1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
33 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
34 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
35 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
37 mod channel_held_info {
40 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
41 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
42 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
43 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
44 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
46 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
47 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
50 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
51 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
52 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
55 payment_hash: [0; 32],
57 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
59 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
67 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
75 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
77 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
78 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
79 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
84 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
85 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
86 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
87 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
89 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
91 source_short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
96 session_priv: SecretKey,
98 /// Used for channel rebalancing
100 source_short_channel_id: u64,
101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
103 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
108 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
109 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
110 /// probably increase this significantly.
111 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
113 struct ChannelHolder {
114 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
115 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
116 next_forward: Instant,
117 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
118 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
119 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
121 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
122 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
123 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
124 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
125 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
126 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
127 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
130 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
132 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
133 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
134 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
135 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
136 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
137 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
142 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
143 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
144 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
145 /// to individual Channels.
146 pub struct ChannelManager {
147 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
148 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
149 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
150 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
151 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
153 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
154 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
155 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, //TODO: Compile-time assert this is at least 32-bits long
158 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
159 our_network_key: SecretKey,
161 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
164 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
166 macro_rules! secp_call {
170 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
171 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
178 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
180 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
181 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
186 pub struct ChannelDetails {
187 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
188 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
189 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
190 /// lifetime of the channel.
191 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
192 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
193 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
194 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
195 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
196 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
197 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
201 impl ChannelManager {
202 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
203 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
204 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
205 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
206 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
207 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
210 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
211 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
212 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
213 monitor: monitor.clone(),
217 announce_channels_publicly,
218 fee_proportional_millionths,
219 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
222 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
223 by_id: HashMap::new(),
224 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
225 next_forward: Instant::now(),
226 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
227 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
231 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
233 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
234 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
238 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
239 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
240 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
241 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
242 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
243 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
244 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
245 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
246 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
248 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
249 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
250 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
251 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
252 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
253 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
254 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
255 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
258 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
259 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
260 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
262 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
266 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
267 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
268 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
269 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
270 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
274 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
275 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
276 node_id: their_network_key,
282 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
283 /// more information.
284 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
285 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
286 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
287 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
288 res.push(ChannelDetails {
289 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
290 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
291 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
292 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
293 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
299 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
300 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
301 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
302 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
303 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
304 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
305 if channel.is_usable() {
306 res.push(ChannelDetails {
307 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
308 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
309 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
310 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
311 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
318 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
319 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
320 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
321 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
322 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
323 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
324 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
325 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
326 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
328 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
329 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
330 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
331 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
333 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
334 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
339 for payment_hash in res.1 {
340 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
343 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
344 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
349 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
350 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
351 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
355 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
364 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
366 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
367 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
368 let mut res = [0; 32];
369 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
373 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
374 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
375 let mut res = [0; 32];
376 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
382 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
383 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
384 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
385 let mut res = [0; 32];
386 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
391 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
392 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
393 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
394 let mut res = [0; 32];
395 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
399 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
401 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
402 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
403 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
404 let mut first_iteration = true;
406 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
407 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
409 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
410 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
411 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
412 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
413 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
416 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
417 first_iteration = false;
419 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
421 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
422 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
424 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
430 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
431 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
432 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
434 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
435 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
441 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
451 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
452 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
453 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
454 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
455 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
456 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
457 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
458 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
460 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
461 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
462 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
463 // the intended recipient).
464 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
465 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
466 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
468 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
469 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
470 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
471 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
475 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
476 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
477 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
479 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
480 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
481 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
483 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
485 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
489 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
491 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
499 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
500 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
502 for i in 0..dst.len() {
507 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
508 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
509 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
510 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
513 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
514 let end_len = iters * 65;
515 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
516 res.resize(end_len, 0);
518 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
519 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
520 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
521 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
522 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
527 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
528 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
530 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
531 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
532 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
533 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
535 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
536 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
537 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
540 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
543 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
544 hmac.input(&packet_data);
545 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
546 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
549 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
551 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
552 hop_data: packet_data,
557 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
558 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
559 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
560 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
562 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
563 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
564 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
565 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
566 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
567 data: packet_crypted,
571 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
572 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
574 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
577 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
578 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
579 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
580 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
584 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
585 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
588 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
590 failuremsg: failuremsg,
594 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
595 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
596 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
602 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
603 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
604 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
607 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
608 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
609 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
610 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
614 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
616 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
617 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
618 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
619 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
620 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
621 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
622 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
623 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
624 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
627 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
628 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
630 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
636 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
637 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
638 /// fields for more info.
639 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
640 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
641 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
642 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
643 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
644 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
645 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
646 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
647 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
648 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
649 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
651 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
652 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
653 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
654 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
658 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
659 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
660 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
664 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
666 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
667 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
668 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
670 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
672 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
674 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
675 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
676 Some(id) => id.clone()
679 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
680 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
681 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
685 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
686 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
687 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
689 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
692 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
694 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
700 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
701 None => return Ok(()),
705 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
706 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
709 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
710 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
711 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
712 msgs: vec![update_add],
713 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
718 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
719 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
720 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
721 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
724 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
725 pending_events.push($event);
730 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
731 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
732 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
734 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
736 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
739 mem::drop(channel_state);
740 add_pending_event!(events::Event::DisconnectPeer {
741 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
742 msg: if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } ) = e.action { msg } else { None },
751 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
752 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
753 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
755 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
756 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
760 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
761 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
764 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
765 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
767 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
768 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
769 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
771 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
772 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
773 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
774 node_signature: our_node_sig,
775 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
779 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
780 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
781 /// Will likely generate further events.
782 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
783 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
784 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
787 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
789 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
793 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
794 if short_chan_id != 0 {
795 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
796 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
798 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
799 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
800 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
805 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
807 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
808 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
809 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
811 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
812 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
817 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
819 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
820 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
821 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
822 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
823 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
824 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
825 // this channel currently :/.
832 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
833 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
836 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
840 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
841 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
843 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
847 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
848 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
849 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
850 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
857 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
858 match failed_forward.2 {
859 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
860 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
864 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
866 new_events.retain(|event| {
867 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
868 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
869 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
875 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
876 events.reserve(new_events.len());
877 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
878 events.push(event.1);
882 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
883 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
887 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
888 let mut pending_htlc = {
889 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
890 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
891 None => return false,
896 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
897 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
901 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
907 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
908 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
909 mem::drop(channel_state);
911 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
912 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
913 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
917 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
918 let err_packet = match onion_error {
919 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
920 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
921 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
923 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
924 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
928 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
929 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
930 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
934 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
935 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
936 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
938 //TODO: Do something with e?
945 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
946 mem::drop(channel_state);
948 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
949 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
952 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
953 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
956 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
967 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
968 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
969 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
970 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
971 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
972 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
974 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
975 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
976 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
977 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
978 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
980 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
981 let mut pending_htlc = {
982 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
983 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
984 None => return false,
989 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
990 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
991 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
992 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
993 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
994 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
995 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
996 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1002 match pending_htlc {
1003 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
1004 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1006 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1008 mem::drop(channel_state);
1009 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1010 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1015 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1016 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1017 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1018 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1019 None => return false
1022 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1023 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1024 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1026 //TODO: Do something with e?
1032 mem::drop(channel_state);
1033 match fulfill_msgs {
1034 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1035 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1036 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1039 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1040 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1053 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1054 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1055 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1058 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1059 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1061 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1066 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1067 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1068 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1069 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1070 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1075 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1076 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1077 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1079 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1080 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1081 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1082 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1083 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1084 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1087 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1091 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1092 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1093 msg: funding_locked,
1094 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1096 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1098 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1099 for tx in txn_matched {
1100 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1101 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1102 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1103 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1105 channel.force_shutdown();
1106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1107 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1116 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1117 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1118 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1120 channel.force_shutdown();
1121 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1122 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1130 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1131 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1133 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1134 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1137 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1138 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1139 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1141 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1144 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1145 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1146 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1147 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1148 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1149 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1150 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1151 let tx = v.force_shutdown();
1152 for broadcast_tx in tx {
1153 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1155 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1156 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1163 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1167 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1168 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1169 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1170 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1171 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1173 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1174 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1175 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1178 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1180 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1181 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1182 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1183 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1184 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1185 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1186 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1187 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1190 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1191 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1192 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1194 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1198 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1199 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1200 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1204 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1205 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1206 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1209 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1210 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1212 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1213 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1215 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1218 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1219 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1220 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1221 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1222 output_script: output_script,
1223 user_channel_id: user_id,
1228 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1229 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1230 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1231 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1232 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1233 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1234 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1236 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1237 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1239 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1240 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1241 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1248 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1250 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1251 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1252 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1253 // for a bogus channel.
1254 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1257 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1258 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1262 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1263 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1264 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1265 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1267 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1268 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1270 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1271 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1273 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1276 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1279 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1280 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1281 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1282 user_channel_id: user_id,
1287 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1288 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1289 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1291 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1292 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1294 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1295 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1297 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1301 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1302 let (res, chan_option) = {
1303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1304 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1306 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1308 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1309 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1311 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1312 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1313 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1314 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1316 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1317 } else { (res, None) }
1319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1322 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1323 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1324 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1326 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1327 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1328 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1329 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1337 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1338 let (res, chan_option) = {
1339 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1340 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1341 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1343 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1344 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1346 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1347 if res.1.is_some() {
1348 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1349 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1350 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1351 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1352 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1353 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1354 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1356 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1357 } else { (res, None) }
1359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1362 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1363 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1365 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1366 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1367 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1368 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1376 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1377 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1378 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1379 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1381 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1382 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1383 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1384 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1386 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1387 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1389 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1392 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1393 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1394 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1395 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1401 macro_rules! return_err {
1402 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1403 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1405 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1406 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1407 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1408 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1409 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1416 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1417 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1418 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1419 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1420 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1421 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1422 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1423 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1426 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1427 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1428 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1429 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1430 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1433 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1434 let next_hop_data = {
1435 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1436 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1437 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1439 let error_code = match err {
1440 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1441 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1443 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1449 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
1451 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1453 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1454 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1456 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1457 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1460 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1461 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1462 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1463 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1465 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1467 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1468 short_channel_id: 0,
1469 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1470 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1471 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1474 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1475 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1476 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1478 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1480 let blinding_factor = {
1481 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1482 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1483 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1484 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1485 sha.result(&mut res);
1486 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1488 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1490 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1496 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1498 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1500 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1505 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1507 public_key: new_pubkey,
1508 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1509 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1512 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1514 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1515 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1516 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1517 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1518 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1519 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1520 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1525 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1527 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1528 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1530 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1532 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1534 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1535 if !chan.is_live() {
1536 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1537 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1541 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1543 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1544 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1545 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1546 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1547 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1548 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1549 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1551 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1552 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1556 if !acceptable_cycle {
1557 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1563 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1565 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1566 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1568 if !chan.is_usable() {
1569 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1571 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1572 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1573 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1575 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), //TODO: panic?
1578 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1580 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1581 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1582 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1583 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1585 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1587 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1588 source_short_channel_id,
1589 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1595 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1596 source_short_channel_id,
1597 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1605 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1606 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1607 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1608 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1609 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1612 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1613 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1615 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1616 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1618 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1620 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1623 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1629 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1630 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1633 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1634 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1636 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1638 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1641 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1642 match pending_htlc {
1643 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1644 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1645 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1647 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1648 if res.is_some() { return; }
1650 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1652 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1653 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1654 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1655 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1656 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1658 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1659 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1660 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1662 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1663 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1664 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1665 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1666 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1667 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1668 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1669 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1670 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1671 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1672 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1673 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1674 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1675 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1683 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1684 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1685 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1686 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1689 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1704 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1705 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1706 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1708 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1709 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1711 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1713 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1717 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1718 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1719 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1722 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1723 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1725 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1727 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1730 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1734 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1737 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1738 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1739 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1742 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1743 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1745 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1747 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1750 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1753 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1757 let mut forward_event = None;
1758 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1759 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1760 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1761 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1762 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1764 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1765 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1767 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1770 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1775 match forward_event {
1777 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1778 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1779 time_forwardable: time
1788 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1790 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1792 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1793 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1795 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1797 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1801 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1802 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1803 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1806 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1807 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1809 if !chan.is_usable() {
1810 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1813 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1814 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1816 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1817 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1818 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1819 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1821 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1823 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1824 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1825 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1826 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1827 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1828 contents: announcement,
1829 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1831 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1834 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1835 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1839 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1840 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1842 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1843 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1844 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1845 if no_connection_possible {
1846 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1847 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1848 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1849 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1851 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1852 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1853 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1855 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1856 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1866 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1867 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1868 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1869 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1875 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1876 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1877 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1878 pending_events.push(event);
1886 use chain::chaininterface;
1887 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1888 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1889 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1890 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1892 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1893 use util::test_utils;
1894 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1896 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1897 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1898 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
1899 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1900 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1901 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1902 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1904 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1905 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1907 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1908 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1910 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1912 use std::collections::HashMap;
1913 use std::default::Default;
1914 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1915 use std::time::Instant;
1918 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1919 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1920 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1925 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1926 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1929 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1930 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1933 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1934 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1937 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1938 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1941 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1942 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1947 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1949 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1950 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1955 fn onion_vectors() {
1956 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1957 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1959 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1960 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1961 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1962 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1963 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1965 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1966 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1967 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1968 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1969 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1971 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1972 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1973 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1974 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1975 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1977 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1978 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1979 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1980 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1981 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1983 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1984 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1985 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1986 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1987 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1989 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1990 let payloads = vec!(
1991 msgs::OnionHopData {
1993 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1994 short_channel_id: 0,
1996 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2000 msgs::OnionHopData {
2002 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2003 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2004 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2005 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2009 msgs::OnionHopData {
2011 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2012 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2013 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2014 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2018 msgs::OnionHopData {
2020 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2021 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2022 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2023 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2027 msgs::OnionHopData {
2029 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2030 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2031 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2032 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2038 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2039 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2041 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2045 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2046 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2048 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2049 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2050 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2052 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2053 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2055 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2056 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2058 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2059 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2061 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2062 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2064 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2065 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2068 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2069 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2070 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2071 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2073 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2074 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2079 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2080 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2081 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2082 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2084 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2088 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2089 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2090 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2092 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2093 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2094 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2095 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2096 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2097 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2102 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2104 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2108 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2109 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2111 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2112 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2113 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2115 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2116 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2118 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2120 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2121 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2122 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2123 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2124 added_monitors.clear();
2126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2129 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2130 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2131 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2132 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2133 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2134 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2135 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2136 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2137 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2138 added_monitors.clear();
2141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2144 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2146 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2147 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2148 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2149 added_monitors.clear();
2152 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2153 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2155 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2156 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2157 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2162 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2163 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2164 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2166 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2167 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2168 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2169 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2176 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2177 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2178 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2179 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2180 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2181 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2182 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2183 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2184 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2185 as_announcement_sigs
2187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2190 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2191 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2192 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2193 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2199 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2200 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2201 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2202 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2203 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2204 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2214 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2217 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2218 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2220 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2221 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2222 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2224 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2227 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2228 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2229 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2232 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2233 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2234 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2235 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2236 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2237 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2243 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2244 if !close_inbound_first {
2245 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2247 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2248 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2249 if close_inbound_first {
2250 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2251 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2252 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2253 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2255 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2256 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2257 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2258 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2260 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2261 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2262 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2264 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2265 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2266 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2267 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2269 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2270 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2271 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2272 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2274 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2275 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2276 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2277 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2283 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2284 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2285 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2286 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292 (as_update, bs_update)
2297 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2298 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2301 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2303 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2304 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2311 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2312 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2313 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2314 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2315 let our_payment_hash = {
2316 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2317 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2318 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2319 sha.result(&mut ret);
2323 let mut payment_event = {
2324 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2326 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2327 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2328 added_monitors.clear();
2331 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2333 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2335 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2337 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2338 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2340 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2342 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2343 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2346 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2348 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2349 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2350 added_monitors.clear();
2352 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2353 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2355 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2356 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2357 added_monitors.clear();
2359 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2360 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2362 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2363 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2364 added_monitors.clear();
2367 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2368 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2370 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2374 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2375 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2377 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2378 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2379 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2381 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2382 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2383 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2389 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2390 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2391 added_monitors.clear();
2393 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2394 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2400 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2403 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2404 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2406 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2407 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2408 added_monitors.clear();
2411 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2412 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2413 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2415 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2417 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2419 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2421 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2422 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2424 added_monitors.clear();
2426 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2428 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2429 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2430 added_monitors.clear();
2432 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2433 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2434 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2436 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2437 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2438 added_monitors.clear();
2440 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2442 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2443 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2444 added_monitors.clear();
2450 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2451 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2452 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2453 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2454 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2455 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2458 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2461 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2462 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2463 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2471 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2472 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2474 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2475 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2477 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2478 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2484 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2486 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2487 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2488 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2489 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2490 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2493 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2496 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2497 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2498 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2499 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2500 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2503 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2504 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2505 let our_payment_hash = {
2506 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2507 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2508 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2509 sha.result(&mut ret);
2513 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2514 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2517 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2518 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2519 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2522 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2523 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2525 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2526 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2527 added_monitors.clear();
2530 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2531 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2532 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2534 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2535 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2538 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2540 added_monitors.clear();
2542 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2544 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2545 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2546 added_monitors.clear();
2548 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2550 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2551 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2552 added_monitors.clear();
2554 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2555 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2556 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2558 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2562 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2563 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2565 added_monitors.clear();
2571 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2572 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2573 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2574 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2575 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2576 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2579 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2582 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2583 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2584 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2592 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2593 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2595 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2598 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2599 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2605 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2606 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2607 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2610 for _ in 0..node_count {
2611 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2612 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2613 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2614 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2616 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2617 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2618 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2620 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2621 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2622 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2629 fn fake_network_test() {
2630 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2631 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2632 let nodes = create_network(4);
2634 // Create some initial channels
2635 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2636 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2637 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2639 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2640 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2641 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2642 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2643 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2645 // Send some more payments
2646 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2647 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2648 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2650 // Test failure packets
2651 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2652 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2654 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2655 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2657 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2658 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2659 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2660 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2661 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2662 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2663 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2665 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2666 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2667 hops.push(RouteHop {
2668 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2669 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2671 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2673 hops.push(RouteHop {
2674 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2675 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2677 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2679 hops.push(RouteHop {
2680 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2681 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2683 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2685 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2686 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2687 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2689 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2690 hops.push(RouteHop {
2691 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2692 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2694 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2696 hops.push(RouteHop {
2697 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2698 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2700 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2702 hops.push(RouteHop {
2703 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2704 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2706 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2708 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2709 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2710 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2712 // Claim the rebalances...
2713 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2714 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2716 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2717 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2719 // Send some payments across both channels
2720 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2721 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2722 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2724 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2726 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2728 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2729 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2732 // Close down the channels...
2733 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2734 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2735 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2736 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2737 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2739 // Check that we processed all pending events
2741 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2742 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2746 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2747 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2748 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2749 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2750 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2752 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2754 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2755 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2757 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2758 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2759 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2760 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2761 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2762 res.push(tx.clone());
2766 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2768 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2769 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2770 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2771 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2772 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2773 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2774 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2775 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2777 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2779 res.push(tx.clone());
2783 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2789 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2790 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2792 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2794 let mut found_prev = false;
2796 for tx in prev_txn {
2797 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2798 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2799 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2800 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2802 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2803 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2809 assert!(found_prev);
2811 let mut res = Vec::new();
2812 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2816 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2817 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2818 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2819 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2820 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2826 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2827 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2828 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2829 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2836 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2837 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2842 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2843 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2844 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2845 let nodes = create_network(5);
2847 // Create some initial channels
2848 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2849 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2850 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2851 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2853 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2854 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2855 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2856 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2857 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2859 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2860 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2862 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2863 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2864 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2865 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2867 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2868 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2869 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2871 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2872 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2874 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2875 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2877 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2878 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2879 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2880 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2882 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2883 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2884 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2886 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2887 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2889 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2891 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2892 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2893 added_monitors.clear();
2896 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2899 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2900 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2908 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2909 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2910 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2912 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2914 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2915 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2917 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2918 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2920 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2922 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2923 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2924 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2926 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2927 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2930 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2931 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2932 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
2933 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2934 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2937 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2939 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2940 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2942 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2943 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2944 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
2945 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2946 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2949 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2951 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2952 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2954 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2956 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2957 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2958 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2960 // Create some new channels:
2961 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2963 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2964 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2965 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2966 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2967 // Revoke the old state
2968 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2971 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2972 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2974 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2975 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2976 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2978 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2979 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2980 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2984 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2985 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2986 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2987 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
2989 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2990 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2992 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2993 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2994 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2996 // Check that we processed all pending events
2998 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2999 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3004 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3005 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3006 let nodes = create_network(2);
3007 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3009 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3010 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3011 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3012 mem::drop(channel_state);
3014 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3015 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3016 headers.push(header.clone());
3018 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3019 headers.push(header.clone());
3021 while !headers.is_empty() {
3022 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3024 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3025 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3026 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);