1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
93 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
101 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
139 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
140 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
141 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
142 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
206 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
208 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
209 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
211 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
215 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
216 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
217 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
218 /// probably increase this significantly.
219 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
221 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
222 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
224 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
227 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
228 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
229 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
230 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
233 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
235 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
239 struct ChannelHolder {
240 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
241 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
242 next_forward: Instant,
243 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
244 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
245 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
246 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
247 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
248 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
249 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
253 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
254 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
256 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
257 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
258 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
259 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
260 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
261 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
265 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
267 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
268 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
269 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
270 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
271 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
272 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
277 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
278 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
280 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
281 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
283 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
284 /// to individual Channels.
286 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
287 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
288 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
289 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
291 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
292 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
293 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
294 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
295 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
296 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
297 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
299 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
300 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
301 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
302 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
304 pub struct ChannelManager {
305 default_configuration: UserConfig,
306 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
307 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
308 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
309 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
310 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
313 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
314 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
317 our_network_key: SecretKey,
319 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
320 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
321 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
322 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
323 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
325 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
330 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
331 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
332 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
333 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
334 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
335 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
336 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
338 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
339 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
340 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
341 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
344 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
346 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
347 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
350 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
352 macro_rules! secp_call {
353 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
356 Err(_) => return Err($err),
363 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
365 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
366 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
371 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
372 pub struct ChannelDetails {
373 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
374 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
375 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
376 /// lifetime of the channel.
377 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
378 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
379 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
380 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
381 /// The node_id of our counterparty
382 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
385 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
389 macro_rules! handle_error {
390 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
393 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
394 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
395 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
396 if let Some(update) = update_option {
397 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
409 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
410 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
413 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
414 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
416 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
417 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
418 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
419 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
421 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
427 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
431 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
434 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
435 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
436 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
437 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
445 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
446 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
447 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
449 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
450 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
451 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
453 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
454 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
456 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
458 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
459 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
460 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
461 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
463 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
464 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
465 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
466 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
467 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
468 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
469 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
470 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
471 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
474 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
475 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
482 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
483 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
484 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
487 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
488 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
489 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
491 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
493 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
494 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
500 impl ChannelManager {
501 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
503 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
504 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
506 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
508 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
509 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
510 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
512 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
513 default_configuration: config.clone(),
514 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
515 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
516 monitor: monitor.clone(),
520 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
521 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
524 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
525 by_id: HashMap::new(),
526 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
527 next_forward: Instant::now(),
528 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
529 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
530 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
532 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
534 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
535 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
541 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
542 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
546 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
548 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
549 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
550 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
551 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
553 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
554 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
556 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
557 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
558 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
559 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
560 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
563 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
564 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
566 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
567 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
570 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
573 panic!("RNG is bad???");
576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
579 node_id: their_network_key,
585 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
586 /// more information.
587 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
588 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
589 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
590 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
591 res.push(ChannelDetails {
592 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
593 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
594 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
595 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
596 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
602 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
603 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
604 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
605 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
606 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
607 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
608 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
609 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
610 // really wanted anyway.
611 if channel.is_live() {
612 res.push(ChannelDetails {
613 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
614 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
615 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
616 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
617 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
624 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
625 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
626 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
628 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
629 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
630 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
632 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
633 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
634 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
637 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
638 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
639 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
642 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
643 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
644 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
646 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
647 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
652 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
653 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
656 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
657 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
662 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
663 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
673 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
674 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
675 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
676 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
679 for tx in local_txn {
680 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
684 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
685 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
686 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
691 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
692 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
693 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
694 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
701 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
710 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
711 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
712 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
713 for chan in self.list_channels() {
714 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
719 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
720 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
722 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
723 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
724 let mut res = [0; 32];
725 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
729 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
730 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
731 let mut res = [0; 32];
732 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
738 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
739 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
740 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
741 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
742 let mut res = [0; 32];
743 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
748 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
749 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
750 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
751 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
752 let mut res = [0; 32];
753 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
757 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
759 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
760 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
761 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
763 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
764 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
766 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
767 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
768 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
769 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
770 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
772 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
774 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
775 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
777 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
783 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
784 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
785 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
787 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
788 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
794 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
804 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
805 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
806 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
807 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
808 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
809 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
810 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
811 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
813 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
814 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
815 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
816 // the intended recipient).
817 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
818 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
819 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
821 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
822 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
823 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
824 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
828 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
829 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
830 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
832 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
833 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
834 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
836 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
838 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
842 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
844 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
852 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
853 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
855 for i in 0..dst.len() {
860 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
861 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
862 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
863 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
866 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
867 let end_len = iters * 65;
868 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
869 res.resize(end_len, 0);
871 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
872 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
873 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
874 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
875 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
880 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
881 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
883 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
884 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
885 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
886 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
888 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
889 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
890 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
893 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
896 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
897 hmac.input(&packet_data);
898 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
899 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
904 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
905 hop_data: packet_data,
910 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
911 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
912 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
913 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
915 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
916 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
917 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
918 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
919 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
920 data: packet_crypted,
924 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
925 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
926 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
928 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
931 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
932 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
933 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
934 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
938 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
939 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
942 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
944 failuremsg: failuremsg,
948 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
949 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
950 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
956 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
957 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
958 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
961 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
962 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
965 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
966 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
967 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
968 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
974 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
975 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
976 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
977 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
978 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
979 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
980 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
981 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
984 let shared_secret = {
985 let mut arr = [0; 32];
986 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
989 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
991 let mut channel_state = None;
992 macro_rules! return_err {
993 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
995 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
996 if channel_state.is_none() {
997 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
999 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1000 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1001 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1002 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1003 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1008 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1009 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1010 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1011 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1012 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1013 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1014 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1015 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1018 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1019 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1020 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1021 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1022 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1025 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1026 let next_hop_data = {
1027 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1028 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1029 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1031 let error_code = match err {
1032 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1033 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1035 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1041 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1043 // final_expiry_too_soon
1044 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1045 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1047 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1048 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1049 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1051 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1052 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1053 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1056 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1057 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1058 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1059 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1061 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1063 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1064 short_channel_id: 0,
1065 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1066 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1067 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1070 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1071 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1072 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1074 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1076 let blinding_factor = {
1077 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1078 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1079 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1080 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1081 sha.result(&mut res);
1082 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1084 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1090 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1091 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1094 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1096 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1097 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1098 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1101 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1102 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1103 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1104 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1105 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1106 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1107 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1111 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1112 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1113 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1114 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1115 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1116 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1117 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1119 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1121 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1122 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1124 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1125 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1126 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1127 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1128 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1129 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1130 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1132 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1133 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1135 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1136 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1137 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1139 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1140 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1142 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1143 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1144 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1145 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1147 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1148 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1153 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1154 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1155 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1157 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1158 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1160 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1161 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1163 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1168 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1171 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1172 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1173 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1174 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1175 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1179 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1181 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1182 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1183 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1184 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1185 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1186 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1187 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1188 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1189 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1190 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1193 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1194 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1196 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1202 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1204 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1205 /// fields for more info.
1207 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1208 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1209 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1210 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1211 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1212 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1214 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1216 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1217 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1218 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1219 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1220 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1221 /// relevant updates.
1223 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1224 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1225 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1226 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1227 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1228 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1229 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1230 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1232 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1233 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1234 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1235 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1239 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1241 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1243 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1244 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1245 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1246 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1248 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1250 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1251 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1253 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1254 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1255 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1258 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1259 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1261 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1262 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1264 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1265 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1267 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1268 route: route.clone(),
1269 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1270 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1271 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1273 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1274 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1275 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1276 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1277 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1278 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1279 // something else in case we will resend later!
1280 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1284 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1285 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1286 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1287 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1288 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1289 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1297 } else { unreachable!(); }
1301 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1302 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1304 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1306 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1307 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1309 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1313 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1318 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1320 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1321 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1323 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1325 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1326 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1327 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1328 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1330 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1332 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1333 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1335 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1336 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1337 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1338 } else { unreachable!(); })
1344 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1345 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1346 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1349 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1350 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1352 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1359 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1360 // lock before add_update_monitor
1361 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1365 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1366 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1367 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1372 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1380 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1381 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1383 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1385 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1387 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1388 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1390 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1391 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1392 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1393 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1394 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1398 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1400 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1401 /// Will likely generate further events.
1402 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1403 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1405 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1406 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1409 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1411 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1415 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1416 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1417 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1418 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1420 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1421 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1422 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1423 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1424 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1425 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1427 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1432 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1434 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1435 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1436 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1437 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1438 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1439 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1441 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1443 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1444 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1449 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1451 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1452 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1453 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1454 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1455 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1456 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1457 // this channel currently :/.
1464 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1465 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1468 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1469 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1471 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1475 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1479 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1481 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1486 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1491 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1492 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1493 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1494 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1495 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1497 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1501 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1502 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1503 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1510 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1512 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1513 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1517 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1518 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1519 events.append(&mut new_events);
1522 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1523 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1524 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1526 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1527 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1528 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1529 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1530 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1537 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1538 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1539 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1540 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1541 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1542 /// still-available channels.
1543 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1545 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1546 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1547 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1548 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1549 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1550 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1551 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1556 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1558 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1561 //TODO: Pass this back (see GH #243)
1564 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1565 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1566 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1567 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1568 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1570 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1571 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1575 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1577 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1578 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1582 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1583 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1584 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1585 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1588 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1589 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1590 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1591 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1592 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1593 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1594 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1596 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1602 //TODO: Do something with e?
1610 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1611 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1612 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1614 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1615 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1616 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1617 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1618 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1619 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1621 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1623 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1624 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1625 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1626 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1627 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1628 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1633 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1635 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1636 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1637 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1638 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1642 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1643 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1644 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1646 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1647 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1649 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1650 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1656 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1657 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1658 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1659 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1660 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1661 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1664 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1666 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1667 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1668 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1669 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1670 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1671 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1679 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1680 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1681 //TODO: Do something with e?
1689 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1690 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1691 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1694 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1695 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1697 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1698 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1699 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1700 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1701 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1704 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1705 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1706 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1707 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1708 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1709 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1710 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1711 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1713 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1714 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1715 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1716 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1717 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1718 // on-chain confirmations.
1719 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1720 // should be written.
1721 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1722 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1724 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1725 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1726 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1732 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1735 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1736 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1737 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1739 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1741 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1742 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1744 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1749 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1750 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1752 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1753 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1758 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1762 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1773 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1776 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1778 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1779 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1783 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1784 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1788 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1789 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1791 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1795 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1796 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1797 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1799 entry.insert(channel);
1805 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1806 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1807 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1808 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1811 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1812 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1813 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1815 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1816 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1818 //TODO: same as above
1819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1822 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1823 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1824 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1825 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1826 output_script: output_script,
1827 user_channel_id: user_id,
1832 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1833 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1834 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1836 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1838 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1839 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1842 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1847 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1848 // lock before add_update_monitor
1849 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1853 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1860 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1869 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1870 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1871 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1872 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1875 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1876 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1879 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1880 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1883 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1888 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1889 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1890 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1891 user_channel_id: user_id,
1896 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1897 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1901 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1902 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1903 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1905 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1906 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1908 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1909 msg: announcement_sigs,
1914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1918 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1919 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1920 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1921 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1925 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1926 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1927 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1929 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1930 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1932 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1936 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1937 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1938 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1942 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1943 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1944 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1946 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1947 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1952 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1953 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1954 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1956 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1958 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1967 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1968 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1971 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1973 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1974 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1977 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1978 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1980 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1985 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1986 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1987 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1988 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1989 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1990 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1991 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1993 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1994 } else { (tx, None) }
1996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1999 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2000 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2002 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2003 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2004 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2013 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2014 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2015 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2016 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2018 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2019 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2020 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2021 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2023 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2024 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2026 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2028 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2029 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2032 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2033 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2034 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2035 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2036 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2037 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2038 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2039 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2040 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2041 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2042 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2044 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2045 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2046 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2047 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2048 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2049 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2054 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2061 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2062 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2064 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2065 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2067 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2068 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2069 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2071 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2076 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2080 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2081 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2082 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2083 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2084 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2085 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2086 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2088 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2089 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2093 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2094 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2095 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2098 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2100 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2101 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2102 if res.is_some() { return; }
2104 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2105 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2106 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2108 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2110 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2111 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2112 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2113 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2114 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2116 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2118 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2119 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2120 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2121 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2122 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2123 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2125 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2126 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2127 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2128 // definitely came from the peer in question
2129 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2131 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2133 match error_code & 0xff {
2135 // either from an intermediate or final node
2136 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2137 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2138 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2139 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2140 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2141 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2142 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2143 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2144 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2145 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2146 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2152 if is_from_final_node {
2153 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2154 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2155 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2156 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2157 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2158 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2161 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2162 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2166 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2167 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2168 // does not coform to the spec.
2169 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2170 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2171 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2177 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2181 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2183 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2184 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2185 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2189 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2190 let offset = match error_code {
2191 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2192 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2193 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2194 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2195 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2196 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2198 // node sending unknown code
2199 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2200 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2207 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2208 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2209 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2210 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2211 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2212 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2213 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2214 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2217 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2218 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2219 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2220 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2222 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2223 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2224 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2225 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2226 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2228 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2229 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2230 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2231 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2233 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2234 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2235 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2236 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2238 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2239 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2242 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2243 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2247 res = Some((msg, true));
2253 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2256 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2257 res = Some((None, true));
2261 // node sending unknown code
2262 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2263 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2272 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2273 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2274 } else { ((None, true)) }
2277 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2278 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2279 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2280 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2282 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2283 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2284 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2286 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2293 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2294 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2295 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2296 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2298 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2299 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2302 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2303 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2305 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2312 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2313 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2314 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2315 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2317 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2318 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2321 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2322 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2323 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2324 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2325 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2328 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2329 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2331 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2333 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2334 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2335 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2336 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2337 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2338 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 commitment_signed: msg,
2344 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2346 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2357 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2358 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2359 let mut forward_event = None;
2360 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2362 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2363 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2364 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2366 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2367 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2369 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2372 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2377 match forward_event {
2379 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2380 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2381 time_forwardable: time
2389 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2390 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2392 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2393 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2395 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2396 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2399 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2400 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2401 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2402 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2404 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2406 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2410 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2412 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2416 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2421 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2422 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2424 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2429 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2430 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2431 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2434 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2435 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2438 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2445 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2446 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2447 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2451 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2454 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2458 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2459 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2462 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2463 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2464 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2465 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2466 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2469 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2471 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2472 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2473 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2474 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2475 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2476 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2477 contents: announcement,
2479 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2487 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2488 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2489 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2491 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2493 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2494 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2496 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2497 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2498 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2499 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2500 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2501 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2502 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2503 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2504 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2506 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2507 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2509 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2510 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2513 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2515 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2519 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2520 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2522 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2527 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2528 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2530 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2536 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2540 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2545 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2547 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2557 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2558 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2559 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2560 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2562 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2563 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2565 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2572 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2575 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2576 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2578 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2579 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2581 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2582 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2583 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2585 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2588 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2589 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2590 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2591 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2592 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2593 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2594 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2595 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2605 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2606 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2608 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2610 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2611 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2613 node_id: their_node_id,
2617 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2623 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2624 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2625 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2626 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2627 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2629 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2630 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2631 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2632 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
2639 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2640 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2641 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2646 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2647 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2648 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2649 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2650 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2652 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2653 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2654 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2655 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2657 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
2662 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2663 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2664 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2669 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2670 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2671 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2672 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2674 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2675 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2676 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2677 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2678 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2679 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2680 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2682 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2683 msg: funding_locked,
2685 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2687 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2688 msg: announcement_sigs,
2691 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2692 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2693 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2694 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2695 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2699 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2700 for tx in txn_matched {
2701 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2702 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2703 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2704 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2706 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2707 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2708 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2709 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2720 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2721 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2722 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2724 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2725 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2726 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2727 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2728 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2729 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2730 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2739 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2740 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2742 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2743 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2746 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2747 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2748 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2749 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2751 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2752 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2753 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2754 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2755 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2756 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2757 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2758 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2760 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2761 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2762 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2772 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2773 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2775 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2776 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2780 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2781 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2782 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2787 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2789 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2792 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2797 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2798 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2799 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2802 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2803 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2804 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2807 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2808 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2809 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2812 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2817 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2819 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2822 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2823 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2824 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2827 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2832 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2833 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2834 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2837 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2842 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2843 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2844 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2847 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2848 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2849 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2852 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2853 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2854 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2857 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2858 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2859 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2862 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2863 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2864 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2865 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2867 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2868 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2869 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2870 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2871 if no_connection_possible {
2872 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2873 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2874 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2875 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2876 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2878 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2880 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2890 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2891 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2892 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2893 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2894 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2895 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2896 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2897 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2899 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2900 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2901 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2910 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2911 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2913 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2914 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2915 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2920 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2921 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2923 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2924 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2925 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2926 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2927 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2928 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2929 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2930 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2931 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2932 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2936 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2937 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2938 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2944 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2947 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2948 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2950 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2951 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2952 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2953 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2957 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2962 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2963 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2965 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2966 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2967 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2969 onion.write(writer)?;
2973 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2974 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2975 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2976 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2977 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2982 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2983 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2984 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2986 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2987 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2989 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2991 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2992 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2993 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2994 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2995 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3000 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3001 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3003 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3005 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3007 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3009 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3016 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3017 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3018 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3019 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3020 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3021 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3026 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3029 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3031 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3033 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3035 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3042 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3043 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3044 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3045 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3046 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3047 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3052 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3055 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3058 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3061 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3063 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3065 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3067 route.write(writer)?;
3068 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3069 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3076 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3077 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3078 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3079 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3080 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3081 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3082 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3083 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3085 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3090 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3091 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3093 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3097 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3099 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3100 data.write(writer)?;
3107 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3108 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3109 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3110 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3111 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3112 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3113 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3115 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3120 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3121 prev_short_channel_id,
3126 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3127 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3128 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3130 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3131 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3133 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3134 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3135 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3137 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3138 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3139 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3140 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3141 unfunded_channels += 1;
3144 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3145 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3146 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3147 channel.write(writer)?;
3151 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3152 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3153 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3154 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3155 for forward in pending_forwards {
3156 forward.write(writer)?;
3160 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3161 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3162 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3163 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3164 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3165 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3173 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3175 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3177 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3178 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3179 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3180 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3181 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3182 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3183 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3184 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3185 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3186 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3187 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3188 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3189 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3190 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3191 /// deserialization.
3192 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3194 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3196 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3197 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3198 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3200 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3201 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3202 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3203 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3204 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3206 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3207 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3208 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3209 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3210 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3211 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3212 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3213 /// deserialization.
3214 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3215 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3216 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3217 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3219 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3220 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3222 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3223 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3224 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3225 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3227 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3229 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3232 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3233 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3234 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3235 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3237 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3240 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3241 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3242 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3246 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3247 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3248 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3249 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3250 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3251 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3252 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3253 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3256 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3257 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3258 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3259 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3260 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3261 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3262 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3263 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3264 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3266 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3267 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3269 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3276 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3277 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3278 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3282 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3283 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3284 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3285 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3286 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3287 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3288 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3289 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3291 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3294 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3295 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3296 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3297 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3298 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3299 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3300 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3301 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3303 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3306 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3308 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3309 monitor: args.monitor,
3310 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3311 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3313 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3314 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3315 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3317 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3320 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3323 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3325 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3327 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3328 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3329 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3330 logger: args.logger,
3331 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3334 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3335 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3336 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3337 //connection or two.
3340 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3346 use chain::chaininterface;
3347 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3348 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3349 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3350 use chain::keysinterface;
3351 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3352 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3353 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3354 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3356 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3357 use util::test_utils;
3358 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3359 use util::errors::APIError;
3360 use util::logger::Logger;
3361 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3362 use util::config::UserConfig;
3364 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3365 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3366 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3367 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3368 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3369 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3370 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3371 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3372 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3373 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3377 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3378 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3380 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3381 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3383 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3385 use std::cell::RefCell;
3386 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3387 use std::default::Default;
3389 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3390 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3391 use std::time::Instant;
3394 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3395 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3396 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3401 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3402 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3405 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3406 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3409 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3410 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3413 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3414 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3417 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3418 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3423 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3425 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3426 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3431 fn onion_vectors() {
3432 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3433 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3435 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3436 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3437 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3438 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3439 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3441 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3442 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3443 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3444 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3445 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3447 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3448 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3449 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3455 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3456 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3457 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3459 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3461 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3462 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3465 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3466 let payloads = vec!(
3467 msgs::OnionHopData {
3469 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3470 short_channel_id: 0,
3472 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3476 msgs::OnionHopData {
3478 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3479 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3480 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3481 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3485 msgs::OnionHopData {
3487 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3488 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3489 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3490 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3494 msgs::OnionHopData {
3496 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3497 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3498 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3499 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3503 msgs::OnionHopData {
3505 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3506 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3507 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3508 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3514 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3515 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3517 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3521 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3522 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3524 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3525 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3526 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3528 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3529 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("a5e6bd0c74cb347f10cce367f949098f2457d14c046fd8a22cb96efb30b0fdcda8cb9168b50f2fd45edd73c1b0c8b33002df376801ff58aaa94000bf8a86f92620f343baef38a580102395ae3abf9128d1047a0736ff9b83d456740ebbb4aeb3aa9737f18fb4afb4aa074fb26c4d702f42968888550a3bded8c05247e045b866baef0499f079fdaeef6538f31d44deafffdfd3afa2fb4ca9082b8f1c465371a9894dd8c243fb4847e004f5256b3e90e2edde4c9fb3082ddfe4d1e734cacd96ef0706bf63c9984e22dc98851bcccd1c3494351feb458c9c6af41c0044bea3c47552b1d992ae542b17a2d0bba1a096c78d169034ecb55b6e3a7263c26017f033031228833c1daefc0dedb8cf7c3e37c9c37ebfe42f3225c326e8bcfd338804c145b16e34e4").unwrap());
3531 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3532 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3534 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3535 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3537 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3538 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3540 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3541 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3544 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3545 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3546 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3547 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3549 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3550 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3555 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3556 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3557 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3558 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3560 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3561 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3562 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3564 impl Drop for Node {
3565 fn drop(&mut self) {
3566 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3567 // Check that we processed all pending events
3568 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3569 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3570 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3575 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3576 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3579 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3580 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3581 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3582 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3585 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3586 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3588 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3591 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3592 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3596 }, match events[1] {
3597 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3598 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3599 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3600 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3601 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3602 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3603 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3604 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3613 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3615 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3616 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3618 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3619 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3628 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3629 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3631 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3634 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3635 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3644 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3645 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3647 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3648 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3655 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3656 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3657 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3658 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3660 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3664 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3665 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3667 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3668 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3669 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3671 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3672 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3674 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3676 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3677 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3679 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3680 added_monitors.clear();
3682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3685 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3687 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3688 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3689 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3690 added_monitors.clear();
3693 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3695 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3696 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3697 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3698 added_monitors.clear();
3701 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3702 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3704 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3705 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3706 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3714 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3715 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3716 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3720 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3721 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3722 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3723 ((match events_6[0] {
3724 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3725 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3726 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730 }, match events_6[1] {
3731 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3732 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3739 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3740 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3741 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3745 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3746 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3747 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3748 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3750 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3751 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3752 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3753 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3760 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3761 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3762 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3763 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3764 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3770 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3772 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3775 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3776 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3779 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3780 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3782 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3783 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3784 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3786 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3789 macro_rules! check_spends {
3790 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3792 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3793 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3794 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3795 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3800 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3801 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3803 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3804 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3805 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3806 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3807 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3811 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3813 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3814 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3824 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3825 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3826 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3829 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3830 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3832 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3833 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3834 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3835 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3836 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3842 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3843 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3846 Some(match events_1[1] {
3847 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3848 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3855 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3856 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3857 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3858 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3859 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3860 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3861 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3863 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3864 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3865 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3866 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3867 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3868 (as_update, bs_update)
3870 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3872 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3873 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3874 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3875 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3877 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3878 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3879 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3880 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3881 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3882 (as_update, bs_update)
3884 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3885 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3887 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3892 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3893 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3896 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3897 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3898 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3901 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3904 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3906 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3911 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3912 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3914 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3918 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3919 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3921 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3922 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3923 added_monitors.clear();
3928 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3929 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3931 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3932 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3933 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3934 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3935 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3938 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3940 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3941 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3942 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3943 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3944 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3945 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3946 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3947 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3948 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3949 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3951 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3952 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3956 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3958 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3959 if $fail_backwards {
3960 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3961 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3963 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3966 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3968 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3969 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3970 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3971 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3972 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3973 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3977 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3979 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3980 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3982 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3983 if $fail_backwards {
3984 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3985 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3987 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3989 added_monitors.clear();
3994 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3996 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3999 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4001 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4002 if $fail_backwards {
4003 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4004 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4005 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4006 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4007 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4009 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4015 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4018 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
4019 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4020 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
4021 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4022 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
4023 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
4024 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4029 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4030 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4032 let mut payment_event = {
4033 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4034 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4036 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4038 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4040 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4042 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4043 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4045 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4046 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4047 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4049 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4050 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4052 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4056 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4057 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4059 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4060 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4061 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4063 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4064 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4065 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4070 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4071 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4072 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4073 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4074 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4080 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4083 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4084 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4085 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4087 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4088 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4089 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4092 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4095 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4096 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4097 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4098 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4099 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4100 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4101 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4102 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4110 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4111 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4113 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4114 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4115 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4116 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4120 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4121 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4123 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4124 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4125 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4126 get_next_msgs!($node)
4128 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4131 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4132 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4137 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4138 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4139 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4140 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4141 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4142 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4143 } else if update_next_msgs {
4144 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4146 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4148 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4149 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4156 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4157 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4160 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4161 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4168 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4169 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4172 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4174 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4175 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4176 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4177 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4178 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4181 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4184 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4185 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4186 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4187 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4188 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4191 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4193 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4195 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4196 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4200 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4201 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4202 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4205 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4206 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4207 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4209 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4210 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4211 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4213 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4214 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4219 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4220 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4221 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4222 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4223 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4224 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4225 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4226 // second-to-last node!
4227 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4230 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4231 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4234 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4235 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4236 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4237 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4238 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4239 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4240 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4241 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4246 assert!(events.is_empty());
4248 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4249 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4256 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4258 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4261 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4262 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4263 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4270 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4271 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4274 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4275 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4276 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4278 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4280 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4281 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4283 for _ in 0..node_count {
4284 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4285 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4286 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4287 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4288 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4289 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4290 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4291 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4292 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4293 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4294 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4295 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4296 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4297 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4298 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4306 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4307 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4309 let channel_id = chan.2;
4312 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4316 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4317 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4318 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4319 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4320 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4321 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4322 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4323 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4324 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4325 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4327 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4329 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4331 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4332 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4337 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4339 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4346 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4347 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4348 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4351 let payment_event = {
4352 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4353 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4354 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4356 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4357 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4359 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4362 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4363 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4366 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4367 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4368 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4369 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4372 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4373 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4374 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4375 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4376 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4377 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4378 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4381 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4382 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4383 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4384 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4385 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4386 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4387 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4390 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4391 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4392 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4395 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4396 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4399 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4402 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4403 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4405 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4409 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4414 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4415 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4416 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4417 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4418 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4419 let channel_id = chan.2;
4422 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4424 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4425 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4428 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4429 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4430 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4439 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4440 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4441 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4444 let payment_event = {
4445 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4446 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4447 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4449 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4450 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4452 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4453 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4454 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4455 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4456 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4459 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4462 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4466 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4467 let nodes = create_network(2);
4468 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4469 let channel_id = chan.2;
4472 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4473 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4474 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4475 // (3) update_fee ->
4476 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4477 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4478 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4479 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4480 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4481 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4482 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4483 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4484 // revoke_and_ack ->
4485 // B should send no response here
4486 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4487 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4488 // revoke_and_ack ->
4490 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4491 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4492 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4495 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4496 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4497 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4498 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4499 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4504 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4505 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4506 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4507 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4510 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4512 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4513 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4514 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4516 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4517 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4518 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4519 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4522 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4524 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4526 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4528 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4529 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4530 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4532 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4533 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4534 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4535 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4536 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4537 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4538 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4540 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4541 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4542 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4544 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4546 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4547 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4551 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4552 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4555 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4556 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4559 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4560 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4561 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4564 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4565 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4570 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4571 let nodes = create_network(2);
4572 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4573 let channel_id = chan.2;
4575 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4576 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4579 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4580 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4581 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4582 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4583 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4587 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4589 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4590 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4593 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4594 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4597 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4598 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4599 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4602 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4603 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4608 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4609 let nodes = create_network(2);
4610 let channel_value = 1888;
4611 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4612 let channel_id = chan.2;
4615 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4617 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4621 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4623 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4624 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4626 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4627 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4629 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4630 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4631 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4632 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4633 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4634 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4637 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4638 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4639 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4642 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4646 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4647 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4648 //Should produce and error.
4649 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4651 assert!(match err.err {
4652 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4656 //clear the message we could not handle
4657 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4661 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4662 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4663 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4664 let channel_id = chan.2;
4667 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4669 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4670 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4673 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4674 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4675 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4676 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4677 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4682 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4683 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4686 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4688 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4690 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4691 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4693 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4694 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4695 added_monitors.clear();
4697 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4698 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4699 // node[1] has nothing to do
4701 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4702 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4705 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4706 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4707 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4713 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4714 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4715 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4716 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4717 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4718 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4720 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4721 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4723 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4725 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4727 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4729 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4731 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4732 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4734 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4736 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4741 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4744 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4745 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4747 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4750 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4754 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4756 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4757 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4758 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4762 fn test_update_fee() {
4763 let nodes = create_network(2);
4764 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4765 let channel_id = chan.2;
4768 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4769 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4770 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4771 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4772 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4773 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4774 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4775 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4776 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4777 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4778 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4779 // revoke_and_ack ->
4781 // Create and deliver (1)...
4782 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4783 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4786 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4787 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4788 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4789 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4790 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4794 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4796 // Generate (2) and (3):
4797 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4798 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4802 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4803 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4806 // Create and deliver (4)...
4807 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4809 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4810 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4811 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4812 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4813 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4818 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4819 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4823 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4825 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4826 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4828 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4829 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4832 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4833 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4836 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4837 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4838 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4839 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4840 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4841 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4842 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4843 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4847 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4849 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4850 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4852 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4856 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4857 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4858 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4862 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4863 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4864 let nodes = create_network(2);
4865 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4866 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4867 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4868 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4870 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4871 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4872 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4873 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4874 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4876 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4877 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4878 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4879 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4880 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4881 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4883 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4884 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4888 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4889 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4890 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4891 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4892 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4893 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4894 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4896 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4898 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4899 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4900 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4901 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4902 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4904 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4905 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4907 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4908 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4909 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4910 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4911 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4913 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4917 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4918 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4919 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4920 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4921 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4924 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4926 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4927 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4928 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4929 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4930 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4931 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4932 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4934 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4937 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4938 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4943 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4944 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4945 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4946 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4947 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4948 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4950 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4952 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4953 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4954 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4955 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4956 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4960 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4961 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4962 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4963 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4964 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4966 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4967 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4968 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4970 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4971 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4972 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4973 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4974 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4975 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4977 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4978 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4979 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4980 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4982 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4983 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4988 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4990 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4991 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4992 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4993 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4995 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4998 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5001 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
5002 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5003 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5008 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5009 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5010 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5011 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5012 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5013 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5014 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5016 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5018 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5019 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5020 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5021 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5022 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5025 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5026 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5027 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5028 let nodes = create_network(3);
5029 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5030 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5032 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5034 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5035 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5037 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5038 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5040 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5044 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5045 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5047 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5048 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5049 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5052 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5053 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5054 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5056 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5057 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5058 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5059 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5062 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5063 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5064 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5066 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5068 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5069 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5071 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5073 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5074 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5075 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5076 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5077 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5078 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5079 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5081 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5084 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5085 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5086 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5087 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5088 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5089 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5090 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5092 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5095 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5096 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5101 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5103 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5104 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5105 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5108 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5109 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5111 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5112 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5113 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5114 if recv_count == 0 {
5115 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5116 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5118 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5119 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5120 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5122 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5123 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5124 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5126 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5127 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5129 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5130 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5131 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5133 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5134 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5135 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5136 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5137 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5139 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5140 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5141 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5142 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5143 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5144 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5148 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5149 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5150 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5151 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5152 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5153 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5155 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5156 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5157 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5158 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5161 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5162 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5168 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5170 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5171 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5172 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5173 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5174 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5178 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5179 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5180 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5181 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5185 fn fake_network_test() {
5186 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5187 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5188 let nodes = create_network(4);
5190 // Create some initial channels
5191 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5192 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5193 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5195 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5196 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5197 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5198 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5201 // Send some more payments
5202 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5203 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5204 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5206 // Test failure packets
5207 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5208 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5210 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5211 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5214 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5215 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5216 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5217 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5218 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5219 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5221 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5222 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5223 hops.push(RouteHop {
5224 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5225 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5227 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5229 hops.push(RouteHop {
5230 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5231 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5233 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5235 hops.push(RouteHop {
5236 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5237 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5239 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5241 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5242 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5243 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5245 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5246 hops.push(RouteHop {
5247 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5248 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5250 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5252 hops.push(RouteHop {
5253 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5254 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5256 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5258 hops.push(RouteHop {
5259 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5260 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5262 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5264 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5265 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5266 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5268 // Claim the rebalances...
5269 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5270 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5272 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5273 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5275 // Send some payments across both channels
5276 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5277 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5278 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5280 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5282 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5284 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5285 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5286 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5288 // Close down the channels...
5289 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5290 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5291 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5292 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5293 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5297 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5298 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5299 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5300 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5302 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5303 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5304 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5305 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5306 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5307 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5309 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5311 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5312 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5314 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5315 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5317 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5318 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5319 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5322 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5323 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5324 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5326 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5327 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5328 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5330 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5331 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5333 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5335 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5336 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5337 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5339 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5340 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5341 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5342 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5343 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5344 res.push(tx.clone());
5349 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5350 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5353 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5355 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5356 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5357 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5358 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5359 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5360 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5362 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5364 res.push(tx.clone());
5368 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5370 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5374 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5378 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5379 /// HTLC transaction.
5380 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5381 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5382 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5383 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5384 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5385 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5389 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5392 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5393 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5395 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5397 let mut found_prev = false;
5399 for tx in prev_txn {
5400 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5401 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5402 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5403 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5409 assert!(found_prev);
5411 let mut res = Vec::new();
5412 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5416 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5417 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5418 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5419 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5420 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5426 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5427 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5428 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5429 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5436 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5437 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5441 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5443 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5446 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5449 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5450 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5454 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5456 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5457 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5459 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5460 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5461 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5462 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5463 chan.get_value_stat()
5467 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5468 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5469 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5471 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5472 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5474 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5475 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5477 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5478 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5479 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5480 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5481 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5485 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5487 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5489 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5490 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5495 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5496 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5497 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5500 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5501 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5502 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5509 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5510 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5512 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5514 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5516 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5517 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5518 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5520 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5521 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5525 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5526 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5527 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5529 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5530 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5533 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5536 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5537 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5538 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5539 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5540 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5543 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5544 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5545 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5546 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5547 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5551 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5552 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5553 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5554 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5556 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5557 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5561 // adding pending output
5562 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5563 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5565 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5566 let payment_event_1 = {
5567 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5570 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5572 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5576 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5577 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5579 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5580 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5581 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5582 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5587 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5588 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5590 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5592 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5593 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5594 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5596 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5598 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5599 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5600 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5601 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5602 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5603 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5605 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5606 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5607 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5608 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5612 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5614 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5616 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5617 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5618 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5619 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5620 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5621 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5622 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5623 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5631 // split the rest to test holding cell
5632 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5633 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5635 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5636 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5639 // now see if they go through on both sides
5640 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5641 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5642 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5644 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5647 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5649 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5650 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5651 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5652 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5656 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5657 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5658 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5661 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5663 // flush the pending htlc
5664 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5665 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5668 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5670 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5672 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5673 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5674 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5677 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5678 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5681 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5683 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5684 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5685 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5688 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5690 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5691 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5692 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5695 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5697 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5698 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5699 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5700 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5702 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5705 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5708 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5709 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5710 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5715 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5716 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5717 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5722 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5724 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5726 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5727 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5728 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5729 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5731 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5732 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5736 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5737 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5738 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5742 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5743 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5744 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5745 let nodes = create_network(5);
5747 // Create some initial channels
5748 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5749 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5750 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5751 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5753 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5755 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5756 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5757 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5759 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5760 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5762 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5763 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5764 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5765 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5767 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5768 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5769 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5771 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5772 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5774 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5775 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5777 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5778 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5779 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5780 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5782 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5783 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5784 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5786 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5787 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5789 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5792 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5795 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5796 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5797 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5806 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5807 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5808 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5810 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5812 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5813 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5815 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5816 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5818 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5820 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5821 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5822 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5824 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5825 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5826 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5829 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5830 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5831 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5832 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5833 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5837 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5838 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5839 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5840 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5841 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5844 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5846 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5847 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5849 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5850 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5851 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5852 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5853 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5856 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5858 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5859 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5861 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5863 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5864 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5865 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5869 fn test_justice_tx() {
5870 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5872 let nodes = create_network(2);
5873 // Create some new channels:
5874 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5876 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5877 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5878 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5879 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5880 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5881 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5883 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5884 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5885 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5887 // Revoke the old state
5888 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5891 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5892 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5894 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5896 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5899 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5900 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5902 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5904 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5905 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5906 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5907 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5908 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5910 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5912 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5913 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5915 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5916 // Create some new channels:
5917 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5919 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5920 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5921 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5922 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5923 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5926 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5927 // Revoke the old state
5928 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5930 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5931 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5933 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5934 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5935 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5939 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5941 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5943 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5944 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5945 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5946 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5947 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5949 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5951 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5955 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5956 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5957 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5958 let nodes = create_network(2);
5959 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5960 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5961 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5963 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5964 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5965 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5966 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5968 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5969 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5970 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5971 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5972 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5974 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5976 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5977 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5979 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5980 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5981 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5985 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5986 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5987 let nodes = create_network(2);
5989 // Create some new channel:
5990 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5992 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5993 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5994 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5995 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5996 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5998 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5999 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6000 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6001 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6002 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6003 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6005 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
6006 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6008 //Revoke the old state
6009 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6012 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6014 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6016 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6017 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6018 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6020 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6021 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6023 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6025 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6026 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6027 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6028 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6029 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6030 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6031 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6032 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6034 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6035 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6036 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6038 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6039 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6040 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6041 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6042 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6043 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6045 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6046 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6047 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6051 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6052 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6053 let nodes = create_network(2);
6055 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6057 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6058 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6059 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6060 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6061 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6062 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6064 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6065 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6067 //Revoke the old state
6068 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6071 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6073 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6075 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6076 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6077 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6079 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6080 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6081 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6082 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6083 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6084 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6085 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6087 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6088 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6089 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6091 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6092 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6093 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6094 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6095 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6097 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6098 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6099 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6100 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6101 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6102 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6103 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6104 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6106 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6107 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6109 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6110 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6111 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6112 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6113 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6114 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6116 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6117 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6118 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6122 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6123 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6124 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6125 let nodes = create_network(2);
6126 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6128 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6129 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6131 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6134 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6135 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6141 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6142 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6144 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6145 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6148 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6152 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6158 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6159 // registering new transactions
6160 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6164 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6165 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6166 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6167 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6170 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6172 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6174 let mut payment_event = {
6175 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6180 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6186 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6187 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6189 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6193 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6194 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6196 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6197 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6198 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6199 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6202 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6203 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6205 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6207 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6208 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6209 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6211 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6212 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6213 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6215 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6216 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6222 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6223 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6224 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6225 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6226 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6230 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6231 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6233 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6234 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6235 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6237 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6238 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6243 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6245 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6246 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6247 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6249 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6250 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6251 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6252 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6253 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6254 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6255 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6257 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6261 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6262 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6263 let nodes = create_network(2);
6264 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6266 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6267 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6268 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6269 mem::drop(channel_state);
6271 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6272 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6273 headers.push(header.clone());
6275 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6276 headers.push(header.clone());
6278 while !headers.is_empty() {
6279 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6282 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6285 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6286 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6291 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6292 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6293 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6296 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6297 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6299 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6300 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6301 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6302 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6303 res.push(msg.clone());
6305 panic!("Unexpected event")
6313 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6314 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6316 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6318 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6320 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6326 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6327 let mut commitment_update = None;
6328 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6331 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6332 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6333 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6334 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6336 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6337 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6338 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6339 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6344 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6347 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6349 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6350 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6351 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6352 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6354 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6355 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6356 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6357 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6363 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6368 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6369 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6370 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6371 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6372 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6373 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6374 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6376 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6377 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6379 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6380 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6383 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6384 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6386 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6387 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6390 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6391 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6392 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6393 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6394 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6396 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6397 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
6401 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6402 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6403 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6404 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6406 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6407 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6409 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6412 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6413 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6414 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6415 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6417 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6418 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6420 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6423 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6424 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6425 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6427 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6428 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6429 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6430 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6431 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6432 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6433 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6434 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6435 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6438 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6441 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6442 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6443 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6444 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6446 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6448 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6449 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6450 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6451 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6453 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6455 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6456 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6457 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6458 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6459 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6461 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6462 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6464 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6465 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6468 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6469 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6471 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6472 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6473 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6474 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6475 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6476 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6477 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6480 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6484 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6485 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6486 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6487 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6488 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6489 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6490 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6491 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6492 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6495 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6498 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6499 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6500 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6501 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6503 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6505 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6506 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6507 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6508 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6510 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6511 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6512 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6513 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6514 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6516 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6517 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6519 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6520 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6523 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6524 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6526 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6527 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6528 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6529 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6530 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6531 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6532 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6535 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6541 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6542 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6543 let nodes = create_network(3);
6544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6547 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6548 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6549 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6551 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6552 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6553 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6554 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6556 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6557 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6558 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6560 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6561 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6562 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6563 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6565 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6566 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6568 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6569 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6573 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6574 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6576 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6577 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6582 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6583 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6584 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6590 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6591 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6594 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6595 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6596 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6597 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6598 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6599 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6601 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6604 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6605 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6607 let payment_event = {
6608 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6611 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6613 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6615 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6617 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6618 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6621 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6624 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6626 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6627 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6628 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6631 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6633 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6634 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6637 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6638 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6639 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6647 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6648 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6649 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6650 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6651 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6652 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6653 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6654 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6655 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6656 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6657 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6658 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6659 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6660 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6661 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6662 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6663 // Everything was delivered...
6664 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6667 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6668 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6670 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6674 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6675 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6676 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6678 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6679 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6681 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6682 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6684 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6685 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6686 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6691 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6694 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6695 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6696 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6697 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6698 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6700 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6701 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6702 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6703 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6704 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6709 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6710 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6712 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6713 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6715 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6716 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6721 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6722 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6724 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6726 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6727 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6728 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6731 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6732 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6733 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6734 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6737 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6738 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6739 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6747 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6748 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6749 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6750 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6751 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6752 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6753 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6754 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6756 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6757 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6763 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6764 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6765 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6766 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6767 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6768 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6769 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6770 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6771 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6772 // Everything was delivered...
6773 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6776 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6777 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6778 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6780 // Channel should still work fine...
6781 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6782 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6786 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6787 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6788 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6789 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6790 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6794 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6795 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6796 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6797 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6801 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6802 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6803 let nodes = create_network(2);
6804 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6806 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6807 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6809 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6810 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6813 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6814 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6819 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6821 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6822 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6824 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6825 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6826 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6828 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6829 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6834 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6835 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6840 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6842 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6843 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6845 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6846 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6847 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6851 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6852 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6853 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6854 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6855 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6857 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6859 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6860 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6861 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6863 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6866 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6867 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6869 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6873 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6876 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6877 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6879 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6880 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6881 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6882 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6883 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6884 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6885 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6887 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6888 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6889 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6891 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6892 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6897 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6898 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6899 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6905 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6906 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6908 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6909 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6910 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6911 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6912 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6913 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6915 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6916 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6917 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6918 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6920 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6921 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6923 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6924 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6926 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6928 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6930 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6931 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6932 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6934 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6935 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6940 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6941 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6942 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6943 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6944 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6945 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6949 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6950 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6951 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6952 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6954 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6957 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6958 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6959 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6962 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6963 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6964 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6967 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6968 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6971 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6972 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6974 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6978 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6979 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6981 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6982 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6984 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6985 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6991 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6994 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6998 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6999 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7000 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7003 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7004 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7006 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7007 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7011 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7013 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7017 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7021 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7022 // PaymentFailed event
7024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7027 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7028 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7029 // a disconnect in between
7030 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7031 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7033 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7034 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7036 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7037 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7041 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7045 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7046 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7047 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7050 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7051 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7054 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7055 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7056 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7057 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7058 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7061 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7063 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7064 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7066 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7067 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7068 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7075 // Now set it to failed again...
7076 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7077 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7078 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7082 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7086 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7087 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7088 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7091 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7092 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7093 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7096 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7097 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7099 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7103 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7104 // PaymentFailed event
7106 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7110 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7111 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7112 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7115 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7116 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7118 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7119 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7120 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7121 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7122 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7123 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7124 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7125 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7126 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7127 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7128 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7129 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7130 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7131 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7132 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7133 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7134 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7135 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7136 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7138 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7140 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7141 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7142 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7144 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7145 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7148 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7149 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7150 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7152 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7153 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7154 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7156 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7157 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7158 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7159 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7160 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7161 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7162 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7163 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7164 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7165 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7167 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7168 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7169 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7170 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7172 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7173 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7178 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7179 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7180 } else { panic!(); }
7183 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7188 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7189 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7190 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7193 // Now fix monitor updating...
7194 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7195 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7198 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7199 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7200 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7202 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7203 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7204 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7205 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7206 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7207 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7209 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7210 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7211 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7212 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7214 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7215 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7217 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7220 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7221 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7222 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7224 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7225 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7226 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7227 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7228 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7229 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7231 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7233 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7234 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7236 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7238 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7239 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7241 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7242 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7243 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7245 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7246 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7247 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7249 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7250 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7251 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7252 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7253 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7254 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7256 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7259 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7260 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7262 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7263 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7268 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7269 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7270 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7273 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7277 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7278 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7280 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7281 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7282 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7284 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7285 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7288 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7290 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7292 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7293 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7294 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7301 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7303 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7304 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7305 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7306 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7309 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7310 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7312 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7313 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7315 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7316 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7319 let as_commitment_update;
7320 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7322 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7323 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7324 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7325 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7326 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7327 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7328 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7329 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7333 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7334 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7335 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7336 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7337 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7338 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7339 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7340 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7344 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7347 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7348 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7350 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7351 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7353 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7354 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7356 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7359 handle_initial_raa!();
7361 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7362 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7364 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7365 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7367 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7368 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7371 handle_initial_raa!();
7373 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7374 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7376 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7377 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7379 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7380 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7382 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7387 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7388 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7390 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7391 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7393 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7394 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7398 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7399 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7400 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7403 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7404 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7405 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7408 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7409 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7412 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7416 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7418 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7419 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7421 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7422 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7423 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7432 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7433 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7434 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7435 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7436 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7437 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7438 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7442 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7443 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7444 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7445 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7446 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7450 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7451 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7452 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7453 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7454 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7455 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7459 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
7460 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
7461 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7462 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7464 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7465 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7466 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
7467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7469 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7472 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7473 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
7474 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
7475 } else { panic!(); }
7476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7477 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7479 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7480 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7482 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7483 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
7485 match responses[0] {
7486 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
7487 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7488 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7493 match responses[1] {
7494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
7495 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7496 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7497 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7498 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7499 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7500 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7502 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7503 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
7504 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
7505 } else { panic!(); }
7506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7507 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7512 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7513 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7516 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7520 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7523 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7526 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7527 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7529 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7532 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
7533 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7534 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7539 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7542 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
7543 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
7544 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
7545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7546 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7548 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
7549 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
7551 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
7552 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
7554 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
7555 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
7556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7558 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7559 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7560 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7561 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7562 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7563 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7566 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
7567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7569 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
7571 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7572 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7573 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7577 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7578 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
7580 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7581 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7583 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7587 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7588 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7590 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7592 // Now fail monitor updating.
7593 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7594 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
7595 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
7596 } else { panic!(); }
7597 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7598 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7601 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
7604 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7605 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7606 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
7607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7609 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
7610 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7615 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7616 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7617 match events_2.remove(0) {
7618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7619 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7620 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7621 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7622 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7623 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7624 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7626 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7627 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
7629 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7631 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] {
7632 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
7633 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
7634 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
7639 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
7640 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
7641 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7642 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7643 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
7644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7646 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7648 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
7649 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7650 } else { panic!(); }
7651 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7652 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7653 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
7654 } else { (None, None) };
7656 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
7657 // update_add update.
7658 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7659 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7662 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 if test_ignore_second_cs {
7664 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
7666 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
7669 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
7670 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
7671 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
7672 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
7673 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7674 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7675 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7676 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7678 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7679 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
7681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
7683 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
7684 match events_3.remove(1) {
7685 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
7686 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7692 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
7693 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7695 // Now deliver the new messages...
7697 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
7698 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
7699 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7700 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7701 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] {
7702 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
7703 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7704 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7706 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7707 if test_ignore_second_cs {
7708 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7710 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
7712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7713 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7714 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7715 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7716 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7717 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7718 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
7720 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7722 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7723 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7724 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7725 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7726 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7727 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
7729 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7731 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7733 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7735 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7737 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
7738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7739 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7741 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
7742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7743 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7745 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
7748 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7749 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7751 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7755 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7756 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7758 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7759 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
7761 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
7762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7765 if test_ignore_second_cs {
7766 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7767 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
7769 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7773 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7774 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7777 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7778 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7779 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7780 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7781 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
7783 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7784 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
7786 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7790 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7791 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7793 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7794 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
7796 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
7797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7799 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
7802 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
7806 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
7807 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
7808 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
7812 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
7813 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
7814 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
7816 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
7817 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7820 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
7822 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7823 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7825 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
7826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7827 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7828 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7829 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7830 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7831 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7832 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7835 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7836 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
7838 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7839 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7840 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7842 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7843 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7845 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
7847 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
7848 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
7849 } else { panic!(); }
7850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7852 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7853 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7855 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7856 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7858 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7859 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7861 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
7863 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
7864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7865 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7867 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7868 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7871 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7872 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7873 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7874 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7875 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7876 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7877 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7878 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
7880 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7883 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
7884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7889 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7890 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7891 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7892 let nodes = create_network(2);
7894 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7896 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7897 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7898 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7899 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7901 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7903 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7904 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7906 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7907 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7909 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7911 let mut chan_announcement;
7913 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7915 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7916 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7917 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7918 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7919 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7920 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7921 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7922 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7923 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7928 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7929 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7930 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7931 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7932 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7933 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7934 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7935 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7936 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7937 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7938 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7939 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7940 contents: $unsigned_msg
7945 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7946 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7947 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7948 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7950 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7951 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7952 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7953 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7954 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7956 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7957 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7958 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7959 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7962 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7963 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7964 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7965 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7968 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7969 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7974 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7975 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7977 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7979 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7981 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7982 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7983 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7985 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7986 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7987 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7988 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7990 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7991 let config = UserConfig::new();
7992 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7993 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7994 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7995 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7996 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7997 default_config: config,
7999 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8000 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8001 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8002 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8003 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8004 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8007 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8009 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8010 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8011 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8012 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8013 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8017 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8018 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8019 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8021 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8022 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8023 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8024 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8026 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8027 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8028 for node in nodes.iter() {
8029 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8030 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8031 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8034 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8038 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8039 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8042 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8043 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8045 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8047 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8048 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8049 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8051 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8052 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8053 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8054 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8056 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8057 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8058 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8059 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8060 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8061 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8062 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8064 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8065 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8066 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8067 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8068 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8069 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8072 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8074 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8075 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8078 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8080 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8081 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8085 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8086 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8087 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8088 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8090 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8092 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8094 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8095 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8097 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8098 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8099 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8100 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8102 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8104 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8105 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8106 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8107 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8108 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8111 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8112 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8113 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8114 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8115 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8116 assert!(read.is_empty());
8117 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8120 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8121 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8122 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8123 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8125 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8126 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8127 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8128 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8129 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8130 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8132 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8134 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8135 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8136 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8137 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8138 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8141 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8142 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8147 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8148 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8149 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8150 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8151 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8153 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8154 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8155 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8157 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8158 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8161 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8162 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8164 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8165 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8166 for event in events {
8168 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8169 for outp in outputs {
8171 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8173 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8174 script_sig: Script::new(),
8176 witness: Vec::new(),
8179 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8180 value: output.value,
8182 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8188 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8189 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8190 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8191 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8192 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8193 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8194 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8195 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8198 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8200 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8201 script_sig: Script::new(),
8202 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8203 witness: Vec::new(),
8206 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8207 value: output.value,
8209 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8216 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8217 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8218 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8219 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8220 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8221 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8224 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8227 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8228 script_sig: Script::new(),
8230 witness: Vec::new(),
8233 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8234 value: output.value,
8236 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8240 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8243 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8245 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8247 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8250 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8253 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8254 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8255 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8256 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8257 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8258 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8259 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8274 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8275 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8276 let nodes = create_network(2);
8278 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8279 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8280 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8282 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8285 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8286 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8287 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8288 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8290 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8291 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8292 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8293 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8294 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8298 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8299 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8300 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8302 let nodes = create_network(2);
8304 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8305 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8306 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8308 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8311 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8312 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8314 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8316 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8317 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8318 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8323 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8324 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8325 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8326 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8330 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8331 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8332 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8334 let nodes = create_network(2);
8336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8337 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8338 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8339 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8340 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8342 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8343 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8344 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8345 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8347 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8350 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8351 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8352 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8353 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8354 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8355 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8356 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8360 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8361 let nodes = create_network(2);
8363 // Create some initial channels
8364 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8366 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8368 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8369 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8370 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8372 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8373 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8374 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8376 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8377 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8379 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8383 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8384 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8387 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
8388 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
8389 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
8390 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
8391 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8392 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8394 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
8395 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8396 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8397 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8401 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
8402 let nodes = create_network(2);
8404 // Create some initial channels
8405 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8407 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8408 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8409 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8410 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8412 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8414 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8415 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8416 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8418 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8421 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8422 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
8423 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
8424 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8425 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8427 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8428 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8429 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8430 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8434 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8435 let nodes = create_network(2);
8437 // Create some initial channels
8438 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8440 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8441 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8442 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8443 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8445 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8447 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8448 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
8449 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8450 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8452 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8455 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8456 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
8457 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8458 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8459 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8460 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8461 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
8463 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8464 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8467 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8471 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8473 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8474 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8476 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8477 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8478 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
8479 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8480 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8481 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
8485 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
8486 let nodes = create_network(2);
8488 // Create some initial channels
8489 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8491 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8492 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8493 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8496 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8498 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8499 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8500 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8501 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8503 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8506 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8508 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
8509 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8510 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8511 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8512 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8514 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8515 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8516 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8518 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8522 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8523 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8524 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8525 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8527 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8528 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8529 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
8530 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8531 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8532 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
8533 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
8534 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
8538 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8539 let nodes = create_network(2);
8541 // Create some initial channels
8542 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8544 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8545 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8546 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8547 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8549 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8550 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8552 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8553 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8554 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8557 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8560 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8561 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8563 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8564 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8565 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8566 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8568 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8569 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8570 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8571 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8572 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
8576 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8577 let nodes = create_network(2);
8579 // Create some initial channels
8580 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8582 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8583 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8584 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8585 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8587 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8588 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8589 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8590 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8592 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8593 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8595 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8597 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8598 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8600 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8601 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
8602 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
8603 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8604 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
8605 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
8606 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8607 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
8608 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
8609 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8610 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8614 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8615 let nodes = create_network(2);
8617 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8619 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8620 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8622 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8623 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8624 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
8625 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8626 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
8628 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8629 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
8630 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8631 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);