1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
23 use util::logger::Logger;
24 use util::errors::APIError;
27 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
28 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
29 use crypto::digest::Digest;
30 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
33 use std::collections::HashMap;
34 use std::collections::hash_map;
35 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
36 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
37 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
39 mod channel_held_info {
42 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
43 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
44 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
45 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
46 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
47 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
48 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
49 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
50 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
53 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
54 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
55 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
56 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
59 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
60 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
61 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
62 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
66 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
67 impl PendingHTLCStatus {
68 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
69 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 payment_hash: [0; 32],
73 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
75 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
83 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
91 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
93 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
94 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
95 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
100 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
101 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
102 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
103 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
105 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
106 IntermediaryHopData {
107 source_short_channel_id: u64,
108 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
112 session_priv: SecretKey,
114 /// Used for channel rebalancing
116 source_short_channel_id: u64,
117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
119 session_priv: SecretKey,
123 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
124 err: msgs::HandleError,
125 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
127 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
129 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
133 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
136 data: err.to_string()
140 needs_channel_force_close: false,
144 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: true,
159 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
160 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
163 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
164 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
168 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
169 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
170 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
171 /// probably increase this significantly.
172 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
174 struct ChannelHolder {
175 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
176 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
177 next_forward: Instant,
178 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
179 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
180 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
181 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
182 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
183 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
184 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
186 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
188 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
189 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
190 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
191 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
192 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
193 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
196 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
198 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
199 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
200 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
201 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
202 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
207 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
208 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
210 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
211 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
212 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
213 /// to individual Channels.
214 pub struct ChannelManager {
215 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
216 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
217 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
218 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
219 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
221 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
222 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
223 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
224 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
226 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
227 our_network_key: SecretKey,
229 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
234 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
236 macro_rules! secp_call {
237 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
240 Err(_) => return Err($err),
247 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
249 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
250 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
255 pub struct ChannelDetails {
256 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
257 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
258 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
259 /// lifetime of the channel.
260 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
261 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
262 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
263 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
264 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
265 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
266 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
270 impl ChannelManager {
271 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
272 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
273 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
274 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
275 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
276 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
279 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
280 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
281 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
282 monitor: monitor.clone(),
286 announce_channels_publicly,
287 fee_proportional_millionths,
288 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
291 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
292 by_id: HashMap::new(),
293 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
294 next_forward: Instant::now(),
295 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
296 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
300 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
304 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
305 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
309 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
310 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
311 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
312 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
313 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
314 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
315 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
316 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
317 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
318 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
320 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
321 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
322 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
323 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
324 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
325 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
326 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
327 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
330 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
331 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
332 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
334 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
338 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
339 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
340 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
341 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
342 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
346 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
347 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
348 node_id: their_network_key,
354 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
355 /// more information.
356 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
357 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
358 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
359 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
360 res.push(ChannelDetails {
361 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
362 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
363 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
364 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
365 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
371 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
372 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
373 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
374 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
375 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
376 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
377 if channel.is_usable() {
378 res.push(ChannelDetails {
379 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
380 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
381 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
382 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
383 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
390 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
391 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
392 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
393 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
394 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
395 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
396 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
397 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
400 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
401 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
402 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
403 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
405 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
406 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
411 for payment_hash in res.1 {
412 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
415 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
416 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
421 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
422 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
423 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
427 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
436 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
437 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
438 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
439 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
442 for tx in local_txn {
443 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
445 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
446 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
447 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
448 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
449 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
450 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
451 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
454 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
455 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
456 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
458 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
459 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
460 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
461 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
462 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
469 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
470 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
472 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
478 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
479 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
480 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
481 for chan in self.list_channels() {
482 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
487 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
489 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
490 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
491 let mut res = [0; 32];
492 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
496 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
497 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
498 let mut res = [0; 32];
499 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
505 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
506 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
507 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
508 let mut res = [0; 32];
509 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
514 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
515 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
516 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
517 let mut res = [0; 32];
518 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
522 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
524 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
525 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
526 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
528 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
529 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
531 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
532 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
533 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
534 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
535 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
537 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
539 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
540 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
542 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
548 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
549 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
550 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
552 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
553 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
559 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
569 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
570 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
571 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
572 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
573 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
574 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
575 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
576 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
578 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
579 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
580 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
581 // the intended recipient).
582 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
583 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
584 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
586 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
587 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
588 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
589 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
593 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
594 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
595 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
597 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
598 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
599 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
601 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
603 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
607 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
609 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
617 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
618 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
620 for i in 0..dst.len() {
625 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
626 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
627 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
628 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
631 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
632 let end_len = iters * 65;
633 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
634 res.resize(end_len, 0);
636 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
637 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
638 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
639 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
640 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
645 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
646 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
648 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
649 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
650 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
651 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
653 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
654 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
655 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
658 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
661 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
662 hmac.input(&packet_data);
663 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
664 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
667 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
669 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
670 hop_data: packet_data,
675 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
676 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
677 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
678 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
680 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
681 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
682 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
683 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
684 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
685 data: packet_crypted,
689 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
690 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
692 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
695 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
696 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
697 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
698 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
702 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
703 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
706 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
708 failuremsg: failuremsg,
712 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
713 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
714 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
720 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
721 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
722 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
725 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, Option<SharedSecret>, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
726 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
729 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
730 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
731 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
732 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
738 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
739 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
740 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
741 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
742 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
743 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
744 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
745 })), None, self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
748 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
749 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
751 let mut channel_state = None;
752 macro_rules! return_err {
753 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
755 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
756 if channel_state.is_none() {
757 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
759 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
760 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
761 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
762 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
763 })), Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap());
768 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
769 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
770 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
771 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
772 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
773 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
774 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
775 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
778 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
779 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
780 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
781 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
782 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
785 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
786 let next_hop_data = {
787 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
788 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
789 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
791 let error_code = match err {
792 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
793 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
795 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
801 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
803 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
805 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
806 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
808 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
809 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
812 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
813 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
814 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
815 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
817 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
819 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
821 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
822 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
823 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
826 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
827 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
828 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
830 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
832 let blinding_factor = {
833 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
834 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
835 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
836 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
837 sha.result(&mut res);
838 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
840 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
846 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
847 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
850 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
852 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
853 hop_data: new_packet_data,
854 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
857 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
858 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
859 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
860 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
861 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
862 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
863 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
867 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
868 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
869 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
870 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
871 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
873 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
875 Some(id) => id.clone(),
877 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
878 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
880 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
882 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
883 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
884 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
886 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
887 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
894 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
899 (pending_forward_info, Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap())
902 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
903 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
904 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
905 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
909 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
911 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
912 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
913 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
914 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
915 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
916 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
917 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
918 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
919 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
920 excess_data: Vec::new(),
923 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
924 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
926 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
932 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
933 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
934 /// fields for more info.
935 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
936 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
937 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
938 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
939 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
940 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
941 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
942 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
943 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
944 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
945 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
947 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
948 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
949 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
950 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
954 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
955 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
956 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
958 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
960 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
962 //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for
964 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
965 HandleError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
966 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
967 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
969 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
971 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
973 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
974 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
975 Some(id) => id.clone()
978 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
979 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
980 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
984 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
985 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
986 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
988 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
991 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
993 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
999 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1000 None => return Ok(()),
1004 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1005 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1008 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1009 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1010 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1011 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1012 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1013 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1014 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1015 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1022 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1023 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1024 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1025 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1026 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1028 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1032 pending_events.push($event);
1037 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1038 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1039 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1041 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1042 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1043 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1046 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1047 mem::drop(channel_state);
1048 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1049 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1058 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1059 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1060 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1062 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1063 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1067 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1068 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1070 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1078 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1079 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1081 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1083 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1085 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1086 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1088 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1089 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1090 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1091 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1092 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1096 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1097 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1098 /// Will likely generate further events.
1099 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1100 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1101 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1103 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1104 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1106 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1110 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1111 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1112 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1113 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1115 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1116 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1117 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1122 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1124 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1125 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1126 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1128 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1129 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1134 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1136 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1137 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1138 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1139 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1140 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1141 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1142 // this channel currently :/.
1149 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1150 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1153 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1154 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1156 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1158 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1162 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1163 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1164 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1165 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1166 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1167 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1168 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1169 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1174 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1175 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1176 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1177 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1184 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1185 match failed_forward.2 {
1186 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
1187 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1191 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1193 new_events.retain(|event| {
1194 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1195 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1196 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1202 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1203 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1204 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1205 events.push(event.1);
1209 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1210 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
1214 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1215 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1216 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1217 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1218 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1219 /// still-available channels.
1220 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
1221 let mut pending_htlc = {
1222 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
1223 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1224 None => return false,
1228 match pending_htlc {
1229 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1230 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
1234 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1239 match pending_htlc {
1240 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1241 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1242 mem::drop(channel_state);
1244 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1245 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1246 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1250 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
1251 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1252 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1253 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1254 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1256 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1257 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1261 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1262 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1263 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1264 None => return false
1267 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1268 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1269 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1271 //TODO: Do something with e?
1278 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1279 mem::drop(channel_state);
1281 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1282 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1285 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1286 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1288 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1289 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1290 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1291 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1292 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1293 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1305 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1306 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1307 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1308 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1309 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1310 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1312 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1313 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1314 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1315 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1316 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1318 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1319 let mut pending_htlc = {
1320 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1321 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1322 None => return false,
1326 match pending_htlc {
1327 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1328 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1329 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1330 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1331 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1332 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1333 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1334 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1340 match pending_htlc {
1341 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1342 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1344 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1346 mem::drop(channel_state);
1347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1348 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1353 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1354 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1355 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1356 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1358 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1359 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1365 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1366 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1367 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1369 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1370 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1371 //TODO: Do something with e?
1377 mem::drop(channel_state);
1378 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1379 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1380 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1384 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1385 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1386 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1388 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1389 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1390 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1391 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1392 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1402 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1403 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1404 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1407 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1408 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1410 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1414 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1415 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1418 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1419 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1423 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1425 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1426 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1427 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1428 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1429 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1430 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1431 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1432 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1435 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1436 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1437 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1439 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1443 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1444 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1445 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1449 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1450 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1451 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1452 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1454 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1455 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1458 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1459 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1461 //TODO: same as above
1462 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1465 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1466 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1467 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1468 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1469 output_script: output_script,
1470 user_channel_id: user_id,
1475 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1476 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1477 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1478 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1480 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1481 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1484 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1485 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1486 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1489 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1495 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1496 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1497 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1498 // for a bogus channel.
1499 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1502 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1503 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1514 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1515 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1516 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1517 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1519 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1520 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1523 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1524 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1526 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1529 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1532 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1533 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1534 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1535 user_channel_id: user_id,
1540 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1541 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1542 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1543 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1545 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1546 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1548 if !chan.is_usable() {
1549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1552 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1553 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1554 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1556 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1557 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1558 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1559 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1560 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1562 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1564 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1565 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1566 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1567 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1568 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1569 contents: announcement,
1570 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1572 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1575 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1576 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1583 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1584 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1585 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1586 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1587 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1592 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1593 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1594 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1595 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1597 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1598 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1599 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1600 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1601 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1602 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1603 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1604 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1605 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1606 msg: funding_locked,
1607 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1609 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1610 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1611 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1612 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1615 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1619 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1620 for tx in txn_matched {
1621 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1622 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1623 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1624 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1626 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1627 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1628 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1629 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1630 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1631 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1640 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1641 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1642 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1644 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1645 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1646 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1647 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1648 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1650 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1659 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1660 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1662 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1663 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1664 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1666 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1669 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1670 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1671 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1672 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1674 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1676 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1677 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1678 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1679 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1680 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1682 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1684 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1694 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1695 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1697 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1698 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1699 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1700 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1703 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1707 macro_rules! handle_error {
1708 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
1711 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
1712 if needs_channel_force_close {
1714 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
1715 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1716 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1718 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1721 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
1722 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
1723 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
1724 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
1725 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
1727 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
1739 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1740 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1741 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1742 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1745 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1746 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1749 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1750 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1753 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1754 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
1757 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1758 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1761 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1762 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1764 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1765 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1767 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1771 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1772 let (res, chan_option) = {
1773 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1774 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1776 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1778 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1779 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1781 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1782 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1783 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1784 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1786 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1787 } else { (res, None) }
1789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1792 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1793 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1796 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1797 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1798 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1799 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1807 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1808 let (res, chan_option) = {
1809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1813 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1814 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1816 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1817 if res.1.is_some() {
1818 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1819 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1820 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1821 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1822 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1823 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1824 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1826 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1827 } else { (res, None) }
1829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1832 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1833 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1835 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1836 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1837 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1838 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1846 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1847 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1848 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1849 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1851 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1852 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1853 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1854 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1856 let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1857 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1859 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1861 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1862 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1863 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1864 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1865 let mut will_forward = false;
1866 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1867 if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1868 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1869 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1870 acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
1872 if !acceptable_cycle {
1873 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
1874 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1877 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret.unwrap(), 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1880 will_forward = true;
1883 will_forward = true;
1887 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1889 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1890 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1892 if !chan.is_usable() {
1893 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1895 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1896 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
1897 forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1899 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1901 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1905 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1907 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1908 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1909 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1910 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1912 _ => unreachable!(),
1914 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1915 source_short_channel_id,
1916 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1922 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1923 source_short_channel_id,
1924 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1933 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1934 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1935 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1936 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1937 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1939 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1942 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1943 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1945 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1947 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1951 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1952 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1955 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1956 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1958 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1960 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1963 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1964 match pending_htlc {
1965 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1966 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1967 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1969 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1970 if res.is_some() { return; }
1972 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1974 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1975 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1976 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1977 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1978 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1980 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1981 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1982 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1984 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1985 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1986 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1987 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1988 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1989 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1990 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1991 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1992 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1993 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1994 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1995 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1996 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1997 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2005 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
2006 // current node as the HMAC validated.
2007 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2008 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
2011 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
2026 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2027 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2028 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2030 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2031 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2033 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2035 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2039 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2040 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
2041 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2042 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2044 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2045 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2047 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
2049 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2052 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2056 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2059 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2060 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
2061 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2062 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2064 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2065 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2067 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
2069 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2072 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2075 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2076 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
2079 let mut forward_event = None;
2080 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2081 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2082 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2083 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2084 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2086 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2087 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2089 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
2091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2092 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
2097 match forward_event {
2099 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2100 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2101 time_forwardable: time
2110 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2112 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2114 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2115 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
2117 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
2119 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
2123 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2124 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2127 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2128 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2129 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2132 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2133 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2134 if no_connection_possible {
2135 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2136 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2137 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2138 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2140 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2141 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2142 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2152 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
2153 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2154 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
2155 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
2161 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2162 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2164 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2165 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2166 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2167 pending_events.push(event);
2172 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2173 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2174 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2175 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2176 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2180 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2187 use chain::chaininterface;
2188 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2189 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2190 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2191 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2193 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2194 use util::test_utils;
2195 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2196 use util::logger::Logger;
2198 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2199 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2200 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2201 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2202 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2203 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2204 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2208 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2209 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2211 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2212 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2214 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2216 use std::collections::HashMap;
2217 use std::default::Default;
2218 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2219 use std::time::Instant;
2222 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2223 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2224 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2229 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2230 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2233 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2234 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2237 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2238 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2241 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2242 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2245 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2246 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2251 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2253 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2254 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2259 fn onion_vectors() {
2260 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2261 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2263 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2264 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2265 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2266 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2267 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2269 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2270 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2271 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2272 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2273 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2275 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2276 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2277 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2278 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2279 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2281 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2282 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2283 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2284 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2285 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2287 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2288 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2289 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2290 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2291 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2293 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2294 let payloads = vec!(
2295 msgs::OnionHopData {
2297 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2298 short_channel_id: 0,
2300 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2304 msgs::OnionHopData {
2306 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2307 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2308 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2309 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2313 msgs::OnionHopData {
2315 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2316 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2317 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2318 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2322 msgs::OnionHopData {
2324 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2325 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2326 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2327 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2331 msgs::OnionHopData {
2333 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2334 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2335 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2336 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2342 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2343 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2345 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2349 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2350 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2352 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2353 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2354 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2356 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2357 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2359 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2360 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2362 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2363 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
2365 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2366 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2368 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2369 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2372 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2373 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2374 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2375 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2377 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2378 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2383 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2384 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2385 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2386 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2390 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2391 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2392 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2394 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2395 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2396 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2397 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2398 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2399 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2404 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2406 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2410 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2411 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2413 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2414 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2415 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2417 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2418 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2420 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2422 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2423 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2424 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2425 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2426 added_monitors.clear();
2428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2431 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2432 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2433 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2434 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2435 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2436 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2437 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2438 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2439 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2440 added_monitors.clear();
2443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2446 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2448 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2449 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2450 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2451 added_monitors.clear();
2454 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2455 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2457 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2458 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2459 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2464 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2465 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2466 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2468 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2469 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2470 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2471 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2478 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2479 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2480 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2481 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2482 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2483 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2484 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2485 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2486 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2487 as_announcement_sigs
2489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2492 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2493 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2494 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2495 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2501 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2502 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2503 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2504 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2505 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2506 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2516 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2519 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2520 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2522 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2523 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2524 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2526 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2529 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2530 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2531 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2534 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2535 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2536 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2537 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2538 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2539 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2545 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2546 if !close_inbound_first {
2547 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2549 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2550 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2551 if close_inbound_first {
2552 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2553 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2554 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2555 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2557 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2558 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2559 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2560 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2562 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2563 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2564 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2566 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2567 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2568 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2569 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2571 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2572 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2573 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2574 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2576 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2577 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2578 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2579 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2585 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2586 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2587 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2588 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2594 (as_update, bs_update)
2599 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2600 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2603 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2605 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2606 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2607 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2608 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2609 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2616 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2617 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2618 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2619 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2620 let our_payment_hash = {
2621 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2622 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2623 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2624 sha.result(&mut ret);
2628 let mut payment_event = {
2629 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2631 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2632 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2633 added_monitors.clear();
2636 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2638 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2640 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2642 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2643 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2645 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2647 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2648 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2651 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2653 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2654 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2655 added_monitors.clear();
2657 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2658 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2660 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2661 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2662 added_monitors.clear();
2664 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2665 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2667 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2668 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2669 added_monitors.clear();
2672 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2673 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2675 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2679 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2680 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2682 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2683 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2684 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2686 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2687 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2688 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2694 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2695 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2696 added_monitors.clear();
2698 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2699 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2705 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2708 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2709 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2711 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2712 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2713 added_monitors.clear();
2716 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2717 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2718 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2720 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2722 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2724 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2726 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2728 added_monitors.clear();
2730 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2732 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2734 added_monitors.clear();
2736 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2737 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2738 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2740 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2742 added_monitors.clear();
2744 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2746 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2747 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2748 added_monitors.clear();
2754 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2755 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2756 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2757 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2758 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2759 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2762 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2765 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2766 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2767 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2768 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2769 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2770 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2771 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2780 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2782 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2785 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2786 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2792 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2794 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2795 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2796 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2797 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2798 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2801 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2804 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2805 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2806 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2807 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2808 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2811 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2812 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2813 let our_payment_hash = {
2814 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2815 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2816 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2817 sha.result(&mut ret);
2821 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2822 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2825 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2826 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2827 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2830 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2831 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2833 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2834 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2835 added_monitors.clear();
2838 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2839 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2840 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2842 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2843 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2846 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2847 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2848 added_monitors.clear();
2850 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2852 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2853 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2854 added_monitors.clear();
2856 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2858 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2859 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2860 added_monitors.clear();
2862 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2863 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2864 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2866 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2868 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2870 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2871 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2873 added_monitors.clear();
2879 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2880 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2881 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2882 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2883 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2884 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2887 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2890 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2891 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2892 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2893 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2894 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2895 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2896 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2904 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2905 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2907 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2910 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2911 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2917 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2918 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2919 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2920 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2921 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2923 for _ in 0..node_count {
2924 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2925 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2926 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2927 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2929 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2930 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2931 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2933 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2934 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2935 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
2942 fn fake_network_test() {
2943 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2944 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2945 let nodes = create_network(4);
2947 // Create some initial channels
2948 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2949 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2950 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2952 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2953 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2954 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2955 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2956 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2958 // Send some more payments
2959 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2960 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2961 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2963 // Test failure packets
2964 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2965 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2967 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2968 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2971 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2972 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2973 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2974 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2975 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2976 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2978 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2979 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2980 hops.push(RouteHop {
2981 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2982 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2984 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2986 hops.push(RouteHop {
2987 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2988 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2990 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2992 hops.push(RouteHop {
2993 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2994 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2996 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2998 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2999 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3000 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3002 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3003 hops.push(RouteHop {
3004 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3005 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3007 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3009 hops.push(RouteHop {
3010 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3011 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3013 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3015 hops.push(RouteHop {
3016 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3017 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3023 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3025 // Claim the rebalances...
3026 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3027 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3029 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3030 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3032 // Send some payments across both channels
3033 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3034 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3035 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3037 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3039 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3041 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3045 // Close down the channels...
3046 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3047 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3048 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3049 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3050 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3052 // Check that we processed all pending events
3054 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3055 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3059 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3060 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3061 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3062 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3063 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3065 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3067 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3068 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3070 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3071 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3072 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3073 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
3074 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3075 res.push(tx.clone());
3079 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3081 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3082 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
3083 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3084 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3085 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
3086 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3087 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3088 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3090 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3092 res.push(tx.clone());
3096 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3102 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3103 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3105 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3107 let mut found_prev = false;
3109 for tx in prev_txn {
3110 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3111 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3112 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3113 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3115 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3116 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3122 assert!(found_prev);
3124 let mut res = Vec::new();
3125 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3129 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3130 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3131 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3132 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3133 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3140 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3141 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3142 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3149 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3150 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3155 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3156 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3157 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3158 let nodes = create_network(5);
3160 // Create some initial channels
3161 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3162 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3163 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3164 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3166 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3167 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3168 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3169 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3172 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3173 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3175 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3176 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3177 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3178 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3180 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3181 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3182 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3184 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3185 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3187 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3188 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3190 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3192 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3193 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3195 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3196 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3197 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3199 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3200 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3202 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3204 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3205 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3206 added_monitors.clear();
3209 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3212 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3215 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3224 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3225 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3227 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3229 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3230 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3232 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3233 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3235 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3237 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3238 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3239 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3241 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3242 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3245 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3246 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3247 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3248 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3249 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3252 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3254 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3255 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3257 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3258 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3259 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3260 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3261 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3264 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3266 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3267 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3269 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3271 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3272 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3273 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3275 // Create some new channels:
3276 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3278 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3279 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3280 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3281 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3282 // Revoke the old state
3283 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3286 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3287 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3289 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3290 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3291 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3293 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3294 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3295 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3296 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3298 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3300 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3301 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3302 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3303 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3305 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3306 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3308 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3309 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3310 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3312 // Check that we processed all pending events
3314 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3315 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3320 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3321 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3322 let nodes = create_network(2);
3323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3325 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3326 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3327 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3328 mem::drop(channel_state);
3330 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3331 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3332 headers.push(header.clone());
3334 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3335 headers.push(header.clone());
3337 while !headers.is_empty() {
3338 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3340 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3341 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3342 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3346 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3347 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3348 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3349 let nodes = create_network(2);
3351 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3353 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3354 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3355 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3356 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3358 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3360 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3361 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3363 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3364 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3366 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3368 let mut chan_announcement;
3370 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3372 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3373 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3374 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3375 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3376 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3377 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3378 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3379 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3380 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3385 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3386 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3387 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3388 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3389 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3390 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3391 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3392 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3393 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3394 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3395 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3396 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3397 contents: $unsigned_msg
3402 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3403 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3404 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3405 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3407 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3408 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3409 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3410 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3411 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3413 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3414 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3415 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3416 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());