Send funding_signed messages out-of-band to ensure ordered delivery
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
30 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
37
38 use crypto;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
43
44 use std::{ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::HashMap;
46 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::io::Cursor;
48 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51
52 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 ///
54 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 ///
58 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 mod channel_held_info {
65         use ln::msgs;
66         use ln::router::Route;
67         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69
70         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
71         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
73                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
75                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
76                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
77                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79         }
80
81         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85         }
86
87         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
91                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
92         }
93
94         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95         #[derive(Clone)]
96         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
97                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
99                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
100         }
101
102         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103         #[derive(Clone)]
104         pub enum HTLCSource {
105                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106                 OutboundRoute {
107                         route: Route,
108                         session_priv: SecretKey,
109                         /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
110                         /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
111                         first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112                 },
113         }
114         #[cfg(test)]
115         impl HTLCSource {
116                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
117                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
118                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
119                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121                         }
122                 }
123         }
124
125         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
127                 ErrorPacket {
128                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
129                 },
130                 Reason {
131                         failure_code: u16,
132                         data: Vec<u8>,
133                 }
134         }
135 }
136 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
137
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139         err: msgs::HandleError,
140         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 }
142 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
143         #[inline]
144         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
145                 Self {
146                         err: HandleError {
147                                 err,
148                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
149                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
150                                                 channel_id,
151                                                 data: err.to_string()
152                                         },
153                                 }),
154                         },
155                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
156                 }
157         }
158         #[inline]
159         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
160                 Self {
161                         err: HandleError {
162                                 err,
163                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
164                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
165                                                 channel_id,
166                                                 data: err.to_string()
167                                         },
168                                 }),
169                         },
170                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
171                 }
172         }
173         #[inline]
174         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
175                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
176         }
177         #[inline]
178         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
179                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
180         }
181         #[inline]
182         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
183                 Self {
184                         err: match err {
185                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
186                                         err: msg,
187                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
188                                 },
189                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
190                                         err: msg,
191                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
192                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
193                                                         channel_id,
194                                                         data: msg.to_string()
195                                                 },
196                                         }),
197                                 },
198                         },
199                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
200                 }
201         }
202         #[inline]
203         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
204                 Self {
205                         err: match err {
206                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
207                                         err: msg,
208                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
209                                 },
210                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
211                                         err: msg,
212                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
213                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
214                                                         channel_id,
215                                                         data: msg.to_string()
216                                                 },
217                                         }),
218                                 },
219                         },
220                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
221                 }
222         }
223 }
224
225 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
226 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
227 #[derive(PartialEq)]
228 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
229         /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
230         PreimageUnknown,
231         /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
232         AmountMismatch,
233 }
234
235 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
236 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
237 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
238 /// probably increase this significantly.
239 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
240
241 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
242         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
243         prev_htlc_id: u64,
244         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
245 }
246
247 struct ChannelHolder {
248         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
249         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
250         next_forward: Instant,
251         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
257         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
258         /// go to read them!
259         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
260         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
261         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
262         pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
263 }
264 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
265         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
266         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
267         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
268         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
269         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
270         pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
271 }
272 impl ChannelHolder {
273         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
274                 MutChannelHolder {
275                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
276                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
277                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
278                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280                         pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
281                 }
282         }
283 }
284
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 ///
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
293 pub struct ChannelManager {
294         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
295         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
296         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
297         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
298         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
299
300         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
301         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
302         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
303         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
304
305         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
306         our_network_key: SecretKey,
307
308         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
309
310         keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
311
312         logger: Arc<Logger>,
313 }
314
315 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
316 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
317 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
318 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
319 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
320 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
321 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
322
323 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
324 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
325 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
326 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
327 #[deny(const_err)]
328 #[allow(dead_code)]
329 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
330
331 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
332 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
333 #[deny(const_err)]
334 #[allow(dead_code)]
335 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
336
337 macro_rules! secp_call {
338         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
339                 match $res {
340                         Ok(key) => key,
341                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
342                 }
343         };
344 }
345
346 struct OnionKeys {
347         #[cfg(test)]
348         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
351         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
352         rho: [u8; 32],
353         mu: [u8; 32],
354 }
355
356 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
357 pub struct ChannelDetails {
358         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
359         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
360         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
361         /// lifetime of the channel.
362         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
363         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
364         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
365         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
366         /// The node_id of our counterparty
367         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
368         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
369         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
370         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
371         pub user_id: u64,
372 }
373
374 impl ChannelManager {
375         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
376         ///
377         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
378         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
379         ///
380         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
381         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
382         ///
383         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
384         pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
385                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
386
387                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
388                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
389                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
390                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
391                         chain_monitor,
392                         tx_broadcaster,
393
394                         announce_channels_publicly,
395                         fee_proportional_millionths,
396                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
397                         secp_ctx,
398
399                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
400                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
401                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
402                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
403                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
404                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
405                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
406                         }),
407                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
408
409                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
410
411                         keys_manager,
412
413                         logger,
414                 });
415                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
416                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
417                 Ok(res)
418         }
419
420         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
421         ///
422         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
423         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
424         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
425         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
426         ///
427         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
428         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
429         ///
430         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
431         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
432                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
433                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
434                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
435                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
436                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
437                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
438                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
439                                 } else {
440                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
441                                 }
442                         },
443                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
444                 }
445                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
446                         node_id: their_network_key,
447                         msg: res,
448                 });
449                 Ok(())
450         }
451
452         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
453         /// more information.
454         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
455                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
457                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
458                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
459                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
460                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
461                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
462                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
463                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
464                         });
465                 }
466                 res
467         }
468
469         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
470         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
471         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
472                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
473                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
474                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
475                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
476                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
477                         // really wanted anyway.
478                         if channel.is_live() {
479                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
480                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
481                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
482                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
483                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
484                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
485                                 });
486                         }
487                 }
488                 res
489         }
490
491         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
492         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
493         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
494         ///
495         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
496         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
497                 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
498                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
499                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
500                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
501                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
502                                         let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
503                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
504                                                 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
505                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
506                                         });
507                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
508                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
509                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
510                                                 }
511                                                 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
512                                         } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
513                                 },
514                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
515                         }
516                 };
517                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
518                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
519                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
520                 }
521                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
522                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
523                                 Some(update)
524                         } else { None }
525                 } else { None };
526
527                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
528                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
529                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
530                                 msg: update
531                         });
532                 }
533
534                 Ok(())
535         }
536
537         #[inline]
538         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
539                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
540                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
541                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
542                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
543                 }
544                 for tx in local_txn {
545                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
546                 }
547                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
548                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
549                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
550                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
551                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
552                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
553                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
554         }
555
556         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
557         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
558         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
559                 let mut chan = {
560                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
561                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
562                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
563                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
564                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
565                                 }
566                                 chan
567                         } else {
568                                 return;
569                         }
570                 };
571                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
572                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
573                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
574                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
575                                 msg: update
576                         });
577                 }
578         }
579
580         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
581         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
582         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
583                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
584                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
585                 }
586         }
587
588         fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
589                 match err {
590                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
591                                 let mut chan = {
592                                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
593                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
594                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
595                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
596                                         }
597                                         chan
598                                 };
599                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
600                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
601                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
602                                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
603                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
604                                                 msg: update
605                                         });
606                                 }
607                         },
608                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
609                                 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
610                                 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
611                         },
612                 }
613         }
614
615         #[inline]
616         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
617                 ({
618                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
619                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
620                         let mut res = [0; 32];
621                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
622                         res
623                 },
624                 {
625                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
626                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
627                         let mut res = [0; 32];
628                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
629                         res
630                 })
631         }
632
633         #[inline]
634         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
635                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
636                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
637                 let mut res = [0; 32];
638                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
639                 res
640         }
641
642         #[inline]
643         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
644                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
645                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
646                 let mut res = [0; 32];
647                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
648                 res
649         }
650
651         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
652         #[inline]
653         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
654                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
655                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
656
657                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
658                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
659
660                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
661                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
662                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
663                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
664                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
665
666                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
667
668                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
669                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
670
671                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
672                 }
673
674                 Ok(())
675         }
676
677         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
678         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
679                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
680
681                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
682                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
683
684                         res.push(OnionKeys {
685                                 #[cfg(test)]
686                                 shared_secret,
687                                 #[cfg(test)]
688                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
689                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
690                                 rho,
691                                 mu,
692                         });
693                 })?;
694
695                 Ok(res)
696         }
697
698         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
699         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
700                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
701                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
702                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
703                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
704                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
705                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
706
707                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
708                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
709                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
710                         // the intended recipient).
711                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
712                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
713                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
714                                 realm: 0,
715                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
716                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
717                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
718                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
719                                 },
720                                 hmac: [0; 32],
721                         };
722                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
723                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
724                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
725                         }
726                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
727                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
728                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
729                         }
730                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
731                 }
732                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
733         }
734
735         #[inline]
736         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
737                 unsafe {
738                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
739                 }
740                 for i in 0..65 {
741                         arr[i] = 0;
742                 }
743         }
744
745         #[inline]
746         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
747                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
748
749                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
750                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
751                 }
752         }
753
754         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
755         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
756                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
757                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
758
759                 let filler = {
760                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
761                         let end_len = iters * 65;
762                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
763                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
764
765                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
766                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
767                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
768                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
769                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
770                         }
771                         res
772                 };
773
774                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
775                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
776
777                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
778                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
779                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
780                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
781
782                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
783                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
784                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
785
786                         if i == 0 {
787                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
788                         }
789
790                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
791                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
792                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
793                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
794                 }
795
796                 msgs::OnionPacket{
797                         version: 0,
798                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
799                         hop_data: packet_data,
800                         hmac: hmac_res,
801                 }
802         }
803
804         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
805         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
806         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
807                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
808
809                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
810                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
811                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
812                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
813                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
814                         data: packet_crypted,
815                 }
816         }
817
818         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
819                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
820
821                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
822
823                 let failuremsg = {
824                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
825                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
826                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
827                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
828                         res
829                 };
830                 let pad = {
831                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
832                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
833                         res
834                 };
835                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
836                         hmac: [0; 32],
837                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
838                         pad: pad,
839                 };
840
841                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
842                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
843                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
844
845                 packet
846         }
847
848         #[inline]
849         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
850                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
851                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
852         }
853
854         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
855                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
856                         () => {
857                                 {
858                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
859                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
860                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
861                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
862                                         onion_hash
863                                 }
864                         }
865                 }
866
867                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
868                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
869                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
870                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
871                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
872                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
873                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
874                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
875                 }
876
877                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
878                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
879
880                 let mut channel_state = None;
881                 macro_rules! return_err {
882                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
883                                 {
884                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
885                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
886                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
887                                         }
888                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
889                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
890                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
891                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
892                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
893                                 }
894                         }
895                 }
896
897                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
898                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
899                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
900                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
901                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
902                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
903                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
904                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
905                 }
906
907                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
908                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
909                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
910                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
911                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
912                 }
913
914                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
915                 let next_hop_data = {
916                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
917                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
918                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
919                                 Err(err) => {
920                                         let error_code = match err {
921                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
922                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
923                                         };
924                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
925                                 },
926                                 Ok(msg) => msg
927                         }
928                 };
929
930                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
931                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
932                                 // final_expiry_too_soon
933                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
934                                         return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
935                                 }
936                                 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
937                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
938                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
939                                 }
940                                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
941                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
942                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
943                                 }
944
945                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
946                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
947                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
948                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
949
950                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
951                                         onion_packet: None,
952                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
953                                         short_channel_id: 0,
954                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
955                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
956                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
957                                 })
958                         } else {
959                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
960                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
961                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
962
963                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
964
965                                 let blinding_factor = {
966                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
967                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
968                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
969                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
970                                         sha.result(&mut res);
971                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
972                                                 Err(_) => {
973                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
974                                                 },
975                                                 Ok(key) => key
976                                         }
977                                 };
978
979                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
980                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
981                                 }
982
983                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
984                                         version: 0,
985                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
986                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
987                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
988                                 };
989
990                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
991                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
992                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
993                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
994                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
995                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
996                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
997                                 })
998                         };
999
1000                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1001                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1002                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1003                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1004                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1005                                         None => { // unknown_next_peer
1006                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1007                                         },
1008                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1009                                 };
1010                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1011                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1012
1013                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1014                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1015                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1016                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1017                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1018                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1019                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1020                                         }
1021                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1022                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1023                                         }
1024                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1025                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1026                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1027                                         }
1028                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1029                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1030                                         }
1031                                         let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1032                                         // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1033                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1034                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1035                                         }
1036                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1037                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1038                                         }
1039                                         break None;
1040                                 }
1041                                 {
1042                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1043                                         if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1044                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1045                                         }
1046                                         else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1047                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1048                                         }
1049                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1050                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1051                                         }
1052                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1053                                 }
1054                         }
1055                 }
1056
1057                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1058         }
1059
1060         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1061         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1062         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1063                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1064                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1065                         Some(id) => id,
1066                 };
1067
1068                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1069
1070                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1071                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1072                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1073                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1074                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1075                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1076                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1077                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1078                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1079                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1080                 };
1081
1082                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1083                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1084
1085                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1086                         signature: sig,
1087                         contents: unsigned
1088                 })
1089         }
1090
1091         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1092         ///
1093         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1094         /// fields for more info.
1095         ///
1096         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1097         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1098         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1099         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1100         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1101         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1102         ///
1103         /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1104         ///
1105         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1106         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1107         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1108                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1109                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1110                 }
1111                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1112                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1113                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1114                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1115                         }
1116                 }
1117
1118                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1119                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1120                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1121                         session_key
1122                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1123
1124                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1125
1126                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1127                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1128                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1129                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1130
1131                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1132
1133                 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1134                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1135                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
1136                 };
1137
1138                 let res = {
1139                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1140                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1141                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1142                         }
1143                         if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1144                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1145                         }
1146                         if !chan.is_live() {
1147                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1148                         }
1149                         chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1150                                 route: route.clone(),
1151                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1152                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1153                         }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1154                 };
1155                 match res {
1156                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1157                                 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1158                                         self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1159                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1160                                 }
1161
1162                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1163                                         node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1164                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1165                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1166                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1167                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1168                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1169                                                 update_fee: None,
1170                                                 commitment_signed,
1171                                         },
1172                                 });
1173                         },
1174                         None => {},
1175                 }
1176
1177                 Ok(())
1178         }
1179
1180         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1181         ///
1182         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1183         ///
1184         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1185         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1186         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1187                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1188                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1190                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1191                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1192                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1193                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1194                                                 },
1195                                                 Err(e) => {
1196                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1197                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1198                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1199                                                                 action: e.action,
1200                                                         });
1201                                                         return;
1202                                                 },
1203                                         }
1204                                 },
1205                                 None => return
1206                         }
1207                 };
1208                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1209                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1210                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1211                         unimplemented!();
1212                 }
1213
1214                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1216                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1217                         msg: msg,
1218                 });
1219                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1220                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1221                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1222                         },
1223                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1224                                 e.insert(chan);
1225                         }
1226                 }
1227         }
1228
1229         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1230                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1231
1232                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1233                         Ok(res) => res,
1234                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1235                 };
1236                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1237                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1238
1239                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1240                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1241                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1242                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1243                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1244                 })
1245         }
1246
1247         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1248         ///
1249         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1250         /// Will likely generate further events.
1251         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1252                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1253                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1254                 {
1255                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1257
1258                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1259                                 return;
1260                         }
1261
1262                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1263                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1264                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1265                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1266                                                 None => {
1267                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1268                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1270                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1271                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1272                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1273                                                                 });
1274                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1275                                                         }
1276                                                         continue;
1277                                                 }
1278                                         };
1279                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1280
1281                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1282                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1283                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1284                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1285                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1286                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1287                                                 });
1288                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1289                                                         Err(_e) => {
1290                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1291                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1292                                                                 continue;
1293                                                         },
1294                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1295                                                                 match update_add {
1296                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1297                                                                         None => {
1298                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1299                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1300                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1301                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1302                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1303                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1304                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1305                                                                         }
1306                                                                 }
1307                                                         }
1308                                                 }
1309                                         }
1310
1311                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1312                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1313                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1314                                                         Err(e) => {
1315                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1316                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1317                                                                 } else {
1318                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1319                                                                 }
1320                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1321                                                                 continue;
1322                                                         },
1323                                                 };
1324                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1325                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1326                                                 }
1327                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1328                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1329                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1330                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1331                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1332                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1333                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1334                                                                 update_fee: None,
1335                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1336                                                         },
1337                                                 });
1338                                         }
1339                                 } else {
1340                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1341                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1342                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1343                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1344                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1345                                                 };
1346                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1347                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1348                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1349                                                 };
1350                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1351                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1352                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1353                                                 });
1354                                         }
1355                                 }
1356                         }
1357                 }
1358
1359                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1360                         match update {
1361                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1362                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1363                         };
1364                 }
1365
1366                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1367                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1368                 events.append(&mut new_events);
1369         }
1370
1371         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1372         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1373                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1374                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1375                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1376                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1377                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1378                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1379                         }
1380                         true
1381                 } else { false }
1382         }
1383
1384         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1385         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1386         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1387         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1388         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1389         /// still-available channels.
1390         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1391                 match source {
1392                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1393                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1394                                 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1395                                         let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1396                                         if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1397                                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1398                                                         events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1399                                                                 update,
1400                                                         }
1401                                                 );
1402                                         }
1403                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1404                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1405                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1406                                         });
1407                                 } else {
1408                                         panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1409                                 }
1410                         },
1411                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1412                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1413                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1414                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1415                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1416                                         },
1417                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1418                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1419                                         }
1420                                 };
1421
1422                                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1423
1424                                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1425                                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1426                                         None => return
1427                                 };
1428
1429                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1430                                 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1431                                         Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1432                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1433                                                         unimplemented!();
1434                                                 }
1435                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1436                                                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1437                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1438                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1439                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1440                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1441                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1442                                                                 update_fee: None,
1443                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1444                                                         },
1445                                                 });
1446                                         },
1447                                         Ok(None) => {},
1448                                         Err(_e) => {
1449                                                 //TODO: Do something with e?
1450                                                 return;
1451                                         },
1452                                 }
1453                         },
1454                 }
1455         }
1456
1457         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1458         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1459         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1460         ///
1461         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1462         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1463                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1464                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1465                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1466                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1467
1468                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1469                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1470                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1471                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1472                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1473                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1474                         }
1475                         true
1476                 } else { false }
1477         }
1478         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1479                 match source {
1480                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1481                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1482                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1483                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1484                                         payment_preimage
1485                                 });
1486                         },
1487                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1488                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1489                                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1490
1491                                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1492                                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1493                                         None => {
1494                                                 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1495                                                 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1496                                                 // why its missing.
1497                                                 return
1498                                         }
1499                                 };
1500
1501                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1502                                 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1503                                         Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1504                                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1505                                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1506                                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1507                                                         }
1508                                                 }
1509                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1510                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1511                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1512                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1513                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1514                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1515                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1516                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1517                                                                         update_fee: None,
1518                                                                         commitment_signed,
1519                                                                 }
1520                                                         });
1521                                                 }
1522                                         },
1523                                         Err(_e) => {
1524                                                 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1525                                                 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1526                                                 //TODO: Do something with e?
1527                                                 return
1528                                         },
1529                                 }
1530                         },
1531                 }
1532         }
1533
1534         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1535         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1536                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1537         }
1538
1539         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1540         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1541         /// operation.
1542         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1543                 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1544                 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1545                 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1546
1547                 {
1548                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1550                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1551                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1552                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1553                                 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1554                                         let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1555                                         if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1556                                                 match e {
1557                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1558                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1559                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1560                                                                 }
1561                                                                 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1562                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1563                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1564                                                                                 msg: update
1565                                                                         });
1566                                                                 }
1567                                                                 false
1568                                                         },
1569                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1570                                                 }
1571                                         } else {
1572                                                 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1573                                                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1574                                                         htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1575                                                 }
1576                                                 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1577
1578                                                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1579                                                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1580                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1581                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1582                                                                         updates: update,
1583                                                                 });
1584                                                         }
1585                                                 } }
1586                                                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1587                                                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1588                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1589                                                                         node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1590                                                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
1591                                                                 });
1592                                                         }
1593                                                 } }
1594                                                 match order {
1595                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1596                                                                 handle_cs!();
1597                                                                 handle_raa!();
1598                                                         },
1599                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1600                                                                 handle_raa!();
1601                                                                 handle_cs!();
1602                                                         },
1603                                                 }
1604                                                 true
1605                                         }
1606                                 } else { true }
1607                         });
1608                 }
1609
1610                 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1611                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1612                 }
1613                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1614
1615                 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1616                         self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1617                 }
1618         }
1619
1620         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1621                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1622                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1623                 }
1624
1625                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1626                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1627                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1628                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1629                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1630                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1631                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1632                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1633                                         node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1634                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1635                                 });
1636                                 entry.insert(channel);
1637                         }
1638                 }
1639                 Ok(())
1640         }
1641
1642         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1643                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1644                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1645                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1646                                 Some(chan) => {
1647                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1648                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1649                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1650                                         }
1651                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1652                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1653                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1654                                 },
1655                                 //TODO: same as above
1656                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1657                         }
1658                 };
1659                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1660                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1661                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1662                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1663                         output_script: output_script,
1664                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1665                 });
1666                 Ok(())
1667         }
1668
1669         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1670                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1671                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1672                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1673                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1674                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1675                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1676                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1677                                         }
1678                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1679                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1680                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1681                                                 },
1682                                                 Err(e) => {
1683                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1684                                                 }
1685                                         }
1686                                 },
1687                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1688                         }
1689                 };
1690                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1691                 // lock before add_update_monitor
1692                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1693                         unimplemented!();
1694                 }
1695                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1697                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1698                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1699                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1700                         },
1701                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1702                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1703                                         node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1704                                         msg: funding_msg,
1705                                 });
1706                                 e.insert(chan);
1707                         }
1708                 }
1709                 Ok(())
1710         }
1711
1712         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1713                 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1714                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1716                                 Some(chan) => {
1717                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1718                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1719                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1720                                         }
1721                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1722                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1723                                                 unimplemented!();
1724                                         }
1725                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
1726                                 },
1727                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1728                         }
1729                 };
1730                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1731                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1732                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1733                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1734                 });
1735                 Ok(())
1736         }
1737
1738         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1739                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1741                         Some(chan) => {
1742                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1743                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1744                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1745                                 }
1746                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1747                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1748                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1749                         },
1750                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1751                 };
1752         }
1753
1754         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1755                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1756                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1757                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1758
1759                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1760                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1761                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1762                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1763                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1764                                         }
1765                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1766                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1767                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1768                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1769                                                 }
1770                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1771                                         } else { (res, None) }
1772                                 },
1773                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1774                         }
1775                 };
1776                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1777                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1778                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1779                 }
1780                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1781                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1782                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1784                                         msg: update
1785                                 });
1786                         }
1787                 }
1788                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1789         }
1790
1791         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1792                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1793                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1794                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1795                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1796                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1797                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1798                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1799                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1800                                         }
1801                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1802                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1803                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1804                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1805                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1806                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1807                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1808                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1809                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1810                                                 }
1811                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1812                                         } else { (res, None) }
1813                                 },
1814                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1815                         }
1816                 };
1817                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1818                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1819                 }
1820                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1821                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1822                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1823                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1824                                         msg: update
1825                                 });
1826                         }
1827                 }
1828                 Ok(res.0)
1829         }
1830
1831         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1832                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1833                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1834                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1835                 //
1836                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1837                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1838                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1839                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1840
1841                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1842                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1843
1844                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1845                         Some(chan) => {
1846                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1847                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1848                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1849                                 }
1850                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1851                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1852                                 }
1853                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1854                         },
1855                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1856                 }
1857         }
1858
1859         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1860                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1862                         Some(chan) => {
1863                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1864                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1865                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1866                                 }
1867                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1868                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1869                         },
1870                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1871                 };
1872                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1873                 Ok(())
1874         }
1875
1876         // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
1877         // indicating that the payment itself failed
1878         fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
1879                 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
1880                         macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
1881                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
1882                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
1883                                 };
1884                                 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
1885                                         log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
1886                                 };
1887                         }
1888
1889                         const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
1890                         const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
1891                         const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
1892
1893                         let mut res = None;
1894                         let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
1895
1896                         // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1897                         Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1898                                 if res.is_some() { return; }
1899
1900                                 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
1901                                 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
1902                                 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
1903
1904                                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1905
1906                                 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1907                                 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1908                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1909                                 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1910                                 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1911
1912                                 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
1913
1914                                 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1915                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1916                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1917                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1918                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1919                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1920
1921                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1922                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
1923                                                         // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
1924                                                         // definitely came from the peer in question
1925                                                         res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
1926                                                 } else {
1927                                                         let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
1928
1929                                                         match error_code & 0xff {
1930                                                                 1|2|3 => {
1931                                                                         // either from an intermediate or final node
1932                                                                         //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
1933                                                                         //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
1934                                                                         //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
1935                                                                         //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
1936                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1937                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1938                                                                                 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
1939                                                                         }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
1940                                                                         // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
1941                                                                         // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
1942                                                                         // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
1943                                                                         return;
1944                                                                 },
1945                                                                 _ => {}
1946                                                         }
1947
1948                                                         if is_from_final_node {
1949                                                                 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
1950                                                                         c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
1951                                                                         c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
1952                                                                         17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
1953                                                                         18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1954                                                                                 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
1955                                                                                 true
1956                                                                         },
1957                                                                         19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1958                                                                                 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
1959                                                                                 true
1960                                                                         },
1961                                                                         _ => {
1962                                                                                 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
1963                                                                                 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
1964                                                                                 // does not coform to the spec.
1965                                                                                 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
1966                                                                                 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1967                                                                                         node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1968                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
1969                                                                                 }), false));
1970                                                                                 return;
1971                                                                         }
1972                                                                 };
1973                                                                 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
1974                                                                 return;
1975                                                         }
1976
1977                                                         // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
1978                                                         match error_code {
1979                                                                 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
1980                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1981                                                                                 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1982                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1983                                                                         }), false));
1984                                                                 },
1985                                                                 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
1986                                                                         let offset = match error_code {
1987                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
1988                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
1989                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
1990                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1991                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
1992                                                                                 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
1993                                                                                 _ =>  {
1994                                                                                         // node sending unknown code
1995                                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
1996                                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
1997                                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
1998                                                                                         }), false));
1999                                                                                         return;
2000                                                                                 }
2001                                                                         };
2002
2003                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2004                                                                                 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2005                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2006                                                                                         if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2007                                                                                                 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2008                                                                                                 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2009                                                                                                 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2010                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2011                                                                                                                 false
2012                                                                                                         },
2013                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2014                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2015                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2016                                                                                                                 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2017                                                                                                         },
2018                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2019                                                                                                                 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2020                                                                                                                 let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2021                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2022                                                                                                                 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2023                                                                                                         }
2024                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2025                                                                                                                 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2026                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2027                                                                                                                 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2028                                                                                                         },
2029                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2030                                                                                                                 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2031                                                                                                                 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2032                                                                                                                 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2033                                                                                                         },
2034                                                                                                         c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2035                                                                                                         _ => { unreachable!(); },
2036                                                                                                 };
2037
2038                                                                                                 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2039                                                                                                         Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2040                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
2041                                                                                                         })
2042                                                                                                 };
2043                                                                                                 res = Some((msg, true));
2044                                                                                                 return;
2045                                                                                         }
2046                                                                                 }
2047                                                                         }
2048                                                                 },
2049                                                                 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2050                                                                         //TODO
2051                                                                 },
2052                                                                 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2053                                                                         res = Some((None, true));
2054                                                                         return;
2055                                                                 }
2056                                                                 _ => {
2057                                                                         // node sending unknown code
2058                                                                         res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2059                                                                                 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2060                                                                                 is_permanent: true,
2061                                                                         }), false));
2062                                                                         return;
2063                                                                 }
2064                                                         }
2065                                                 }
2066                                         }
2067                                 }
2068                         }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2069                         res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2070                 } else { ((None, true)) }
2071         }
2072
2073         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2074                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2075                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2076                         Some(chan) => {
2077                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2078                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2079                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2080                                 }
2081                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
2082                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2083                         },
2084                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2085                 }?;
2086                 Ok(())
2087         }
2088
2089         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2090                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2091                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2092                         Some(chan) => {
2093                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2094                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2095                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2096                                 }
2097                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
2098                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
2099                                 }
2100                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
2101                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2102                                 Ok(())
2103                         },
2104                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2105                 }
2106         }
2107
2108         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2109                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = {
2110                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2111                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2112                                 Some(chan) => {
2113                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2114                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2115                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2116                                         }
2117                                         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2118                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2119                                                 unimplemented!();
2120                                         }
2121                                         (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed)
2122                                 },
2123                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2124                         }
2125                 };
2126                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
2127         }
2128
2129         #[inline]
2130         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2131                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2132                         let mut forward_event = None;
2133                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2134                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2135                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2136                                         forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2137                                         channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2138                                 }
2139                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2140                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2141                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2142                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2143                                                 },
2144                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2145                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2146                                                 }
2147                                         }
2148                                 }
2149                         }
2150                         match forward_event {
2151                                 Some(time) => {
2152                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2153                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2154                                                 time_forwardable: time
2155                                         });
2156                                 }
2157                                 None => {},
2158                         }
2159                 }
2160         }
2161
2162         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2163                 let ((res, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures), short_channel_id) = {
2164                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2165                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2166                                 Some(chan) => {
2167                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2168                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2169                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2170                                         }
2171                                         let (res, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
2172                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2173                                                 unimplemented!();
2174                                         }
2175                                         ((res, pending_forwards, pending_failures), chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2176                                 },
2177                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2178                         }
2179                 };
2180                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2181                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2182                 }
2183                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2184
2185                 Ok(res)
2186         }
2187
2188         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2189                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2190                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2191                         Some(chan) => {
2192                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2193                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2194                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2195                                 }
2196                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
2197                         },
2198                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2199                 }
2200         }
2201
2202         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2203                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2204                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2205
2206                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2207                         Some(chan) => {
2208                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2209                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2210                                 }
2211                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2212                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2213                                 }
2214
2215                                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2216                                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
2217                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2218
2219                                 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2220                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2221                                 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2222                                 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2223                                 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2224
2225                                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2226
2227                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2228                                         msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2229                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2230                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2231                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2232                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2233                                                 contents: announcement,
2234                                         },
2235                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2236                                 });
2237                         },
2238                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2239                 }
2240                 Ok(())
2241         }
2242
2243         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2244                 let res = {
2245                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2246                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
2247                                 Some(chan) => {
2248                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2249                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2250                                         }
2251                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
2252                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2253                                         if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2254                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2255                                                         unimplemented!();
2256                                                 }
2257                                         }
2258                                         Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order))
2259                                 },
2260                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2261                         }
2262                 };
2263
2264                 res
2265         }
2266
2267         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2268         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2269         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2270         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2271         #[doc(hidden)]
2272         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2273                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2274                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2275
2276                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2277                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2278                         Some(chan) => {
2279                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2280                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2281                                 }
2282                                 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2283                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2284                                 }
2285                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2286                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2287                                 }
2288                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2289                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2290                                                 unimplemented!();
2291                                         }
2292                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2293                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2294                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2295                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2296                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2297                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2298                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2299                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2300                                                         commitment_signed,
2301                                                 },
2302                                         });
2303                                 }
2304                         },
2305                 }
2306                 Ok(())
2307         }
2308 }
2309
2310 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2311         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2312                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2313                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2314                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2315                 ret
2316         }
2317 }
2318
2319 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2320         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2321                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2322                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2323                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2324                 ret
2325         }
2326 }
2327
2328 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2329         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2330                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2331                 {
2332                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2333                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2334                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2335                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2336                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2337                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2338                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2339                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2340                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2341                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2342                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2343                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2344                                         });
2345                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2346                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2347                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2348                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2349                                                 action: e.action,
2350                                         });
2351                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2352                                                 return false;
2353                                         }
2354                                 }
2355                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2356                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2357                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2358                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2359                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2360                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2361                                                                 }
2362                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2363                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2364                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2365                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2366                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2367                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2368                                                                                 msg: update
2369                                                                         });
2370                                                                 }
2371                                                                 return false;
2372                                                         }
2373                                                 }
2374                                         }
2375                                 }
2376                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2377                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2378                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2379                                         }
2380                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2381                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2382                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2383                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2384                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2385                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2386                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2387                                                         msg: update
2388                                                 });
2389                                         }
2390                                         return false;
2391                                 }
2392                                 true
2393                         });
2394                 }
2395                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2396                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2397                 }
2398                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2399         }
2400
2401         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2402         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2403                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2404                 {
2405                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2406                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2407                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2408                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2409                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2410                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2411                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2412                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2413                                         }
2414                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2415                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2416                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2417                                                         msg: update
2418                                                 });
2419                                         }
2420                                         false
2421                                 } else {
2422                                         true
2423                                 }
2424                         });
2425                 }
2426                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2427                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2428                 }
2429                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2430         }
2431 }
2432
2433 macro_rules! handle_error {
2434         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2435                 match $internal {
2436                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2437                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2438                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2439                                         match &err.action {
2440                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2441                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2442                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2443                                                         } else {
2444                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2445                                                         }
2446                                                 },
2447                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2448                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2449                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2450                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2451                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2452                                                         } else {
2453                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2454                                                         }
2455                                                 },
2456                                                 &None => {},
2457                                         }
2458                                 }
2459                                 Err(err)
2460                         },
2461                 }
2462         }
2463 }
2464
2465 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2466         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2467         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2468                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2469         }
2470
2471         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2472                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2473         }
2474
2475         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2476                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2477         }
2478
2479         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2480                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2481         }
2482
2483         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2484                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2485         }
2486
2487         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2488                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2489         }
2490
2491         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2492                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2493         }
2494
2495         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2496                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2497         }
2498
2499         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2500                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2501         }
2502
2503         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2504                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2505         }
2506
2507         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2508                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2509         }
2510
2511         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2512                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2513         }
2514
2515         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2516                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2517         }
2518
2519         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2520                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2521         }
2522
2523         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2524                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2525         }
2526
2527         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder), HandleError> {
2528                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2529         }
2530
2531         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2532                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2533                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2534                 {
2535                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2536                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2537                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2538                         let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2539                         if no_connection_possible {
2540                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2541                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2542                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2543                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2544                                                 }
2545                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2546                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2547                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2548                                                                 msg: update
2549                                                         });
2550                                                 }
2551                                                 false
2552                                         } else {
2553                                                 true
2554                                         }
2555                                 });
2556                         } else {
2557                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2558                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2559                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2560                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2561                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2562                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2563                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2564                                                 }
2565                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2566                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2567                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2568                                                         }
2569                                                         return false;
2570                                                 }
2571                                         }
2572                                         true
2573                                 })
2574                         }
2575                 }
2576                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2577                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2578                 }
2579                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2580                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2581                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2582                         }
2583                 }
2584         }
2585
2586         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2587                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2588                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2589                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2590                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2591                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2592                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2593                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2594                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2595                                         // drop it.
2596                                         false
2597                                 } else {
2598                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2599                                         true
2600                                 }
2601                         } else { true }
2602                 });
2603                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2604                 res
2605         }
2606
2607         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2608                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2609                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2610                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2611                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2612                                 }
2613                         }
2614                 } else {
2615                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2616                 }
2617         }
2618 }
2619
2620 #[cfg(test)]
2621 mod tests {
2622         use chain::chaininterface;
2623         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2624         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2625         use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
2626         use chain::keysinterface;
2627         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason};
2628         use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2629         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2630         use ln::msgs;
2631         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2632         use util::test_utils;
2633         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2634         use util::errors::APIError;
2635         use util::logger::Logger;
2636         use util::ser::Writeable;
2637
2638         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2639         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2640         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2641         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2642         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2643         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2644         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2645
2646         use hex;
2647
2648         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2649         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2650
2651         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2652         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2653
2654         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2655
2656         use std::cell::RefCell;
2657         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2658         use std::default::Default;
2659         use std::rc::Rc;
2660         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2661         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2662         use std::time::Instant;
2663         use std::mem;
2664
2665         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2666                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2667                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2668
2669                 let route = Route {
2670                         hops: vec!(
2671                                         RouteHop {
2672                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2673                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2674                                         },
2675                                         RouteHop {
2676                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2677                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2678                                         },
2679                                         RouteHop {
2680                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2681                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2682                                         },
2683                                         RouteHop {
2684                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2685                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2686                                         },
2687                                         RouteHop {
2688                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2689                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2690                                         },
2691                         ),
2692                 };
2693
2694                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2695
2696                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2697                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2698                 onion_keys
2699         }
2700
2701         #[test]
2702         fn onion_vectors() {
2703                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2704                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2705
2706                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2707                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2708                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2709                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2710                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2711
2712                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2713                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2714                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2715                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2716                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2717
2718                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2719                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2720                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2721                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2722                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2723
2724                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2725                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2726                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2727                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2728                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2729
2730                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2731                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2732                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2733                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2734                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2735
2736                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2737                 let payloads = vec!(
2738                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2739                                 realm: 0,
2740                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2741                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2742                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2743                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2744                                 },
2745                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2746                         },
2747                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2748                                 realm: 0,
2749                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2750                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2751                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2752                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2753                                 },
2754                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2755                         },
2756                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2757                                 realm: 0,
2758                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2759                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2760                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2761                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2762                                 },
2763                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2764                         },
2765                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2766                                 realm: 0,
2767                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2768                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2769                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2770                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2771                                 },
2772                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2773                         },
2774                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2775                                 realm: 0,
2776                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2777                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2778                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2779                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2780                                 },
2781                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2782                         },
2783                 );
2784
2785                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2786                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2787                 // anyway...
2788                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2789         }
2790
2791         #[test]
2792         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2793                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2794
2795                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2796                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2797                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2798
2799                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2800                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2801
2802                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2803                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2804
2805                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2806                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2807
2808                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2809                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2810
2811                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2812                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2813         }
2814
2815         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2816                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2817                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2818                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2819                 for i in 2..100 {
2820                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2821                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2822                 }
2823         }
2824
2825         struct Node {
2826                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2827                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2828                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2829                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2830                 router: Router,
2831                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2832                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2833         }
2834         impl Drop for Node {
2835                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2836                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2837                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2838                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
2839                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2840                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2841                         }
2842                 }
2843         }
2844
2845         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2846                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2847         }
2848
2849         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2850                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2851                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2852                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2853         }
2854
2855         macro_rules! get_event_msg {
2856                 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
2857                         {
2858                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2859                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2860                                 match events[0] {
2861                                         $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2862                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
2863                                                 (*msg).clone()
2864                                         },
2865                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2866                                 }
2867                         }
2868                 }
2869         }
2870
2871         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2872                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2873                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2874                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2875
2876                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2877                 let tx;
2878                 let funding_output;
2879
2880                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2881                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2882                 match events_2[0] {
2883                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2884                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2885                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2886
2887                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2888                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2889                                 }]};
2890                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2891
2892                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2893                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2894                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2895                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2896                                 added_monitors.clear();
2897                         },
2898                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2899                 }
2900
2901                 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2902                 {
2903                         let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2904                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2905                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2906                         added_monitors.clear();
2907                 }
2908
2909                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
2910                 {
2911                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2912                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2913                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2914                         added_monitors.clear();
2915                 }
2916
2917                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2918                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2919                 match events_4[0] {
2920                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2921                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2922                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2923                         },
2924                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2925                 };
2926
2927                 tx
2928         }
2929
2930         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2931                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2932                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2933                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2934                 match events_5[0] {
2935                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2936                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2937                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2938                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2939                         },
2940                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2941                 };
2942
2943                 let channel_id;
2944
2945                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2946                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2948                 (match events_6[0] {
2949                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2950                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2951                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2952                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2953                         },
2954                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2955                 }, channel_id)
2956         }
2957
2958         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2959                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2960                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2961                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2962         }
2963
2964         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2965                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2966                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2967                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2968                         bs_announcement_sigs
2969                 };
2970
2971                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2972                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2973                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2974                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2975                                 (msg, update_msg)
2976                         },
2977                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2978                 };
2979
2980                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2981                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2982                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2983                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2984                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2985                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2986                                 update_msg
2987                         },
2988                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2989                 };
2990
2991                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2992
2993                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2994         }
2995
2996         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2997                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2998         }
2999
3000         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3001                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3002                 for node in nodes {
3003                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3004                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3005                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3006                 }
3007                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3008         }
3009
3010         macro_rules! check_spends {
3011                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3012                         {
3013                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3014                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3015                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3016                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3017                         }
3018                 }
3019         }
3020
3021         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3022                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3023                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3024                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
3025
3026                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3027                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3028                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3029                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
3030                         MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3031                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
3032                                 msg.clone()
3033                         },
3034                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3035                 };
3036
3037                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
3038                 if !close_inbound_first {
3039                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
3040                 }
3041                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3042                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
3043                 if close_inbound_first {
3044                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
3045                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3046                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3047                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3048
3049                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3050                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
3051                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3052                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3053                 } else {
3054                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3055                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3056                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3057
3058                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3059                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
3060                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3061                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3062                 }
3063                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3064                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3065
3066                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3067                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3068                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
3069                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3070                                 msg.clone()
3071                         },
3072                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3073                 };
3074
3075                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3076                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3077                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
3078                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3079                                 msg.clone()
3080                         },
3081                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082                 };
3083
3084                 (as_update, bs_update)
3085         }
3086
3087         struct SendEvent {
3088                 node_id: PublicKey,
3089                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3090                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3091         }
3092         impl SendEvent {
3093                 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3094                         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3095                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3096                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3097                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3098                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3099                 }
3100
3101                 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3102                         match event {
3103                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3104                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3105                         }
3106                 }
3107         }
3108
3109         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3110                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3111                         {
3112                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3113                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3114                                 added_monitors.clear();
3115                         }
3116                 }
3117         }
3118
3119         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3120                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3121                         {
3122                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3123                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3124                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3125                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3126                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3127                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3128                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
3129                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
3130                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3131                                 if $fail_backwards {
3132                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3133                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3134                                 }
3135                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
3136                                 {
3137                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3138                                         if $fail_backwards {
3139                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3140                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3141                                         } else {
3142                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3143                                         }
3144                                         added_monitors.clear();
3145                                 }
3146                         }
3147                 }
3148         }
3149
3150         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3151                 ($node: expr) => {
3152                         {
3153                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3154                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3155                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3156                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3157                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3158                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3159                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3160                         }
3161                 }
3162         }
3163
3164         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3165                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3166
3167                 let mut payment_event = {
3168                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3169                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3170
3171                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3172                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3173                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3174                 };
3175                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3176
3177                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3178                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3179
3180                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3181                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3182                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3183
3184                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3185                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3186                         match events_1[0] {
3187                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3188                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189                         };
3190
3191                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3192                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3193
3194                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3195                                 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3196                                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3197                                 match events_2[0] {
3198                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3199                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3200                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
3201                                         },
3202                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203                                 }
3204                         } else {
3205                                 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3206                                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3207                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
3208                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3209                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3210                         }
3211
3212                         prev_node = node;
3213                 }
3214
3215                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
3216         }
3217
3218         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3219                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
3220                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3221
3222                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3223                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
3224                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3225                                 {
3226                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3227                                         if $last_node {
3228                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
3229                                         } else {
3230                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3231                                         }
3232                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
3233                                 }
3234                         }
3235                 }
3236
3237                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3238                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3239                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3240                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3241                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3242                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
3243                         }
3244
3245                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3246                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3247                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3248                                 match events[0] {
3249                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3250                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3251                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3252                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3253                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3254                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3255                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3256                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3257                                         },
3258                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3259                                 }
3260                         } else {
3261                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3262                         }
3263                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3264                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3265                         }
3266
3267                         prev_node = node;
3268                 }
3269
3270                 if !skip_last {
3271                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3272                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3273                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3274                         match events[0] {
3275                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3276                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3277                                 },
3278                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3279                         }
3280                 }
3281         }
3282
3283         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3284                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3285         }
3286
3287         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3288
3289         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3290                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3291                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3292                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3293                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3294                 }
3295
3296                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3297         }
3298
3299         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3300                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3301                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3302                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3303                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3304                 }
3305
3306                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3307
3308                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3309                 match err {
3310                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3311                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3312                 };
3313         }
3314
3315         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3316                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3317                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3318         }
3319
3320         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3321                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
3322                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3323
3324                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3325                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3326                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3327                                 {
3328                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3329                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3330                                 }
3331                         }
3332                 }
3333
3334                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3335                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3336                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3337                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3338                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3339                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3340                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3341                                 // second-to-last node!
3342                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3343                         }
3344
3345                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3346                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3347                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3348                                 match events[0] {
3349                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3350                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3351                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3352                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3353                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3354                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3355                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3356                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3357                                         },
3358                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3359                                 }
3360                         } else {
3361                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3362                         }
3363                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3364                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3365                         }
3366
3367                         prev_node = node;
3368                 }
3369
3370                 if !skip_last {
3371                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3372
3373                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3374                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3375                         match events[0] {
3376                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
3377                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3378                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3379                                 },
3380                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3381                         }
3382                 }
3383         }
3384
3385         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3386                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3387         }
3388
3389         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3390                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3391                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3392                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3393                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3394
3395                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3396                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3397
3398                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3399                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3400                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3401                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3402                         let mut seed = [0; 32];
3403                         rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
3404                         let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3405                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3406                         let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
3407                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3408                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3409                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3410                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3411                         });
3412                 }
3413
3414                 nodes
3415         }
3416
3417         #[test]
3418         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3419                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3420                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3421                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3422
3423                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3424                         ($node: expr) => {{
3425                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3426                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3427                                 chan.get_feerate()
3428                         }}
3429                 }
3430
3431                 // balancing
3432                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3433
3434                 // A                                        B
3435                 // update_fee                            ->
3436                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3437                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3438                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3439                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3440                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3441                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3442                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3443                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3444                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3445                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3446                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3447                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3448                 //                                       <- RAA
3449                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3450
3451                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3452                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3453                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3454
3455                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3456                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3457                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3458                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3459                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3460                         },
3461                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3462                 };
3463
3464                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3465
3466                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3467                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3468                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3469                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470
3471                 let payment_event = {
3472                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3473                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3474                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3475                 };
3476                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3477                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3478
3479                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3480                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3481                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3482                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3483                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3484
3485                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3486                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3487                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3489
3490                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3491                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3492                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3493                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3494                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3495                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3496                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3497
3498                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3499                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3500                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3501                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3502                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3503                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3505
3506                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3507                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3509
3510                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3511                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3513
3514                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3515                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3516
3517                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3518                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3519                 match events_2[0] {
3520                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3521                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3522                 }
3523
3524                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3526         }
3527
3528         #[test]
3529         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3530                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3531                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3532                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3533                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3534                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3535
3536                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3537                         ($node: expr) => {{
3538                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3539                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3540                                 chan.get_feerate()
3541                         }}
3542                 }
3543
3544                 // balancing
3545                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3546
3547                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3548                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3550
3551                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3552                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3553                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3554                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3555                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3556                         },
3557                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3558                 };
3559
3560                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3561
3562                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3563                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3564                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3565                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3566
3567                 let payment_event = {
3568                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3569                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3570                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3571                 };
3572                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3573                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3574
3575                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3576                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3577                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3578                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3579                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3580
3581                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3582                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3583
3584                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3585         }
3586
3587         #[test]
3588         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3589                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3590                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3591                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3592
3593                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3594                         ($node: expr) => {{
3595                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3597                                 chan.get_feerate()
3598                         }}
3599                 }
3600
3601                 // A                                        B
3602                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3603                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3604                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3605                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3606                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3607                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3608                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3609                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3610                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3611                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3612                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3613                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3614                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3615                 //                                          B should send no response here
3616                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3617                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3618                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3619
3620                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3621                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3622                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3623                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3624
3625                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3626                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3627                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3628                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3629                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3630                         },
3631                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3632                 };
3633
3634                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3635                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3636                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3638
3639                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3640                 // transaction:
3641                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3642                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3643                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3644
3645                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3646                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3647                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3648                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3649                 };
3650
3651                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3652
3653                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3654                 // Deliver (3)
3655                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3656
3657                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3658                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3659                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3660                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3661                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3662                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3663                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3664                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3665                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3666                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3667
3668                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3669                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3670                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3671                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3672
3673                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3675
3676                 // Delever (4)
3677                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3678                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3679
3680                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3681                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3682
3683                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3684                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3685                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3686
3687                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3689         }
3690
3691         #[test]
3692         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3693                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3694                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3695                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3696
3697                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3698                         ($node: expr) => {{
3699                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3700                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3701                                 chan.get_feerate()
3702                         }}
3703                 }
3704
3705                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3706                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3707
3708                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3709                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3710                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3711                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3712                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3713                         },
3714                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3715                 };
3716                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3717
3718                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3719                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3720                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3722
3723                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3724                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3725                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3726
3727                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3728                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3729                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3730
3731                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3732                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3733                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3734         }
3735
3736         #[test]
3737         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3738                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3739                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3740                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3741
3742                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3743                         ($node: expr) => {{
3744                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3745                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3746                                 chan.get_feerate()
3747                         }}
3748                 }
3749
3750                 // balancing
3751                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3752
3753                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3754                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3755
3756                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3757                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3758                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3759                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3760                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3761                         },
3762                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3763                 };
3764                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3765                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3766                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3767                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3768                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3769
3770                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3771
3772                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3773
3774                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3775                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3776                 {
3777                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3778                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3779                         added_monitors.clear();
3780                 }
3781                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3782                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3784
3785                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3786                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3787                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3788
3789                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3790                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3791                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3792                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3793                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3794
3795                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3796                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3797                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3798                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3799                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3800                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3801
3802                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3803                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3804                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3805                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3806                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3807                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3808                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3809                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3810
3811                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3812                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3813                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3814                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3815                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3816                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3817
3818                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3819                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3820                 match events[0] {
3821                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3822                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3823                 };
3824                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3825                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3826
3827                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3828                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3829                 match events[0] {
3830                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3831                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3832                 };
3833
3834                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3835
3836                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3837                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3838                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3839         }
3840
3841         #[test]
3842         fn test_update_fee() {
3843                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3844                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3845                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3846
3847                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3848                         ($node: expr) => {{
3849                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3850                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3851                                 chan.get_feerate()
3852                         }}
3853                 }
3854
3855                 // A                                        B
3856                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3857                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3858                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3859                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3860                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3861                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3862                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3863                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3864                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3865                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3866                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3867                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3868
3869                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3870                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3871                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3872
3873                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3874                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3875                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3876                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3877                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3878                         },
3879                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3880                 };
3881                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3882
3883                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3884                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3885                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3886                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3887                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3888
3889                 // Deliver (2):
3890                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3891                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3892                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3893
3894                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3895                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3896                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3897                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3898                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3899                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3900                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3901                         },
3902                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3903                 };
3904                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3905
3906                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3907                 // ... creating (5)
3908                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3909                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3910                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3911
3912                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3913                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3914                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3915                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916
3917                 // Deliver (5):
3918                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3919                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3920                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3921
3922                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3923                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3924                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3925                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3926
3927                 // Deliver (7)
3928                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3929                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3930                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3931                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3932                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3933                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3934
3935                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3936                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3937                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3938         }
3939
3940         #[test]
3941         fn fake_network_test() {
3942                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3943                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3944                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3945
3946                 // Create some initial channels
3947                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3948                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3949                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3950
3951                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3952                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3953                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3954                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3955                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3956
3957                 // Send some more payments
3958                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3959                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3960                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3961
3962                 // Test failure packets
3963                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3964                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3965
3966                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3967                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3968
3969                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3970                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3971                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3972                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3973                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3974                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3975                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3976
3977                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3978                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3979                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3980                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3981                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3982                         fee_msat: 0,
3983                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3984                 });
3985                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3986                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3987                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3988                         fee_msat: 0,
3989                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3990                 });
3991                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3992                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3993                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3994                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3995                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3996                 });
3997                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3998                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3999                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
4000
4001                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
4002                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4003                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
4004                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4005                         fee_msat: 0,
4006                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4007                 });
4008                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4009                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
4010                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4011                         fee_msat: 0,
4012                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
4013                 });
4014                 hops.push(RouteHop {
4015                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
4016                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
4017                         fee_msat: 1000000,
4018                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
4019                 });
4020                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4021                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
4022                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
4023
4024                 // Claim the rebalances...
4025                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
4026                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4027
4028                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
4029                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4030
4031                 // Send some payments across both channels
4032                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4033                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4034                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4035
4036                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
4037
4038                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
4039
4040                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4041                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
4042                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
4043
4044                 // Close down the channels...
4045                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
4046                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
4047                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
4048                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
4049                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
4050         }
4051
4052         #[test]
4053         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
4054                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
4055                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
4056                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
4057
4058                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
4059                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
4060                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
4061                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4062                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4063                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4064
4065                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
4066
4067                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4068                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4069
4070                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
4071                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
4072
4073                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
4074                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
4075                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
4076         }
4077
4078         #[derive(PartialEq)]
4079         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
4080         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
4081         ///
4082         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
4083         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
4084         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
4085         ///
4086         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
4087         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
4088         ///
4089         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
4090         /// also fail.
4091         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4092                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4093                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
4094
4095                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
4096                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4097                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
4098                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
4099                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
4100                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4101                                 }
4102                                 false
4103                         } else { true }
4104                 });
4105                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
4106                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
4107                 }
4108
4109                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
4110
4111                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
4112                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4113                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
4114                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
4115                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
4116                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
4117                                         } else {
4118                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
4119                                         }
4120                                         res.push(tx.clone());
4121                                         false
4122                                 } else { true }
4123                         });
4124                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
4125                 }
4126
4127                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4128                 res
4129         }
4130
4131         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
4132         /// HTLC transaction.
4133         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
4134                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4135                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4136                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
4137                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
4138                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
4139                                 false
4140                         } else { true }
4141                 });
4142                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
4143         }
4144
4145         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
4146                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4147
4148                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
4149                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4150                 let mut found_prev = false;
4151
4152                 for tx in prev_txn {
4153                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
4154                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
4155                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
4156                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
4157
4158                                 found_prev = true;
4159                                 break;
4160                         }
4161                 }
4162                 assert!(found_prev);
4163
4164                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4165                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
4166                 res
4167         }
4168
4169         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
4170                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4171                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4172                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
4173                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4174                                 msg.clone()
4175                         },
4176                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4177                 };
4178
4179                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4180                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4181                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
4182                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
4183                                 msg.clone()
4184                         },
4185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4186                 };
4187
4188                 for node in nodes {
4189                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4190                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4191                 }
4192         }
4193
4194         macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
4195                 ($node: expr) => {{
4196                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4197                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4198                         match events[0] {
4199                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4200                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4201                         };
4202                         $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4203                         $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4204                 }}
4205         }
4206
4207         #[test]
4208         fn channel_reserve_test() {
4209                 use util::rng;
4210                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
4211                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
4212
4213                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
4214                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
4215                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4216                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
4217                                 chan.get_value_stat()
4218                         }}
4219                 }
4220
4221                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4222                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
4223                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
4224
4225                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4226                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4227
4228                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
4229                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4230
4231                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
4232                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
4233                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4234                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4235                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
4236                         }}
4237                 };
4238
4239                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
4240                         ($node: expr) => {{
4241                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4242                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4243                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4244                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
4245                                 payment_event
4246                         }}
4247                 }
4248
4249                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
4250                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
4251                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4252                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4253                                 match events[0] {
4254                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4255                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4256                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
4257                                         },
4258                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4259                                 }
4260                         }
4261                 };
4262
4263                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4264                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4265
4266                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4267
4268                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4269                 {
4270                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4271                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4272                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4273                         match err {
4274                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4275                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4276                         }
4277                 }
4278
4279                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4280                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4281                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4282                 loop {
4283                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4284                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4285                                 break;
4286                         }
4287                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4288                         htlc_id += 1;
4289
4290                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4291                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4292                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4293                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4294                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4295                         );
4296
4297                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4298                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4299                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4300                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4301                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4302                 }
4303
4304                 {
4305                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4306                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4307                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4308                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4309                         match err {
4310                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4311                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4312                         }
4313                 }
4314
4315                 // adding pending output
4316                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4317                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4318
4319                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4320                 let payment_event_1 = {
4321                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4322                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4323
4324                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4325                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4326                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4327                 };
4328                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4329
4330                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4331                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4332                 {
4333                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4334                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4335                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4336                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4337                         }
4338                 }
4339
4340                 {
4341                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4342                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4343
4344                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4345                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4346                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4347                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4348                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4349                                 session_key
4350                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4351
4352                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4353                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4354                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4355                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4356                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4357                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4358                                 htlc_id,
4359                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4360                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4361                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4362                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4363                         };
4364
4365                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4366                         match err {
4367                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4368                         }
4369                 }
4370
4371                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4372                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4373                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4374                 {
4375                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4376                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4377                 }
4378
4379                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4380                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4381                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4382                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4383                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4384                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4385                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4386
4387                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4388                 {
4389                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4390                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4391                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4392                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4393                         }
4394                 }
4395
4396                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4397                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4398                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4399                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4400                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4401                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4402
4403                 // flush the pending htlc
4404                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4406
4407                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4409                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4410                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4411                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4412                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4414
4415                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4416
4417                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4418                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4419                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4420
4421                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4422                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4423
4424                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4425                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4426                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4427                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4428                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4429                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4430
4431                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4432                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4433                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4434                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4435
4436                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4437                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4438
4439                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4440                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4441                 match events[0] {
4442                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4443                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4444                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4445                         },
4446                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4447                 }
4448                 match events[1] {
4449                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4450                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4451                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4452                         },
4453                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4454                 }
4455
4456                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4457                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4458                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4459
4460                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4461                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4462                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4463                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4464
4465                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4466                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4467         }
4468
4469         #[test]
4470         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4471                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4472                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4473                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4474
4475                 // Create some initial channels
4476                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4477                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4478                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4479                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4480
4481                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4482                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4483                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4484                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4485                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4486
4487                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4488                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4489                 {
4490                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4491                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4492                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4493                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4494                 }
4495                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4496                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4497                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4498
4499                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4500                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4501
4502                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4503                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4504                 {
4505                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4506                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4507                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4508                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4509                 }
4510                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4511                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4512                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4513
4514                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4515                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4516                                 {
4517                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4518                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4519
4520                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4521                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4522                                         match events[0] {
4523                                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4524                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4525                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4526                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4527                                                 },
4528                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4529                                         };
4530                                 }
4531                         }
4532                 }
4533
4534                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4535                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4536                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4537                 {
4538                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4539
4540                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4541                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4542
4543                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4544                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4545
4546                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4547                 }
4548                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4549                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4550                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4551
4552                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4553                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4554                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4555                 }
4556
4557                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4558                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4559                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4560                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4561                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4562                 // buffer space).
4563
4564                 {
4565                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4566                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4567                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4568                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4569                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4570                         }
4571
4572                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4573
4574                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4575                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4576
4577                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4578                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4579                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4580                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4581                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4582                         }
4583
4584                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4585
4586                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4587                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4588
4589                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4590                 }
4591                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4592                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4593                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4594
4595                 // Create some new channels:
4596                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4597
4598                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4599                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4600                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4601                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4602                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4603                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4604                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4605                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4606                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4607                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4608                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4609                 // Revoke the old state
4610                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4611
4612                 {
4613                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4614                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4615                         {
4616                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4617                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4618                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4619                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4620
4621                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4622                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4623                         }
4624                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4625
4626                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4627                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4628                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4629                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4630                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4631                 }
4632                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4633                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4634                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4635         }
4636
4637         #[test]
4638         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4639                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4640                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4641                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4642                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4643                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4644                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4645                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4646                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4647                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4648                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4649                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4650
4651                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4652                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4653                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4654                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4655                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4656
4657                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4658
4659                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4660                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4661
4662                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4663                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4664                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4665         }
4666
4667         #[test]
4668         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4669                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4670                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4671
4672                 // Create some new channel:
4673                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4674
4675                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4676                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4677                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4678                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4679                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4680
4681                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4682                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4683                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4684                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4685                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4686                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4687                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4688                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4689                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4690
4691                 //Revoke the old state
4692                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4693
4694                 {
4695                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4696
4697                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4698
4699                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4700                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4701                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4702
4703                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4704                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4705
4706                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4707
4708                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4709                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4710                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4711                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4712                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4713                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4714                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4715                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4716
4717                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4718                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4719                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4720
4721                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4722                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4723                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4724                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4725                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4726                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4727                 }
4728                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4729                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4730                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4731         }
4732
4733         #[test]
4734         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4735                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4736                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4737
4738                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4739
4740                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4741                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4742                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4743                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4744                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4745                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4746
4747                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4748                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4749
4750                 //Revoke the old state
4751                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4752
4753                 {
4754                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4755
4756                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4757
4758                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4759                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4760                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4761
4762                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4763                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4764                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4765                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4766                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4768                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4769
4770                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4771                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4773
4774                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4775                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4776                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4777                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4778                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4779
4780                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4781                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4782                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4783                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4784                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4785                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4786                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4787                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4788
4789                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4790                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4791
4792                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4793                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4794                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4795                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4796                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4797                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4798                 }
4799                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4800                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4801                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4802         }
4803
4804         #[test]
4805         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4806                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4807                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4808                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4809                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4810
4811                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4812                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4813                 {
4814                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4815                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4816                         match events[0] {
4817                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4818                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4819                                 },
4820                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4821                         }
4822                 }
4823
4824                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4825                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4826
4827                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4828                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4829
4830                 {
4831                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4832                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4833                         match events[0] {
4834                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4835                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4836                                 },
4837                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4838                         }
4839                 }
4840
4841                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4842                 // registering new transactions
4843                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4844         }
4845
4846         #[test]
4847         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4848                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4849                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4850                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4851                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4852
4853                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4854
4855                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4856
4857                 let mut payment_event = {
4858                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4859                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4860
4861                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4862                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4863                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4864                 };
4865
4866                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4867                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4868
4869                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4870                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4871                 match events_1[0] {
4872                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4873                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4874                 };
4875
4876                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4877                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4878
4879                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4880                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4881                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4882                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4883
4884                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4885                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4886                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4887                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4888
4889                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4890                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4891                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4892
4893                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4894                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4895                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4896                 match events_3[0] {
4897                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4898                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4899                         },
4900                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4901                 }
4902
4903                 let tx = {
4904                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4905                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4906                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4907                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4908                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4909                         node_txn.remove(0)
4910                 };
4911
4912                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4913                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4914
4915                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4916                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4917                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4918                 match events_4[0] {
4919                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4920                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4921                         },
4922                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4923                 }
4924
4925                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4926                 {
4927                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4928                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4929                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4930                 }
4931                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4932                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4933                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4934                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4935                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4936                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4938
4939                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4940         }
4941
4942         #[test]
4943         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4944                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4945                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4946                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4947
4948                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4949                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4950                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4951                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4952
4953                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4954                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4955                 headers.push(header.clone());
4956                 for _i in 2..100 {
4957                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4958                         headers.push(header.clone());
4959                 }
4960                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4961                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4962                 }
4963                 {
4964                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4965                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4966                         match events[0] {
4967                                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4968                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4969                                 },
4970                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4971                         }
4972                 }
4973                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4974                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4975                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4976         }
4977
4978         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4979         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4980         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4981                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4982                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4983
4984                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4985                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4986                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4987                 }
4988                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4989                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4990                 } else {
4991                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4992                 }
4993
4994                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4995                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4996                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4997                 }
4998                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4999                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5000                 } else {
5001                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
5002                 }
5003
5004                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
5005                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
5006                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
5007
5008                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
5009                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5010                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
5011                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
5012                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5013                         } else {
5014                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5015                         }
5016                         if pending_raa.0 {
5017                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5018                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5019                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5020                         } else {
5021                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5022                         }
5023                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
5024                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5025                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5026                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
5027                                 } else {
5028                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5029                                 }
5030                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5031                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5032                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5033                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5034                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5035                                 }
5036                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5037                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5038                                 }
5039                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5040                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5041                                 }
5042
5043                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5044                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5045                                 } else {
5046                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5047                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5048                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5049                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5050                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5051                                 }
5052                         } else {
5053                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5054                         }
5055                 }
5056
5057                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
5058                         if pre_all_htlcs {
5059                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
5060                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
5061                         } else {
5062                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
5063                         }
5064                         if pending_raa.1 {
5065                                 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5066                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
5067                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5068                         } else {
5069                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
5070                         }
5071                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
5072                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
5073                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5074                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
5075                                 }
5076                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
5077                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
5078                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5079                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
5080                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
5081                                 }
5082                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
5083                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
5084                                 }
5085                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
5086                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
5087                                 }
5088
5089                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
5090                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
5091                                 } else {
5092                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5093                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
5094                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5095                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5096                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
5097                                 }
5098                         } else {
5099                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
5100                         }
5101                 }
5102         }
5103
5104         #[test]
5105         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
5106                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
5107                 let nodes = create_network(3);
5108                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5109                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5110
5111                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5112                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5113                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5114
5115                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5116                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5117                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
5118                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
5119
5120                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5121                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5122                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5123
5124                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5125                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
5126                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5127                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
5128
5129                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5130                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5131
5132                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
5133                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
5134
5135                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
5136                 {
5137                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5138                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5139                         match events[0] {
5140                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
5141                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
5142                                 },
5143                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144                         }
5145                         match events[1] {
5146                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
5147                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
5148                                         assert!(rejected_by_dest);
5149                                 },
5150                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5151                         }
5152                 }
5153
5154                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
5155                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
5156         }
5157
5158         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
5159                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
5160                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5161                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
5162                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5163                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
5164                 } else {
5165                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5166                 }
5167
5168                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5169                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5170
5171                 let payment_event = {
5172                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5173                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5174
5175                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5176                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5177                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5178                 };
5179                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
5180
5181                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5182                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
5183                 } else {
5184                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5185                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5186                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5187
5188                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5189                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5190                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5191
5192                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5193                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5194                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5195                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5196
5197                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5198                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5199                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5200                                         }
5201                                 }
5202                         }
5203                 }
5204
5205                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5206                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5207                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5208                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
5209                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
5210                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5211                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5212                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5213                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5214                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5215                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5216                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5217                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5218                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5219                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5220                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5221                         // Everything was delivered...
5222                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5223                 }
5224
5225                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5226                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5227                 match events_1[0] {
5228                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5229                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230                 };
5231
5232                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5233                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5234                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5235
5236                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5237                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5238
5239                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5240                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5241                 match events_2[0] {
5242                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5243                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5244                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5245                         },
5246                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5247                 }
5248
5249                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5251
5252                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5253                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5254                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
5255                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5256                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5257                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5258                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5259                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5260                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5261                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5262                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5263                         },
5264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5265                 };
5266
5267                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5268                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5269
5270                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5271                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5272                         match events_4[0] {
5273                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5274                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5275                                 },
5276                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5277                         }
5278
5279                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5280                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5281                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5282
5283                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5284                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5285                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5286
5287                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5288                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5289                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5290                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5291
5292                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5293                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5294                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5295                                                 }
5296                                         }
5297                                 }
5298                         }
5299                 }
5300
5301                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5302                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5303                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5304                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5305                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5306                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5307                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5308                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5309                                 match events_4[0] {
5310                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5311                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5312                                         },
5313                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5314                                 }
5315                         //}
5316                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5317                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5318                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5319                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5320                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5321                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5322                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5323                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5324                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5325                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5326                         // Everything was delivered...
5327                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5328                 }
5329
5330                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5331                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5332                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5333
5334                 // Channel should still work fine...
5335                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5336                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5337         }
5338
5339         #[test]
5340         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5341                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5342                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5343                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5344         }
5345
5346         #[test]
5347         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5348                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5349                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5350                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5351         }
5352
5353         #[test]
5354         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5355                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5356                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5357                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5358
5359                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5360                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5361
5362                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5363                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5364                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5365                 match events_1[0] {
5366                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5367                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5368                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5369                         },
5370                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5371                 }
5372
5373                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5374                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5375                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5376                 match events_2[0] {
5377                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5378                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5379                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5380                         },
5381                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5382                 }
5383
5384                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5385                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5386                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5387                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5388
5389                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5390                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5391
5392                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5393                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5394                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5395         }
5396
5397         #[test]
5398         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
5399                 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
5400                 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
5401                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5402                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5403
5404                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5405
5406                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5407                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5408                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5409
5410                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
5411                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5412
5413                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5414                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5415                 match events_1[0] {
5416                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5417                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5418                 }
5419
5420                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5421                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5422
5423                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5424                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5425                 match events_2[0] {
5426                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5427                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5428                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5429                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5430                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5431                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5432                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5433
5434                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5435                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5436                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5437                                 match events_3[0] {
5438                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5439                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5440                                         },
5441                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442                                 }
5443
5444                                 let (_, commitment_update) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
5445                                 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
5446                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5447                         },
5448                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5449                 }
5450
5451                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5452                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5453
5454                 let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5455                 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5456                 let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5457                 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5458
5459                 let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5460                 let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5461
5462                 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5463                 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5464
5465                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5466                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5467
5468                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5469
5470                 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5471                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5472                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5473                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5474                 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5475                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5476                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5477                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5479
5480                 let bs_second_commitment_signed = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap().unwrap();
5481                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5482                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5483                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5484                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5485                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5487
5488                 let as_commitment_signed = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5489                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5490                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5491                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5492                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5493                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
5494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5495
5496                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5497                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
5498                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5499
5500                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5501                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5502                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5503
5504                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5505                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5506
5507                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5508                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5509                 match events_4[0] {
5510                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5512                 };
5513
5514                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5515                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5516
5517                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5518                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5519                 match events_5[0] {
5520                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
5521                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5522                         },
5523                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5524                 }
5525
5526                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5528
5529                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5530         }
5531
5532         #[test]
5533         fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
5534                 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
5535                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5536                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5537
5538                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5539                 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5540
5541                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5542                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5544
5545                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5546                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5547                 match events_1[0] {
5548                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5549                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5550                 };
5551
5552                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5553                 // PaymentFailed event
5554
5555                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5556         }
5557
5558         fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
5559                 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
5560                 // a disconnect in between
5561                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5562                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5563
5564                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5565                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5566
5567                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5568                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
5569                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5570
5571                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5572                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5573                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5574
5575                 if disconnect {
5576                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5577                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5578                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5579                 }
5580
5581                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5582                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5584
5585                 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5586                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5587                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
5588                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5589                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5590                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5591
5592                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5593
5594                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5595                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5596                 match events_3[0] {
5597                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5598                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
5599                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5600                         },
5601                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5602                 }
5603
5604                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
5605
5606                 // Now set it to failed again...
5607                 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5608                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5609                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5610                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5611
5612                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5613                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5614                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5615
5616                 if disconnect {
5617                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5618                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5619                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5620                 }
5621
5622                 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
5623                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
5624                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5625                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5626
5627                 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5628                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5629                 match events_5[0] {
5630                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5631                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5632                 }
5633
5634                 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
5635                 // PaymentFailed event
5636
5637                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5638         }
5639
5640         #[test]
5641         fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
5642                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
5643                 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
5644         }
5645
5646         fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
5647                 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
5648
5649                 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
5650                 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
5651                 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
5652                 //   route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
5653                 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
5654                 //   TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
5655                 //   the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
5656                 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
5657                 //   immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
5658                 //   channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
5659                 //   disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
5660                 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
5661                 //   through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
5662                 //   disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
5663                 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
5664                 //   through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
5665                 //   disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
5666                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
5667                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5668
5669                 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5670
5671                 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
5672                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5673                 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5674
5675                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
5676                 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
5677                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5678
5679                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5680                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5681                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5682
5683                 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
5684                 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
5685                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
5686                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5688                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5689                 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
5690                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
5691                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5692                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5693                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5694                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5695                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5696                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
5697
5698                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5699                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5700                                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5701                                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5702                                         match events_3[0] {
5703                                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5704                                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5705                                                 },
5706                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5707                                         }
5708
5709                                         if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
5710                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
5711                                         } else { panic!(); }
5712                                 }
5713
5714                                 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
5715                         },
5716                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5717                 };
5718
5719                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5720                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5721                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5722                 }
5723
5724                 // Now fix monitor updating...
5725                 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
5726                 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
5727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5728
5729                 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
5730                         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5731                         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5732
5733                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5734                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5735                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5736                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5737
5738                         let as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5739                         let bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5740
5741                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5742                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5743
5744                         (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
5745                 } } }
5746
5747                 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
5748                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5749                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5750
5751                         let reestablish_1 = nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5752                         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
5753                         let reestablish_2 = nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5754                         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
5755
5756                         let mut as_resp = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
5757                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5758                         let mut bs_resp = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
5759                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5760
5761                         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
5762                         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
5763
5764                         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5765                         if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5766                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5767
5768                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
5769                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
5770                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
5771                         } else {
5772                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5773                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5774                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5775                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
5776                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
5777                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
5778
5779                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5780
5781                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5782                                 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5783                                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
5784                                 match events_3[0] {
5785                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5786                                                 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
5787                                         },
5788                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5789                                 }
5790
5791                                 let (as_resp_raa, as_resp_cu) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
5792                                 assert!(as_resp_cu.is_none());
5793                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5794
5795                                 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
5796                                 bs_resp.2 = None;
5797                         }
5798
5799                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
5800                                 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5801
5802                                 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
5803                                         assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
5804                                         assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
5805                                 }
5806                                 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
5807                                 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
5808                         }
5809
5810                         (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
5811                 } else {
5812                         let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5813                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
5814                         (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
5815                                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5816                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5817                                         msg.clone()
5818                                 },
5819                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5820                         })
5821                 };
5822
5823                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5824
5825                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5826                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5827                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still
5828                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5829
5830                 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
5831                         let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5832
5833                         assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5834                         assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5835
5836                         assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5837                         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5838                 }
5839
5840                 let as_commitment_update;
5841                 let bs_second_commitment_update;
5842
5843                 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
5844                         as_commitment_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5845                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5846                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5847                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5848                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5849                         assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5850                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5851                 } }
5852
5853                 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
5854                         bs_second_commitment_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
5855                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5856                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5857                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5858                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5859                         assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
5860                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5861                 } }
5862
5863                 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
5864                         handle_bs_raa!();
5865
5866                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5867                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5868
5869                                 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
5870                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5871
5872                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5873                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
5874
5875                                 assert!(as_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5876                         }
5877
5878                         handle_initial_raa!();
5879
5880                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5881                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5882
5883                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5884                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5885
5886                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5887                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5888                         }
5889                 } else {
5890                         handle_initial_raa!();
5891
5892                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
5893                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5894
5895                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5896                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
5897
5898                                 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
5899                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5900
5901                                 assert!(bs_resp.3 == msgs::RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
5902                         }
5903
5904                         handle_bs_raa!();
5905
5906                         if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
5907                                 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
5908
5909                                 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
5910                                 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
5911
5912                                 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
5913                                 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
5914                         }
5915                 }
5916
5917                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5918                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
5919                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5920
5921                 let (bs_second_revoke_and_ack, bs_third_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
5922                 assert!(bs_third_commitment_signed.is_none());
5923                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5924
5925                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5926                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5927
5928                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5929                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5930
5931                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5932
5933                 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5934                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
5935                 match events_5[0] {
5936                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5937                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
5938                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
5939                         },
5940                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5941                 }
5942
5943                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5944         }
5945
5946         #[test]
5947         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
5948                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
5949                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
5950                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
5951                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
5952                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
5953                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
5954         }
5955
5956         #[test]
5957         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
5958                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
5959                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
5960                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
5961                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
5962         }
5963
5964         #[test]
5965         fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
5966                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
5967                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
5968                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
5969                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
5970                 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
5971         }
5972
5973         #[test]
5974         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5975                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5976                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5977                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5978
5979                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5980
5981                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5982                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5983                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5984                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5985
5986                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5987
5988                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5989                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5990
5991                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5992                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5993
5994                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5995
5996                 let mut chan_announcement;
5997
5998                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5999                         () => {
6000                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6001                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
6002                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
6003                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
6004                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
6005                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
6006                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
6007                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
6008                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
6009                                 };
6010                         }
6011                 }
6012
6013                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
6014                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
6015                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
6016                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6017                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
6018                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
6019                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
6020                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6021                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
6022                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
6023                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
6024                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
6025                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
6026                                 }
6027                         }
6028                 }
6029
6030                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6031                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6032                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
6033                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
6034
6035                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
6036                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6037                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
6038                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6039                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6040
6041                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
6042                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
6043                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
6044                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
6045         }
6046 }