1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
33 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
34 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
36 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
37 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
38 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::errors::APIError;
43 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
65 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
66 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
68 short_channel_id: u64,
70 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
75 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
76 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
79 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
82 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
86 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
87 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
88 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
89 short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
97 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
100 session_priv: SecretKey,
101 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
102 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
103 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
108 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
110 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
111 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
112 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
120 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
129 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
130 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
131 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
132 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
133 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
135 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
137 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
138 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
139 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
140 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
141 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
206 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
207 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
208 /// probably increase this significantly.
209 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
211 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
212 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
214 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
217 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
218 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
219 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
220 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
221 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
222 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
223 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
225 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
229 struct ChannelHolder {
230 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
231 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
232 next_forward: Instant,
233 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
234 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
235 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
236 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
237 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
238 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
239 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
241 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
242 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
243 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
244 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
255 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
257 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
258 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
259 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
260 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
261 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
262 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
267 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
268 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
270 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
271 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
273 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
274 /// to individual Channels.
276 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
277 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
278 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
279 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
281 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
282 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
283 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
284 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
285 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
286 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
287 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
289 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
290 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
291 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
292 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
294 pub struct ChannelManager {
295 default_configuration: UserConfig,
296 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
297 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
298 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
299 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
300 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
302 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
303 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
304 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
306 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
307 our_network_key: SecretKey,
309 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
310 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
311 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
312 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
313 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
315 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
320 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
321 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
322 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
323 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
324 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
325 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
326 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
328 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
329 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
330 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
331 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
332 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
335 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
337 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
338 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
341 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
343 macro_rules! secp_call {
344 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
347 Err(_) => return Err($err),
354 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
356 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
357 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
362 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
363 pub struct ChannelDetails {
364 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
365 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
366 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
367 /// lifetime of the channel.
368 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
369 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
370 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
371 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
372 /// The node_id of our counterparty
373 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
374 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
375 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
376 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
380 macro_rules! handle_error {
381 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
384 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
385 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
386 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
387 if let Some(update) = update_option {
388 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
400 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
401 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
404 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
405 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
407 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
408 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
409 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
410 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
411 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
413 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
419 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
423 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
426 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
427 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
428 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
429 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
430 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
438 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
439 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
440 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
442 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
443 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
444 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
446 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
447 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
451 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
452 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
453 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
454 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
456 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
457 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
458 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
459 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
460 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
461 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
462 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
463 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
464 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
465 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
467 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
468 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
475 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
476 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
477 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
480 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
481 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
482 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
484 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
487 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
493 impl ChannelManager {
494 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
496 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
497 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
499 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
501 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
502 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
505 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
506 default_configuration: config.clone(),
507 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
508 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
509 monitor: monitor.clone(),
513 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
514 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
517 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
518 by_id: HashMap::new(),
519 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
520 next_forward: Instant::now(),
521 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
522 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
523 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
525 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
527 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
528 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
534 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
535 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
539 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
541 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
542 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
543 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
544 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
546 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
547 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
549 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
550 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
551 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
552 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
556 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
557 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
559 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
560 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
561 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
563 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
566 panic!("RNG is bad???");
569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
572 node_id: their_network_key,
578 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
579 /// more information.
580 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
581 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
582 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
583 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
584 res.push(ChannelDetails {
585 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
586 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
587 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
588 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
589 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
595 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
596 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
597 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
598 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
599 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
600 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
601 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
602 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
603 // really wanted anyway.
604 if channel.is_live() {
605 res.push(ChannelDetails {
606 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
607 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
608 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
609 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
610 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
617 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
618 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
619 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
621 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
622 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
623 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
625 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
626 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
627 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
630 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
632 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
635 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
636 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
637 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
639 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
640 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
645 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
648 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
654 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
655 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
665 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
666 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
667 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
668 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
669 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
671 for tx in local_txn {
672 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
676 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
677 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
678 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
683 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
684 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
693 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
694 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
695 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
696 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
703 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
704 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
705 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
706 for chan in self.list_channels() {
707 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
712 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
713 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
715 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
716 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
717 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
720 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
721 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
722 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
727 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
728 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
729 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
730 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
731 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
735 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
736 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
737 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
738 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
739 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
742 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
744 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
745 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
746 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
748 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
749 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
751 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
752 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
753 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
754 let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
756 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
758 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
759 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
761 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
767 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
768 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
769 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
771 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
772 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
778 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
788 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
789 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
790 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
791 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
792 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
793 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
794 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
795 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
797 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
798 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
799 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
800 // the intended recipient).
801 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
802 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
803 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
805 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
806 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
807 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
808 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
812 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
813 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
814 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
816 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
817 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
818 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
820 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
822 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
826 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
828 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
836 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
837 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
839 for i in 0..dst.len() {
844 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
845 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
846 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
847 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
850 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
851 let end_len = iters * 65;
852 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
853 res.resize(end_len, 0);
855 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
856 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
857 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
858 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
859 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
864 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
865 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
867 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
868 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
869 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
870 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
872 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
873 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
874 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
877 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
880 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
881 hmac.input(&packet_data);
882 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
883 hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
888 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
889 hop_data: packet_data,
894 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
895 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
896 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
897 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
899 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
900 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
901 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
902 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
903 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
904 data: packet_crypted,
908 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
909 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
910 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
912 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
915 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
916 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
917 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
918 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
922 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
923 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
926 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
928 failuremsg: failuremsg,
932 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
933 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
934 packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
940 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
941 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
942 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
945 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
946 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
947 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
949 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
950 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
951 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
952 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
953 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
954 failure_code: $err_code,
955 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
960 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
961 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
964 let shared_secret = {
965 let mut arr = [0; 32];
966 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
969 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
971 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
972 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
973 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
974 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
975 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
976 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
977 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
978 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
982 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
983 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
984 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
985 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
986 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
989 let mut channel_state = None;
990 macro_rules! return_err {
991 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
993 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
994 if channel_state.is_none() {
995 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
997 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
998 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
999 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1000 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1001 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1006 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1007 let next_hop_data = {
1008 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1009 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1010 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1012 let error_code = match err {
1013 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1014 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1016 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1022 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1024 // final_expiry_too_soon
1025 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1026 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1028 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1029 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1030 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1032 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1033 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1034 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1037 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1038 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1039 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1040 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1042 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1044 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1045 short_channel_id: 0,
1046 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1047 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1048 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1051 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1052 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1053 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1055 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1057 let blinding_factor = {
1058 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1059 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1060 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1061 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
1064 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1066 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1068 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1071 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1072 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1075 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1076 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1077 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1078 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1079 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1080 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1081 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1085 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1086 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1087 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1088 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1089 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1090 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1091 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1093 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1095 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1096 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1098 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1099 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1100 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1101 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1102 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1103 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1104 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1106 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1107 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1109 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1110 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1111 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1113 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1114 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1116 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1117 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1118 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1119 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1121 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1122 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1127 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1128 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1129 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1130 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1132 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1133 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1135 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1136 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1138 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1140 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1145 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1148 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1149 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1150 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1151 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1152 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1156 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1158 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1159 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1160 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1161 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1162 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1163 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1164 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1165 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1166 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1167 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1170 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1171 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1173 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1179 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1181 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1182 /// fields for more info.
1184 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1185 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1186 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1187 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1188 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1189 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1191 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1193 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1194 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1195 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1196 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1197 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1198 /// relevant updates.
1200 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1201 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1202 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1203 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1204 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1205 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1206 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1207 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1209 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1210 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1211 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1212 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1216 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1218 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1220 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1221 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1222 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1223 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1225 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1227 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1228 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1230 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1231 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1232 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1235 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1236 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1238 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1239 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1241 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1242 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1244 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1245 route: route.clone(),
1246 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1247 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1248 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1250 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1251 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1252 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1253 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1254 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1255 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1256 // something else in case we will resend later!
1257 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1261 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1262 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1263 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1264 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1265 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1266 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1274 } else { unreachable!(); }
1278 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1279 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1281 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1283 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1284 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1286 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1290 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1295 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1297 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1298 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1300 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1302 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1303 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1304 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1305 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1307 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1309 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1310 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1312 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1313 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1314 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1315 } else { unreachable!(); })
1321 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1322 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1323 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1326 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1327 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1328 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1329 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1336 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1337 // lock before add_update_monitor
1338 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1342 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1344 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1349 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1357 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1358 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1360 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1362 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1364 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1365 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1367 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1368 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1369 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1370 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1371 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1375 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1377 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1378 /// Will likely generate further events.
1379 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1380 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1382 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1383 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1385 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1386 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1388 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1392 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1393 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1394 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1395 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1397 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1398 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1399 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1400 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1401 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1402 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1404 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1409 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1411 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1412 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1413 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1414 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1415 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1416 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1418 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1420 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1421 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1426 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1428 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1429 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1430 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1431 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1432 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1433 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1434 // this channel currently :/.
1441 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1442 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1445 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1446 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1448 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1452 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1455 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1456 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1457 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1458 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1459 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1460 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1461 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1463 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1468 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1469 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1470 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1471 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1472 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1474 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1478 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1479 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1480 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1487 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1489 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1490 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1494 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1495 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1496 events.append(&mut new_events);
1499 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1500 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1501 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1502 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1503 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1504 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1506 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1507 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1508 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1509 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1510 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1512 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1513 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1519 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1520 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1521 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1522 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1523 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1524 /// still-available channels.
1525 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1527 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1528 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1529 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1530 match &onion_error {
1531 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1533 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1535 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1536 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1537 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1538 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1539 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1540 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1541 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1546 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1547 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1548 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1549 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1551 error_code: onion_error_code
1555 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1559 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1560 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1561 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1562 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1564 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1565 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1566 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1567 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1568 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1569 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1571 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1577 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1578 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1579 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1580 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1581 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1582 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1584 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1585 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1586 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1590 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1592 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1593 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1597 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1598 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1599 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1600 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1604 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1605 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1606 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1607 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1608 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1609 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1611 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1617 //TODO: Do something with e?
1625 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1626 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1627 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1629 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1630 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1631 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1635 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1636 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1637 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1638 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1639 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1640 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1645 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1647 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1648 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1650 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1654 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1655 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1656 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1658 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1659 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1661 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1662 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1668 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1669 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1670 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1671 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1672 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1673 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1676 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1677 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1678 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1679 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1680 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1681 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1682 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1683 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1691 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1692 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1693 //TODO: Do something with e?
1701 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1702 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1703 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1706 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1707 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1709 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1710 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1711 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1712 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1713 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1716 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1717 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1718 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1719 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1720 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1721 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1722 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1723 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1725 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1726 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1727 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1728 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1729 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1730 // on-chain confirmations.
1731 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1732 // should be written.
1733 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1734 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1736 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1737 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1744 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1747 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1748 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1749 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1751 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1753 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1754 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1755 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1756 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1761 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1762 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1764 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1765 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1770 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1774 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1785 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1788 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1790 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1791 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1795 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1796 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1800 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1801 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1808 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1809 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1811 entry.insert(channel);
1817 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1818 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1819 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1823 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1824 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1825 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1827 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1828 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1830 //TODO: same as above
1831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1834 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1835 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1836 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1837 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1838 output_script: output_script,
1839 user_channel_id: user_id,
1844 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1846 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1850 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1851 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1854 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1859 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1860 // lock before add_update_monitor
1861 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1864 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1872 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1881 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1882 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1883 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1884 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1885 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1887 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1888 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1889 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1891 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1892 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1895 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1900 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1901 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1902 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1903 user_channel_id: user_id,
1908 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1909 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1910 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1911 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1913 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1914 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1917 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1918 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1920 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1921 msg: announcement_sigs,
1926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1930 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1931 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1932 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1933 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1935 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1937 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1938 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1941 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1942 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1943 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1944 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1948 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1950 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1954 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1955 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1956 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1958 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1959 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1964 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1965 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1967 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1968 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1969 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1978 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1979 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1981 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1982 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1984 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1985 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1988 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1989 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1991 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1996 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1997 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1998 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1999 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2000 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2001 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2002 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2004 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2005 } else { (tx, None) }
2007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2010 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2011 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2013 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2014 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2015 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2024 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2025 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2026 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2027 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2029 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2030 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2031 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2032 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2034 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2035 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2039 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2040 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2043 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2044 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2045 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2046 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2047 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2048 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2049 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2050 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2052 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2053 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2054 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2055 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2056 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2058 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2059 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2060 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2061 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2065 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2066 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2067 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2068 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2069 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2070 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2075 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2082 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2083 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2085 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2088 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2089 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2092 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2097 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2101 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2102 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2103 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2104 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2107 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2108 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2109 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2110 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2112 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2113 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2114 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2115 if res.is_some() { return; }
2117 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2118 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2120 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2122 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2123 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2124 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2125 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2126 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2128 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2130 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2131 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2132 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
2133 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2135 if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
2136 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2137 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2138 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2139 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2141 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2142 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2144 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2146 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2147 // update Route object
2148 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2149 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2151 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2152 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2154 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2156 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2157 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2159 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2160 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2161 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2165 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2166 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2167 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2168 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2169 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2170 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2171 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2172 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2174 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2176 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2177 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2179 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2180 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2181 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2182 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2184 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2185 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2186 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2187 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2188 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2192 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2199 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2200 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2201 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2202 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2203 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2207 } else if !payment_failed {
2208 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2209 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2210 // really not worth trying any further.
2211 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2212 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2217 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2218 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2219 // to decode the onion.
2220 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2222 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2223 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2224 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2227 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2230 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2231 // definitely came from the peer in question
2232 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2233 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2235 }), !is_from_final_node));
2239 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2240 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2241 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2243 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2244 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2245 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2247 } else { unreachable!(); }
2250 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2251 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2252 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2253 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2255 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2256 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2257 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2259 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2266 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2267 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2271 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2272 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2275 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2276 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2278 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2285 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2286 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2287 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2288 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2290 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2291 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2292 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2294 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2295 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2296 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2297 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2298 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2301 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2302 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2304 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2306 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2307 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2308 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2309 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2310 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2311 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2313 commitment_signed: msg,
2317 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2318 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2319 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2330 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2331 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2332 let mut forward_event = None;
2333 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2334 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2335 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2336 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2337 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2339 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2340 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2342 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2345 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2350 match forward_event {
2352 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2353 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2354 time_forwardable: time
2362 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2363 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2365 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2366 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2368 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2369 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2372 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2373 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2374 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2375 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2377 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2378 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2379 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2383 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2384 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2385 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2389 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2394 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2395 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2397 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2402 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2404 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2405 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2407 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2408 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2411 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2418 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2419 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2420 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2422 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2424 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2425 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2427 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2431 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2432 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2433 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2435 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2436 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2437 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2438 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2439 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2442 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2445 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2446 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2447 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2448 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2449 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2450 contents: announcement,
2452 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2460 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2461 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2462 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2466 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2469 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2470 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2471 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2472 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2473 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2474 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2475 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2476 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2477 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2479 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2480 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2482 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2483 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2486 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2487 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2488 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2492 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2493 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2495 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2500 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2501 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2503 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2509 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2513 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2518 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2519 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2520 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2530 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2531 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2532 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2533 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2535 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2538 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2539 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2540 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2542 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2545 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2546 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2548 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2549 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2551 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2552 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2554 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2555 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2556 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2558 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2561 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2562 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2563 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2564 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2565 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2566 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2567 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2568 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2578 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2579 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2581 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2583 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2584 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2586 node_id: their_node_id,
2590 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2596 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2597 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2598 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2599 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2600 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2602 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2603 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2604 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2605 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2606 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2608 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2614 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2616 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2621 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2622 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2623 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2624 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2625 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2627 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2628 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2629 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2630 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2631 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2633 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2639 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2640 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2641 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2646 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2647 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2648 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2649 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2650 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2651 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2653 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2654 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2655 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2656 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2657 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2658 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2659 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2661 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2662 msg: funding_locked,
2664 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2665 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2666 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2667 msg: announcement_sigs,
2670 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2671 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2672 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2673 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2674 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2678 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2679 for tx in txn_matched {
2680 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2681 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2682 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2683 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2684 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2686 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2687 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2688 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2689 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2690 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2700 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2701 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2702 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2704 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2705 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2706 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2707 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2708 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2709 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2719 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2720 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2722 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2723 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2726 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2727 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2728 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2729 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2731 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2732 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2733 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2734 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2735 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2736 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2737 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2738 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2740 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2741 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2742 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2752 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2753 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2755 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2756 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2760 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2761 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2762 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2763 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2764 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2767 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2769 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2772 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2773 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2774 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2777 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2779 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2782 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2787 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2789 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2792 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2797 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2798 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2799 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2802 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2803 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2804 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2807 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2809 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2812 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2817 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2819 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2822 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2823 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2824 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2827 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2832 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2833 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2834 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2837 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2842 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2843 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2844 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2845 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2847 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2848 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2849 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2850 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2851 if no_connection_possible {
2852 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2853 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2854 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2855 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2856 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2858 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2859 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2870 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2871 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2872 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2873 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2874 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2875 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2876 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2877 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2879 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2880 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2881 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2890 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2891 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2893 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2894 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2895 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2900 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2901 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2903 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2904 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2905 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2906 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2907 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2908 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2909 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2910 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2911 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2912 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2916 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2917 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2918 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2924 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2927 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2928 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2930 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2931 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2932 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2933 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2937 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2942 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2943 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2945 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2947 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2949 onion.write(writer)?;
2953 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2954 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2955 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2956 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2957 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2962 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2963 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2964 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2966 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2967 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2969 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2971 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2972 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2973 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2974 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2975 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2980 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2981 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2983 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2985 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2987 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2989 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2996 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2997 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2998 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2999 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3000 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3001 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3006 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3009 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3011 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3013 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3015 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3022 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3023 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3024 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3025 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3026 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3027 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3032 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3035 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3038 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3039 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3041 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3043 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3045 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3047 route.write(writer)?;
3048 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3049 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3056 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3057 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3058 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3059 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3060 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3061 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3062 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3063 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3065 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3070 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3073 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3077 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3079 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3080 data.write(writer)?;
3087 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3088 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3089 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3090 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3091 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3092 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3093 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3095 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3100 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3101 prev_short_channel_id,
3106 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3107 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3108 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3110 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3111 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3113 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3114 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3115 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3117 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3118 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3119 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3120 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3121 unfunded_channels += 1;
3124 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3125 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3126 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3127 channel.write(writer)?;
3131 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3132 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3133 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3134 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3135 for forward in pending_forwards {
3136 forward.write(writer)?;
3140 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3141 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3142 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3143 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3144 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3145 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3153 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3155 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3157 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3158 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3159 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3160 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3161 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3162 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3163 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3164 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3165 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3166 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3167 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3168 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3169 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3170 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3171 /// deserialization.
3172 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3174 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3176 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3177 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3178 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3180 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3181 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3182 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3183 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3184 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3186 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3187 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3188 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3189 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3190 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3191 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3192 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3193 /// deserialization.
3194 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3195 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3196 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3197 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3199 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3200 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3202 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3203 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3204 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3205 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3207 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3209 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3212 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3213 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3214 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3216 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3217 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3220 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3221 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3222 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3226 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3228 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3229 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3230 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3231 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3232 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3233 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3236 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3237 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3238 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3239 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3240 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3241 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3242 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3243 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3244 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3246 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3247 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3249 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3252 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3256 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3257 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3258 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3262 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3264 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3265 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3268 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3269 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3271 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3274 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3275 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3276 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3277 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3278 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3279 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3280 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3281 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3283 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3286 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3288 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3289 monitor: args.monitor,
3290 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3291 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3293 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3294 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3295 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3297 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3300 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3303 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3305 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3307 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3308 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3309 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3310 logger: args.logger,
3311 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3314 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3315 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3316 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3317 //connection or two.
3320 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3326 use chain::chaininterface;
3327 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3328 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3329 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3330 use chain::keysinterface;
3331 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3332 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3333 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3334 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3335 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3337 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
3338 use util::test_utils;
3339 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3340 use util::errors::APIError;
3341 use util::logger::Logger;
3342 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3343 use util::config::UserConfig;
3345 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3346 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3347 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3348 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3349 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3350 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3351 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3352 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3353 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3354 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3356 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3357 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3361 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3362 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3364 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3366 use std::cell::RefCell;
3367 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3368 use std::default::Default;
3370 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3371 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3372 use std::time::Instant;
3375 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3376 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3377 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3382 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3383 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3386 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3387 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3390 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3391 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3394 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3395 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3398 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3399 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3404 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3406 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3407 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3412 fn onion_vectors() {
3413 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3414 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3416 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3417 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3418 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3419 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3420 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3422 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3423 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3425 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3426 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3428 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3429 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3431 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3432 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3434 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3435 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3437 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3440 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3441 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3443 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3446 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3447 let payloads = vec!(
3448 msgs::OnionHopData {
3450 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3451 short_channel_id: 0,
3453 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3457 msgs::OnionHopData {
3459 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3460 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3461 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3462 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3466 msgs::OnionHopData {
3468 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3469 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3470 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3471 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3475 msgs::OnionHopData {
3477 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3478 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3479 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3480 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3484 msgs::OnionHopData {
3486 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3487 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3488 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3489 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3495 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3496 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3498 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3502 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3503 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3505 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3506 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3507 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3509 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3510 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3512 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3513 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3515 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3516 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3518 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3519 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3521 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3522 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3525 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3526 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3527 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3528 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3530 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3531 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3536 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3537 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3538 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3539 keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
3540 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3542 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3543 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3544 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3546 impl Drop for Node {
3547 fn drop(&mut self) {
3548 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3549 // Check that we processed all pending events
3550 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3551 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3552 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3557 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3561 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3562 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3563 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3564 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3567 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3568 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3570 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3573 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3574 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578 }, match events[1] {
3579 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3580 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3581 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3582 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3583 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3584 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3585 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3586 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3594 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3595 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3597 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3600 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3601 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3610 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3611 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3613 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3616 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3617 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3627 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3629 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3630 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3637 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3638 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3639 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3640 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3642 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3646 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3647 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3649 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3650 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3651 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3653 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3654 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3656 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3658 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3659 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3660 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3661 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3662 added_monitors.clear();
3664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3667 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3669 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3670 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3671 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3672 added_monitors.clear();
3675 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3677 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3679 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3680 added_monitors.clear();
3683 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3684 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3686 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3687 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3688 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3696 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3697 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3698 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3702 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3703 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3704 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3705 ((match events_6[0] {
3706 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3707 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3708 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3712 }, match events_6[1] {
3713 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3714 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3721 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3722 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3723 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3727 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3728 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3729 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3730 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3732 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3733 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3734 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3735 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3742 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3743 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3744 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3745 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3746 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3747 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
3748 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3756 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3759 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3763 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3764 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3766 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3767 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3768 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3770 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3773 macro_rules! check_spends {
3774 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3776 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3777 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3778 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3779 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3784 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3785 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3787 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3788 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3789 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3790 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3791 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3795 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3797 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3798 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3808 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3809 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3810 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3813 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3814 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3816 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3817 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3818 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3819 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3820 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3826 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3827 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3830 Some(match events_1[1] {
3831 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3832 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3839 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3840 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3841 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3842 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3843 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3844 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3845 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3847 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3848 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3849 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3850 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3851 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3852 (as_update, bs_update)
3854 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3856 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3857 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3858 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3859 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3861 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3862 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3863 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3864 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3865 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3866 (as_update, bs_update)
3868 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3869 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3871 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3876 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3877 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3880 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3881 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3882 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3883 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3884 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3885 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3888 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3890 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3895 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3896 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3898 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3902 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3903 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3905 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3906 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3907 added_monitors.clear();
3912 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3913 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3915 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3916 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3917 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3918 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3919 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3922 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3924 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3925 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3926 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3927 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3928 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3929 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3930 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3931 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3932 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3933 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3935 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3936 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3940 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3942 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3943 if $fail_backwards {
3944 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3945 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3947 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3950 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3952 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3953 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3954 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3955 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3956 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3957 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3961 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3963 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3964 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3966 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3967 if $fail_backwards {
3968 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3969 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3971 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3973 added_monitors.clear();
3978 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3980 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3983 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3985 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3986 if $fail_backwards {
3987 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3988 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3989 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3990 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3991 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3993 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4002 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4003 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4004 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4005 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4010 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4011 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4013 let mut payment_event = {
4014 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4015 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4017 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4019 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4021 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4023 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4024 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4026 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4027 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4028 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4030 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4031 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4033 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4037 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4038 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4040 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4041 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4042 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4044 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4045 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4046 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4051 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4052 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4053 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4054 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4055 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4061 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4064 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4065 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4066 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4068 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4069 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4070 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4073 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4077 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4079 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4082 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4083 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4091 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4092 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4094 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4095 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4096 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4097 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4101 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4102 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4104 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4105 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4106 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4107 get_next_msgs!($node)
4109 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4112 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4113 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4118 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4119 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4120 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4121 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4122 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4123 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4124 } else if update_next_msgs {
4125 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4127 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4129 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4130 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4137 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4138 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4141 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4142 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4149 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4150 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4153 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4155 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4156 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4157 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4158 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4159 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4162 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4165 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4166 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4167 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4168 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4169 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4172 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4174 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4176 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4177 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4181 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4182 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4183 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4186 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4187 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
4188 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4190 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4191 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4192 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4194 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4195 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4200 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4201 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4202 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4203 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4204 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4205 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4206 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4207 // second-to-last node!
4208 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4211 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4212 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4215 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4216 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4217 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4218 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4219 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4220 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4221 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4222 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4227 assert!(events.is_empty());
4229 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4230 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4237 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4239 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4242 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4243 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4244 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4251 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4252 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4255 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4256 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4257 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4258 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4260 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4261 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4263 for i in 0..node_count {
4264 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4265 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4266 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4267 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4268 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4269 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4270 let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4271 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4272 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4273 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4274 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4275 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4276 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4277 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
4278 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4279 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4287 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4288 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4289 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4290 let channel_id = chan.2;
4293 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4297 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4298 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4299 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4300 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4301 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4302 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4303 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4304 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4305 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4306 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4308 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4310 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4312 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4313 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4316 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4317 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4318 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4320 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4327 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4328 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4329 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4332 let payment_event = {
4333 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4334 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4335 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4337 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4338 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4340 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4341 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4342 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4343 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4344 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4347 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4348 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4349 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4350 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4353 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4354 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4355 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4356 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4357 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4358 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4359 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4362 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4363 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4364 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4365 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4366 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4367 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4368 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4372 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4373 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4377 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4380 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4384 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4386 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4390 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4395 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4396 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4397 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4398 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4399 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4400 let channel_id = chan.2;
4403 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4405 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4406 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4409 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4410 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4411 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4420 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4421 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4422 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4425 let payment_event = {
4426 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4427 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4428 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4430 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4431 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4433 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4434 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4435 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4436 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4437 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4440 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4443 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4447 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4448 let nodes = create_network(2);
4449 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4450 let channel_id = chan.2;
4453 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4454 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4455 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4456 // (3) update_fee ->
4457 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4458 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4459 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4460 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4461 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4462 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4463 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4464 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4465 // revoke_and_ack ->
4466 // B should send no response here
4467 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4468 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4469 // revoke_and_ack ->
4471 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4472 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4473 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4476 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4477 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4478 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4479 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4480 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4485 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4487 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4488 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4491 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4493 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4495 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4497 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4498 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4499 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4500 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4503 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4505 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4509 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4510 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4511 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4513 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4514 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4515 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4516 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4517 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4518 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4519 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4521 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4522 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4523 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4525 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4527 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4528 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4532 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4533 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4536 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4537 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4540 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4541 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4542 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4545 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4546 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4552 let nodes = create_network(2);
4553 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4554 let channel_id = chan.2;
4556 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4557 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4561 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4562 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4563 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4564 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4568 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4570 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4571 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4574 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4575 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4578 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4579 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4580 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4583 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4584 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4589 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4590 let nodes = create_network(2);
4591 let channel_value = 1888;
4592 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4593 let channel_id = chan.2;
4596 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4598 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4604 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4605 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4607 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4608 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4610 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4611 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4612 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4613 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4614 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4615 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4618 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4619 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4620 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4623 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4627 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4628 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4629 //Should produce and error.
4630 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4632 assert!(match err.err {
4633 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4637 //clear the message we could not handle
4638 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4642 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4643 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4644 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4645 let channel_id = chan.2;
4648 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4650 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4651 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4654 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4655 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4656 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4658 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4663 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4664 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4667 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4669 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4671 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4672 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4674 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4675 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4676 added_monitors.clear();
4678 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4679 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4680 // node[1] has nothing to do
4682 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4683 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4686 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4687 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4688 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4690 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4692 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4694 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4695 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4696 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4697 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4704 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4706 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4710 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4712 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4713 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4715 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4717 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4719 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4720 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4722 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4725 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4726 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4731 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4735 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4737 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4738 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4739 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4743 fn test_update_fee() {
4744 let nodes = create_network(2);
4745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4746 let channel_id = chan.2;
4749 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4750 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4751 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4752 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4753 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4754 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4755 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4756 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4757 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4758 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4759 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4760 // revoke_and_ack ->
4762 // Create and deliver (1)...
4763 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4764 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4767 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4768 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4769 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4771 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4775 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4777 // Generate (2) and (3):
4778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4783 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4784 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4787 // Create and deliver (4)...
4788 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4790 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4791 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4792 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4793 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4794 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4799 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4800 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4804 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4806 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4807 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4809 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4810 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4813 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4814 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4817 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4819 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4820 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4821 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4822 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4823 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4824 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4828 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4830 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4831 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4833 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4837 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4838 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4839 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4843 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4844 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4845 let nodes = create_network(2);
4846 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4847 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4848 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4849 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4851 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4852 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4853 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4854 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4855 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4857 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4858 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4859 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4860 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4861 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4862 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4864 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4865 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4869 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4870 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4871 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4872 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4873 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4874 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4875 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4877 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4879 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4880 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4882 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4883 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4885 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4886 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4888 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4889 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4890 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4891 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4892 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4894 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4896 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4897 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4898 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4901 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4902 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4904 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4905 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4907 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4909 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4910 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4911 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4913 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4915 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4918 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4919 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4924 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4925 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4926 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4927 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4928 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4929 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4931 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4933 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4934 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4935 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4936 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4937 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4941 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4942 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4943 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4944 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4945 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4947 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4948 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4949 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4951 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4952 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4953 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4954 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4955 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4958 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4959 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4960 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4961 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4963 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4964 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4966 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4967 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4969 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4970 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4971 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4972 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4973 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4974 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4976 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4979 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4980 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4982 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4983 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4984 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4989 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4990 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
4991 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
4992 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
4993 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4998 match msg_events[1] {
4999 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
5000 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
5002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5005 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5006 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5007 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5008 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5009 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5010 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5012 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5014 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5015 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5016 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5017 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5018 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5021 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5022 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5023 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5024 let nodes = create_network(3);
5025 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5026 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5028 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5030 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5031 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5034 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5036 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5040 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5041 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5043 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5044 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5045 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5046 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5048 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5049 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5052 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5053 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5054 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5055 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5058 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5059 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5060 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5062 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5064 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5065 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5067 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5069 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5070 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5071 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5072 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5073 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5074 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5075 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5077 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5080 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5082 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5083 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5084 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5088 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5091 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5092 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5097 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5099 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5100 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5101 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5104 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5105 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5107 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5108 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5109 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5110 if recv_count == 0 {
5111 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5112 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5114 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5115 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5116 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5118 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5119 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5120 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5122 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5123 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5125 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5126 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5127 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5129 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5130 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5131 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5132 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5133 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5135 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5136 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5137 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5138 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5139 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5140 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5144 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5145 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5146 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5147 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5148 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5149 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5151 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5152 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5153 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5154 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5157 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5158 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5164 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5166 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5167 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5168 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5169 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5170 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5174 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5175 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5176 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5177 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5181 fn fake_network_test() {
5182 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5183 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5184 let nodes = create_network(4);
5186 // Create some initial channels
5187 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5188 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5189 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5191 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5197 // Send some more payments
5198 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5199 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5200 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5202 // Test failure packets
5203 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5204 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5206 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5207 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5210 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5211 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5212 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5213 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5214 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5215 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5217 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5218 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5219 hops.push(RouteHop {
5220 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5221 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5223 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5225 hops.push(RouteHop {
5226 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5227 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5229 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5231 hops.push(RouteHop {
5232 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5233 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5235 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5237 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5238 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5239 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5241 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5242 hops.push(RouteHop {
5243 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5244 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5246 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5248 hops.push(RouteHop {
5249 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5250 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5252 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5254 hops.push(RouteHop {
5255 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5256 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5258 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5260 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5261 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5262 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5264 // Claim the rebalances...
5265 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5266 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5268 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5269 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5271 // Send some payments across both channels
5272 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5273 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5274 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5276 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5278 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5280 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5282 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5284 // Close down the channels...
5285 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5286 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5287 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5288 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5289 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5293 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5294 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5295 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5296 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5298 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5299 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5302 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5303 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5305 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5307 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5308 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5310 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5311 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5313 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5314 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5315 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5318 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5319 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5320 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5322 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5323 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5324 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5326 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5327 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5329 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5331 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5332 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5333 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5335 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5336 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5337 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5338 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5339 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5340 res.push(tx.clone());
5345 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5346 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5349 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5351 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5352 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5353 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5354 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5355 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5356 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5358 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5360 res.push(tx.clone());
5364 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5366 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5370 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5374 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5375 /// HTLC transaction.
5376 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5377 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5378 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5379 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5380 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5381 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5385 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5388 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5389 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5391 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5392 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5393 let mut found_prev = false;
5395 for tx in prev_txn {
5396 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5397 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5398 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5399 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5405 assert!(found_prev);
5407 let mut res = Vec::new();
5408 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5412 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5413 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5414 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5415 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5416 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5422 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5423 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5424 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5425 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5432 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5433 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5437 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5439 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5442 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5445 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5446 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5450 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5452 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5453 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5455 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5456 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5457 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5458 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5459 chan.get_value_stat()
5463 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5464 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5465 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5467 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5468 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5470 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5471 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5473 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5474 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5475 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5476 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5477 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5481 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5483 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5484 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5485 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5486 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5491 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5492 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5493 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5496 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5497 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5498 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5505 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5506 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5508 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5510 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5512 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5513 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5514 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5516 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5517 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5521 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5522 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5523 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5525 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5526 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5529 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5532 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5533 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5534 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5535 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5536 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5539 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5540 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5541 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5542 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5543 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5547 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5548 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5549 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5550 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5552 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5553 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5557 // adding pending output
5558 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5559 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5561 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5562 let payment_event_1 = {
5563 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5566 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5568 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5570 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5572 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5573 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5575 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5576 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5577 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5578 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5583 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5584 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5586 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5588 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5589 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5590 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5592 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5594 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5595 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5596 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5597 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5598 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5599 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5601 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5602 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5603 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5604 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5608 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5610 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5612 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5613 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5614 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5615 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5616 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5617 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5618 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5619 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5627 // split the rest to test holding cell
5628 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5629 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5631 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5632 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5635 // now see if they go through on both sides
5636 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5637 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5638 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5640 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5641 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5643 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5645 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5646 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5647 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5648 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5652 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5653 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5654 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5656 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5657 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5659 // flush the pending htlc
5660 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5661 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5664 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5669 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5670 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5673 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5674 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5677 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5679 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5680 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5684 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5686 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5687 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5689 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5690 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5693 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5694 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5695 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5696 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5698 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5699 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5701 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5704 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5705 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5706 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5711 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5712 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5713 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5718 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5719 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5720 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5722 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5723 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5724 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5725 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5727 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5728 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5732 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5733 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5734 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5738 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5739 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5740 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5741 let nodes = create_network(5);
5743 // Create some initial channels
5744 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5745 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5746 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5747 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5749 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5750 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5752 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5753 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5755 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5756 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5758 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5759 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5760 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5761 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5763 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5764 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5765 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5767 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5768 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5770 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5771 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5773 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5775 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5776 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5778 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5779 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5780 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5782 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5783 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5785 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5786 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5788 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5791 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5792 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5793 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5794 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5802 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5803 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5804 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5806 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5808 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5809 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5811 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5812 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5814 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5816 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5817 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5818 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5820 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5821 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5822 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5825 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5826 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5827 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5828 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5829 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5833 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5834 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5835 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5836 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5837 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5840 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5842 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5843 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5845 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5846 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5847 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5848 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5849 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5852 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5854 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5855 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5857 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5859 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5860 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5861 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5865 fn test_justice_tx() {
5866 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5868 let nodes = create_network(2);
5869 // Create some new channels:
5870 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5872 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5873 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5874 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5875 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5876 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5877 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5878 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5879 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5880 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5881 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5883 // Revoke the old state
5884 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5887 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5888 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5890 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5891 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5892 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5893 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5895 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5896 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5898 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5900 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5901 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5902 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5903 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5904 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5906 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5909 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5911 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5912 // Create some new channels:
5913 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5915 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5916 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5917 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5918 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5919 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5920 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5921 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5922 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5923 // Revoke the old state
5924 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5926 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5927 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5929 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5931 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5932 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5934 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5935 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5937 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5939 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5940 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5941 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5942 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5943 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5945 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5947 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5951 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5952 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5953 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5954 let nodes = create_network(2);
5955 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5956 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5957 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5958 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5959 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5961 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5962 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5964 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5965 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5966 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5967 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5968 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5970 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5972 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5973 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5975 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5976 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5977 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5981 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5982 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5983 let nodes = create_network(2);
5985 // Create some new channel:
5986 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5988 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5990 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5991 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5992 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
5994 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5995 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5998 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5999 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6000 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6001 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6002 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6004 //Revoke the old state
6005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6008 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6009 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6010 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6015 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6016 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6021 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6022 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6024 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6025 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6027 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6029 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6030 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6031 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6032 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6033 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6034 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6035 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6036 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6038 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6039 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6040 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6042 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6043 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6044 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6045 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6046 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6047 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6049 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6050 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6051 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6055 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6056 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6057 let nodes = create_network(2);
6059 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6061 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6062 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6063 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6064 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6065 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6066 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6068 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6069 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6071 //Revoke the old state
6072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6075 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6076 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6077 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6079 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6082 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6083 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6088 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6089 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6091 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6092 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6093 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6094 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6095 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6096 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6097 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6099 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6100 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6101 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6103 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6104 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6105 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6106 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6107 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6109 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6110 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6111 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6112 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6113 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6114 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6115 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6116 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6118 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6119 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6121 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6122 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6123 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6124 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6125 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6126 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6128 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6129 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6130 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6134 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6135 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6136 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6137 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6138 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6139 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6140 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6141 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6143 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6144 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6145 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6146 // PaymentSent event).
6148 let nodes = create_network(3);
6150 // Create some initial channels
6151 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6152 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6154 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6155 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6156 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6158 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6159 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6161 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6162 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6163 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6164 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6165 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6166 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6169 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6170 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6171 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6172 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6174 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6175 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6178 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6181 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6182 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6183 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6184 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6185 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6186 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6187 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6188 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6190 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6191 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6194 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6195 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6196 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6197 added_monitors.clear();
6199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6201 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6205 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6206 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6207 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6208 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6209 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6210 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6215 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6216 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6217 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6218 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6222 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6223 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6224 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6225 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6226 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6227 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6228 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6229 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6230 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6234 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6235 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6236 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6237 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6238 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6239 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6245 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6247 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6248 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6250 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6251 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6252 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6253 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6254 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6255 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6257 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6258 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6259 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6262 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6265 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6268 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6269 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6273 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6274 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6275 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6276 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6278 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6279 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6280 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6281 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6282 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6283 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6284 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6285 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6289 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6290 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6291 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6292 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6293 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6294 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6296 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6298 let nodes = create_network(3);
6300 // Create some intial channels
6301 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6302 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6304 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6305 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6306 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6308 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6309 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6311 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6312 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6313 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6314 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
6316 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6317 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6318 added_monitors.clear();
6320 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6323 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6324 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6325 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6326 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6327 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6328 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6332 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6333 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6336 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6339 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6340 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6341 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6342 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6344 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6345 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6346 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6349 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6350 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6351 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6352 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6353 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6354 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6355 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6356 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6357 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6358 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6359 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6360 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6361 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6362 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6363 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6364 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6368 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6369 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6377 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6378 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6379 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6380 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6381 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6382 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6386 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6387 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6389 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6390 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6391 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6393 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6394 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6397 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6400 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6401 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6402 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6403 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6404 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6405 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6406 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6407 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6408 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6412 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6413 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6414 // and fail backward accordingly.
6416 let nodes = create_network(3);
6418 // Create some initial channels
6419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6420 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6422 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6423 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6424 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6425 // Revoke the old state
6426 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6428 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6430 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6431 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6432 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6436 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6440 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6441 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6442 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6443 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6444 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6445 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6447 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6448 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6450 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6453 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6456 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6459 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6467 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6468 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6469 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6470 // commitment transaction anymore.
6471 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6472 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6473 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6474 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6475 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6476 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6478 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6479 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6480 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6481 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6482 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6483 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6485 // Create some initial channels
6486 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6487 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6489 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6490 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6491 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6492 // Revoke the old state
6493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6495 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6496 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6497 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6499 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
6500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6502 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6504 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6505 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6508 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6509 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6511 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6513 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6514 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6515 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6516 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6517 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6518 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6519 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6520 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6522 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6523 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6524 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6527 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
6528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6529 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6530 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6531 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6532 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6533 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6534 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6536 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6537 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6538 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6540 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6541 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6542 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6545 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6546 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6547 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6548 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6549 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6550 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6551 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6555 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6556 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6557 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6561 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6562 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6564 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6565 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6567 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6570 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6571 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6576 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6577 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6581 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6582 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6583 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6584 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6589 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6590 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6591 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6592 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6593 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6594 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6599 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6600 let updates = match events[1] {
6601 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6602 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6603 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6604 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6605 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6606 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6608 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6609 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6611 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6612 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6614 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6615 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6617 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6621 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6622 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6623 // that we should update our routing table for.
6624 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6625 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6627 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6631 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6634 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6635 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6645 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6646 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6647 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6648 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6649 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6650 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6653 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6655 for event in events {
6657 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6662 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6665 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6666 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6671 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6672 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6677 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6678 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6679 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6683 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6684 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6685 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6689 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6690 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6691 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6692 let nodes = create_network(2);
6693 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6695 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6696 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6698 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6701 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6702 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6708 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6709 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6711 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6712 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6715 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6718 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6719 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6725 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6726 // registering new transactions
6727 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6731 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6732 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6733 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6734 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6735 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6737 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6739 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6741 let mut payment_event = {
6742 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6747 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6751 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6753 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6754 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6756 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6760 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6761 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6763 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6764 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6765 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6766 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6769 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6770 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6772 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6774 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6775 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6776 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6778 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6779 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6780 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6782 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6783 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6789 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6790 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6791 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6792 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6797 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6798 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6800 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6801 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6802 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6804 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6805 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6810 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6812 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6813 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6814 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6816 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6817 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6819 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6820 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6821 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6822 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6828 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6829 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6830 let nodes = create_network(2);
6831 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6833 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6834 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6835 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6836 mem::drop(channel_state);
6838 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6839 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6840 headers.push(header.clone());
6842 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6843 headers.push(header.clone());
6845 while !headers.is_empty() {
6846 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6852 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6853 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6858 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6859 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6860 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6863 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6864 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6866 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6867 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6868 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6869 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6870 res.push(msg.clone());
6872 panic!("Unexpected event")
6880 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6881 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6883 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6885 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6887 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6893 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6894 let mut commitment_update = None;
6895 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6898 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6899 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6900 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6901 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6903 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6904 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6905 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6906 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6911 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6914 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6916 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6917 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6918 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6919 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6921 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6922 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6923 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6924 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6930 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6935 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6936 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6937 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6938 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6939 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6940 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6941 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6943 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6944 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6946 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6947 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6950 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6951 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6953 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6954 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6957 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6958 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6959 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6960 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6961 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6963 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6964 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6968 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6969 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6970 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6971 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6973 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6974 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6976 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6979 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6980 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6981 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6982 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6984 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6985 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6987 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6990 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6991 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6992 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6994 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6995 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6996 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6997 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6999 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7000 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7001 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7002 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7005 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7008 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7009 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7010 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7011 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7013 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7015 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7016 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7017 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7018 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7020 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7022 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7023 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7024 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7025 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7026 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7028 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7029 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7031 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7032 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7035 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7036 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7038 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7039 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7040 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7041 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7042 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7043 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7044 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7047 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7051 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7052 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7053 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7054 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7055 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7056 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7057 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7058 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7059 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7062 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7065 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7066 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7067 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7068 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7070 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7072 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7073 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7074 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7075 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7077 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7078 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7079 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7080 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7081 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7083 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7084 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7086 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7087 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7090 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7091 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7093 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7094 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7095 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7096 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7097 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7098 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7099 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7102 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7108 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7109 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7110 let nodes = create_network(3);
7111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7114 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7115 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7116 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7118 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7119 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7120 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7121 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7123 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7124 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7125 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7127 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7128 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7129 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7130 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7132 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7133 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7135 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7136 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7138 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7140 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7143 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7144 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7149 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7150 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7151 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7157 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7158 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7161 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7162 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7163 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7164 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7165 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7166 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7171 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7172 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7174 let payment_event = {
7175 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7180 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7182 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7184 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7185 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7188 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7189 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7191 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7193 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7194 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7195 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7198 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7199 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7200 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7201 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7204 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7205 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7206 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7214 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7215 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7216 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7217 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7218 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7219 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7220 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7221 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7222 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7223 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7224 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7225 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7226 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7227 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7228 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7229 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7230 // Everything was delivered...
7231 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7234 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7235 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7237 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7241 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7242 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7243 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7245 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7246 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7248 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7249 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7251 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7252 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7253 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7258 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7261 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7262 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7263 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7265 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7266 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7267 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7268 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7269 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7271 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7276 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7279 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7280 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7282 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7283 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7288 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7289 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7291 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7293 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7294 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7295 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7298 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7299 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7300 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7301 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7304 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7305 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7306 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7314 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7315 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7316 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7317 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7318 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7319 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7320 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7321 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7323 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7324 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7329 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7330 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7331 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7332 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7333 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7334 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7335 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7336 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7337 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7338 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7339 // Everything was delivered...
7340 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7343 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7344 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7345 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7347 // Channel should still work fine...
7348 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7349 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7353 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7354 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7355 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7356 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7357 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7361 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7362 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7363 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7364 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7368 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7369 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7370 let nodes = create_network(2);
7371 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7373 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7374 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7376 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7377 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7378 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7380 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7381 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7386 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7388 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7389 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7391 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7392 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7393 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7395 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7396 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7401 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7402 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7407 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7409 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7410 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7412 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7413 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7414 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7418 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7419 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7420 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7421 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7422 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7424 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7426 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7427 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7428 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7430 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7433 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7434 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7436 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7440 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7443 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7444 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7446 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7447 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7448 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7449 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7450 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7451 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7452 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7455 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7456 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7458 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7459 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7464 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7465 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7466 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7472 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7473 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7475 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7477 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7478 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7479 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7480 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7482 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7483 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7484 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7485 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7487 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7488 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7490 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7491 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7493 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7495 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7496 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7497 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7498 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7499 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7501 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7502 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7503 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7506 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7507 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7509 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7510 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7511 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7512 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7515 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7516 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7517 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7518 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7519 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7520 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7525 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7529 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7530 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7531 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7534 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7539 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7541 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7545 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7546 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7548 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7549 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7551 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7552 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7557 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7558 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7561 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7565 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7566 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7567 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7570 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7571 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7573 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7574 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7577 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7578 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7580 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7584 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7588 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7589 // PaymentFailed event
7591 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7594 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7595 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7596 // a disconnect in between
7597 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7598 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7600 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7601 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7603 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7604 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7607 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7609 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7612 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7613 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7614 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7617 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7618 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7621 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7622 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7623 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7624 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7626 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7630 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7631 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7633 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7634 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7635 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7640 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7642 // Now set it to failed again...
7643 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7644 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7645 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7648 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7649 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7653 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7654 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7655 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7658 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7659 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7660 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7663 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7664 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7666 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7670 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7671 // PaymentFailed event
7673 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7677 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7678 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7679 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7682 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7683 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7685 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7686 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7687 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7688 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7689 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7690 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7691 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7692 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7693 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7694 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7695 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7696 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7697 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7698 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7699 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7700 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7701 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7702 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7705 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7707 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7708 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7709 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7711 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7712 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7716 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7717 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7719 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7720 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7721 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7723 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7724 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7725 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7726 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7727 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7728 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7729 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7730 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7731 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7732 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7734 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7735 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7736 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7737 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7739 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7740 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7745 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7746 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7747 } else { panic!(); }
7750 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7755 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7756 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7757 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7760 // Now fix monitor updating...
7761 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7762 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7765 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7766 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7767 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7769 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7770 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7771 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7772 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7773 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7774 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7776 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7777 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7778 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7779 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7781 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7782 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7784 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7787 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7788 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7789 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7791 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7792 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7793 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7794 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7795 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7796 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7798 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7800 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7801 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7803 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7805 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7806 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7808 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7809 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7810 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7812 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7813 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7814 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7816 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7817 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7818 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7819 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7820 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7821 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7823 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7825 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7826 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7827 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7829 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7830 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7835 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7836 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7837 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7840 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7844 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7845 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7847 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7848 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7849 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7851 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7852 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7855 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7857 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7858 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7859 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7860 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7861 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7868 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7870 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7871 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7872 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7873 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7876 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7877 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7879 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7880 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7882 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7883 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7886 let as_commitment_update;
7887 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7889 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7891 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7892 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7893 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7894 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7895 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7896 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7901 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7902 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7903 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7904 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7905 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7906 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7907 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7911 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7914 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7915 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7917 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7918 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7920 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7921 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7923 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7926 handle_initial_raa!();
7928 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7929 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7931 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7932 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7934 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7935 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7938 handle_initial_raa!();
7940 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7941 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7943 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7944 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7946 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7947 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7949 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7954 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7955 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7957 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7958 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7960 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7961 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7965 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7966 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7967 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7971 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7972 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7975 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7976 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7979 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7980 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7985 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7986 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7988 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7989 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7990 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7995 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7999 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8000 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8001 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8002 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8003 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8004 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8005 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8009 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8010 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8011 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8012 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8013 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8017 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8018 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8019 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8020 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8021 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8022 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8026 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8027 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8028 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8029 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8031 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8032 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8033 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8036 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8039 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8040 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8041 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8042 } else { panic!(); }
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8044 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8046 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8047 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8050 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8052 match responses[0] {
8053 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8054 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8055 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8060 match responses[1] {
8061 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8062 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8063 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8064 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8065 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8066 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8067 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8069 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8070 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8071 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8072 } else { panic!(); }
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8074 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8079 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8080 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8083 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8084 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8087 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8090 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8093 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8094 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8096 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8099 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8100 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8101 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8106 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8109 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8110 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8111 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8113 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8115 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8116 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8118 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8119 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8121 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8122 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8125 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8126 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8127 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8128 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8129 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8130 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8131 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8133 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8136 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8138 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8139 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8140 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8143 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8147 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8148 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8150 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8154 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8155 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8159 // Now fail monitor updating.
8160 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8161 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8162 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8163 } else { panic!(); }
8164 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8168 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8171 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8172 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8173 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8176 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8177 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8178 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8182 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8183 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8184 match events_2.remove(0) {
8185 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8186 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8187 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8188 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8189 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8190 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8191 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8193 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8194 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8196 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8197 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8198 match msg_events[0] {
8199 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
8200 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
8201 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
8203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8206 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8208 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8209 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8210 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8211 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8216 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8217 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8218 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8219 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8220 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8223 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8225 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8226 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8227 } else { panic!(); }
8228 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8229 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8230 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8231 } else { (None, None) };
8233 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8234 // update_add update.
8235 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8236 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8239 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8240 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8241 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8243 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8246 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8247 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8248 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8250 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8251 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8252 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8253 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8254 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8255 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8256 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8260 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8261 match events_3.remove(1) {
8262 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8263 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8269 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8270 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8272 // Now deliver the new messages...
8274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8276 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8277 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8278 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8279 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8280 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8281 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8283 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8284 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8285 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8287 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8288 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8290 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8291 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8292 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8293 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8294 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8295 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8297 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8299 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8301 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8302 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8303 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8304 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8308 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8312 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8316 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8318 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8320 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8322 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8325 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8326 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8328 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8332 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8333 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8335 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8336 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8338 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8342 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8343 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8344 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8346 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8350 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8351 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8354 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8355 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8356 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8360 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8361 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8363 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8367 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8368 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8370 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8371 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8373 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8376 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8379 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8383 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8384 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8385 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8389 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8390 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8391 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8393 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8394 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8397 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8399 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8400 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8402 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8404 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8405 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8406 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8407 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8408 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8409 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8410 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8412 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8413 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8415 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8416 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8419 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8420 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8422 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8424 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8425 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8426 } else { panic!(); }
8427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8429 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8432 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8435 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8436 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8438 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8440 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8444 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8445 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8448 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8449 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8450 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8451 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8452 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8453 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8457 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8458 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8460 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8466 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8467 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8469 let nodes = create_network(2);
8471 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8473 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8474 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8475 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8476 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8478 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8480 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8481 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8483 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8484 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8486 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8488 let mut chan_announcement;
8490 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8492 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8493 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8494 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8495 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8496 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8497 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8498 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8499 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8500 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8505 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8506 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8507 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8508 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8509 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8510 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8511 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8512 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8513 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8514 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8515 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8516 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8517 contents: $unsigned_msg
8522 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8523 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8525 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8527 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8528 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8529 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8530 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8531 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8533 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8534 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8535 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8536 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8539 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8540 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8541 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8542 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8545 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8546 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8551 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8552 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8554 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8556 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8558 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8559 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8560 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8562 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8563 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8564 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8565 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8567 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8568 let config = UserConfig::new();
8569 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8570 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8571 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8572 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8573 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8574 default_config: config,
8576 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8577 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8578 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8579 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8580 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8581 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8584 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8586 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8587 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8588 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8589 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8590 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8593 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8594 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8595 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8596 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8598 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8599 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8600 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8601 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8603 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8604 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8605 for node in nodes.iter() {
8606 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8607 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8608 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8611 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8615 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8616 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8617 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8619 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8620 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8622 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8624 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8625 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8626 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8628 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8629 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8630 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8631 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8633 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8634 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8635 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8636 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8637 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8638 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8639 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8641 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8642 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8643 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8644 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8645 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8646 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8649 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8651 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8652 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8655 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8657 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8658 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8662 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8663 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8664 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8665 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8666 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8667 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8669 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8671 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8672 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8674 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8675 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8676 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8677 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8679 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8681 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8682 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8683 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8684 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8685 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8688 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8689 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8690 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8691 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8692 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8693 assert!(read.is_empty());
8694 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8697 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8698 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8699 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8700 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8702 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8703 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8704 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8705 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8706 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8707 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8709 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8711 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8712 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8713 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8714 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8715 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8718 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8719 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8722 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8724 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8725 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8727 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8728 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8730 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8731 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8733 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8734 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8735 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8738 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8739 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8741 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8742 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8743 for event in events {
8745 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8746 for outp in outputs {
8748 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8750 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8751 script_sig: Script::new(),
8753 witness: Vec::new(),
8756 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8757 value: output.value,
8759 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8766 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8767 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8768 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8769 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8770 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8771 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8772 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8775 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8777 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8778 script_sig: Script::new(),
8779 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8780 witness: Vec::new(),
8783 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8784 value: output.value,
8786 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8793 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8794 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8795 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8796 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8797 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8798 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8801 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8804 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8805 script_sig: Script::new(),
8807 witness: Vec::new(),
8810 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8811 value: output.value,
8813 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8817 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8820 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8822 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8824 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8827 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8830 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8831 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8832 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8833 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8834 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8835 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8836 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8851 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8852 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8853 let nodes = create_network(2);
8855 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8856 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8859 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8862 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8863 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8864 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8865 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8867 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8868 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8869 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8870 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8871 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8875 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8876 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8877 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8879 let nodes = create_network(2);
8881 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8882 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8883 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8885 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8889 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8890 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8891 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8893 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8894 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8895 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8897 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8900 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8901 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8902 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8903 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8907 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8908 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8909 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8911 let nodes = create_network(2);
8913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8914 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8915 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8916 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8919 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8920 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8921 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8922 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8924 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8927 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8928 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8929 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8930 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8931 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8932 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8933 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8937 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8938 let nodes = create_network(2);
8940 // Create some initial channels
8941 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8943 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8945 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8946 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8947 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8949 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8950 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8951 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8953 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8956 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8960 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8961 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8964 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8965 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8966 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8967 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8968 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8971 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8972 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8973 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8974 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8978 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
8979 let nodes = create_network(2);
8981 // Create some initial channels
8982 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8984 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8985 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8986 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8987 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8991 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8992 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8993 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8995 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8998 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9000 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9001 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9004 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9005 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9006 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9007 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9011 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9012 let nodes = create_network(2);
9014 // Create some initial channels
9015 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9017 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9018 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9019 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9020 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9022 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9024 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9025 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9026 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9027 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9032 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9033 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9034 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9035 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9036 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9037 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9038 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9040 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9041 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9042 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9044 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9048 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9049 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9050 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9051 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9053 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9054 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9055 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9056 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9057 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9058 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9062 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9063 let nodes = create_network(2);
9065 // Create some initial channels
9066 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9068 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9069 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9070 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9071 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9075 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9076 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9077 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9078 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9080 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9083 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9085 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9086 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9087 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9088 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9089 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9091 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9092 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9093 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9095 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9099 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9100 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9101 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9102 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9104 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9105 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9106 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9107 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9108 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9109 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9110 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9111 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9115 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9116 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9117 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9118 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9119 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9121 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9124 let nodes = create_network(3);
9126 // Create some initial channels
9127 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9128 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9130 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9134 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9135 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9136 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9137 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9138 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9140 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9141 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9142 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9143 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9144 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9146 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9147 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9150 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9154 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9155 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9156 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9157 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9158 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9159 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9160 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9161 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9162 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9163 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9165 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9166 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9168 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9169 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9170 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9171 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9172 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9173 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9174 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9175 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9176 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9177 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9178 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9179 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9182 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9184 match msg_events[0] {
9185 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9188 match msg_events[1] {
9189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9190 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9191 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9192 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9193 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9194 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9198 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9199 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9200 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9201 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9202 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9203 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9204 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9205 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9206 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9207 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9208 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9209 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9210 match msg_events[0] {
9211 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9217 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9218 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9219 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9220 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9223 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9225 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9226 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9227 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9229 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9230 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9231 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9233 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9234 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9235 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9236 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9237 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9238 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9239 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9240 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9241 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9242 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9243 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9244 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9245 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9246 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9247 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9248 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9249 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9252 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9254 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9255 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9258 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9259 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9261 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9263 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9267 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9268 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9270 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9271 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9272 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9273 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9274 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9275 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9276 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9277 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9278 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9279 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9280 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9281 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9283 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9284 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9285 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9286 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9287 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9288 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9289 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9292 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9293 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9295 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9299 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9301 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9304 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9306 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9307 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9312 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9313 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9314 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9315 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9316 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9317 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9318 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9319 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9323 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9327 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9328 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9335 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9336 let nodes = create_network(2);
9338 // Create some initial channels
9339 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9341 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9342 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9343 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9344 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9346 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9347 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9349 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9350 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9351 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9353 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9357 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9358 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9360 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9361 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9362 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9363 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9365 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9366 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9367 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9368 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9369 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9373 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9374 let nodes = create_network(2);
9376 // Create some initial channels
9377 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9379 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9380 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9381 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9382 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9384 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9385 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9386 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9387 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9389 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9390 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9392 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9393 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9395 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9397 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9398 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9399 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9400 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9401 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9402 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9403 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9404 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9405 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9406 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9407 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9411 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9412 let nodes = create_network(2);
9414 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9416 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9417 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9419 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9420 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9421 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9422 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9423 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9425 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9426 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9427 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9428 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
9431 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9432 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9435 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
9439 // 0: node1 fail backward
9440 // 1: final node fail backward
9441 // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
9442 // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
9443 // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9444 // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9445 fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9446 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9447 F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
9450 use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
9452 // reset block height
9453 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9454 for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
9455 nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9458 macro_rules! expect_event {
9459 ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
9460 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9463 $event_type { .. } => {},
9464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9469 macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
9471 expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
9472 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
9473 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9477 // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
9478 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
9479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9480 let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9481 // temper update_add (0 => 1)
9482 let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9483 if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
9484 callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
9487 // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
9488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
9489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9491 let update_1_0 = match test_case {
9492 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
9493 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9494 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
9497 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
9498 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9500 if test_case != 200 {
9503 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
9505 let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9506 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9507 assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9508 // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
9509 let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9510 if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
9511 callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
9515 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
9516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
9518 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9519 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
9520 expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
9524 let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9525 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9526 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
9528 assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9530 let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9531 if test_case == 200 {
9532 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9537 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
9539 // backward fail on 1
9540 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9541 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9544 _ => unreachable!(),
9547 // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
9548 if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
9549 let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9550 if test_case == 100 {
9551 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9553 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9558 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9560 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9562 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
9563 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
9564 assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
9566 panic!("Uexpected event");
9569 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9570 if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
9571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9573 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
9575 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
9576 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
9577 panic!("channel_update not found!");
9580 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9581 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9582 assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
9583 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9585 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9588 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9589 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9590 assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
9591 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9593 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9598 _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
9601 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9605 impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9606 fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9607 use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9608 use secp256k1::Signature;
9609 msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9610 signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
9611 contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9612 chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
9613 short_channel_id: 0,
9616 cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
9617 htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
9619 fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
9620 excess_data: vec![],
9627 fn test_onion_failure() {
9628 use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
9629 use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
9632 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
9633 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
9634 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
9635 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
9637 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9638 for node in nodes.iter() {
9639 *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
9641 let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
9642 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
9643 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9645 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
9647 // intermediate node failure
9648 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9649 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9650 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9651 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9652 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9653 onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
9654 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9655 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
9657 // final node failure
9658 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9659 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9660 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9661 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9662 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9663 onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
9664 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9665 }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9667 // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
9668 // receiving simulated fail messages
9669 // intermediate node failure
9670 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9672 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9674 // and tamper returing error message
9675 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9676 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9677 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9678 }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9680 // final node failure
9681 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9682 // and tamper returing error message
9683 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9684 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9685 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9687 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9688 }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9690 // intermediate node failure
9691 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9692 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9694 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9695 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9696 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9697 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9699 // final node failure
9700 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9701 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9702 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9703 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9705 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9706 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9708 // intermediate node failure
9709 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9710 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9713 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9714 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9716 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9717 }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9719 // final node failure
9720 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9721 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9722 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9723 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9725 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9726 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9728 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
9729 Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
9731 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
9732 Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
9734 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
9735 Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
9737 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9738 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9740 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9741 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9742 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
9743 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9745 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9746 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9748 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9749 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9750 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
9751 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9752 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9754 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9755 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9757 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9758 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9759 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
9760 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9761 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9763 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9764 bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
9765 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
9766 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
9768 let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
9769 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9770 let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
9771 bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
9772 run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9774 //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
9775 //invalid channel_update cases.
9776 run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9777 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9778 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9780 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9781 // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
9782 msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
9783 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9785 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9786 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9787 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9788 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9789 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9791 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9792 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
9793 }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
9795 run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9796 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9797 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9798 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9799 }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
9801 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9802 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9803 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9804 f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
9807 }, true, Some(18), None);
9809 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9810 // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
9811 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9812 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9813 f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
9816 }, true, Some(19), None);
9818 run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9819 // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
9820 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9821 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9822 }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9823 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9825 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9826 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9827 let mut route = route.clone();
9829 route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
9830 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9831 let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
9832 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9833 msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
9834 msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
9835 }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);