1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
24 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
25 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
26 use crypto::digest::Digest;
27 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
28 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
30 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
31 use std::collections::HashMap;
32 use std::collections::hash_map;
34 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
36 mod channel_held_info {
39 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
40 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
41 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
42 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
43 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
44 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
46 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
49 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
50 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
51 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
54 payment_hash: [0; 32],
56 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
58 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
66 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
74 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
76 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
77 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
78 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
83 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
84 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
85 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
86 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
88 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
90 source_short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
95 session_priv: SecretKey,
97 /// Used for channel rebalancing
99 source_short_channel_id: u64,
100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
106 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
107 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
108 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
109 /// probably increase this significantly.
110 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
112 struct ChannelHolder {
113 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
114 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
115 next_forward: Instant,
116 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
117 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
118 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
120 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
121 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
122 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
123 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
124 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
125 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
126 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
129 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
131 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
132 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
133 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
134 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
135 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
136 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
141 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
142 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
143 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
144 /// to individual Channels.
145 pub struct ChannelManager {
146 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
147 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
148 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
149 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
150 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
152 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
153 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
156 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
157 our_network_key: SecretKey,
159 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
162 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
164 macro_rules! secp_call {
168 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
169 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", action: None})
176 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
178 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
179 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
184 pub struct ChannelDetails {
185 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
186 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
187 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
188 /// lifetime of the channel.
189 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
192 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
193 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
194 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
195 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
199 impl ChannelManager {
200 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
201 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
202 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
203 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
204 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
205 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
208 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
209 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
210 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
211 monitor: monitor.clone(),
215 announce_channels_publicly,
216 fee_proportional_millionths,
219 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
220 by_id: HashMap::new(),
221 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
222 next_forward: Instant::now(),
223 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
224 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
228 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
230 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
231 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
235 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
236 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
237 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
238 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
239 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
240 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
241 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
242 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
243 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
245 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
246 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
247 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
248 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
249 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
250 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
251 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
252 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
255 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
256 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
257 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
259 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
263 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
264 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
265 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
266 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
267 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
271 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
272 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
273 node_id: their_network_key,
279 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
280 /// more information.
281 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
282 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
283 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
284 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
285 res.push(ChannelDetails {
286 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
287 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
288 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
289 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
290 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
296 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
297 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
298 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
299 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
300 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
301 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
302 if channel.is_usable() {
303 res.push(ChannelDetails {
304 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
305 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
306 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
307 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
308 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
315 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
316 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
317 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
318 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
319 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
320 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
321 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
322 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
325 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
326 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
327 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
328 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
330 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
331 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
336 for payment_hash in res.1 {
337 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
340 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
346 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
347 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
348 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
352 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
361 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
363 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
364 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
365 let mut res = [0; 32];
366 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
370 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
371 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
372 let mut res = [0; 32];
373 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
379 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
380 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
381 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
382 let mut res = [0; 32];
383 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
388 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
389 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
390 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
391 let mut res = [0; 32];
392 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
396 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
398 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
399 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
400 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
401 let mut first_iteration = true;
403 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
404 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
406 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
407 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
408 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
409 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
410 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
413 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
414 first_iteration = false;
416 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
418 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
419 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
421 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
427 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
428 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
429 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
431 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
432 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
438 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
448 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
449 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
450 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
451 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
452 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
453 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
454 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
455 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
457 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
458 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
459 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
460 // the intended recipient).
461 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
462 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
463 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
465 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
466 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
467 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
468 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
472 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
473 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
474 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
476 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
477 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
478 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
480 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
482 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
486 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
488 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
496 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
497 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
499 for i in 0..dst.len() {
504 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
505 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
506 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
507 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
510 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
511 let end_len = iters * 65;
512 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
513 res.resize(end_len, 0);
515 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
516 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
517 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
518 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
519 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
524 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
525 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
527 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
528 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
529 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
530 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
532 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
533 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
534 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
537 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
540 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
541 hmac.input(&packet_data);
542 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
543 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
546 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
548 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
549 hop_data: packet_data,
554 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
555 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
556 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
557 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
559 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
560 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
561 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
562 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
563 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
564 data: packet_crypted,
568 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
569 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
571 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
574 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
575 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
576 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
577 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
582 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
585 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
587 failuremsg: failuremsg,
591 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
592 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
593 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
599 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
600 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
601 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
604 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
605 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
606 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
607 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
611 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
613 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
614 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
615 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
616 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
617 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
618 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
619 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
620 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
621 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
624 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
625 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
627 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
633 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
634 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
635 /// fields for more info.
636 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
637 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
638 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
639 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
640 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
642 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
643 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
644 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
645 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
649 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
650 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
651 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
656 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
657 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
658 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
660 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
661 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
662 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
663 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
664 Some(id) => id.clone()
667 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
668 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
669 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
671 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
674 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
676 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
680 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
681 // third-party might make this happen:
682 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
686 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
687 None => return Ok(()),
691 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
692 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
695 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
696 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
697 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
698 msgs: vec![update_add],
699 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
704 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
705 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
706 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
708 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
711 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
712 pending_events.push($event);
717 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
718 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
719 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
721 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
723 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
726 mem::drop(channel_state);
727 add_pending_event!(events::Event::DisconnectPeer {
728 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
729 msg: if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } ) = e.action { msg } else { None },
738 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
739 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
740 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
742 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
743 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
747 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
748 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
751 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
752 if !chan.is_usable() || !chan.should_announce() { return Ok(None) }
754 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
755 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
756 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
758 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
759 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
760 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
761 node_signature: our_node_sig,
762 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
766 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
767 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
768 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
770 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
771 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
773 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
777 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
778 if short_chan_id != 0 {
779 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
780 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
782 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
783 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
784 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
789 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
791 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
792 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
793 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
795 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
796 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
801 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
803 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
804 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
805 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
806 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
807 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
808 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
809 // this channel currently :/.
816 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
817 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
820 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
824 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
825 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
827 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
831 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
832 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
833 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
834 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
841 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
842 match failed_forward.2 {
843 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
844 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
848 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
850 new_events.retain(|event| {
851 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
852 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
853 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
859 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
860 events.reserve(new_events.len());
861 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
862 events.push(event.1);
866 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
867 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
868 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
871 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
872 let mut pending_htlc = {
873 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
874 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
875 None => return false,
880 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
881 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
885 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
891 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
892 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
893 mem::drop(channel_state);
895 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
896 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
897 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
901 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
902 let err_packet = match onion_error {
903 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
904 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
905 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
907 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
908 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
912 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
913 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
914 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
918 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
919 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
920 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
922 //TODO: Do something with e?
929 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
930 mem::drop(channel_state);
932 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
933 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
936 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
937 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
940 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
951 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
952 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
953 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
954 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
955 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
956 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
958 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
959 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
960 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
961 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
962 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
964 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
965 let mut pending_htlc = {
966 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
967 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
968 None => return false,
973 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
974 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
975 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
976 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
977 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
978 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
979 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
980 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
987 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
988 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
990 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
992 mem::drop(channel_state);
993 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
994 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
999 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1000 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1001 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1002 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1003 None => return false
1006 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1007 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1008 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1010 //TODO: Do something with e?
1016 mem::drop(channel_state);
1017 match fulfill_msgs {
1018 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1019 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1020 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1023 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1024 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
1037 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1038 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1039 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
1042 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1043 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1045 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1050 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1051 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1052 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1053 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1054 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1059 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1060 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1061 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1063 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1064 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1065 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1066 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1067 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1068 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1071 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1075 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1076 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1077 msg: funding_locked,
1078 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1080 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1082 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1083 for tx in txn_matched {
1084 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1085 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1086 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1087 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1089 channel.force_shutdown();
1090 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1091 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1100 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1101 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1102 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1104 channel.force_shutdown();
1105 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1106 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1114 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1115 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1117 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1118 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1121 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1122 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1123 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1127 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1128 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1129 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1130 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1131 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1132 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1133 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1134 let tx = v.force_shutdown();
1135 for broadcast_tx in tx {
1136 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1138 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1139 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1149 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1150 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1151 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1152 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1153 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1155 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1156 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1157 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1160 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1162 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1163 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1164 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1165 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1166 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1167 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1168 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1169 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1172 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1173 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1174 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1176 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1180 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1181 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1182 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1186 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1187 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1188 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1191 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1192 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1194 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1195 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1197 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1201 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1202 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1203 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1204 output_script: output_script,
1205 user_channel_id: user_id,
1210 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1211 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1212 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1213 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1214 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1215 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1216 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1218 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1219 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1221 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1222 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1223 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1230 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1232 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1233 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1234 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1235 // for a bogus channel.
1236 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1239 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1240 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1244 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1245 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1246 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1247 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1249 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1250 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1252 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1253 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1255 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1258 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1261 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1262 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1263 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1264 user_channel_id: user_id,
1269 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1270 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1271 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1273 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1274 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1276 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1277 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1279 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1283 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1284 let (res, chan_option) = {
1285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1286 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1288 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1290 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1291 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1293 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1294 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1295 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1296 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1298 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1299 } else { (res, None) }
1301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1304 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1305 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1308 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1309 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1310 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1311 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1319 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1320 let (res, chan_option) = {
1321 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1322 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1325 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1326 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1328 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1329 if res.1.is_some() {
1330 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1331 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1332 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1333 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1334 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1335 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1336 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1338 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1339 } else { (res, None) }
1341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1344 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1345 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1347 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1348 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1349 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1350 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1358 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1359 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1360 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1361 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1363 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1364 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1365 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1366 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1368 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1369 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1371 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1374 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1375 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1376 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1377 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1383 macro_rules! return_err {
1384 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1385 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1387 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1388 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1389 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1390 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1391 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1398 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1399 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1400 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1401 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1402 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1403 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1404 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1405 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1408 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1409 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1410 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1411 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1412 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1415 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1416 let next_hop_data = {
1417 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1418 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1419 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1421 let error_code = match err {
1422 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1423 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1425 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1431 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1433 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1434 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1436 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1437 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1440 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1441 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1442 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1443 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1445 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1447 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1448 short_channel_id: 0,
1449 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1450 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1451 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1454 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1455 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1456 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1458 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1460 let blinding_factor = {
1461 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1462 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1463 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1464 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1465 sha.result(&mut res);
1466 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1468 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1470 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1476 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1478 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1480 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1485 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1487 public_key: new_pubkey,
1488 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1489 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1492 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1494 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1495 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1496 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1497 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1498 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1499 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1500 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1504 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1507 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1508 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1510 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1512 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1514 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1515 if !chan.is_live() {
1516 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1517 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1521 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1523 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1524 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1525 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1526 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1527 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1528 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1529 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1531 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1532 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1536 if !acceptable_cycle {
1537 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1543 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1545 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1546 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1548 if !chan.is_usable() {
1549 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1551 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1552 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1553 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1555 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), //TODO: panic?
1558 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1560 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1561 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1562 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1563 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1565 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1567 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1568 source_short_channel_id,
1569 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1575 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1576 source_short_channel_id,
1577 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1585 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1586 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1587 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1588 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1589 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1592 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1593 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1595 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1596 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1598 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1600 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1603 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1609 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1610 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1611 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1613 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1614 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1616 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1618 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1621 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1622 match pending_htlc {
1623 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1624 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1625 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1627 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1628 if res.is_some() { return; }
1630 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1632 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1633 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1634 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1635 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1636 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1638 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1639 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1640 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1642 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1643 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1644 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1645 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1646 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1647 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1648 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1649 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1650 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1651 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1652 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1653 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1654 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1655 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1663 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1664 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1665 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1666 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1669 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1684 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1685 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1686 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1688 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1689 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1691 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1693 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1697 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1698 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1702 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1703 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1705 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1707 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1710 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1714 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1717 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1718 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1719 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1722 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1723 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1725 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1727 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1730 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1733 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1737 let mut forward_event = None;
1738 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1739 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1741 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1742 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1744 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1745 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1747 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1750 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1755 match forward_event {
1757 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1758 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1759 time_forwardable: time
1768 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1769 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1770 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1772 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1773 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1775 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1777 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1781 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1782 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1783 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1784 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1786 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1787 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1789 if !chan.is_usable() {
1790 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: None });
1793 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1794 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1796 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1797 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1798 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1799 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1801 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1803 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1804 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1805 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1806 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1807 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1808 contents: announcement,
1809 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1811 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1814 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1815 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1819 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1820 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1824 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1825 if no_connection_possible {
1826 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1827 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1828 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1829 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1831 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1832 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1833 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1835 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1836 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1846 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1847 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1848 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1849 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1855 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1856 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1857 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1858 pending_events.push(event);
1866 use chain::chaininterface;
1867 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1868 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
1869 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1870 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1872 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1873 use util::test_utils;
1874 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1876 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1877 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1878 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
1879 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1880 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1881 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1882 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1884 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1885 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1887 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1888 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1890 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1892 use std::collections::HashMap;
1893 use std::default::Default;
1894 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1895 use std::time::Instant;
1898 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1899 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1905 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1906 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1909 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1910 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1913 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1914 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1917 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1918 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1921 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1922 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1927 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1929 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1930 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1935 fn onion_vectors() {
1936 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1937 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1939 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1940 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1941 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1942 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1943 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1945 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1946 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1947 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1948 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1949 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1951 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1952 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1953 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1954 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1955 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1957 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1958 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1959 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1960 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1961 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1963 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1964 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1965 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1966 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1967 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1969 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1970 let payloads = vec!(
1971 msgs::OnionHopData {
1973 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1974 short_channel_id: 0,
1976 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1980 msgs::OnionHopData {
1982 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1983 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1984 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1985 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1989 msgs::OnionHopData {
1991 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1992 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1993 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1994 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1998 msgs::OnionHopData {
2000 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2001 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2002 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2003 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2007 msgs::OnionHopData {
2009 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2010 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2011 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2012 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2018 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2019 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2021 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2025 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2026 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2028 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2029 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2030 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2032 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2033 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2035 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2036 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2038 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2039 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2041 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2042 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap());
2044 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2045 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
2048 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2049 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2050 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2051 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2053 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2054 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2059 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
2060 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2061 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2062 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2064 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2068 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2069 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2070 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2072 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2073 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2074 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2075 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2076 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2077 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2082 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2084 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2088 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2089 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2091 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2092 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2093 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2095 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2096 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2098 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2100 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2101 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2102 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2103 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2104 added_monitors.clear();
2106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2109 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2110 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2111 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2112 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2113 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2114 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2115 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2116 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2117 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2118 added_monitors.clear();
2121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2124 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2126 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2127 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2128 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2129 added_monitors.clear();
2132 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2133 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2135 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2136 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2137 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2142 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2143 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2144 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2146 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2147 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2148 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2149 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2156 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2157 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2158 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2159 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2160 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2161 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2162 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2163 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2164 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2165 as_announcement_sigs
2167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2170 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2171 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2172 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2173 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2179 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2180 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2181 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2182 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2183 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2184 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2194 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2197 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2198 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2200 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2201 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2202 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2204 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2207 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2208 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2209 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2212 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2213 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2214 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2215 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2216 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2217 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2223 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2224 if !close_inbound_first {
2225 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2227 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2228 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2229 if close_inbound_first {
2230 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2231 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2232 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2233 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2235 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2236 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2237 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2238 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2240 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2241 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2242 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2244 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2245 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2246 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2247 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2249 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2250 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2251 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2252 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2254 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2255 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2256 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2257 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2263 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2264 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2265 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2266 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2272 (as_update, bs_update)
2277 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2278 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2281 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2283 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2284 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2291 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2292 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2293 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2294 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2295 let our_payment_hash = {
2296 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2297 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2298 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2299 sha.result(&mut ret);
2303 let mut payment_event = {
2304 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2306 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2307 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2308 added_monitors.clear();
2311 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2313 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2315 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2317 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2318 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2320 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2322 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2323 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2326 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2328 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2329 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2330 added_monitors.clear();
2332 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2333 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2335 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2336 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2337 added_monitors.clear();
2339 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2340 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2342 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2343 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2344 added_monitors.clear();
2347 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2348 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2350 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2354 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2355 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2357 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2358 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2359 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2361 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2362 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2363 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2369 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2370 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2371 added_monitors.clear();
2373 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2374 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2380 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2383 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2384 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2386 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2387 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2388 added_monitors.clear();
2391 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2392 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2393 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2395 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2397 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2399 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2401 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2402 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2404 added_monitors.clear();
2406 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2408 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2409 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2410 added_monitors.clear();
2412 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2413 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2414 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2416 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2417 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2418 added_monitors.clear();
2420 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2422 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2423 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2424 added_monitors.clear();
2430 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2431 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2432 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2433 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2434 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2435 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2438 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2439 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2441 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2442 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2443 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2445 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2451 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2452 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2454 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2457 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2458 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2464 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2466 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2467 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2468 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2469 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2470 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2473 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2476 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2477 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2478 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2479 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2480 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2483 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2484 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2485 let our_payment_hash = {
2486 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2487 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2488 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2489 sha.result(&mut ret);
2493 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2497 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2498 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2499 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2502 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2503 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2505 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2506 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2507 added_monitors.clear();
2510 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2511 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2512 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2514 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2515 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2518 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2519 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2520 added_monitors.clear();
2522 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2524 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2525 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2526 added_monitors.clear();
2528 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2530 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2531 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2532 added_monitors.clear();
2534 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2535 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2536 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2538 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2540 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2543 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2545 added_monitors.clear();
2551 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2552 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2553 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2554 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2555 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2556 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2559 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2560 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2562 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2563 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2564 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2572 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2573 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2575 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2578 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2579 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2585 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2586 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2587 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2588 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2590 for _ in 0..node_count {
2591 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2592 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2593 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2594 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2596 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2597 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2598 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2600 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2601 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2602 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2609 fn fake_network_test() {
2610 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2611 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2612 let nodes = create_network(4);
2614 // Create some initial channels
2615 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2616 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2617 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2619 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2620 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2621 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2622 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2623 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2625 // Send some more payments
2626 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2627 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2628 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2630 // Test failure packets
2631 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2632 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2634 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2635 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2637 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2638 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2639 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2640 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2641 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2642 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2643 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2645 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2646 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2647 hops.push(RouteHop {
2648 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2649 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2651 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2653 hops.push(RouteHop {
2654 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2655 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2657 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2659 hops.push(RouteHop {
2660 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2661 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2663 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2665 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2666 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2667 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2669 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2670 hops.push(RouteHop {
2671 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2672 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2674 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2676 hops.push(RouteHop {
2677 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2678 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2680 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2682 hops.push(RouteHop {
2683 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2684 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2686 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2688 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2689 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2690 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2692 // Claim the rebalances...
2693 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2694 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2696 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2697 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2699 // Send some payments across both channels
2700 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2701 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2702 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2704 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2706 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2708 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2709 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2710 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2712 // Close down the channels...
2713 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2714 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2715 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2716 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2717 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2719 // Check that we processed all pending events
2721 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2722 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2726 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2727 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2728 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2729 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2730 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2732 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2734 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2735 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2737 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2738 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2739 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2740 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2741 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2742 res.push(tx.clone());
2746 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2748 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2749 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2750 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2751 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2752 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2753 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2754 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2755 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2757 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2759 res.push(tx.clone());
2763 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2769 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2770 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2772 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2773 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2774 let mut found_prev = false;
2776 for tx in prev_txn {
2777 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2778 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2779 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2780 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2782 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2783 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2789 assert!(found_prev);
2791 let mut res = Vec::new();
2792 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2796 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2797 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2798 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2799 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2800 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2806 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2807 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2808 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2809 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2816 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2817 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2822 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2823 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2824 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2825 let nodes = create_network(5);
2827 // Create some initial channels
2828 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2831 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2833 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2834 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2836 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2837 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2839 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2840 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2842 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2843 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2844 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2847 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2849 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2851 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2852 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2854 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2855 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2857 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2858 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2859 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
2860 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2862 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2863 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2864 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2866 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2867 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2869 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2871 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2872 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2873 added_monitors.clear();
2876 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2879 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2880 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2888 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2889 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2890 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2892 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2894 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2895 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2897 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2898 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2900 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2902 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2903 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2904 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2906 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2907 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2910 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2911 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2912 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2913 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2914 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2917 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2919 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2920 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2922 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2923 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2924 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2925 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2926 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2929 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2931 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2932 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2934 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2936 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2937 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2938 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2940 // Create some new channels:
2941 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2943 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2944 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2945 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2946 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2947 // Revoke the old state
2948 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2951 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2952 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2954 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2955 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2956 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2958 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2959 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2960 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2964 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
2965 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2966 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2967 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
2969 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2970 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2972 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2974 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2976 // Check that we processed all pending events
2978 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2979 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2984 fn test_unconf_chan() {
2985 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
2986 let nodes = create_network(2);
2987 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2989 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2990 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
2991 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
2992 mem::drop(channel_state);
2994 let mut headers = Vec::new();
2995 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2996 headers.push(header.clone());
2998 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2999 headers.push(header.clone());
3001 while !headers.is_empty() {
3002 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3004 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3005 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3006 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);