1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
35 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
65 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
66 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
68 short_channel_id: u64,
69 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
70 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
75 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
76 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
79 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
82 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
86 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
87 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
88 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
89 short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
97 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
100 session_priv: SecretKey,
101 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
102 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
103 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
108 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
110 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
111 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
112 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
120 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
129 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
130 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
131 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
132 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
133 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
135 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
137 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
138 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
139 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
140 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
141 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
168 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
170 shutdown_finish: None,
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
178 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
183 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
185 data: err.to_string()
189 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
193 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
198 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: msg.to_string()
210 shutdown_finish: None,
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
223 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
225 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
229 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
233 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
234 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
235 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
236 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
238 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
239 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
241 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
245 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
246 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
247 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
250 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
251 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
252 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
253 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
254 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
255 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
256 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
258 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
259 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
260 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
261 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
263 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
264 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
265 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
266 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
268 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
269 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
272 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
274 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
275 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
276 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
277 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
278 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
279 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
311 pub struct ChannelManager {
312 default_configuration: UserConfig,
313 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
314 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
315 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
316 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
317 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
320 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
327 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
329 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 our_network_key: SecretKey,
332 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
333 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
334 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
335 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
336 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
338 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
343 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
344 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
345 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
346 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
347 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
348 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
349 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
351 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
352 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
353 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
354 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
355 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
358 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
360 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
361 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
364 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
366 macro_rules! secp_call {
367 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
370 Err(_) => return Err($err),
375 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
376 pub struct ChannelDetails {
377 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
378 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
379 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
380 /// lifetime of the channel.
381 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
382 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
383 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
384 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
385 /// The node_id of our counterparty
386 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
387 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
388 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
389 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
393 macro_rules! handle_error {
394 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
397 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
398 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
399 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
400 if let Some(update) = update_option {
401 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
402 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
413 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
414 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
417 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
418 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
420 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
421 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
422 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
423 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
424 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
426 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
432 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
433 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
436 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
439 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
440 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
441 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
442 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
443 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
445 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
451 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
453 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
455 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
457 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
458 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
459 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
460 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
462 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
463 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
464 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
465 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
466 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
467 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
468 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
469 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
470 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
473 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
474 if !$resend_commitment {
475 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
478 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
480 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
487 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
488 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
489 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
491 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
492 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
493 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
494 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
496 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
499 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
505 impl ChannelManager {
506 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
508 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
509 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
511 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
513 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
514 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
515 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
517 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
518 default_configuration: config.clone(),
519 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
520 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
521 monitor: monitor.clone(),
525 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
526 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
529 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
530 by_id: HashMap::new(),
531 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
532 next_forward: Instant::now(),
533 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
534 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
535 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
537 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
539 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
540 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
546 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
547 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
551 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
553 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
554 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
555 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
556 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
558 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
559 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
561 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
562 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
563 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
564 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
568 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
569 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
571 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
572 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
573 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
575 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
578 panic!("RNG is bad???");
581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
583 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
584 node_id: their_network_key,
590 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
591 /// more information.
592 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
593 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
594 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
595 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
596 res.push(ChannelDetails {
597 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
598 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
599 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
600 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
601 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
607 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
608 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
609 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
610 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
611 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
612 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
613 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
614 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
615 // really wanted anyway.
616 if channel.is_live() {
617 res.push(ChannelDetails {
618 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
619 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
620 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
621 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
622 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
629 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
630 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
631 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
633 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
634 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
635 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
637 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
638 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
639 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
640 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
642 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
643 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
644 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
647 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
648 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
649 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
651 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
652 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
657 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
660 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
661 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
666 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
667 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
677 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
678 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
679 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
680 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
683 for tx in local_txn {
684 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
688 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
689 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
690 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
691 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
694 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
695 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
696 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
697 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
698 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
705 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
706 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
707 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
708 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
715 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
716 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
717 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
718 for chan in self.list_channels() {
719 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
723 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
724 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
725 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
726 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
728 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
729 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
730 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
731 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
732 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
733 failure_code: $err_code,
734 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
739 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
740 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
743 let shared_secret = {
744 let mut arr = [0; 32];
745 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
748 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
750 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
751 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
752 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
753 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
754 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
755 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
756 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
757 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
760 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
761 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
762 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
763 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
764 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
767 let mut channel_state = None;
768 macro_rules! return_err {
769 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
771 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
772 if channel_state.is_none() {
773 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
775 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
776 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
777 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
778 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
779 })), channel_state.unwrap());
784 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
785 let next_hop_data = {
786 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
787 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
788 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
790 let error_code = match err {
791 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
792 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
794 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
800 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
802 // final_expiry_too_soon
803 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
804 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
806 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
807 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
808 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
810 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
811 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
812 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
815 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
816 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
817 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
818 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
820 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
822 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
824 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
825 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
826 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
829 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
830 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
831 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
833 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
835 let blinding_factor = {
836 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
837 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
838 sha.input(&shared_secret);
839 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
842 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
844 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
846 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
849 hop_data: new_packet_data,
850 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
853 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
854 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
855 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
856 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
857 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
858 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
859 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
863 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
864 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
865 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
866 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
867 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
868 None => { // unknown_next_peer
869 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
871 Some(id) => id.clone(),
873 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
874 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
876 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
877 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
878 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
879 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
880 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
881 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
882 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
884 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
885 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
887 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
888 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
889 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
891 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
892 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
894 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
895 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
896 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
897 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
899 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
900 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
905 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
906 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
907 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
908 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
910 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
911 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
913 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
914 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
916 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
918 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
923 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
926 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
927 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
928 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
929 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
930 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
934 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
936 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
937 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
938 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
939 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
940 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
941 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
942 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
943 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
944 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
945 excess_data: Vec::new(),
948 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
949 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
951 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
957 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
959 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
960 /// fields for more info.
962 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
963 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
964 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
965 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
966 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
967 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
969 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
971 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
972 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
973 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
974 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
975 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
976 /// relevant updates.
978 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
979 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
980 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
981 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
982 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
983 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
984 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
985 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
987 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
988 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
989 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
990 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
994 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
996 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
998 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
999 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1000 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1001 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1003 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1005 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1006 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1008 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1009 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1010 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1013 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1014 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1016 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1017 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1019 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1022 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1023 route: route.clone(),
1024 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1025 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1026 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1028 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1029 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1030 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1031 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1032 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1033 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1034 // something else in case we will resend later!
1035 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1038 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1039 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1040 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1041 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1042 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1043 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1044 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1052 } else { unreachable!(); }
1056 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1057 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1059 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1061 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1062 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1063 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1064 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1068 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1073 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1075 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1076 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1078 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1080 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1081 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1082 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1083 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1085 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1087 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1088 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1090 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1091 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1092 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1093 } else { unreachable!(); })
1099 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1100 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1101 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1104 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1105 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1107 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1114 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1115 // lock before add_update_monitor
1116 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1120 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1121 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1122 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1127 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1135 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1136 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1138 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1140 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1142 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1143 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1145 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1146 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1147 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1148 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1149 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1153 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1155 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1156 /// Will likely generate further events.
1157 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1158 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1160 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1161 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1163 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1164 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1166 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1170 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1171 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1172 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1173 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1175 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1176 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1177 match forward_info {
1178 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1179 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1180 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1181 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1182 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1184 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1186 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1187 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1188 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1189 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1190 // problem, not ours.
1197 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1199 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1200 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1201 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1202 match forward_info {
1203 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1204 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1205 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1206 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1207 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1208 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1210 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1212 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1213 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1215 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1217 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1218 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1223 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1225 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1226 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1227 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1228 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1229 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1230 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1231 // this channel currently :/.
1237 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1238 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1239 match forward_chan.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1241 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1242 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1244 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1246 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1247 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1248 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1251 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1253 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1254 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1255 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1256 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1257 // messages when we can.
1258 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1259 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1260 // update_fail_htlc in time, its not our problem.
1267 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1268 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1271 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1272 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1274 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1278 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1282 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1283 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1284 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1285 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1286 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1287 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1289 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1294 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1295 match forward_info {
1296 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1297 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1298 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1299 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1300 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1302 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1306 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1307 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1308 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1311 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1312 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1320 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1322 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1323 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1327 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1328 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1329 events.append(&mut new_events);
1332 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1333 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1334 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1335 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1336 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1337 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1339 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1340 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1341 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1342 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1343 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1344 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1345 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1346 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1352 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1353 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1354 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1355 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1356 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1357 /// still-available channels.
1358 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1359 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1360 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1361 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1364 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1365 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1366 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1367 match &onion_error {
1368 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1370 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1372 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1373 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1374 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1375 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1376 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1377 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1378 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1383 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1384 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1385 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1386 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1388 error_code: onion_error_code
1392 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1396 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1397 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1398 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1399 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1401 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1402 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1403 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1404 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1405 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1406 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1408 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1414 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1415 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1416 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1417 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1418 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1419 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1421 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1422 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1423 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1427 let mut forward_event = None;
1428 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1429 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1430 channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1432 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1434 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1437 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1440 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1441 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1442 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1443 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1444 time_forwardable: time
1451 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1452 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1453 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1455 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1456 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1457 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1459 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1461 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1462 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1463 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1464 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1465 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1466 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1471 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1473 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1474 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1475 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1476 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1481 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1482 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1484 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1485 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1487 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1488 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1494 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1495 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1496 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1497 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1498 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1499 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1502 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1504 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1505 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1506 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1507 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1508 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1509 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1517 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1518 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1519 //TODO: Do something with e?
1527 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1528 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1529 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1532 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1533 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1535 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1536 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1537 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1538 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1539 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1542 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1543 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1544 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1545 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1546 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1547 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1548 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1549 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1551 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1552 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1553 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1554 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1555 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1556 // on-chain confirmations.
1557 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1558 // should be written.
1559 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1560 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1562 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1563 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1570 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1573 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1574 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1575 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1577 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1579 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1580 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1581 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1582 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1587 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1588 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1589 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1590 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1591 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1596 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1600 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1611 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1612 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1614 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1616 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1617 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1621 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1622 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1626 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1627 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1629 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1630 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1634 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1635 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1637 entry.insert(channel);
1643 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1644 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1646 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1649 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1650 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1653 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1654 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1656 //TODO: same as above
1657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1660 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1661 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1662 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1663 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1664 output_script: output_script,
1665 user_channel_id: user_id,
1670 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1671 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1672 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1673 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1674 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1676 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1677 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1680 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1685 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1686 // lock before add_update_monitor
1687 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1692 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1694 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1698 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1707 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1709 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1710 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1711 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1713 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1714 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1717 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1718 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1721 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1726 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1727 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1728 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1729 user_channel_id: user_id,
1734 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1736 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1739 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1740 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1743 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1744 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1745 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1746 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1747 msg: announcement_sigs,
1752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1756 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1757 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1758 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1761 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1763 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1764 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1767 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1768 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1770 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1774 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1775 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1776 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1780 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1781 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1782 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1784 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1785 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1790 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1791 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1793 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1794 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1795 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1804 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1806 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1807 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1810 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1811 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1814 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1815 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1817 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1822 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1823 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1824 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1825 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1826 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1827 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1828 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1830 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1831 } else { (tx, None) }
1833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1836 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1837 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1839 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1840 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1841 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1850 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1851 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1852 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1853 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1855 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1856 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1857 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1858 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1860 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1861 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1865 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1866 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1869 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1870 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1871 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1872 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1873 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1874 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1875 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1876 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1877 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1878 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1879 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1880 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1881 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1882 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1884 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1885 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1886 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1887 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1891 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1892 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1893 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1894 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1895 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1896 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1901 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1903 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1908 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1909 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1911 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1912 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1914 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1915 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1918 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1923 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1927 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1928 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1929 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1932 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1933 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1936 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
1938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1943 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1944 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1945 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1946 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1948 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1949 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1952 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
1953 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
1955 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
1958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1962 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1964 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1967 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1968 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1971 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
1972 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
1973 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1974 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
1975 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
1977 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1978 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1979 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1981 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
1982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1983 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1984 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1985 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1986 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1987 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1988 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1990 commitment_signed: msg,
1994 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1996 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2007 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2008 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2009 let mut forward_event = None;
2010 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2013 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2014 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2016 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2017 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2019 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2022 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2027 match forward_event {
2029 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2030 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2031 time_forwardable: time
2039 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2040 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2041 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2042 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2045 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2046 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2049 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2050 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2051 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2052 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2053 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2054 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2057 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2060 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2061 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2062 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2066 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2068 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2072 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2077 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2080 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2085 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2086 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2087 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2088 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2090 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2091 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2094 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2101 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2103 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2105 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2107 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2110 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2111 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2114 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2115 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2116 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2118 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2119 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2120 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2121 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2122 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2125 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2127 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2128 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2129 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2130 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2131 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2132 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2133 contents: announcement,
2135 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2143 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2144 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2145 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2147 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2149 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2152 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2153 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2154 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2155 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2156 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2157 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2158 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2159 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2160 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2162 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2163 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2165 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2166 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2169 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2171 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2175 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2176 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2177 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2178 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2183 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2184 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2185 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2186 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2192 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2196 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2201 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2202 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2203 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2213 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2214 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2215 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2216 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2218 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2219 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2221 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2222 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2223 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2225 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2228 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2229 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2231 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2232 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2234 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2235 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2237 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2238 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2239 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2241 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2245 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2246 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2247 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2248 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2249 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2250 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2251 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2261 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2262 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2264 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2266 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2267 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2269 node_id: their_node_id,
2273 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2279 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2280 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2281 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2282 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2283 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2285 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2286 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2287 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2288 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2289 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2291 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2297 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2298 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2299 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2304 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2305 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2306 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2307 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2308 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2310 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2311 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2312 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2313 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2314 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2316 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2317 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2322 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2323 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2324 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2329 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2330 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2331 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2332 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2333 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2334 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2336 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2337 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2338 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2339 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2340 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2341 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2342 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2344 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2345 msg: funding_locked,
2347 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2349 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2350 msg: announcement_sigs,
2353 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2354 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2355 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2356 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2357 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2361 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2362 for tx in txn_matched {
2363 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2364 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2365 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2366 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2367 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2369 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2370 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2371 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2372 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2373 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2374 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2383 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2384 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2385 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2387 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2388 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2389 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2390 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2391 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2392 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2402 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2403 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2405 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2406 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2409 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2410 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2411 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2412 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2414 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2415 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2416 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2417 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2418 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2419 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2420 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2421 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2423 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2424 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2435 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2436 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2438 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2439 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2443 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2444 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2445 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2446 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2447 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2450 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2451 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2452 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
2455 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2456 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2457 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2460 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2462 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2465 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2466 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2467 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2470 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2471 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2472 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2475 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2476 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2477 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2480 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2481 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2482 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2485 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2486 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2487 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2490 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2491 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2492 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2495 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2496 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2497 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2500 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2501 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2502 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2505 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2506 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2507 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2510 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2511 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2512 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2515 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2516 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2517 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2520 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2521 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2522 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2525 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2526 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2527 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2528 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2531 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2532 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2533 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2534 if no_connection_possible {
2535 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2536 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2537 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2538 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2539 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2541 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2543 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2553 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2554 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2555 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2556 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2557 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2558 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2559 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2560 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2562 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2563 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2564 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2573 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2574 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2576 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2577 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2578 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2583 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2584 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2586 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2588 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2589 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2590 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2591 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2592 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2593 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2594 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2595 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2599 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2600 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2601 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2607 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2610 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2611 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2613 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2614 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2615 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2616 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2620 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2625 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2626 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2628 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2629 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2630 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2631 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2632 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2633 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2634 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2635 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2640 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2641 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2642 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2643 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2644 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2645 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2646 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2647 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2648 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2653 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2654 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2656 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2658 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2660 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2662 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2669 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2670 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2671 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2672 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2673 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2674 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2679 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2680 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2682 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2684 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2686 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2688 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2695 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2696 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2697 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2698 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2699 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2700 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2705 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2708 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2711 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2712 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2714 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2716 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2718 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2720 route.write(writer)?;
2721 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2722 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2729 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2730 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2731 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2732 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2733 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2734 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2735 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2736 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2738 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2743 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2744 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2746 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2750 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2752 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2753 data.write(writer)?;
2760 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2761 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2762 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2763 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2764 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2765 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2766 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2768 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2773 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2774 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2776 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2778 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2779 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2780 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2782 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2784 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2785 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2792 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2793 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2794 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2795 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2796 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2797 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2798 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2800 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2801 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2802 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2804 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2809 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2810 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2813 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2814 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2816 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2817 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2818 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2820 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2821 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2822 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2823 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2824 unfunded_channels += 1;
2827 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2828 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2829 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2830 channel.write(writer)?;
2834 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2835 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2836 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2837 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2838 for forward in pending_forwards {
2839 forward.write(writer)?;
2843 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2844 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2845 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2846 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2847 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2848 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2856 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2858 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2860 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2861 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2862 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2863 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2864 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2865 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2866 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2867 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2868 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2869 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2870 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2871 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2872 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2873 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2874 /// deserialization.
2875 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2877 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2879 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2880 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2881 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2883 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2884 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2885 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2886 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2887 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2889 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2890 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2891 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2892 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2893 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2894 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2895 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2896 /// deserialization.
2897 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2898 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2899 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2900 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2902 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2903 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2905 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2906 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
2907 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2908 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2910 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2912 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2915 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2916 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2917 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2918 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2919 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2920 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2923 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2924 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2925 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2927 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
2929 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2930 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2931 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2932 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2933 for _ in 0..channel_count {
2934 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
2935 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
2936 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2939 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2940 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
2941 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
2942 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
2943 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
2944 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
2945 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
2946 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
2947 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
2949 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2950 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
2952 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
2955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2959 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
2960 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
2961 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
2965 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2966 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2967 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
2968 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2969 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2970 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
2971 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
2972 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2974 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
2977 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2978 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2979 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
2980 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2981 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2982 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
2983 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
2984 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2986 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
2989 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
2991 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
2992 monitor: args.monitor,
2993 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
2994 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
2996 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
2997 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
2998 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3000 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3003 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3006 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3008 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3010 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3011 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3012 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3013 logger: args.logger,
3014 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3017 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3018 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3019 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3020 //connection or two.
3023 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))