1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
35 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
36 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
40 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
41 use util::logger::Logger;
42 use util::errors::APIError;
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
66 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
67 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
68 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
69 short_channel_id: u64,
70 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
71 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
74 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
75 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
76 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
77 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
80 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
83 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
87 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
88 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
89 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
90 short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
95 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
98 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
101 session_priv: SecretKey,
102 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
103 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
104 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
109 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
111 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
112 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
113 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
121 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
130 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
131 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
132 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
144 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 err: msgs::HandleError,
146 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
148 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
150 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
154 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
155 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
157 data: err.to_string()
161 shutdown_finish: None,
165 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
169 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
171 shutdown_finish: None,
175 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
176 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
179 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
183 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
184 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
186 data: err.to_string()
190 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
194 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
199 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
203 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 data: msg.to_string()
211 shutdown_finish: None,
216 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
217 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
218 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
219 /// probably increase this significantly.
220 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
222 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
224 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
226 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
234 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
235 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
236 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
237 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
238 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
239 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
240 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
242 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
246 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
247 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
248 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
272 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
277 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
278 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
279 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
280 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
281 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
282 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
287 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
288 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
290 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
291 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
293 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
294 /// to individual Channels.
296 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
297 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
298 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
299 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
301 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
302 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
303 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
304 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
305 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
306 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
307 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
309 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
310 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
311 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
312 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
314 pub struct ChannelManager {
315 default_configuration: UserConfig,
316 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
317 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
318 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
319 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
320 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
323 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
325 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
326 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
327 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
330 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
332 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
333 our_network_key: SecretKey,
335 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
336 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
337 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
338 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
339 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
341 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
346 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
347 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
348 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
349 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
350 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
351 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
352 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
354 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
355 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
356 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
357 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
358 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
359 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
362 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
364 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
365 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
368 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
370 macro_rules! secp_call {
371 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
374 Err(_) => return Err($err),
379 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
380 pub struct ChannelDetails {
381 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
382 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
383 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
384 /// lifetime of the channel.
385 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
386 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
387 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
388 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
389 /// The node_id of our counterparty
390 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
391 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
392 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
393 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
397 macro_rules! handle_error {
398 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
401 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
402 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
403 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
404 if let Some(update) = update_option {
405 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
406 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
417 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
418 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
421 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
422 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
424 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
425 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
426 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
427 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
428 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
430 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
436 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
437 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
440 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
443 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
444 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
445 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
446 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
447 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
455 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
456 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
457 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
459 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
461 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
462 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
463 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
464 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
465 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
467 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
468 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
469 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
470 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
471 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
472 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
473 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
474 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
475 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
476 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
480 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
481 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
482 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
484 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
485 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
487 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
488 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
490 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
491 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
492 if !$resend_commitment {
493 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
496 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
498 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
499 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
505 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
506 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
507 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
510 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
514 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
515 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
517 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
518 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
521 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
526 impl ChannelManager {
527 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
529 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
530 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
532 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
534 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
535 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
536 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
538 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
539 default_configuration: config.clone(),
540 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
541 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
542 monitor: monitor.clone(),
546 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
547 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
550 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
551 by_id: HashMap::new(),
552 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
553 next_forward: Instant::now(),
554 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
555 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
556 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
558 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
560 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
561 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
567 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
568 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
572 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
574 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
575 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
576 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
577 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
579 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
580 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
582 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
583 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
584 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
585 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
589 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
590 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
592 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
593 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
594 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
596 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
599 panic!("RNG is bad???");
602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
604 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
605 node_id: their_network_key,
611 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
612 /// more information.
613 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
614 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
615 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
616 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
617 res.push(ChannelDetails {
618 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
619 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
620 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
621 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
622 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
628 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
629 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
630 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
631 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
632 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
633 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
634 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
635 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
636 // really wanted anyway.
637 if channel.is_live() {
638 res.push(ChannelDetails {
639 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
640 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
641 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
642 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
643 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
650 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
651 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
652 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
654 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
655 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
656 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
658 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
659 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
660 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
661 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
663 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
665 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
668 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
669 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
670 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
672 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
673 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
678 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
679 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
681 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
682 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
687 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
688 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
698 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
699 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
700 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
701 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
704 for tx in local_txn {
705 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
709 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
710 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
711 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
712 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
715 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
716 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
717 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
718 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
719 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
726 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
727 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
728 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
729 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
736 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
737 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
738 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
739 for chan in self.list_channels() {
740 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
744 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
745 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
746 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
747 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
749 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
750 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
751 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
752 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
753 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
754 failure_code: $err_code,
755 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
760 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
761 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
764 let shared_secret = {
765 let mut arr = [0; 32];
766 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
769 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
771 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
772 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
773 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
774 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
775 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
776 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
777 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
778 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
781 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
782 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
783 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
784 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
785 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
788 let mut channel_state = None;
789 macro_rules! return_err {
790 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
792 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
793 if channel_state.is_none() {
794 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
796 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
797 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
798 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
799 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
800 })), channel_state.unwrap());
805 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
806 let next_hop_data = {
807 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
808 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
809 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
811 let error_code = match err {
812 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
813 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
815 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
821 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
823 // final_expiry_too_soon
824 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
825 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
827 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
828 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
829 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
831 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
832 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
833 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
836 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
837 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
838 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
839 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
841 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
843 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
845 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
846 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
847 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
850 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
851 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
852 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
854 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
856 let blinding_factor = {
857 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
858 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
859 sha.input(&shared_secret);
860 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
863 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
865 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
867 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
870 hop_data: new_packet_data,
871 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
874 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
875 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
876 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
877 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
878 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
879 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
880 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
884 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
885 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
886 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
887 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
888 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
889 None => { // unknown_next_peer
890 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
892 Some(id) => id.clone(),
894 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
895 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
897 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
898 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
899 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
900 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
901 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
902 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
903 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
905 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
906 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
908 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
909 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
910 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
912 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
913 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
915 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
916 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
917 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
918 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
920 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
921 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
926 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
927 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
928 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
929 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
931 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
932 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
934 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
935 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
937 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
939 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
944 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
947 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
948 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
949 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
950 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
951 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
955 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
957 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
958 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
959 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
960 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
961 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
962 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
963 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
964 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
965 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
966 excess_data: Vec::new(),
969 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
970 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
972 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
978 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
980 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
981 /// fields for more info.
983 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
984 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
985 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
986 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
987 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
988 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
990 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
992 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
993 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
994 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
995 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
996 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
997 /// relevant updates.
999 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1000 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1001 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1002 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1003 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1004 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1005 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1006 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1008 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1009 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1010 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1011 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1015 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1017 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1019 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1020 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1021 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1022 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1024 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1026 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1029 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1030 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1031 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1034 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1037 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1038 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1040 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1041 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1043 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1044 route: route.clone(),
1045 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1046 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1047 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1049 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1050 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1051 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1052 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1053 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1054 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1055 // something else in case we will resend later!
1056 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1059 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1060 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1061 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1062 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1063 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1064 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1065 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1073 } else { unreachable!(); }
1077 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1078 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1080 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1082 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1083 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1084 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1085 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1089 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1094 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1096 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1097 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1099 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1101 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1102 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1103 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1104 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1106 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1108 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1109 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1111 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1112 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1113 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1114 } else { unreachable!(); })
1120 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1121 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1122 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1125 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1126 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1127 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1128 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1135 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1136 // lock before add_update_monitor
1137 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1141 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1142 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1143 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1146 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1148 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1156 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1157 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1159 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1161 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1163 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1164 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1166 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1167 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1168 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1169 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1170 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1174 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1176 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1177 /// Will likely generate further events.
1178 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1179 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1181 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1182 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1183 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1186 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1188 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1192 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1193 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1194 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1195 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1197 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1198 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1199 match forward_info {
1200 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1201 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1202 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1203 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1204 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1206 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1208 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1209 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1210 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1211 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1212 // problem, not ours.
1219 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1220 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1221 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1222 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1223 match forward_info {
1224 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1225 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1226 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1227 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1228 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1229 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1231 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1233 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1234 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1236 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1238 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1239 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1244 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1246 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1247 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1248 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1249 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1250 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1251 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1252 // this channel currently :/.
1258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1259 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1260 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1262 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1263 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1265 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1267 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1268 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1269 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1272 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1274 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1275 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1276 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1277 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1278 // messages when we can.
1279 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1280 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1281 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1288 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1289 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1292 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1293 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1295 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1299 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1300 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1304 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1305 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1306 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1307 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1308 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1309 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1311 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1319 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1320 match forward_info {
1321 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1322 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1323 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1324 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1325 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1327 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1331 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1332 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1333 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1336 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1337 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1345 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1347 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1348 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1352 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1353 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1356 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1358 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1360 node_id: their_node_id,
1368 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1369 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1370 events.append(&mut new_events);
1373 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1374 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1375 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1376 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1377 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1378 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1379 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1381 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1382 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1383 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1384 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1385 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1386 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1387 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1388 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1394 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1395 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1396 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1397 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1398 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1399 /// still-available channels.
1400 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1401 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1402 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1403 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1406 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1407 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1408 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1409 match &onion_error {
1410 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1412 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1414 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1415 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1416 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1417 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1418 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1419 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1420 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1425 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1426 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1427 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1428 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1430 error_code: onion_error_code
1434 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1438 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1439 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1440 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1441 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1443 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1444 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1445 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1446 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1447 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1448 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1450 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1456 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1457 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1458 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1459 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1460 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1461 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1463 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1464 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1465 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1469 let mut forward_event = None;
1470 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1471 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1472 channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1474 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1476 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1479 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1482 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1483 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1484 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1485 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1486 time_forwardable: time
1493 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1494 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1495 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1497 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1498 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1499 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1503 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1504 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1505 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1506 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1507 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1508 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1509 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1510 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1511 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1516 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1517 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1519 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1520 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1522 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1526 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1527 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1528 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1530 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1531 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1533 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1534 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1535 // why it's missing.
1540 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1541 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1542 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1543 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1544 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1545 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1546 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1547 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1549 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1553 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1554 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1555 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1556 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1557 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1558 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1559 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1560 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1568 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1569 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1570 //TODO: Do something with e?
1574 } else { unreachable!(); }
1580 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1583 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1585 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1586 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1587 node_id: their_node_id,
1595 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1596 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1597 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1600 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1601 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1603 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1604 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1605 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1606 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1607 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1610 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1611 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1612 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1613 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1614 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1615 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1616 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1617 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1619 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1620 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1621 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1622 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1623 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1624 // on-chain confirmations.
1625 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1626 // should be written.
1627 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1628 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1630 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1631 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1638 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1641 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1642 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1643 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1645 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1647 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1648 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1650 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1655 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1656 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1658 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1659 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1664 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1668 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1679 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1682 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1684 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1685 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1689 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1690 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1694 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1695 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1697 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1701 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1702 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1703 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1705 entry.insert(channel);
1711 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1712 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1713 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1717 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1718 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1721 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1722 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1724 //TODO: same as above
1725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1728 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1729 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1730 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1731 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1732 output_script: output_script,
1733 user_channel_id: user_id,
1738 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1739 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1740 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1741 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1744 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1745 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1746 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1748 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1753 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1754 // lock before add_update_monitor
1755 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1758 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1760 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1766 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1775 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1776 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1777 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1781 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1782 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1785 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1786 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1789 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1794 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1795 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1796 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1797 user_channel_id: user_id,
1802 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1805 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1807 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1808 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1811 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1812 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1814 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1815 msg: announcement_sigs,
1820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1824 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1825 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1826 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1831 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1832 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1835 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1836 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1837 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1838 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1842 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1843 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1844 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1848 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1849 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1850 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1852 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1853 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1858 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1861 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1862 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1863 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1864 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1872 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1873 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1875 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1878 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1879 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1882 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1883 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1885 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1890 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1891 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1892 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1893 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1894 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1895 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1896 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1898 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1899 } else { (tx, None) }
1901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1904 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1905 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1907 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1908 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1909 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1910 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1918 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1919 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1920 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1921 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1923 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1924 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1925 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1926 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1928 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1929 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1933 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1934 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1937 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1938 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1939 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1940 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1941 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1942 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1943 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1944 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1945 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1946 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1947 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1948 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1949 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1950 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1952 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1953 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1954 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1955 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1959 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1960 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1961 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1962 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1963 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1964 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1969 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1976 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1977 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1980 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1982 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1983 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1986 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1991 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1995 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1996 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1997 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1998 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2000 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2001 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2002 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2004 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2011 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2012 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2013 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2014 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2016 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2017 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2020 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2021 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2023 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2030 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2032 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2033 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2035 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2036 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2039 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2040 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2041 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2042 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2043 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2045 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2046 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2047 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2049 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2051 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2052 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2053 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2054 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2055 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2056 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2058 commitment_signed: msg,
2062 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2063 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2064 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2075 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2076 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2077 let mut forward_event = None;
2078 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2079 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2080 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2081 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2082 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2084 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2085 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2087 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2090 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2095 match forward_event {
2097 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2098 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2099 time_forwardable: time
2107 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2108 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2109 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2110 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2111 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2113 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2114 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2115 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2117 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2118 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2119 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2120 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2121 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2122 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2125 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2128 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2129 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2130 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2134 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2136 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2140 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2145 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2146 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2148 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2153 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2154 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2155 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2156 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2158 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2159 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2162 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2169 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2170 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2171 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2175 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2178 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2179 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2182 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2183 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2184 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2186 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2187 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2188 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2189 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2190 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2193 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2195 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2196 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2197 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2198 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2199 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2200 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2201 contents: announcement,
2203 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2211 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2212 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2213 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2215 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2217 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2220 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2221 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2222 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2223 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2224 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2225 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2226 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2227 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2228 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2230 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2231 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2233 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2234 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2237 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2239 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2243 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2244 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2245 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2246 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2251 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2252 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2254 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2260 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2264 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2269 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2271 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2281 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2282 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2283 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2284 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2286 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2287 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2289 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2291 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2293 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2296 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2297 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2299 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2300 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2302 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2303 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2305 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2306 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2307 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2309 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2313 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2314 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2315 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2316 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2317 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2318 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2319 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2329 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2330 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2332 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2334 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2335 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2337 node_id: their_node_id,
2341 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2347 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2348 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2349 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2350 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2351 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2353 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2354 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2355 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2356 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2357 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2359 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2365 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2366 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2367 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2372 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2373 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2374 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2375 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2376 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2378 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2379 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2380 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2381 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2382 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2384 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2390 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2391 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2392 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2397 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2398 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2399 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2400 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2401 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2402 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2404 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2405 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2406 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2407 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2408 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2409 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2410 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2412 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2413 msg: funding_locked,
2415 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2417 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2418 msg: announcement_sigs,
2421 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2422 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2424 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2425 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2429 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2430 for tx in txn_matched {
2431 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2432 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2433 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2434 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2435 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2437 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2438 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2439 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2440 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2441 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2451 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2452 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2453 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2455 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2456 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2457 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2458 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2459 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2460 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2461 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2470 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2471 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2473 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2474 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2477 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2478 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2479 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2480 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2482 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2483 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2484 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2485 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2486 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2487 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2488 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2489 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2491 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2492 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2503 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2504 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2506 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2507 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2511 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2512 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2513 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2514 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2515 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2518 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2519 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2520 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2523 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2524 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2525 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2528 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2529 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2530 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2533 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2534 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2535 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2538 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2539 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2540 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2543 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2544 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2545 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2548 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2549 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2550 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2553 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2554 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2555 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2558 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2559 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2560 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2563 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2564 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2565 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2568 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2570 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2573 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2574 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2575 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2578 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2580 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2583 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2584 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2585 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2588 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2589 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2590 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2593 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2594 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2595 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2596 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2598 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2599 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2600 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2601 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2602 if no_connection_possible {
2603 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2604 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2605 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2606 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2607 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2609 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2610 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2611 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2621 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2622 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2623 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2624 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2625 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2626 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2627 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2628 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2630 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2631 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2632 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2640 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2648 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2653 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2654 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2655 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2656 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2660 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2661 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2663 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2664 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2670 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2671 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2673 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2674 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2675 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2676 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2677 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2678 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2679 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2680 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2681 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2682 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2687 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2688 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2694 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2697 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2698 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2700 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2701 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2702 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2703 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2707 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2712 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2713 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2715 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2716 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2717 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2718 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2719 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2720 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2721 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2722 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2727 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2728 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2729 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2730 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2731 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2732 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2733 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2734 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2735 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2740 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2741 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2743 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2745 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2747 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2749 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2756 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2757 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2758 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2759 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2760 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2761 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2766 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2767 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2769 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2771 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2773 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2775 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2782 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2783 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2784 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2785 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2786 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2787 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2792 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2795 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2798 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2801 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2803 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2805 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2807 route.write(writer)?;
2808 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2809 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2816 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2817 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2818 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2819 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2820 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2821 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2822 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2823 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2825 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2830 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2831 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2833 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2837 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2839 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2840 data.write(writer)?;
2847 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2848 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2849 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2850 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2851 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2852 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2853 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2855 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2860 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2861 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2863 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2865 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2866 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2867 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2869 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2871 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2872 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2879 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2880 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2881 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2882 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2883 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2884 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2885 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2887 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2889 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2891 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2896 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2897 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2898 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2900 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2901 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2903 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2904 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2905 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2907 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2909 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2910 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2911 unfunded_channels += 1;
2914 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2915 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2916 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2917 channel.write(writer)?;
2921 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2922 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2923 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2924 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2925 for forward in pending_forwards {
2926 forward.write(writer)?;
2930 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2931 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2932 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2933 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2934 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2935 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2936 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2944 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2946 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2948 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2949 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2950 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2951 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2952 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2953 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2954 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2955 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2956 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2957 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2958 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2959 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2960 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2961 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2962 /// deserialization.
2963 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2965 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2967 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2968 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2969 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2971 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2972 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2973 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2974 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2975 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2977 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2978 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2979 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2980 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2981 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2982 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2983 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2984 /// deserialization.
2985 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2986 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2987 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2988 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2990 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2991 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2993 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2994 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
2995 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2996 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2998 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3000 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3003 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3004 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3005 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3006 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3007 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3008 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3011 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3012 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3013 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3015 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3017 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3018 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3019 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3020 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3021 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3022 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3023 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3024 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3027 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3028 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3029 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3030 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3031 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3032 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3033 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3034 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3035 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3037 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3038 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3040 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3043 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3047 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3048 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3049 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3053 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3054 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3055 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3056 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3058 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3059 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3060 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3062 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3065 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3066 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3067 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3068 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3069 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3070 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3071 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3072 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3074 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3077 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3079 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3080 monitor: args.monitor,
3081 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3082 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3084 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3085 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3086 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3088 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3091 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3094 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3096 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3098 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3099 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3100 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3101 logger: args.logger,
3102 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3105 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3106 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3107 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3108 //connection or two.
3111 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))