1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
40 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
41 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
42 use crypto::digest::Digest;
43 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
45 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
66 use ln::router::Route;
67 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
68 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
70 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
102 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
104 pub enum HTLCSource {
105 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
108 session_priv: SecretKey,
109 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
116 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
128 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
138 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
139 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
140 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
141 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
142 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
143 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
145 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
147 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
148 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
149 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
150 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
151 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
153 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
154 err: msgs::HandleError,
155 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
157 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
159 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
163 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
166 data: err.to_string()
170 shutdown_finish: None,
174 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
178 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
183 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
185 data: err.to_string()
189 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
193 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
198 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: msg.to_string()
210 shutdown_finish: None,
215 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
216 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
218 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
219 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
221 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
225 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
226 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
227 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
228 /// probably increase this significantly.
229 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
231 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
232 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
234 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
237 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
238 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
239 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
240 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
241 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
242 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
243 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
245 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
249 struct ChannelHolder {
250 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
251 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
252 next_forward: Instant,
253 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
254 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
255 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
256 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
257 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
270 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
272 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
277 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
278 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
279 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
280 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
281 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
282 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
287 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
288 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
290 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
291 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
293 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
294 /// to individual Channels.
296 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
297 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
298 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
299 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
301 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
302 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
303 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
304 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
305 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
306 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
307 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
309 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
310 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
311 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
312 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
314 pub struct ChannelManager {
315 default_configuration: UserConfig,
316 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
317 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
318 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
319 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
320 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
322 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
324 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
326 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
327 our_network_key: SecretKey,
329 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
330 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
331 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
332 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
333 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
335 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
340 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
341 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
342 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
343 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
344 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
345 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
346 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
348 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
349 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
350 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
351 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
352 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
355 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
357 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
358 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
363 macro_rules! secp_call {
364 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
367 Err(_) => return Err($err),
374 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
376 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
377 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
382 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
383 pub struct ChannelDetails {
384 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
385 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
386 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
387 /// lifetime of the channel.
388 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
389 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
390 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
391 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
392 /// The node_id of our counterparty
393 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
394 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
395 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
396 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
400 macro_rules! handle_error {
401 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
404 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
405 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
406 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
407 if let Some(update) = update_option {
408 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
409 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
420 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
421 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
424 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
425 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
427 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
428 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
429 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
430 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
431 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
433 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
439 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
443 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
446 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
447 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
448 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
449 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
450 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
458 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
459 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
460 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
462 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
463 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
464 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
466 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
467 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
469 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
471 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
472 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
473 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
474 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
476 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
477 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
478 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
479 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
480 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
481 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
482 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
483 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
484 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
488 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
495 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
496 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
497 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
500 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
501 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
502 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
504 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
506 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
507 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
513 impl ChannelManager {
514 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
516 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
517 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
519 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
521 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
522 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
525 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
526 default_configuration: config.clone(),
527 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
528 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
529 monitor: monitor.clone(),
533 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
534 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
537 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
538 by_id: HashMap::new(),
539 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
540 next_forward: Instant::now(),
541 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
542 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
543 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
545 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
547 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
548 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
554 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
555 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
559 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
561 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
562 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
563 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
564 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
566 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
567 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
569 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
570 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
571 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
572 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
576 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
577 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
579 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
580 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
581 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
583 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
584 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
586 panic!("RNG is bad???");
589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
591 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
592 node_id: their_network_key,
598 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
599 /// more information.
600 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
601 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
602 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
603 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
604 res.push(ChannelDetails {
605 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
606 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
607 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
608 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
609 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
615 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
616 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
617 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
618 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
619 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
620 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
621 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
622 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
623 // really wanted anyway.
624 if channel.is_live() {
625 res.push(ChannelDetails {
626 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
627 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
628 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
629 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
630 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
637 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
638 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
639 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
641 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
642 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
643 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
645 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
647 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
650 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
651 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
652 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
655 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
656 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
657 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
659 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
660 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
665 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
668 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
669 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
674 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
675 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
685 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
686 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
687 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
688 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
691 for tx in local_txn {
692 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
696 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
697 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
698 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
704 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
706 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
713 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
714 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
723 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
724 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
725 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
726 for chan in self.list_channels() {
727 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
732 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
733 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
735 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
736 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
737 let mut res = [0; 32];
738 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
742 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
743 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
744 let mut res = [0; 32];
745 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
751 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
752 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
753 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
754 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
755 let mut res = [0; 32];
756 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
761 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
762 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
763 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
764 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
765 let mut res = [0; 32];
766 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
770 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
772 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
773 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
774 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
776 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
777 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
779 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
780 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
781 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
782 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
783 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
785 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
787 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
788 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
790 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
796 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
797 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
798 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
800 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
801 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
807 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
817 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
818 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
819 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
820 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
821 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
822 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
823 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
824 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
826 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
827 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
828 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
829 // the intended recipient).
830 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
831 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
832 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
834 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
835 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
836 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
837 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
841 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
842 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
843 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
845 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
846 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
847 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
849 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
851 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
855 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
857 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
865 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
866 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
868 for i in 0..dst.len() {
873 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
874 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
875 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
876 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
879 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
880 let end_len = iters * 65;
881 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
882 res.resize(end_len, 0);
884 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
885 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
886 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
887 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
888 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
893 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
894 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
896 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
897 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
898 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
899 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
901 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
902 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
903 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
906 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
909 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
910 hmac.input(&packet_data);
911 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
912 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
917 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
918 hop_data: packet_data,
923 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
924 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
925 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
926 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
928 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
929 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
930 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
931 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
932 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
933 data: packet_crypted,
937 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
938 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
939 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
941 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
944 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
945 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
946 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
947 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
951 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
952 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
955 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
957 failuremsg: failuremsg,
961 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
962 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
963 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
969 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
970 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
971 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
974 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
975 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
976 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
978 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
979 let mut sha256_of_onion = [0; 32];
980 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
981 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
982 sha.result(&mut sha256_of_onion);
983 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
984 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
985 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
987 failure_code: $err_code,
988 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
993 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
994 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
997 let shared_secret = {
998 let mut arr = [0; 32];
999 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1002 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1004 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1005 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1006 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1007 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1008 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1009 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1010 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1011 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1014 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1015 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1016 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1017 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1018 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1021 let mut channel_state = None;
1022 macro_rules! return_err {
1023 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1025 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1026 if channel_state.is_none() {
1027 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1029 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1030 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1031 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1032 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1033 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1038 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1039 let next_hop_data = {
1040 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1041 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1042 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1044 let error_code = match err {
1045 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1046 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1048 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1054 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1056 // final_expiry_too_soon
1057 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1058 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1060 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1061 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1062 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1064 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1065 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1066 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1069 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1070 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1071 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1072 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1074 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1076 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1077 short_channel_id: 0,
1078 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1079 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1080 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1083 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1084 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1085 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1087 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1089 let blinding_factor = {
1090 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1091 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1092 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1093 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1094 sha.result(&mut res);
1095 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
1098 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1100 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1102 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1105 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1106 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1109 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1110 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1111 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1112 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1113 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1114 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1115 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1119 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1120 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1121 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1122 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1123 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1124 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1125 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1127 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1129 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1130 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1132 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1133 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1134 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1135 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1136 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1137 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1138 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1140 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1141 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1143 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1144 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1145 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1147 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1148 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1150 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1151 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1152 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1153 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1156 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1161 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1162 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1163 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1164 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1166 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1167 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1169 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1170 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1172 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1174 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1179 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1182 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1183 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1184 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1185 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1186 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1190 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1192 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1193 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1194 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1195 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1196 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1197 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1198 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1199 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1200 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1201 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1204 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1205 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1207 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1213 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1215 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1216 /// fields for more info.
1218 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1219 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1220 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1221 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1222 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1223 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1225 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1227 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1228 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1229 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1230 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1231 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1232 /// relevant updates.
1234 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1235 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1236 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1237 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1238 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1239 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1240 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1241 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1243 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1244 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1245 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1246 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1250 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1252 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1254 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1255 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1256 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1257 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1259 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1261 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1262 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1264 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1265 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1266 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1269 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1270 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1272 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1273 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1275 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1276 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1278 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1279 route: route.clone(),
1280 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1281 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1282 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1284 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1285 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1286 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1287 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1288 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1289 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1290 // something else in case we will resend later!
1291 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1295 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1296 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1297 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1298 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1308 } else { unreachable!(); }
1312 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1313 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1315 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1317 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1318 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1319 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1320 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1324 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1329 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1331 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1332 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1334 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1336 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1337 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1338 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1339 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1341 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1343 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1344 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1346 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1347 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1348 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1349 } else { unreachable!(); })
1355 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1356 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1357 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1360 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1363 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1370 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1371 // lock before add_update_monitor
1372 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1376 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1378 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1381 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1383 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1391 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1392 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1394 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1396 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1398 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1399 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1401 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1402 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1403 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1404 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1405 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1409 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1411 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1412 /// Will likely generate further events.
1413 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1414 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1416 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1417 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1419 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1420 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1422 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1426 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1427 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1428 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1429 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1431 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1432 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1433 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1434 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1435 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1436 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1438 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1443 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1445 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1446 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1447 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1448 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1449 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1452 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1454 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1455 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1460 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1462 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1463 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1464 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1465 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1466 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1467 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1468 // this channel currently :/.
1475 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1476 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1479 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1480 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1482 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1486 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1490 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1491 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1492 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1493 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1494 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1495 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1497 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1502 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1503 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1504 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1505 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1506 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1508 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1512 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1513 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1514 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1521 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1523 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1524 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1528 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1529 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1530 events.append(&mut new_events);
1533 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1534 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1535 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1537 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1538 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1539 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1540 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1541 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1542 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1548 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1549 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1550 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1551 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1552 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1553 /// still-available channels.
1554 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1556 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1557 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1558 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1559 match &onion_error {
1560 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1562 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1564 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1565 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1566 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1567 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1568 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1569 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1570 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1575 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1576 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1577 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1578 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1580 error_code: onion_error_code
1584 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1588 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1589 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1590 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1591 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1593 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1594 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1595 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1596 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1597 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1598 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1600 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1606 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1607 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1608 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1609 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1610 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1611 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1613 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1614 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1615 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1619 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1621 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1622 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1626 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1627 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1628 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1629 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1632 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1633 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1634 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1635 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1636 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1637 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1638 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1640 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1646 //TODO: Do something with e?
1654 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1655 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1656 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1658 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1659 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1660 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1661 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
1662 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
1663 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
1665 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1667 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1668 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1669 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1670 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1671 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1672 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1677 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1679 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1680 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1681 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1682 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1686 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1687 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1690 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1691 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1693 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1694 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1700 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1701 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1702 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1703 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1704 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1705 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1708 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1710 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1711 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1712 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1713 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1714 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1715 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1723 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1724 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1725 //TODO: Do something with e?
1733 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1734 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1735 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1738 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1739 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1741 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1742 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1743 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1744 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1745 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1748 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1749 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1750 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1751 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1752 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1753 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1754 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1755 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1757 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1758 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1759 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1760 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1761 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1762 // on-chain confirmations.
1763 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1764 // should be written.
1765 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1766 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1768 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1769 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1770 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1776 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1779 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1780 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1781 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1783 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1785 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1786 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1788 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1793 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1794 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1795 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1796 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1797 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1802 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1806 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1817 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1818 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1820 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1822 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1823 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1827 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1828 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1829 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1832 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1833 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1836 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1839 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1840 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1841 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1843 entry.insert(channel);
1849 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1850 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1851 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1852 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1855 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1856 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1859 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1860 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1862 //TODO: same as above
1863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1866 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1867 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1868 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1869 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1870 output_script: output_script,
1871 user_channel_id: user_id,
1876 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1877 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1878 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1882 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1886 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1891 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1892 // lock before add_update_monitor
1893 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1896 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1897 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1900 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1904 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1913 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1914 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1915 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1919 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1920 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1921 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1923 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1924 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1927 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1932 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1933 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1934 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1935 user_channel_id: user_id,
1940 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1941 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1942 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1943 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1945 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1946 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1947 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1949 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1950 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1952 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1953 msg: announcement_sigs,
1958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1962 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1963 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1969 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1970 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1971 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1973 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1974 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1975 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1976 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1980 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1982 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1986 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1987 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1988 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1990 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1991 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1996 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1999 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2000 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2001 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2010 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2011 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2012 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2013 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2014 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2016 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2017 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2020 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2021 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2023 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2028 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2029 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2030 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2031 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2032 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2033 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2034 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2036 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2037 } else { (tx, None) }
2039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2042 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2043 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2045 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2047 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2056 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2057 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2058 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2059 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2061 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2062 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2063 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2064 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2066 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2067 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2069 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2071 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2072 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2073 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2075 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2076 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2077 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2078 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2079 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2080 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2081 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2082 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2083 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2084 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2085 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2086 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2087 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2088 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2090 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2091 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2092 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2093 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2097 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2098 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2099 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2100 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2101 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2102 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2107 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2114 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2115 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2117 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2118 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2120 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2121 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2129 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2133 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2134 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2135 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
2136 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2139 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2140 let mut error_code_ret = None;
2141 let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
2142 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
2144 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2145 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2146 next_route_hop_ix += 1;
2147 if res.is_some() { return; }
2149 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2150 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2152 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2154 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2155 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2156 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2157 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2158 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2160 is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2162 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2163 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2164 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2165 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2166 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2167 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2169 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2170 if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
2171 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2172 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
2173 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2175 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
2176 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
2178 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
2180 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
2181 // update Route object
2182 let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
2183 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
2185 } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
2186 || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
2188 let mut fail_channel_update = None;
2190 if error_code & NODE == NODE {
2191 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
2193 else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
2194 fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2195 short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
2199 else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
2200 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
2201 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
2202 if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
2203 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
2204 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2205 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2206 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
2208 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
2210 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2211 new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
2213 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
2214 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
2215 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
2216 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
2218 fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
2219 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
2220 // to the node in question corrupted something.
2221 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2222 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2226 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2233 if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
2234 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
2235 // trying to relay through them anymore.
2236 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2237 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2241 } else if !payment_failed {
2242 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
2243 // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
2244 // really not worth trying any further.
2245 fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2246 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2251 // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
2252 // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
2253 // to decode the onion.
2254 res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2256 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
2257 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
2258 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
2261 log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
2264 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2265 // definitely came from the peer in question
2266 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2267 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2269 }), !is_from_final_node));
2273 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2274 if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
2275 (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
2277 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
2278 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
2279 (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
2281 } else { unreachable!(); }
2284 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2285 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2286 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2287 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2289 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2290 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2293 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2300 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2301 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2302 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2303 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2305 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2306 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2309 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2310 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2312 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2319 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2320 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2321 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2324 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2325 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2328 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2329 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2330 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2331 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
2332 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2335 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2336 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2338 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2340 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2341 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2342 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2343 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2344 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2345 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347 commitment_signed: msg,
2351 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2364 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2365 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2366 let mut forward_event = None;
2367 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2368 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2369 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2370 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2371 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2373 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2374 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2376 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2379 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2384 match forward_event {
2386 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2387 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2388 time_forwardable: time
2396 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2397 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2398 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2399 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2402 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2403 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2406 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2407 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2408 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2409 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2411 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2413 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2417 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2419 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2423 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2428 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2431 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2436 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2437 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2438 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2439 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2441 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2442 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2445 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2452 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2454 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2456 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2458 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2461 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2465 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2466 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2467 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2469 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2470 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2471 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2472 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2473 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2476 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2479 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2480 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2481 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2482 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2483 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2484 contents: announcement,
2486 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2494 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2498 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2500 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2503 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2504 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2505 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2506 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2507 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2508 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2509 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2510 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2511 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2513 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2514 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2516 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2517 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2520 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2522 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2526 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2527 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2529 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2534 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2535 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2536 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2537 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2543 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2547 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2552 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2553 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2554 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2564 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2565 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2566 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2567 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2569 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2570 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2572 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2573 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2574 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2576 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2579 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2582 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2583 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2585 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2586 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2588 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2589 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2590 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2592 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2596 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2597 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2598 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2599 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2600 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2601 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2602 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2612 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2613 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2615 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2617 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2618 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2620 node_id: their_node_id,
2624 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2630 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2631 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2632 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2633 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2634 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2636 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2637 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2638 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2639 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2640 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2642 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2643 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2648 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2650 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2655 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2656 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2657 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2658 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2659 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2661 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2662 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2663 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2664 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2665 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2667 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2673 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2674 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2675 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2680 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2681 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2682 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2683 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2685 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2687 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2689 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2690 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2691 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2692 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2693 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2694 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2695 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2696 msg: funding_locked,
2698 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2700 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2701 msg: announcement_sigs,
2704 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2705 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2706 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2707 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2708 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2712 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2713 for tx in txn_matched {
2714 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2715 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2716 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2717 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2718 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2720 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2721 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2722 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2723 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2724 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2734 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2735 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2736 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2738 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2739 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2740 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2741 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2742 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2743 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2744 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2753 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2754 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2756 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2757 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2760 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2761 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2762 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2763 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2765 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2766 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2767 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2768 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2769 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2770 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2771 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2772 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2774 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2775 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2776 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2786 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2787 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2789 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2790 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2794 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2795 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2796 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2797 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2798 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2801 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2806 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2807 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2808 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2811 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2812 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2813 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2816 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2817 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2818 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2821 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2823 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2826 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2827 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2828 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2831 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2832 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2833 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2836 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2838 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2841 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2843 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2846 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2851 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2852 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2853 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2856 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2857 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2858 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2861 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2862 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2863 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2866 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2867 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2868 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2871 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2872 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2873 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2876 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2877 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2878 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2879 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2882 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2883 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2884 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2885 if no_connection_possible {
2886 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2887 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2888 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2889 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2890 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2892 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2893 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2904 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2905 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2906 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2907 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2908 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2909 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2910 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2911 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2913 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2914 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2915 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2924 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2925 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2927 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2928 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2934 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2935 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2937 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2938 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2939 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2940 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2941 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2942 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2943 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2944 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2945 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2946 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2950 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2951 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2952 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2958 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2961 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2962 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2964 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2965 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2966 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2967 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2971 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2976 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2977 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2979 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2980 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2981 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2983 onion.write(writer)?;
2987 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2988 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2989 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2990 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2991 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2996 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2997 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2998 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3000 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
3001 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3003 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3005 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3006 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3007 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3008 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3014 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3017 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3019 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3021 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3023 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3030 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3031 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3032 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3033 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3034 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3035 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3040 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3041 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3043 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3045 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3047 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3049 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3056 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3057 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3058 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3059 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3060 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3061 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3066 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3069 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3072 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3075 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3077 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3079 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3081 route.write(writer)?;
3082 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3083 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3090 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3091 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3092 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3093 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3094 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3095 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3096 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3097 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3099 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3104 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3107 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3111 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3113 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3114 data.write(writer)?;
3121 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3122 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3123 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3124 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3125 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3126 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3127 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3129 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3134 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3135 prev_short_channel_id,
3140 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3142 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3144 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3145 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3147 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3148 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3149 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3151 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3152 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3153 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3154 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3155 unfunded_channels += 1;
3158 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3159 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3160 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3161 channel.write(writer)?;
3165 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3166 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3167 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3168 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3169 for forward in pending_forwards {
3170 forward.write(writer)?;
3174 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3175 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3176 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3177 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3178 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3179 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3187 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3189 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3191 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3192 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3193 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3194 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3195 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3196 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3197 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3198 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3199 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3200 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3201 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3202 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3203 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3204 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3205 /// deserialization.
3206 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3208 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3210 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3211 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3212 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3214 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3215 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3216 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3217 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3218 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3220 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3221 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3222 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3223 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3224 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3225 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3226 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3227 /// deserialization.
3228 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3229 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3230 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3231 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3233 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3234 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3236 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3237 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3238 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3239 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3241 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3243 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3246 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3247 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3248 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3249 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3250 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3251 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3254 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3258 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3260 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3261 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3262 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3263 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3264 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3265 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3266 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3267 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3270 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3271 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3272 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3273 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3274 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3275 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3276 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3277 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3278 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3280 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3281 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3283 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3286 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3290 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3291 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3292 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3296 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3297 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3298 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3299 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3300 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3301 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3302 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3303 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3305 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3308 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3309 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3310 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3311 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3312 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3313 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3314 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3315 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3317 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3320 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3322 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3323 monitor: args.monitor,
3324 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3325 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3327 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3328 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3329 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3331 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3334 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3337 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3339 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3341 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3342 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3343 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3344 logger: args.logger,
3345 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3348 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3349 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3350 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3351 //connection or two.
3354 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3360 use chain::chaininterface;
3361 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3362 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3363 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3364 use chain::keysinterface;
3365 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3366 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3367 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3368 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
3369 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3371 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
3372 use util::test_utils;
3373 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3374 use util::errors::APIError;
3375 use util::logger::Logger;
3376 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3377 use util::config::UserConfig;
3379 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3380 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3381 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3382 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3383 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3384 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3385 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3386 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3387 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3388 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3392 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3393 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3395 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3396 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3398 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3400 use std::cell::RefCell;
3401 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
3402 use std::default::Default;
3404 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3405 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3406 use std::time::Instant;
3409 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3410 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3411 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3416 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3417 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3420 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3421 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3424 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3425 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3428 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3429 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3432 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3433 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3438 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3440 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3441 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3446 fn onion_vectors() {
3447 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3448 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3450 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3451 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3452 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3453 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3454 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3456 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3457 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3458 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3459 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3460 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3462 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3463 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3464 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3465 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3466 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3468 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3469 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3470 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3471 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3472 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3474 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3475 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3476 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3477 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3478 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3480 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3481 let payloads = vec!(
3482 msgs::OnionHopData {
3484 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3485 short_channel_id: 0,
3487 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3491 msgs::OnionHopData {
3493 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3494 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3495 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3496 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3500 msgs::OnionHopData {
3502 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3503 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3504 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3505 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3509 msgs::OnionHopData {
3511 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3512 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3513 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3514 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3518 msgs::OnionHopData {
3520 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3521 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3522 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3523 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3529 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
3530 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3532 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
3536 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3537 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3539 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3540 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3541 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3543 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3544 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3546 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3547 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3549 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3550 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3552 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3553 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3555 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3556 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3559 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3560 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3561 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3562 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3564 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3565 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3570 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3571 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3572 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3573 keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
3574 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3576 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3577 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3578 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3580 impl Drop for Node {
3581 fn drop(&mut self) {
3582 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3583 // Check that we processed all pending events
3584 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3585 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3586 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3591 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3592 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3595 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3596 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3597 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3598 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3601 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3602 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3604 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3607 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3608 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 }, match events[1] {
3613 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3614 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3615 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3616 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3617 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3618 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3619 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3620 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3628 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3629 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3631 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3634 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3635 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3644 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3645 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3647 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3650 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3651 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3660 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3661 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3663 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3664 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3671 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3672 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3673 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3674 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3676 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3680 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3683 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3684 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3685 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3687 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3688 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3690 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3692 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3693 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3694 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3695 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3696 added_monitors.clear();
3698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3701 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3703 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3704 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3705 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3706 added_monitors.clear();
3709 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3711 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3712 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3713 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3714 added_monitors.clear();
3717 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3718 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3720 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3721 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3722 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3731 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3732 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3736 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3737 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3738 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3739 ((match events_6[0] {
3740 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3741 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3742 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3746 }, match events_6[1] {
3747 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3748 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3755 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3756 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3757 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3761 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3762 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3763 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3764 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3766 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3767 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3768 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3769 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3776 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3777 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3778 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3779 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3780 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3781 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
3782 assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
3785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3790 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3793 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3794 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3797 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3798 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3800 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3801 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3802 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3804 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3807 macro_rules! check_spends {
3808 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3810 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3811 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3812 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3813 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3818 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3819 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3821 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3822 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3823 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3824 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3825 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3829 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3831 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3832 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3842 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3843 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3844 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3847 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3848 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3850 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3851 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3852 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3853 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3854 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3860 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3861 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3864 Some(match events_1[1] {
3865 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3866 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3873 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3874 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3875 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3876 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3877 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3878 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3879 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3881 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3882 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3883 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3884 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3885 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3886 (as_update, bs_update)
3888 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3890 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3891 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3892 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3893 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3895 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3896 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3897 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3898 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3899 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3900 (as_update, bs_update)
3902 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3903 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3905 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3910 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3911 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3914 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3915 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3916 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3918 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3919 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3922 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3924 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3929 fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
3930 let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3932 SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
3936 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3937 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3939 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3940 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3941 added_monitors.clear();
3946 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3947 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3949 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3950 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3951 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3952 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3953 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3956 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3958 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3959 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3960 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3961 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3962 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3963 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3964 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3965 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3966 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3967 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3969 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3970 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3974 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3976 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3977 if $fail_backwards {
3978 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3979 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3981 (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
3984 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
3986 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3987 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3988 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3990 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3991 assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
3995 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3997 let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
3998 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
4000 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4001 if $fail_backwards {
4002 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
4003 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
4005 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4007 added_monitors.clear();
4012 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
4014 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
4017 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
4019 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
4020 if $fail_backwards {
4021 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4022 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
4023 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
4024 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4025 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4027 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4033 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
4036 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
4037 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
4038 let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
4039 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
4040 sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
4041 sha.result(&mut payment_hash.0[..]);
4042 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
4047 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4048 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4050 let mut payment_event = {
4051 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4052 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
4054 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4056 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4058 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
4060 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
4061 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4063 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4064 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
4065 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4067 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4068 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4070 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4074 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4075 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4077 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4078 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4079 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4081 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4082 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4083 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4088 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4089 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4090 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4091 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4092 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4098 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4101 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4102 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4103 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4105 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4106 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4107 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4110 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4111 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4114 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4115 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4116 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4117 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4118 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4119 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4120 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4128 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4129 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4131 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4132 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4133 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4134 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4138 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4139 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4141 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4142 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4143 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4144 get_next_msgs!($node)
4146 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4149 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4150 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4155 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4156 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4157 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4158 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4159 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4160 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4161 } else if update_next_msgs {
4162 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4164 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4166 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4167 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4174 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4175 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4178 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4179 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4186 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4187 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4190 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4192 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
4193 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4194 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4195 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4196 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4199 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4202 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4203 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4204 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4205 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4206 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4209 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4211 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4213 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4214 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4218 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4219 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4220 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4223 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4224 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4225 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4227 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4228 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4229 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4231 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4232 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4237 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4238 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4239 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4240 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4241 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4242 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4243 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4244 // second-to-last node!
4245 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4248 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4249 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4252 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4253 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4254 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4255 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4256 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4257 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4258 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4259 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4264 assert!(events.is_empty());
4266 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4267 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4274 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4276 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4279 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
4280 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4281 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4288 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
4289 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4292 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4293 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4294 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4297 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4298 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4300 for i in 0..node_count {
4301 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
4302 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4303 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4304 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4305 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4306 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4307 let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4308 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4309 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4310 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4311 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4312 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4313 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4314 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
4315 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4316 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4324 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4325 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4326 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4327 let channel_id = chan.2;
4330 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4334 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4335 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4336 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4337 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4338 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4339 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4340 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4341 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4342 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4343 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4345 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4347 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4349 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4350 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4353 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4354 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4355 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4356 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4357 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4364 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4365 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4366 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4369 let payment_event = {
4370 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4371 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4372 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4374 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4375 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4377 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4379 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4380 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4381 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4384 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4385 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4386 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4387 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4390 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4391 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4392 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4393 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4394 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4395 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4396 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4399 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4400 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4401 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4402 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4403 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4404 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4405 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4408 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4409 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4410 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4413 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4414 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4417 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4420 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4421 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4423 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4427 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4432 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4433 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4434 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4435 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4436 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4437 let channel_id = chan.2;
4440 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4442 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4443 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4446 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4447 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4448 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4449 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4452 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4455 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4457 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4458 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4459 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4462 let payment_event = {
4463 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4464 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4465 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4467 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4468 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4470 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4471 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4472 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4473 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4474 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4477 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4480 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4484 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4485 let nodes = create_network(2);
4486 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4487 let channel_id = chan.2;
4490 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4491 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4492 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4493 // (3) update_fee ->
4494 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4495 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4496 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4497 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4498 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4499 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4500 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4501 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4502 // revoke_and_ack ->
4503 // B should send no response here
4504 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4505 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4506 // revoke_and_ack ->
4508 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4509 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4510 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4513 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4514 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4515 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4516 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4517 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4522 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4523 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4524 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4525 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4528 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4530 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4531 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4532 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4534 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4535 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4536 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4537 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4540 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4542 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4546 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4547 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4548 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4550 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4551 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4552 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4553 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4554 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4555 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4556 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4558 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4559 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4560 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4562 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4564 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4565 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4569 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4570 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4573 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4574 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4577 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4578 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4579 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4582 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4588 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4589 let nodes = create_network(2);
4590 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4591 let channel_id = chan.2;
4593 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4594 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4597 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4598 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4599 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4600 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4601 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4607 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4608 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4611 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4615 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4616 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4617 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4620 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4626 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4627 let nodes = create_network(2);
4628 let channel_value = 1888;
4629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4630 let channel_id = chan.2;
4633 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4635 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4639 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4641 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4642 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4644 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4645 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4647 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4648 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4649 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4650 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4651 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4652 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4655 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4656 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4657 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4660 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4664 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4665 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4666 //Should produce and error.
4667 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4669 assert!(match err.err {
4670 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4674 //clear the message we could not handle
4675 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4679 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4680 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4681 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4682 let channel_id = chan.2;
4685 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4687 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4688 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4691 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4692 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4693 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4694 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4695 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4700 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4701 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4704 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4706 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4708 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4709 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4711 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4712 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4713 added_monitors.clear();
4715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4716 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4717 // node[1] has nothing to do
4719 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4720 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4723 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4724 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4725 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4727 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4729 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4731 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4732 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4733 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4734 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4735 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4736 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4738 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4739 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4741 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4743 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4745 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4747 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4749 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4750 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4752 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4754 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4756 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4757 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4759 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4762 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4763 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4765 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4768 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4772 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4774 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4775 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4776 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4780 fn test_update_fee() {
4781 let nodes = create_network(2);
4782 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4783 let channel_id = chan.2;
4786 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4787 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4788 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4789 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4790 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4791 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4792 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4793 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4794 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4795 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4796 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4797 // revoke_and_ack ->
4799 // Create and deliver (1)...
4800 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4801 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4804 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4805 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4806 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4807 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4808 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4814 // Generate (2) and (3):
4815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4816 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4820 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4824 // Create and deliver (4)...
4825 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4827 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4828 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4829 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4831 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4837 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4840 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4841 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4843 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4844 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4846 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4847 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4851 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4854 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4855 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4856 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4857 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4858 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4859 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4860 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4861 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4865 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4867 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4868 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4874 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4875 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4876 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4880 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4881 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4882 let nodes = create_network(2);
4883 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4884 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4885 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4886 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4888 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4889 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4890 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4891 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4892 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4894 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4895 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4896 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4897 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4898 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4899 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4901 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4902 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4906 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4907 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4908 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4909 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4910 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4911 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4912 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4914 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4916 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4917 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4918 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4919 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4920 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4922 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4923 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4925 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4926 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4927 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4928 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4929 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4931 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4933 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4934 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4935 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4936 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4937 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4938 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4939 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4941 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4944 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4945 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4946 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4947 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4948 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4952 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4955 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4956 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4961 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4962 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4963 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4964 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4965 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4966 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4968 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4970 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4971 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4972 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4973 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4974 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4978 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4979 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4980 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4981 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4982 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4984 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4985 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4986 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4988 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4989 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4990 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4991 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4992 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4993 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4995 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4996 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4997 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4998 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5000 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5001 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5003 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
5006 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5007 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5008 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5009 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5010 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5011 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5016 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5019 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
5020 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5021 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5026 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5027 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5028 let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
5029 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5030 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5035 match msg_events[1] {
5036 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
5037 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
5039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5042 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5043 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5044 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5045 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5046 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5047 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5049 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5051 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5052 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5053 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5054 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5055 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5058 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5059 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5060 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5061 let nodes = create_network(3);
5062 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5063 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5065 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5067 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5068 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5070 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5071 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5073 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5077 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5078 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5080 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5081 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5083 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5085 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5086 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5087 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5089 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5090 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5091 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5092 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5095 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5096 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5097 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5099 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5101 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5102 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5104 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5106 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5107 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5108 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5109 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5114 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5117 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5118 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5119 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5120 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5121 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5123 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5125 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5128 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5129 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5134 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5136 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5137 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5138 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5141 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5142 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5144 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5145 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5146 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5147 if recv_count == 0 {
5148 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5149 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5151 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5152 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5153 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5155 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5156 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5157 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5159 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5162 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5163 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5164 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5166 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5167 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5168 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5169 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5170 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5172 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5173 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5174 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5175 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5176 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5177 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5179 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5181 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5182 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5183 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5184 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5185 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5186 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5188 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5189 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5190 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5191 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5194 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5195 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5201 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5203 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5204 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5205 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5206 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5207 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5211 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5212 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5213 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5214 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5218 fn fake_network_test() {
5219 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5220 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5221 let nodes = create_network(4);
5223 // Create some initial channels
5224 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5225 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5226 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5228 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5229 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5230 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5231 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5232 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5234 // Send some more payments
5235 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5236 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5237 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5239 // Test failure packets
5240 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5241 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5243 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5244 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5246 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5247 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5248 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5249 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5250 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5251 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5252 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5254 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5255 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5256 hops.push(RouteHop {
5257 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5258 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5260 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5262 hops.push(RouteHop {
5263 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5264 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5266 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5268 hops.push(RouteHop {
5269 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5270 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5272 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5274 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5275 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5276 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5278 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5279 hops.push(RouteHop {
5280 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5281 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5283 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5285 hops.push(RouteHop {
5286 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5287 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5289 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5291 hops.push(RouteHop {
5292 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5293 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5295 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5297 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5298 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5299 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5301 // Claim the rebalances...
5302 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5303 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5305 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5306 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5308 // Send some payments across both channels
5309 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5310 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5311 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5313 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5315 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5317 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5318 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5319 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5321 // Close down the channels...
5322 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5323 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5324 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5325 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5326 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5330 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5331 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5332 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5333 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5335 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5336 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5337 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5338 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5339 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5342 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5344 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5345 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5347 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5348 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5350 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5351 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5352 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5355 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5356 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5357 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5359 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5360 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5361 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5363 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5364 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5366 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5368 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5369 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5370 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5372 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5373 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5374 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5375 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5376 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5377 res.push(tx.clone());
5382 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5383 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5386 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5388 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5389 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5390 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5391 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5392 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5393 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5395 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5397 res.push(tx.clone());
5401 assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
5403 assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
5407 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5411 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5412 /// HTLC transaction.
5413 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5414 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5415 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5416 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5417 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5418 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5422 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5425 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5426 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5428 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5429 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5430 let mut found_prev = false;
5432 for tx in prev_txn {
5433 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5434 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5435 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5436 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5442 assert!(found_prev);
5444 let mut res = Vec::new();
5445 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5449 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5450 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5451 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5452 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5453 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5459 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5460 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5461 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5462 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5469 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5470 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5474 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5476 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5479 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5482 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5483 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5487 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5489 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5490 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5492 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5493 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5494 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5495 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5496 chan.get_value_stat()
5500 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5501 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5502 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5504 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5505 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5507 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5508 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5510 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5511 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5512 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5513 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5514 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5518 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5520 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5522 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5523 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5528 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5529 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5530 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5533 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5534 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5535 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5542 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5543 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5545 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5547 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5549 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5550 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5551 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5553 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5554 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5558 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5559 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5560 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5562 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5563 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5566 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5569 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5570 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5571 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5572 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5573 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5576 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5577 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5578 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5579 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5580 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5584 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5585 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5586 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5587 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5589 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5590 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5594 // adding pending output
5595 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5596 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5598 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5599 let payment_event_1 = {
5600 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5603 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5604 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5605 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5607 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5609 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5610 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5612 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5613 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5614 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5615 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5620 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5621 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5623 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5624 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5625 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5626 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5627 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5629 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5631 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5632 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5633 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5634 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5635 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5636 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5638 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5639 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5640 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5641 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5645 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5647 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5649 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5650 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5651 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5652 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5653 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5654 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5655 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5656 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5664 // split the rest to test holding cell
5665 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5666 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5668 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5669 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5672 // now see if they go through on both sides
5673 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5674 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5675 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5677 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5678 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5680 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5682 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5683 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5684 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5685 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5689 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5690 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5691 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5693 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5694 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5696 // flush the pending htlc
5697 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5698 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5701 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5703 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5706 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5707 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5710 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5711 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5714 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5716 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5717 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5718 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5720 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5721 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5723 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5724 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5727 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5728 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5730 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5731 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5732 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5733 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5735 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5736 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5738 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5741 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5742 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5743 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5748 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5749 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5750 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5755 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5756 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5759 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5760 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5761 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5762 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5764 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5765 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5769 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5770 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5771 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5775 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5776 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5777 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5778 let nodes = create_network(5);
5780 // Create some initial channels
5781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5783 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5784 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5786 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5787 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5788 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5789 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5790 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5792 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5793 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5795 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5796 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5797 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5798 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5800 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5801 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5802 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5804 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5805 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5807 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5810 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5811 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5812 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5813 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5815 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5816 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5817 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5819 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5820 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5822 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5823 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5825 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5828 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5829 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5830 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5831 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5839 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5840 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5841 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5843 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5845 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5846 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5848 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5849 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5851 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5853 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5854 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5855 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5857 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5858 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5859 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5862 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5863 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5864 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5865 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5866 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5870 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5871 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5872 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5873 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5874 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5877 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5879 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5880 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5882 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5883 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5884 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5885 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5886 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5889 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5891 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5892 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5894 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5896 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5897 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5898 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5902 fn test_justice_tx() {
5903 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5905 let nodes = create_network(2);
5906 // Create some new channels:
5907 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5909 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5910 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5911 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5912 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5915 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5916 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5919 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
5920 // Revoke the old state
5921 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5924 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5925 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5927 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5928 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5929 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5930 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5932 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5933 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5935 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5937 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5938 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5939 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5940 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5941 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5943 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5945 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5946 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5948 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5949 // Create some new channels:
5950 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5952 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5953 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5954 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5955 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5956 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5957 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5958 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5959 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5960 // Revoke the old state
5961 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5963 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5964 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5966 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5967 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5968 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5969 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5972 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5974 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5976 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5977 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5978 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5979 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5980 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5982 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5984 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5988 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5989 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5990 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5991 let nodes = create_network(2);
5992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5993 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5994 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5995 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5996 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5998 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5999 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
6001 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
6002 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6003 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6004 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6005 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
6007 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6009 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6010 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6012 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
6013 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6014 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6018 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
6019 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
6020 let nodes = create_network(2);
6022 // Create some new channel:
6023 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6025 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6026 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6027 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
6028 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6029 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6031 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6032 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6033 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
6034 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6035 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6036 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6037 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
6038 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
6039 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6041 //Revoke the old state
6042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6045 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6046 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6047 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6049 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6052 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6053 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6058 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6059 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6061 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6062 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6064 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6066 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6067 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6068 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6069 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6070 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6071 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6072 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6073 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6075 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6076 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6077 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6079 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6080 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6081 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6082 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6083 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6084 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6086 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6087 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6088 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6092 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6093 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6094 let nodes = create_network(2);
6096 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6098 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6099 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6100 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6101 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6102 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6103 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
6105 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6106 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6108 //Revoke the old state
6109 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6112 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6113 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6114 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6116 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6119 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6120 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6125 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6126 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6128 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6129 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6130 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6131 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6132 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6133 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6134 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6136 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6137 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6138 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6140 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6141 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6142 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6143 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6144 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6146 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6147 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6148 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6149 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6150 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6151 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6152 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
6153 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
6155 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6156 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6158 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6159 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6160 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
6161 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6162 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6163 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6165 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6166 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6167 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6171 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
6172 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6173 // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6174 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6175 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
6176 // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
6177 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
6178 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
6180 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
6181 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
6182 // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
6183 // PaymentSent event).
6185 let nodes = create_network(3);
6187 // Create some initial channels
6188 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6189 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6191 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
6192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6195 let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6196 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6198 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6199 // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
6200 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6201 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
6202 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6203 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6205 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6206 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6207 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6208 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6209 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6211 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6212 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6215 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6218 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
6219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6220 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
6221 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6222 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6223 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6224 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6225 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6227 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
6228 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
6229 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6231 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6232 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6233 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
6234 added_monitors.clear();
6236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6238 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6243 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6244 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6245 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6246 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6252 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
6253 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
6254 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
6255 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6256 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6257 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6258 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6259 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6260 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6261 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6262 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6263 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6264 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6265 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6266 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6267 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6271 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
6272 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
6273 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6274 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6275 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6276 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6279 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6282 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
6283 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
6284 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
6285 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6286 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6287 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6288 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
6289 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6290 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6291 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
6292 // we already checked the same situation with A.
6294 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
6295 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6299 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6305 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6306 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
6308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6310 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6312 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6314 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6315 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
6316 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6317 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6318 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6319 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6320 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6321 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
6322 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
6326 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
6327 // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
6328 // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
6329 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
6330 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
6331 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
6333 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
6335 let nodes = create_network(3);
6337 // Create some intial channels
6338 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6339 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6341 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
6342 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6343 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
6345 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
6346 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6348 // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
6349 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6350 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6351 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
6353 let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
6354 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
6355 added_monitors.clear();
6357 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6360 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6361 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6362 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6363 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6364 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6365 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6369 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
6370 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6376 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
6377 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6378 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
6379 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6381 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
6382 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
6383 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6386 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6387 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
6389 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
6390 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
6391 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6392 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6393 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
6394 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6395 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6396 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6397 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
6398 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
6399 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6400 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6401 timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
6405 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
6406 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6410 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6414 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6415 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6416 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6417 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6418 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6419 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6423 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
6424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
6426 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
6427 let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6428 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
6430 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
6431 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6434 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6437 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
6438 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6439 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
6440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
6441 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6442 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
6443 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
6444 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
6445 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6449 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
6450 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
6451 // and fail backward accordingly.
6453 let nodes = create_network(3);
6455 // Create some initial channels
6456 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6457 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6459 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6460 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6461 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6462 // Revoke the old state
6463 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6465 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6467 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6468 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6469 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6473 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6477 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6478 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6479 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6480 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6481 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6484 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6485 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6487 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6490 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6493 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6496 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
6497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6504 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
6505 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
6506 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
6507 // commitment transaction anymore.
6508 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
6509 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
6510 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
6511 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
6512 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
6513 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
6515 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
6516 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
6517 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
6518 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
6519 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
6520 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6522 // Create some initial channels
6523 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6524 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6526 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6527 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
6528 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6529 // Revoke the old state
6530 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
6532 let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6533 let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6534 let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
6536 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6538 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6539 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6540 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6541 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6542 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6543 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6545 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
6546 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
6548 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6550 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6551 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6552 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6553 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6554 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6555 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6557 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6559 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6560 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6561 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6564 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
6565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6566 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6567 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6568 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6569 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6570 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6571 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6572 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6573 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
6574 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
6575 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6577 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
6578 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
6579 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
6580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6582 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
6583 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
6584 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6585 let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6586 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
6587 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6588 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6592 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
6593 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
6594 // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6598 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
6599 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
6601 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
6602 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6604 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6607 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6608 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
6610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6613 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6614 // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
6615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6618 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6619 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
6620 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
6621 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
6622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6626 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
6627 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6628 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6629 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6630 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6631 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6636 // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
6637 let updates = match events[1] {
6638 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
6639 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6640 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6641 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6642 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6643 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
6645 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6646 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6648 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6649 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6651 let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6652 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6654 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6658 if !deliver_bs_raa {
6659 // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
6660 // that we should update our routing table for.
6661 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6662 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6664 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6668 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6671 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6672 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6682 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6683 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
6684 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6685 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6686 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6687 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
6688 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6690 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6691 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6692 for event in events {
6694 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
6695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6699 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6700 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6702 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6703 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6708 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6709 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
6711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6714 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
6715 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
6716 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
6720 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
6721 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
6722 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
6726 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6727 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6728 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6729 let nodes = create_network(2);
6730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6732 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6733 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6735 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6738 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6739 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6745 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6746 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6748 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6749 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6752 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6755 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6756 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6763 // registering new transactions
6764 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6768 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6769 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6770 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6771 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6772 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6774 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6776 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6778 let mut payment_event = {
6779 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6784 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6790 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6791 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6793 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6797 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6798 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6800 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6801 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6802 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6803 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6806 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6807 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6809 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6811 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6812 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6813 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6815 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6816 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6817 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6819 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6820 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6827 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6828 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6829 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6830 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6834 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6835 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6837 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6838 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6839 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6841 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6842 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6847 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6849 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6850 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6851 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6853 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6854 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6855 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6856 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6857 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6858 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6859 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6861 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6865 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6866 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6867 let nodes = create_network(2);
6868 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6870 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6871 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6872 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6873 mem::drop(channel_state);
6875 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6876 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6877 headers.push(header.clone());
6879 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6880 headers.push(header.clone());
6882 while !headers.is_empty() {
6883 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6889 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6890 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6895 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6896 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6897 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6900 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6901 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6903 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6904 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6905 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6906 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6907 res.push(msg.clone());
6909 panic!("Unexpected event")
6917 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6918 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6920 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6922 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6924 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6930 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6931 let mut commitment_update = None;
6932 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6935 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6936 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6937 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6938 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6940 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6941 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6942 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6943 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6948 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6951 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6953 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6954 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6955 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6956 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6958 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6959 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6960 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6961 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6967 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6972 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6973 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6974 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6975 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6976 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6977 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6978 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6980 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6981 // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6983 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6984 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6987 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6988 // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
6990 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
6991 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
6994 if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
6995 // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
6996 // next_local_commitment_number to 1
6997 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
6998 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7000 for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
7001 assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
7005 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
7006 for msg in reestablish_1 {
7007 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7008 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
7010 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7011 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7013 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
7016 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
7017 for msg in reestablish_2 {
7018 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
7019 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
7021 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7022 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7024 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
7027 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
7028 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
7029 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
7031 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
7032 if send_funding_locked.0 {
7033 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7034 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7035 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7036 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7037 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7038 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7039 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7042 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7045 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7046 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7047 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7048 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7050 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7052 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
7053 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7054 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7055 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
7057 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7059 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7060 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7061 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7063 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7065 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7066 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7068 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7069 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7072 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7073 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7075 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7076 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7077 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
7078 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7079 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7080 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7081 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7084 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7088 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
7089 if send_funding_locked.1 {
7090 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
7091 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7092 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
7093 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
7094 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
7095 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
7096 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
7099 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
7102 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7103 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
7104 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7105 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7107 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
7109 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
7110 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
7111 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7112 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
7114 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
7115 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
7116 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7117 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
7118 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
7120 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
7121 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
7123 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
7124 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
7127 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
7128 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
7130 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7131 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
7132 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
7133 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7134 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7135 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7136 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
7139 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
7145 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
7146 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
7147 let nodes = create_network(3);
7148 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
7151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7153 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7155 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7156 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7157 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
7158 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
7160 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7161 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7162 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7164 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7165 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
7166 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7167 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
7169 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7170 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7172 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
7173 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
7175 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
7177 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7180 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
7181 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
7183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7186 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
7187 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
7188 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
7190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
7195 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
7198 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
7199 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
7200 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7201 if messages_delivered == 0 {
7202 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7203 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
7205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7208 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7209 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7211 let payment_event = {
7212 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
7213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7215 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7217 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
7221 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7222 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
7224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7225 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7226 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7228 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7230 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7231 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7232 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7235 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7236 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7237 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7238 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7241 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
7242 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7243 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7251 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7252 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7253 if messages_delivered < 3 {
7254 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
7255 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
7256 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7257 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7258 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7259 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7260 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7261 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7262 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7263 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7264 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7265 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7266 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
7267 // Everything was delivered...
7268 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7271 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7272 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7274 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7278 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7279 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7280 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7282 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7283 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7285 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7286 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7288 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7289 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7290 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7295 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
7296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7298 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7299 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7300 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
7301 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
7302 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7303 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7304 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7305 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7306 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7307 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7308 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
7310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7313 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
7314 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
7316 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7317 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7319 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7320 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7325 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
7326 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
7327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7328 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7330 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
7331 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7332 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7335 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
7336 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
7337 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7338 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7341 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
7342 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7343 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7351 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7352 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7353 if messages_delivered < 2 {
7354 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7355 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
7356 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
7357 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7358 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7360 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7361 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
7363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7366 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
7367 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
7368 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
7369 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
7370 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
7371 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7372 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
7373 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
7374 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
7375 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
7376 // Everything was delivered...
7377 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7380 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7381 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7382 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7384 // Channel should still work fine...
7385 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
7386 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7390 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
7391 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
7392 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
7393 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
7394 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
7398 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
7399 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
7400 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
7401 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
7405 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
7406 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
7407 let nodes = create_network(2);
7408 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7411 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7413 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7414 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7415 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7417 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7418 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7423 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7425 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7426 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7428 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
7429 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7430 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
7432 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7433 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7438 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
7439 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7444 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7446 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
7447 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
7449 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7450 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7451 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
7455 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
7456 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
7457 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
7458 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7459 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7461 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7463 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7464 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7465 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7467 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
7468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7470 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7471 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
7473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7477 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7480 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7481 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7484 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7485 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7486 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7487 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7488 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7489 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7491 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7492 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7493 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7495 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7496 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7501 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
7502 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7503 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7509 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7510 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7512 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7513 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7514 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7515 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7516 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7517 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7519 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7520 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7521 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7522 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7524 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7525 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7527 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7528 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7530 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7532 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7533 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7534 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7535 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7536 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7537 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7538 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7539 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
7544 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7545 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7546 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7547 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7549 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7552 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7553 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7554 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7555 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7556 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7557 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7558 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7561 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7562 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7563 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7566 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7567 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7568 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7571 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7572 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7575 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7576 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7578 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
7579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7582 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
7583 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7585 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7586 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7588 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
7589 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7594 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7595 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7598 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7602 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
7603 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
7604 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7605 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7607 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7608 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7610 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7611 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7614 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7615 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
7617 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7621 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
7622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7625 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7626 // PaymentFailed event
7628 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7631 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
7632 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
7633 // a disconnect in between
7634 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7637 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7638 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7640 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7641 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
7642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7644 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7645 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7646 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7649 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7650 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7651 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7654 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7655 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7658 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7659 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7660 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7661 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7663 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7665 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7667 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7668 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7670 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7671 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7672 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7677 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7679 // Now set it to failed again...
7680 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7681 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7682 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7687 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7690 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7691 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7695 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7696 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7697 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7700 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7701 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7703 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7707 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7708 // PaymentFailed event
7710 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7714 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7715 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7716 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7719 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7720 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7722 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7723 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7724 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7725 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7726 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7727 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7728 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7729 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7730 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7731 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7732 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7733 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7734 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7735 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7736 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7737 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7738 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7739 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7740 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7742 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7744 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7745 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7746 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7748 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7749 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7756 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7757 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7758 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7760 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7761 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7762 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7764 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7765 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7766 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7767 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7768 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7769 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7771 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7772 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7773 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7774 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7776 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7777 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7782 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7783 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7784 } else { panic!(); }
7787 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7792 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7793 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7794 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7797 // Now fix monitor updating...
7798 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7799 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7802 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7803 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7804 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7806 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7807 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7808 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7809 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7810 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7811 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7813 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7814 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7815 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7816 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7818 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7819 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7821 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7824 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7825 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7826 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7828 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7829 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7830 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7831 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7832 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7833 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7835 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7837 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7838 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7840 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7842 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7843 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7845 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7846 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7847 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7849 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7850 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7851 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7853 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7854 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7855 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7856 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7857 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7858 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7860 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7863 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7864 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7866 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7867 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7872 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7873 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7874 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7877 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7881 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7882 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7884 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7885 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7886 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7888 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7889 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7892 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7894 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7895 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7896 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7897 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7898 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7905 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7907 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7908 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7909 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7913 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7914 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7916 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7917 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7919 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7920 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7923 let as_commitment_update;
7924 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7926 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7928 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7929 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7930 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7931 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7932 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7933 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7937 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7939 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7940 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7941 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7942 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7943 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7944 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7948 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7951 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7952 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7954 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7955 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7957 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7958 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7960 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7963 handle_initial_raa!();
7965 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7966 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7968 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7969 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7971 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7972 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7975 handle_initial_raa!();
7977 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7978 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7980 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7981 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7983 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7984 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7986 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7991 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7992 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7994 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7995 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7997 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7998 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
8002 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8003 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8004 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8007 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8008 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8009 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8012 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8013 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8016 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8017 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8022 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8023 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8025 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
8026 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
8027 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
8036 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
8037 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
8038 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
8039 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
8040 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
8041 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
8042 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
8046 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
8047 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
8048 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
8049 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
8050 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
8054 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
8055 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
8056 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
8057 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
8058 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
8059 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
8063 fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
8064 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
8065 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8066 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8068 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8069 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8070 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8073 let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8074 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8076 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8077 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
8078 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8079 } else { panic!(); }
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8081 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8083 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8084 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8086 let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8087 assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
8089 match responses[0] {
8090 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
8091 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8092 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8097 match responses[1] {
8098 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
8099 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8100 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8101 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8103 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8104 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8106 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8107 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
8108 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8109 } else { panic!(); }
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8111 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8113 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8116 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8117 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120 let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8121 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
8122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8124 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8127 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8130 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8131 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8133 events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8136 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
8137 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
8138 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
8140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8143 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
8146 fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
8147 // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
8148 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8150 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8152 // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
8153 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
8155 // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
8156 let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8158 // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
8159 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8162 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8163 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8164 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8165 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8166 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8167 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8170 let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
8171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8173 // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
8175 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8176 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8177 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
8178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8180 let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8181 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8184 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8185 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
8187 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8191 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8192 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8194 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8196 // Now fail monitor updating.
8197 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8198 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
8199 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8200 } else { panic!(); }
8201 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8202 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8205 // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
8208 let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8209 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8210 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8213 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
8214 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8215 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8219 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8220 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8221 match events_2.remove(0) {
8222 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8223 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8224 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8225 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8226 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8227 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8228 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
8233 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8234 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
8235 match msg_events[0] {
8236 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
8237 assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
8238 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
8240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8243 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8245 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
8246 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
8247 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
8248 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8253 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8254 // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
8255 let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8256 let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8257 nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
8258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8260 send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
8261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8262 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
8263 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
8264 } else { panic!(); }
8265 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8266 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8267 (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
8268 } else { (None, None) };
8270 // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
8271 // update_add update.
8272 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8273 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8276 let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8277 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8278 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
8280 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
8283 // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
8284 // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
8285 let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
8286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
8287 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8288 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8289 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8290 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8291 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8292 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8293 (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
8295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
8297 let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
8298 match events_3.remove(1) {
8299 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
8300 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8306 let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
8307 assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8309 // Now deliver the new messages...
8311 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
8312 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
8313 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8314 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
8315 if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
8316 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
8317 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
8318 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
8320 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8321 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8322 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
8323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8324 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8325 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
8326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8327 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8328 assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8329 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8330 assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8331 assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8332 assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8334 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
8335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8336 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8338 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8339 assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8340 assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8341 assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
8343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8345 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
8348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8349 let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8351 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
8352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8353 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8355 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
8356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8357 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
8362 let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8363 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
8365 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8369 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8370 nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8372 let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8373 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
8375 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
8376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8379 if test_ignore_second_cs {
8380 let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8381 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
8383 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8387 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8388 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8391 send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
8392 assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8393 assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8394 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
8395 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
8397 let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8398 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
8400 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
8401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8404 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
8405 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8407 let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8408 assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
8410 Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
8411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8413 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
8416 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
8420 fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
8421 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
8422 do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
8426 fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
8427 // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
8428 // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
8430 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
8431 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8434 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
8436 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8437 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8439 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
8440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8441 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8443 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8444 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8445 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8446 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8449 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8452 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
8453 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8456 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8461 if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
8462 assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
8463 } else { panic!(); }
8464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8466 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8467 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8469 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8470 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8473 assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8475 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
8477 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
8478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8479 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8481 *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
8482 nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
8483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8485 updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8487 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8488 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8489 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8491 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
8492 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
8494 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8497 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
8498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8503 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
8504 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
8505 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8506 let nodes = create_network(2);
8508 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8510 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8511 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8512 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8513 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
8515 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8517 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8518 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8520 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8521 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8523 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
8525 let mut chan_announcement;
8527 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
8529 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
8530 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
8531 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
8532 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
8533 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
8534 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
8535 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
8536 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
8537 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8542 macro_rules! sign_msg {
8543 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
8544 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
8545 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8546 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
8547 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
8548 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
8549 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
8550 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
8551 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
8552 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
8553 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
8554 contents: $unsigned_msg
8559 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8560 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8561 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
8562 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
8564 // Configured with Network::Testnet
8565 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8566 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
8567 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8568 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8570 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
8571 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
8572 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
8573 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
8576 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
8577 impl Writer for VecWriter {
8578 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
8579 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
8582 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
8583 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
8588 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8589 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8591 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
8593 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8595 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8596 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8597 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8599 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8600 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8601 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8602 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8604 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8605 let config = UserConfig::new();
8606 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8607 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8608 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8609 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8610 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8611 default_config: config,
8613 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8614 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8615 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8616 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8617 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8618 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8621 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8623 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8624 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8625 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
8626 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
8627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
8628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8630 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8631 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
8632 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
8635 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
8636 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8637 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
8638 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8640 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8641 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8642 for node in nodes.iter() {
8643 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
8644 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
8645 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
8648 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8652 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
8653 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
8654 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8656 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8657 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8661 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8662 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8663 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8665 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8666 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8667 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8668 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8670 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8671 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8672 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
8673 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
8674 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
8675 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8676 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8678 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8679 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8680 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8681 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8682 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8683 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
8686 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8688 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
8689 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8694 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
8695 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8699 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
8700 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
8701 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
8702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
8704 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
8706 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
8708 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
8709 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
8711 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
8712 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8713 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8714 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8716 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
8718 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
8719 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
8720 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
8721 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
8722 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
8725 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8726 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
8727 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
8728 let mut read = &serialized[..];
8729 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
8730 assert!(read.is_empty());
8731 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
8734 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
8735 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
8736 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
8737 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
8739 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
8740 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
8741 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
8742 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
8743 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
8744 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
8746 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
8748 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
8749 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8750 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8751 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
8752 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
8755 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
8756 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
8757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8759 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
8761 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
8762 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8763 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
8764 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
8765 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8767 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8768 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8769 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
8770 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
8771 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8772 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
8775 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
8776 ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
8778 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8779 let mut txn = Vec::new();
8780 for event in events {
8782 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
8783 for outp in outputs {
8785 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
8787 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8788 script_sig: Script::new(),
8790 witness: Vec::new(),
8793 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8794 value: output.value,
8796 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8803 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
8804 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8805 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8806 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8807 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8808 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8809 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8812 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
8814 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8815 script_sig: Script::new(),
8816 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
8817 witness: Vec::new(),
8820 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8821 value: output.value,
8823 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8829 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8830 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8831 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
8832 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8833 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8834 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
8835 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
8838 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
8839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8841 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
8842 script_sig: Script::new(),
8844 witness: Vec::new(),
8847 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
8848 value: output.value,
8850 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8854 output: vec![outp.clone()],
8857 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
8859 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
8861 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
8864 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
8867 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
8868 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
8869 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
8870 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
8871 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
8872 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
8873 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
8879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
8889 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
8890 let nodes = create_network(2);
8892 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8893 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8894 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8896 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8900 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8901 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8902 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8904 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8905 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8906 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8907 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8908 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8912 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
8913 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8914 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8916 let nodes = create_network(2);
8918 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
8919 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
8920 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8925 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8926 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
8928 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
8930 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8931 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
8932 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8934 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8937 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8938 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
8939 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
8940 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8944 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
8945 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
8946 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
8948 let nodes = create_network(2);
8950 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
8951 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8952 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8953 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8954 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8957 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8958 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8959 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8961 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8964 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8965 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
8966 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8967 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
8968 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8969 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
8970 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8974 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
8975 let nodes = create_network(2);
8977 // Create some initial channels
8978 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8980 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8982 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8983 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
8984 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8986 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
8987 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8988 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8990 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
8991 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8993 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8997 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8998 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9001 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
9002 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
9003 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9004 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
9005 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9006 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9008 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
9009 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9010 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9011 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9015 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
9016 let nodes = create_network(2);
9018 // Create some initial channels
9019 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9021 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9022 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9023 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9024 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9026 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9028 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9029 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9030 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9032 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9035 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9036 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
9037 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
9038 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
9039 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9041 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9042 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9043 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9044 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9048 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9049 let nodes = create_network(2);
9051 // Create some initial channels
9052 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9054 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9055 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9056 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9057 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9059 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9061 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9062 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
9063 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9064 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9066 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9069 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9070 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9071 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9072 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9073 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9074 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9075 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
9077 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9078 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9079 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9085 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9086 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9087 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9088 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9090 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9091 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9092 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
9093 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
9094 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9095 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
9099 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
9100 let nodes = create_network(2);
9102 // Create some initial channels
9103 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9105 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
9106 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9107 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9108 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
9110 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9112 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9113 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
9114 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9115 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9117 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9120 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9122 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
9123 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
9124 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9125 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9126 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
9128 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
9129 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9130 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9132 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9136 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9137 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
9138 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
9139 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
9141 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
9142 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9143 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
9144 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9145 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9146 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
9147 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
9148 check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
9152 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
9153 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
9154 // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
9155 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
9156 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
9158 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
9161 let nodes = create_network(3);
9163 // Create some initial channels
9164 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9165 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9167 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
9168 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9169 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
9171 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
9172 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9173 let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9174 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9175 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9177 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9178 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9179 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9180 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9181 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9183 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9185 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9187 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9191 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
9192 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
9193 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
9194 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
9195 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
9196 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
9197 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
9198 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9199 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9200 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9202 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
9203 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
9205 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9206 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
9207 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
9208 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9209 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9210 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9211 assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
9212 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9213 check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9214 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9215 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9216 assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
9219 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9221 match msg_events[0] {
9222 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9225 match msg_events[1] {
9226 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
9227 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9228 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9229 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9230 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9231 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
9233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9235 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
9236 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9237 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
9238 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9239 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
9240 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
9241 assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
9242 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
9243 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9244 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
9245 assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
9246 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9247 match msg_events[0] {
9248 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9254 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
9255 // Topology : A --> B --> C
9256 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
9257 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9259 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9260 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9262 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
9263 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
9264 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
9266 let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9267 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9268 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
9270 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9271 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9272 let htlc_timeout_tx;
9273 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
9274 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9275 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
9276 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
9277 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
9278 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9280 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9281 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9282 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
9283 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9284 check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
9285 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
9286 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
9289 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9291 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9292 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9295 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
9296 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
9298 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9300 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9304 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9305 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9307 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9308 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
9309 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
9310 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
9311 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9312 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9313 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
9314 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9315 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9316 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
9317 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9318 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
9320 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
9321 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9322 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9323 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9324 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
9325 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9326 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9329 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9330 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9332 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9336 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
9338 _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
9341 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9343 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
9344 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
9346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9349 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
9350 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9351 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9352 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9353 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9354 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9355 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
9356 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
9362 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9364 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
9365 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
9367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9372 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
9373 let nodes = create_network(2);
9375 // Create some initial channels
9376 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9378 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9379 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9380 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9381 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9383 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
9384 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9386 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9387 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
9388 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
9391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9394 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9395 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9397 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9399 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9400 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9402 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9403 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
9404 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
9405 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
9406 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
9410 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
9411 let nodes = create_network(2);
9413 // Create some initial channels
9414 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9416 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
9417 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
9418 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9419 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
9421 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9422 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9423 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
9424 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9426 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9427 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
9429 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9430 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9431 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9432 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9434 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
9435 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
9436 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
9437 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
9438 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
9439 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
9440 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
9441 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
9442 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
9443 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
9444 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
9448 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
9449 let nodes = create_network(2);
9451 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9453 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
9454 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
9456 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9457 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9458 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
9459 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9460 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
9462 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
9463 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
9464 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
9465 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
9468 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9469 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9472 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
9476 // 0: node1 fail backward
9477 // 1: final node fail backward
9478 // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
9479 // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
9480 // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9481 // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
9482 fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
9483 where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
9484 F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
9487 use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
9489 // reset block height
9490 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9491 for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
9492 nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9495 macro_rules! expect_event {
9496 ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
9497 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9500 $event_type { .. } => {},
9501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9506 macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
9508 expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
9509 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
9510 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9514 // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
9515 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
9516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9517 let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9518 // temper update_add (0 => 1)
9519 let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9520 if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
9521 callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
9524 // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
9525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
9526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9528 let update_1_0 = match test_case {
9529 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
9530 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9531 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
9534 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
9535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9537 if test_case != 200 {
9540 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
9542 let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9543 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9544 assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9545 // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
9546 let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
9547 if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
9548 callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
9552 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
9553 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
9555 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9556 expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
9557 expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
9561 let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9562 if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
9563 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
9565 assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9567 let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9568 if test_case == 200 {
9569 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9574 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
9576 // backward fail on 1
9577 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9578 assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
9581 _ => unreachable!(),
9584 // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
9585 if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
9586 let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
9587 if test_case == 100 {
9588 callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
9590 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
9592 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
9595 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
9597 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9599 if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
9600 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
9601 assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
9603 panic!("Uexpected event");
9606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9607 if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
9608 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9610 MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
9612 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
9613 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
9614 panic!("channel_update not found!");
9617 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9618 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9619 assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
9620 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9622 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9625 &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
9626 if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
9627 assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
9628 assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
9630 panic!("Unexpected message event");
9635 _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
9638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9642 impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9643 fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9644 use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9645 use secp256k1::Signature;
9646 msgs::ChannelUpdate {
9647 signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
9648 contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9649 chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
9650 short_channel_id: 0,
9653 cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
9654 htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
9656 fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
9657 excess_data: vec![],
9664 fn test_onion_failure() {
9665 use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
9666 use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
9669 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
9670 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
9671 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
9672 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
9674 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
9675 for node in nodes.iter() {
9676 *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
9678 let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
9679 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
9680 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9682 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
9684 // intermediate node failure
9685 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9686 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9687 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9688 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9689 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9690 onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
9691 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9692 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
9694 // final node failure
9695 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9696 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9697 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
9698 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9699 let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
9700 onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
9701 msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9702 }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9704 // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
9705 // receiving simulated fail messages
9706 // intermediate node failure
9707 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9709 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9711 // and tamper returing error message
9712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9713 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9714 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9715 }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9717 // final node failure
9718 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9719 // and tamper returing error message
9720 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9721 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9722 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9724 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
9725 }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
9727 // intermediate node failure
9728 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9729 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9731 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9732 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9733 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9734 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9736 // final node failure
9737 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9738 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9739 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9740 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
9742 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
9743 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9745 // intermediate node failure
9746 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9747 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9749 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9750 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9751 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9753 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
9754 }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9756 // final node failure
9757 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
9758 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9759 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9760 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
9762 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
9763 }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
9765 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
9766 Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
9768 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
9769 Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
9771 run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
9772 Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
9774 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9775 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9777 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9778 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9779 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
9780 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9782 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9783 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9785 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9786 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9787 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
9788 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9789 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9791 run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9792 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9794 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9795 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9796 msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
9797 // short_channel_id from the processing node
9798 }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9800 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9801 bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
9802 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
9803 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
9805 let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
9806 let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
9807 let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
9808 bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
9809 run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9811 //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
9812 //invalid channel_update cases.
9813 run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9814 msg.amount_msat -= 1;
9815 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9817 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9818 // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
9819 msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
9820 }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
9822 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9823 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9824 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9825 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9826 }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9828 run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9829 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown);
9830 }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
9832 run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_payment_amount", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9833 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::AmountMismatch);
9834 }, false, Some(PERM|16), None);
9836 run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9837 let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
9838 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9839 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
9840 }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
9842 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9843 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9844 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9845 f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
9848 }, true, Some(18), None);
9850 run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9851 // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
9852 for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9853 for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
9854 f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
9857 }, true, Some(19), None);
9859 run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
9860 // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
9861 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9862 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9863 }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
9864 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9866 run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
9867 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
9868 let mut route = route.clone();
9870 route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
9871 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
9872 let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
9873 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
9874 msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
9875 msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
9876 }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);