1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
137 err: msgs::HandleError,
138 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
140 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
142 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
146 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
147 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
149 data: err.to_string()
153 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
161 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
162 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
164 data: err.to_string()
168 needs_channel_force_close: true,
172 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
173 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
187 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
189 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: msg.to_string()
197 needs_channel_force_close: false,
201 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
208 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
210 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: msg.to_string()
218 needs_channel_force_close: true,
223 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
224 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
226 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
227 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
229 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
233 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
234 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
235 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
236 /// probably increase this significantly.
237 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
239 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
240 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
242 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
246 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
247 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
248 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
251 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
253 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
257 struct ChannelHolder {
258 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 next_forward: Instant,
261 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
262 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
263 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
264 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
265 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
266 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
267 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
269 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
271 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
272 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
275 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
276 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
277 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
278 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
280 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
288 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
289 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
290 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
295 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
296 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
298 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
299 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
301 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
302 /// to individual Channels.
304 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
305 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
306 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
307 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
309 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
310 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
311 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
312 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
313 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
314 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
315 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
317 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
318 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
319 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
320 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 pub struct ChannelManager {
323 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
324 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
325 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
326 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
327 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
329 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
330 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
331 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
332 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
333 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
335 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
336 our_network_key: SecretKey,
338 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
339 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
340 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
341 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
344 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
349 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
350 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
351 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
352 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
353 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
354 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
355 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
357 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
358 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
359 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
360 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
363 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
365 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
366 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
369 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
371 macro_rules! secp_call {
372 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
375 Err(_) => return Err($err),
382 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
384 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
385 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
390 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
391 pub struct ChannelDetails {
392 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
393 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
394 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
395 /// lifetime of the channel.
396 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
397 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
398 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
399 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
400 /// The node_id of our counterparty
401 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
402 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
403 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
404 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
408 impl ChannelManager {
409 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
411 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
412 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
414 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
415 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
417 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
418 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
421 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
422 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
423 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
424 monitor: monitor.clone(),
428 announce_channels_publicly,
429 fee_proportional_millionths,
430 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
431 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
434 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
435 by_id: HashMap::new(),
436 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
437 next_forward: Instant::now(),
438 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
439 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
440 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
442 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
444 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
445 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
451 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
452 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
456 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
458 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
459 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
460 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
461 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
463 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
464 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
466 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
467 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
468 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
469 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
473 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
474 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
476 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
477 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
478 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
480 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
481 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
483 panic!("RNG is bad???");
486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
488 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
489 node_id: their_network_key,
495 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
496 /// more information.
497 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
498 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
499 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
500 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
501 res.push(ChannelDetails {
502 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
503 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
504 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
505 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
506 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
512 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
513 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
514 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
515 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
516 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
517 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
518 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
519 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
520 // really wanted anyway.
521 if channel.is_live() {
522 res.push(ChannelDetails {
523 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
524 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
525 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
526 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
527 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
534 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
535 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
536 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
538 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
539 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
540 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
542 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
544 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
547 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
549 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
552 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
553 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
554 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
556 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
557 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
562 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
563 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
566 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
567 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
572 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
573 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
583 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
584 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
585 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
586 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
589 for tx in local_txn {
590 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
592 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
593 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
594 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
595 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
596 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
597 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
598 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
601 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
602 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
603 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
604 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
607 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
608 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
609 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
610 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
611 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
618 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
619 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
620 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
627 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
628 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
629 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
630 for chan in self.list_channels() {
631 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
635 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
637 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
639 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
640 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
641 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
642 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
646 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
647 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
655 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
656 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
657 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
663 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
664 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
666 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
667 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
668 let mut res = [0; 32];
669 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
673 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
674 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
675 let mut res = [0; 32];
676 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
682 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
683 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
684 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
685 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
686 let mut res = [0; 32];
687 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
692 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
693 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
694 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
695 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
696 let mut res = [0; 32];
697 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
701 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
703 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
704 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
705 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
707 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
708 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
710 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
711 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
712 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
713 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
714 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
716 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
718 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
719 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
721 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
727 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
728 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
729 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
731 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
732 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
738 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
748 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
749 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
750 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
751 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
752 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
753 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
754 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
755 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
757 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
758 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
759 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
760 // the intended recipient).
761 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
762 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
763 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
765 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
766 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
767 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
768 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
772 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
773 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
774 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
776 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
777 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
778 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
780 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
782 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
786 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
788 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
796 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
797 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
799 for i in 0..dst.len() {
804 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
805 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
806 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
807 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
810 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
811 let end_len = iters * 65;
812 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
813 res.resize(end_len, 0);
815 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
816 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
817 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
818 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
819 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
824 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
825 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
827 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
828 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
829 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
830 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
832 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
833 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
834 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
837 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
840 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
841 hmac.input(&packet_data);
842 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
843 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
848 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
849 hop_data: packet_data,
854 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
855 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
856 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
857 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
859 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
860 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
861 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
862 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
863 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
864 data: packet_crypted,
868 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
869 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
870 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
872 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
875 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
876 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
877 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
878 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
882 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
883 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
886 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
888 failuremsg: failuremsg,
892 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
893 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
894 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
900 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
901 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
902 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
905 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
906 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
909 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
910 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
911 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
912 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
918 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
919 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
920 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
921 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
923 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
924 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
925 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
928 let shared_secret = {
929 let mut arr = [0; 32];
930 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
933 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
935 let mut channel_state = None;
936 macro_rules! return_err {
937 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
939 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
940 if channel_state.is_none() {
941 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
943 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
944 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
945 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
946 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
947 })), channel_state.unwrap());
952 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
953 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
954 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
955 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
956 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
957 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
958 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
959 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
962 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
963 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
964 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
965 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
966 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
969 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
970 let next_hop_data = {
971 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
972 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
973 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
975 let error_code = match err {
976 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
977 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
979 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
985 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
987 // final_expiry_too_soon
988 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
989 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
991 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
992 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
993 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
995 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
996 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
997 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1000 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1001 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1002 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1003 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1005 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1007 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1008 short_channel_id: 0,
1009 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1010 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1011 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1014 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1015 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1016 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1018 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1020 let blinding_factor = {
1021 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1022 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1023 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1024 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1025 sha.result(&mut res);
1026 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1028 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1034 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1035 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1038 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1040 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1041 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1042 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1045 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1046 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1047 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1048 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1049 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1050 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1051 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1055 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1056 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1057 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1058 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1059 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1060 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1061 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1063 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1065 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1066 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1068 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1069 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1070 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1071 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1072 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1073 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1074 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1076 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1077 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1079 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1080 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1081 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1083 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1084 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1086 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1087 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1088 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1089 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1091 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1092 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1097 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1098 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1099 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1101 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1102 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1104 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1105 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1107 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1112 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1115 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1116 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1117 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1118 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1119 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1123 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1125 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1126 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1127 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1128 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1129 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1130 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1131 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1132 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1133 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1134 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1137 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1138 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1140 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1146 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1148 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1149 /// fields for more info.
1151 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1152 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1153 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1154 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1155 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1156 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1158 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1160 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1161 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1162 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1163 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1164 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1166 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1167 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1168 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1169 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1173 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1174 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1175 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1177 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1179 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1181 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1182 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1183 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1184 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1186 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1187 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1190 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1191 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1195 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1196 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1197 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1199 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1200 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1202 if !chan.is_live() {
1203 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1205 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1206 route: route.clone(),
1207 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1208 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1209 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1212 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1213 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1214 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1215 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1218 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1219 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1220 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1221 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1222 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1223 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1224 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1236 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1238 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1240 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1241 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1242 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1243 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1245 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1246 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1247 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1249 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1250 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1251 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1254 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1256 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1266 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1267 // lock before add_update_monitor
1268 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1272 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1273 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1274 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1279 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1287 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1288 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1290 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1292 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1294 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1295 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1297 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1298 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1299 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1300 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1301 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1305 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1307 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1308 /// Will likely generate further events.
1309 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1310 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1312 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1313 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1316 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1318 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1322 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1323 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1324 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1325 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1327 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1328 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1329 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1330 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1331 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1332 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1334 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1339 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1341 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1342 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1343 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1344 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1345 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1348 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1350 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1351 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1356 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1358 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1359 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1360 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1361 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1362 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1363 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1364 // this channel currently :/.
1371 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1372 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1375 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1376 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1378 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1380 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1384 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1385 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1388 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1389 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1390 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1391 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1392 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1395 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1400 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1401 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1402 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1403 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1404 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1406 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1410 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1411 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1412 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1419 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1421 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1422 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1426 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1427 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1428 events.append(&mut new_events);
1431 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1432 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1433 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1435 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1436 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1437 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1438 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1439 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1446 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1447 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1448 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1449 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1450 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1451 /// still-available channels.
1452 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1454 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1455 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1456 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1457 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1458 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1459 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1460 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1465 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1466 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1467 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1470 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1473 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1474 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1475 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1476 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1477 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1479 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1480 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1484 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1486 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1487 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1491 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1492 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1493 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1494 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1498 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1499 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1500 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1501 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1502 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1503 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1505 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1511 //TODO: Do something with e?
1519 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1520 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1521 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1523 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1524 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1525 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1526 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1527 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1528 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1530 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1532 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1533 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1534 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1535 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1536 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1537 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1542 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1544 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1545 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1546 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1547 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1551 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1552 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1553 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1555 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1556 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1558 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1559 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1565 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1566 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1567 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1568 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1569 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1570 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1573 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1575 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1576 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1577 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1578 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1579 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1580 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1588 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1589 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1590 //TODO: Do something with e?
1598 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1599 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1600 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1603 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1604 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1606 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1607 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1608 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1609 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1610 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1613 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1614 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1615 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1616 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1617 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1618 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1619 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1620 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1622 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1623 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1624 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1626 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1627 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1634 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1637 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1638 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1639 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1641 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1643 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1644 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1646 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1651 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1652 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1654 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1655 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1660 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1664 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1675 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1676 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1678 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1680 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1681 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1685 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1686 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1690 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1691 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1693 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1694 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1698 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1699 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1701 entry.insert(channel);
1707 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1710 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1712 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1713 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1714 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1716 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1717 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1718 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1720 //TODO: same as above
1721 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1724 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1725 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1726 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1727 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1728 output_script: output_script,
1729 user_channel_id: user_id,
1734 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1735 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1736 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1739 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1740 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1743 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1744 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1745 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1748 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1755 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1756 // lock before add_update_monitor
1757 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1761 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1768 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1777 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1778 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1782 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1783 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1786 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1787 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1790 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1792 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1795 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1796 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1797 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1798 user_channel_id: user_id,
1803 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1805 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1806 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1808 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1809 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1812 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1813 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1814 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1816 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1817 msg: announcement_sigs,
1822 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1826 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1833 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1834 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1837 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1838 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1839 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1840 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1844 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1846 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1850 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1851 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1852 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1854 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1855 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1860 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1861 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1864 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1866 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1876 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1877 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1881 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1882 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1885 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1886 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1888 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1893 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1894 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1895 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1896 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1897 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1898 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1899 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1901 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1902 } else { (tx, None) }
1904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1907 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1908 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1910 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1911 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1912 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1921 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1922 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1923 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1924 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1926 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1927 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1928 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1929 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1931 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1932 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1934 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1936 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1940 if !chan.is_usable() {
1941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1943 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1945 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1949 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1950 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1951 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1953 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1954 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1957 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1958 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1960 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1962 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1966 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1967 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1968 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1969 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1970 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1971 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1972 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1974 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1975 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1979 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1980 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1981 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1984 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1986 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1987 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1988 if res.is_some() { return; }
1990 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1991 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1992 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1994 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
1996 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1997 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1998 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1999 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2000 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2002 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2004 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2005 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2006 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2007 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2008 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2009 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2011 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2012 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2013 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2014 // definitely came from the peer in question
2015 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2017 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2019 match error_code & 0xff {
2021 // either from an intermediate or final node
2022 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2023 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2024 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2025 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2026 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2027 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2028 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2029 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2030 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2031 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2032 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2038 if is_from_final_node {
2039 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2040 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2041 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2042 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2043 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2044 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2047 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2048 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2052 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2053 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2054 // does not coform to the spec.
2055 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2056 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2057 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2063 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2067 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2069 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2070 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2071 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2075 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2076 let offset = match error_code {
2077 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2078 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2079 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2080 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2081 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2082 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2084 // node sending unknown code
2085 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2086 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2093 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2094 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2095 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2096 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2097 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2098 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2099 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2100 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2103 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2104 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2105 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2106 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2108 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2109 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2110 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2111 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2112 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2114 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2115 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2116 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2117 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2119 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2120 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2121 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2122 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2124 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2125 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2128 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2129 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2133 res = Some((msg, true));
2139 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2142 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2143 res = Some((None, true));
2147 // node sending unknown code
2148 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2149 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2158 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2159 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2160 } else { ((None, true)) }
2163 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2164 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2165 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2167 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2168 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2171 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2172 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2174 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2179 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2180 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2181 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2183 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2184 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2187 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2188 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2190 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2191 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2194 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2198 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2199 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2200 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2201 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2203 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2204 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2207 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2208 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2212 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2213 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2215 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2217 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2219 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2224 commitment_signed: msg,
2230 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2235 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2236 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2237 let mut forward_event = None;
2238 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2239 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2240 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2241 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2242 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2244 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2245 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2247 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2250 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2255 match forward_event {
2257 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2258 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2259 time_forwardable: time
2267 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2268 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2269 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2270 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2271 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2273 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2274 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2277 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2278 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2281 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2283 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2287 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2289 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2292 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2293 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2295 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2300 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2301 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2302 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2304 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2305 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2306 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2308 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2310 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2318 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2320 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2323 if !chan.is_usable() {
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2327 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2328 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2329 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2331 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2332 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2333 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2334 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2335 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2337 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2340 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2341 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2342 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2343 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2344 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2345 contents: announcement,
2347 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2350 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2355 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2356 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2357 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2359 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2361 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2362 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2364 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2365 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2366 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2367 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2371 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2373 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2377 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2378 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2380 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2385 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2386 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2388 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2394 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2398 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2405 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2409 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2410 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2411 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2412 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2414 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2416 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2419 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2420 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2422 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2423 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2425 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2426 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2428 if !chan.is_live() {
2429 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2431 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2432 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2436 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2437 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2438 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2439 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2440 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2441 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2442 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2453 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2454 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2455 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2456 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2457 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2462 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2463 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2464 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2465 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2466 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2471 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2472 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2473 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2474 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2476 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2477 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2478 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2479 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2480 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2481 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2482 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2484 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2485 msg: funding_locked,
2487 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2488 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2489 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2490 msg: announcement_sigs,
2493 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2494 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2496 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2499 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2503 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2504 for tx in txn_matched {
2505 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2506 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2507 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2508 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2510 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2511 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2512 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2513 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2514 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2524 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2525 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2526 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2528 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2529 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2530 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2531 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2532 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2533 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2543 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2544 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2546 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2547 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2550 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2551 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2552 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2553 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2555 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2556 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2557 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2558 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2559 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2560 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2561 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2562 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2564 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2565 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2566 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2576 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2577 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2579 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2580 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2584 macro_rules! handle_error {
2585 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2588 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2589 if needs_channel_force_close {
2591 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2592 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2593 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2595 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2598 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2599 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2600 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2601 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2602 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2604 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2616 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2617 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2618 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2619 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2620 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2623 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2625 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2628 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2629 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2630 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2633 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2634 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2635 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2638 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2639 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2640 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2643 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2644 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2645 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2648 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2649 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2650 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2653 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2654 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2655 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2658 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2659 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2660 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2663 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2664 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2665 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2668 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2669 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2670 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2673 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2674 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2675 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2678 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2680 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2683 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2685 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2688 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2690 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2693 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2694 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2695 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2698 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2700 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2701 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2704 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2705 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2706 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2707 if no_connection_possible {
2708 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2709 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2710 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2711 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2713 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2714 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2725 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2726 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2727 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2728 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2729 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2730 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2731 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2733 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2734 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2735 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2744 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2745 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2747 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2748 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2754 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2755 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2756 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2757 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2758 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2759 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2760 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2761 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2762 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2763 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2764 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2769 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2770 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2776 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2779 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2780 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2782 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2783 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2784 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2785 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2789 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2794 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2795 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2797 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2798 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2799 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2801 onion.write(writer)?;
2805 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2806 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2807 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2808 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2809 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2814 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2815 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2816 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2818 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2819 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2821 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2823 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2824 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2825 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2826 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2827 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2832 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2833 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2835 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2837 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2839 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2841 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2848 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2849 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2850 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2851 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2852 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2853 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2858 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2859 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2861 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2863 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2865 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2867 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2874 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2875 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2876 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2877 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2878 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2879 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2884 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2887 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2890 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2891 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2893 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2895 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2897 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2899 route.write(writer)?;
2900 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2901 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2908 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2909 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2910 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2911 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2912 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2913 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2914 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2915 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2917 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2922 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2923 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2925 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2929 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2931 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2932 data.write(writer)?;
2939 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2940 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2941 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2942 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2943 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2944 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2945 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2947 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2952 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
2953 prev_short_channel_id,
2958 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2960 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2962 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2963 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2965 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2966 self.announce_channels_publicly.write(writer)?;
2967 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
2968 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2969 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2971 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2972 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2973 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2974 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2975 unfunded_channels += 1;
2978 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2979 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2980 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2981 channel.write(writer)?;
2985 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2986 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2987 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2988 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2989 for forward in pending_forwards {
2990 forward.write(writer)?;
2994 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2995 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2996 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2997 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2998 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2999 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3007 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3009 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3011 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3012 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3013 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3014 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3015 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3016 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3017 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3018 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3019 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3020 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3021 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3022 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3023 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3024 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3025 /// deserialization.
3026 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3028 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3030 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3031 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3032 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3034 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3035 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3036 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3037 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3038 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3040 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3041 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3042 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3043 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3044 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3045 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3046 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3047 /// deserialization.
3048 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3051 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3052 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3054 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3055 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3056 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3057 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3059 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3061 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3064 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3065 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3066 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3067 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3068 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3069 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3072 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let announce_channels_publicly: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3074 let fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3075 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3076 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3078 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3080 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3081 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3082 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3083 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3084 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3085 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3086 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3087 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3090 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3091 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3092 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3093 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3094 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3095 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3096 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3097 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3098 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3100 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3101 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3103 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3106 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3110 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3111 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3112 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3116 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3117 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3118 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3119 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3120 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3121 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3122 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3123 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3125 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3128 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3129 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3130 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3131 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3132 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3134 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3135 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3137 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3140 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3142 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3143 monitor: args.monitor,
3144 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3145 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3147 announce_channels_publicly,
3148 fee_proportional_millionths,
3149 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3150 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3151 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3153 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3156 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3159 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3161 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3163 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3164 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3165 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3166 logger: args.logger,
3169 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3170 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3171 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3172 //connection or two.
3175 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3181 use chain::chaininterface;
3182 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3183 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3184 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
3185 use chain::keysinterface;
3186 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3187 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3188 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3190 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3191 use util::test_utils;
3192 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3193 use util::errors::APIError;
3194 use util::logger::Logger;
3195 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3197 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
3198 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3199 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
3200 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3201 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3202 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
3203 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
3207 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3208 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3210 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3211 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3213 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3215 use std::cell::RefCell;
3216 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3217 use std::default::Default;
3219 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3220 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3221 use std::time::Instant;
3224 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3225 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3226 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3231 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3232 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3235 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3236 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3239 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3240 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3243 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3244 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3247 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3248 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3253 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3255 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3256 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3261 fn onion_vectors() {
3262 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3263 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3265 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3266 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3267 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3268 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3269 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3271 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3272 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3273 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3274 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3275 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3277 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3278 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3279 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3280 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3281 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3283 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3284 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3285 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3286 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3287 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3289 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3290 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3291 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3292 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3293 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3295 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3296 let payloads = vec!(
3297 msgs::OnionHopData {
3299 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3300 short_channel_id: 0,
3302 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3306 msgs::OnionHopData {
3308 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3309 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3310 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3311 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3315 msgs::OnionHopData {
3317 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3318 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3319 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3320 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3324 msgs::OnionHopData {
3326 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3327 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3328 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3329 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3333 msgs::OnionHopData {
3335 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3336 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3337 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3338 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3344 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3345 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3347 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3351 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3352 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3354 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3355 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3356 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3358 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3359 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3361 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3362 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3364 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3365 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3367 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3368 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3370 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3371 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3374 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3375 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3376 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3377 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3379 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3380 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3385 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3386 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3387 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3388 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3390 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3391 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3392 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3394 impl Drop for Node {
3395 fn drop(&mut self) {
3396 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3397 // Check that we processed all pending events
3398 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3399 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3400 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3405 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3406 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3409 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3410 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3411 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3412 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3415 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3416 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3418 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3419 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3421 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3422 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426 }, match events[1] {
3427 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3428 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3429 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3430 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3431 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3432 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3433 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3434 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3442 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3443 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3445 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3448 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3449 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3458 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3459 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3461 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3462 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3464 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3465 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3474 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3475 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3476 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3477 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3479 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3483 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3484 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3486 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3487 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3488 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3490 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3491 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3493 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3495 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3496 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3497 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3498 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3499 added_monitors.clear();
3501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3504 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3506 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3507 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3508 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3509 added_monitors.clear();
3512 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3514 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3515 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3516 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3517 added_monitors.clear();
3520 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3521 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3523 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3524 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3525 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3534 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3535 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3539 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3540 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3541 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3542 ((match events_6[0] {
3543 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3544 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3545 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3549 }, match events_6[1] {
3550 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3551 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3554 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3558 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3559 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3560 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3564 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3565 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3566 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3567 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3569 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3570 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3571 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3572 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3579 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3580 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3581 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3582 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3583 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3591 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3594 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3598 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3599 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3601 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3602 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3603 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3605 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3608 macro_rules! check_spends {
3609 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3611 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3612 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3613 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3614 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3619 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3620 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3621 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3624 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3625 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3627 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3628 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3629 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3630 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3631 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3638 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3641 Some(match events_1[1] {
3642 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3643 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3650 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3651 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3653 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3654 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3655 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3656 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3660 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3662 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3663 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3673 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3674 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3675 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3677 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3678 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3679 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3681 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3682 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3683 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3684 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3685 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3686 (as_update, bs_update)
3688 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3690 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3691 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3692 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3693 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3695 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3696 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3697 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3698 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3699 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3700 (as_update, bs_update)
3702 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3703 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3705 (as_update, bs_update)
3710 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3711 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3714 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3715 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3716 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3717 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3718 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3719 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3722 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3724 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3730 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3731 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3733 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3734 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3735 added_monitors.clear();
3740 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3741 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3743 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3744 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3745 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3746 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3747 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3748 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3749 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3750 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3751 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3752 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3753 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3754 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3755 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3756 if $fail_backwards {
3757 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3758 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3760 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3761 if $fail_backwards {
3762 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3763 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3764 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3765 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3766 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3768 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3771 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3772 if $fail_backwards {
3773 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3774 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3776 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3778 added_monitors.clear();
3784 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3787 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3788 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3789 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3790 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3791 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3792 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3793 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3798 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3799 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3801 let mut payment_event = {
3802 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3803 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3805 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3807 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3809 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3811 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3812 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3814 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3815 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3816 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3818 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3819 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3821 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3825 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3826 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3828 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3829 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3830 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3832 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3833 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3834 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3839 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3840 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3841 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3842 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3843 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3849 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3852 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3853 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3854 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3856 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3857 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3858 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3861 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3864 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3865 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3866 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3867 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3868 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3869 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3870 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3871 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3879 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3880 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3882 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3883 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3884 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3885 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3889 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3890 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3892 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3893 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3894 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3895 get_next_msgs!($node)
3897 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3900 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3901 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3906 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3907 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3908 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3909 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3910 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3911 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3912 } else if update_next_msgs {
3913 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3915 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3917 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3918 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3925 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3926 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3929 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3930 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3937 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3938 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3941 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3943 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3944 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3945 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3946 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3947 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3950 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3953 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3954 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3955 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3956 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3957 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3960 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3962 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3964 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3965 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3969 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3970 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3971 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3974 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3975 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3976 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3978 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3979 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3980 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3982 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3983 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3988 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3989 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3990 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3991 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3992 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3993 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3994 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3995 // second-to-last node!
3996 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3999 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4000 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4003 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4004 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4005 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4007 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4008 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4009 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4010 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4015 assert!(events.is_empty());
4017 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4018 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4025 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4027 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4030 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4031 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4032 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4040 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4043 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4044 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4045 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4046 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4047 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4049 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4050 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4052 for _ in 0..node_count {
4053 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4054 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4055 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4056 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4057 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4058 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4059 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4060 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
4061 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4062 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4063 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4064 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4072 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4073 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4074 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4075 let channel_id = chan.2;
4077 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4079 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4080 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4086 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4090 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4091 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4092 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4093 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4094 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4095 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4096 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4097 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4098 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4099 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4101 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4103 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4105 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4106 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4109 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4110 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4111 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4112 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4113 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4120 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4121 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4122 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4125 let payment_event = {
4126 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4127 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4128 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4130 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4131 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4133 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4134 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4135 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4136 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4137 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4140 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4141 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4142 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4143 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4147 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4148 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4149 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4150 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4151 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4152 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4155 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4156 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4157 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4158 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4159 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4160 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4161 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4164 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4165 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4166 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4169 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4170 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4173 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4176 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4177 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4179 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4183 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4188 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4189 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4190 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4191 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4192 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4193 let channel_id = chan.2;
4195 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4197 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4198 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4207 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
4208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4210 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4211 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4212 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4221 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4222 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4223 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4226 let payment_event = {
4227 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4228 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4229 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4231 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4232 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4234 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4236 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4237 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4238 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4241 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4244 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4248 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4249 let nodes = create_network(2);
4250 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4251 let channel_id = chan.2;
4253 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4255 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4256 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4262 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4263 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4264 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4265 // (3) update_fee ->
4266 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4267 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4268 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4269 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4270 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4271 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4272 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4273 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4274 // revoke_and_ack ->
4275 // B should send no response here
4276 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4277 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4278 // revoke_and_ack ->
4280 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4281 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4282 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4285 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4286 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4287 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4289 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4294 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4295 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4297 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4300 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4302 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4303 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4304 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4306 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4307 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4308 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4309 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4314 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4316 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4318 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4320 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4322 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4323 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4324 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4325 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4326 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4327 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4328 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4330 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4331 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4332 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4334 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4336 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4337 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4342 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4345 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4346 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4349 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4350 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4351 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4354 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4355 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4360 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4361 let nodes = create_network(2);
4362 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4363 let channel_id = chan.2;
4365 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4367 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4368 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4373 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4374 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4377 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4378 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4379 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4380 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4381 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4387 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4388 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4391 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4392 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4395 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4396 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4397 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4400 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4401 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4406 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4407 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4408 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4409 let channel_id = chan.2;
4411 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4413 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4414 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4420 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4422 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4423 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4426 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4427 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4428 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4429 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4430 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4435 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4436 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4441 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4443 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4444 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4446 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4447 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4448 added_monitors.clear();
4450 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4452 // node[1] has nothing to do
4454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4455 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4458 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4459 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4460 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4462 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4464 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4466 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4467 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4468 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4469 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4470 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4471 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4474 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4476 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4478 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4480 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4482 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4484 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4485 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4487 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4489 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4491 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4494 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4497 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4498 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4500 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4503 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4507 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4509 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4511 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4515 fn test_update_fee() {
4516 let nodes = create_network(2);
4517 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4518 let channel_id = chan.2;
4520 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4522 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4523 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4529 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4530 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4531 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4532 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4533 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4534 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4535 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4536 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4537 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4538 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4539 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4540 // revoke_and_ack ->
4542 // Create and deliver (1)...
4543 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4544 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4547 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4548 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4549 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4550 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4551 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4555 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4557 // Generate (2) and (3):
4558 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4559 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4563 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4567 // Create and deliver (4)...
4568 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4570 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4571 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4572 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4573 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4574 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4580 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4583 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4584 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4586 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4587 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4589 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4590 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4593 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4594 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4597 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4598 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4599 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4600 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4601 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4602 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4603 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4604 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4608 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4610 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4611 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4613 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4615 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4617 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4618 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4619 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4623 fn fake_network_test() {
4624 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4625 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4626 let nodes = create_network(4);
4628 // Create some initial channels
4629 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4630 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4631 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4633 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4634 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4635 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4636 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4637 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4639 // Send some more payments
4640 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4641 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4642 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4644 // Test failure packets
4645 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4646 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4648 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4649 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4651 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4652 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4653 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4654 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4655 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4656 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4657 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4659 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4660 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4661 hops.push(RouteHop {
4662 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4663 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4665 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4667 hops.push(RouteHop {
4668 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4669 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4671 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4673 hops.push(RouteHop {
4674 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4675 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4677 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4679 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4680 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4681 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4683 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4684 hops.push(RouteHop {
4685 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4686 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4688 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4690 hops.push(RouteHop {
4691 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4692 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4694 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4696 hops.push(RouteHop {
4697 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4698 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4700 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4702 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4703 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4704 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4706 // Claim the rebalances...
4707 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4708 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4710 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4711 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4713 // Send some payments across both channels
4714 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4715 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4716 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4718 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4720 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4722 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4724 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4726 // Close down the channels...
4727 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4728 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4729 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4730 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4731 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4735 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4736 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4737 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4738 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4740 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4741 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4742 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4743 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4744 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4745 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4747 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4749 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4750 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4752 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4753 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4755 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4756 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4757 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4760 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4761 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4762 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4764 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4765 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4766 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4768 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4769 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4771 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4773 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4774 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4775 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4777 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4778 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4779 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4780 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4781 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4782 res.push(tx.clone());
4787 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4788 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4791 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4793 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4794 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4795 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4796 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4797 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4798 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4800 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4802 res.push(tx.clone());
4806 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4809 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4813 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4814 /// HTLC transaction.
4815 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4816 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4818 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4819 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4820 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4824 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4827 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4828 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4830 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4831 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4832 let mut found_prev = false;
4834 for tx in prev_txn {
4835 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4836 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4837 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4838 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4844 assert!(found_prev);
4846 let mut res = Vec::new();
4847 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4851 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4852 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4853 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4854 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4855 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4861 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4862 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4863 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4864 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4871 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4872 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4876 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4878 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4881 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4884 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4885 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4890 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4892 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4893 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4895 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4896 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4897 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4898 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4899 chan.get_value_stat()
4903 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4904 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4905 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4907 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4908 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4910 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4911 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4913 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4914 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4915 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4916 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4917 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4921 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4923 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4925 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4926 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4931 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4932 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4933 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4936 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4937 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4938 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4945 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4946 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4948 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4950 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4952 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4953 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4954 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4956 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4957 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4961 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4962 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4963 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4965 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4966 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4969 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4972 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4973 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4974 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4975 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4976 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4979 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4980 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4981 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4982 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4983 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4987 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4988 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4989 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4990 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4992 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4993 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4997 // adding pending output
4998 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4999 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5001 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5002 let payment_event_1 = {
5003 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5008 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5012 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5013 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5015 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5016 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5017 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5018 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5023 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5024 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5026 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5028 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5029 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5030 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5032 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5034 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5035 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5036 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5037 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5038 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5039 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5041 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5042 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5043 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5044 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5047 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5049 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5053 // split the rest to test holding cell
5054 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5055 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5057 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5058 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5061 // now see if they go through on both sides
5062 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5063 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5064 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5066 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5069 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5071 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5072 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5073 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5074 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5078 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5079 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5080 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5082 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5083 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5085 // flush the pending htlc
5086 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5087 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5090 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5092 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5095 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5096 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5105 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5106 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5107 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5109 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5110 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5112 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5113 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5115 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5119 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5120 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5121 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5122 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5125 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5127 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5130 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5131 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5132 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5137 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5138 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5139 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5145 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5148 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5149 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5150 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5151 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5153 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5154 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5158 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5159 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5160 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5161 let nodes = create_network(5);
5163 // Create some initial channels
5164 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5165 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5166 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5167 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5169 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5171 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5172 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5173 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5175 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5176 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5178 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5179 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5180 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5181 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5183 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5184 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5185 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5187 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5188 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5190 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5191 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5193 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5194 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5195 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5196 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5198 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5199 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5200 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5202 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5203 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5205 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5206 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5208 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5212 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5214 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5222 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5223 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5224 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5226 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5228 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5229 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5231 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5232 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5234 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5236 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5237 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5238 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5240 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5241 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5242 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5245 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5246 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5247 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5248 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5249 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5253 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5254 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5255 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5256 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5257 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5260 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5262 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5263 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5265 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5266 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5267 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5268 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5269 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5272 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5274 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5275 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5277 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5279 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5280 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5281 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5283 // Create some new channels:
5284 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5286 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5287 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5288 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5289 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5290 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5291 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5292 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5293 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5294 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5295 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5296 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5297 // Revoke the old state
5298 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5301 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5302 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5304 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5305 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5306 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5307 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5309 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5310 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5312 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5314 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5315 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5316 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5317 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5318 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5320 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5322 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5326 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5327 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5328 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5329 let nodes = create_network(2);
5330 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5331 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5332 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5333 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5334 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5335 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5336 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5337 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5339 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5340 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5341 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5342 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5343 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5345 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5347 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5348 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5350 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5351 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5352 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5356 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5357 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5358 let nodes = create_network(2);
5360 // Create some new channel:
5361 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5363 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5364 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5365 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5366 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5367 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5369 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5370 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5377 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5379 //Revoke the old state
5380 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5383 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5385 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5387 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5388 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5389 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5391 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
5392 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
5396 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5397 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5398 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5399 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5400 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5401 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5402 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5403 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5405 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
5406 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5407 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
5409 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5410 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
5411 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5412 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
5413 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5414 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
5416 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5422 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
5423 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
5424 let nodes = create_network(2);
5426 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5428 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5429 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5430 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
5431 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
5432 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5433 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5435 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5436 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5438 //Revoke the old state
5439 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5442 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5444 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5446 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
5447 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5448 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
5450 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
5451 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
5452 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
5453 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
5454 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
5455 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
5456 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
5458 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5459 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5460 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5462 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
5463 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5464 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5465 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5466 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5468 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5469 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5470 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5471 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5472 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5473 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5474 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5475 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5478 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5480 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5481 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5482 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5483 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5484 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5485 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5487 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5488 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5489 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5493 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5494 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5495 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5496 let nodes = create_network(2);
5497 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5499 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5500 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5502 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5505 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5506 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5512 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5513 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5515 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5516 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5519 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5522 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5523 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5529 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5530 // registering new transactions
5531 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5535 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5536 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5537 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5538 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5539 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5541 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5543 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5545 let mut payment_event = {
5546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5551 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5555 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5557 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5558 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5560 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5564 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5565 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5567 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5568 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5569 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5570 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5573 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5574 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5576 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5578 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5579 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5580 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5582 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5583 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5584 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5586 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5587 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5593 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5594 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5595 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5596 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5597 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5601 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5602 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5604 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5605 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5606 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5608 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5609 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5614 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5616 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5617 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5618 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5620 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5621 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5623 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5628 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5632 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5633 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5634 let nodes = create_network(2);
5635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5637 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5638 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5639 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5640 mem::drop(channel_state);
5642 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5643 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5644 headers.push(header.clone());
5646 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5647 headers.push(header.clone());
5649 while !headers.is_empty() {
5650 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5653 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5656 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5657 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5662 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5663 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5664 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5667 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5668 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5670 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
5671 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
5672 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
5673 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5674 res.push(msg.clone());
5676 panic!("Unexpected event")
5684 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5685 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5687 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5689 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5691 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5697 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5698 let mut commitment_update = None;
5699 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5702 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5703 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5704 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5705 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5707 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5708 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5709 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5710 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5715 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5718 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5720 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5721 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5722 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5723 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5725 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5726 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5727 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5728 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5734 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5739 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5740 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5741 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5742 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5743 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
5744 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5745 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
5747 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5748 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5749 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5750 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5752 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5753 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5755 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5758 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5759 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5760 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5761 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5763 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5764 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5766 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5769 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5770 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5771 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5773 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5775 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5776 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5777 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5778 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5779 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5780 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5781 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5784 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5787 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5788 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5789 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5790 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5792 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5794 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5795 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5796 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5797 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5799 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5801 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5803 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5804 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5805 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5807 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5808 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5810 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5811 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5814 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5815 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5817 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5818 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5819 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5821 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5822 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5823 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5826 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5830 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5832 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5833 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5834 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5835 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5836 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5837 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5838 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5841 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5844 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5845 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5846 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5847 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5849 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5851 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5852 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5853 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5854 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5856 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5857 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5858 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5859 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5860 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5862 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5863 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5865 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5866 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5869 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5870 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5872 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5873 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5874 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5875 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5876 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5877 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5878 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5881 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5887 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5888 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5889 let nodes = create_network(3);
5890 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5893 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5894 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5895 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5897 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5898 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5899 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5902 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5903 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5904 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5906 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5907 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5908 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5909 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5911 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5912 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5914 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5915 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5917 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5919 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5920 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5922 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5923 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5928 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5929 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5930 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5936 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5937 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5940 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5941 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5942 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5943 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5944 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5945 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5947 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5950 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5951 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5953 let payment_event = {
5954 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5957 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5959 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5963 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5964 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5966 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5967 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5968 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5970 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5972 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5973 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5974 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5977 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5978 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5979 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5980 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5983 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
5984 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5993 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5995 if messages_delivered < 3 {
5996 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5997 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5998 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5999 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6000 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6001 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6002 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6003 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6004 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6005 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6006 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6007 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6008 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6009 // Everything was delivered...
6010 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6013 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6014 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6016 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6020 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6021 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6022 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6024 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6025 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6027 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6028 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6030 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6031 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6032 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6037 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6040 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6041 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6042 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6043 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6044 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6045 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6046 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6047 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6048 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6049 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6050 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6056 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6058 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6059 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6061 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6062 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6067 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6068 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6070 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6072 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6073 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6077 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6078 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6079 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6080 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6083 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6084 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6085 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6093 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6094 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6095 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6096 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6097 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6098 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6099 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6100 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6102 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6103 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6105 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6108 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6109 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6110 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6111 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6112 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6113 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6114 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6115 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6116 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6117 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6118 // Everything was delivered...
6119 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6122 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6123 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6124 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6126 // Channel should still work fine...
6127 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6128 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6132 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6133 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6134 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6135 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6136 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6140 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6141 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6142 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6143 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6147 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6148 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6149 let nodes = create_network(2);
6150 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6152 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6153 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6155 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6156 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6157 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6159 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6160 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6165 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6166 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6169 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6170 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6175 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6176 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6177 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6178 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6180 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6181 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6183 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6184 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6189 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6190 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6191 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6193 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6195 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6197 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6198 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6199 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6201 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6204 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6214 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6215 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6218 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6219 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6220 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6221 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6222 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6223 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6226 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6227 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6229 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6230 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6235 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6236 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6237 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6243 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6244 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6246 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6247 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6248 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6249 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6250 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6251 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6253 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6254 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6255 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6256 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6258 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6259 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6261 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6262 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6264 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6266 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6267 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6268 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6269 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6270 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6272 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6273 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6274 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6277 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6278 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6279 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6280 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6281 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6282 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6283 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6286 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6287 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6288 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6289 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6290 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6291 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6292 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6296 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6297 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6301 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6302 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6306 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6309 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6310 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6312 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6316 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6317 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6319 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6320 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6322 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6323 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6328 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6329 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6336 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6337 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6338 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6339 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6341 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6342 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6344 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6345 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6348 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6349 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6351 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6355 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6356 // PaymentFailed event
6358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6361 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6362 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6363 // a disconnect in between
6364 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6365 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6367 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6368 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6370 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6371 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6374 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6376 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6379 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6380 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6381 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6384 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6385 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6388 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6389 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6390 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
6391 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6392 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6397 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6398 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6400 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6401 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6402 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6407 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
6409 // Now set it to failed again...
6410 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6411 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6412 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6415 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6416 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6420 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6421 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6422 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6425 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
6426 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6427 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6430 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6431 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6433 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6437 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6438 // PaymentFailed event
6440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6444 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
6445 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
6446 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
6449 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
6450 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
6452 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
6453 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
6454 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
6455 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
6456 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
6457 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
6458 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
6459 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
6460 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
6461 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
6462 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
6463 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
6464 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
6465 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
6466 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
6467 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
6468 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
6469 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6470 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6472 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6474 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6475 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6476 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6478 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6479 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
6480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6482 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6483 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6484 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6486 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
6487 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
6488 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6490 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6491 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6492 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6493 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6494 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6495 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6496 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6497 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6498 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6499 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6501 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6502 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6503 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6504 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6506 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6507 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6512 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6513 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6514 } else { panic!(); }
6517 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6522 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6523 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6524 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6527 // Now fix monitor updating...
6528 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6529 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6532 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6533 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6536 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6537 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6538 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6539 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6540 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6541 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6543 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6544 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6545 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6546 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6548 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6549 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6551 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6554 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6555 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6556 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6558 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6559 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6560 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6561 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6563 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6565 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6567 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6568 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6570 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6572 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6573 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6575 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6576 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6577 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6579 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6580 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6581 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6583 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6584 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6585 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6586 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6587 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6588 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6590 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6592 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6593 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6594 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6596 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6597 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6602 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6603 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6604 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6611 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6612 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6614 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6615 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6616 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6618 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6619 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6622 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6624 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6625 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6626 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6627 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6628 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6635 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6638 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6639 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6640 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6643 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6644 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6646 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6647 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6649 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6650 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6653 let as_commitment_update;
6654 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6656 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6657 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6658 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6659 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6660 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6661 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6662 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6663 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6668 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6669 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6670 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6671 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6672 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6673 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6674 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6678 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6681 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6682 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6684 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6685 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6687 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6688 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6690 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6693 handle_initial_raa!();
6695 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6696 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6698 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6699 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6701 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6702 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6705 handle_initial_raa!();
6707 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6708 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6710 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6711 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6713 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6714 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6716 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6721 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6722 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6724 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6725 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6727 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6728 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6732 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6733 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6734 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6737 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6738 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6739 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6743 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6746 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6747 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6750 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6752 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6753 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6755 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6756 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6757 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6766 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6767 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6768 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6769 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6770 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6771 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6772 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6776 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6777 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6778 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6779 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6780 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6784 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6785 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6786 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6787 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6788 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6789 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6793 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6794 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6795 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6796 let nodes = create_network(2);
6798 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6800 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6801 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6802 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6803 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6805 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6807 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6808 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6810 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6811 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6813 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6815 let mut chan_announcement;
6817 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6819 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6820 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6821 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6822 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6823 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6824 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6825 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6826 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6827 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6832 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6833 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6834 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6835 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6836 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6837 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6838 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6839 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6840 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6841 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6842 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6843 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6844 contents: $unsigned_msg
6849 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6850 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6852 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6854 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6855 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6856 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6857 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6858 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6860 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6861 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6862 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6863 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6866 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
6867 impl Writer for VecWriter {
6868 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
6869 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
6872 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
6873 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
6878 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6879 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6881 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6883 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6885 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6886 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6887 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6889 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6890 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6891 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6892 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6894 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6895 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6896 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6897 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6898 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6899 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6901 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6902 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6903 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
6904 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
6905 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
6906 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
6909 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
6911 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
6912 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
6913 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
6914 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
6915 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
6916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6918 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6919 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6920 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6921 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6923 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6924 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6925 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6928 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
6929 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
6930 for node in nodes.iter() {
6931 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
6932 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
6933 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
6936 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6940 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
6941 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6942 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6944 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6945 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6947 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6949 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6950 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6951 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
6953 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6954 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
6955 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
6956 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
6958 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
6959 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
6960 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
6961 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
6962 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
6963 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
6965 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
6966 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
6967 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
6968 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
6969 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
6970 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
6973 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
6975 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
6976 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
6977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6979 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6981 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
6982 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
6986 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
6987 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
6988 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
6989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6990 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
6991 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
6993 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
6995 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
6996 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
6998 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
6999 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7000 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7001 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7003 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7005 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7006 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7007 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7008 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7009 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7012 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7013 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7014 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7015 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7016 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7017 assert!(read.is_empty());
7018 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7021 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7022 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7023 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7025 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7026 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7027 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7028 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7029 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7030 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7032 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7034 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7035 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7036 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7037 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7038 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7041 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7042 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7045 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7047 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7048 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7049 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7050 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7051 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7053 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7054 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7056 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7057 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7058 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }