1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
123 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134 err: msgs::HandleError,
135 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
143 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
146 data: err.to_string()
150 needs_channel_force_close: false,
154 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
158 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
161 data: err.to_string()
165 needs_channel_force_close: true,
169 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
178 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
179 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
180 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
181 /// probably increase this significantly.
182 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
184 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
185 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
187 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
190 struct ChannelHolder {
191 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
192 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
193 next_forward: Instant,
194 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
195 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
196 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
197 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
198 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
199 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
200 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
202 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
204 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
205 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
206 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
207 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
208 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
209 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
212 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
214 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
215 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
216 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
217 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
218 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
223 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
224 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
226 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
227 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
229 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
230 /// to individual Channels.
231 pub struct ChannelManager {
232 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
233 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
234 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
235 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
236 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
238 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
239 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
240 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
241 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
243 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
244 our_network_key: SecretKey,
246 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
251 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
253 macro_rules! secp_call {
254 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
257 Err(_) => return Err($err),
264 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
266 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
267 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
272 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
273 pub struct ChannelDetails {
274 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
275 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
276 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
277 /// lifetime of the channel.
278 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
279 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
280 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
281 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
282 /// The node_id of our counterparty
283 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
284 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
285 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
286 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
290 impl ChannelManager {
291 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
293 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
294 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
296 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
297 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
299 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
300 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
303 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
304 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
305 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
306 monitor: monitor.clone(),
310 announce_channels_publicly,
311 fee_proportional_millionths,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
315 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
316 by_id: HashMap::new(),
317 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
318 next_forward: Instant::now(),
319 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
324 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
328 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
329 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
333 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
335 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
336 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
337 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
338 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
340 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
341 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
343 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
344 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
345 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
347 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
348 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
349 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
350 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
351 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
352 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
353 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
354 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
357 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
358 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
359 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
361 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
365 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
366 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
367 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
368 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
370 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
373 panic!("RNG is bad???");
376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
379 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
380 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
381 node_id: their_network_key,
387 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
388 /// more information.
389 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
390 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
391 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
392 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
393 res.push(ChannelDetails {
394 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
395 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
396 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
397 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
398 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
404 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
405 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
406 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
407 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
408 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
409 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
410 if channel.is_usable() {
411 res.push(ChannelDetails {
412 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
413 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
414 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
415 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
416 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
423 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
424 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
425 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
427 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
428 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
429 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
431 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
434 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
435 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
436 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
437 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
439 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
440 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
445 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
446 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
447 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
449 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
450 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
455 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
456 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
457 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
461 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
470 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
471 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
472 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
473 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
474 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
476 for tx in local_txn {
477 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
479 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
480 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
481 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
482 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
483 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
484 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
485 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
488 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
489 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
490 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
493 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
494 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
495 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
496 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
503 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
504 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
505 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
506 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
512 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
513 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
514 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
515 for chan in self.list_channels() {
516 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
521 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
523 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
524 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
525 let mut res = [0; 32];
526 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
530 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
531 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
532 let mut res = [0; 32];
533 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
539 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
540 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
541 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
542 let mut res = [0; 32];
543 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
548 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
549 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
550 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
551 let mut res = [0; 32];
552 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
556 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
558 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
559 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
560 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
562 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
563 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
565 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
566 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
567 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
568 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
569 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
571 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
573 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
574 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
576 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
582 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
583 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
584 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
586 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
587 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
593 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
603 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
604 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
605 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
606 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
607 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
608 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
609 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
610 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
612 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
613 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
614 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
615 // the intended recipient).
616 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
617 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
618 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
620 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
621 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
622 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
623 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
627 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
628 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
629 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
631 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
632 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
633 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
635 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
637 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
641 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
643 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
651 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
652 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
654 for i in 0..dst.len() {
659 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
660 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
661 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
662 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
665 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
666 let end_len = iters * 65;
667 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
668 res.resize(end_len, 0);
670 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
671 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
672 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
673 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
674 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
679 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
680 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
682 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
683 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
684 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
685 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
687 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
688 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
689 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
692 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
695 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
696 hmac.input(&packet_data);
697 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
698 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
703 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
704 hop_data: packet_data,
709 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
710 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
711 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
712 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
714 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
715 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
716 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
717 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
718 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
719 data: packet_crypted,
723 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
724 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
726 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
729 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
730 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
731 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
732 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
736 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
737 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
740 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
742 failuremsg: failuremsg,
746 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
747 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
748 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
754 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
755 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
756 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
759 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
760 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
763 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
764 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
765 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
766 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
772 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
773 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
774 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
775 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
776 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
777 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
778 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
779 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
782 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
783 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
785 let mut channel_state = None;
786 macro_rules! return_err {
787 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
789 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
790 if channel_state.is_none() {
791 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
793 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
794 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
795 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
796 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
797 })), channel_state.unwrap());
802 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
803 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
804 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
805 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
806 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
807 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
808 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
809 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
812 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
813 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
814 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
815 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
816 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
819 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
820 let next_hop_data = {
821 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
822 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
823 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
825 let error_code = match err {
826 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
827 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
829 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
835 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
837 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
839 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
840 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
842 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
843 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
846 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
847 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
848 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
849 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
851 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
853 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
855 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
856 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
857 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
860 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
861 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
862 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
864 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
866 let blinding_factor = {
867 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
868 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
869 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
870 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
871 sha.result(&mut res);
872 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
874 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
880 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
881 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
884 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
886 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
887 hop_data: new_packet_data,
888 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
891 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
892 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
893 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
894 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
895 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
896 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
897 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
901 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
902 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
903 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
904 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
905 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
907 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
909 Some(id) => id.clone(),
911 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
912 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
914 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
916 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
917 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
918 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
920 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
921 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
928 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
933 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
936 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
937 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
938 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
939 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
943 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
945 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
946 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
947 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
948 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
949 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
950 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
951 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
952 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
953 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
954 excess_data: Vec::new(),
957 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
958 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
960 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
966 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
968 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
969 /// fields for more info.
971 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
972 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
973 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
974 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
975 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
976 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
978 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
980 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
981 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
982 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
983 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
984 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
986 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
987 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
988 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
989 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
993 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
994 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
995 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
997 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
999 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1001 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1002 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1003 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1004 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1006 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1007 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1008 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1010 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1011 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1012 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1016 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1017 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1018 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1020 if !chan.is_live() {
1021 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1023 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1024 route: route.clone(),
1025 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1026 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1029 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1032 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1033 None => return Ok(()),
1037 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1041 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1042 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1043 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1044 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1045 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1046 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1048 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1055 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1057 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1059 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1060 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1061 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1063 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1066 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1067 pending_events.push($event);
1072 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1073 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1074 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1076 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1077 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1078 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1081 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1082 mem::drop(channel_state);
1083 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1084 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1093 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1094 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1097 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1098 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1102 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1103 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1105 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1113 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1114 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1116 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1118 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1120 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1121 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1123 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1124 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1125 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1126 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1127 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1131 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1133 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1134 /// Will likely generate further events.
1135 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1136 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1137 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1139 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1140 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1142 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1146 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1147 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1148 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1149 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1151 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1152 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1153 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1154 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1155 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1156 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1158 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1163 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1165 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1166 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1167 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1168 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1169 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1172 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1174 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1175 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1180 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1182 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1183 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1184 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1185 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1186 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1187 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1188 // this channel currently :/.
1195 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1196 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1199 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1200 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1202 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1204 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1208 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1209 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1210 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1211 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1212 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1213 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1214 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1215 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1220 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1221 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1222 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1226 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1230 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1231 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1232 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1239 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1241 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1242 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1246 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1248 new_events.retain(|event| {
1249 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1250 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1251 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1257 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1258 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1259 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1260 events.push(event.1);
1264 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1265 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1266 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1267 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1268 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1269 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1270 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1271 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1277 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1278 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1279 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1280 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1281 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1282 /// still-available channels.
1283 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1285 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1286 mem::drop(channel_state);
1288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1289 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1290 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1293 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1294 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1295 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1296 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1297 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1299 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1300 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1304 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1305 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1306 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1310 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1311 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1312 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1314 //TODO: Do something with e?
1321 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1322 mem::drop(channel_state);
1324 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1325 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1328 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1329 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1331 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1332 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1334 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1335 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1346 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1347 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1348 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1350 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1351 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1352 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1353 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1354 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1355 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1357 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1358 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1359 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1360 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1361 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1362 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1367 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1369 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1370 mem::drop(channel_state);
1371 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1372 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1376 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1377 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1378 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1379 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1380 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1382 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1383 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1389 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1390 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1391 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1393 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1394 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1395 //TODO: Do something with e?
1401 mem::drop(channel_state);
1402 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1403 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1404 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1408 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1409 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1410 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1412 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1413 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1414 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1415 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1416 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1417 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1425 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1426 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1427 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1430 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1431 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1433 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1437 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1438 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1441 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1442 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1446 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1448 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1449 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1450 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1451 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1452 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1453 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1454 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1455 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1458 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1459 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1460 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1462 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1466 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1467 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1468 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1472 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1473 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1474 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1475 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1477 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1478 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1481 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1482 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1484 //TODO: same as above
1485 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1488 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1489 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1490 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1491 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1492 output_script: output_script,
1493 user_channel_id: user_id,
1498 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1499 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1500 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1501 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1503 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1504 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1507 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1508 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1509 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1512 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1516 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1518 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1519 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1520 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1521 // for a bogus channel.
1522 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1525 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1528 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1537 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1538 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1539 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1540 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1542 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1543 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1546 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1547 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1549 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1552 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1556 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1557 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1558 user_channel_id: user_id,
1563 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1564 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1565 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1567 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1568 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1571 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1572 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1574 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1578 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1579 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1580 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1581 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1583 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1585 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1586 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1589 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1590 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1591 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1592 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1594 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1595 } else { (res, None) }
1597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1600 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1601 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1602 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1604 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1605 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1606 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1615 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1616 let (res, chan_option) = {
1617 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1618 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1619 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1621 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1622 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1625 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1626 if res.1.is_some() {
1627 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1628 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1629 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1630 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1631 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1632 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1633 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1635 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1636 } else { (res, None) }
1638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1641 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1642 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1644 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1645 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1646 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1647 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1655 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1656 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1657 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1658 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1660 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1661 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1662 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1663 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1665 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1666 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1668 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1670 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1671 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1674 if !chan.is_usable() {
1675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1677 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1679 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1683 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1684 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1685 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1687 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1688 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1691 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1693 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1695 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1699 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1700 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1701 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1703 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1704 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1705 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1707 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1709 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1713 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1714 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1715 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1717 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1718 if res.is_some() { return; }
1720 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1722 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1723 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1724 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1725 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1726 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1728 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1729 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1730 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1732 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1733 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1734 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1735 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1736 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1737 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1738 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1739 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1740 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1741 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1742 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1743 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1744 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1745 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1753 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1754 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1755 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1756 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1759 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1771 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1772 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1775 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1776 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1779 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1782 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1786 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1787 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1788 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1789 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1791 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1792 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1795 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1797 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1800 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1804 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1807 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1808 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1809 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1812 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1813 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1816 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1818 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1821 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1824 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1828 let mut forward_event = None;
1829 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1830 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1831 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1832 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1833 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1835 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1836 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1838 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1841 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1846 match forward_event {
1848 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1849 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1850 time_forwardable: time
1859 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1860 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1863 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1864 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1865 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1867 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1869 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1873 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1874 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1875 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1876 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1878 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1881 if !chan.is_usable() {
1882 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1885 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1886 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1887 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1889 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1890 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1891 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1892 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1893 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1895 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1897 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1898 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1899 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1900 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1901 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1902 contents: announcement,
1903 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1905 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1909 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1913 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1914 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1915 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1918 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1921 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1922 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1924 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1927 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1928 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1936 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1937 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1938 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1939 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1940 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1945 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1946 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1947 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1948 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1950 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1951 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1952 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1953 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1954 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1955 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1956 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1957 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1958 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1959 msg: funding_locked,
1960 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1962 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1963 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1964 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1965 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1968 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1972 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1973 for tx in txn_matched {
1974 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1975 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1976 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1977 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1979 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1980 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1981 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1982 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1983 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1984 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1993 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1994 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1995 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1997 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1998 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1999 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2000 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2001 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2003 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2012 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2013 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2015 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2016 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2017 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2019 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2022 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2023 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2024 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2025 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2028 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2029 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2030 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2031 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2032 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2033 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2035 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2037 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2047 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2048 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2050 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2051 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2052 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2053 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2056 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2060 macro_rules! handle_error {
2061 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2064 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2065 if needs_channel_force_close {
2067 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2068 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2069 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2071 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2074 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2075 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2076 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2077 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2078 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2080 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2092 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2093 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2094 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2095 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2098 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2099 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2102 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2103 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2106 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2107 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2110 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2111 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2114 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2115 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2118 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2119 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2122 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2123 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2126 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2127 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2130 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2131 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2134 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2135 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2138 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2139 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2142 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2143 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2146 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2147 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2150 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2151 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2154 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2155 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2158 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2159 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2160 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2161 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2163 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2164 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2165 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2166 if no_connection_possible {
2167 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2168 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2169 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2170 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2172 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2173 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2174 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2184 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2185 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2186 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2187 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2188 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2189 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2190 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2192 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2193 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2194 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2203 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2204 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2206 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2207 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2208 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2209 pending_events.push(event);
2212 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2213 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2214 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2219 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2220 let mut res = Vec::new();
2221 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2222 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2223 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2224 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2225 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2226 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2227 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2231 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2236 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2240 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2241 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2242 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2243 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2244 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2248 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2255 use chain::chaininterface;
2256 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2257 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2258 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2259 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2261 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2262 use util::test_utils;
2263 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2264 use util::errors::APIError;
2265 use util::logger::Logger;
2266 use util::ser::Writeable;
2268 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2269 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2270 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2271 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2272 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2273 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2274 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2278 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2279 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2281 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2282 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2284 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2286 use std::cell::RefCell;
2287 use std::collections::HashMap;
2288 use std::default::Default;
2290 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2291 use std::time::Instant;
2294 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2295 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2296 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2301 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2302 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2305 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2306 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2309 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2310 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2313 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2314 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2317 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2318 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2323 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2325 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2326 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2331 fn onion_vectors() {
2332 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2333 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2335 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2336 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2337 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2338 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2339 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2341 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2342 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2343 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2344 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2345 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2347 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2348 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2349 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2350 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2351 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2353 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2354 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2355 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2356 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2357 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2359 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2360 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2361 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2362 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2363 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2365 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2366 let payloads = vec!(
2367 msgs::OnionHopData {
2369 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2370 short_channel_id: 0,
2372 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2376 msgs::OnionHopData {
2378 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2379 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2380 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2381 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2385 msgs::OnionHopData {
2387 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2388 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2389 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2390 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2394 msgs::OnionHopData {
2396 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2397 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2398 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2399 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2403 msgs::OnionHopData {
2405 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2406 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2407 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2408 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2414 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2415 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2417 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2421 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2422 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2424 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2425 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2426 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2428 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2429 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2431 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2432 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2434 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2435 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2437 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2438 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2440 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2441 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2444 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2445 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2446 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2447 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2449 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2450 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2455 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2456 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2457 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2458 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2460 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2461 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2463 impl Drop for Node {
2464 fn drop(&mut self) {
2465 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2466 // Check that we processed all pending events
2467 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2468 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2473 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2474 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2476 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2477 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2478 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2479 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2480 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2481 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2486 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2488 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2492 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2493 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2495 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2496 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2497 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2499 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2500 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2502 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2504 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2505 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2506 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2507 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2508 added_monitors.clear();
2510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2513 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2514 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2515 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2516 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2517 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2518 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2519 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2520 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2522 added_monitors.clear();
2525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2528 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2530 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2531 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2532 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2533 added_monitors.clear();
2536 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2537 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2539 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2540 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2541 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2546 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2547 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2548 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2550 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2551 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2552 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2553 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2560 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2561 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2562 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2563 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2564 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2565 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2566 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2567 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2568 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2569 as_announcement_sigs
2571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2574 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2575 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2576 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2577 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2583 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2584 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2585 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2586 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2587 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2588 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2594 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2596 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2599 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2600 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2602 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2603 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2604 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2606 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2609 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2610 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2611 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2614 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2615 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2616 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2617 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2618 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2619 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2625 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2626 if !close_inbound_first {
2627 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2629 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2630 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2631 if close_inbound_first {
2632 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2633 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2634 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2635 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2637 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2638 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2639 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2640 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2642 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2643 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2644 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2646 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2647 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2648 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2649 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2651 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2652 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2653 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2654 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2656 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2658 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2659 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2665 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2666 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2667 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2668 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674 (as_update, bs_update)
2679 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2680 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2683 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2685 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2686 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2687 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2688 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2689 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2696 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2697 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2699 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2700 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2701 added_monitors.clear();
2706 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2707 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2709 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2710 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2711 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2712 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2713 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2714 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2715 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2716 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2717 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2718 if $fail_backwards {
2719 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2721 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2723 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2724 if $fail_backwards {
2725 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2726 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2728 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2730 added_monitors.clear();
2736 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2739 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2740 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2741 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2742 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2743 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2744 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2745 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2750 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2751 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2753 let mut payment_event = {
2754 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2755 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2757 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2759 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2761 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2763 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2764 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2766 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2767 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2768 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2770 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2771 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2773 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2778 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2780 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2781 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2782 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2784 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2785 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2786 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2791 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2792 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2793 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2799 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2802 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2803 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2804 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2806 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2807 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2808 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2810 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2812 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2814 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2816 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2821 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2822 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2823 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2824 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2825 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2826 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2829 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2830 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2831 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2833 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2834 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2835 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2836 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2837 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2838 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2839 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2844 assert!(events.is_empty());
2846 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2847 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2854 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2855 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2858 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2859 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2866 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2867 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2870 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2872 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2873 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2874 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2875 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2876 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2879 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2882 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2883 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2884 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2885 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2886 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2889 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2891 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2893 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2894 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2898 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2899 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2900 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2903 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2904 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2905 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2907 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2908 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2909 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2911 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2912 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2917 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2918 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2919 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2920 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2921 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2922 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2923 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2924 // second-to-last node!
2925 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2928 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2929 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2930 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2932 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2933 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2934 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2935 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2936 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2937 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2938 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2943 assert!(events.is_empty());
2945 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2946 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2953 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2955 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2958 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2959 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2966 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2967 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
2970 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2971 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2972 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2974 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2976 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2977 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
2979 for _ in 0..node_count {
2980 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2981 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2982 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2983 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2985 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2986 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2987 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2989 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2990 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2991 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
2992 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
2993 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3001 fn fake_network_test() {
3002 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3003 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3004 let nodes = create_network(4);
3006 // Create some initial channels
3007 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3008 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3009 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3011 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3012 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3013 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3014 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3015 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3017 // Send some more payments
3018 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3019 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3020 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3022 // Test failure packets
3023 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3024 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3026 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3027 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3029 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3030 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3031 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3032 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3033 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3034 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3035 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3037 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3038 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3039 hops.push(RouteHop {
3040 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3041 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3043 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3045 hops.push(RouteHop {
3046 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3047 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3051 hops.push(RouteHop {
3052 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3053 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3055 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3057 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3058 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3059 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3061 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3062 hops.push(RouteHop {
3063 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3064 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3066 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3068 hops.push(RouteHop {
3069 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3070 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3072 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3074 hops.push(RouteHop {
3075 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3076 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3078 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3080 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3081 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3082 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3084 // Claim the rebalances...
3085 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3086 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3088 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3089 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3091 // Send some payments across both channels
3092 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3093 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3094 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3096 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3098 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3100 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3101 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3102 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3104 // Close down the channels...
3105 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3106 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3107 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3108 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3109 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3113 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3114 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3115 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3116 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3118 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3125 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3127 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3128 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3130 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3131 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3134 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3135 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3138 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3139 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3140 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3142 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3143 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3144 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3146 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3147 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3149 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3151 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3152 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3153 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3155 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3156 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3157 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3158 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3159 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3160 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3161 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3162 res.push(tx.clone());
3167 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3168 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3171 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3173 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3174 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3175 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3176 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3177 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3178 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3179 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3180 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3182 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3184 res.push(tx.clone());
3188 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3191 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3195 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3196 /// HTLC transaction.
3197 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3198 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3199 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3200 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3201 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3202 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3203 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
3204 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3208 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3211 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3212 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3214 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3216 let mut found_prev = false;
3218 for tx in prev_txn {
3219 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3220 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3221 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3222 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3224 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3225 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3231 assert!(found_prev);
3233 let mut res = Vec::new();
3234 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3238 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3239 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3241 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3242 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3249 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3250 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3251 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3259 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3264 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3265 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3266 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3267 let nodes = create_network(5);
3269 // Create some initial channels
3270 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3271 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3272 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3273 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3275 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3276 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3277 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3278 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3279 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3281 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3282 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3284 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3285 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3286 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3287 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3289 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3291 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3293 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3294 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3296 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3297 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3299 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3300 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3301 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3302 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3304 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3305 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3306 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3308 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3309 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3311 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3312 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3314 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3315 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3317 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3318 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3319 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3320 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3328 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3329 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3330 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3332 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3334 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3335 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3337 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3338 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3340 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3342 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3343 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3344 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3346 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3347 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3350 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3351 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3352 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3353 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3354 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3357 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3359 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3360 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3362 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3363 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3364 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3365 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3366 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3369 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3371 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3372 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3374 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3376 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3377 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3378 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3380 // Create some new channels:
3381 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3383 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3384 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3385 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3386 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3387 // Revoke the old state
3388 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3391 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3392 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3396 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3399 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3400 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3401 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3402 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3404 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3406 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3407 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3408 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3409 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3410 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3412 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3413 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3414 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3418 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3419 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3420 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3421 let nodes = create_network(2);
3422 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3424 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3425 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
3427 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3430 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3431 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3437 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3438 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3440 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3441 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3444 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3447 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3448 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3454 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
3455 // registering new transactions
3456 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
3460 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3461 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3462 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3463 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3466 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
3468 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3470 let mut payment_event = {
3471 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3474 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3475 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3476 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3479 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3482 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3483 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3485 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3489 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3490 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3492 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3493 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3494 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3495 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3498 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3499 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
3500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3502 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3503 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3504 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3506 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
3507 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3508 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3510 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3511 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3517 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3518 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3519 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3520 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3521 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3525 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3526 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3528 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3529 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3530 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3532 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3533 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3535 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3538 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3540 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
3541 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
3542 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
3544 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
3545 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3546 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3547 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3548 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3551 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3552 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
3553 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3557 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3558 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3559 let nodes = create_network(2);
3560 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3562 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3563 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3564 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3565 mem::drop(channel_state);
3567 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3568 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3569 headers.push(header.clone());
3571 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3572 headers.push(header.clone());
3574 while !headers.is_empty() {
3575 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3578 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3581 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
3582 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
3584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3587 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3588 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3589 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3592 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
3593 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3594 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3596 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
3597 for msg in reestablish_1 {
3598 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3600 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3601 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
3603 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
3606 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
3607 for msg in reestablish_2 {
3608 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
3610 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3611 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
3613 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
3616 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
3617 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
3619 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
3621 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3622 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3624 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3626 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3627 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
3628 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3629 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3630 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3631 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3632 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3633 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3634 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3636 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3637 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3640 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3642 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3646 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
3648 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
3649 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
3651 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
3653 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
3654 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
3655 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
3656 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
3657 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
3658 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
3659 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3660 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
3661 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
3663 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
3664 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
3667 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
3669 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
3675 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3676 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3677 let nodes = create_network(3);
3678 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3681 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3685 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3686 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3687 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3688 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3690 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3691 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
3694 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3695 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3696 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3697 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3699 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3700 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3702 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
3703 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
3707 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3708 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3710 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3711 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3717 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3724 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3728 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3729 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3730 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3731 let nodes = create_network(2);
3733 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3735 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3736 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3737 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3738 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3740 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3742 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3743 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3745 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3746 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3748 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3750 let mut chan_announcement;
3752 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3754 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3755 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3756 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3757 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3758 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3759 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3760 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3761 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3762 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3767 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3768 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3769 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3770 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3771 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3772 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3773 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3774 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3775 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3776 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3777 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3778 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3779 contents: $unsigned_msg
3784 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3785 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3787 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3789 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3790 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3791 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3792 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3793 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3795 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3796 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3797 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3798 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());