1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
33 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
34 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
35 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
37 mod channel_held_info {
40 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
41 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
42 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
43 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
44 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
46 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
47 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
50 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
51 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
52 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
55 payment_hash: [0; 32],
57 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
59 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
67 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
75 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
77 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
78 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
79 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
84 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
85 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
86 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
87 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
89 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
91 source_short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
96 session_priv: SecretKey,
98 /// Used for channel rebalancing
100 source_short_channel_id: u64,
101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
103 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
108 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
109 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
110 /// probably increase this significantly.
111 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
113 struct ChannelHolder {
114 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
115 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
116 next_forward: Instant,
117 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
118 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
119 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
120 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
121 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
122 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
123 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
125 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
127 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
128 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
129 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
130 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
131 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
132 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
135 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
137 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
138 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
139 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
140 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
141 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
146 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
147 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
149 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
150 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
151 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
152 /// to individual Channels.
153 pub struct ChannelManager {
154 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
155 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
156 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
157 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
158 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
160 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
161 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
162 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
165 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
166 our_network_key: SecretKey,
168 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
171 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
173 macro_rules! secp_call {
177 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
178 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
185 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
187 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
188 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
193 pub struct ChannelDetails {
194 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
195 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
196 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
197 /// lifetime of the channel.
198 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
199 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
200 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
201 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
202 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
203 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
204 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
208 impl ChannelManager {
209 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
210 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
211 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
212 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
213 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
214 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
217 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
218 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
219 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
220 monitor: monitor.clone(),
224 announce_channels_publicly,
225 fee_proportional_millionths,
226 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
229 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
230 by_id: HashMap::new(),
231 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
232 next_forward: Instant::now(),
233 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
234 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
238 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
240 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
241 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
245 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
246 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
247 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
248 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
249 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
250 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
251 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
252 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
253 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
255 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
256 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
257 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
258 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
259 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
260 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
261 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
262 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
265 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
266 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
267 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
269 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
273 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
274 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
275 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
276 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
277 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
281 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
282 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
283 node_id: their_network_key,
289 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
290 /// more information.
291 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
292 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
293 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
294 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
295 res.push(ChannelDetails {
296 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
297 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
298 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
299 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
300 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
306 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
307 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
308 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
309 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
310 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
311 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
312 if channel.is_usable() {
313 res.push(ChannelDetails {
314 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
315 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
316 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
317 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
318 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
325 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
326 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
327 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
328 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
329 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
330 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
331 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
332 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
333 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
335 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
336 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
337 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
338 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
340 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
341 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
346 for payment_hash in res.1 {
347 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
350 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
351 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
356 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
357 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
358 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
362 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
371 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
372 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
373 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
374 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
375 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
377 for tx in local_txn {
378 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
380 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
381 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
382 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
383 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
384 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
387 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
388 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
389 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
392 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
393 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
394 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
395 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
402 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
403 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
404 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
405 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
412 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
414 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
415 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
416 let mut res = [0; 32];
417 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
421 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
422 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
423 let mut res = [0; 32];
424 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
430 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
431 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
432 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
433 let mut res = [0; 32];
434 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
439 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
440 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
441 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
442 let mut res = [0; 32];
443 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
447 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
449 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
450 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
451 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
452 let mut first_iteration = true;
454 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
455 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
457 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
458 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
459 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
460 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
461 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
464 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
465 first_iteration = false;
467 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
469 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
470 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
472 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
478 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
479 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
480 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
482 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
483 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
489 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
499 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
500 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
501 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
502 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
503 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
504 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
505 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
506 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
508 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
509 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
510 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
511 // the intended recipient).
512 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
513 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
514 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
516 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
517 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
518 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
519 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
523 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
524 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
525 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
527 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
528 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
529 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
531 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
533 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
537 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
539 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
547 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
548 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
550 for i in 0..dst.len() {
555 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
556 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
557 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
558 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
561 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
562 let end_len = iters * 65;
563 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
564 res.resize(end_len, 0);
566 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
567 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
568 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
569 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
570 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
575 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
576 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
578 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
579 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
580 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
581 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
583 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
584 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
585 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
588 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
591 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
592 hmac.input(&packet_data);
593 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
594 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
597 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
599 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
600 hop_data: packet_data,
605 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
606 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
607 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
608 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
610 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
611 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
612 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
613 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
614 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
615 data: packet_crypted,
619 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
620 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
622 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
625 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
626 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
627 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
628 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
632 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
633 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
636 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
638 failuremsg: failuremsg,
642 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
643 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
644 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
650 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
651 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
652 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
655 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
656 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
657 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
658 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
662 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
664 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
665 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
666 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
667 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
668 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
669 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
670 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
671 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
672 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
675 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
676 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
678 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
684 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
685 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
686 /// fields for more info.
687 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
688 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
689 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
690 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
691 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
692 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
693 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
694 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
695 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
696 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
697 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
699 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
700 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
701 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
702 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
706 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
707 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
708 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
712 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
714 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
715 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
716 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
718 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
720 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
722 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
723 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
724 Some(id) => id.clone()
727 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
728 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
729 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
733 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
734 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
735 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
737 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
740 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
742 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
748 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
749 None => return Ok(()),
753 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
754 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
757 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
758 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
759 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
760 msgs: vec![update_add],
761 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
766 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
767 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
768 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
769 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
772 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
773 pending_events.push($event);
778 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
780 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
782 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
784 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
787 mem::drop(channel_state);
788 add_pending_event!(events::Event::DisconnectPeer {
789 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
790 msg: if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } ) = e.action { msg } else { None },
799 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
800 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
801 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
803 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
804 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
808 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
809 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
812 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
813 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
815 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
816 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
817 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
819 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
820 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
821 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
822 node_signature: our_node_sig,
823 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
827 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
828 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
829 /// Will likely generate further events.
830 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
831 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
832 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
835 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
837 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
841 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
842 if short_chan_id != 0 {
843 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
844 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
846 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
847 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
848 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
853 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
855 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
856 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
857 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
859 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
860 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
865 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
867 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
868 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
869 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
870 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
871 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
872 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
873 // this channel currently :/.
880 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
881 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
884 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
888 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
889 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
891 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
895 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
896 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
897 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
898 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
905 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
906 match failed_forward.2 {
907 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
908 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
912 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
914 new_events.retain(|event| {
915 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
916 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
917 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
923 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
924 events.reserve(new_events.len());
925 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
926 events.push(event.1);
930 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
931 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
932 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
935 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
936 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
937 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
938 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
939 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
940 /// still-available channels.
941 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
942 let mut pending_htlc = {
943 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
944 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
945 None => return false,
950 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
951 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
955 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
961 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
962 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
963 mem::drop(channel_state);
965 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
966 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
967 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
971 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
972 let err_packet = match onion_error {
973 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
974 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
975 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
977 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
978 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
982 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
983 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
984 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
988 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
989 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
990 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
992 //TODO: Do something with e?
999 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1000 mem::drop(channel_state);
1002 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1003 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1006 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1007 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
1010 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
1021 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1022 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1023 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1024 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1025 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1026 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1028 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1029 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1030 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1031 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1032 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1034 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1035 let mut pending_htlc = {
1036 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1037 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1038 None => return false,
1042 match pending_htlc {
1043 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1044 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1045 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1046 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1047 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1048 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1049 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1050 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1056 match pending_htlc {
1057 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1058 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1060 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1062 mem::drop(channel_state);
1063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1064 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1069 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1070 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1071 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1072 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1074 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1075 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1081 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1082 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1083 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1085 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1086 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1087 //TODO: Do something with e?
1093 mem::drop(channel_state);
1094 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1095 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1096 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1100 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1102 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1113 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1114 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1115 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1118 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1119 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1121 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1126 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1127 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1128 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1129 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1130 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1135 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1136 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1137 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1138 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1140 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1141 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1142 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1143 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1144 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1145 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1148 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1152 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1153 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1154 msg: funding_locked,
1155 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1157 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1159 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1160 for tx in txn_matched {
1161 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1162 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1163 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1164 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1166 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1167 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1168 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1169 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1170 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1171 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1180 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1181 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1182 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1184 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1185 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1186 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1187 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1188 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1189 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1190 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1199 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1200 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1202 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1203 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1204 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1206 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1209 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1210 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1211 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1212 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1214 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1216 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1217 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1218 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1219 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1220 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1222 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1223 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1224 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1234 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1235 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1237 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1238 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1239 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1240 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1243 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1247 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1248 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1249 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1250 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1251 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1253 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1254 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1255 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1258 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1260 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1261 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1262 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1263 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1264 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1265 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1266 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1267 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1270 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1271 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1272 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1274 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1278 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1279 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1280 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1284 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1285 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1286 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1287 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1289 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1290 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1292 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1293 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1295 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1298 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1299 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1300 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1301 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1302 output_script: output_script,
1303 user_channel_id: user_id,
1308 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1309 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1310 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1311 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1312 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1313 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1314 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1316 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1317 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1319 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1320 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1321 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1328 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1330 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1331 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1332 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1333 // for a bogus channel.
1334 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1342 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1343 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1344 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1345 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1347 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1348 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1350 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1351 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1353 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1356 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1359 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1360 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1361 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1362 user_channel_id: user_id,
1367 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1368 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1369 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1371 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1372 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1374 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1375 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1377 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1381 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1382 let (res, chan_option) = {
1383 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1384 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1388 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1389 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1391 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1392 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1393 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1394 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1396 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1397 } else { (res, None) }
1399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1402 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1403 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1406 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1407 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1408 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1409 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1417 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1418 let (res, chan_option) = {
1419 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1420 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1423 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1424 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1426 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1427 if res.1.is_some() {
1428 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1429 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1430 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1431 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1432 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1433 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1434 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1436 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1437 } else { (res, None) }
1439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1442 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1443 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1445 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1446 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1447 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1448 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1456 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1457 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1458 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1459 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1461 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1462 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1463 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1464 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1466 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1467 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1469 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1472 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1473 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1474 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1475 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1481 macro_rules! return_err {
1482 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1483 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1485 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1486 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1487 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1488 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1489 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1496 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1497 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1498 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1499 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1500 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1501 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1502 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1503 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1506 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1507 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1508 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1509 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1510 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1513 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1514 let next_hop_data = {
1515 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1516 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1517 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1519 let error_code = match err {
1520 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1521 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1523 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1529 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
1531 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1533 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1534 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1536 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1537 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1540 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1541 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1542 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1543 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1545 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1547 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1548 short_channel_id: 0,
1549 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1550 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1551 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1554 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1555 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1556 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1558 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1560 let blinding_factor = {
1561 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1562 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1563 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1564 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1565 sha.result(&mut res);
1566 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1568 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1570 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1576 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1578 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1580 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1585 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1587 public_key: new_pubkey,
1588 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1589 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1592 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1594 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1595 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1596 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1597 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1598 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1599 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1600 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1604 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1605 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1607 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1608 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1610 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1612 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1614 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1615 if !chan.is_live() {
1616 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1617 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1621 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1623 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1624 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1625 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1626 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1627 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1628 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1629 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1631 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1632 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1636 if !acceptable_cycle {
1637 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1643 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1645 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1646 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1648 if !chan.is_usable() {
1649 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1651 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1652 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1653 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1655 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1658 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1660 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1661 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1662 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1663 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1665 _ => unreachable!(),
1667 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1668 source_short_channel_id,
1669 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1675 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1676 source_short_channel_id,
1677 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1685 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1686 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1687 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1688 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1689 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1692 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1693 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1695 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1696 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1698 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1700 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1703 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1709 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1711 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1713 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1714 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1716 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1718 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1721 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1722 match pending_htlc {
1723 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1724 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1725 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1727 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1728 if res.is_some() { return; }
1730 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1732 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1733 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1734 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1735 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1736 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1738 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1739 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1740 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1742 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1743 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1744 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1745 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1746 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1747 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1748 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1749 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1750 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1751 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1752 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1753 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1754 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1755 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1763 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1764 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1765 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1766 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1769 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1784 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1785 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1786 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1788 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1789 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1791 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1793 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1797 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1798 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1799 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1800 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1802 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1803 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1805 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1807 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1810 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1814 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1817 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1818 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1819 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1822 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1823 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1825 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1827 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1830 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1833 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1837 let mut forward_event = None;
1838 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1839 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1840 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1841 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1842 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1844 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1845 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1847 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1850 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1855 match forward_event {
1857 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1858 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1859 time_forwardable: time
1868 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1869 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1870 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1872 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1873 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1875 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1877 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1881 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1882 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1883 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1884 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1886 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1887 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1889 if !chan.is_usable() {
1890 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1893 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1894 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1896 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1897 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1898 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1899 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1901 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1903 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1904 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1905 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1906 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1907 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1908 contents: announcement,
1909 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1911 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1914 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1915 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1919 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1920 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1921 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1923 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1924 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1925 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1926 if no_connection_possible {
1927 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1928 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1929 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1930 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1932 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
1933 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1934 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1944 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1945 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1946 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1947 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1953 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1954 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1956 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1957 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1958 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1959 pending_events.push(event);
1967 use chain::chaininterface;
1968 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1969 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1970 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1971 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1973 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1974 use util::test_utils;
1975 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1977 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1978 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
1979 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1980 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1981 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1982 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1986 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1987 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1989 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1990 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1992 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1994 use std::collections::HashMap;
1995 use std::default::Default;
1996 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1997 use std::time::Instant;
2000 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2001 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2007 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2008 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2011 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2012 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2015 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2016 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2019 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2020 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2023 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2024 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2029 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2031 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2032 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2037 fn onion_vectors() {
2038 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2039 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2041 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2042 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2043 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2044 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2045 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2047 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2048 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2049 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2050 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2051 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2053 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2054 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2055 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2056 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2057 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2059 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2060 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2061 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2062 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2063 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2065 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2066 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2067 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2068 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2069 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2071 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2072 let payloads = vec!(
2073 msgs::OnionHopData {
2075 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2076 short_channel_id: 0,
2078 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2082 msgs::OnionHopData {
2084 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2085 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2086 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2087 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2091 msgs::OnionHopData {
2093 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2094 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2095 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2096 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2100 msgs::OnionHopData {
2102 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2103 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2104 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2105 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2109 msgs::OnionHopData {
2111 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2112 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2113 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2114 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2120 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2121 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2123 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
2127 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2128 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2130 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2131 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2132 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
2134 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2135 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2137 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2138 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2140 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2141 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2143 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2144 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2146 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2147 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2150 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2151 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2152 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2153 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2155 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2156 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2161 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2162 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2163 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2164 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2166 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2170 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2171 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2172 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2174 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2175 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2176 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2177 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2178 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2179 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2184 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2186 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2190 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2191 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2193 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2194 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2195 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2197 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2198 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2200 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2202 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2203 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2204 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2205 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2206 added_monitors.clear();
2208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2211 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2212 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2213 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2214 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2215 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2216 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2217 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2218 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2219 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2220 added_monitors.clear();
2223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2226 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2228 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2229 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2230 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2231 added_monitors.clear();
2234 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2235 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2237 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2238 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2239 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2244 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2245 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2246 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2248 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2249 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2251 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2258 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2259 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2260 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2261 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2262 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2263 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2264 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2265 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2266 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2267 as_announcement_sigs
2269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2272 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2273 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2274 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2275 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2281 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2282 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2283 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2284 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2285 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2286 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2296 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2299 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2300 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2302 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2303 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2304 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2306 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2309 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2310 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2311 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2314 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2315 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2316 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2317 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2318 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2319 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2325 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2326 if !close_inbound_first {
2327 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2329 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2330 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2331 if close_inbound_first {
2332 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2333 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2334 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2335 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2337 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2338 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2339 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2340 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2342 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2343 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2344 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2346 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2347 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2348 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2349 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2351 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2352 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2353 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2354 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2356 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2357 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2358 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2359 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2365 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2366 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2367 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2368 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2374 (as_update, bs_update)
2379 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2380 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2383 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2385 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2386 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2393 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2394 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2395 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2396 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2397 let our_payment_hash = {
2398 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2399 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2400 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2401 sha.result(&mut ret);
2405 let mut payment_event = {
2406 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2408 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2409 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2410 added_monitors.clear();
2413 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2415 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2417 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2419 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2420 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2422 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2424 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2425 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2428 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2430 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2431 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2432 added_monitors.clear();
2434 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2435 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2437 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2438 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2439 added_monitors.clear();
2441 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2442 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2444 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2445 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2446 added_monitors.clear();
2449 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2450 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2452 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2456 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2457 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2459 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2460 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2461 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2463 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2464 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2465 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2471 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2472 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2473 added_monitors.clear();
2475 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2476 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2482 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2485 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2486 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2488 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2490 added_monitors.clear();
2493 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2494 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2495 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2497 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2499 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2501 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2503 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2504 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2506 added_monitors.clear();
2508 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2510 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2511 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2512 added_monitors.clear();
2514 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2515 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2516 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2518 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2519 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2520 added_monitors.clear();
2522 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2524 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2525 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2526 added_monitors.clear();
2532 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2533 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2534 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2535 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2536 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2537 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2540 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2543 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2544 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2545 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2547 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2553 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2554 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2556 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2559 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2560 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2566 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2568 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2569 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2570 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2571 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2572 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2575 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2578 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2579 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2580 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2581 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2582 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2585 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2586 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2587 let our_payment_hash = {
2588 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2589 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2590 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2591 sha.result(&mut ret);
2595 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2596 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2599 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2600 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2601 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2604 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2605 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2607 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2608 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2609 added_monitors.clear();
2612 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2613 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2614 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2616 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2617 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2620 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2621 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2622 added_monitors.clear();
2624 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2626 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2628 added_monitors.clear();
2630 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2632 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2633 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2634 added_monitors.clear();
2636 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2637 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2638 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2640 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2642 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2644 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2645 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2647 added_monitors.clear();
2653 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2654 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2655 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2656 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2657 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2658 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2661 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2662 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2664 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2665 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2666 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2675 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2677 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2678 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2680 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2681 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2687 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2688 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2689 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2692 for _ in 0..node_count {
2693 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2694 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2695 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2696 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2698 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2699 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2700 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2702 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2703 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2704 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2711 fn fake_network_test() {
2712 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2713 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2714 let nodes = create_network(4);
2716 // Create some initial channels
2717 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2719 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2721 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2722 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2723 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2724 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2725 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2727 // Send some more payments
2728 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2729 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2730 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2732 // Test failure packets
2733 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2734 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2736 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2737 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2739 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2740 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2741 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2742 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2743 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2744 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2745 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2747 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2748 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2749 hops.push(RouteHop {
2750 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2751 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2753 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2755 hops.push(RouteHop {
2756 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2757 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2759 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2761 hops.push(RouteHop {
2762 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2763 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2765 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2767 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2768 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2769 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2771 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2772 hops.push(RouteHop {
2773 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2774 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2776 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2778 hops.push(RouteHop {
2779 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2780 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2782 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2784 hops.push(RouteHop {
2785 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2786 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2788 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2790 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2791 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2792 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2794 // Claim the rebalances...
2795 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2796 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2798 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2799 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2801 // Send some payments across both channels
2802 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2803 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2804 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2806 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2808 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2810 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2811 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2812 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2814 // Close down the channels...
2815 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2816 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2817 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2818 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2819 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2821 // Check that we processed all pending events
2823 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2824 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2828 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2829 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2830 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2831 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2832 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2834 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2836 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2837 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2839 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2840 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2841 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2842 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2843 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2844 res.push(tx.clone());
2848 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2850 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2851 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2852 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2853 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2854 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2855 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2856 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2857 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2859 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2861 res.push(tx.clone());
2865 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2871 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2872 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2874 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2875 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2876 let mut found_prev = false;
2878 for tx in prev_txn {
2879 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2880 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2881 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2882 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2884 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2885 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2891 assert!(found_prev);
2893 let mut res = Vec::new();
2894 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2898 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2899 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2900 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2901 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2902 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2908 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2909 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2910 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2911 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2919 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2924 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2925 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2926 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2927 let nodes = create_network(5);
2929 // Create some initial channels
2930 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2931 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2932 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2933 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2935 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2936 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2937 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2938 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2939 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2941 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2942 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2944 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2945 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2946 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2947 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2949 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2951 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2953 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2954 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2956 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2957 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2959 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2960 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2961 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2962 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2964 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2966 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2968 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2969 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2971 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2973 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2974 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2975 added_monitors.clear();
2978 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2981 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2982 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2990 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2991 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2992 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2994 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2996 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2997 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2999 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3000 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3002 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3004 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3005 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3006 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3008 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3009 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3012 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3013 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3014 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3015 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3016 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3019 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3021 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3022 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3024 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3025 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3026 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3027 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3028 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3031 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3033 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3034 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3036 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3038 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3039 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3040 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3042 // Create some new channels:
3043 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3045 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3046 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3047 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3048 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3049 // Revoke the old state
3050 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3053 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3054 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3056 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3057 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3058 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3060 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3061 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3062 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3063 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3065 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3067 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3068 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3069 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3070 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3072 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3073 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3075 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3076 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3077 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3079 // Check that we processed all pending events
3081 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3082 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3087 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3088 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3089 let nodes = create_network(2);
3090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3092 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3093 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3094 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3095 mem::drop(channel_state);
3097 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3098 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3099 headers.push(header.clone());
3101 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3102 headers.push(header.clone());
3104 while !headers.is_empty() {
3105 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3107 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3108 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3109 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);