1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
148 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
151 data: err.to_string()
155 needs_channel_force_close: false,
159 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 needs_channel_force_close: true,
174 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
182 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
185 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
187 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
189 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
191 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
194 data: msg.to_string()
199 needs_channel_force_close: false,
203 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
206 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
208 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
210 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
212 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
215 data: msg.to_string()
220 needs_channel_force_close: true,
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
231 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
244 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
247 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
248 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
249 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
250 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
252 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
253 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
255 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
259 struct ChannelHolder {
260 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
261 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 next_forward: Instant,
263 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
264 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
265 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
266 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
267 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
268 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
269 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
271 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
272 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
273 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
274 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
276 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
277 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
278 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
279 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
280 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
281 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
282 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
285 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
287 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
288 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
289 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
290 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
291 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
292 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
297 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
298 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
300 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
301 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
303 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
304 /// to individual Channels.
305 pub struct ChannelManager {
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
313 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
314 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
315 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
317 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
318 our_network_key: SecretKey,
320 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
322 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
327 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
328 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
329 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
330 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
331 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
332 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
333 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
335 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
336 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
337 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
338 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
341 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
343 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
344 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
347 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
349 macro_rules! secp_call {
350 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
353 Err(_) => return Err($err),
360 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
362 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
363 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
368 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
369 pub struct ChannelDetails {
370 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
371 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
372 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
373 /// lifetime of the channel.
374 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
375 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
376 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
377 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
378 /// The node_id of our counterparty
379 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
380 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
381 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
382 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
386 impl ChannelManager {
387 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
389 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
390 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
392 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
393 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
395 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
396 pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
399 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
400 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
401 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
402 monitor: monitor.clone(),
406 announce_channels_publicly,
407 fee_proportional_millionths,
408 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
411 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
412 by_id: HashMap::new(),
413 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
414 next_forward: Instant::now(),
415 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
416 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
417 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
419 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
421 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
427 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
428 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
432 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
434 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
435 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
436 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
437 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
439 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
440 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
442 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
443 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
444 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
445 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
446 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
447 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
449 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
450 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
452 panic!("RNG is bad???");
455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
457 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
458 node_id: their_network_key,
464 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
465 /// more information.
466 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
467 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
468 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
469 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
470 res.push(ChannelDetails {
471 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
472 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
473 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
474 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
475 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
481 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
482 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
483 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
484 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
485 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
486 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
487 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
488 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
489 // really wanted anyway.
490 if channel.is_live() {
491 res.push(ChannelDetails {
492 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
493 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
494 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
495 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
496 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
503 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
504 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
505 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
507 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
508 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
509 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
510 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
511 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
512 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
514 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
516 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
519 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
520 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
521 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
523 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
524 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
529 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
530 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
533 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
539 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
540 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
550 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
551 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
552 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
553 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
556 for tx in local_txn {
557 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
559 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
560 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
561 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
562 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
563 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
564 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
565 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
568 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
569 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
570 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
573 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
574 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
575 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
576 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
583 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
584 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
585 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
586 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
592 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
593 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
594 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
595 for chan in self.list_channels() {
596 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
600 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
602 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
604 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
605 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
606 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
607 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
611 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
612 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
613 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
614 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
615 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
620 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
621 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
622 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
628 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
630 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
631 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
632 let mut res = [0; 32];
633 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
637 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
638 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
639 let mut res = [0; 32];
640 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
646 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
647 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
648 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
649 let mut res = [0; 32];
650 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
655 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
656 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
657 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
658 let mut res = [0; 32];
659 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
663 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
665 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
666 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
667 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
669 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
670 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
672 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
673 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
674 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
675 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
676 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
678 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
680 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
681 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
683 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
689 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
690 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
691 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
693 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
694 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
700 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
710 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
711 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
712 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
713 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
714 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
715 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
716 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
717 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
719 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
720 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
721 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
722 // the intended recipient).
723 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
724 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
725 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
727 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
728 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
729 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
730 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
734 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
735 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
736 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
738 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
739 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
740 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
742 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
744 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
748 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
750 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
758 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
759 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
761 for i in 0..dst.len() {
766 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
767 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
768 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
769 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
772 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
773 let end_len = iters * 65;
774 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
775 res.resize(end_len, 0);
777 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
778 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
779 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
780 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
781 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
786 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
787 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
789 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
790 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
791 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
792 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
794 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
795 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
796 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
799 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
802 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
803 hmac.input(&packet_data);
804 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
805 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
810 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
811 hop_data: packet_data,
816 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
817 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
818 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
819 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
821 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
822 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
823 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
824 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
825 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
826 data: packet_crypted,
830 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
831 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
833 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
836 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
837 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
838 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
839 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
843 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
844 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
847 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
849 failuremsg: failuremsg,
853 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
854 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
855 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
861 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
862 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
863 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
866 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
867 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
870 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
871 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
872 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
873 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
879 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
880 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
881 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
882 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
883 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
884 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
885 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
886 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
889 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
890 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
892 let mut channel_state = None;
893 macro_rules! return_err {
894 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
896 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
897 if channel_state.is_none() {
898 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
900 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
901 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
902 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
903 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
904 })), channel_state.unwrap());
909 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
910 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
911 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
912 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
913 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
914 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
915 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
916 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
919 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
920 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
921 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
922 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
923 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
926 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
927 let next_hop_data = {
928 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
929 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
930 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
932 let error_code = match err {
933 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
934 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
936 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
942 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
944 // final_expiry_too_soon
945 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
946 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
948 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
949 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
950 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
952 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
953 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
954 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
957 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
958 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
959 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
960 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
962 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
964 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
966 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
967 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
968 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
971 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
972 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
973 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
975 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
977 let blinding_factor = {
978 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
979 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
980 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
981 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
982 sha.result(&mut res);
983 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
985 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
991 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
992 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
995 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
997 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
998 hop_data: new_packet_data,
999 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1002 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1003 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1004 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1005 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1006 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
1007 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1008 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1012 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1013 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1014 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1015 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1016 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1017 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1018 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1020 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1022 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1023 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1025 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1026 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1027 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1028 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1029 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1030 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1031 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1033 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1034 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1036 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1037 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1038 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1040 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1041 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1043 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1044 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1045 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1046 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1048 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1049 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1054 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1055 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1056 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1058 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1059 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1061 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1062 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1064 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1069 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1072 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1073 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1074 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1075 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1076 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1080 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1082 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1083 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1084 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1085 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1086 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1087 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1088 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1089 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1090 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1091 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1094 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1095 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1097 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1103 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1105 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1106 /// fields for more info.
1108 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1109 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1110 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1111 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1112 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1113 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1115 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1117 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1118 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1119 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1120 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1121 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1123 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1124 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1125 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1126 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1130 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1131 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1132 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1134 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1136 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1138 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1139 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1140 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1141 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1143 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1145 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1146 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1147 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1151 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1152 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1153 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1155 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1156 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1158 if !chan.is_live() {
1159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1161 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1162 route: route.clone(),
1163 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1164 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1165 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1168 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1169 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1170 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1171 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1174 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1175 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1176 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1177 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1178 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1179 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1180 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1192 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1194 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1196 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1197 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1198 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1199 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1200 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1201 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1203 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1204 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1205 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1208 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1209 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1210 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1220 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1221 // lock before add_update_monitor
1222 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1226 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1228 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1231 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1233 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1241 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1242 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1244 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1246 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1248 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1249 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1251 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1252 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1253 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1254 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1255 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1259 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1261 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1262 /// Will likely generate further events.
1263 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1264 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1265 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1267 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1268 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1270 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1274 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1275 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1276 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1277 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1279 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1280 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1281 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1282 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1283 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1284 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1286 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1291 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1293 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1294 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1295 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1296 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1297 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1300 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1302 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1303 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1308 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1310 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1311 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1312 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1313 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1314 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1315 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1316 // this channel currently :/.
1323 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1324 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1327 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1328 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1330 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1332 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1336 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1337 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1340 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1341 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1342 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1343 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1344 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1345 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1347 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1352 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1353 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1354 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1355 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1356 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1358 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1362 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1363 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1364 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1371 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1373 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1374 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1378 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1379 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1380 events.append(&mut new_events);
1383 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1384 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1385 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1386 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1387 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1388 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1389 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1390 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1396 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1397 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1398 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1399 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1400 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1401 /// still-available channels.
1402 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1404 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1405 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1406 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1407 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1408 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1409 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1410 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1415 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1416 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1417 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1420 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1423 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1424 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1425 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1426 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1427 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1429 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1430 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1434 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1436 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1437 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1441 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1442 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1443 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1444 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1448 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1449 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1450 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1451 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1452 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1453 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1455 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1461 //TODO: Do something with e?
1469 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1470 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1471 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1473 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1474 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1475 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1476 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1477 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1478 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1480 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1481 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1482 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1483 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1484 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1485 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1490 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1492 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1493 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1494 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1495 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1499 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1500 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1501 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1503 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1504 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1506 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1507 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1513 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1514 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1515 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1516 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1517 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1518 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1521 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1522 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1523 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1524 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1525 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1526 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1527 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1528 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1536 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1537 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1538 //TODO: Do something with e?
1546 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1547 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1548 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1551 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1552 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1554 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1555 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1556 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1557 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1560 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1561 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1562 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1563 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1564 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1565 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1566 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1567 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1569 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1570 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1571 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1573 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1574 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1575 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1581 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1584 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1585 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1586 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1588 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1590 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1591 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1592 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1593 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1598 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1599 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1601 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1602 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1607 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1611 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1622 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1625 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1627 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1628 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1632 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1633 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1637 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1638 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1639 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1640 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1641 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1645 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1646 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1648 entry.insert(channel);
1654 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1655 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1656 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1657 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1659 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1660 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1663 chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1664 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1665 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1667 //TODO: same as above
1668 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1671 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1672 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1673 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1674 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1675 output_script: output_script,
1676 user_channel_id: user_id,
1681 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1682 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1683 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1684 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1686 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1687 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1690 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1691 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1692 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1695 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1702 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1703 // lock before add_update_monitor
1704 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1707 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1708 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1709 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1711 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1715 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1724 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1725 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1726 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1729 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1730 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1733 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1734 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1737 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1739 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1742 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1743 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1744 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1745 user_channel_id: user_id,
1750 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1751 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1752 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1753 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1755 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1756 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1759 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1760 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1761 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
1762 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1763 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1764 msg: announcement_sigs,
1769 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1773 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1774 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1776 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1780 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1781 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1784 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1785 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1786 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1787 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1791 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1793 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1797 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1798 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1799 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1801 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1802 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1807 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1808 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1811 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1812 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1813 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1822 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1823 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1824 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1825 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1826 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1828 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1829 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1832 let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1833 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1835 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1840 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1841 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1842 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1843 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1844 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1845 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1846 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1848 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1849 } else { (tx, None) }
1851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1854 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1855 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1857 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1858 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1859 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1868 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1869 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1870 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1871 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1873 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1874 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1875 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1876 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1878 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1879 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1881 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1883 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1884 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1887 if !chan.is_usable() {
1888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1890 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1892 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1896 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1897 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1900 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1901 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1904 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1905 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1907 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1909 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1913 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1914 // indicating that the payment itself failed
1915 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1916 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1917 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1918 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1919 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1921 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1922 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1926 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1927 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1928 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1931 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1933 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1934 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1935 if res.is_some() { return; }
1937 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1938 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1939 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1941 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1943 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1944 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1945 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1946 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1947 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1949 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1951 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1952 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1953 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1954 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1955 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1956 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1958 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1959 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1960 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1961 // definitely came from the peer in question
1962 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1964 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1966 match error_code & 0xff {
1968 // either from an intermediate or final node
1969 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1970 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1971 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1972 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1973 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1974 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1975 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1976 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1977 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1978 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1979 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1985 if is_from_final_node {
1986 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1987 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1988 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1989 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1990 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1991 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1994 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1995 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1999 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2000 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2001 // does not coform to the spec.
2002 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2003 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2004 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2010 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2014 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2016 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2017 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2018 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2022 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2023 let offset = match error_code {
2024 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2025 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2026 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2027 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2028 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2029 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2031 // node sending unknown code
2032 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2033 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2040 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2041 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2042 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2043 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2044 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2045 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2046 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2047 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2050 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2051 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2052 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2053 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2055 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2056 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2057 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2058 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2059 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2061 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2062 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2063 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2064 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2066 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2067 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2068 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2069 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2071 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2072 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2075 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2076 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2080 res = Some((msg, true));
2086 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2089 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2090 res = Some((None, true));
2094 // node sending unknown code
2095 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2096 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2105 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2106 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2107 } else { ((None, true)) }
2110 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2112 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2114 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2115 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2118 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2119 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2121 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2126 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2127 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2128 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2130 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2131 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2134 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2137 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2138 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2141 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2145 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2146 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2147 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2148 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2150 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2151 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2154 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2155 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2159 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2160 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2162 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2163 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2164 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2165 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2166 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2167 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2168 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2169 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2171 commitment_signed: msg,
2177 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2182 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2183 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2184 let mut forward_event = None;
2185 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2186 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2187 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2188 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2189 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2191 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2192 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2194 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2197 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2202 match forward_event {
2204 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2205 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2206 time_forwardable: time
2214 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2215 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2216 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2217 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2218 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2220 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2221 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2224 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2225 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2228 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2230 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2234 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2236 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2239 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2242 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2247 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2248 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2249 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2251 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2252 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2255 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2257 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2261 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2262 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2263 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2265 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2267 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2270 if !chan.is_usable() {
2271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2274 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2275 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2276 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2278 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2279 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2280 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2281 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2282 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2284 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2287 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2288 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2289 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2290 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2291 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2292 contents: announcement,
2294 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2297 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2302 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2304 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2306 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2308 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2309 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2311 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2312 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2313 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2314 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2318 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2319 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2320 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2324 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2325 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2327 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2332 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2333 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2335 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2341 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2345 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2352 None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2356 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2357 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2358 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2359 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2361 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2363 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2365 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2366 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2368 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2369 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2371 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2372 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2374 if !chan.is_live() {
2375 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2377 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2378 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2381 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2382 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2383 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2384 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2385 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2386 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2387 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2388 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2399 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2400 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2401 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2402 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2403 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2408 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2409 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2410 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2411 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2412 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2417 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2418 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2419 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2421 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2422 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2423 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2424 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2425 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2426 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2427 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2429 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2430 msg: funding_locked,
2432 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2434 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2435 msg: announcement_sigs,
2438 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2439 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2441 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2444 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2448 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2449 for tx in txn_matched {
2450 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2451 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2452 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2453 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2455 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2456 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2457 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2458 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2459 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2469 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2470 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2471 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2473 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2474 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2475 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2476 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2477 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2478 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2488 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2489 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2491 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2494 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2495 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2496 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2498 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2499 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2500 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2501 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2502 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2503 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2504 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2505 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2507 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2519 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2520 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2522 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2526 macro_rules! handle_error {
2527 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2530 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2531 if needs_channel_force_close {
2533 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2534 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2535 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2537 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2540 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2541 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2542 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2543 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2544 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2546 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2558 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2559 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2560 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2561 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2564 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2565 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2568 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2569 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2572 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2573 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2576 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2577 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2580 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2581 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2584 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2585 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2588 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2589 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2592 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2593 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2596 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2597 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2600 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2601 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2604 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2605 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2608 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2609 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2612 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2613 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2616 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2617 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2620 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2621 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2624 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2625 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2626 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2629 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2630 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2631 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2632 if no_connection_possible {
2633 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2634 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2635 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2636 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2638 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2639 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2650 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2651 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2652 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2653 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2654 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2655 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2656 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2658 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2659 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2660 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2669 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2670 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2672 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2673 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2679 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2680 let mut res = Vec::new();
2681 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2682 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2683 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2684 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2685 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2686 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2687 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2691 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2696 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2700 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2701 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2702 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2703 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2704 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2708 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2715 use chain::chaininterface;
2716 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2717 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2718 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2719 use chain::keysinterface;
2720 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
2721 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2722 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2724 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2725 use util::test_utils;
2726 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2727 use util::errors::APIError;
2728 use util::logger::Logger;
2729 use util::ser::Writeable;
2731 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2732 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2733 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2734 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2735 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2736 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2737 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2741 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2742 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2744 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2745 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2747 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2749 use std::cell::RefCell;
2750 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2751 use std::default::Default;
2753 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2754 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2755 use std::time::Instant;
2758 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2759 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2760 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2765 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2766 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2769 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2770 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2773 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2774 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2777 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2778 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2781 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2782 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2787 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2789 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2790 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2795 fn onion_vectors() {
2796 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2797 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2799 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2800 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2801 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2802 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2803 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2805 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2806 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2807 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2808 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2809 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2811 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2812 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2813 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2814 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2815 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2817 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2818 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2819 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2820 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2821 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2823 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2824 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2825 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2826 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2827 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2829 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2830 let payloads = vec!(
2831 msgs::OnionHopData {
2833 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2834 short_channel_id: 0,
2836 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2840 msgs::OnionHopData {
2842 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2843 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2844 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2845 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2849 msgs::OnionHopData {
2851 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2852 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2853 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2854 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2858 msgs::OnionHopData {
2860 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2861 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2862 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2863 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2867 msgs::OnionHopData {
2869 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2870 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2871 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2872 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2878 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2879 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2881 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
2885 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2886 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2888 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2889 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2890 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
2892 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2893 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2895 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2896 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2898 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2899 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2901 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2902 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2904 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2905 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
2908 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2909 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2910 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2911 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2913 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2914 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2919 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2920 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2921 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2922 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2924 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2925 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2927 impl Drop for Node {
2928 fn drop(&mut self) {
2929 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2930 // Check that we processed all pending events
2931 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2932 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2933 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2938 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2939 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2942 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2943 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2944 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2945 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2948 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
2949 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
2951 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2954 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2955 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2959 }, match events[1] {
2960 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
2961 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2962 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2964 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2967 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
2969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
2976 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
2978 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2981 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2982 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2991 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
2992 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
2994 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
2998 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3007 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3008 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3009 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3010 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3012 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3016 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3017 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3019 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3020 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3021 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3023 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3024 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3026 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
3028 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3029 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3030 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3031 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3032 added_monitors.clear();
3034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3039 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3040 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3041 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3042 added_monitors.clear();
3045 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3047 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3048 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3049 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3050 added_monitors.clear();
3053 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3054 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3056 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3057 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3058 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3066 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3067 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3068 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3072 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3073 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3075 ((match events_6[0] {
3076 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3077 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3078 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082 }, match events_6[1] {
3083 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3084 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3091 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3092 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3093 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3097 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3098 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3099 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3100 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3102 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3103 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3104 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3105 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3111 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3112 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3113 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3114 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3116 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3122 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3124 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3127 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3131 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3132 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3134 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3135 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3136 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3138 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3141 macro_rules! check_spends {
3142 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3144 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3145 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3146 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3147 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3152 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3153 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3154 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3157 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3158 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3160 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3161 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3162 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3163 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3164 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3170 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3171 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3174 Some(match events_1[1] {
3175 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3176 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3184 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3186 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3187 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3188 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3189 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3195 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3196 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3207 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3208 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3209 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3210 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3211 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3212 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3214 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3215 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3216 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3217 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3218 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3219 (as_update, bs_update)
3221 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3223 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3224 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3225 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3226 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3228 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3229 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3230 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3231 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3232 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3233 (as_update, bs_update)
3235 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3236 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3238 (as_update, bs_update)
3243 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3244 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3247 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3248 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3249 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3250 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3251 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3252 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3255 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3263 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3264 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3266 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3267 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3268 added_monitors.clear();
3273 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3274 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3276 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3277 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3278 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3279 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3280 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3281 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3282 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3283 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3284 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3285 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3286 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3287 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3288 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3289 if $fail_backwards {
3290 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3291 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3293 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3294 if $fail_backwards {
3295 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3296 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3297 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3298 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3299 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3301 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3305 if $fail_backwards {
3306 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3307 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3309 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3311 added_monitors.clear();
3317 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3320 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3321 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3322 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3323 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3324 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3325 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3326 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3331 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3332 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3334 let mut payment_event = {
3335 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3336 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3338 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3339 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3340 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3342 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3344 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3345 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3347 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3348 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3349 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3351 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3352 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3354 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3358 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3359 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3361 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3362 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3363 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3365 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3366 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3367 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3372 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3373 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3374 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3375 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3376 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3382 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3385 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3386 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3387 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3389 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3390 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3391 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
3394 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3397 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3398 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3399 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3400 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3401 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3402 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3403 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3404 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
3406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
3413 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
3415 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3416 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3417 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3418 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3422 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
3423 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
3425 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3426 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3427 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
3428 get_next_msgs!($node)
3430 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3433 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3434 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
3439 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3440 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3441 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3442 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
3443 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3444 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
3445 } else if update_next_msgs {
3446 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
3448 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3450 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3451 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3458 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
3459 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3462 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3463 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3470 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3471 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3474 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3476 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3477 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3478 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3479 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3480 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3483 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3486 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3487 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3488 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3489 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3490 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3493 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3495 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3497 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3498 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3502 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3503 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3504 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3507 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3508 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3509 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3511 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3512 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3513 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3515 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3516 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3521 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3522 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3523 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3524 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3525 if next_msgs.is_some() {
3526 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3527 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3528 // second-to-last node!
3529 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3532 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3533 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3534 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3536 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3537 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3538 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3539 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3540 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3541 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3542 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3543 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3548 assert!(events.is_empty());
3550 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3551 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3558 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3560 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3563 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3564 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3565 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3573 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3576 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3577 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3578 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3580 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3582 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3583 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3585 for _ in 0..node_count {
3586 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3587 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3588 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3589 let mut seed = [0; 32];
3590 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3591 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3592 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3593 let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3594 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3595 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3596 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3597 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3605 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3606 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3607 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3608 let channel_id = chan.2;
3610 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3612 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3613 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3619 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3623 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3624 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3625 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3626 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3627 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3628 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3629 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3630 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3631 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3632 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3634 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3636 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3638 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3639 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3642 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3644 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3645 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3646 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3651 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3653 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3654 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3655 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3658 let payment_event = {
3659 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3660 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3661 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3663 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3664 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3666 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3667 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3669 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3675 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3676 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3680 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3681 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3682 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3683 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3684 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3685 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3688 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3689 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3690 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3691 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3692 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3693 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3694 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3697 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3698 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3699 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3702 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3703 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3706 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3709 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3710 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3712 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
3717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3721 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3722 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3723 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3724 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3725 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3726 let channel_id = chan.2;
3728 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3730 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3731 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3737 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3739 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3740 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3743 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3744 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3745 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3746 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3754 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3755 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3756 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3759 let payment_event = {
3760 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3761 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3762 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3764 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3765 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3767 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3768 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3769 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3770 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3771 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3774 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3781 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3782 let nodes = create_network(2);
3783 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3784 let channel_id = chan.2;
3786 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3788 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3789 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3795 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3796 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3797 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3798 // (3) update_fee ->
3799 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3800 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3801 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3802 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3803 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3804 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3805 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3806 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3807 // revoke_and_ack ->
3808 // B should send no response here
3809 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3810 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3811 // revoke_and_ack ->
3813 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3814 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3815 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3818 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3819 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3820 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3821 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3822 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3824 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3827 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3828 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3830 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3833 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3835 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3837 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3839 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3840 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3841 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3842 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3845 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3847 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3849 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3851 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3852 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3853 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3855 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3857 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3858 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3859 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3860 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3861 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3863 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3864 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3865 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3867 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3874 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3875 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3878 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
3879 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3882 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
3883 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3884 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3887 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
3888 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3893 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3894 let nodes = create_network(2);
3895 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3896 let channel_id = chan.2;
3898 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3900 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3901 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3906 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3907 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3910 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3911 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3912 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3914 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3921 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3928 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3934 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3939 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3940 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3941 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3942 let channel_id = chan.2;
3944 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3946 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3947 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3953 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3955 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3956 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3959 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3961 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3962 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3963 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3967 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3968 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3969 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3974 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3976 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3977 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3979 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3980 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3981 added_monitors.clear();
3983 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3984 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3985 // node[1] has nothing to do
3987 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3988 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3991 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3992 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3993 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3995 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3997 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3999 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4000 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4002 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4003 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4004 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4006 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4007 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4009 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4013 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4015 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4017 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4018 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4020 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4022 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4024 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4027 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4030 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4031 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4033 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4036 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4040 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4042 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4043 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4044 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4048 fn test_update_fee() {
4049 let nodes = create_network(2);
4050 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4051 let channel_id = chan.2;
4053 macro_rules! get_feerate {
4055 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4056 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4062 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4063 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4064 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4065 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4066 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4067 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4068 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4069 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4070 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4071 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4072 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4073 // revoke_and_ack ->
4075 // Create and deliver (1)...
4076 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
4077 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4080 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4081 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4082 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4083 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4084 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4090 // Generate (2) and (3):
4091 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4092 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4096 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4097 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4100 // Create and deliver (4)...
4101 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4103 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4104 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4105 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4106 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4107 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4113 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4116 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4117 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4119 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4122 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4123 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4126 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4127 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4130 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4131 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4132 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4133 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4134 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4135 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4136 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4137 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4141 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4143 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4144 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4150 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
4151 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
4152 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4156 fn fake_network_test() {
4157 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4158 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
4159 let nodes = create_network(4);
4161 // Create some initial channels
4162 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4163 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4164 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4166 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4167 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4168 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4169 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4172 // Send some more payments
4173 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4174 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
4175 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
4177 // Test failure packets
4178 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
4179 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
4181 // Add a new channel that skips 3
4182 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4185 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
4186 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4187 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4188 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4189 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4190 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
4192 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
4193 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4194 hops.push(RouteHop {
4195 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4196 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4198 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4200 hops.push(RouteHop {
4201 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4202 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4204 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4206 hops.push(RouteHop {
4207 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4208 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4210 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4212 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4213 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4214 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4216 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4217 hops.push(RouteHop {
4218 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4219 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4221 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4223 hops.push(RouteHop {
4224 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4225 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4227 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4229 hops.push(RouteHop {
4230 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4231 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4233 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4235 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4236 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4237 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4239 // Claim the rebalances...
4240 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4241 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4243 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4244 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4246 // Send some payments across both channels
4247 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4248 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4249 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4251 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4253 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4255 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4256 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4257 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4259 // Close down the channels...
4260 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4261 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4262 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4263 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4264 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4268 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4269 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4270 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4271 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4273 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4274 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4275 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4276 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4277 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4278 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4280 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4282 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4283 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4285 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4286 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4288 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4289 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4290 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4293 #[derive(PartialEq)]
4294 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4295 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4297 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4298 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4299 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4301 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4302 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4304 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4306 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4307 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4308 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4310 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4311 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4312 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4313 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4314 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4315 res.push(tx.clone());
4320 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4321 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4324 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4326 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4327 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4328 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4329 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4330 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4331 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4333 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4335 res.push(tx.clone());
4339 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4342 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4346 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4347 /// HTLC transaction.
4348 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4349 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4350 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4351 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4352 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4353 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4357 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4360 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4361 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4363 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4364 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4365 let mut found_prev = false;
4367 for tx in prev_txn {
4368 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4369 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4370 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4371 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4377 assert!(found_prev);
4379 let mut res = Vec::new();
4380 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4384 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4385 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4386 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4387 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4388 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4394 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4395 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4396 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4397 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4404 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4405 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4409 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4411 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4414 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4417 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4418 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4423 fn channel_reserve_test() {
4425 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4426 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4428 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4429 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4430 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4431 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4432 chan.get_value_stat()
4436 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4437 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4438 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4440 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4441 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4443 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4444 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4446 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4447 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4448 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4449 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4450 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4454 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4456 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4458 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4459 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4464 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4465 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4466 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4469 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4470 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4471 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4478 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4479 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4481 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4483 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4485 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4486 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4487 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4489 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4490 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4494 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4495 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4496 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4498 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4499 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4505 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4506 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4507 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4508 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4509 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4512 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4513 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4514 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4515 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4516 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4520 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4521 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4522 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4523 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4525 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4526 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4530 // adding pending output
4531 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4532 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4534 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4535 let payment_event_1 = {
4536 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4539 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4541 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4545 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4546 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4548 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4549 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4550 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4551 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4556 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4559 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4561 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4562 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4563 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4565 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4567 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4568 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4569 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4570 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4571 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4572 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4574 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4575 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4576 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4577 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4580 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4582 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4586 // split the rest to test holding cell
4587 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4588 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4590 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4591 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4594 // now see if they go through on both sides
4595 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4596 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4597 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4599 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4602 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4604 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4605 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4606 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4607 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4611 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4612 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4613 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4618 // flush the pending htlc
4619 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4620 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4625 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4627 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4628 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4629 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4633 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4636 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4638 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4639 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4640 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4642 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4643 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4645 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4646 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4648 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4650 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4652 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4653 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4654 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4655 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4658 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4660 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4661 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4663 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4664 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4665 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4670 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4671 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4672 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4677 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4678 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4679 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4681 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4682 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4683 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4684 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4686 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4687 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4691 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4692 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4693 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4694 let nodes = create_network(5);
4696 // Create some initial channels
4697 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4698 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4699 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4700 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4702 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4704 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4705 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4706 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4708 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4709 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4711 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4712 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4713 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4714 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4716 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4717 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4718 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4720 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4721 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4723 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4724 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4726 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4727 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4728 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4729 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4731 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4732 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4733 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4735 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4736 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4738 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4739 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4741 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4744 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4745 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4746 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4747 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4755 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4756 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4757 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4759 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4761 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4762 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4764 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4765 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4767 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4769 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4770 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4771 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4773 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4775 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4778 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4779 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4780 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4781 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4782 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4786 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4787 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4788 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4789 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4790 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4793 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4795 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4796 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4798 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4799 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4800 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4801 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4802 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4805 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4807 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4808 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4810 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4812 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4813 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4814 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4816 // Create some new channels:
4817 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4819 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4820 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4821 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4822 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4823 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4824 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4825 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4826 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4827 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4828 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4829 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4830 // Revoke the old state
4831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4834 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4835 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4837 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4838 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4839 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4842 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4843 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4845 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4847 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4848 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4849 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4850 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4851 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4853 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4854 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4855 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4859 fn revoked_output_claim() {
4860 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4861 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4862 let nodes = create_network(2);
4863 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4864 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4865 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4866 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4867 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4869 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4872 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4873 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4874 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4875 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4876 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4878 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4880 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4881 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4883 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4884 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4885 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4889 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4890 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4891 let nodes = create_network(2);
4893 // Create some new channel:
4894 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4896 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4897 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4898 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4899 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4900 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4902 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4903 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4904 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4905 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4907 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4908 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4909 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4910 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4912 //Revoke the old state
4913 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4916 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4918 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4920 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4921 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4925 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4927 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4929 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4930 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4931 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4932 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4933 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4934 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4935 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4936 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4938 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4939 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4940 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4942 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4943 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4944 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4945 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4946 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4947 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4949 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4951 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4955 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4956 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4957 let nodes = create_network(2);
4959 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4961 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4962 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4963 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4964 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4965 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4966 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4968 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4969 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4971 //Revoke the old state
4972 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4975 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4977 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4979 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4980 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4981 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4983 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4984 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4985 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4986 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4987 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4989 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4992 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4995 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4996 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4997 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4998 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4999 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
5001 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
5002 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5003 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5004 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
5005 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
5006 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
5007 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
5008 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
5010 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
5011 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
5013 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
5014 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
5015 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
5016 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
5017 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5018 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
5020 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5021 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5022 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5026 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
5027 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
5028 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
5029 let nodes = create_network(2);
5030 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5032 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
5033 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
5035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5038 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5039 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5045 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5046 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5048 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5049 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5052 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5055 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5056 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5062 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
5063 // registering new transactions
5064 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
5068 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
5069 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
5070 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5074 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
5076 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5078 let mut payment_event = {
5079 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
5080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5082 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5084 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5087 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5090 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5091 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5093 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5097 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5098 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5100 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5101 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5102 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
5103 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
5105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5106 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5107 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5109 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5111 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
5112 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
5113 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
5115 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
5116 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5117 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5119 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5120 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5126 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5127 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
5128 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
5129 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
5130 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5134 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5135 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5137 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5138 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
5139 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5141 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5142 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5147 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
5149 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
5150 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
5151 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
5153 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
5154 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5155 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5156 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5157 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
5158 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5159 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
5161 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
5165 fn test_unconf_chan() {
5166 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
5167 let nodes = create_network(2);
5168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5170 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5171 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
5172 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
5173 mem::drop(channel_state);
5175 let mut headers = Vec::new();
5176 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5177 headers.push(header.clone());
5179 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5180 headers.push(header.clone());
5182 while !headers.is_empty() {
5183 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
5186 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5189 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
5190 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
5192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5195 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5196 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
5197 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
5200 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
5201 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
5203 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5205 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
5207 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5213 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
5214 let mut commitment_update = None;
5215 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5218 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5219 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5220 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5221 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
5223 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5224 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5225 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5226 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5231 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
5234 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
5236 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5237 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5238 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
5239 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
5241 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5242 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5243 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5244 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
5246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5250 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
5255 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
5256 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
5257 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
5258 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5259 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5261 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
5262 for msg in reestablish_1 {
5263 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5264 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
5266 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5267 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5269 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
5272 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
5273 for msg in reestablish_2 {
5274 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
5275 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
5277 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5278 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5280 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5283 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5284 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5285 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5287 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5289 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5290 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5291 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5292 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5293 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5294 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5295 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5298 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5301 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5302 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5303 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5304 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5306 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5308 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5309 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5310 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5311 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5313 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5315 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5316 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5317 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5319 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5321 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5322 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5324 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5325 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5328 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5329 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5331 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5332 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5333 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
5334 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5335 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5336 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5337 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5340 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5344 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5346 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5347 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5348 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
5349 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
5350 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
5351 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
5352 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
5355 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5358 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5359 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
5360 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5361 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5363 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5365 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5366 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5367 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5368 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5370 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5371 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5372 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5373 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5374 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5376 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5377 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5379 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5380 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5383 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5384 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5386 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5387 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5388 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
5389 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5390 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5391 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5392 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5395 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5401 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5402 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5403 let nodes = create_network(3);
5404 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5407 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5408 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5409 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5411 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5412 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5413 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5414 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5416 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5417 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5418 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5420 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5421 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5422 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5423 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5425 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5426 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5428 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5429 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5431 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5433 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5436 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5437 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5443 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5444 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5450 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5451 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5454 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5455 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5456 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5457 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5458 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5459 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5461 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5464 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5465 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5467 let payment_event = {
5468 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5471 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5473 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5475 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5477 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5478 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5481 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5483 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5485 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5486 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5487 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5490 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5491 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5492 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5493 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5496 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5497 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5498 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5505 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5506 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5507 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5508 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5509 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5510 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5511 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5512 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5513 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5514 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5515 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5516 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5517 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5518 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5519 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5520 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5521 // Everything was delivered...
5522 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5525 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5526 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5528 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5532 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5533 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5534 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5536 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5537 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5539 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5540 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5542 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5543 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5544 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5549 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5552 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5553 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5554 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5555 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5556 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5557 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5558 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5559 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5560 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5561 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5562 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5567 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5568 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5570 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5571 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5573 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5574 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5579 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5580 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5586 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5589 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5590 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5591 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5592 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5595 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5596 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5597 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5605 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5606 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5607 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5608 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5609 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5610 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5611 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5612 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5614 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5615 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5620 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5621 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5622 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5623 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5624 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5625 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5626 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5627 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5628 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5629 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5630 // Everything was delivered...
5631 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5634 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5635 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5636 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5638 // Channel should still work fine...
5639 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5640 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5644 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5645 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5646 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5647 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5651 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5652 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5653 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5654 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5658 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5659 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5660 let nodes = create_network(2);
5661 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5663 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5664 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5666 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5667 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5668 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5670 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5671 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5676 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5677 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5678 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5680 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
5681 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5687 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5688 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5691 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5692 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5694 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5695 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5696 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5700 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5701 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5702 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5703 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5704 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5706 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5708 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5709 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5710 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5712 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5715 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5716 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5722 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5725 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5726 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5728 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5729 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5730 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5731 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5732 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5733 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5734 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5736 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5737 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5738 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5740 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5741 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5746 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5747 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5748 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5754 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5755 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5757 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5759 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5760 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5762 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5763 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
5764 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5765 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
5767 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5768 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5770 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5771 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5773 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5775 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5776 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5777 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5778 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5779 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5781 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5782 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5783 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5786 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
5787 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5788 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5789 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5790 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5791 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5792 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5795 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5796 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5797 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5799 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5800 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5801 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5805 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5806 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5810 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5811 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5815 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5819 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5821 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5825 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5826 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5828 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5829 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5831 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5832 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5837 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5838 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5841 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5845 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5846 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5847 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5848 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5850 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5851 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5853 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5854 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5857 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5858 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5860 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5864 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5865 // PaymentFailed event
5867 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5870 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5871 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5872 // a disconnect in between
5873 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5874 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5876 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5877 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5879 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5880 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5883 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5884 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5885 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5888 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5889 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5890 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5893 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5894 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5897 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5898 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5899 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5900 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5906 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5907 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5909 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5910 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5911 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5918 // Now set it to failed again...
5919 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5920 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5921 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5924 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5926 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5929 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5930 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5931 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5934 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5935 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5936 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5939 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5940 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5942 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5946 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5947 // PaymentFailed event
5949 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5953 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5954 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5955 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5958 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5959 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5961 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5962 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5963 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5964 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5965 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5966 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5967 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5968 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5969 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5970 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5971 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5972 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5973 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5974 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5975 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5976 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5977 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5978 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5979 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5981 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5983 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5984 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5985 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5987 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5988 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5991 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5992 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5993 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5995 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5996 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5997 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5999 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6000 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6001 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
6002 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6003 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6004 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6005 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6006 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6007 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6008 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6010 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6011 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6012 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6013 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6015 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6016 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6021 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
6022 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
6023 } else { panic!(); }
6026 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6031 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6032 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6033 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6036 // Now fix monitor updating...
6037 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
6038 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
6039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6041 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
6042 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6043 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6045 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6046 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6047 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6048 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6050 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6051 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6052 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6053 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6055 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6056 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6058 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
6061 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
6062 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6063 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6065 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6066 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6067 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6068 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6070 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
6072 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6073 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6075 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6077 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6078 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6080 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6081 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6082 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6084 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
6085 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
6086 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6088 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6089 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6090 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6091 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6092 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
6093 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
6095 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6098 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6099 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6101 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6102 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6107 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6108 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6109 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6112 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
6116 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
6117 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6119 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
6120 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
6121 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
6123 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
6124 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
6127 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
6129 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6130 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
6131 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
6132 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6133 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6140 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6144 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6145 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6148 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
6149 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6151 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6152 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6154 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6155 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6158 let as_commitment_update;
6159 let bs_second_commitment_update;
6161 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
6162 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6163 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6164 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6165 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6166 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6167 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6168 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6172 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
6173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6174 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6175 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6176 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6177 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6178 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6179 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
6180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6183 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
6186 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6187 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6189 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
6190 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6192 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6193 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6195 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6198 handle_initial_raa!();
6200 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6201 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6203 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6204 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6206 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6207 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6210 handle_initial_raa!();
6212 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
6213 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6215 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6216 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
6218 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
6219 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6221 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6226 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
6227 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
6229 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
6230 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6232 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
6233 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
6237 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6238 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6239 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6242 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6243 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6244 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6248 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6251 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6252 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6257 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6258 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6260 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6261 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6262 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6267 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6271 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
6272 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
6273 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
6274 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
6275 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
6276 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
6277 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
6281 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
6282 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
6283 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
6284 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
6285 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
6289 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
6290 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
6291 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
6292 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
6293 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
6294 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
6298 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
6299 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
6300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6301 let nodes = create_network(2);
6303 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
6305 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6306 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6307 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6308 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
6310 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6312 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6313 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6315 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6316 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6318 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
6320 let mut chan_announcement;
6322 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
6324 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6325 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6326 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6327 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6328 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6329 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6330 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6331 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6332 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6337 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6338 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6339 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6340 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6341 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6342 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6343 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6344 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6345 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6346 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6347 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6348 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6349 contents: $unsigned_msg
6354 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6355 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6356 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6357 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6359 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6360 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6361 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6362 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6363 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6365 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6366 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6367 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6368 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());