1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
143 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
149 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
152 data: err.to_string()
156 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 shutdown_finish: None,
161 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
165 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
166 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
168 data: err.to_string()
172 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 shutdown_finish: None,
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false, shutdown_finish: None }
181 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
186 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188 data: err.to_string()
192 needs_channel_force_close: false,
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
214 needs_channel_force_close: false,
215 shutdown_finish: None,
219 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
222 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
224 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
226 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
228 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
231 data: msg.to_string()
236 needs_channel_force_close: true,
237 shutdown_finish: None,
242 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
243 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
245 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
246 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
248 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
253 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
254 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
255 /// probably increase this significantly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
258 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
259 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
261 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
264 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
265 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
266 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
267 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
268 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
269 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
270 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
272 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
276 struct ChannelHolder {
277 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
278 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
279 next_forward: Instant,
280 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
283 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
284 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
285 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
286 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
288 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
289 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
290 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
291 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
293 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
294 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
295 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
296 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
297 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
298 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
299 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
302 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
304 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
305 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
306 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
307 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
308 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
309 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
314 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
315 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
317 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
318 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
320 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
321 /// to individual Channels.
323 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
324 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
325 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
326 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
328 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
329 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
330 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
331 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
332 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
333 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
334 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
336 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
337 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
338 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
339 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
341 pub struct ChannelManager {
342 default_configuration: UserConfig,
343 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
344 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
345 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
346 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
347 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
349 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
350 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
351 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
353 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
354 our_network_key: SecretKey,
356 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
357 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
358 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
359 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
360 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
362 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
367 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
368 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
369 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
370 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
371 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
372 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
373 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
375 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
376 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
377 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
378 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
381 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
383 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
384 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
387 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
389 macro_rules! secp_call {
390 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err($err),
400 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
402 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
403 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
408 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
409 pub struct ChannelDetails {
410 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
411 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
412 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
413 /// lifetime of the channel.
414 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
415 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
416 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
417 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
418 /// The node_id of our counterparty
419 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
420 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
421 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
422 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
426 macro_rules! handle_error {
427 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
430 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close, shutdown_finish }) => {
431 if needs_channel_force_close {
433 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
434 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
435 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
437 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
440 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
441 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
442 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
443 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
444 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
446 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
452 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
453 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
454 if let Some(update) = update_option {
455 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
467 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
468 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
471 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
472 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
474 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
475 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
476 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
477 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
479 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
486 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
489 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
492 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
493 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
494 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
495 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
497 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
503 impl ChannelManager {
504 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
506 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
507 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
509 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
511 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
512 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
515 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
516 default_configuration: config.clone(),
517 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
518 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
519 monitor: monitor.clone(),
523 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
524 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
527 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
528 by_id: HashMap::new(),
529 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
530 next_forward: Instant::now(),
531 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
532 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
533 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
535 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
537 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
538 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
544 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
545 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
549 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
551 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
552 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
553 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
554 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
556 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
557 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
559 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
560 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
561 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
562 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
566 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
573 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
576 panic!("RNG is bad???");
579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
582 node_id: their_network_key,
588 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
589 /// more information.
590 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
591 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
592 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
593 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
594 res.push(ChannelDetails {
595 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
596 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
597 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
598 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
599 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
605 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
606 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
607 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
608 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
610 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
611 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
612 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
613 // really wanted anyway.
614 if channel.is_live() {
615 res.push(ChannelDetails {
616 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
617 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
618 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
619 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
620 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
627 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
628 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
629 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
631 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
632 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
635 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
640 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
642 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
645 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
646 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
647 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
649 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
650 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
655 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
656 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
657 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
659 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
660 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
665 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
666 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
667 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
676 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
677 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
678 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
679 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
682 for tx in local_txn {
683 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
685 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
686 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
687 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
688 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
689 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
690 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
691 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
694 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
695 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
696 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
701 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
702 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
703 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
704 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
711 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
713 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
720 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
721 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
722 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
723 for chan in self.list_channels() {
724 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
728 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
732 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
733 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
734 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
735 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
739 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
740 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
741 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
742 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
748 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
749 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
750 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
756 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
757 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
759 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
760 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
761 let mut res = [0; 32];
762 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
766 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
767 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
768 let mut res = [0; 32];
769 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
775 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
776 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
777 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
778 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
779 let mut res = [0; 32];
780 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
785 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
786 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
787 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
788 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
789 let mut res = [0; 32];
790 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
794 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
796 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
797 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
798 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
800 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
801 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
803 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
804 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
805 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
806 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
807 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
809 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
811 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
812 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
814 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
820 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
821 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
822 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
824 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
825 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
831 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
841 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
842 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
843 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
844 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
845 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
846 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
847 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
848 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
850 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
851 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
852 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
853 // the intended recipient).
854 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
855 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
856 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
858 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
859 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
860 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
861 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
865 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
866 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
867 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
869 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
870 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
871 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
873 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
875 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
879 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
881 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
889 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
890 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
892 for i in 0..dst.len() {
897 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
898 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
899 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
900 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
903 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
904 let end_len = iters * 65;
905 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
906 res.resize(end_len, 0);
908 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
909 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
910 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
911 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
912 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
917 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
918 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
920 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
921 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
922 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
923 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
925 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
926 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
927 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
930 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
933 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
934 hmac.input(&packet_data);
935 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
936 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
941 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
942 hop_data: packet_data,
947 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
948 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
949 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
950 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
952 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
953 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
954 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
955 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
956 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
957 data: packet_crypted,
961 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
962 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
963 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
965 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
968 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
969 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
970 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
971 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
975 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
976 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
979 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
981 failuremsg: failuremsg,
985 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
986 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
987 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
993 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
994 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
995 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
998 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
999 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1002 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1003 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1004 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1005 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1011 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1012 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
1013 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1014 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1015 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1016 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
1017 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
1018 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1021 let shared_secret = {
1022 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1023 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1026 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1028 let mut channel_state = None;
1029 macro_rules! return_err {
1030 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1032 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1033 if channel_state.is_none() {
1034 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1036 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1037 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1038 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1039 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1040 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1045 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1046 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1047 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1048 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1049 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1050 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1051 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1052 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1055 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1056 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1057 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1058 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1059 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1062 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1063 let next_hop_data = {
1064 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1065 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1066 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1068 let error_code = match err {
1069 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1070 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1072 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1078 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1080 // final_expiry_too_soon
1081 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1082 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1084 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1085 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1086 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1088 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1089 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1090 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1093 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1094 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1095 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1096 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1098 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1100 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1101 short_channel_id: 0,
1102 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1103 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1104 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1107 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1108 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1109 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1111 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1113 let blinding_factor = {
1114 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1115 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1116 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1117 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1118 sha.result(&mut res);
1119 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1121 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1127 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1128 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1131 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1133 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1134 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1135 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1138 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1139 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1140 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1141 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1142 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1143 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1144 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1148 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1149 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1150 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1151 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1152 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1153 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1154 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1156 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1158 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1159 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1161 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1162 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1163 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1164 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1165 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1166 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1167 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1169 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1170 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1172 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1173 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1174 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1176 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1177 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1179 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1180 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1181 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1182 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1184 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1185 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1190 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1191 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1192 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1194 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1195 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1197 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1198 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1200 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1205 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1208 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1209 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1210 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1211 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1212 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1216 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1218 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1219 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1220 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1221 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1222 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1223 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1224 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1225 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1226 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1227 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1230 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1231 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1233 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1239 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1241 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1242 /// fields for more info.
1244 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1245 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1246 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1247 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1248 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1249 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1251 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1253 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1254 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1255 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1256 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1257 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1259 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1260 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1261 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1262 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1266 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1267 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1268 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1270 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1272 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1274 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1275 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1276 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1277 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1279 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1281 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1282 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1285 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1286 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1290 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1291 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1292 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1293 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1295 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1296 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1298 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1301 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1302 route: route.clone(),
1303 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1304 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1305 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1306 } else { unreachable!(); }
1308 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1309 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1310 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_lock, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1311 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1314 channel_lock.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1315 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1316 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1317 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1318 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1319 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1320 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1332 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1334 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1336 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1339 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1343 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1348 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1350 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1351 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1353 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1355 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1356 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1357 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1358 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1360 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1362 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1365 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1366 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1372 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1373 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1374 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1377 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1380 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1387 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1388 // lock before add_update_monitor
1389 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1393 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1395 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1400 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1408 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1409 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1411 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1413 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1415 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1416 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1418 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1419 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1420 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1421 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1422 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1426 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1428 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1429 /// Will likely generate further events.
1430 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1431 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1433 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1434 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1436 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1437 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1439 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1443 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1444 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1445 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1446 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1448 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1449 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1450 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1451 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1452 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1453 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1455 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1460 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1462 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1463 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1464 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1466 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1467 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1469 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1471 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1472 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1477 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1479 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1480 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1481 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1482 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1483 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1484 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1485 // this channel currently :/.
1492 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1493 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1496 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1497 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1499 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1503 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1504 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1507 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1508 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1509 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1510 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1511 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1512 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1514 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1519 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1520 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1521 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1522 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1523 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1525 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1529 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1530 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1531 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1538 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1540 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1541 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1545 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1546 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1547 events.append(&mut new_events);
1550 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1551 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1552 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1554 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1555 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1556 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1557 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1558 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1565 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1566 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1567 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1568 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1569 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1570 /// still-available channels.
1571 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1573 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1574 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1575 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1576 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1577 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1578 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1579 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1584 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1585 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1586 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1589 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1592 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1593 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1594 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1595 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1596 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1598 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1599 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1603 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1605 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1606 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1610 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1611 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1612 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1613 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1617 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1618 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1619 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1620 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1621 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1622 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1624 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1630 //TODO: Do something with e?
1638 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1639 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1640 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1642 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1643 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1644 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1645 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1646 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1647 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1649 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1651 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1652 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1653 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1654 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1655 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1656 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1661 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1663 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1664 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1665 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1666 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1670 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1671 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1672 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1674 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1675 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1677 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1678 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1684 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1685 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1686 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1687 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1688 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1689 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1692 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1693 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1694 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1695 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1696 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1697 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1698 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1699 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1707 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1708 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1709 //TODO: Do something with e?
1717 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1718 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1719 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1722 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1723 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1725 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1726 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1727 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1728 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1732 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1733 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1734 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1735 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1737 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1738 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1739 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1741 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1742 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1743 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1745 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1746 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1753 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1756 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1757 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1758 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1760 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1762 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1763 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1764 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1765 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1770 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1771 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1773 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1774 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1779 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1783 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1794 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1795 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1797 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1799 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1800 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1804 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1809 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1810 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1811 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1817 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1818 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1820 entry.insert(channel);
1826 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1832 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1833 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1836 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1837 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1839 //TODO: same as above
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1844 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1845 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1846 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1847 output_script: output_script,
1848 user_channel_id: user_id,
1853 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1854 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1855 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1856 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1857 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1859 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1860 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1861 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1863 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1868 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1869 // lock before add_update_monitor
1870 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1873 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1875 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1881 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1890 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1891 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1892 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1894 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1896 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1897 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1900 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1901 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1904 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1909 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1910 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1911 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1912 user_channel_id: user_id,
1917 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1922 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1923 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1926 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1927 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1929 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1930 msg: announcement_sigs,
1935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1939 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1940 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1941 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1942 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1944 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1946 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1947 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1950 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1951 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1952 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1953 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1957 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1959 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1963 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1964 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1965 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1967 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1968 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1973 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1977 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1979 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1988 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1989 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1991 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1992 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1994 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1995 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1998 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1999 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2001 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2006 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2007 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2008 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2009 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2010 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2011 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2012 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2014 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2015 } else { (tx, None) }
2017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2021 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2023 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2025 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2034 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2035 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2036 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2037 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2039 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2040 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2041 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2042 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2044 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2045 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2047 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2049 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2050 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2053 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2054 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2055 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2056 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2057 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2058 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2059 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2062 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2063 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2065 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2066 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2067 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2068 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2069 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2070 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2075 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2082 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2083 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2085 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2088 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2089 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2092 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2097 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2101 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2102 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2103 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2104 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2105 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2106 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2107 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2109 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2110 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2114 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2115 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2116 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2119 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2121 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2122 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2123 if res.is_some() { return; }
2125 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2126 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2127 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2129 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2131 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2132 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2133 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2134 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2135 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2137 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2139 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2140 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2141 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2142 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2143 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2144 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2146 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2147 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2148 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2149 // definitely came from the peer in question
2150 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2152 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2154 match error_code & 0xff {
2156 // either from an intermediate or final node
2157 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2158 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2159 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2160 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2161 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2162 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2163 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2164 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2165 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2166 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2167 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2173 if is_from_final_node {
2174 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2175 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2176 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2177 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2178 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2179 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2182 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2183 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2187 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2188 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2189 // does not coform to the spec.
2190 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2191 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2192 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2198 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2202 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2204 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2205 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2206 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2210 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2211 let offset = match error_code {
2212 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2213 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2214 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2215 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2216 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2217 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2219 // node sending unknown code
2220 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2221 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2228 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2229 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2230 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2231 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2232 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2233 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2234 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2235 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2238 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2239 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2240 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2241 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2243 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2244 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2245 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2246 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2247 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2249 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2250 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2251 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2252 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2254 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2255 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2256 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2257 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2259 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2260 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2263 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2264 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2268 res = Some((msg, true));
2274 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2277 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2278 res = Some((None, true));
2282 // node sending unknown code
2283 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2284 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2293 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2294 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2295 } else { ((None, true)) }
2298 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2299 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2300 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2301 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2303 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2304 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2307 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2323 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2333 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2334 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2335 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2338 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2339 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2342 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2343 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2344 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2348 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2349 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2351 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2354 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2355 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2357 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2360 commitment_signed: msg,
2364 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2366 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2377 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2378 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2379 let mut forward_event = None;
2380 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2381 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2382 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2383 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2384 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2386 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2387 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2389 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2392 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2397 match forward_event {
2399 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2400 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2401 time_forwardable: time
2409 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2419 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2421 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2424 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2430 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2436 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2441 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2444 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2449 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2454 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2455 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2458 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2465 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2467 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2471 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2474 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2478 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2479 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2480 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2482 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2483 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2484 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2485 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2486 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2488 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2491 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2492 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2493 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2494 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2495 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2496 contents: announcement,
2498 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2506 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2508 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2512 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2515 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2516 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2517 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2518 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2522 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2524 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2528 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2529 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2531 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2536 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2537 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2539 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2545 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2549 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2554 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2555 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2556 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2566 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2567 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2568 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2569 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2571 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2572 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2574 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2575 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2576 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2578 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2581 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2582 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2584 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2585 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2587 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2588 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2590 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2591 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2592 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2594 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2597 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2598 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2599 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2600 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2601 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2602 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2603 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2604 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2614 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2615 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2617 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2619 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2620 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2621 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2622 node_id: their_node_id,
2626 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2632 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2633 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2634 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2635 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2636 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2641 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2642 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2643 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2644 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2645 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2650 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2651 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2653 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2655 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2656 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2657 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2658 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2659 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2660 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2661 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2662 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2663 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2664 msg: funding_locked,
2666 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2668 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2669 msg: announcement_sigs,
2672 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2673 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2675 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2676 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2680 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2681 for tx in txn_matched {
2682 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2683 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2684 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2685 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2687 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2688 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2689 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2690 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2691 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2692 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2701 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2702 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2703 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2705 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2706 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2707 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2708 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2709 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2720 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2721 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2723 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2724 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2727 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2728 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2730 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2732 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2733 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2734 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2735 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2737 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2738 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2739 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2741 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2753 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2754 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2756 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2757 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2761 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2762 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2763 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2764 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2765 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2768 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2773 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2778 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2783 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2788 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2793 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2794 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2795 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2798 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2799 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2800 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2803 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2808 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2809 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2810 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2813 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2814 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2815 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2818 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2823 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2824 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2825 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2828 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2829 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2830 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2833 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2834 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2835 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2838 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2839 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2840 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2843 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2844 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2845 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2846 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2849 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2850 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2851 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2852 if no_connection_possible {
2853 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2854 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2855 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2856 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2857 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2859 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2860 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2861 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2871 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2872 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2873 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2874 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2875 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2876 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2877 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2878 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2880 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2881 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2882 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2891 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2892 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2894 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2895 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2896 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2901 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2902 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2904 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2906 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2907 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2908 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2909 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2910 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2911 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2912 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2913 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2918 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2919 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2925 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2928 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2929 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2931 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2932 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2933 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2934 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2938 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2943 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2944 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2946 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2947 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2948 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2950 onion.write(writer)?;
2954 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2955 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2956 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2957 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2958 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2963 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2964 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2965 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2967 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2970 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2972 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2973 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2974 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2975 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2976 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2981 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2982 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2984 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2986 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2988 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2990 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2997 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2998 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2999 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3000 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3001 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3002 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3007 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3008 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3010 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3012 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3014 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3016 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3023 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3024 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3025 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3026 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3027 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3028 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3033 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3036 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3039 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3040 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3042 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3044 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3046 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3048 route.write(writer)?;
3049 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3050 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3057 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3058 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3059 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3060 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3061 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3062 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3063 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3064 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3066 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3071 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3074 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3078 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3080 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3081 data.write(writer)?;
3088 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3089 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3090 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3091 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3092 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3093 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3094 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3096 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3101 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3102 prev_short_channel_id,
3107 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3108 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3109 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3111 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3112 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3114 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3115 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3116 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3118 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3119 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3120 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3121 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3122 unfunded_channels += 1;
3125 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3126 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3127 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3128 channel.write(writer)?;
3132 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3133 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3134 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3135 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3136 for forward in pending_forwards {
3137 forward.write(writer)?;
3141 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3142 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3143 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3144 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3145 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3146 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3154 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3156 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3158 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3159 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3160 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3161 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3162 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3163 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3164 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3165 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3166 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3167 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3168 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3169 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3170 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3171 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3172 /// deserialization.
3173 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3175 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3177 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3178 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3179 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3181 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3182 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3183 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3184 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3185 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3187 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3188 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3189 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3190 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3191 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3192 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3193 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3194 /// deserialization.
3195 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3196 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3197 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3198 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3200 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3201 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3203 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3204 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3205 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3206 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3208 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3210 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3213 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3214 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3215 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3216 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3217 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3218 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3221 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3222 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3223 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3227 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3228 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3229 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3230 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3231 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3232 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3233 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3234 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3237 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3238 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3239 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3240 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3241 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3242 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3243 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3244 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3245 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3247 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3248 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3250 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3253 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3257 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3258 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3259 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3263 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3264 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3265 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3266 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3268 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3269 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3270 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3272 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3275 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3276 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3277 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3278 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3279 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3280 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3281 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3282 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3284 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3287 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3289 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3290 monitor: args.monitor,
3291 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3292 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3294 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3295 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3296 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3298 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3301 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3304 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3306 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3308 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3309 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3310 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3311 logger: args.logger,
3312 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3315 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3316 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3317 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3318 //connection or two.
3321 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3327 use chain::chaininterface;
3328 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3329 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3330 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3331 use chain::keysinterface;
3332 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3333 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3334 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3335 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3337 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3338 use util::test_utils;
3339 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3340 use util::errors::APIError;
3341 use util::logger::Logger;
3342 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3343 use util::config::UserConfig;
3345 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3346 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3347 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3348 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3349 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3350 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3351 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3352 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3353 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3354 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3358 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3359 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3361 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3362 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3364 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3366 use std::cell::RefCell;
3367 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3368 use std::default::Default;
3370 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3371 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3372 use std::time::Instant;
3375 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3376 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3377 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3382 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3383 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3386 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3387 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3390 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3391 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3394 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3395 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3398 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3399 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3404 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3406 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3407 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3412 fn onion_vectors() {
3413 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3414 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3416 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3417 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3418 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3419 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3420 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3422 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3423 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3425 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3426 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3428 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3429 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3431 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3432 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3434 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3435 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3437 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3440 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3441 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3443 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3446 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3447 let payloads = vec!(
3448 msgs::OnionHopData {
3450 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3451 short_channel_id: 0,
3453 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3457 msgs::OnionHopData {
3459 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3460 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3461 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3462 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3466 msgs::OnionHopData {
3468 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3469 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3470 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3471 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3475 msgs::OnionHopData {
3477 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3478 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3479 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3480 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3484 msgs::OnionHopData {
3486 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3487 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3488 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3489 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3495 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3496 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3498 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3502 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3503 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3505 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3506 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3507 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
3509 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3510 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3512 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3513 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3515 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3516 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3518 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3519 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3521 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3522 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3525 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3526 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3527 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3528 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3530 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3531 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3536 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3537 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3538 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3539 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3541 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3542 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3543 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3545 impl Drop for Node {
3546 fn drop(&mut self) {
3547 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3548 // Check that we processed all pending events
3549 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3550 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3551 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3556 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3557 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3560 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3561 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3562 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3563 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3566 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3567 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3569 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3572 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3573 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577 }, match events[1] {
3578 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3579 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3580 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3581 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3582 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3583 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3584 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3585 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3593 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3594 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3596 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3599 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3600 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3609 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3610 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3612 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3616 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3625 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3626 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3628 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3629 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3636 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3637 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3638 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3639 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3641 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3645 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3646 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3648 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3649 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3650 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3652 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3653 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3655 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3657 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3658 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3659 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3660 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3661 added_monitors.clear();
3663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3666 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3668 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3669 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3670 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3671 added_monitors.clear();
3674 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3676 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3677 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3678 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3679 added_monitors.clear();
3682 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3683 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3685 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3686 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3687 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3695 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3696 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3697 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3701 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3702 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3703 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3704 ((match events_6[0] {
3705 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3706 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3707 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3711 }, match events_6[1] {
3712 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3713 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3721 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3722 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3726 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3727 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3728 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3729 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3731 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3732 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3733 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3734 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3741 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3742 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3743 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3744 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3745 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3751 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3753 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3756 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3757 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3760 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3761 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3763 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3764 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3765 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3767 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3770 macro_rules! check_spends {
3771 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3773 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3774 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3775 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3776 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3781 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3782 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3784 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3785 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3786 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3787 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3788 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3792 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3794 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3795 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3805 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3806 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3807 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3810 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3811 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3813 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3814 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3815 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3816 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3817 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3823 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3824 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3827 Some(match events_1[1] {
3828 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3829 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3836 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3837 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3838 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3839 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3840 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3841 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3842 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3844 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3845 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3846 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3847 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3848 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3849 (as_update, bs_update)
3851 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3853 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3854 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3855 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3856 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3858 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3859 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3860 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3861 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3862 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3863 (as_update, bs_update)
3865 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3866 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3868 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3873 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3874 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3877 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3878 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3879 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3880 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3881 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3882 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3885 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3887 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3893 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3894 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3896 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3897 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3898 added_monitors.clear();
3903 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3904 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3906 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3907 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3908 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3909 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3910 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3913 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3915 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3916 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3917 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3918 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3919 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3920 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3921 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3922 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3923 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3924 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3926 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3927 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3931 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3933 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3934 if $fail_backwards {
3935 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3936 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3938 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3940 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3941 if $fail_backwards {
3942 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3943 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3945 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3947 added_monitors.clear();
3952 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3954 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3957 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3959 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3960 if $fail_backwards {
3961 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3962 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3963 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3964 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3965 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3967 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3973 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3976 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3977 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3978 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3979 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3980 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3981 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3982 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3987 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3988 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3990 let mut payment_event = {
3991 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3992 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3994 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3996 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3998 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4000 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4001 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4003 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4004 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4005 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4007 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4008 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4010 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4014 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4015 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4017 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4018 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4019 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4021 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4022 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4023 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4025 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4028 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4029 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4030 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4031 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4032 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4038 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4041 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4042 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4043 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4045 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4046 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4047 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4050 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4053 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4054 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4055 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4056 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4057 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4058 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4059 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4060 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4068 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4069 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4071 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4072 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4073 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4074 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4078 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4079 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4081 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4082 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4083 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4084 get_next_msgs!($node)
4086 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4089 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4090 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4095 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4096 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4097 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4098 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4099 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4100 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4101 } else if update_next_msgs {
4102 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4104 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4106 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4107 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4114 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4115 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4118 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4119 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4126 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4127 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4130 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4132 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4133 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4134 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4135 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4136 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4139 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4142 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4143 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4144 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4145 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4146 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4149 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4151 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4153 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4154 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4158 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4159 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4160 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4163 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4164 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4165 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4167 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4168 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4169 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4171 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4172 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4177 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4178 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4179 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4180 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4181 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4182 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4183 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4184 // second-to-last node!
4185 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4188 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4189 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4190 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4192 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4193 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4194 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4195 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4196 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4197 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4198 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4199 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4204 assert!(events.is_empty());
4206 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4207 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4214 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4216 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4219 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4220 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4221 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4228 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4229 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4232 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4233 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4234 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4235 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4236 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4238 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4239 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4241 for _ in 0..node_count {
4242 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4243 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4244 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4245 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4246 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4247 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4248 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4249 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4250 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4251 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4252 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4253 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4254 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4255 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4256 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4264 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4265 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4266 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4267 let channel_id = chan.2;
4270 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4274 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4275 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4276 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4277 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4278 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4279 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4280 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4281 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4282 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4283 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4285 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4287 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4289 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4290 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4293 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4294 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4295 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4296 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4297 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4304 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4305 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4306 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4309 let payment_event = {
4310 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4311 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4312 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4314 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4315 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4317 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4318 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4319 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4320 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4321 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4324 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4325 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4326 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4327 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4330 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4331 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4332 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4333 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4334 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4335 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4336 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4339 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4340 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4341 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4342 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4343 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4344 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4345 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4348 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4349 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4350 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4353 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4354 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4357 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4360 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4361 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4363 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4367 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4372 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4373 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4374 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4375 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4376 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4377 let channel_id = chan.2;
4380 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4382 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4383 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4386 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4387 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4388 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4389 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4397 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4398 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4399 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4402 let payment_event = {
4403 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4404 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4405 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4407 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4408 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4410 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4411 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4412 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4413 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4414 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4417 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4420 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4424 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4425 let nodes = create_network(2);
4426 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4427 let channel_id = chan.2;
4430 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4431 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4432 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4433 // (3) update_fee ->
4434 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4435 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4436 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4437 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4438 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4439 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4440 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4441 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4442 // revoke_and_ack ->
4443 // B should send no response here
4444 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4445 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4446 // revoke_and_ack ->
4448 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4449 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4450 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4453 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4454 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4455 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4456 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4457 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4462 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4464 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4465 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4470 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4471 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4472 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4474 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4475 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4476 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4477 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4482 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4484 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4486 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4487 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4488 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4490 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4491 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4492 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4493 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4494 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4495 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4496 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4498 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4499 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4500 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4502 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4504 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4505 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4509 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4510 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4513 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4514 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4518 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4519 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4522 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4523 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4528 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4529 let nodes = create_network(2);
4530 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4531 let channel_id = chan.2;
4533 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4534 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4537 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4538 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4539 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4540 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4541 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4545 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4547 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4548 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4552 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4555 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4556 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4557 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4566 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4567 let nodes = create_network(2);
4568 let channel_value = 1888;
4569 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4570 let channel_id = chan.2;
4573 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4575 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4577 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4579 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4581 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4582 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4584 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4585 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4587 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4588 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4589 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4590 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4591 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4592 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4595 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4596 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4597 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4600 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4604 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4605 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4606 //Should produce and error.
4607 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4609 assert!(match err.err {
4610 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4614 //clear the message we could not handle
4615 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4619 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4620 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4621 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4622 let channel_id = chan.2;
4625 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4627 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4628 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4631 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4632 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4633 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4634 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4635 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4640 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4641 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4644 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4646 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4648 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4649 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4651 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4652 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4653 added_monitors.clear();
4655 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4656 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4657 // node[1] has nothing to do
4659 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4663 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4664 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4665 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4667 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4669 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4671 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4672 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4673 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4674 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4675 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4676 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4678 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4679 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4681 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4683 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4685 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4687 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4689 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4690 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4692 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4694 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4696 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4699 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4702 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4703 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4705 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4708 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4709 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4714 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4715 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4716 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4720 fn test_update_fee() {
4721 let nodes = create_network(2);
4722 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4723 let channel_id = chan.2;
4726 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4727 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4728 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4729 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4730 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4731 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4732 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4733 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4734 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4735 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4736 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4737 // revoke_and_ack ->
4739 // Create and deliver (1)...
4740 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4741 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4744 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4745 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4746 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4748 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4752 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4754 // Generate (2) and (3):
4755 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4756 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4761 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4764 // Create and deliver (4)...
4765 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4767 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4768 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4769 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4771 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4777 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4780 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4781 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4783 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4784 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4786 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4787 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4790 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4794 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4795 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4796 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4797 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4799 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4800 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4801 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4807 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4808 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4814 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4815 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4816 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4820 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4821 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4822 let nodes = create_network(2);
4823 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4824 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4825 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4826 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4828 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4829 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4830 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4831 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4832 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4834 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4835 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4836 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4837 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4838 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4839 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4841 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4842 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4846 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4847 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4848 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4849 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4850 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4851 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4852 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4854 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4856 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4857 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4858 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4859 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4860 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4862 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4863 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4865 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4866 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4867 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4868 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4869 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4871 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4873 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4874 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4875 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4876 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4877 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4878 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4881 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4882 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4884 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4885 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4886 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4887 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4888 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4889 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4890 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4892 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4895 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4896 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4901 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4902 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4903 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4904 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4905 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4906 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4908 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4910 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4911 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4912 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4913 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4914 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4918 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4919 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4920 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4921 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4922 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4924 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4925 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4926 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4928 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4929 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4930 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4931 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4932 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4933 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4935 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4936 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4937 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4938 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4941 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4943 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4946 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4947 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4948 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4949 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4950 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4951 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4953 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4959 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4961 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4966 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4967 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4968 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4969 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4970 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4971 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4972 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4974 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4976 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4977 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4978 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4979 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4980 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4984 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4985 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4986 let nodes = create_network(2);
4987 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4989 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4990 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4992 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4993 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4994 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4995 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4996 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4997 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4999 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5000 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5001 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5002 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
5003 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
5004 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
5005 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
5006 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
5007 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5009 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
5010 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5012 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5013 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
5015 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5016 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
5017 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5018 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5023 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5024 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5025 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5026 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5029 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5030 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5031 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5032 let nodes = create_network(3);
5033 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5034 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5036 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5038 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5039 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5041 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5042 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5044 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5048 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5049 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5051 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5053 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5057 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5058 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5060 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5061 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5062 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5063 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5066 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5067 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5068 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5070 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5072 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5075 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5077 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5078 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5079 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5080 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5082 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5085 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5088 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5090 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5091 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5092 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5096 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5099 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5100 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5105 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5107 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5108 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5109 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5112 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5113 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5115 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5116 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5117 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5118 if recv_count == 0 {
5119 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5120 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5122 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5123 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5124 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5126 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5127 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5128 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5130 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5133 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5134 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5135 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5137 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5138 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5139 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5140 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5141 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5143 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5144 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5145 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5146 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5147 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5148 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5152 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5153 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5154 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5155 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5156 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5157 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5159 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5160 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5161 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5162 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5165 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5166 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5172 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5174 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5175 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5176 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5177 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5178 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5182 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5183 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5184 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5185 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5189 fn fake_network_test() {
5190 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5191 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5192 let nodes = create_network(4);
5194 // Create some initial channels
5195 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5196 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5197 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5199 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5200 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5203 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5205 // Send some more payments
5206 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5207 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5208 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5210 // Test failure packets
5211 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5212 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5214 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5215 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5217 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5218 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5219 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5220 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5221 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5222 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5223 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5225 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5226 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5227 hops.push(RouteHop {
5228 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5229 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5231 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5233 hops.push(RouteHop {
5234 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5235 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5237 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5239 hops.push(RouteHop {
5240 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5241 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5243 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5245 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5246 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5247 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5249 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5250 hops.push(RouteHop {
5251 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5252 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5254 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5256 hops.push(RouteHop {
5257 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5258 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5260 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5262 hops.push(RouteHop {
5263 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5264 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5266 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5268 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5269 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5270 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5272 // Claim the rebalances...
5273 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5274 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5276 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5277 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5279 // Send some payments across both channels
5280 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5281 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5282 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5284 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5286 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5288 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5289 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5290 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5292 // Close down the channels...
5293 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5294 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5295 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5296 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5297 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5301 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5302 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5303 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5304 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5306 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5307 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5308 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5311 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5313 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5315 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5316 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5318 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5319 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5321 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5322 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5323 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5326 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5327 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5328 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5330 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5331 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5332 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5334 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5335 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5337 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5339 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5340 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5341 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5343 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5344 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5345 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5346 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5347 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5348 res.push(tx.clone());
5353 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5354 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5357 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5359 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5360 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5361 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5362 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5363 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5364 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5366 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5368 res.push(tx.clone());
5372 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5375 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5379 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5380 /// HTLC transaction.
5381 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5382 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5384 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5385 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5386 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5390 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5393 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5394 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5396 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5397 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5398 let mut found_prev = false;
5400 for tx in prev_txn {
5401 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5402 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5403 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5404 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5410 assert!(found_prev);
5412 let mut res = Vec::new();
5413 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5417 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5418 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5419 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5420 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5421 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5427 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5428 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5429 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5430 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5437 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5438 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5442 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5444 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5447 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5448 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5450 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5451 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5455 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5457 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5458 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5460 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5461 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5462 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5463 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5464 chan.get_value_stat()
5468 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5469 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5470 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5472 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5473 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5475 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5476 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5478 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5479 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5480 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5481 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5482 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5486 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5488 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5490 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5491 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5496 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5497 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5498 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5501 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5502 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5503 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5510 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5511 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5513 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5515 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5517 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5518 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5519 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5521 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5522 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5526 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5527 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5528 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5530 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5531 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5534 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5537 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5538 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5539 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5540 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5541 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5544 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5545 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5546 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5547 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5548 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5552 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5553 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5554 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5555 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5557 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5558 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5562 // adding pending output
5563 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5564 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5566 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5567 let payment_event_1 = {
5568 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5571 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5573 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5575 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5577 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5578 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5580 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5581 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5582 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5583 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5588 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5589 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5591 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5592 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5593 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5594 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5595 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5597 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5599 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5600 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5601 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5602 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5603 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5604 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5606 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5607 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5608 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5609 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5613 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5615 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5617 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5618 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5619 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5620 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5621 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5622 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5623 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5624 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5632 // split the rest to test holding cell
5633 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5634 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5636 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5637 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5640 // now see if they go through on both sides
5641 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5642 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5643 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5645 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5646 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5648 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5650 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5651 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5652 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5653 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5657 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5658 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5659 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5661 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5662 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5664 // flush the pending htlc
5665 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5666 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5669 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5671 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5673 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5674 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5675 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5678 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5679 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5682 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5684 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5685 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5686 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5689 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5691 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5692 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5694 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5695 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5696 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5698 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5699 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5700 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5701 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5703 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5704 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5706 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5709 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5710 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5711 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5716 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5717 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5718 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5724 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5725 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5727 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5728 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5729 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5730 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5732 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5733 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5737 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5738 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5739 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5743 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5744 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5745 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5746 let nodes = create_network(5);
5748 // Create some initial channels
5749 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5750 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5751 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5752 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5754 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5755 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5756 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5757 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5758 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5760 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5761 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5763 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5764 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5765 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5766 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5768 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5769 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5770 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5772 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5773 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5775 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5776 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5778 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5779 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5780 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5781 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5783 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5784 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5785 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5787 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5788 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5790 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5791 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5793 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5797 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5799 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5807 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5808 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5809 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5811 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5813 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5814 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5816 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5817 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5819 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5821 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5822 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5823 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5825 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5826 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5827 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5830 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5831 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5832 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5833 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5834 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5838 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5839 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5840 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5841 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5842 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5845 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5847 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5848 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5850 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5851 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5852 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5853 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5854 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5857 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5859 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5860 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5862 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5864 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5865 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5866 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5870 fn test_justice_tx() {
5871 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5873 let nodes = create_network(2);
5874 // Create some new channels:
5875 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5877 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5878 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5879 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5880 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5881 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5883 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5884 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5885 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5888 // Revoke the old state
5889 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5892 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5893 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5895 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5896 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5897 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5900 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5901 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5903 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5905 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5906 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5907 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5908 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5909 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5911 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5913 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5916 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5917 // Create some new channels:
5918 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5920 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5921 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5922 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5923 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5926 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5927 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5928 // Revoke the old state
5929 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5931 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5932 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5934 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5936 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5937 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5939 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5940 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5942 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5944 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5945 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5946 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5947 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5948 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5950 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5956 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5957 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5958 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5959 let nodes = create_network(2);
5960 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5961 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5962 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5963 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5964 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5965 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5966 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5967 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5969 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5970 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5971 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5972 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5975 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5977 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5978 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5980 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5981 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5982 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5986 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5987 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5988 let nodes = create_network(2);
5990 // Create some new channel:
5991 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5993 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5995 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5996 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5997 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5999 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6000 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6001 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6002 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6003 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6005 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6006 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
6007 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6009 //Revoke the old state
6010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6013 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6015 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6017 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6018 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6019 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6021 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6022 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6024 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6026 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6027 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6028 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6029 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6030 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6031 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6032 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6033 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6035 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6036 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6037 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6039 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6040 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6041 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6042 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6043 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6044 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6046 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6047 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6048 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6052 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6053 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6054 let nodes = create_network(2);
6056 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6058 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6059 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6060 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6061 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6062 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6063 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6065 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6066 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6068 //Revoke the old state
6069 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6072 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6074 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6076 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6077 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6078 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6080 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6081 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6082 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6083 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6084 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6085 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6086 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6088 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6089 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6090 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6092 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6093 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6094 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6095 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6096 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6098 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6099 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6100 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6101 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6102 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6103 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6104 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6105 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6107 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6108 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6110 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6111 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6112 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6113 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6114 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6115 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6117 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6118 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6123 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6124 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6125 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6126 let nodes = create_network(2);
6127 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6129 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6130 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6132 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6135 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6136 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6142 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6143 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6145 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6146 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6149 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6153 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6159 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6160 // registering new transactions
6161 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6165 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6166 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6167 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6169 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6171 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6173 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6175 let mut payment_event = {
6176 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6179 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6181 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6185 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6187 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6188 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6190 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6195 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6197 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6198 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6199 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6200 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6203 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6204 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6206 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6208 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6209 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6210 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6212 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6213 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6214 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6216 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6217 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6223 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6224 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6225 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6226 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6227 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6231 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6232 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6234 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6235 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6236 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6238 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6239 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6244 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6246 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6247 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6248 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6250 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6251 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6253 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6255 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6256 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6258 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6262 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6263 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6264 let nodes = create_network(2);
6265 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6267 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6268 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6269 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6270 mem::drop(channel_state);
6272 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6273 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6274 headers.push(header.clone());
6276 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6277 headers.push(header.clone());
6279 while !headers.is_empty() {
6280 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6283 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6286 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6287 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6292 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6293 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6294 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6297 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6298 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6300 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6301 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6302 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6303 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6304 res.push(msg.clone());
6306 panic!("Unexpected event")
6314 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6315 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6317 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6319 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6321 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6327 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6328 let mut commitment_update = None;
6329 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6332 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6333 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6334 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6335 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6337 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6338 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6339 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6340 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6345 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6348 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6350 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6351 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6352 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6353 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6355 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6356 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6357 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6358 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6369 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6370 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6371 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6372 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6373 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6374 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6375 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6377 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6378 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6379 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6380 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6382 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6383 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6385 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6388 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6389 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6390 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6391 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6393 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6394 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6396 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6399 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6400 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6401 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6403 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6404 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6405 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6406 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6407 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6408 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6409 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6410 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6411 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6414 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6417 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6418 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6419 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6420 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6422 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6424 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6425 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6426 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6427 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6429 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6431 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6432 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6433 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6434 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6435 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6437 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6438 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6440 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6441 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6444 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6445 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6447 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6448 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6449 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6450 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6451 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6452 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6453 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6456 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6460 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6461 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6462 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6463 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6464 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6465 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6466 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6467 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6468 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6471 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6474 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6475 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6476 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6477 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6479 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6481 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6482 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6483 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6484 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6486 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6487 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6488 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6489 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6490 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6492 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6493 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6495 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6496 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6499 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6500 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6502 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6503 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6504 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6505 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6506 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6507 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6508 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6511 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6517 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6518 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6519 let nodes = create_network(3);
6520 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6521 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6523 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6524 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6525 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6527 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6528 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6529 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6530 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6532 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6533 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6534 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6536 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6537 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6538 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6539 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6541 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6544 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6545 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6547 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6549 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6552 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6553 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6558 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6559 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6560 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6566 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6567 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6570 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6571 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6572 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6573 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6574 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6575 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6577 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6580 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6581 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6583 let payment_event = {
6584 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6588 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6589 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6591 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6593 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6594 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6596 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6597 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6598 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6600 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6602 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6603 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6604 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6608 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6609 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6610 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6613 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6614 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6615 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6623 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6624 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6625 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6626 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6627 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6628 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6629 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6630 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6631 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6632 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6633 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6635 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6636 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6638 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6639 // Everything was delivered...
6640 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6643 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6644 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6646 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6650 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6651 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6652 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6654 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6655 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6657 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6658 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6660 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6661 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6662 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6667 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6670 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6671 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6672 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6673 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6674 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6675 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6676 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6678 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6679 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6680 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6685 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6686 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6688 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6689 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6691 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6692 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6697 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6698 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6702 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6703 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6704 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6707 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6709 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6710 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6713 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6714 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6723 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6724 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6725 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6727 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6728 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6729 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6730 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6732 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6733 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6738 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6739 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6740 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6741 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6742 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6743 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6744 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6745 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6746 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6747 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6748 // Everything was delivered...
6749 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6752 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6753 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6754 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6756 // Channel should still work fine...
6757 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6758 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6762 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6763 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6764 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6765 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6766 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6770 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6771 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6772 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6773 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6777 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6778 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6779 let nodes = create_network(2);
6780 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6782 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6783 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6785 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6786 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6787 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6789 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6790 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6795 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6797 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6798 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6800 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6801 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6802 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6804 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6805 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6810 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6811 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6816 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6818 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6819 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6821 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6822 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6823 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6827 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6828 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6829 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6830 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6831 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6833 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6835 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6836 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6837 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6839 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6843 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6845 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6849 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6852 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6853 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6855 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6856 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6857 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6858 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6859 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6860 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6861 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6864 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6865 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6867 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6868 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6873 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6874 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6875 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6881 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6882 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6884 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6885 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6886 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6887 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6888 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6889 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6891 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6892 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6893 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6894 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6896 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6897 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6899 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6900 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6902 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6904 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6905 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6906 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6908 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6910 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6911 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6912 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6915 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6916 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6917 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6918 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6919 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6920 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6921 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6925 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6926 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6928 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6929 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6930 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6934 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6935 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6939 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6940 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6947 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6948 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6950 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6954 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6955 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6957 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6958 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6960 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6961 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6966 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6967 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6970 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6974 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6975 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6976 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6977 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6979 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6980 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6982 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6983 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6986 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6987 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6989 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6993 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6994 // PaymentFailed event
6996 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6999 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7000 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7001 // a disconnect in between
7002 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7005 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7006 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7008 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7009 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7012 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7013 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7014 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7017 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7018 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7019 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7022 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7023 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7026 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7027 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7028 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7029 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7030 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7033 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7035 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7038 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7039 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7040 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7045 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7047 // Now set it to failed again...
7048 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7049 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7050 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7054 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7058 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7059 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7060 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7063 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7064 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7065 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7068 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7069 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7071 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7075 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7076 // PaymentFailed event
7078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7082 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7083 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7084 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7087 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7088 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7090 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7091 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7092 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7093 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7094 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7095 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7096 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7097 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7098 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7099 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7100 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7101 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7102 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7103 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7104 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7105 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7106 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7107 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7108 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7110 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7112 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7113 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7114 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7116 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7117 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7120 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7121 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7122 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7124 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7125 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7126 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7128 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7130 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7131 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7132 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7133 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7135 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7136 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7137 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7139 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7140 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7141 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7142 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7144 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7145 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7150 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7151 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7152 } else { panic!(); }
7155 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7160 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7161 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7162 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7165 // Now fix monitor updating...
7166 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7167 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7170 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7171 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7172 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7174 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7175 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7176 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7177 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7178 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7179 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7181 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7182 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7183 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7184 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7186 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7187 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7189 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7192 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7193 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7194 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7196 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7197 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7198 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7199 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7200 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7201 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7203 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7205 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7206 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7208 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7210 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7211 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7213 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7214 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7215 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7217 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7218 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7219 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7221 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7222 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7223 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7224 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7225 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7226 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7228 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7231 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7232 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7234 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7235 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7240 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7241 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7242 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7245 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7249 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7250 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7252 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7253 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7254 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7256 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7257 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7260 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7262 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7263 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7264 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7265 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7266 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7275 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7276 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7277 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7278 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7281 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7282 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7284 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7285 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7287 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7288 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7291 let as_commitment_update;
7292 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7294 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7295 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7296 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7297 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7300 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7301 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7305 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7306 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7307 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7308 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7309 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7310 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7311 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7312 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7316 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7319 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7320 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7322 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7323 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7325 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7326 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7328 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7331 handle_initial_raa!();
7333 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7334 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7336 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7337 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7339 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7340 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7343 handle_initial_raa!();
7345 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7346 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7348 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7349 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7351 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7352 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7354 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7359 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7360 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7362 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7363 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7365 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7366 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7371 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7372 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7375 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7376 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7377 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7380 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7381 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7384 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7385 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7390 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7391 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7393 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7394 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7395 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7400 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7404 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7405 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7406 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7407 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7408 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7409 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7410 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7414 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7415 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7416 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7417 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7418 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7422 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7423 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7424 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7425 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7426 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7427 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7431 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7432 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7434 let nodes = create_network(2);
7436 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7438 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7439 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7440 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7441 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7443 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7445 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7446 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7448 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7449 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7451 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7453 let mut chan_announcement;
7455 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7457 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7458 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7459 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7460 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7461 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7462 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7463 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7464 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7465 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7470 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7471 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7472 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7473 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7474 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7475 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7476 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7477 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7478 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7479 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7480 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7481 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7482 contents: $unsigned_msg
7487 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7488 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7489 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7490 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7492 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7493 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7494 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7495 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7496 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7498 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7499 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7500 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7501 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7504 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7505 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7506 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7507 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7510 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7511 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7516 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7517 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7519 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7521 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7523 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7524 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7525 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7527 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7528 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7529 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7530 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7532 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7533 let config = UserConfig::new();
7534 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7535 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7536 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7537 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7538 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7539 default_config: config,
7541 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7542 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7543 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7544 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7545 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7546 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7549 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7551 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7552 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7553 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7554 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7558 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7559 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7560 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7561 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7563 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7564 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7565 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7566 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7568 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7569 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7570 for node in nodes.iter() {
7571 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7572 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7573 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7580 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7581 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7584 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7585 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7587 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7589 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7590 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7591 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7593 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7594 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7595 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7596 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7598 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7599 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7600 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7601 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7602 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7603 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7604 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7606 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7607 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7608 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7609 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7610 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7611 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7614 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7616 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7617 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7622 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7623 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7627 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7628 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7629 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7630 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7631 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7632 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7634 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7636 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7637 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7639 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7640 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7641 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7642 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7644 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7646 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7647 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7648 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7649 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7650 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7653 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7654 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7655 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7656 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7657 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7658 assert!(read.is_empty());
7659 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7662 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7663 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7664 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7665 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7667 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7668 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7669 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7670 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7671 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7672 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7674 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7676 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7677 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7678 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7679 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7680 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7683 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7684 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7687 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7689 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7690 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7691 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7692 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7693 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7695 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7696 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7697 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7698 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7699 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7700 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7703 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7706 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7707 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7708 for event in events {
7710 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7711 for outp in outputs {
7713 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7715 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7716 script_sig: Script::new(),
7717 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7718 witness: Vec::new(),
7721 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7722 value: output.value,
7724 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7730 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7731 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7732 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7733 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7734 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7735 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7736 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7751 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7754 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7755 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7756 for event in events {
7758 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7759 for outp in outputs {
7761 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7763 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7764 script_sig: Script::new(),
7766 witness: Vec::new(),
7769 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7770 value: output.value,
7772 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7779 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7780 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7781 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7782 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7783 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7784 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7785 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7800 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7801 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7802 match $event[$event_idx] {
7803 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7804 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7805 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7808 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7809 script_sig: Script::new(),
7811 witness: Vec::new(),
7814 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7815 value: output.value,
7817 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7821 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7824 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7826 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7828 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7831 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7834 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7835 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7836 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7837 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7838 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7839 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7840 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7852 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7853 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7854 let nodes = create_network(2);
7856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7857 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7858 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7860 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7863 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7864 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7865 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7868 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7869 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7870 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7871 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7872 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7876 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7877 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7878 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7880 let nodes = create_network(2);
7882 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7883 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7884 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7886 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7889 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7890 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7891 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7894 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7895 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7896 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7898 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7901 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7902 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7903 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7904 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7908 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7909 let nodes = create_network(2);
7911 // Create some initial channels
7912 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7914 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7916 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7917 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7918 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7920 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7921 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7922 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7924 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7925 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7927 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7931 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7932 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7935 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7936 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7938 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7939 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7940 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7942 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7943 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7944 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7948 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7949 let nodes = create_network(2);
7951 // Create some initial channels
7952 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7954 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7955 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7956 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7957 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7959 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7961 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7962 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7963 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7965 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7968 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7969 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7970 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7971 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7972 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7974 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7975 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7976 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7980 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7981 let nodes = create_network(2);
7983 // Create some initial channels
7984 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7986 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7987 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7988 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7989 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7993 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7994 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7995 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7996 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7998 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8001 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8002 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8003 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8004 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8005 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8007 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8008 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8009 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8011 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8015 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8016 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8017 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8018 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8020 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8021 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8022 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
8023 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8027 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
8028 let nodes = create_network(2);
8030 // Create some initial channels
8031 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8033 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8034 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8035 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8036 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8038 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8040 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8041 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8042 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8043 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8045 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8048 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8050 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8051 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8052 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8053 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8055 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8056 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8057 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8059 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8063 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8064 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8065 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8066 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8068 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8069 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8070 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
8071 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8075 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8076 let nodes = create_network(2);
8078 // Create some initial channels
8079 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8081 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8082 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8083 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8084 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8086 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8087 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8089 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8090 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8091 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8097 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8098 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8100 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8101 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8102 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8103 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8105 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8106 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8107 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8108 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8112 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8113 let nodes = create_network(2);
8115 // Create some initial channels
8116 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8118 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8119 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8120 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8121 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8123 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8124 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8125 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8128 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8129 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8131 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8132 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8133 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8134 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8136 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8137 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8138 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8139 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8140 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8141 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8142 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8146 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8147 let nodes = create_network(2);
8149 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8152 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8154 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8155 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8156 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8157 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8158 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8160 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8161 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8162 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8163 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);