806d056dddbffbf165625923002e66618c1ce9b7
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36
37 use crypto;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
42
43 use std::{ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
46 use std::io::Cursor;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 ///
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 ///
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
64         use ln::msgs;
65         use ln::router::Route;
66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
68
69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
78         }
79
80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
84         }
85
86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
91         }
92
93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94         #[derive(Clone)]
95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
99         }
100
101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102         #[derive(Clone)]
103         pub enum HTLCSource {
104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
105                 OutboundRoute {
106                         route: Route,
107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
108                 },
109         }
110         #[cfg(test)]
111         impl HTLCSource {
112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116                         }
117                 }
118         }
119
120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
122                 ErrorPacket {
123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
124                 },
125                 Reason {
126                         failure_code: u16,
127                         data: Vec<u8>,
128                 }
129         }
130 }
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
132
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134         err: msgs::HandleError,
135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
136 }
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
138         #[inline]
139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
140                 Self {
141                         err: HandleError {
142                                 err,
143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
145                                                 channel_id,
146                                                 data: err.to_string()
147                                         },
148                                 }),
149                         },
150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
151                 }
152         }
153         #[inline]
154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155                 Self {
156                         err: HandleError {
157                                 err,
158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160                                                 channel_id,
161                                                 data: err.to_string()
162                                         },
163                                 }),
164                         },
165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
166                 }
167         }
168         #[inline]
169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
171         }
172         #[inline]
173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
175         }
176         #[inline]
177         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
178                 Self {
179                         err: match err {
180                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
181                                         err: msg,
182                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
183                                 },
184                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
185                                         err: msg,
186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188                                                         channel_id,
189                                                         data: msg.to_string()
190                                                 },
191                                         }),
192                                 },
193                         },
194                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
195                 }
196         }
197         #[inline]
198         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
199                 Self {
200                         err: match err {
201                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202                                         err: msg,
203                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204                                 },
205                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206                                         err: msg,
207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
208                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209                                                         channel_id,
210                                                         data: msg.to_string()
211                                                 },
212                                         }),
213                                 },
214                         },
215                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
216                 }
217         }
218 }
219
220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
223 /// probably increase this significantly.
224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
225
226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
227         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
228         prev_htlc_id: u64,
229         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 }
231
232 struct ChannelHolder {
233         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235         next_forward: Instant,
236         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
243         /// go to read them!
244         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
245 }
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 }
253 impl ChannelHolder {
254         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
255                 MutChannelHolder {
256                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
257                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
258                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
259                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
260                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
261                 }
262         }
263 }
264
265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
267
268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
270 ///
271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
272 /// to individual Channels.
273 pub struct ChannelManager {
274         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
275         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
276         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
277         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
278         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
279
280         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
281         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
282         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
283         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
284
285         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
286         our_network_key: SecretKey,
287
288         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
289
290         logger: Arc<Logger>,
291 }
292
293 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
294 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
295 const FINAL_NODE_TIMEOUT: u16 = 3; //TODO?
296
297 macro_rules! secp_call {
298         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
299                 match $res {
300                         Ok(key) => key,
301                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
302                 }
303         };
304 }
305
306 struct OnionKeys {
307         #[cfg(test)]
308         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
309         #[cfg(test)]
310         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
311         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
312         rho: [u8; 32],
313         mu: [u8; 32],
314 }
315
316 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
317 pub struct ChannelDetails {
318         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
319         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
320         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
321         /// lifetime of the channel.
322         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
323         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
324         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
325         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
326         /// The node_id of our counterparty
327         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
328         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
329         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
330         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
331         pub user_id: u64,
332 }
333
334 impl ChannelManager {
335         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
336         ///
337         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
338         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
339         ///
340         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
341         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
342         ///
343         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
344         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
345                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
346
347                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
348                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
349                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
350                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
351                         chain_monitor,
352                         tx_broadcaster,
353
354                         announce_channels_publicly,
355                         fee_proportional_millionths,
356                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
357                         secp_ctx,
358
359                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
360                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
361                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
362                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
363                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
364                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
365                         }),
366                         our_network_key,
367
368                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
369
370                         logger,
371                 });
372                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
373                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
374                 Ok(res)
375         }
376
377         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
378         ///
379         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
380         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
381         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
382         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
383         ///
384         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
385         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
386         ///
387         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
388         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
389                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
390                         ChannelKeys {
391                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
392                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
393                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
394                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
395                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
396                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
397                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
398                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
399                         }
400                 } else {
401                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
402                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
403                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
404                                 Ok(key) => key,
405                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
406                         }
407                 };
408
409                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
410                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
411                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
412                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
413                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
414                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
415                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
416                                 } else {
417                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
418                                 }
419                         },
420                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
421                 }
422
423                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
424                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
425                         node_id: their_network_key,
426                         msg: res,
427                 });
428                 Ok(())
429         }
430
431         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
432         /// more information.
433         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
434                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
435                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
436                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
437                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
438                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
439                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
440                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
441                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
442                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
443                         });
444                 }
445                 res
446         }
447
448         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
449         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
450         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
451                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
452                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
453                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
454                         if channel.is_usable() {
455                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
456                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
457                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
458                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
459                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
460                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
461                                 });
462                         }
463                 }
464                 res
465         }
466
467         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
468         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
469         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
470         ///
471         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
472         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
473                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
474                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
475                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
476                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
477                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
478                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
479                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
480                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
481                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
482                                                 }
483                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
484                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
485                                 },
486                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
487                         }
488                 };
489                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
490                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
491                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
492                 }
493                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
494                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
495                                 Some(update)
496                         } else { None }
497                 } else { None };
498
499                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
500                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
501                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
502                                 msg: update
503                         });
504                 }
505                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
506                         node_id,
507                         msg: res.0
508                 });
509
510                 Ok(())
511         }
512
513         #[inline]
514         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
515                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
516                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
517                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
518                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
519                 }
520                 for tx in local_txn {
521                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
522                 }
523                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
524                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
525                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
526                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
527                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
528                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
529                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
530         }
531
532         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
533         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
534         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
535                 let mut chan = {
536                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
537                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
538                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
539                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
540                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
541                                 }
542                                 chan
543                         } else {
544                                 return;
545                         }
546                 };
547                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
548                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
549                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
550                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
551                                 msg: update
552                         });
553                 }
554         }
555
556         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
557         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
558         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
559                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
560                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
561                 }
562         }
563
564         #[inline]
565         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
566                 ({
567                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
568                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
569                         let mut res = [0; 32];
570                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
571                         res
572                 },
573                 {
574                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
575                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
576                         let mut res = [0; 32];
577                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
578                         res
579                 })
580         }
581
582         #[inline]
583         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
584                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
585                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
586                 let mut res = [0; 32];
587                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
588                 res
589         }
590
591         #[inline]
592         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
593                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
594                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
595                 let mut res = [0; 32];
596                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
597                 res
598         }
599
600         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
601         #[inline]
602         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
603                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
604                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
605
606                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
607                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
608
609                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
610                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
611                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
612                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
613                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
614
615                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
616
617                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
618                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
619
620                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
621                 }
622
623                 Ok(())
624         }
625
626         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
627         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
628                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
629
630                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
631                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
632
633                         res.push(OnionKeys {
634                                 #[cfg(test)]
635                                 shared_secret,
636                                 #[cfg(test)]
637                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
638                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
639                                 rho,
640                                 mu,
641                         });
642                 })?;
643
644                 Ok(res)
645         }
646
647         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
648         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
649                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
650                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
651                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
652                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
653                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
654                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
655
656                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
657                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
658                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
659                         // the intended recipient).
660                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
661                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
662                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
663                                 realm: 0,
664                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
665                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
666                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
667                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
668                                 },
669                                 hmac: [0; 32],
670                         };
671                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
672                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
673                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
674                         }
675                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
676                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
677                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
678                         }
679                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
680                 }
681                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
682         }
683
684         #[inline]
685         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
686                 unsafe {
687                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
688                 }
689                 for i in 0..65 {
690                         arr[i] = 0;
691                 }
692         }
693
694         #[inline]
695         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
696                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
697
698                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
699                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
700                 }
701         }
702
703         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
704         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
705                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
706                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
707
708                 let filler = {
709                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
710                         let end_len = iters * 65;
711                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
712                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
713
714                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
715                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
716                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
717                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
718                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
719                         }
720                         res
721                 };
722
723                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
724                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
725
726                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
727                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
728                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
729                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
730
731                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
732                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
733                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
734
735                         if i == 0 {
736                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
737                         }
738
739                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
740                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
741                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
742                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
743                 }
744
745                 msgs::OnionPacket{
746                         version: 0,
747                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
748                         hop_data: packet_data,
749                         hmac: hmac_res,
750                 }
751         }
752
753         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
754         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
755         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
756                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
757
758                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
759                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
760                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
761                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
762                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
763                         data: packet_crypted,
764                 }
765         }
766
767         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
768                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
769
770                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
771
772                 let failuremsg = {
773                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
774                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
775                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
776                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
777                         res
778                 };
779                 let pad = {
780                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
781                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
782                         res
783                 };
784                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
785                         hmac: [0; 32],
786                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
787                         pad: pad,
788                 };
789
790                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
791                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
792                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
793
794                 packet
795         }
796
797         #[inline]
798         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
799                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
800                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
801         }
802
803         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
804                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
805                         () => {
806                                 {
807                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
808                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
809                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
810                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
811                                         onion_hash
812                                 }
813                         }
814                 }
815
816                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
817                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
818                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
819                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
820                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
821                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
822                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
823                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
824                 }
825
826                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
827                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
828
829                 let mut channel_state = None;
830                 macro_rules! return_err {
831                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
832                                 {
833                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
834                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
835                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
836                                         }
837                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
838                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
839                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
840                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
841                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
842                                 }
843                         }
844                 }
845
846                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
847                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
848                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
849                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
850                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
851                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
852                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
853                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
854                 }
855
856                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
857                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
858                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
859                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
860                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
861                 }
862
863                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
864                 let next_hop_data = {
865                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
866                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
867                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
868                                 Err(err) => {
869                                         let error_code = match err {
870                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
871                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
872                                         };
873                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
874                                 },
875                                 Ok(msg) => msg
876                         }
877                 };
878
879                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
880
881                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
882                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
883                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + FINAL_NODE_TIMEOUT as u64 { // final_expiry_too_soon
884                                         return_err!("The CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
885                                 }
886                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
887                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
888                                 }
889                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
890                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
891                                 }
892
893                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
894                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
895                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
896                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
897
898                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
899                                         onion_packet: None,
900                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
901                                         short_channel_id: 0,
902                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
903                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
904                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
905                                 })
906                         } else {
907                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
908                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
909                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
910
911                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
912
913                                 let blinding_factor = {
914                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
915                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
916                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
917                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
918                                         sha.result(&mut res);
919                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
920                                                 Err(_) => {
921                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
922                                                 },
923                                                 Ok(key) => key
924                                         }
925                                 };
926
927                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
928                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
929                                 }
930
931                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
932                                         version: 0,
933                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
934                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
935                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
936                                 };
937
938                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
939                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
940                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
941                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
942                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
943                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
944                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
945                                 })
946                         };
947
948                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
949                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
950                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
951                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
952                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
953                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
954                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
955                                         },
956                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
957                                 };
958                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
959                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
960
961                                         if !chan.is_live() { // temporary_channel_failure
962                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
963                                         }
964                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
965                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
966                                         }
967                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
968                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
969                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
970                                         }
971                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
972                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
973                                         }
974                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
975                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + 3 as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
976                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
977                                         }
978                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
979                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 0x1000 | 21, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()));
980                                         }
981                                         break None;
982                                 }
983                                 {
984                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
985                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
986                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amt_to_forward));
987                                         }
988                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
989                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
990                                         }
991                                         res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
992                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
993                                 }
994                         }
995                 }
996
997                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
998         }
999
1000         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1001         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1002                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1003                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1004                         Some(id) => id,
1005                 };
1006
1007                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1008
1009                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1010                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1011                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1012                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1013                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1014                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1015                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1016                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1017                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1018                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1019                 };
1020
1021                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1022                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
1023
1024                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1025                         signature: sig,
1026                         contents: unsigned
1027                 })
1028         }
1029
1030         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1031         ///
1032         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1033         /// fields for more info.
1034         ///
1035         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1036         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1037         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1038         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1039         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1040         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1041         ///
1042         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1043         ///
1044         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1045         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1046         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1047                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1048                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1049                 }
1050                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1051                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1052                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1053                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1054                         }
1055                 }
1056
1057                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1058                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1059                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1060                         session_key
1061                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1062
1063                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1064
1065                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1066                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1067                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1068                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1069
1070                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1071                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1072                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1073
1074                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1075                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1076                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1077                         };
1078
1079                         let res = {
1080                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1081                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1082                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1083                                 }
1084                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1085                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1086                                 }
1087                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1088                                         route: route.clone(),
1089                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1090                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1091                         };
1092
1093                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1094
1095                         match res {
1096                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1097                                 None => return Ok(()),
1098                         }
1099                 };
1100
1101                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1102                         unimplemented!();
1103                 }
1104
1105                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1106                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1107                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1108                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1109                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1110                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1111                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1112                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1113                                 update_fee: None,
1114                                 commitment_signed,
1115                         },
1116                 });
1117                 Ok(())
1118         }
1119
1120         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1121         ///
1122         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1123         ///
1124         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1125         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1126         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1127
1128                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1129                         ($event: expr) => {
1130                                 {
1131                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1132                                         pending_events.push($event);
1133                                 }
1134                         }
1135                 }
1136
1137                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1138                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1139                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1140                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1141                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1142                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1143                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1144                                                 },
1145                                                 Err(e) => {
1146                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1147                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1148                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1149                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1150                                                                 action: e.action,
1151                                                         });
1152                                                         return;
1153                                                 },
1154                                         }
1155                                 },
1156                                 None => return
1157                         }
1158                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1159                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1160                         unimplemented!();
1161                 }
1162                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1163                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1164                         msg: msg,
1165                 });
1166
1167                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1168                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1169                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1170                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1171                         },
1172                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1173                                 e.insert(chan);
1174                         }
1175                 }
1176         }
1177
1178         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1179                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1180
1181                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1182                         Ok(res) => res,
1183                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1184                 };
1185                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1186                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1187
1188                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1189                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1190                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1191                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1192                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1193                 })
1194         }
1195
1196         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1197         ///
1198         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1199         /// Will likely generate further events.
1200         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1201                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1202                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1203                 {
1204                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1205                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1206
1207                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1208                                 return;
1209                         }
1210
1211                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1212                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1213                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1214                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1215                                                 None => {
1216                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1217                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1218                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1219                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1220                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1221                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1222                                                                 });
1223                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1224                                                         }
1225                                                         continue;
1226                                                 }
1227                                         };
1228                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1229
1230                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1231                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1232                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1233                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1234                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1235                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1236                                                 });
1237                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1238                                                         Err(_e) => {
1239                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1240                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1241                                                                 continue;
1242                                                         },
1243                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1244                                                                 match update_add {
1245                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1246                                                                         None => {
1247                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1248                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1249                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1250                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1251                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1252                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1253                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1254                                                                         }
1255                                                                 }
1256                                                         }
1257                                                 }
1258                                         }
1259
1260                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1261                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1262                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1263                                                         Err(e) => {
1264                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1265                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1266                                                                 } else {
1267                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1268                                                                 }
1269                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1270                                                                 continue;
1271                                                         },
1272                                                 };
1273                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1274                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1275                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1276                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1277                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1278                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1279                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1280                                                                 update_fee: None,
1281                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1282                                                         },
1283                                                 }));
1284                                         }
1285                                 } else {
1286                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1287                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1288                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1289                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1290                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1291                                                 };
1292                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1293                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1294                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1295                                                 };
1296                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1297                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1298                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1299                                                 }));
1300                                         }
1301                                 }
1302                         }
1303                 }
1304
1305                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1306                         match update {
1307                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1308                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1309                         };
1310                 }
1311
1312                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1313
1314                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1315                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1316                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1317                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1318                                 }
1319                         }
1320                         true
1321                 });
1322
1323                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1324                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1325                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1326                         events.push(event.1);
1327                 }
1328         }
1329
1330         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1331         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1332                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1333                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1334                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1335                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1336                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1337                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1338                         }
1339                         true
1340                 } else { false }
1341         }
1342
1343         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1344         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1345         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1346         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1347         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1348         /// still-available channels.
1349         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1350                 match source {
1351                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1352                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1353
1354                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1355                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1356                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1357                                 });
1358                         },
1359                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1360                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1361                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1362                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1363                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1364                                         },
1365                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1366                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1367                                         }
1368                                 };
1369
1370                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1371                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1372                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1373                                                 None => return
1374                                         };
1375
1376                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1377                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1378                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1379                                                 Err(_e) => {
1380                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1381                                                         return;
1382                                                 },
1383                                         }
1384                                 };
1385
1386                                 match fail_msgs {
1387                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1388                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1389
1390                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1391                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1392                                                 }
1393
1394                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1395                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1396                                                         node_id,
1397                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1398                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1400                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1401                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1402                                                                 update_fee: None,
1403                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1404                                                         },
1405                                                 });
1406                                         },
1407                                         None => {},
1408                                 }
1409                         },
1410                 }
1411         }
1412
1413         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1414         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1415         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1416         ///
1417         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1418         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1419                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1420                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1421                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1422                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1423
1424                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1425                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1426                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1427                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1428                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1429                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1430                         }
1431                         true
1432                 } else { false }
1433         }
1434         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1435                 match source {
1436                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1437                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1438                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1439                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1440                                         payment_preimage
1441                                 });
1442                         },
1443                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1444                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1445                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1446                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1447                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1448                                                 None => {
1449                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1450                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1451                                                         // why its missing.
1452                                                         return
1453                                                 }
1454                                         };
1455
1456                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1457                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1458                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1459                                                 Err(_e) => {
1460                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1461                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1462                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1463                                                         return
1464                                                 },
1465                                         }
1466                                 };
1467
1468                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1469                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1470                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1471                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1472                                         }
1473                                 }
1474
1475                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1476                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1477                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1478                                                 node_id: node_id,
1479                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1480                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1481                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1482                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1484                                                         update_fee: None,
1485                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1486                                                 }
1487                                         });
1488                                 }
1489                         },
1490                 }
1491         }
1492
1493         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1494         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1495                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1496         }
1497
1498         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1499         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1500         /// operation.
1501         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1502                 unimplemented!();
1503         }
1504
1505         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1506                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1507                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1508                 }
1509                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1510                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1511                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1512                 }
1513
1514                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1515                         ChannelKeys {
1516                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1517                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1518                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1519                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1520                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1521                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1522                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1523                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1524                         }
1525                 } else {
1526                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1527                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1528                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1529                                 Ok(key) => key,
1530                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1531                         }
1532                 };
1533
1534                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1535                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1536                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1537                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1538                 Ok(accept_msg)
1539         }
1540
1541         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1542                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1543                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1545                                 Some(chan) => {
1546                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1547                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1548                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1549                                         }
1550                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1551                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1552                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1553                                 },
1554                                 //TODO: same as above
1555                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1556                         }
1557                 };
1558                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1559                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1560                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1561                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1562                         output_script: output_script,
1563                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1564                 });
1565                 Ok(())
1566         }
1567
1568         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1569                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1570                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1571                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1572                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1573                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1574                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1575                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1576                                         }
1577                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1578                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1579                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1580                                                 },
1581                                                 Err(e) => {
1582                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1583                                                 }
1584                                         }
1585                                 },
1586                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1587                         }
1588                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1589                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1590                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1591                    // for a bogus channel.
1592                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1593                         unimplemented!();
1594                 }
1595                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1596                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1597                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1598                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1599                         },
1600                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1601                                 e.insert(chan);
1602                         }
1603                 }
1604                 Ok(funding_msg)
1605         }
1606
1607         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1608                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1609                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1610                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1611                                 Some(chan) => {
1612                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1613                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1614                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1615                                         }
1616                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1617                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1618                                 },
1619                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1620                         }
1621                 };
1622                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1623                         unimplemented!();
1624                 }
1625                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1626                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1627                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1628                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1629                 });
1630                 Ok(())
1631         }
1632
1633         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1634                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1636                         Some(chan) => {
1637                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1638                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1639                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1640                                 }
1641                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1642                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1643                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1644                         },
1645                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1646                 };
1647         }
1648
1649         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1650                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1651                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1652                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1653
1654                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1655                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1656                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1657                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1658                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1659                                         }
1660                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1661                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1662                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1663                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1664                                                 }
1665                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1666                                         } else { (res, None) }
1667                                 },
1668                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1669                         }
1670                 };
1671                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1672                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1673                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1674                 }
1675                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1676                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1677                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1678                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1679                                         msg: update
1680                                 });
1681                         }
1682                 }
1683                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1684         }
1685
1686         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1687                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1688                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1689                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1690                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1691                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1692                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1693                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1694                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1695                                         }
1696                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1697                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1698                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1699                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1700                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1701                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1702                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1703                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1704                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1705                                                 }
1706                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1707                                         } else { (res, None) }
1708                                 },
1709                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1710                         }
1711                 };
1712                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1713                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1714                 }
1715                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1716                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1717                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1718                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1719                                         msg: update
1720                                 });
1721                         }
1722                 }
1723                 Ok(res.0)
1724         }
1725
1726         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1727                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1728                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1729                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1730                 //
1731                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1732                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1733                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1734                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1735
1736                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1737                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1738
1739                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1740                         Some(chan) => {
1741                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1742                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1743                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1744                                 }
1745                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1746                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1747                                 }
1748                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1749                         },
1750                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1751                 }
1752         }
1753
1754         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1755                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1756                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1757                         Some(chan) => {
1758                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1759                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1760                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1761                                 }
1762                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1763                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1764                         },
1765                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1766                 };
1767                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1768                 Ok(())
1769         }
1770
1771         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1772                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1773                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1774                         Some(chan) => {
1775                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1776                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1777                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1778                                 }
1779                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1780                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1781                         },
1782                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1783                 }?;
1784
1785                 match htlc_source {
1786                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1787                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1788                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1789                                 let mut res = None;
1790                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1791                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1792
1793                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1794
1795                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1796                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1797                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1798                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1799                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1800
1801                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1802                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1803                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1804
1805                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1806                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1807                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1808                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1809                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1810                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1811                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1812                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1813                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1814                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1815                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1816                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1817                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1818                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1819                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1820                                                                                                         });
1821                                                                                                 }
1822                                                                                         }
1823                                                                                 }
1824                                                                         },
1825                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1826                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1827                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1828                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1829                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1830                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
1831                                                                                 });
1832                                                                         },
1833                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1834                                                                 }
1835                                                         }
1836                                                 }
1837                                         }
1838                                 }).unwrap();
1839                                 Ok(res)
1840                         },
1841                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1842                 }
1843         }
1844
1845         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1846                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1848                         Some(chan) => {
1849                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1850                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1851                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1852                                 }
1853                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1854                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1855                                 }
1856                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1857                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1858                                 Ok(())
1859                         },
1860                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1861                 }
1862         }
1863
1864         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1865                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1866                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1868                                 Some(chan) => {
1869                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1870                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1871                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1872                                         }
1873                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1874                                 },
1875                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1876                         }
1877                 };
1878                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1879                         unimplemented!();
1880                 }
1881
1882                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1883         }
1884
1885         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1886                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1887                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1888                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1889                                 Some(chan) => {
1890                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1891                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1892                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1893                                         }
1894                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1895                                 },
1896                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1897                         }
1898                 };
1899                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1900                         unimplemented!();
1901                 }
1902                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1903                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1904                 }
1905
1906                 let mut forward_event = None;
1907                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1908                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1910                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1911                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1912                         }
1913                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1914                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1915                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1916                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1917                                         },
1918                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1919                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1920                                         }
1921                                 }
1922                         }
1923                 }
1924                 match forward_event {
1925                         Some(time) => {
1926                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1927                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1928                                         time_forwardable: time
1929                                 });
1930                         }
1931                         None => {},
1932                 }
1933
1934                 Ok(res)
1935         }
1936
1937         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1939                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1940                         Some(chan) => {
1941                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1942                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1943                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1944                                 }
1945                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1946                         },
1947                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1948                 }
1949         }
1950
1951         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1952                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1953                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1954                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1955                                 Some(chan) => {
1956                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1957                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1958                                         }
1959                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1960                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1961                                         }
1962
1963                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1964                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1965                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1966
1967                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1968                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1969                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1970                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1971                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1972
1973                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1974
1975                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1976                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1977                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1978                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1979                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1980                                                 contents: announcement,
1981                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1982                                 },
1983                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1984                         }
1985                 };
1986                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1987                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1988                 Ok(())
1989         }
1990
1991         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1992                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1993                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1995                                 Some(chan) => {
1996                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1997                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1998                                         }
1999                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2000                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2001                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
2002                                 },
2003                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2004                         }
2005                 };
2006                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
2007                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2008                                 unimplemented!();
2009                         }
2010                 }
2011                 res
2012         }
2013
2014         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2015         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2016         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2017         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2018         #[doc(hidden)]
2019         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2020                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2022                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2023                         Some(chan) => {
2024                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2025                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
2026                                 }
2027                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2028                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2029                                 }
2030                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2031                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2032                                                 unimplemented!();
2033                                         }
2034                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2035                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2036                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2037                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2038                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2039                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2040                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2041                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2042                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2043                                                         commitment_signed,
2044                                                 },
2045                                         });
2046                                 }
2047                         },
2048                 }
2049                 Ok(())
2050         }
2051 }
2052
2053 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2054         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2055                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2056                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2057                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2058                 ret
2059         }
2060 }
2061
2062 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2063         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2064                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2065                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2066                 {
2067                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2068                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2069                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2070                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2071                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2072                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2073                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2074                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2075                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2076                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2077                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2078                                         });
2079                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2080                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2081                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2082                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2083                                                 action: e.action,
2084                                         });
2085                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2086                                                 return false;
2087                                         }
2088                                 }
2089                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2090                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2091                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2092                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2093                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2094                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2095                                                                 }
2096                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2097                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2098                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2099                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2100                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2101                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2102                                                                                 msg: update
2103                                                                         });
2104                                                                 }
2105                                                                 return false;
2106                                                         }
2107                                                 }
2108                                         }
2109                                 }
2110                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2111                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2112                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2113                                         }
2114                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2115                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2116                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2117                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2118                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2119                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2120                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2121                                                         msg: update
2122                                                 });
2123                                         }
2124                                         return false;
2125                                 }
2126                                 true
2127                         });
2128                 }
2129                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2130                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2131                 }
2132                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2133                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2134                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2135                 }
2136                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2137         }
2138
2139         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2140         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2141                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2142                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2143                 {
2144                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2145                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2146                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2147                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2148                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2149                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2150                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2151                                         }
2152                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2153                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2154                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2155                                                         msg: update
2156                                                 });
2157                                         }
2158                                         false
2159                                 } else {
2160                                         true
2161                                 }
2162                         });
2163                 }
2164                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2165                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2166                 }
2167                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2168                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2169                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2170                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2171                         }
2172                 }
2173                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2174         }
2175 }
2176
2177 macro_rules! handle_error {
2178         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2179                 match $internal {
2180                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2181                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2182                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2183                                         match &err.action {
2184                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2185                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2186                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2187                                                         } else {
2188                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2189                                                         }
2190                                                 },
2191                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2192                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2193                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2194                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2195                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2196                                                         } else {
2197                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2198                                                         }
2199                                                 },
2200                                                 &None => {},
2201                                         }
2202                                 }
2203                                 Err(err)
2204                         },
2205                 }
2206         }
2207 }
2208
2209 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2210         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2211         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2212                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2213         }
2214
2215         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2216                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2217         }
2218
2219         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2220                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2221         }
2222
2223         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2224                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2225         }
2226
2227         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2228                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2229         }
2230
2231         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2232                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2233         }
2234
2235         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2236                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2237         }
2238
2239         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2240                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2241         }
2242
2243         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2244                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2245         }
2246
2247         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2248                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2249         }
2250
2251         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2252                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2253         }
2254
2255         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2256                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2257         }
2258
2259         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2260                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2261         }
2262
2263         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2264                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2265         }
2266
2267         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2268                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2269         }
2270
2271         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2272                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2273         }
2274
2275         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2276                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2277                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2278                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2279                 {
2280                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2281                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2282                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2283                         if no_connection_possible {
2284                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2285                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2286                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2287                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2288                                                 }
2289                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2290                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2291                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2292                                                                 msg: update
2293                                                         });
2294                                                 }
2295                                                 false
2296                                         } else {
2297                                                 true
2298                                         }
2299                                 });
2300                         } else {
2301                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2302                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2303                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2304                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2305                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2306                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2307                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2308                                                 }
2309                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2310                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2311                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2312                                                         }
2313                                                         return false;
2314                                                 }
2315                                         }
2316                                         true
2317                                 })
2318                         }
2319                 }
2320                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2321                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2322                 }
2323                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2324                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2325                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2326                                 pending_events.push(event);
2327                         }
2328                 }
2329                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2330                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2331                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2332                         }
2333                 }
2334         }
2335
2336         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2337                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2338                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2339                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2340                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2341                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2342                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2343                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2344                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2345                                         // drop it.
2346                                         false
2347                                 } else {
2348                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2349                                         true
2350                                 }
2351                         } else { true }
2352                 });
2353                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2354                 res
2355         }
2356
2357         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2358                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2359                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2360                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2361                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2362                                 }
2363                         }
2364                 } else {
2365                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2366                 }
2367         }
2368 }
2369
2370 #[cfg(test)]
2371 mod tests {
2372         use chain::chaininterface;
2373         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2374         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2375         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2376         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2377         use ln::msgs;
2378         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2379         use util::test_utils;
2380         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2381         use util::errors::APIError;
2382         use util::logger::Logger;
2383         use util::ser::Writeable;
2384
2385         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2386         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2387         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2388         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2389         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2390         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2391         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2392
2393         use hex;
2394
2395         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2396         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2397
2398         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2399         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2400
2401         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2402
2403         use std::cell::RefCell;
2404         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2405         use std::default::Default;
2406         use std::rc::Rc;
2407         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2408         use std::time::Instant;
2409         use std::mem;
2410
2411         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2412                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2413                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414
2415                 let route = Route {
2416                         hops: vec!(
2417                                         RouteHop {
2418                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2419                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2420                                         },
2421                                         RouteHop {
2422                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2423                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2424                                         },
2425                                         RouteHop {
2426                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2427                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2428                                         },
2429                                         RouteHop {
2430                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2431                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2432                                         },
2433                                         RouteHop {
2434                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2435                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2436                                         },
2437                         ),
2438                 };
2439
2440                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2441
2442                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2443                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2444                 onion_keys
2445         }
2446
2447         #[test]
2448         fn onion_vectors() {
2449                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2450                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2451
2452                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2453                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2454                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2455                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2456                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2457
2458                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2459                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2460                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2461                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2462                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2463
2464                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2465                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2466                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2467                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2468                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2469
2470                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2471                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2472                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2473                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2474                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2475
2476                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2477                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2478                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2479                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2480                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2481
2482                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2483                 let payloads = vec!(
2484                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2485                                 realm: 0,
2486                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2487                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2488                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2489                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2490                                 },
2491                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2492                         },
2493                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2494                                 realm: 0,
2495                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2496                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2497                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2498                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2499                                 },
2500                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2501                         },
2502                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2503                                 realm: 0,
2504                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2505                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2506                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2507                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2508                                 },
2509                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2510                         },
2511                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2512                                 realm: 0,
2513                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2514                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2515                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2516                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2517                                 },
2518                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2519                         },
2520                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2521                                 realm: 0,
2522                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2523                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2524                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2525                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2526                                 },
2527                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2528                         },
2529                 );
2530
2531                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2532                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2533                 // anyway...
2534                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2535         }
2536
2537         #[test]
2538         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2539                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2540
2541                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2542                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2543                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2544
2545                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2546                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2547
2548                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2549                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2550
2551                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2552                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2553
2554                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2555                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2556
2557                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2558                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2559         }
2560
2561         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2562                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2563                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2564                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2565                 for i in 2..100 {
2566                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2567                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2568                 }
2569         }
2570
2571         struct Node {
2572                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2573                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2574                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2575                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2576                 router: Router,
2577                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2578                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2579         }
2580         impl Drop for Node {
2581                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2582                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2583                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2584                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2585                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2586                         }
2587                 }
2588         }
2589
2590         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2591                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2592         }
2593
2594         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2595                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2596
2597                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2598                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2599                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2600                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2601                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2602                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2603                         },
2604                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2605                 };
2606
2607                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2608
2609                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2610                 let tx;
2611                 let funding_output;
2612
2613                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2614                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2615                 match events_2[0] {
2616                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2617                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2618                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2619
2620                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2621                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2622                                 }]};
2623                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2624
2625                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2626                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2628                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2629                                 added_monitors.clear();
2630                         },
2631                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2632                 }
2633
2634                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2635                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2636                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2637                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2638                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2639                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2640                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2641                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2642                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2643                                 added_monitors.clear();
2644                                 res
2645                         },
2646                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2647                 };
2648
2649                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2650                 {
2651                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2652                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2653                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2654                         added_monitors.clear();
2655                 }
2656
2657                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2658                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2659                 match events_4[0] {
2660                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2661                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2662                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2663                         },
2664                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2665                 };
2666
2667                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2668                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2669                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2670                 match events_5[0] {
2671                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2672                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2673                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2674                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2675                         },
2676                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2677                 };
2678
2679                 let channel_id;
2680
2681                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2682                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2683                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2684                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2685                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2686                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2687                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2688                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2689                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2690                                 as_announcement_sigs
2691                         },
2692                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2693                 };
2694
2695                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2696                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2697                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2698                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2699                                 (msg, update_msg)
2700                         },
2701                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2702                 };
2703
2704                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2705                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2706                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2707                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2708                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2709                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2710                                 update_msg
2711                         },
2712                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2713                 };
2714
2715                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2716
2717                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2718         }
2719
2720         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2721                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2722         }
2723
2724         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2725                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2726                 for node in nodes {
2727                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2728                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2729                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2730                 }
2731                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2732         }
2733
2734         macro_rules! check_spends {
2735                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2736                         {
2737                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2738                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2739                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2740                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2741                         }
2742                 }
2743         }
2744
2745         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2746                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2747                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2748                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2749
2750                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2751                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2752                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2753                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2754                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2755                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2756                                 msg.clone()
2757                         },
2758                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2759                 };
2760
2761                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2762                 if !close_inbound_first {
2763                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2764                 }
2765                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2766                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2767                 if close_inbound_first {
2768                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2769                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2770                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2771                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2772
2773                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2774                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2775                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2776                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2777                 } else {
2778                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2779                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2780                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2781
2782                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2783                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2784                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2785                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2786                 }
2787                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2788                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2789
2790                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2791                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2792                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2793                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2794                                 msg.clone()
2795                         },
2796                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2797                 };
2798
2799                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2800                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2801                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2802                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2803                                 msg.clone()
2804                         },
2805                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2806                 };
2807
2808                 (as_update, bs_update)
2809         }
2810
2811         struct SendEvent {
2812                 node_id: PublicKey,
2813                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2814                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2815         }
2816         impl SendEvent {
2817                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2818                         match event {
2819                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2820                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2821                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2823                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2824                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2825                                 },
2826                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2827                         }
2828                 }
2829         }
2830
2831         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2832                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2833                         {
2834                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2835                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2836                                 added_monitors.clear();
2837                         }
2838                 }
2839         }
2840
2841         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2842                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2843                         {
2844                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2845                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2846                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2847                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2848                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2849                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2850                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2851                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2852                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2853                                 if $fail_backwards {
2854                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2855                                 }
2856                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2857                                 {
2858                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2859                                         if $fail_backwards {
2860                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2861                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2862                                         } else {
2863                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2864                                         }
2865                                         added_monitors.clear();
2866                                 }
2867                         }
2868                 }
2869         }
2870
2871         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2872                 ($node: expr) => {
2873                         {
2874                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2875                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2876                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2877                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2878                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2879                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2880                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2881                         }
2882                 }
2883         }
2884
2885         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2886                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2887
2888                 let mut payment_event = {
2889                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2890                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2891
2892                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2893                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2894                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2895                 };
2896                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2897
2898                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2899                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2900
2901                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2902                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2903                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2904
2905                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2906                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2907                         match events_1[0] {
2908                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2909                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2910                         };
2911
2912                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2913                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2914
2915                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2916                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2917                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2918                                 match events_2[0] {
2919                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2920                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2921                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2922                                         },
2923                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924                                 }
2925                         } else {
2926                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2927                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2928                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2929                         }
2930
2931                         prev_node = node;
2932                 }
2933
2934                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2935         }
2936
2937         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2938                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2939                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2940
2941                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2942                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2943                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2944                                 {
2945                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2946                                         if $last_node {
2947                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2948                                         } else {
2949                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2950                                         }
2951                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2952                                 }
2953                         }
2954                 }
2955
2956                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2957                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2958                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2959                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2960                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2961                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2962                         }
2963
2964                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2965                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2966                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2967                                 match events[0] {
2968                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2969                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2970                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2971                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2972                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2973                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2974                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2975                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2976                                         },
2977                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2978                                 }
2979                         } else {
2980                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2981                         }
2982                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2983                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2984                         }
2985
2986                         prev_node = node;
2987                 }
2988
2989                 if !skip_last {
2990                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2991                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2992                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2993                         match events[0] {
2994                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2995                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2996                                 },
2997                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2998                         }
2999                 }
3000         }
3001
3002         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3003                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3004         }
3005
3006         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3007
3008         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3009                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3010                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3011                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3012                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3013                 }
3014
3015                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3016         }
3017
3018         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3019                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3020                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3021                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3022                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3023                 }
3024
3025                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3026
3027                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3028                 match err {
3029                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3030                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3031                 };
3032         }
3033
3034         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3035                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3036                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3037         }
3038
3039         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3040                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3041                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3042
3043                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3044                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3045                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3046                                 {
3047                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3048                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3049                                 }
3050                         }
3051                 }
3052
3053                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3054                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3055                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3056                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3057                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3058                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3059                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3060                                 // second-to-last node!
3061                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3062                         }
3063
3064                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3065                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3066                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3067                                 match events[0] {
3068                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3069                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3070                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3071                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3072                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3073                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3074                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3075                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3076                                         },
3077                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3078                                 }
3079                         } else {
3080                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3081                         }
3082                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3083                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3084                         }
3085
3086                         prev_node = node;
3087                 }
3088
3089                 if !skip_last {
3090                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3091
3092                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3093                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3094                         match events[0] {
3095                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3096                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3097                                 },
3098                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3099                         }
3100                 }
3101         }
3102
3103         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3104                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3105         }
3106
3107         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3108                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3109                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3110                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3111                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3112
3113                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3114                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3115
3116                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3117                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3118                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3119                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3120                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3121                         let node_id = {
3122                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3123                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3124                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3125                         };
3126                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3127                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3128                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3129                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3130                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3131                         });
3132                 }
3133
3134                 nodes
3135         }
3136
3137         #[test]
3138         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3139                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3140                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3141                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3142
3143                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3144                         ($node: expr) => {{
3145                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3146                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3147                                 chan.get_feerate()
3148                         }}
3149                 }
3150
3151                 // balancing
3152                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3153
3154                 // A                                        B
3155                 // update_fee                            ->
3156                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3157                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3158                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3159                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3160                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3161                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3162                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3163                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3164                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3165                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3166                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3167                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3168                 //                                       <- RAA
3169                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3170
3171                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3172                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3173                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3174
3175                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3176                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3177                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3178                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3179                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3180                         },
3181                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182                 };
3183
3184                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3185
3186                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3187                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3188                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3189                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3190
3191                 let payment_event = {
3192                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3193                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3194                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3195                 };
3196                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3197                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3198
3199                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3200                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3201                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3202                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3203                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3204
3205                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3206                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3207                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3208                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3209
3210                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3211                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3212                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3213                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3214                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3215                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3217
3218                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3219                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3220                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3221                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3222                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3223                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3224                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3225
3226                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3227                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3228                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3229
3230                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3231                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3233
3234                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3235                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3236
3237                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3238                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3239                 match events_2[0] {
3240                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3241                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242                 }
3243
3244                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3245                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3246         }
3247
3248         #[test]
3249         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3250                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3251                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3252                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3253                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3254                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3255
3256                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3257                         ($node: expr) => {{
3258                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3259                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3260                                 chan.get_feerate()
3261                         }}
3262                 }
3263
3264                 // balancing
3265                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3266
3267                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3268                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3269                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3270
3271                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3272                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3273                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3274                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3275                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3276                         },
3277                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3278                 };
3279
3280                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3281
3282                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3283                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3284                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3286
3287                 let payment_event = {
3288                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3289                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3290                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3291                 };
3292                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3293                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3294
3295                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3296                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3297                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3298                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3300
3301                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3303
3304                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3305         }
3306
3307         #[test]
3308         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3309                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3310                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3311                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3312
3313                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3314                         ($node: expr) => {{
3315                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3316                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3317                                 chan.get_feerate()
3318                         }}
3319                 }
3320
3321                 // A                                        B
3322                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3323                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3324                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3325                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3326                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3327                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3328                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3329                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3330                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3331                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3332                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3333                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3334                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3335                 //                                          B should send no response here
3336                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3337                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3338                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3339
3340                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3341                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3342                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3344
3345                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3346                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3347                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3348                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3349                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3350                         },
3351                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352                 };
3353
3354                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3355                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3356                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3358
3359                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3360                 // transaction:
3361                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3362                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3363
3364                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3365                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3366                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3367                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3368                 };
3369
3370                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3371
3372                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3373                 // Deliver (3)
3374                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3375
3376                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3377                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3378                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3379                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3380                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3381                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3382                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3383                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3384                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3385                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3386
3387                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3388                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3390                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3391
3392                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3393                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3394
3395                 // Delever (4)
3396                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3397                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3398
3399                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3401
3402                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3403                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3404                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3405
3406                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3407                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3408         }
3409
3410         #[test]
3411         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3412                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3413                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3414                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3415
3416                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3417                         ($node: expr) => {{
3418                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3419                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3420                                 chan.get_feerate()
3421                         }}
3422                 }
3423
3424                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3425                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3426
3427                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3428                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3429                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3430                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3431                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3432                         },
3433                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434                 };
3435                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3436
3437                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3438                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3441
3442                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3443                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3445
3446                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3447                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3449
3450                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3451                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3452                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3453         }
3454
3455         #[test]
3456         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3457                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3458                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3459                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3460
3461                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3462                         ($node: expr) => {{
3463                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3464                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3465                                 chan.get_feerate()
3466                         }}
3467                 }
3468
3469                 // balancing
3470                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3471
3472                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3473                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3474
3475                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3476                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3477                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3478                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3479                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3480                         },
3481                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3482                 };
3483                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3485                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3486                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3487                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3488
3489                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3490
3491                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3492
3493                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3494                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3495                 {
3496                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3497                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3498                         added_monitors.clear();
3499                 }
3500                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3501                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3502                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3503
3504                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3505                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3506                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3507
3508                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3509                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3510                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3511                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3512                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3513
3514                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3515                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3516                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3517                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3518                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3519                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3520
3521                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3522                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3523                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3525                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3526                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3528                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3529
3530                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3531                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3532                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3533                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3534                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3535                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3536
3537                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3538                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3539                 match events[0] {
3540                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3541                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3542                 };
3543                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3544                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3545
3546                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3547                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3548                 match events[0] {
3549                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3550                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3551                 };
3552
3553                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3554
3555                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3556                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3557                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3558         }
3559
3560         #[test]
3561         fn test_update_fee() {
3562                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3563                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3564                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3565
3566                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3567                         ($node: expr) => {{
3568                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3569                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3570                                 chan.get_feerate()
3571                         }}
3572                 }
3573
3574                 // A                                        B
3575                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3576                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3577                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3578                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3579                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3580                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3581                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3582                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3583                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3584                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3585                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3586                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3587
3588                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3589                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3590                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3591
3592                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3593                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3594                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3595                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3596                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3597                         },
3598                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3599                 };
3600                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3601
3602                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3603                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3604                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3605                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3606                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3607
3608                 // Deliver (2):
3609                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3610                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3611                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3612
3613                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3614                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3615                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3616                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3617                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3618                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3619                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3620                         },
3621                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622                 };
3623                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3624
3625                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3626                 // ... creating (5)
3627                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3628                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3630
3631                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3632                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3633                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3635
3636                 // Deliver (5):
3637                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3638                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3639                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3640
3641                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3642                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3643                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3644                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3645
3646                 // Deliver (7)
3647                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3648                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3649                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3650                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3651                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3653
3654                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3655                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3656                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3657         }
3658
3659         #[test]
3660         fn fake_network_test() {
3661                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3662                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3663                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3664
3665                 // Create some initial channels
3666                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3667                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3668                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3669
3670                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3671                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3672                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3673                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3674                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3675
3676                 // Send some more payments
3677                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3678                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3679                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3680
3681                 // Test failure packets
3682                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3683                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3684
3685                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3686                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3687
3688                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3689                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3690                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3691                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3692                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3693                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3694                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3695
3696                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3697                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3698                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3699                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3700                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3701                         fee_msat: 0,
3702                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3703                 });
3704                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3705                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3706                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3707                         fee_msat: 0,
3708                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3709                 });
3710                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3711                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3712                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3713                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3714                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3715                 });
3716                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3717                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3718                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3719
3720                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3721                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3722                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3723                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3724                         fee_msat: 0,
3725                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3726                 });
3727                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3728                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3729                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3730                         fee_msat: 0,
3731                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3732                 });
3733                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3734                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3735                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3736                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3737                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3738                 });
3739                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3740                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3741                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3742
3743                 // Claim the rebalances...
3744                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3745                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3746
3747                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3748                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3749
3750                 // Send some payments across both channels
3751                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3752                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3753                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3754
3755                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3756
3757                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3758
3759                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3760                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3761                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3762
3763                 // Close down the channels...
3764                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3765                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3766                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3767                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3768                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3769         }
3770
3771         #[test]
3772         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3773                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3774                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3775                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3776
3777                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3778                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3779                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3780                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3781                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3782                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3783
3784                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3785
3786                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3787                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3788
3789                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3790                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3791
3792                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3793                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3794                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3795         }
3796
3797         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3798         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3799         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3800         ///
3801         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3802         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3803         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3804         ///
3805         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3806         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3807         ///
3808         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3809         /// also fail.
3810         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3811                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3812                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3813
3814                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3815                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3816                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3817                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3818                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3819                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3820                                 }
3821                                 false
3822                         } else { true }
3823                 });
3824                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3825                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3826                 }
3827
3828                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3829
3830                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3831                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3832                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3833                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3834                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3835                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3836                                         } else {
3837                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3838                                         }
3839                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3840                                         false
3841                                 } else { true }
3842                         });
3843                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3844                 }
3845
3846                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3847                 res
3848         }
3849
3850         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3851         /// HTLC transaction.
3852         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3853                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3854                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3855                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3856                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3857                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3858                                 false
3859                         } else { true }
3860                 });
3861                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3862         }
3863
3864         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3865                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3866
3867                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3868                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3869                 let mut found_prev = false;
3870
3871                 for tx in prev_txn {
3872                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3873                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3874                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3875                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3876
3877                                 found_prev = true;
3878                                 break;
3879                         }
3880                 }
3881                 assert!(found_prev);
3882
3883                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3884                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3885                 res
3886         }
3887
3888         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3889                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3890                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3891                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3892                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3893                                 msg.clone()
3894                         },
3895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3896                 };
3897
3898                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3899                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3900                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3901                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3902                                 msg.clone()
3903                         },
3904                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905                 };
3906
3907                 for node in nodes {
3908                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3909                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3910                 }
3911         }
3912
3913         #[test]
3914         fn channel_reserve_test() {
3915                 use util::rng;
3916                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3917                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3918
3919                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3920                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3921                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3922                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3923                                 chan.get_value_stat()
3924                         }}
3925                 }
3926
3927                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3928                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3929                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3930
3931                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3932                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3933
3934                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3935                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3936
3937                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3938                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3939                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3940                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3941                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3942                         }}
3943                 };
3944
3945                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3946                         ($node: expr) => {{
3947                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3948                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3949                                 match events[0] {
3950                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3951                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3952                                 };
3953                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3954                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3955                         }}
3956                 };
3957
3958                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3959                         ($node: expr) => {{
3960                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3961                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3962                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3963                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3964                                 payment_event
3965                         }}
3966                 }
3967
3968                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3969                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3970                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3971                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3972                                 match events[0] {
3973                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3974                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3975                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3976                                         },
3977                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3978                                 }
3979                         }
3980                 };
3981
3982                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
3983                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
3984
3985                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
3986
3987                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3988                 {
3989                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
3990                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
3991                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3992                         match err {
3993                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3994                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3995                         }
3996                 }
3997
3998                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
3999                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4000                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4001                 loop {
4002                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4003                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4004                                 break;
4005                         }
4006                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4007                         htlc_id += 1;
4008
4009                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4010                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4011                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4012                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4013                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4014                         );
4015
4016                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4017                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4018                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4019                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4020                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4021                 }
4022
4023                 {
4024                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4025                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4026                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4027                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4028                         match err {
4029                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4030                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4031                         }
4032                 }
4033
4034                 // adding pending output
4035                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4036                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4037
4038                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4039                 let payment_event_1 = {
4040                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4041                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4042
4043                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4044                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4045                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4046                 };
4047                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4048
4049                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4050                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4051                 {
4052                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4053                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4054                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4055                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4056                         }
4057                 }
4058
4059                 {
4060                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4061                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4062
4063                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4064                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4065                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4066                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4067                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4068                                 session_key
4069                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4070
4071                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4072                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4073                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4074                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4075                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4076                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4077                                 htlc_id,
4078                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4079                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4080                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4081                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4082                         };
4083
4084                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4085                         match err {
4086                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4087                         }
4088                 }
4089
4090                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4091                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4092                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4093                 {
4094                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4095                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4096                 }
4097
4098                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4099                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4100                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4101                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4102                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4103                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4104                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4105
4106                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4107                 {
4108                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4109                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4110                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4111                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4112                         }
4113                 }
4114
4115                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4116                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4117                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4118                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4119                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4120                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4121
4122                 // flush the pending htlc
4123                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4124                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4125
4126                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4127                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4128                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4129                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4131                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4132                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4133
4134                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4135
4136                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4137                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4138                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4139
4140                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4141                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4142
4143                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4144                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4145                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4146                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4147                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4148                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4149
4150                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4151                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4152                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4153                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4154
4155                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4156                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4157
4158                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4159                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4160                 match events[0] {
4161                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4162                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4163                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4164                         },
4165                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4166                 }
4167                 match events[1] {
4168                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4169                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4170                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4171                         },
4172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4173                 }
4174
4175                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4176                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4177                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4178
4179                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4180                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4181                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4182                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4183
4184                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4185                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4186         }
4187
4188         #[test]
4189         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4190                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4191                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4192                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4193
4194                 // Create some initial channels
4195                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4196                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4197                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4198                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4199
4200                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4201                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4202                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4203                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4205
4206                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4207                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4208                 {
4209                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4210                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4211                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4212                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4213                 }
4214                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4215                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4216                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4217
4218                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4219                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4220
4221                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4222                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4223
4224                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4225                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4226                 {
4227                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4228                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4229                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4230                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4231                 }
4232                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4233                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4234                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4235
4236                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4237                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4238                                 {
4239                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4240                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4241
4242                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4243                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4244                                         match events[0] {
4245                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4246                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4247                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4248                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4249                                                 },
4250                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4251                                         };
4252                                 }
4253                         }
4254                 }
4255
4256                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4257                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4258                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4259                 {
4260                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4261
4262                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4263                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4264
4265                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4266                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4267
4268                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4269                 }
4270                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4271                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4272                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4273
4274                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4275                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4276
4277                 {
4278                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4279                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4280                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4281                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4282                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4283                         }
4284
4285                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4286
4287                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4288                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4289
4290                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4291                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4292                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4293                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4294                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4295                         }
4296
4297                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4298
4299                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4300                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4301
4302                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4303                 }
4304                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4305                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4306                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4307
4308                 // Create some new channels:
4309                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4310
4311                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4312                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4313                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4314                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4315                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4316                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4317                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4318                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4319                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4320                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4321                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4322                 // Revoke the old state
4323                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4324
4325                 {
4326                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4327                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4328                         {
4329                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4330                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4331                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4332                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4333
4334                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4335                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4336                         }
4337                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4338
4339                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4340                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4341                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4342                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4343                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4344                 }
4345                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4346                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4347                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4348         }
4349
4350         #[test]
4351         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4352                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4353                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4354                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4355                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4356                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4357                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4358                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4359                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4360                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4361                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4362                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4363
4364                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4365                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4366                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4367                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4368                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4369
4370                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4371
4372                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4373                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4374
4375                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4376                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4377                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4378         }
4379
4380         #[test]
4381         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4382                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4383                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4384
4385                 // Create some new channel:
4386                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4387
4388                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4389                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4390                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4391                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4392                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4393
4394                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4395                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4396                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4397                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4398                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4399                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4400                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4401                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4402                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4403
4404                 //Revoke the old state
4405                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4406
4407                 {
4408                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4409
4410                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4411
4412                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4413                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4414                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4415
4416                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4417                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4418
4419                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4420
4421                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4422                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4423                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4424                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4425                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4426                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4427                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4428                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4429
4430                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4431                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4432                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4433
4434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4435                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4436                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4437                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4438                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4439                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4440                 }
4441                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4442                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4443                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4444         }
4445
4446         #[test]
4447         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4448                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4449                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4450
4451                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4452
4453                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4454                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4455                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4456                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4457                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4458                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4459
4460                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4461                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4462
4463                 //Revoke the old state
4464                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4465
4466                 {
4467                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4468
4469                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4470
4471                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4472                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4473                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4474
4475                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4477                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4478                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4479                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4480                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4481                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4482
4483                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4484                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4485                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4486
4487                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4488                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4489                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4490                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4491                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4492
4493                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4494                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4495                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4496                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4497                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4498                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4499                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4500                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4501
4502                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4503                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4504
4505                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4506                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4507                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4508                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4509                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4510                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4511                 }
4512                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4513                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4514                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4515         }
4516
4517         #[test]
4518         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4519                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4520                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4521                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4522                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4523
4524                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4525                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4526                 {
4527                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4528                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4529                         match events[0] {
4530                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4531                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4532                                 },
4533                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4534                         }
4535                 }
4536
4537                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4538                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4539
4540                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4541                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4542
4543                 {
4544                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4545                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4546                         match events[0] {
4547                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4548                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4549                                 },
4550                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4551                         }
4552                 }
4553
4554                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4555                 // registering new transactions
4556                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4557         }
4558
4559         #[test]
4560         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4561                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4562                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4563                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4564                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4565
4566                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4567
4568                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4569
4570                 let mut payment_event = {
4571                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4572                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4573
4574                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4575                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4576                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4577                 };
4578
4579                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4580                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4581
4582                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4583                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4584                 match events_1[0] {
4585                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4586                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4587                 };
4588
4589                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4590                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4591
4592                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4593                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4594                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4595                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4596
4597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4598                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4599                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4600                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4601
4602                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4603                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4604                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4605
4606                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4607                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4608                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4609                 match events_3[0] {
4610                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4611                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4612                         },
4613                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4614                 }
4615
4616                 let tx = {
4617                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4618                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4619                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4620                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4621                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4622                         node_txn.remove(0)
4623                 };
4624
4625                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4626                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4627
4628                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4629                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4630                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4631                 match events_4[0] {
4632                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4633                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4634                         },
4635                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4636                 }
4637
4638                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4639                 {
4640                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4641                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4642                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4643                 }
4644                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4645                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4646                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4648                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4649                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4650                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4651
4652                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4653         }
4654
4655         #[test]
4656         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4657                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4658                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4659                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4660
4661                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4662                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4663                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4664                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4665
4666                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4667                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4668                 headers.push(header.clone());
4669                 for _i in 2..100 {
4670                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4671                         headers.push(header.clone());
4672                 }
4673                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4674                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4675                 }
4676                 {
4677                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4678                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4679                         match events[0] {
4680                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4681                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4682                                 },
4683                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4684                         }
4685                 }
4686                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4687                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4688                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4689         }
4690
4691         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
4692                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4693                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4694
4695                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4696                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4697                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4698                 }
4699                 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4700                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4701                 } else {
4702                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4703                 }
4704
4705                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4706                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4707                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4708                 }
4709                 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4710                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4711                 } else {
4712                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4713                 }
4714
4715                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4716                 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4717
4718                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4719                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4720                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4721                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4722                         } else {
4723                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4724                         }
4725                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4726                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4727                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4728                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4729                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4730                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4731                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4732                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4733                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4734                                 }
4735                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4736                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4737                                 }
4738
4739                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4740                         } else {
4741                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4742                         }
4743                 }
4744
4745                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4746                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4747                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4748                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4749                         } else {
4750                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4751                         }
4752                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4753                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4754                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4755                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4756                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4757                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4758                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4759                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4760                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4761                                 }
4762                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4763                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4764                                 }
4765
4766                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4767                         } else {
4768                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4769                         }
4770                 }
4771         }
4772
4773         #[test]
4774         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4775                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4776                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4777                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4778                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4779
4780                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4781                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4782                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4783
4784                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4785                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4786                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4787                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4788
4789                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4790                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4791                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4792
4793                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4794                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4795                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4796                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4797
4798                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4799                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4800
4801                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4802                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4803
4804                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
4805                 {
4806                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4807                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4808                         match events[0] {
4809                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4810                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4811                                 },
4812                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4813                         }
4814                         match events[1] {
4815                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4816                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4817                                 },
4818                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4819                         }
4820                 }
4821
4822                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4823                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4824         }
4825
4826         #[test]
4827         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
4828                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
4829                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4830                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4831
4832                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4833
4834                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4835                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4836                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4837                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4838
4839                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
4840
4841                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4842                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4843
4844                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
4845                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
4846
4847                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
4848
4849                 let mut chan_announcement;
4850
4851                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4852                         () => {
4853                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4854                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4855                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4856                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4857                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4858                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4859                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4860                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4861                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4862                                 };
4863                         }
4864                 }
4865
4866                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4867                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4868                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4869                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4870                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4871                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4872                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4873                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4874                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4875                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4876                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4877                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4878                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
4879                                 }
4880                         }
4881                 }
4882
4883                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4884                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4885                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4886                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
4887
4888                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4889                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4890                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4891                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4892                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4893
4894                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4895                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4896                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4897                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4898         }
4899 }