1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::config::UserConfig;
32 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
33 use util::sha2::Sha256;
34 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
35 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
41 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
42 use crypto::digest::Digest;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
108 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
109 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
110 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
115 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
117 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
118 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
119 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
135 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
138 err: msgs::HandleError,
139 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
147 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
148 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150 data: err.to_string()
154 needs_channel_force_close: false,
158 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
162 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
163 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165 data: err.to_string()
169 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
181 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
184 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193 data: msg.to_string()
198 needs_channel_force_close: false,
202 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
205 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
212 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214 data: msg.to_string()
219 needs_channel_force_close: true,
224 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
225 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
228 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
234 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
235 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
236 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
237 /// probably increase this significantly.
238 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
241 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 struct ChannelHolder {
259 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
260 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
261 next_forward: Instant,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
279 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
280 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
281 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
284 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
286 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
287 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
288 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
289 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
290 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
291 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
300 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
302 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
303 /// to individual Channels.
305 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
306 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
307 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
308 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
310 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
311 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
312 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
313 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
314 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
315 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
316 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
318 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
319 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
320 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
321 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
323 pub struct ChannelManager {
324 default_configuration: UserConfig,
325 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
326 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
327 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
328 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
329 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
331 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
333 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
335 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
336 our_network_key: SecretKey,
338 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
339 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
340 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
341 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
344 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
349 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
350 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
351 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
352 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
353 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
354 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
355 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
357 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
358 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
359 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
360 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
363 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
365 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
366 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
369 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
371 macro_rules! secp_call {
372 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
375 Err(_) => return Err($err),
382 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
384 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
385 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
390 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
391 pub struct ChannelDetails {
392 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
393 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
394 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
395 /// lifetime of the channel.
396 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
397 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
398 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
399 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
400 /// The node_id of our counterparty
401 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
402 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
403 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
404 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
408 impl ChannelManager {
409 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
411 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
412 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
414 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
416 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
417 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
420 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
421 default_configuration: config.clone(),
422 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
423 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
424 monitor: monitor.clone(),
428 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
429 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
432 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
433 by_id: HashMap::new(),
434 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
435 next_forward: Instant::now(),
436 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
437 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
438 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
440 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
442 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
443 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
449 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
450 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
454 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
456 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
457 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
458 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
459 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
461 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
462 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
464 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
465 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
466 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
467 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
471 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
472 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
474 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
475 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
478 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
481 panic!("RNG is bad???");
484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
486 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
487 node_id: their_network_key,
493 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
494 /// more information.
495 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
496 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
497 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
498 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
499 res.push(ChannelDetails {
500 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
501 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
502 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
503 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
504 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
510 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
511 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
512 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
513 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
514 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
515 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
516 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
517 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
518 // really wanted anyway.
519 if channel.is_live() {
520 res.push(ChannelDetails {
521 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
522 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
523 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
524 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
525 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
532 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
533 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
534 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
536 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
537 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
538 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
540 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
541 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
542 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
543 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
545 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
547 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
550 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
551 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
552 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
554 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
555 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
560 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
561 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
564 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
565 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
570 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
581 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
582 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
583 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
584 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
587 for tx in local_txn {
588 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
590 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
591 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
592 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
593 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
594 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
595 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
596 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
599 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
600 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
601 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
606 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
607 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
608 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
609 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
616 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
617 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
618 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
625 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
626 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
627 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
628 for chan in self.list_channels() {
629 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
633 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
644 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
645 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
647 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
648 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
653 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
654 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
655 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
661 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
662 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
664 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
665 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
666 let mut res = [0; 32];
667 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
671 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
672 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
673 let mut res = [0; 32];
674 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
680 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
681 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
682 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
683 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
684 let mut res = [0; 32];
685 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
690 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
691 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
692 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
693 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
694 let mut res = [0; 32];
695 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
699 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
701 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
702 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
703 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
705 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
706 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
708 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
709 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
710 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
711 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
712 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
714 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
716 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
717 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
719 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
725 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
726 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
727 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
729 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
730 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
736 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
746 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
747 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
748 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
749 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
750 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
751 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
752 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
753 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
755 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
756 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
757 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
758 // the intended recipient).
759 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
760 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
761 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
763 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
764 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
765 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
766 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
770 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
771 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
772 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
774 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
775 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
776 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
778 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
780 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
784 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
786 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
794 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
795 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
797 for i in 0..dst.len() {
802 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
803 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
804 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
805 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
808 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
809 let end_len = iters * 65;
810 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
811 res.resize(end_len, 0);
813 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
814 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
815 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
816 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
817 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
822 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
823 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
825 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
826 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
827 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
828 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
830 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
831 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
832 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
835 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
838 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
839 hmac.input(&packet_data);
840 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
841 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
846 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
847 hop_data: packet_data,
852 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
853 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
854 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
855 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
857 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
858 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
859 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
860 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
861 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
862 data: packet_crypted,
866 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
867 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
868 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
870 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
873 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
874 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
875 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
876 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
881 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
884 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
886 failuremsg: failuremsg,
890 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
891 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
892 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
898 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
899 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
900 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
903 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
904 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
907 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
908 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
909 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
910 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
916 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
917 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
918 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
919 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
920 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
921 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
922 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
923 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
926 let shared_secret = {
927 let mut arr = [0; 32];
928 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
931 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
933 let mut channel_state = None;
934 macro_rules! return_err {
935 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
937 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
938 if channel_state.is_none() {
939 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
941 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
942 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
943 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
944 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
945 })), channel_state.unwrap());
950 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
951 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
952 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
953 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
954 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
955 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
956 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
957 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
960 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
961 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
962 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
963 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
964 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
967 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
968 let next_hop_data = {
969 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
970 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
971 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
973 let error_code = match err {
974 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
975 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
977 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
983 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
985 // final_expiry_too_soon
986 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
987 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
989 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
990 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
991 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
993 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
994 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
995 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
998 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
999 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1000 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1001 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1003 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1005 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1006 short_channel_id: 0,
1007 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1008 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1009 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1012 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1013 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1014 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1016 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1018 let blinding_factor = {
1019 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1020 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1021 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1022 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1023 sha.result(&mut res);
1024 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1026 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1032 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1033 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1036 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1038 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1039 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1040 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1043 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1044 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1045 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1046 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1047 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1048 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1049 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1053 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1054 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1055 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1056 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1057 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1058 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1059 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1061 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1063 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1064 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1066 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1067 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1068 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1069 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1070 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1071 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1072 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1074 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1075 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1077 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1078 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1079 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1081 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1082 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1084 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1085 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1086 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1087 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1089 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1090 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1095 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1096 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1097 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1099 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1100 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1102 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1103 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1105 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1110 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1113 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1114 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1115 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1116 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1117 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1121 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1123 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1124 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1125 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1126 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1127 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1128 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1129 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1130 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1131 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1132 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1135 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1136 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1138 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1144 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1146 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1147 /// fields for more info.
1149 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1150 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1151 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1152 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1153 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1154 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1156 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1158 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1159 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1160 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1161 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1162 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1164 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1165 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1166 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1167 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1171 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1172 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1173 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1175 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1177 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1179 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1180 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1181 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1182 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1184 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1185 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1187 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1188 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1189 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1193 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1194 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1195 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1197 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1198 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1200 if !chan.is_live() {
1201 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1203 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1204 route: route.clone(),
1205 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1206 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1207 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1210 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1211 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1212 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1213 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1217 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1219 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1234 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1236 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1237 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1239 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1241 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1242 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1243 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1244 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1246 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1247 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1248 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1250 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1251 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1252 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1255 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1256 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1257 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1267 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1268 // lock before add_update_monitor
1269 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1273 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1275 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1278 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1280 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1288 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1289 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1291 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1293 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1295 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1296 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1298 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1299 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1300 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1301 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1302 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1306 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1308 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1309 /// Will likely generate further events.
1310 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1311 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1313 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1314 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1316 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1317 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1319 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1323 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1324 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1325 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1326 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1328 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1329 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1330 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1331 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1332 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1333 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1335 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1340 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1342 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1343 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1344 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1345 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1346 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1349 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1351 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1352 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1357 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1359 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1360 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1361 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1362 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1363 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1364 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1365 // this channel currently :/.
1372 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1373 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1376 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1377 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1379 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1381 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1385 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1386 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1389 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1390 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1391 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1392 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1394 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1396 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1401 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1402 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1403 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1404 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1407 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1411 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1412 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1413 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1420 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1422 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1423 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1427 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1428 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1429 events.append(&mut new_events);
1432 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1433 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1434 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1436 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1437 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1438 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1439 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1440 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1441 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1447 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1448 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1449 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1450 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1451 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1452 /// still-available channels.
1453 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1455 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1456 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1457 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1458 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1459 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1460 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1461 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1466 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1467 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1468 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1471 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1474 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1475 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1476 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1477 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1478 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1480 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1481 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1485 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1487 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1488 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1492 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1493 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1494 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1495 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1499 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1500 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1501 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1502 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1503 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1504 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1506 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1512 //TODO: Do something with e?
1520 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1521 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1522 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1524 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1525 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1526 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1527 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1528 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1529 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1531 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1533 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1534 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1535 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1536 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1537 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1538 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1543 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1545 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1546 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1548 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1552 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1553 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1554 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1556 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1557 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1559 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1560 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1566 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1567 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1568 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1569 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1570 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1571 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1574 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1576 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1577 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1578 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1579 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1580 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1581 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1589 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1590 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1591 //TODO: Do something with e?
1599 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1600 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1601 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1604 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1605 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1607 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1608 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1609 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1610 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1611 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1614 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1615 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1616 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1617 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1618 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1619 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1620 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1621 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1623 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1624 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1625 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1627 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1628 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1635 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1638 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1639 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1640 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1642 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1644 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1645 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1647 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1652 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1653 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1655 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1656 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1661 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1665 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1676 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1679 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1681 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1682 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1686 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1687 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1691 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1692 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1694 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1699 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1700 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1702 entry.insert(channel);
1708 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1709 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1711 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1713 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1714 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1717 chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
1718 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1719 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1721 //TODO: same as above
1722 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1725 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1726 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1727 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1728 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1729 output_script: output_script,
1730 user_channel_id: user_id,
1735 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1737 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1738 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1740 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1744 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1745 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1746 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1749 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1756 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1757 // lock before add_update_monitor
1758 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1762 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1763 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1768 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1769 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1778 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1779 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1780 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1781 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1783 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1784 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1787 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1788 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1791 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1793 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1796 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1797 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1798 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1799 user_channel_id: user_id,
1804 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1806 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1807 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1809 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1810 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1813 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1814 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1815 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1817 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1818 msg: announcement_sigs,
1823 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1827 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1828 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1829 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1830 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1834 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1835 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1838 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1839 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1841 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1845 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1846 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1847 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1851 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1852 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1853 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1855 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1856 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1861 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1862 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1865 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1867 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1876 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1877 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1878 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1882 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1886 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1887 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1889 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1894 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1895 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1896 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1897 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1898 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1899 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1900 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1902 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1903 } else { (tx, None) }
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1909 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1911 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1912 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1913 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1922 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1923 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1924 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1925 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1927 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1928 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1929 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1930 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1932 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1933 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1935 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1937 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1938 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1941 if !chan.is_usable() {
1942 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1943 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1944 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1945 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1946 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1947 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1948 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1949 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap().encode_with_len()[..]),
1953 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1955 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1959 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1960 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1961 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1963 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1964 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1967 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1968 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1970 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1972 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1976 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1977 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1978 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1979 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1980 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1981 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1982 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1984 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1985 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1989 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1990 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1991 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1994 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1996 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1997 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1998 if res.is_some() { return; }
2000 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2001 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2002 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2004 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2006 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2007 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2008 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2009 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2010 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2012 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2014 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2015 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2016 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2017 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2018 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2019 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2021 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2022 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2023 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2024 // definitely came from the peer in question
2025 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2027 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2029 match error_code & 0xff {
2031 // either from an intermediate or final node
2032 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2033 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2034 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2035 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2036 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2037 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2038 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2039 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2040 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2041 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2042 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2048 if is_from_final_node {
2049 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2050 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2051 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2052 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2053 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2054 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2057 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2058 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2062 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2063 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2064 // does not coform to the spec.
2065 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2066 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2067 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2073 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2077 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2079 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2080 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2081 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2085 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2086 let offset = match error_code {
2087 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2088 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2089 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2090 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2091 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2092 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2094 // node sending unknown code
2095 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2096 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2103 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2104 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2105 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2106 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2107 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2108 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2109 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2110 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2113 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2114 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2115 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2116 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2118 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2119 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2120 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2121 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2122 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2124 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2125 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2126 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2127 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2129 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2130 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2131 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2132 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2134 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2135 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2138 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2139 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2143 res = Some((msg, true));
2149 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2152 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2153 res = Some((None, true));
2157 // node sending unknown code
2158 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2159 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2168 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2169 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2170 } else { ((None, true)) }
2173 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2174 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2175 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2177 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2178 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2179 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2181 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2182 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2184 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2189 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2190 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2191 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2193 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2194 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2197 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2200 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2201 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2204 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2208 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2209 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2210 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2211 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2213 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2214 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2217 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2218 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2222 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2223 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2225 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2227 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2228 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2229 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2230 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2231 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2232 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2234 commitment_signed: msg,
2238 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2239 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2240 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2246 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2251 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2252 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2253 let mut forward_event = None;
2254 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2255 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2256 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2257 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2258 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2260 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2261 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2263 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2266 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2271 match forward_event {
2273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2274 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2275 time_forwardable: time
2283 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2284 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2286 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2287 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2289 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2290 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2293 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2294 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2297 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2298 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2299 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2303 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2305 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2309 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2311 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2317 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2322 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2323 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2324 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2326 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2327 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2330 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2332 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2336 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2338 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2340 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2342 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2345 if !chan.is_usable() {
2346 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2349 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2350 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2351 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2353 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2354 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2355 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2356 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2357 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2359 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2361 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2362 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2363 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2364 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2365 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2366 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2367 contents: announcement,
2369 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2372 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2377 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2378 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2379 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2381 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2383 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2384 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2386 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2387 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2388 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2389 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2393 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2395 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2399 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2400 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2401 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2402 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2407 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2408 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2409 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2410 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2416 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2420 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2425 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2426 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2427 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2433 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2437 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2438 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2439 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2440 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2442 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2443 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2444 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2445 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2447 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2448 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2450 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2451 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2453 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2454 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2456 if !chan.is_live() {
2457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2459 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2460 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2464 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2465 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2466 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2469 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2470 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2481 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2482 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2483 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2484 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2485 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2490 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2491 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2492 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2494 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2499 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2500 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2502 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2504 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2505 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2506 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2507 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2508 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2509 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2510 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2512 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2513 msg: funding_locked,
2515 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2517 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2518 msg: announcement_sigs,
2521 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2522 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2524 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2527 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2531 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2532 for tx in txn_matched {
2533 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2534 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2535 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2536 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2538 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2539 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2540 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2541 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2543 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2552 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2553 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2554 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2556 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2557 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2558 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2559 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2560 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2561 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2562 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2571 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2572 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2574 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2575 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2578 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2579 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2580 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2581 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2583 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2584 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2585 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2586 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2587 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2588 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2589 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2590 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2592 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2593 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2594 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2604 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2605 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2607 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2608 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2612 macro_rules! handle_error {
2613 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2616 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2617 if needs_channel_force_close {
2619 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2620 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2621 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2623 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2626 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2627 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2628 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2629 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2630 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2632 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2644 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2645 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2646 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2647 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2648 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2651 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2653 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2656 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2657 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2658 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2661 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2662 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2663 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2666 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2667 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2668 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2671 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2676 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2677 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2678 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2681 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2682 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2683 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2686 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2688 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2691 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2692 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2693 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2696 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2698 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2701 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2702 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2703 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2706 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2707 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2708 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2711 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2713 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2716 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2717 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2718 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2721 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2722 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2723 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2726 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2727 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2728 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2729 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2731 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2732 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2733 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2734 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2735 if no_connection_possible {
2736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2737 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2738 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2739 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2741 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2753 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2754 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2755 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2756 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2757 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2758 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2759 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2761 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2762 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2763 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2772 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2773 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2775 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2776 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2777 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2782 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2785 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2786 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2787 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2788 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2789 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2790 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2791 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2792 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2797 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2798 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2804 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2807 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2810 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2811 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2812 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2813 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2817 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2822 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2823 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2825 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2826 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2827 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2829 onion.write(writer)?;
2833 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2834 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2835 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2836 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2837 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2842 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2843 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2844 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2846 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2847 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2849 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2851 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2852 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2853 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2854 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2855 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2860 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2861 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2863 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2865 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2867 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2869 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2876 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2877 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2878 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2879 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2880 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2881 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2886 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2887 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2889 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2891 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2893 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2895 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2902 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2903 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2904 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2905 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2906 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2907 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2912 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2915 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2918 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2921 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2923 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2925 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2927 route.write(writer)?;
2928 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2929 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2936 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2937 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2938 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2939 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2940 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2941 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2942 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2943 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2945 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2950 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2951 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2953 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2957 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2959 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2960 data.write(writer)?;
2967 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2968 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2969 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2970 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2971 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2972 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2973 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2975 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2980 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2981 prev_short_channel_id,
2986 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2987 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2988 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2990 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2991 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2993 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2994 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2995 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2997 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2998 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2999 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3000 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3001 unfunded_channels += 1;
3004 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3005 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3006 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3007 channel.write(writer)?;
3011 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3012 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3013 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3014 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3015 for forward in pending_forwards {
3016 forward.write(writer)?;
3020 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3021 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3022 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3023 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3024 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3025 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3033 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3035 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3037 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3038 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3039 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3040 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3041 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3042 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3043 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3044 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3045 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3046 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3047 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3048 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3049 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3050 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3051 /// deserialization.
3052 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3054 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3056 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3057 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3058 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3060 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3061 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3062 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3063 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3064 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3066 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3067 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3068 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3069 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3070 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3071 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3072 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3073 /// deserialization.
3074 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3075 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3076 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3077 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3079 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3080 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3082 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3083 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3084 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3085 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3087 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3089 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3092 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3093 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3094 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3095 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3096 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3097 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3100 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3101 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3102 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3104 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3106 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3107 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3108 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3109 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3110 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3111 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3112 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3113 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3116 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3117 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3118 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3119 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3120 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3121 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3122 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3123 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3124 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3126 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3127 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3129 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3136 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3137 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3138 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3142 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3143 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3144 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3145 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3146 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3147 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3148 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3149 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3151 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3154 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3155 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3156 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3157 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3158 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3159 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3160 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3161 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3163 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3166 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3168 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3169 monitor: args.monitor,
3170 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3171 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3173 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3174 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3175 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3177 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3180 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3183 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3185 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3187 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3188 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3189 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3190 logger: args.logger,
3191 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3194 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3195 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3196 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3197 //connection or two.
3200 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3206 use chain::chaininterface;
3207 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3208 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3209 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3210 use chain::keysinterface;
3211 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3212 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3213 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3215 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3216 use util::test_utils;
3217 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3218 use util::errors::APIError;
3219 use util::logger::Logger;
3220 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3221 use util::config::UserConfig;
3223 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
3224 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3225 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
3226 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3227 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3228 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3229 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
3233 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3234 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3236 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3237 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3239 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3241 use std::cell::RefCell;
3242 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3243 use std::default::Default;
3245 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3246 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3247 use std::time::Instant;
3250 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3251 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3257 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3258 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3261 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3262 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3265 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3266 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3269 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3270 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3273 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3274 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3279 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3281 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3282 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3287 fn onion_vectors() {
3288 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3289 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3291 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3292 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3293 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3294 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3295 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3297 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3298 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3299 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3300 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3301 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3303 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3304 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3305 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3306 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3307 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3309 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3310 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3311 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3312 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3313 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3315 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3316 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3317 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3318 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3319 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3321 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3322 let payloads = vec!(
3323 msgs::OnionHopData {
3325 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3326 short_channel_id: 0,
3328 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3332 msgs::OnionHopData {
3334 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3335 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3336 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3337 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3341 msgs::OnionHopData {
3343 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3344 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3345 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3346 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3350 msgs::OnionHopData {
3352 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3353 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3354 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3355 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3359 msgs::OnionHopData {
3361 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3362 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3363 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3364 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3370 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3371 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3373 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3377 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3378 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3380 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3381 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3382 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3384 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3385 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3387 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3388 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3390 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3391 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3393 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3394 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3396 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3397 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3400 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3401 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3402 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3405 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3406 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3411 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3412 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3413 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3414 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3416 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3417 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3418 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3420 impl Drop for Node {
3421 fn drop(&mut self) {
3422 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3423 // Check that we processed all pending events
3424 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3425 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3426 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3431 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3432 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3435 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3436 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3437 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3438 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3441 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3442 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3444 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3447 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3448 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3452 }, match events[1] {
3453 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3454 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3455 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3456 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3457 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3458 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3459 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3460 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3469 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3471 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3474 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3475 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3484 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3485 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3487 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3490 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3491 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3500 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3501 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3502 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3503 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3505 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3509 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3510 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3512 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3513 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3514 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3516 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3517 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3519 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3521 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3522 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3523 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3524 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3525 added_monitors.clear();
3527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3532 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3533 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3534 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3535 added_monitors.clear();
3538 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3540 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3541 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3542 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3543 added_monitors.clear();
3546 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3547 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3549 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3550 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3551 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3559 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3560 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3561 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3565 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3566 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3567 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3568 ((match events_6[0] {
3569 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3570 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3571 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3575 }, match events_6[1] {
3576 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3577 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3584 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3585 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3586 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3590 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3591 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3592 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3593 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3595 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3596 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3597 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3598 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3605 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3606 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3607 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3608 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3609 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3617 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3620 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3621 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3624 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3625 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3627 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3628 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3629 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3631 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3634 macro_rules! check_spends {
3635 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3637 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3638 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3639 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3640 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3645 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3646 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3647 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3650 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3651 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3653 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3654 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3655 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3656 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3657 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3663 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3664 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3667 Some(match events_1[1] {
3668 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3669 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3677 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3679 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3680 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3681 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3682 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3688 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3689 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3699 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3700 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3701 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3702 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3703 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3704 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3705 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3707 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3708 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3709 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3710 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3711 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3712 (as_update, bs_update)
3714 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3716 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3717 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3718 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3719 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3721 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3722 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3723 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3724 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3725 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3726 (as_update, bs_update)
3728 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3729 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3731 (as_update, bs_update)
3736 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3737 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3740 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3741 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3742 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3743 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3744 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3745 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3748 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3756 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3757 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3759 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3760 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3761 added_monitors.clear();
3766 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3767 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3769 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3770 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3771 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3772 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3773 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3774 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3775 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3776 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3777 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3778 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3779 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3780 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3781 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3782 if $fail_backwards {
3783 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3784 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3786 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3787 if $fail_backwards {
3788 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3789 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3790 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3791 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3792 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3794 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3797 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3798 if $fail_backwards {
3799 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3800 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3802 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3804 added_monitors.clear();
3810 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3813 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3814 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3815 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3816 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3817 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3818 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3819 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3824 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3825 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3827 let mut payment_event = {
3828 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3829 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3831 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3832 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3833 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3835 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3837 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3838 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3840 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3841 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3842 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3844 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3845 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3847 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3851 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3852 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3854 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3855 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3856 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3858 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3859 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3860 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3865 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3866 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3867 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3868 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3869 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3875 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3878 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3879 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3880 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3882 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3883 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3884 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3887 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3890 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3891 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3892 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3893 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3894 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3895 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3896 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3897 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3906 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3908 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3909 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3910 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3911 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3915 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3916 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3918 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3919 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3920 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3921 get_next_msgs!($node)
3923 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3926 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3927 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3932 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3933 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3934 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3935 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3936 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3937 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3938 } else if update_next_msgs {
3939 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3941 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3943 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3944 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3951 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3952 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3955 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3956 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3963 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3964 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3967 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3969 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3970 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3971 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3972 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3973 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3976 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3979 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3980 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3981 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3982 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3983 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3986 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3988 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3990 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3991 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3995 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3996 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3997 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4000 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4001 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4002 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4004 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4005 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4006 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4008 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4009 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4014 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4015 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4016 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4017 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4018 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4019 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4020 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4021 // second-to-last node!
4022 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4025 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4026 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4029 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4030 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4031 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4032 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4033 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4034 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4035 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4036 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4041 assert!(events.is_empty());
4043 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4044 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4051 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4053 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4056 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4057 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4058 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4065 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4066 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4069 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4070 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4071 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4073 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4075 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4076 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4078 for _ in 0..node_count {
4079 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4080 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4081 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4082 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4083 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4084 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4085 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4086 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4087 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4088 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4089 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4090 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4091 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4092 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4093 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4101 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4102 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4103 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4104 let channel_id = chan.2;
4106 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4108 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4109 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4115 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4119 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4120 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4121 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4122 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4123 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4124 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4125 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4126 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4127 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4128 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4130 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4132 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4134 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4135 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4138 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4139 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4140 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4141 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4142 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4149 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4150 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4151 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4154 let payment_event = {
4155 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4156 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4157 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4159 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4160 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4162 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4163 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4164 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4165 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4166 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4169 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4170 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4171 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4172 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4176 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4177 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4178 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4179 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4180 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4181 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4185 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4186 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4187 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4188 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4189 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4190 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4194 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4195 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4198 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4199 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4202 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4206 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4208 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4212 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4217 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4218 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4219 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4220 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4221 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4222 let channel_id = chan.2;
4224 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4226 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4227 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4233 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4236 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4239 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4240 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4241 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4250 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4251 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4252 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4255 let payment_event = {
4256 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4257 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4258 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4260 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4261 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4263 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4264 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4265 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4266 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4267 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4270 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4273 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4277 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4278 let nodes = create_network(2);
4279 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4280 let channel_id = chan.2;
4282 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4284 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4285 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4291 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4292 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4293 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4294 // (3) update_fee ->
4295 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4296 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4297 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4298 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4299 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4300 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4301 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4302 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4303 // revoke_and_ack ->
4304 // B should send no response here
4305 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4306 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4307 // revoke_and_ack ->
4309 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4310 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4311 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4314 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4315 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4316 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4318 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4323 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4325 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4326 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4329 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4331 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4332 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4333 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4335 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4336 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4337 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4338 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4343 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4347 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4348 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4349 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4351 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4352 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4353 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4354 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4355 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4356 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4357 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4359 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4360 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4361 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4363 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4365 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4366 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4370 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4371 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4374 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4378 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4379 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4380 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4384 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4389 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4390 let nodes = create_network(2);
4391 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4392 let channel_id = chan.2;
4394 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4396 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4397 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4402 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4403 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4406 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4407 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4408 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4409 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4410 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4414 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4416 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4417 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4420 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4421 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4424 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4425 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4426 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4429 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4430 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4435 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4436 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4437 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4438 let channel_id = chan.2;
4440 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4442 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4443 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4449 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4451 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4452 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4455 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4456 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4457 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4458 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4459 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4465 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4470 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4472 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4473 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4475 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4476 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4477 added_monitors.clear();
4479 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4480 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4481 // node[1] has nothing to do
4483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4488 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4491 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4493 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4495 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4496 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4497 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4498 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4499 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4500 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4502 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4503 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4505 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4507 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4509 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4511 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4513 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4514 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4516 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4518 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4520 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4523 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4526 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4527 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4529 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4532 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4536 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4538 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4540 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4544 fn test_update_fee() {
4545 let nodes = create_network(2);
4546 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4547 let channel_id = chan.2;
4549 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4551 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4552 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4558 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4559 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4560 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4561 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4562 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4563 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4564 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4565 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4566 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4567 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4568 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4569 // revoke_and_ack ->
4571 // Create and deliver (1)...
4572 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4573 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4576 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4577 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4578 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4579 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4580 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4586 // Generate (2) and (3):
4587 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4588 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4592 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4593 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4596 // Create and deliver (4)...
4597 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4599 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4600 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4601 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4602 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4603 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4609 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4615 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4616 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4618 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4619 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4622 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4623 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4626 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4628 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4629 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4630 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4631 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4632 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4633 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4637 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4639 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4640 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4642 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4644 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4646 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4647 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4648 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4652 fn fake_network_test() {
4653 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4654 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4655 let nodes = create_network(4);
4657 // Create some initial channels
4658 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4659 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4660 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4662 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4663 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4664 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4665 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4666 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4668 // Send some more payments
4669 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4670 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4671 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4673 // Test failure packets
4674 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4675 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4677 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4678 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4680 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4681 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4682 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4683 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4684 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4685 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4686 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4688 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4689 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4690 hops.push(RouteHop {
4691 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4692 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4694 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4696 hops.push(RouteHop {
4697 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4698 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4700 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4702 hops.push(RouteHop {
4703 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4704 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4706 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4708 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4709 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4710 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4712 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4713 hops.push(RouteHop {
4714 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4715 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4717 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4719 hops.push(RouteHop {
4720 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4721 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4723 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4725 hops.push(RouteHop {
4726 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4727 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4729 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4731 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4732 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4733 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4735 // Claim the rebalances...
4736 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4737 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4739 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4740 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4742 // Send some payments across both channels
4743 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4744 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4745 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4747 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4749 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4751 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4755 // Close down the channels...
4756 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4757 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4758 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4759 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4760 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4764 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4765 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4766 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4767 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4769 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4770 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4771 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4772 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4773 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4774 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4776 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4778 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4779 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4781 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4782 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4784 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4785 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4786 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4789 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4790 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4791 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4793 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4794 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4795 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4797 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4798 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4800 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4802 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4803 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4804 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4806 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4807 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4808 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4809 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4810 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4811 res.push(tx.clone());
4816 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4817 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4820 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4822 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4823 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4824 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4825 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4826 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4827 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4829 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4831 res.push(tx.clone());
4835 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4838 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4842 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4843 /// HTLC transaction.
4844 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4845 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4847 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4848 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4849 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4853 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4856 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4857 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4859 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4860 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4861 let mut found_prev = false;
4863 for tx in prev_txn {
4864 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4865 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4866 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4867 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4873 assert!(found_prev);
4875 let mut res = Vec::new();
4876 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4880 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4881 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4882 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4883 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4884 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4890 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4891 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4892 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4893 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4900 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4901 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4905 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4907 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4910 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4913 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4914 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4919 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4921 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4922 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4924 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4925 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4926 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4927 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4928 chan.get_value_stat()
4932 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4933 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4934 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4936 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4937 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4939 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4940 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4942 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4943 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4944 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4945 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4946 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4950 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4952 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4954 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4955 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4960 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4961 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4962 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4965 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4966 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4967 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4974 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4975 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4977 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4979 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4981 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4982 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4983 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4985 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4986 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4990 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4991 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4992 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4994 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4995 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4998 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5001 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5002 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5003 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5004 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5005 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5008 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5009 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5010 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5011 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5012 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5016 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5017 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5018 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5019 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5021 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5022 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5026 // adding pending output
5027 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5028 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5030 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5031 let payment_event_1 = {
5032 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5035 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5037 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5041 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5042 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5044 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5045 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5046 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5047 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5052 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5053 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5055 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5057 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5058 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5059 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5061 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5063 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5064 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5065 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5066 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5067 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5068 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5070 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5071 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5072 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5073 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5076 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5078 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5082 // split the rest to test holding cell
5083 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5084 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5086 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5087 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5090 // now see if they go through on both sides
5091 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5092 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5093 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5095 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5098 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5100 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5101 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5102 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5103 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5107 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5108 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5109 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5111 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5112 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5114 // flush the pending htlc
5115 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5116 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5121 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5123 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5124 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5125 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5128 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5129 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5134 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5135 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5136 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5139 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5141 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5142 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5148 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5149 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5150 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5156 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5159 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5160 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5161 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5166 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5167 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5168 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5173 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5174 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5177 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5178 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5179 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5180 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5182 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5183 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5187 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5188 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5189 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5190 let nodes = create_network(5);
5192 // Create some initial channels
5193 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5194 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5195 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5196 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5198 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5204 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5205 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5207 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5208 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5209 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5210 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5212 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5213 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5216 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5217 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5219 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5220 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5223 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5224 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5225 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5227 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5228 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5229 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5231 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5232 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5234 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5235 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5237 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5241 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5242 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5243 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5251 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5252 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5253 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5255 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5257 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5258 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5260 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5261 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5263 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5265 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5266 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5267 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5269 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5270 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5271 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5274 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5275 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5276 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5277 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5278 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5282 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5283 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5284 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5285 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5286 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5289 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5291 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5292 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5294 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5295 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5296 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5297 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5298 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5301 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5303 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5304 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5306 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5308 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5309 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5310 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5312 // Create some new channels:
5313 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5315 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5316 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5317 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5318 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5319 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5320 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5321 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5322 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5323 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5324 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5325 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5326 // Revoke the old state
5327 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5330 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5331 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5333 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5334 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5335 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5336 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5338 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5339 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5341 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5343 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5344 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5345 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5346 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5347 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5349 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5350 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5351 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5355 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5356 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5357 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5358 let nodes = create_network(2);
5359 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5360 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5361 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5362 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5363 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5365 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5366 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5368 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5369 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5370 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5371 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5372 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5376 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5377 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5379 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5380 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5381 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5385 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5386 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5387 let nodes = create_network(2);
5389 // Create some new channel:
5390 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5392 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5393 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5394 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5395 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5396 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5398 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5399 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5401 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5406 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5408 //Revoke the old state
5409 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5412 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5414 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5416 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5417 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5418 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5420 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5421 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5423 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5425 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5426 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5427 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5428 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5429 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5430 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5431 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5432 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5434 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5435 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5436 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5438 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5439 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5440 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5441 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5442 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5443 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5445 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5447 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5451 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5452 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5453 let nodes = create_network(2);
5455 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5457 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5458 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5459 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5460 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5461 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5462 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5464 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5465 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5467 //Revoke the old state
5468 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5471 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5473 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5475 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5476 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5479 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5480 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5481 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5482 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5483 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5484 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5485 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5487 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5488 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5489 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5491 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5492 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5493 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5494 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5495 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5497 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5498 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5499 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5500 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5501 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5502 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5503 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5504 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5506 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5507 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5509 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5510 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5511 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5512 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5513 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5514 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5516 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5517 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5518 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5522 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5523 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5524 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5525 let nodes = create_network(2);
5526 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5528 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5529 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5531 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5534 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5535 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5541 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5542 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5544 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5545 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5548 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5551 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5552 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5558 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5559 // registering new transactions
5560 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5564 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5565 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5566 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5570 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5572 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5574 let mut payment_event = {
5575 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5578 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5580 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5586 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5587 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5589 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5593 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5594 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5596 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5597 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5598 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5599 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5602 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5603 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5605 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5607 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5608 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5609 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5611 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5612 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5613 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5615 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5616 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5622 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5623 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5624 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5625 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5626 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5630 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5631 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5633 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5634 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5635 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5637 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5638 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5643 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5645 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5646 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5647 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5649 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5650 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5651 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5652 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5653 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5654 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5655 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5657 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5661 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5662 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5663 let nodes = create_network(2);
5664 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5666 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5667 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5668 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5669 mem::drop(channel_state);
5671 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5672 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5673 headers.push(header.clone());
5675 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5676 headers.push(header.clone());
5678 while !headers.is_empty() {
5679 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5682 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5685 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5686 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5691 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5692 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5693 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5696 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5697 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5699 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5700 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5701 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5702 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5703 res.push(msg.clone());
5705 panic!("Unexpected event")
5713 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5714 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5716 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5718 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5720 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5726 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5727 let mut commitment_update = None;
5728 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5731 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5732 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5733 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5734 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5736 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5737 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5738 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5739 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5744 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5747 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5749 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5750 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5751 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5752 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5754 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5755 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5756 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5757 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5763 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5768 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5769 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5770 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5771 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5772 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5773 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5774 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5776 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5777 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5778 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5779 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5781 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5782 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5784 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5787 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5788 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5789 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5790 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5792 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5793 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5795 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5798 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5799 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5800 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5802 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5804 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5805 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5806 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5807 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5808 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5809 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5810 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5813 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5816 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5817 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5818 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5819 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5821 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5823 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5824 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5825 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5826 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5828 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5830 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5831 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5833 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5834 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5836 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5837 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5839 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5840 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5843 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5844 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5846 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5847 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5848 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5849 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5850 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5851 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5852 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5855 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5859 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5861 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5862 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5863 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5864 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5865 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5866 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5867 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5870 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5873 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5874 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5875 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5876 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5878 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5880 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5881 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5882 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5883 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5885 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5886 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5887 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5888 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5889 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5891 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5892 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5894 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5895 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5898 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5899 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5901 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5902 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5903 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5904 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5905 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5906 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5907 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5910 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5916 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5917 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5918 let nodes = create_network(3);
5919 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5920 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5922 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5923 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5924 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5926 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5927 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5928 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5929 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5931 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5932 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5933 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5935 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5936 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5937 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5938 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5940 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5941 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5943 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5944 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5946 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5948 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5951 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5952 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5957 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5958 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5959 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5965 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5966 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5969 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5970 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5971 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5972 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5973 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5974 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5976 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5979 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5980 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5982 let payment_event = {
5983 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5986 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5987 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5988 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5990 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5992 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5993 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5995 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5996 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5997 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5999 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6001 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6002 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6003 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6006 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6007 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6008 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6009 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6012 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6013 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6014 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6022 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6023 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6024 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6025 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6026 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6027 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6028 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6029 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6030 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6031 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6032 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6033 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6034 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6035 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6036 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6037 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6038 // Everything was delivered...
6039 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6042 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6043 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6045 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6049 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6050 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6051 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6053 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6054 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6056 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6057 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6059 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6060 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6061 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6066 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6069 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6070 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6071 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6072 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6073 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6074 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6075 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6076 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6077 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6078 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6079 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6084 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6087 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6090 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6091 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6096 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6097 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6099 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6101 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6103 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6107 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6108 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6109 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6112 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6113 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6114 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6122 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6123 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6124 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6125 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6126 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6127 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6128 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6129 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6131 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6132 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6137 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6138 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6139 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6140 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6141 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6142 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6143 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6144 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6145 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6146 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6147 // Everything was delivered...
6148 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6153 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6155 // Channel should still work fine...
6156 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6157 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6161 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6162 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6163 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6164 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6165 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6169 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6170 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6171 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6172 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6176 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6177 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6178 let nodes = create_network(2);
6179 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6181 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6182 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6184 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6185 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6186 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6188 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6189 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6195 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6196 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6198 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6199 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6204 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6205 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6206 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6207 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6209 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6210 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6212 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6213 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6214 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6218 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6219 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6220 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6221 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6224 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6226 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6227 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6228 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6230 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6233 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6234 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6236 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6240 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6243 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6244 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6247 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6248 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6249 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6250 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6251 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6252 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6254 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6255 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6256 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6258 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6259 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6264 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6265 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6266 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6272 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6273 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6275 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6276 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6277 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6278 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6279 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6280 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6282 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6283 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6284 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6285 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6287 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6288 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6290 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6291 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6293 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6295 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6296 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6297 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6298 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6299 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6300 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6301 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6302 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6303 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6306 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6307 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6308 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6309 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6310 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6311 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6312 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6316 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6317 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6318 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6319 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6320 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6321 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6324 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6325 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6326 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6329 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6330 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6331 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6335 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6338 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6339 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6341 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6345 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6346 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6348 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6349 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6351 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6352 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6357 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6358 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6361 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6365 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6366 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6367 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6368 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6370 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6371 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6373 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6374 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6377 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6378 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6380 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6384 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6385 // PaymentFailed event
6387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6390 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6391 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6392 // a disconnect in between
6393 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6394 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6396 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6397 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6399 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6400 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6403 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6404 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6405 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6408 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6409 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6410 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6413 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6414 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6417 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6418 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6419 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6420 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6421 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6424 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6426 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6427 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6429 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6430 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6431 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6438 // Now set it to failed again...
6439 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6440 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6441 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6444 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6445 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6449 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6450 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6451 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6454 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6455 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6456 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6460 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6462 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6466 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6467 // PaymentFailed event
6469 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6473 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6474 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6475 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6478 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6479 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6481 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6482 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6483 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6484 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6485 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6486 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6487 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6488 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6489 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6490 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6491 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6492 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6493 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6494 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6495 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6496 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6497 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6498 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6501 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6503 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6504 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6505 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6507 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6508 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6512 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6513 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6515 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6516 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6517 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6519 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6520 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6521 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6522 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6523 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6524 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6525 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6526 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6527 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6528 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6530 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6531 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6532 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6533 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6535 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6536 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6541 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6542 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6543 } else { panic!(); }
6546 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6551 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6552 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6553 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6556 // Now fix monitor updating...
6557 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6558 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6562 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6563 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6565 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6566 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6567 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6568 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6569 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6570 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6572 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6573 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6575 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6577 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6578 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6580 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6583 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6584 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6585 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6587 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6588 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6589 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6591 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6592 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6594 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6596 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6599 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6601 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6602 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6604 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6605 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6606 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6608 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6609 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6610 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6612 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6613 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6614 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6615 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6616 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6617 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6619 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6621 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6622 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6623 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6625 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6626 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6631 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6632 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6633 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6640 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6641 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6643 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6644 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6645 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6647 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6648 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6651 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6653 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6654 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6655 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6656 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6657 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6664 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6668 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6669 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6672 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6673 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6675 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6676 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6678 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6679 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6682 let as_commitment_update;
6683 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6685 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6686 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6687 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6688 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6689 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6690 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6692 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6696 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6697 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6698 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6700 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6701 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6702 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6703 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6707 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6710 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6711 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6713 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6714 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6716 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6717 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6719 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6722 handle_initial_raa!();
6724 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6725 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6727 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6728 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6730 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6731 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6734 handle_initial_raa!();
6736 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6737 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6739 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6740 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6742 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6743 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6745 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6750 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6751 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6753 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6754 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6756 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6757 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6762 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6763 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6766 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6767 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6768 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6771 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6772 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6775 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6776 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6781 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6782 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6784 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6785 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6786 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6791 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6795 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6796 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6797 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6798 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6799 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6800 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6801 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6805 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6806 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6807 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6808 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6809 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6813 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6814 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6815 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6816 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6817 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6818 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6822 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6823 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6825 let nodes = create_network(2);
6827 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6829 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6830 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6831 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6832 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6834 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6836 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6837 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6839 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6840 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6842 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6844 let mut chan_announcement;
6846 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6848 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6849 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6850 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6851 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6852 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6853 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6854 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6855 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6856 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6861 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6862 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6863 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6864 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6865 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6866 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6867 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6868 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6869 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6870 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6871 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6872 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6873 contents: $unsigned_msg
6878 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6879 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6880 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6881 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6883 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6884 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6885 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6886 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6887 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6889 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6890 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6891 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6892 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6895 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
6896 impl Writer for VecWriter {
6897 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
6898 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
6901 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
6902 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
6907 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6908 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6910 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6912 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6914 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6915 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6916 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6918 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6919 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6920 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6921 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6923 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6924 let config = UserConfig::new();
6925 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6926 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6927 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6928 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6929 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6930 default_config: config,
6932 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6933 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6934 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
6935 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
6936 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
6937 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
6940 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
6942 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
6943 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
6944 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
6945 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
6946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6949 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6950 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6951 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6952 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6954 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6956 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6957 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6959 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
6960 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
6961 for node in nodes.iter() {
6962 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
6963 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
6964 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
6967 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6971 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6972 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6973 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6975 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6976 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6978 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6980 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6981 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6982 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6984 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6985 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6986 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6987 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6989 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6990 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6991 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6992 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6993 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6994 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6995 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
6997 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6998 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6999 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7000 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7001 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7002 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7005 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7007 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7008 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7011 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7013 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7014 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7018 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7019 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7020 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7021 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7022 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7023 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7025 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7027 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7028 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7030 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7031 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7032 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7033 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7035 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7037 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7038 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7039 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7040 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7041 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7044 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7045 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7046 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7047 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7048 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7049 assert!(read.is_empty());
7050 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7053 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7054 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7055 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7056 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7058 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7059 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7060 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7061 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7062 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7063 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7065 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7067 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7068 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7069 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7070 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7071 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7074 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7075 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7078 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7080 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7081 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7082 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7083 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7084 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7086 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7087 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7088 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7089 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7090 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7091 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }