601                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 602         }
 603
 604         #[inline]
 605         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 606                 unsafe {
 607                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 608                 }
 609                 for i in 0..65 {
 610                         arr[i] = 0;
 611                 }
 612         }
 613
 614         #[inline]
 615         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 616                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 617
 618                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 619                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 620                 }
 621         }
 622
 623         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 624         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
 625                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 626                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 627
 628                 let filler = {
 629                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 630                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 631                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 632                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 633
 634                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 635                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 636                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 637                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 638                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 639                         }
 640                         res
 641                 };
 642
 643                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 644                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 645
 646                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 647                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 648                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 649                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 650
 651                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 652                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 653                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 654
 655                         if i == 0 {
 656                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 657                         }
 658
 659                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 660                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 661                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 662                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 663                 }
 664
 665                 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
 666                         version: 0,
 667                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 668                         hop_data: packet_data,
 669                         hmac: hmac_res,
 670                 })
 671         }
 672
 673         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 674         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 675         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 676                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 677
 678                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 679                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 680                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 681                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 682                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 683                         data: packet_crypted,
 684                 }
 685         }
 686
 687         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 688                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 689
 690                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 691
 692                 let failuremsg = {
 693                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 694                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 695                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 696                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 697                         res
 698                 };
 699                 let pad = {
 700                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 701                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 702                         res
 703                 };
 704                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 705                         hmac: [0; 32],
 706                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 707                         pad: pad,
 708                 };
 709
 710                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 711                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 712                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 713
 714                 packet
 715         }
 716
 717         #[inline]
 718         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 719                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 720                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 721         }
 722
 723         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, Option<SharedSecret>, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 724                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 725                         () => {
 726                                 {
 727                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 728                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 729                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 730                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 731                                         onion_hash
 732                                 }
 733                         }
 734                 }
 735
 736                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 737                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 738                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 739                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 740                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 741                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 742                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 743                         })), None, self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 744                 }
 745
 746                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 747                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 748
 749                 let mut channel_state = None;
 750                 macro_rules! return_err {
 751                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 752                                 {
 753                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 754                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 755                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 756                                         }
 757                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 758                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 759                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 760                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 761                                         })), Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap());
 762                                 }
 763                         }
 764                 }
 765
 766                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 767                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 768                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 769                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 770                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 771                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 772                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 773                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 774                 }
 775
 776                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 777                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 778                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 779                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 780                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 781                 }
 782
 783                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 784                 let next_hop_data = {
 785                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 786                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 787                         match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
 788                                 Err(err) => {
 789                                         let error_code = match err {
 790                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
 791                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 792                                         };
 793                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 794                                 },
 795                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 796                         }
 797                 };
 798
 799                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 800
 801                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 802                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 803                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 804                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 805                                 }
 806                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 807                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 808                                 }
 809
 810                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 811                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 812                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 813                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 814
 815                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 816                                         onion_packet: None,
 817                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 818                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 819                                         prev_short_channel_id: 0,
 820                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 821                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 822                                 })
 823                         } else {
 824                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 825                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 826                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 827
 828                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 829
 830                                 let blinding_factor = {
 831                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 832                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 833                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 834                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 835                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 836                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 837                                                 Err(_) => {
 838                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 839                                                 },
 840                                                 Ok(key) => key
 841                                         }
 842                                 };
 843
 844                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 845                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 846                                 }
 847
 848                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 849                                         version: 0,
 850                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 851                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 852                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 853                                 };
 854
 855                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 856                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 857                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 858                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 859                                         prev_short_channel_id: 0,
 860                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 861                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 862                                 })
 863                         };
 864
 865                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 866                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 867                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 868                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 869                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 870                                         None => {
 871                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 872                                         },
 873                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 874                                 };
 875                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 876                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 877                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 878                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 879                                         } else {
 880                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 881                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 882                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 883                                                 } else {
 884                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 885                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 886                                                         } else {
 887                                                                 None
 888                                                         }
 889                                                 }
 890                                         }
 891                                 } {
 892                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 893                                 }
 894                         }
 895                 }
 896
 897                 (pending_forward_info, Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap())
 898         }
 899
 900         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 901         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 902                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 903                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 904                         Some(id) => id,
 905                 };
 906
 907                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 908
 909                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 910                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 911                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 912                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 913                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 914                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 915                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 916                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 917                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 918                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 919                 };
 920
 921                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
 922                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
 923
 924                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
 925                         signature: sig,
 926                         contents: unsigned
 927                 })
 928         }
 929
 930         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
 931         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
 932         /// fields for more info.
 933         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
 934         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
 935         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
 936         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
 937         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
 938         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
 939         /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
 940         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
 941         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 942                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
 943                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
 944                 }
 945                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
 946                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
 947                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
 948                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
 949                         }
 950                 }
 951
 952                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
 953                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
 954                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
 955                         session_key
 956                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
 957
 958                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
 959
 960                 //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for
 961                 //p2p-returns only.
 962                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
 963                                 HandleError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
 964                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
 965                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
 966
 967                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
 968                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 969                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 970
 971                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
 972                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
 973                                 Some(id) => id.clone()
 974                         };
 975
 976                         let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
 977                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
 978                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
 979                         }
 980
 981                         let res = {
 982                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
 983                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
 984                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
 985                                 }
 986                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
 987                         };
 988
 989                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
 990
 991                         claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
 992                                 route,
 993                                 session_priv,
 994                         });
 995
 996                         match res {
 997                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
 998                                 None => return Ok(()),
 999                         }
1000                 };
1001
1002                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1003                         unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1004                 }
1005
1006                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1007                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1008                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1009                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1010                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1011                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1012                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1013                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1014                                 commitment_signed,
1015                         },
1016                 });
1017                 Ok(())
1018         }
1019
1020         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1021         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1022         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1023         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1024         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1025
1026                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1027                         ($event: expr) => {
1028                                 {
1029                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1030                                         pending_events.push($event);
1031                                 }
1032                         }
1033                 }
1034
1035                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1036                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1037                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1038                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1039                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1040                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1041                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1042                                                 },
1043                                                 Err(e) => {
1044                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1045                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1046                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1047                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1048                                                                 action: e.action,
1049                                                         });
1050                                                         return;
1051                                                 },
1052                                         }
1053                                 },
1054                                 None => return
1055                         }
1056                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1057                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1058                         unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1059                 }
1060                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1061                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1062                         msg: msg,
1063                 });
1064
1065                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1066                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1067                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1068                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1069                         },
1070                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1071                                 e.insert(chan);
1072                         }
1073                 }
1074         }
1075
1076         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1077                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1078
1079                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1080                         Ok(res) => res,
1081                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1082                 };
1083                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1084                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1085
1086                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1087                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1088                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1089                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1090                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1091                 })
1092         }
1093
1094         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1095         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1096         /// Will likely generate further events.
1097         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1098                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1099                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1100                 {
1101                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1102                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1103
1104                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1105                                 return;
1106                         }
1107
1108                         for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1109                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1110                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1111                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1112                                                 None => {
1113                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1114                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1115                                                                 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1116                                                         }
1117                                                         continue;
1118                                                 }
1119                                         };
1120                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1121
1122                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1123                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1124                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1125                                                         Err(_e) => {
1126                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1127                                                                 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1128                                                                 continue;
1129                                                         },
1130                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1131                                                                 match update_add {
1132                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1133                                                                         None => {
1134                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1135                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1136                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1137                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1138                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1139                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1140                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1141                                                                         }
1142                                                                 }
1143                                                         }
1144                                                 }
1145                                         }
1146
1147                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1148                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1149                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1150                                                         Err(_e) => {
1151                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1152                                                                 continue;
1153                                                         },
1154                                                 };
1155                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1156                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1157                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1158                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1159                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1160                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1161                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1162                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1163                                                         },
1164                                                 }));
1165                                         }
1166                                 } else {
1167                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1168                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1169                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1170                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1171                                                 }));
1172                                         }
1173                                 }
1174                         }
1175                 }
1176
1177                 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1178                         match failed_forward.2 {
1179                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
1180                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1181                         };
1182                 }
1183
1184                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1185
1186                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1187                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1188                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1189                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1190                                 }
1191                         }
1192                         true
1193                 });
1194
1195                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1196                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1197                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1198                         events.push(event.1);
1199                 }
1200         }
1201
1202         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1203         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1204                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
1205         }
1206
1207         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1208         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1209         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1210         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1211         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1212         /// still-available channels.
1213         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
1214                 let mut pending_htlc = {
1215                         match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
1216                                 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1217                                 None => return false,
1218                         }
1219                 };
1220
1221                 match pending_htlc {
1222                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1223                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
1224                                         route,
1225                                         session_priv,
1226                                 });
1227                                 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1228                         },
1229                         _ => {}
1230                 }
1231
1232                 match pending_htlc {
1233                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1234                         PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1235                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1236
1237                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1238                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1239                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1240                                 });
1241                                 false
1242                         },
1243                         PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
1244                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1245                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1246                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1247                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1248                                         },
1249                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1250                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1251                                         }
1252                                 };
1253
1254                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1255                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1256                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1257                                                 None => return false
1258                                         };
1259
1260                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1261                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1262                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1263                                                 Err(_e) => {
1264                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1265                                                         return false;
1266                                                 },
1267                                         }
1268                                 };
1269
1270                                 match fail_msgs {
1271                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1272                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1273
1274                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1275                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1276                                                 }
1277
1278                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1279                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1280                                                         node_id,
1281                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1282                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1283                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1284                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1285                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1286                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1287                                                         },
1288                                                 });
1289                                         },
1290                                         None => {},
1291                                 }
1292
1293                                 true
1294                         },
1295                 }
1296         }
1297
1298         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1299         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1300         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1301         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1302         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1303                 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1304         }
1305         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1306                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1307                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1308                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1309                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1310
1311                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1312                 let mut pending_htlc = {
1313                         match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1314                                 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1315                                 None => return false,
1316                         }
1317                 };
1318
1319                 match pending_htlc {
1320                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1321                                 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1322                                         pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1323                                         channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1324                                 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1325                                         // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1326                                         pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1327                                         channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1328                                 }
1329                         },
1330                         _ => {},
1331                 }
1332
1333                 match pending_htlc {
1334                         PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1335                         PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1336                                 if from_user {
1337                                         panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1338                                 }
1339                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1340                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1341                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1342                                         payment_preimage
1343                                 });
1344                                 false
1345                         },
1346                         PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1347                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1348                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1349                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1350                                                 None => {
1351                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1352                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1353                                                         // why its missing.
1354                                                         return false
1355                                                 }
1356                                         };
1357
1358                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1359                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1360                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1361                                                 Err(_e) => {
1362                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1363                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1364                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1365                                                         return false;
1366                                                 },
1367                                         }
1368                                 };
1369
1370                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1371                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1372                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1373                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1374                                         }
1375                                 }
1376
1377                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1378                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1379                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1380                                                 node_id: node_id,
1381                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1382                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1383                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1384                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1385                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1386                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1387                                                 }
1388                                         });
1389                                 }
1390                                 true
1391                         },
1392                 }
1393         }
1394
1395         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1396         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1397                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1398         }
1399
1400         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1401         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1402         /// operation.
1403         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1404                 unimplemented!();
1405         }
1406
1407         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1408                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1409                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1410                 }
1411                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1413                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1414                 }
1415
1416                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1417                         ChannelKeys {
1418                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1419                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1420                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1421                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1422                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1423                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1424                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1425                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1426                         }
1427                 } else {
1428                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1429                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1430                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1431                                 Ok(key) => key,
1432                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1433                         }
1434                 };
1435
1436                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1437                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1438                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1439                 Ok(accept_msg)
1440         }
1441
1442         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1443                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1444                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1445                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1446                                 Some(chan) => {
1447                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1448                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1449                                         }
1450                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1451                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1452                                         }
1453
1454                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1455                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1456                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1457
1458                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1459                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1460                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1461                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1462                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1463
1464                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1465
1466                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1467                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1468                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1469                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1470                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1471                                                 contents: announcement,
1472                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1473                                 },
1474                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1475                         }
1476                 };
1477                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1478                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1479                 Ok(())
1480         }
1481
1482
1483 }
1484
1485 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1486         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1487                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1488                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1489                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1490                 ret
1491         }
1492 }
1493
1494 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1495         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1496                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1497                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1498                 {
1499                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1500                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1501                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1502                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1503                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1504                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1505                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1506                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1507                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1508                                                 msg: funding_locked,
1509                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1510                                         });
1511                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1512                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1513                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1514                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1515                                                 action: e.action,
1516                                         });
1517                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
1518                                                 return false;
1519                                         }
1520                                 }
1521                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1522                                         for tx in txn_matched {
1523                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1524                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1525                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1526                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1527                                                                 }
1528                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1529                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1530                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1531                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1532                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1533                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1534                                                                                 msg: update
1535                                                                         });
1536                                                                 }
1537                                                                 return false;
1538                                                         }
1539                                                 }
1540                                         }
1541                                 }
1542                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1543                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1544                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1545                                         }
1546                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1547                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1548                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1549                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1550                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1551                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1552                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1553                                                         msg: update
1554                                                 });
1555                                         }
1556                                         return false;
1557                                 }
1558                                 true
1559                         });
1560                 }
1561                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1562                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1563                 }
1564                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1565                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1566                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1567                 }
1568                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1569         }
1570
1571         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1572         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1573                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1574                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1575                 {
1576                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1577                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1578                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1579                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
1580                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1581                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1582                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1583                                         }
1584                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1585                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1586                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1587                                                         msg: update
1588                                                 });
1589                                         }
1590                                         false
1591                                 } else {
1592                                         true
1593                                 }
1594                         });
1595                 }
1596                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1597                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1598                 }
1599                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1600                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1601                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1602                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1603                         }
1604                 }
1605                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1606         }
1607 }
1608
1609 macro_rules! handle_error {
1610         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
1611                 match $internal {
1612                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1613                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
1614                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
1615                                         match &err.action {
1616                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
1617                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1618                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1619                                                         } else {
1620                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1621                                                         }
1622                                                 },
1623                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
1624                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
1625                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
1626                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1627                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1628                                                         } else {
1629                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1630                                                         }
1631                                                 },
1632                                                 &None => {},
1633                                         }
1634                                 }
1635                                 Err(err)
1636                         },
1637                 }
1638         }
1639 }
1640
1641 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1642         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1643         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1644                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1645         }
1646
1647         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1648                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1649                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1650                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1651                                 Some(chan) => {
1652                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1653                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1654                                         }
1655                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1656                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1657                                 },
1658                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1659                         }
1660                 };
1661                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1662                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1663                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1664                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1665                         output_script: output_script,
1666                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1667                 });
1668                 Ok(())
1669         }
1670
1671         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1672                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1673                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1674                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1675                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1676                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1677                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1678                                         }
1679                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1680                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1681                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1682                                                 },
1683                                                 Err(e) => {
1684                                                         //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
1685                                                         return Err(e);
1686                                                 }
1687                                         }
1688                                 },
1689                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1690                         }
1691                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1692                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1693                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1694                    // for a bogus channel.
1695                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1696                         unimplemented!();
1697                 }
1698                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1699                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1700                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1701                                 return Err(HandleError {
1702                                         err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
1703                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
1704                                 });
1705                         },
1706                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1707                                 e.insert(chan);
1708                         }
1709                 }
1710                 Ok(funding_msg)
1711         }
1712
1713         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1714                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1715                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1716                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1717                                 Some(chan) => {
1718                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1719                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1720                                         }
1721                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1722                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1723                                 },
1724                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1725                         }
1726                 };
1727                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1728                         unimplemented!();
1729                 }
1730                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1731                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1732                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1733                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1734                 });
1735                 Ok(())
1736         }
1737
1738         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1739                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1741                         Some(chan) => {
1742                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1743                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1744                                 }
1745                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1746                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1747                         },
1748                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1749                 };
1750         }
1751
1752         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1753                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1754                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1755                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1756
1757                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1758                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1759                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1760                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1761                                         }
1762                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1763                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1764                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1765                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1766                                                 }
1767                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1768                                         } else { (res, None) }
1769                                 },
1770                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1771                         }
1772                 };
1773                 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1774                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1775                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1776                 }
1777                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1778                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1779                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1780                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1781                                         msg: update
1782                                 });
1783                         }
1784                 }
1785                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1786         }
1787
1788         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1789                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1790                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1791                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1792                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1793                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1794                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1795                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1796                                         }
1797                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1798                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1799                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1800                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1801                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1802                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1803                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1804                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1805                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1806                                                 }
1807                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1808                                         } else { (res, None) }
1809                                 },
1810                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1811                         }
1812                 };
1813                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1814                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1815                 }
1816                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1817                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1818                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1819                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1820                                         msg: update
1821                                 });
1822                         }
1823                 }
1824                 Ok(res.0)
1825         }
1826
1827         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1828                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1829                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1830                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1831                 //
1832                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1833                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1834                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1835                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1836
1837                 let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1838                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1839
1840                 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1841
1842                 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1843                 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1844                 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1845                 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1846                 let mut will_forward = false;
1847                 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1848                         if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1849                                 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1850                                 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1851                                         acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
1852                                 }
1853                                 if !acceptable_cycle {
1854                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
1855                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1856                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1857                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1858                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret.unwrap(), 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1859                                         }));
1860                                 } else {
1861                                         will_forward = true;
1862                                 }
1863                         } else {
1864                                 will_forward = true;
1865                         }
1866                 }
1867
1868                 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1869                         Some(chan) => {
1870                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1871                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1872                                 }
1873                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1874                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1875                                 }
1876                                 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1877                                 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
1878                                         forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1879                                 }
1880                                 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1881                         },
1882                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1883                 };
1884
1885                 if will_forward {
1886                         match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1887                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1888                                         let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1889                                         let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1890                                                 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1891                                                         (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1892                                                 },
1893                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
1894                                         };
1895                                         *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1896                                                 source_short_channel_id,
1897                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1898                                                 route,
1899                                                 session_priv,
1900                                         };
1901                                 },
1902                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1903                                         e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1904                                                 source_short_channel_id,
1905                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1906                                         });
1907                                 }
1908                         }
1909                 }
1910
1911                 Ok(res)
1912         }
1913
1914         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1915                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1916                 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1917                 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1918                 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1919
1920                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1921                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1922                         Some(chan) => {
1923                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1924                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1925                                 }
1926                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1927                         },
1928                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1929                 }
1930         }
1931
1932         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1933                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1934                 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1935                         Some(chan) => {
1936                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1938                                 }
1939                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1940                         },
1941                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1942                 }?;
1943
1944                 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1945                         match pending_htlc {
1946                                 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1947                                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1948                                         let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1949                                         let mut res = None;
1950                                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1951                                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1952
1953                                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1954
1955                                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1956                                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1957                                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1958                                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1959                                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1960
1961                                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1962                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1963                                                                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1964
1965                                                                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1966                                                                 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1967                                                                 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1968                                                                 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1969                                                                 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1970                                                                         const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1971                                                                         const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1972                                                                         match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1973                                                                                 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1974                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1975                                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1976                                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1977                                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1978                                                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1979                                                                                                                         msg: chan_update,
1980                                                                                                                 });
1981                                                                                                         }
1982                                                                                                 }
1983                                                                                         }
1984                                                                                 },
1985                                                                                 UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1986                                                                                         // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1987                                                                                         // current node as the HMAC validated.
1988                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1989                                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1990                                                                                         });
1991                                                                                 },
1992                                                                                 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1993                                                                         }
1994                                                                 }
1995                                                         }
1996                                                 }
1997                                         }).unwrap();
1998                                         Ok(res)
1999                                 },
2000                                 _ => { Ok(None) },
2001                         }
2002                 } else {
2003                         Ok(None)
2004                 }
2005         }
2006
2007         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2008                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2009                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2010                         Some(chan) => {
2011                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2012                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2013                                 }
2014                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2015                         },
2016                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2017                 }
2018         }
2019
2020         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2021                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
2022                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2023                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2024                                 Some(chan) => {
2025                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2026                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2027                                         }
2028                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
2029                                 },
2030                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2031                         }
2032                 };
2033                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2034                         unimplemented!();
2035                 }
2036
2037                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2038         }
2039
2040         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2041                 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
2042                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2044                                 Some(chan) => {
2045                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2046                                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2047                                         }
2048                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
2049                                 },
2050                                 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2051                         }
2052                 };
2053                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2054                         unimplemented!();
2055                 }
2056                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2057                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
2058                 }
2059
2060                 let mut forward_event = None;
2061                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2062                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2063                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2064                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2065                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2066                         }
2067                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2068                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2069                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2070                                                 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
2071                                         },
2072                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2073                                                 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
2074                                         }
2075                                 }
2076                         }
2077                 }
2078                 match forward_event {
2079                         Some(time) => {
2080                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2081                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2082                                         time_forwardable: time
2083                                 });
2084                         }
2085                         None => {},
2086                 }
2087
2088                 Ok(res)
2089         }
2090
2091         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2092                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2093                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2094                         Some(chan) => {
2095                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2096                                         return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2097                                 }
2098                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
2099                         },
2100                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2101                 }
2102         }
2103
2104         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2105                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2106         }
2107
2108         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2109                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2110                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2111                 {
2112                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2113                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2114                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2115                         if no_connection_possible {
2116                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2117                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2118                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2119                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2120                                                 }
2121                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2122                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2123                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2124                                                                 msg: update
2125                                                         });
2126                                                 }
2127                                                 false
2128                                         } else {
2129                                                 true
2130                                         }
2131                                 });
2132                         } else {
2133                                 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
2134                                         if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2135                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
2136                                                 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
2137                                                 //reconnect.
2138                                         }
2139                                 }
2140                         }
2141                 }
2142                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2143                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2144                 }
2145                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2146                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2147                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2148                                 pending_events.push(event);
2149                         }
2150                 }
2151         }
2152
2153         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2154                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2155                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2156                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2157                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2158                                 }
2159                         }
2160                 } else {
2161                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2162                 }
2163         }
2164 }
2165
2166 #[cfg(test)]
2167 mod tests {
2168         use chain::chaininterface;
2169         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2170         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2171         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2172         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2173         use ln::msgs;
2174         use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2175         use util::test_utils;
2176         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2177         use util::logger::Logger;
2178
2179         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2180         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2181         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2182         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2183         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2184         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2185         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2186
2187         use hex;
2188
2189         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2190         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2191
2192         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2193         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2194
2195         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2196
2197         use std::collections::HashMap;
2198         use std::default::Default;
2199         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2200         use std::time::Instant;
2201         use std::mem;
2202
2203         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2204                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2205                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2206
2207                 let route = Route {
2208                         hops: vec!(
2209                                         RouteHop {
2210                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2211                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2212                                         },
2213                                         RouteHop {
2214                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2215                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2216                                         },
2217                                         RouteHop {
2218                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2219                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2220                                         },
2221                                         RouteHop {
2222                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2223                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2224                                         },
2225                                         RouteHop {
2226                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2227                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2228                                         },
2229                         ),
2230                 };
2231
2232                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2233
2234                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2235                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2236                 onion_keys
2237         }
2238
2239         #[test]
2240         fn onion_vectors() {
2241                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2242                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2243
2244                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2245                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2246                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2247                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2248                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2249
2250                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2251                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2252                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2253                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2254                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2255
2256                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2257                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2258                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2259                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2260                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2261
2262                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2263                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2264                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2265                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2266                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2267
2268                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2269                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2270                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2271                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2272                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2273
2274                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2275                 let payloads = vec!(
2276                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2277                                 realm: 0,
2278                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2279                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2280                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2281                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2282                                 },
2283                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2284                         },
2285                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2286                                 realm: 0,
2287                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2288                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2289                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2290                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2291                                 },
2292                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2293                         },
2294                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2295                                 realm: 0,
2296                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2297                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2298                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2299                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2300                                 },
2301                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2302                         },
2303                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2304                                 realm: 0,
2305                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2306                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2307                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2308                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2309                                 },
2310                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2311                         },
2312                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2313                                 realm: 0,
2314                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2315                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2316                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2317                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2318                                 },
2319                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2320                         },
2321                 );
2322
2323                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2324                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2325                 // anyway...
2326                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2327         }
2328
2329         #[test]
2330         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2331                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2332
2333                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2334                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2335                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2336
2337                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2338                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2339
2340                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2341                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2342
2343                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2344                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2345
2346                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2347                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2348
2349                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2350                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
2351         }
2352
2353         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2354                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2355                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2356                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2357                 for i in 2..100 {
2358                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2359                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2360                 }
2361         }
2362
2363         struct Node {
2364                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2365                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2366                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2367                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2368                 router: Router,
2369         }
2370
2371         static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2372         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2373                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2374
2375                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2376                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2377                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2378                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2379                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2380                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2381                         },
2382                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2383                 };
2384
2385                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2386
2387                 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2388                 let tx;
2389                 let funding_output;
2390
2391                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2392                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2393                 match events_2[0] {
2394                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2395                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2396                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2397
2398                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2399                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2400                                 }]};
2401                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2402
2403                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2404                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2405                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2406                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2407                                 added_monitors.clear();
2408                         },
2409                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2410                 }
2411
2412                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2413                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2414                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2415                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2416                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2417                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2418                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2419                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2420                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2421                                 added_monitors.clear();
2422                                 res
2423                         },
2424                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2425                 };
2426
2427                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2428                 {
2429                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2430                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2431                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2432                         added_monitors.clear();
2433                 }
2434
2435                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2436                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2437                 match events_4[0] {
2438                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2439                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2440                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2441                         },
2442                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2443                 };
2444
2445                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2446                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2447                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2448                 match events_5[0] {
2449                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2450                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2451                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2452                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2453                         },
2454                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2455                 };
2456
2457                 let channel_id;
2458
2459                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2460                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2461                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2462                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2463                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2464                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2465                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2466                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2467                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2468                                 as_announcement_sigs
2469                         },
2470                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2471                 };
2472
2473                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2474                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2475                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2476                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2477                                 (msg, update_msg)
2478                         },
2479                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2480                 };
2481
2482                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2483                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2484                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2485                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2486                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2487                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2488                                 update_msg
2489                         },
2490                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2491                 };
2492
2493                 unsafe {
2494                         CHAN_COUNT += 1;
2495                 }
2496
2497                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2498         }
2499
2500         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2501                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2502                 for node in nodes {
2503                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2504                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2505                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2506                 }
2507                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2508         }
2509
2510         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2511                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2512                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2513                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2514
2515                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2516                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2517                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2518                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2519                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2520                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2521                                 msg.clone()
2522                         },
2523                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2524                 };
2525
2526                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2527                 if !close_inbound_first {
2528                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2529                 }
2530                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2531                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2532                 if close_inbound_first {
2533                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2534                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2535                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2536                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2537
2538                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2539                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2540                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2541                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2542                 } else {
2543                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2544                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2545                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2546
2547                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2548                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2549                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2550                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2551                 }
2552                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2553                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2554                 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2555                 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2556
2557                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2558                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2559                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2560                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2561                                 msg.clone()
2562                         },
2563                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2564                 };
2565
2566                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2567                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2568                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2569                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2570                                 msg.clone()
2571                         },
2572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2573                 };
2574
2575                 (as_update, bs_update)
2576         }
2577
2578         struct SendEvent {
2579                 node_id: PublicKey,
2580                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2581                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2582         }
2583         impl SendEvent {
2584                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2585                         match event {
2586                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2587                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2588                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2589                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2590                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2591                                 },
2592                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2593                         }
2594                 }
2595         }
2596
2597         static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2598         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2599                 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2600                 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2601                 let our_payment_hash = {
2602                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2603                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2604                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2605                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2606                         ret
2607                 };
2608
2609                 let mut payment_event = {
2610                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2611                         {
2612                                 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2614                                 added_monitors.clear();
2615                         }
2616
2617                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2618                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2619                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2620                 };
2621                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2622
2623                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2624                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2625
2626                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2627                         {
2628                                 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2629                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2630                         }
2631
2632                         let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2633                         {
2634                                 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2635                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2636                                 added_monitors.clear();
2637                         }
2638                         assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2639                         let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2640                         {
2641                                 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2642                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2643                                 added_monitors.clear();
2644                         }
2645                         assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2646                         assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2647                         {
2648                                 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2649                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2650                                 added_monitors.clear();
2651                         }
2652
2653                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2654                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2655                         match events_1[0] {
2656                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2657                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2658                         };
2659
2660                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2661                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2662
2663                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2664                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2665                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2666                                 match events_2[0] {
2667                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2668                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2669                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2670                                         },
2671                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2672                                 }
2673                         } else {
2674                                 {
2675                                         let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2676                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2677                                         added_monitors.clear();
2678                                 }
2679                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2680                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2681                         }
2682
2683                         prev_node = node;
2684                 }
2685
2686                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2687         }
2688
2689         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2690                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2691                 {
2692                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2693                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2694                         added_monitors.clear();
2695                 }
2696
2697                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2698                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2699                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2700                                 {
2701                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2702                                         {
2703                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2704                                                 if $last_node {
2705                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2706                                                 } else {
2707                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2708                                                 }
2709                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2710                                         }
2711                                         let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2712                                         {
2713                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2714                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2715                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2716                                         }
2717                                         assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2718                                         let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2719                                         assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2720                                         {
2721                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2722                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2723                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2724                                         }
2725                                         assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2726                                         {
2727                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2728                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2729                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2730                                         }
2731                                 }
2732                         }
2733                 }
2734
2735                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2736                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2737                 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2738                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2739                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2740                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2741                         }
2742
2743                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2744                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2745                         match events[0] {
2746                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2747                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2748                                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2749                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2750                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2751                                         expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2752                                         next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2753                                 },
2754                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2755                         };
2756
2757                         prev_node = node;
2758                 }
2759
2760                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2761                 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2762
2763                 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2764                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2765                 match events[0] {
2766                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2767                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2768                         },
2769                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770                 }
2771         }
2772
2773         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2774
2775         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2776                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2777                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2778                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2779                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2780                 }
2781
2782                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2783         }
2784
2785         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2786                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2787                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2788                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2789                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2790                 }
2791
2792                 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2793                 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2794                 let our_payment_hash = {
2795                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2796                         sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2797                         let mut ret = [0; 32];
2798                         sha.result(&mut ret);
2799                         ret
2800                 };
2801
2802                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2803                 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2804         }
2805
2806         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2807                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2808                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2809         }
2810
2811         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2812                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2813                 {
2814                         let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2815                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2816                         added_monitors.clear();
2817                 }
2818
2819                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2820                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2821                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2822                                 {
2823                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2824                                         let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2825
2826                                         {
2827                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2828                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2829                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2830                                         }
2831                                         assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2832                                         {
2833                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2834                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2835                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2836                                         }
2837                                         let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2838                                         {
2839                                                 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2840                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2841                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2842                                         }
2843                                         assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2844                                         assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2845                                         assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2846                                         {
2847                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2848                                                 if $last_node {
2849                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2850                                                 } else {
2851                                                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2852                                                         assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2853                                                 }
2854                                                 added_monitors.clear();
2855                                         }
2856                                 }
2857                         }
2858                 }
2859
2860                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2861                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2862                 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2863                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2864                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2865                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2866                         }
2867
2868                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2869                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2870                         match events[0] {
2871                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2872                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2873                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2874                                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2875                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2876                                         expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2877                                         next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2878                                 },
2879                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2880                         };
2881
2882                         prev_node = node;
2883                 }
2884
2885                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2886                 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2887
2888                 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2889                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2890                 match events[0] {
2891                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2892                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2893                         },
2894                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2895                 }
2896         }
2897
2898         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2899                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2900                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2901                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2902                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2903
2904                 for _ in 0..node_count {
2905                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2906                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2907                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2908                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2909                         let node_id = {
2910                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2911                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2912                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2913                         };
2914                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2915                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2916                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
2917                 }
2918
2919                 nodes
2920         }
2921
2922         #[test]
2923         fn fake_network_test() {
2924                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2925                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2926                 let nodes = create_network(4);
2927
2928                 // Create some initial channels
2929                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2930                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2931                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2932
2933                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2934                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2935                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2936                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2937                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2938
2939                 // Send some more payments
2940                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2941                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2942                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2943
2944                 // Test failure packets
2945                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2946                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2947
2948                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2949                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2950
2951                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2952                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2953                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2954                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2955                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2956                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2957                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2958
2959                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2960                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2961                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2962                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2963                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2964                         fee_msat: 0,
2965                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2966                 });
2967                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2968                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2969                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2970                         fee_msat: 0,
2971                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2972                 });
2973                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2974                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2975                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2976                         fee_msat: 1000000,
2977                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2978                 });
2979                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2980                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2981                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2982
2983                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2984                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2985                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2986                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2987                         fee_msat: 0,
2988                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2989                 });
2990                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2991                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2992                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2993                         fee_msat: 0,
2994                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2995                 });
2996                 hops.push(RouteHop {
2997                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2998                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2999                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3000                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3001                 });
3002                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3003                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3004                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3005
3006                 // Claim the rebalances...
3007                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3008                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3009
3010                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3011                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3012
3013                 // Send some payments across both channels
3014                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3015                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3016                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3017
3018                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3019
3020                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3021
3022                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3023                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3024                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3025
3026                 // Close down the channels...
3027                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3028                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3029                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3030                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3031                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3032
3033                 // Check that we processed all pending events
3034                 for node in nodes {
3035                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3036                         assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3037                 }
3038         }
3039
3040         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3041         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3042         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3043                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3044                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3045
3046                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3047
3048                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3049                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3050                 } else {
3051                         for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3052                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3053                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3054                                         funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3055                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3056                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3057                                 }
3058                         }
3059                 }
3060                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3061
3062                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3063                         for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3064                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3065                                         let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3066                                         funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3067                                         tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3068                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3069                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3070                                         } else {
3071                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3072                                         }
3073                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3074                                         break;
3075                                 }
3076                         }
3077                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3078                 }
3079                 node_txn.clear();
3080                 res
3081         }
3082
3083         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3084                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3085
3086                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3087                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3088                 let mut found_prev = false;
3089
3090                 for tx in prev_txn {
3091                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3092                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3093                                 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3094                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3095
3096                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3097                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3098
3099                                 found_prev = true;
3100                                 break;
3101                         }
3102                 }
3103                 assert!(found_prev);
3104
3105                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3106                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3107                 res
3108         }
3109
3110         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3111                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3112                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3113                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3114                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3115                                 msg.clone()
3116                         },
3117                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3118                 };
3119
3120                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3121                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3122                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3123                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3124                                 msg.clone()
3125                         },
3126                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3127                 };
3128
3129                 for node in nodes {
3130                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3131                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3132                 }
3133         }
3134
3135         #[test]
3136         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3137                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3138                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3139                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3140
3141                 // Create some initial channels
3142                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3143                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3144                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3145                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3146
3147                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3148                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3149                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3150                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3151                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3152
3153                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3154                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3155                 {
3156                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3157                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3158                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3159                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3160                 }
3161                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3162                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3163                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3164
3165                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3166                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3167
3168                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3169                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3170                 {
3171                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3172                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3173                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3174                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3175                 }
3176                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3177                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3178                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3179
3180                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3181                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3182                                 {
3183                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3184                                         {
3185                                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3186                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3187                                                 added_monitors.clear();
3188                                         }
3189
3190                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3191                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3192                                         match events[0] {
3193                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3194                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3195                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3197                                                 },
3198                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199                                         };
3200                                 }
3201                         }
3202                 }
3203
3204                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3205                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3206                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3207                 {
3208                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3209
3210                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3211                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3212
3213                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3214                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3215
3216                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3217                 }
3218                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3219                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3220                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3221
3222                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3223                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3224
3225                 {
3226                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3227                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3228                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3229                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3230                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3231                         }
3232
3233                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3234
3235                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3236                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3237
3238                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3239                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3240                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3241                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3242                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3243                         }
3244
3245                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3246
3247                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3248                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3249
3250                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3251                 }
3252                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3253                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3254                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3255
3256                 // Create some new channels:
3257                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3258
3259                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3260                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3261                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3262                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3263                 // Revoke the old state
3264                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3265
3266                 {
3267                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3268                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3269                         {
3270                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3271                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3272                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3273
3274                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3275                                 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3276                                 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3277                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3278                         }
3279                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3280
3281                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3282                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3283                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3284                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3285
3286                         //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3287                         //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3288                 }
3289                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3290                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3291                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3292
3293                 // Check that we processed all pending events
3294                 for node in nodes {
3295                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3296                         assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3297                 }
3298         }
3299
3300         #[test]
3301         fn test_unconf_chan() {
3302                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3303                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3304                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3305
3306                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3307                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3308                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3309                 mem::drop(channel_state);
3310
3311                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3312                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3313                 headers.push(header.clone());
3314                 for _i in 2..100 {
3315                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3316                         headers.push(header.clone());
3317                 }
3318                 while !headers.is_empty() {
3319                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3320                 }
3321                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3322                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3323                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3324         }
3325
3326         #[test]
3327         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3328                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3329                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3330                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3331
3332                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3333
3334                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3335                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3337                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3338
3339                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3340
3341                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3342                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3343
3344                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3345                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3346
3347                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3348
3349                 let mut chan_announcement;
3350
3351                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3352                         () => {
3353                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3354                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3355                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3356                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3357                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3358                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3359                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3360                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3361                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3362                                 };
3363                         }
3364                 }
3365
3366                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3367                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3368                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3369                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3370                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3371                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3372                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3373                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3374                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3375                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3376                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3377                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3378                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
3379                                 }
3380                         }
3381                 }
3382
3383                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3384                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3385                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3386                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3387
3388                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3389                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3390                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3391                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3392                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3393
3394                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3395                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3396                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3397                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3398         }
3399 }