_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
  30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  34 use util::logger::Logger;
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36
  37 use crypto;
  38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  42
  43 use std::{ptr, mem};
  44 use std::collections::HashMap;
  45 use std::collections::hash_map;
  46 use std::io::Cursor;
  47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  50
  51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  52 ///
  53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  56 ///
  57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  63 mod channel_held_info {
  64         use ln::msgs;
  65         use ln::router::Route;
  66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  68
  69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  84         }
  85
  86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  91         }
  92
  93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  94         #[derive(Clone)]
  95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  99         }
 100
 101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 102         #[derive(Clone)]
 103         pub enum HTLCSource {
 104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 105                 OutboundRoute {
 106                         route: Route,
 107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 108                 },
 109         }
 110         #[cfg(test)]
 111         impl HTLCSource {
 112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 116                         }
 117                 }
 118         }
 119
 120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 122                 ErrorPacket {
 123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 124                 },
 125                 Reason {
 126                         failure_code: u16,
 127                         data: Vec<u8>,
 128                 }
 129         }
 130 }
 131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 132
 133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 134         err: msgs::HandleError,
 135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 136 }
 137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 138         #[inline]
 139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 140                 Self {
 141                         err: HandleError {
 142                                 err,
 143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 145                                                 channel_id,
 146                                                 data: err.to_string()
 147                                         },
 148                                 }),
 149                         },
 150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 151                 }
 152         }
 153         #[inline]
 154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 155                 Self {
 156                         err: HandleError {
 157                                 err,
 158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 160                                                 channel_id,
 161                                                 data: err.to_string()
 162                                         },
 163                                 }),
 164                         },
 165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 166                 }
 167         }
 168         #[inline]
 169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 175         }
 176 }
 177
 178 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 179 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 180 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 181 /// probably increase this significantly.
 182 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 183
 184 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 185         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 186         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 187         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 188 }
 189
 190 struct ChannelHolder {
 191         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 192         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 193         next_forward: Instant,
 194         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 195         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 196         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 197         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 198         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 199         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 200         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 201         /// go to read them!
 202         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 203 }
 204 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 205         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 206         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 207         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 208         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 209         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 210 }
 211 impl ChannelHolder {
 212         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 213                 MutChannelHolder {
 214                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 215                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 216                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 217                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 218                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 219                 }
 220         }
 221 }
 222
 223 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 224 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 225
 226 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 227 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 228 ///
 229 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 230 /// to individual Channels.
 231 pub struct ChannelManager {
 232         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 233         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 234         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 235         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 236         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 237
 238         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 239         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 240         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 241         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 242
 243         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 244         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 245
 246         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 247
 248         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 249 }
 250
 251 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 252
 253 macro_rules! secp_call {
 254         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 255                 match $res {
 256                         Ok(key) => key,
 257                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 258                 }
 259         };
 260 }
 261
 262 struct OnionKeys {
 263         #[cfg(test)]
 264         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 265         #[cfg(test)]
 266         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 267         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 268         rho: [u8; 32],
 269         mu: [u8; 32],
 270 }
 271
 272 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 273 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 274         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 275         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 276         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 277         /// lifetime of the channel.
 278         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 279         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 280         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 281         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 282         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 283         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 284         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 285         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 286         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 287         pub user_id: u64,
 288 }
 289
 290 impl ChannelManager {
 291         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 292         ///
 293         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 294         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 295         ///
 296         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 297         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 298         ///
 299         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 300         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 301                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 302
 303                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 304                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 305                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 306                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 307                         chain_monitor,
 308                         tx_broadcaster,
 309
 310                         announce_channels_publicly,
 311                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 312                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 313                         secp_ctx,
 314
 315                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 316                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 317                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 318                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 319                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 320                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 321                         }),
 322                         our_network_key,
 323
 324                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 325
 326                         logger,
 327                 });
 328                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 329                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 330                 Ok(res)
 331         }
 332
 333         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 334         ///
 335         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 336         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 337         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 338         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 339         ///
 340         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 341         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 342         ///
 343         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 344         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 345                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 346                         ChannelKeys {
 347                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 348                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 349                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 350                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 351                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 352                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 353                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 354                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 355                         }
 356                 } else {
 357                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 358                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 359                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 360                                 Ok(key) => key,
 361                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 362                         }
 363                 };
 364
 365                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 366                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 367                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 368                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 369                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 370                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 371                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 372                                 } else {
 373                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 374                                 }
 375                         },
 376                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 377                 }
 378
 379                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 380                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 381                         node_id: their_network_key,
 382                         msg: res,
 383                 });
 384                 Ok(())
 385         }
 386
 387         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 388         /// more information.
 389         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 390                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 391                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 392                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 393                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 394                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 395                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 396                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 397                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 398                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 399                         });
 400                 }
 401                 res
 402         }
 403
 404         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 405         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 406         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 407                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 408                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 409                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 410                         if channel.is_usable() {
 411                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 412                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 413                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 414                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 415                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 416                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 417                                 });
 418                         }
 419                 }
 420                 res
 421         }
 422
 423         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 424         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 425         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 426         ///
 427         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 428         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 429                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 430                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 431                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 432                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 433                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 434                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 435                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 436                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 437                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 438                                                 }
 439                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 440                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 441                                 },
 442                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 443                         }
 444                 };
 445                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 446                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 447                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 448                 }
 449                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 450                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 451                                 Some(update)
 452                         } else { None }
 453                 } else { None };
 454
 455                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 456                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 457                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 458                                 msg: update
 459                         });
 460                 }
 461                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 462                         node_id,
 463                         msg: res.0
 464                 });
 465
 466                 Ok(())
 467         }
 468
 469         #[inline]
 470         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 471                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 472                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 473                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 474                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 475                 }
 476                 for tx in local_txn {
 477                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 478                 }
 479                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 480                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 481                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 482                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 483                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 484                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 485                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 486         }
 487
 488         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 489         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 490         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 491                 let mut chan = {
 492                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 493                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 494                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 495                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 496                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 497                                 }
 498                                 chan
 499                         } else {
 500                                 return;
 501                         }
 502                 };
 503                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 504                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 505                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 506                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 507                                 msg: update
 508                         });
 509                 }
 510         }
 511
 512         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 513         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 514         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 515                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 516                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 517                 }
 518         }
 519
 520         #[inline]
 521         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 522                 ({
 523                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 524                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 525                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 526                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 527                         res
 528                 },
 529                 {
 530                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 531                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 532                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 533                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 534                         res
 535                 })
 536         }
 537
 538         #[inline]
 539         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 540                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 541                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 542                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 543                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 544                 res
 545         }
 546
 547         #[inline]
 548         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 549                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 550                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 551                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 552                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 553                 res
 554         }
 555
 556         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 557         #[inline]
 558         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 559                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 560                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 561
 562                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 563                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 564
 565                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 566                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 567                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 568                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 569                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 570
 571                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 572
 573                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 574                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 575
 576                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 577                 }
 578
 579                 Ok(())
 580         }
 581
 582         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 583         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 584                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 585
 586                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 587                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 588
 589                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 590                                 #[cfg(test)]
 591                                 shared_secret,
 592                                 #[cfg(test)]
 593                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 594                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 595                                 rho,
 596                                 mu,
 597                         });
 598                 })?;
 599
 600                 Ok(res)
 601         }
 602
 603         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 604         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 605                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 606                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 607                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 608                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 609                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 610                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 611
 612                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 613                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 614                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 615                         // the intended recipient).
 616                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 617                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 618                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 619                                 realm: 0,
 620                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 621                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 622                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 623                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 624                                 },
 625                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 626                         };
 627                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 628                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 629                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 630                         }
 631                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 632                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 633                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 634                         }
 635                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 636                 }
 637                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 638         }
 639
 640         #[inline]
 641         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 642                 unsafe {
 643                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 644                 }
 645                 for i in 0..65 {
 646                         arr[i] = 0;
 647                 }
 648         }
 649
 650         #[inline]
 651         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 652                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 653
 654                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 655                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 656                 }
 657         }
 658
 659         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 660         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 661                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 662                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 663
 664                 let filler = {
 665                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 666                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 667                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 668                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 669
 670                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 671                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 672                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 673                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 674                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 675                         }
 676                         res
 677                 };
 678
 679                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 680                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 681
 682                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 683                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 684                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 685                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 686
 687                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 688                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 689                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 690
 691                         if i == 0 {
 692                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 693                         }
 694
 695                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 696                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 697                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 698                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 699                 }
 700
 701                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 702                         version: 0,
 703                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 704                         hop_data: packet_data,
 705                         hmac: hmac_res,
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 710         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 711         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 712                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 713
 714                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 715                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 716                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 717                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 718                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 719                         data: packet_crypted,
 720                 }
 721         }
 722
 723         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 724                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 725
 726                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 727
 728                 let failuremsg = {
 729                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 730                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 731                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 732                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 733                         res
 734                 };
 735                 let pad = {
 736                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 737                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 738                         res
 739                 };
 740                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 741                         hmac: [0; 32],
 742                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 743                         pad: pad,
 744                 };
 745
 746                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 747                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 748                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 749
 750                 packet
 751         }
 752
 753         #[inline]
 754         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 755                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 756                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 757         }
 758
 759         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 760                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 761                         () => {
 762                                 {
 763                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 764                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 765                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 766                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 767                                         onion_hash
 768                                 }
 769                         }
 770                 }
 771
 772                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 773                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 774                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 775                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 776                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 777                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 778                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 779                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 780                 }
 781
 782                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 783                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 784
 785                 let mut channel_state = None;
 786                 macro_rules! return_err {
 787                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 788                                 {
 789                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 790                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 791                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 792                                         }
 793                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 794                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 795                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 796                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 797                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 798                                 }
 799                         }
 800                 }
 801
 802                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 803                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 804                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 805                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 806                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 807                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 808                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 809                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 810                 }
 811
 812                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 813                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 814                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 815                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 816                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 817                 }
 818
 819                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 820                 let next_hop_data = {
 821                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 822                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 823                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 824                                 Err(err) => {
 825                                         let error_code = match err {
 826                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 827                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 828                                         };
 829                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 830                                 },
 831                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 832                         }
 833                 };
 834
 835                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 836
 837                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 838                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 839                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 840                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 841                                 }
 842                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 843                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 844                                 }
 845
 846                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 847                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 848                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 849                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 850
 851                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 852                                         onion_packet: None,
 853                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 854                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 855                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 856                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 857                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 858                                 })
 859                         } else {
 860                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 861                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 862                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 863
 864                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 865
 866                                 let blinding_factor = {
 867                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 868                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 869                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 870                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 871                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 872                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 873                                                 Err(_) => {
 874                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 875                                                 },
 876                                                 Ok(key) => key
 877                                         }
 878                                 };
 879
 880                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 881                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 882                                 }
 883
 884                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 885                                         version: 0,
 886                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 887                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 888                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 889                                 };
 890
 891                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 892                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 893                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 894                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 895                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 896                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 897                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 898                                 })
 899                         };
 900
 901                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 902                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 903                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 904                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 905                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 906                                         None => {
 907                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 908                                         },
 909                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 910                                 };
 911                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 912                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 913                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 914                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 915                                         } else {
 916                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 917                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 918                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 919                                                 } else {
 920                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 921                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 922                                                         } else {
 923                                                                 None
 924                                                         }
 925                                                 }
 926                                         }
 927                                 } {
 928                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 929                                 }
 930                         }
 931                 }
 932
 933                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 934         }
 935
 936         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 937         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 938                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 939                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 940                         Some(id) => id,
 941                 };
 942
 943                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 944
 945                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 946                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 947                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 948                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 949                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 950                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 951                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 952                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 953                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 954                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 955                 };
 956
 957                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
 958                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
 959
 960                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
 961                         signature: sig,
 962                         contents: unsigned
 963                 })
 964         }
 965
 966         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
 967         ///
 968         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
 969         /// fields for more info.
 970         ///
 971         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
 972         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
 973         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
 974         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
 975         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
 976         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
 977         ///
 978         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
 979         ///
 980         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
 981         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
 982         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 983                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
 984                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
 985                 }
 986                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
 987                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
 988                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
 989                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
 990                         }
 991                 }
 992
 993                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
 994                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
 995                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
 996                         session_key
 997                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
 998
 999                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1000
1001                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1002                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1003                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1004                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1005
1006                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1007                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1008                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1009
1010                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1011                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1012                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1013                         };
1014
1015                         let res = {
1016                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1017                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1018                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1019                                 }
1020                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1021                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1022                                 }
1023                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1024                                         route: route.clone(),
1025                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1026                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1027                         };
1028
1029                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1030
1031                         match res {
1032                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1033                                 None => return Ok(()),
1034                         }
1035                 };
1036
1037                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1038                         unimplemented!();
1039                 }
1040
1041                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1042                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1043                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1044                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1045                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1046                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1048                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1049                                 update_fee: None,
1050                                 commitment_signed,
1051                         },
1052                 });
1053                 Ok(())
1054         }
1055
1056         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1057         ///
1058         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1059         ///
1060         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1061         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1062         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1063
1064                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1065                         ($event: expr) => {
1066                                 {
1067                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1068                                         pending_events.push($event);
1069                                 }
1070                         }
1071                 }
1072
1073                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1074                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1075                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1076                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1077                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1078                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1079                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1080                                                 },
1081                                                 Err(e) => {
1082                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1083                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1084                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1085                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1086                                                                 action: e.action,
1087                                                         });
1088                                                         return;
1089                                                 },
1090                                         }
1091                                 },
1092                                 None => return
1093                         }
1094                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1095                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1096                         unimplemented!();
1097                 }
1098                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1099                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1100                         msg: msg,
1101                 });
1102
1103                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1104                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1105                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1106                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1107                         },
1108                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1109                                 e.insert(chan);
1110                         }
1111                 }
1112         }
1113
1114         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1115                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1116
1117                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1118                         Ok(res) => res,
1119                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1120                 };
1121                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1122                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1123
1124                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1125                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1126                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1127                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1128                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1129                 })
1130         }
1131
1132         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1133         ///
1134         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1135         /// Will likely generate further events.
1136         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1137                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1138                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1139                 {
1140                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1141                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1142
1143                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1144                                 return;
1145                         }
1146
1147                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1148                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1149                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1150                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1151                                                 None => {
1152                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1153                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1154                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1155                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1156                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1157                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1158                                                                 });
1159                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1160                                                         }
1161                                                         continue;
1162                                                 }
1163                                         };
1164                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1165
1166                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1167                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1168                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1169                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1170                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1171                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1172                                                 });
1173                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1174                                                         Err(_e) => {
1175                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1176                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1177                                                                 continue;
1178                                                         },
1179                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1180                                                                 match update_add {
1181                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1182                                                                         None => {
1183                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1184                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1185                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1186                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1187                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1188                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1189                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1190                                                                         }
1191                                                                 }
1192                                                         }
1193                                                 }
1194                                         }
1195
1196                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1197                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1198                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1199                                                         Err(e) => {
1200                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1201                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1202                                                                 } else {
1203                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1204                                                                 }
1205                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1206                                                                 continue;
1207                                                         },
1208                                                 };
1209                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1210                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1211                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1212                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1213                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1214                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1215                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1216                                                                 update_fee: None,
1217                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1218                                                         },
1219                                                 }));
1220                                         }
1221                                 } else {
1222                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1223                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1224                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1225                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1226                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1227                                                 };
1228                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1229                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1230                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1231                                                 };
1232                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1233                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1234                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1235                                                 }));
1236                                         }
1237                                 }
1238                         }
1239                 }
1240
1241                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1242                         match update {
1243                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1244                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1245                         };
1246                 }
1247
1248                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1249
1250                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1251                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1252                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1253                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1254                                 }
1255                         }
1256                         true
1257                 });
1258
1259                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1260                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1261                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1262                         events.push(event.1);
1263                 }
1264         }
1265
1266         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1267         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1268                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1269                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1270                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1271                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1272                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1273                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1274                         }
1275                         true
1276                 } else { false }
1277         }
1278
1279         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1280         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1281         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1282         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1283         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1284         /// still-available channels.
1285         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1286                 match source {
1287                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1288                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1289
1290                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1291                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1292                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1293                                 });
1294                         },
1295                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1296                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1297                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1298                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1299                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1300                                         },
1301                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1302                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1303                                         }
1304                                 };
1305
1306                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1307                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1308                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1309                                                 None => return
1310                                         };
1311
1312                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1313                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1314                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1315                                                 Err(_e) => {
1316                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1317                                                         return;
1318                                                 },
1319                                         }
1320                                 };
1321
1322                                 match fail_msgs {
1323                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1324                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1325
1326                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1327                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1328                                                 }
1329
1330                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1331                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1332                                                         node_id,
1333                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1334                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1337                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1338                                                                 update_fee: None,
1339                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1340                                                         },
1341                                                 });
1342                                         },
1343                                         None => {},
1344                                 }
1345                         },
1346                 }
1347         }
1348
1349         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1350         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1351         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1352         ///
1353         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1354         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1355                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1356                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1357                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1358                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1359
1360                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1361                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1362                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1363                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1364                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1365                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1366                         }
1367                         true
1368                 } else { false }
1369         }
1370         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1371                 match source {
1372                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1373                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1374                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1375                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1376                                         payment_preimage
1377                                 });
1378                         },
1379                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1380                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1381                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1382                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1383                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1384                                                 None => {
1385                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1386                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1387                                                         // why its missing.
1388                                                         return
1389                                                 }
1390                                         };
1391
1392                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1393                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1394                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1395                                                 Err(_e) => {
1396                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1397                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1398                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1399                                                         return
1400                                                 },
1401                                         }
1402                                 };
1403
1404                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1405                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1406                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1407                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1408                                         }
1409                                 }
1410
1411                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1412                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1413                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1414                                                 node_id: node_id,
1415                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1416                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1417                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1418                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1419                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1420                                                         update_fee: None,
1421                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1422                                                 }
1423                                         });
1424                                 }
1425                         },
1426                 }
1427         }
1428
1429         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1430         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1431                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1432         }
1433
1434         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1435         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1436         /// operation.
1437         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1438                 unimplemented!();
1439         }
1440
1441         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1442                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1443                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1444                 }
1445                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1446                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1447                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1448                 }
1449
1450                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1451                         ChannelKeys {
1452                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1453                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1454                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1455                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1456                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1457                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1458                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1459                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1460                         }
1461                 } else {
1462                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1463                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1464                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1465                                 Ok(key) => key,
1466                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1467                         }
1468                 };
1469
1470                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1471                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1472                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1473                 Ok(accept_msg)
1474         }
1475
1476         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1477                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1478                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1479                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1480                                 Some(chan) => {
1481                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1482                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1483                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1484                                         }
1485                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1486                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1487                                 },
1488                                 //TODO: same as above
1489                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1490                         }
1491                 };
1492                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1493                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1494                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1495                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1496                         output_script: output_script,
1497                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1498                 });
1499                 Ok(())
1500         }
1501
1502         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1503                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1504                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1506                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1507                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1508                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1509                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1510                                         }
1511                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1512                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1513                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1514                                                 },
1515                                                 Err(e) => {
1516                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1517                                                 }
1518                                         }
1519                                 },
1520                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1521                         }
1522                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1523                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1524                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1525                    // for a bogus channel.
1526                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1527                         unimplemented!();
1528                 }
1529                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1530                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1531                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1532                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1533                         },
1534                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1535                                 e.insert(chan);
1536                         }
1537                 }
1538                 Ok(funding_msg)
1539         }
1540
1541         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1542                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1543                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1545                                 Some(chan) => {
1546                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1547                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1548                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1549                                         }
1550                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1551                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1552                                 },
1553                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1554                         }
1555                 };
1556                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1557                         unimplemented!();
1558                 }
1559                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1560                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1561                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1562                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1563                 });
1564                 Ok(())
1565         }
1566
1567         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1568                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1569                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1570                         Some(chan) => {
1571                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1572                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1573                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1574                                 }
1575                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1576                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1577                         },
1578                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1579                 };
1580         }
1581
1582         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1583                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1584                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1586
1587                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1588                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1589                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1590                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1591                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1592                                         }
1593                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1594                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1595                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1596                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1597                                                 }
1598                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1599                                         } else { (res, None) }
1600                                 },
1601                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1602                         }
1603                 };
1604                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1605                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1606                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1607                 }
1608                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1609                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1610                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1611                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1612                                         msg: update
1613                                 });
1614                         }
1615                 }
1616                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1617         }
1618
1619         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1620                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1621                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1622                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1623                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1624                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1625                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1626                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1627                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1628                                         }
1629                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1630                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1631                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1632                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1633                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1634                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1635                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1636                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1637                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1638                                                 }
1639                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1640                                         } else { (res, None) }
1641                                 },
1642                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1643                         }
1644                 };
1645                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1646                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1647                 }
1648                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1649                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1650                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1651                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1652                                         msg: update
1653                                 });
1654                         }
1655                 }
1656                 Ok(res.0)
1657         }
1658
1659         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1660                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1661                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1662                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1663                 //
1664                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1665                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1666                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1667                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1668
1669                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1670                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1671
1672                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1673                         Some(chan) => {
1674                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1675                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1676                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1677                                 }
1678                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1679                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1680                                 }
1681                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1682                         },
1683                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1684                 }
1685         }
1686
1687         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1688                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1689                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1690                         Some(chan) => {
1691                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1692                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1693                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1694                                 }
1695                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1696                         },
1697                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1698                 };
1699                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1700                 Ok(())
1701         }
1702
1703         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1704                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1705                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1706                         Some(chan) => {
1707                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1708                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1709                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1710                                 }
1711                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1712                         },
1713                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1714                 }?;
1715
1716                 match htlc_source {
1717                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1718                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1719                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1720                                 let mut res = None;
1721                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1722                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1723
1724                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1725
1726                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1727                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1728                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1729                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1730                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1731
1732                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1733                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1734                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1735
1736                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1737                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1738                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1739                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1740                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1741                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1742                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1743                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1744                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1745                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1746                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1747                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1748                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1749                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1750                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1751                                                                                                         });
1752                                                                                                 }
1753                                                                                         }
1754                                                                                 }
1755                                                                         },
1756                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1757                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1758                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1759                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1760                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1761                                                                                 });
1762                                                                         },
1763                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1764                                                                 }
1765                                                         }
1766                                                 }
1767                                         }
1768                                 }).unwrap();
1769                                 Ok(res)
1770                         },
1771                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1772                 }
1773         }
1774
1775         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1776                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1777                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1778                         Some(chan) => {
1779                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1780                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1781                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1782                                 }
1783                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1784                                 Ok(())
1785                         },
1786                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1787                 }
1788         }
1789
1790         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1791                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1792                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1794                                 Some(chan) => {
1795                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1796                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1797                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1798                                         }
1799                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1800                                 },
1801                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1802                         }
1803                 };
1804                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1805                         unimplemented!();
1806                 }
1807
1808                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1809         }
1810
1811         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1812                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1813                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1814                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1815                                 Some(chan) => {
1816                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1817                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1818                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1819                                         }
1820                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1821                                 },
1822                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1823                         }
1824                 };
1825                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1826                         unimplemented!();
1827                 }
1828                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1829                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1830                 }
1831
1832                 let mut forward_event = None;
1833                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1834                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1836                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1837                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1838                         }
1839                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1840                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1841                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1842                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1843                                         },
1844                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1845                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1846                                         }
1847                                 }
1848                         }
1849                 }
1850                 match forward_event {
1851                         Some(time) => {
1852                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1853                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1854                                         time_forwardable: time
1855                                 });
1856                         }
1857                         None => {},
1858                 }
1859
1860                 Ok(res)
1861         }
1862
1863         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1864                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1866                         Some(chan) => {
1867                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1868                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1869                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1870                                 }
1871                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1872                         },
1873                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1874                 }
1875         }
1876
1877         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1878                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1879                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1880                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1881                                 Some(chan) => {
1882                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1884                                         }
1885                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1886                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1887                                         }
1888
1889                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1890                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1891                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1892
1893                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1894                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1895                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1896                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1897                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1898
1899                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1900
1901                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1902                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1903                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1904                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1905                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1906                                                 contents: announcement,
1907                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1908                                 },
1909                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1910                         }
1911                 };
1912                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1913                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1914                 Ok(())
1915         }
1916
1917         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1919                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1921                                 Some(chan) => {
1922                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1923                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1924                                         }
1925                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1926                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1927                                 },
1928                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1929                         }
1930                 };
1931                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1932                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1933                                 unimplemented!();
1934                         }
1935                 }
1936                 res
1937         }
1938
1939         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
1940         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
1941         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1942         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
1943         #[doc(hidden)]
1944         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1945                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1946                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
1947                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
1948                         Some(chan) => {
1949                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1950                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
1951                                 }
1952                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
1953                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
1954                                 }
1955                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
1956                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1957                                                 unimplemented!();
1958                                         }
1959                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1960                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1961                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1962                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1963                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1964                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1965                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1966                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1967                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
1968                                                         commitment_signed,
1969                                                 },
1970                                         });
1971                                 }
1972                         },
1973                 }
1974                 Ok(())
1975         }
1976 }
1977
1978 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1979         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1980                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1981                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1982                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1983                 ret
1984         }
1985 }
1986
1987 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1988         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1989                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1990                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1991                 {
1992                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1994                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1995                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1996                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1997                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1998                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1999                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2000                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2001                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2002                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2003                                         });
2004                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2005                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2006                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2007                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2008                                                 action: e.action,
2009                                         });
2010                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2011                                                 return false;
2012                                         }
2013                                 }
2014                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2015                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2016                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2017                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2018                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2019                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2020                                                                 }
2021                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2022                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2023                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2024                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2025                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2026                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2027                                                                                 msg: update
2028                                                                         });
2029                                                                 }
2030                                                                 return false;
2031                                                         }
2032                                                 }
2033                                         }
2034                                 }
2035                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2036                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2037                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2038                                         }
2039                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2040                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2041                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2042                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2043                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2044                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2045                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2046                                                         msg: update
2047                                                 });
2048                                         }
2049                                         return false;
2050                                 }
2051                                 true
2052                         });
2053                 }
2054                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2055                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2056                 }
2057                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2058                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2059                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2060                 }
2061                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2062         }
2063
2064         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2065         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2066                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2067                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2068                 {
2069                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2071                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2072                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2073                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2074                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2075                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2076                                         }
2077                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2078                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2079                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2080                                                         msg: update
2081                                                 });
2082                                         }
2083                                         false
2084                                 } else {
2085                                         true
2086                                 }
2087                         });
2088                 }
2089                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2090                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2091                 }
2092                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2093                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2094                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2095                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2096                         }
2097                 }
2098                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2099         }
2100 }
2101
2102 macro_rules! handle_error {
2103         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2104                 match $internal {
2105                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2106                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2107                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2108                                         match &err.action {
2109                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2110                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2111                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2112                                                         } else {
2113                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2114                                                         }
2115                                                 },
2116                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2117                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2118                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2119                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2120                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2121                                                         } else {
2122                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2123                                                         }
2124                                                 },
2125                                                 &None => {},
2126                                         }
2127                                 }
2128                                 Err(err)
2129                         },
2130                 }
2131         }
2132 }
2133
2134 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2135         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2136         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2137                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2138         }
2139
2140         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2141                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2142         }
2143
2144         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2145                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2146         }
2147
2148         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2149                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2150         }
2151
2152         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2153                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2154         }
2155
2156         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2157                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2158         }
2159
2160         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2161                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2162         }
2163
2164         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2165                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2166         }
2167
2168         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2169                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2170         }
2171
2172         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2173                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2174         }
2175
2176         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2177                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2178         }
2179
2180         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2181                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2182         }
2183
2184         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2185                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2186         }
2187
2188         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2189                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2190         }
2191
2192         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2193                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2194         }
2195
2196         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2197                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2198         }
2199
2200         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2201                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2202                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2203                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2204                 {
2205                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2206                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2207                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2208                         if no_connection_possible {
2209                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2210                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2211                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2212                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2213                                                 }
2214                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2215                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2216                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2217                                                                 msg: update
2218                                                         });
2219                                                 }
2220                                                 false
2221                                         } else {
2222                                                 true
2223                                         }
2224                                 });
2225                         } else {
2226                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2227                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2228                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2229                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2230                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2231                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2232                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2233                                                 }
2234                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2235                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2236                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2237                                                         }
2238                                                         return false;
2239                                                 }
2240                                         }
2241                                         true
2242                                 })
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2246                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2247                 }
2248                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2249                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2250                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2251                                 pending_events.push(event);
2252                         }
2253                 }
2254                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2255                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2256                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2257                         }
2258                 }
2259         }
2260
2261         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2262                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2263                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2264                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2265                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2266                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2267                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2268                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2269                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2270                                         // drop it.
2271                                         false
2272                                 } else {
2273                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2274                                         true
2275                                 }
2276                         } else { true }
2277                 });
2278                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2279                 res
2280         }
2281
2282         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2283                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2284                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2285                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2286                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2287                                 }
2288                         }
2289                 } else {
2290                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2291                 }
2292         }
2293 }
2294
2295 #[cfg(test)]
2296 mod tests {
2297         use chain::chaininterface;
2298         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2299         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2300         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2301         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2302         use ln::msgs;
2303         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2304         use util::test_utils;
2305         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2306         use util::errors::APIError;
2307         use util::logger::Logger;
2308         use util::ser::Writeable;
2309
2310         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2311         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2312         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2313         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2314         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2315         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2316         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2317
2318         use hex;
2319
2320         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2321         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2322
2323         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2324         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2325
2326         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2327
2328         use std::cell::RefCell;
2329         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2330         use std::default::Default;
2331         use std::rc::Rc;
2332         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2333         use std::time::Instant;
2334         use std::mem;
2335
2336         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2337                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2338                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2339
2340                 let route = Route {
2341                         hops: vec!(
2342                                         RouteHop {
2343                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2344                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2345                                         },
2346                                         RouteHop {
2347                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2348                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2349                                         },
2350                                         RouteHop {
2351                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2352                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2353                                         },
2354                                         RouteHop {
2355                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2356                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2357                                         },
2358                                         RouteHop {
2359                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2360                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2361                                         },
2362                         ),
2363                 };
2364
2365                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2366
2367                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2368                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2369                 onion_keys
2370         }
2371
2372         #[test]
2373         fn onion_vectors() {
2374                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2375                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2376
2377                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2378                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2379                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2380                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2381                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2382
2383                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2384                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2385                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2386                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2387                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2388
2389                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2390                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2391                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2392                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2393                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2394
2395                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2396                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2397                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2398                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2399                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2400
2401                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2402                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2403                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2404                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2405                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2406
2407                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2408                 let payloads = vec!(
2409                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2410                                 realm: 0,
2411                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2412                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2413                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2414                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2415                                 },
2416                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2417                         },
2418                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2419                                 realm: 0,
2420                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2421                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2422                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2423                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2424                                 },
2425                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2426                         },
2427                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2428                                 realm: 0,
2429                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2430                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2431                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2432                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2433                                 },
2434                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2435                         },
2436                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2437                                 realm: 0,
2438                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2439                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2440                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2441                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2442                                 },
2443                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2444                         },
2445                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2446                                 realm: 0,
2447                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2448                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2449                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2450                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2451                                 },
2452                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2453                         },
2454                 );
2455
2456                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2457                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2458                 // anyway...
2459                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2460         }
2461
2462         #[test]
2463         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2464                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2465
2466                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2467                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2468                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2469
2470                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2471                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2472
2473                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2474                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2475
2476                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2477                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2478
2479                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2480                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2481
2482                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2483                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2484         }
2485
2486         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2487                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2488                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2489                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2490                 for i in 2..100 {
2491                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2492                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2493                 }
2494         }
2495
2496         struct Node {
2497                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2498                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2499                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2500                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2501                 router: Router,
2502                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2503                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2504         }
2505         impl Drop for Node {
2506                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2507                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2508                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2509                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2510                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2511                         }
2512                 }
2513         }
2514
2515         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2516                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2517
2518                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2519                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2520                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2521                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2522                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2523                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2524                         },
2525                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2526                 };
2527
2528                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2529
2530                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2531                 let tx;
2532                 let funding_output;
2533
2534                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2535                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2536                 match events_2[0] {
2537                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2538                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2539                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2540
2541                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2542                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2543                                 }]};
2544                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2545
2546                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2547                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2548                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2549                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2550                                 added_monitors.clear();
2551                         },
2552                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2553                 }
2554
2555                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2556                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2557                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2558                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2559                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2560                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2561                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2562                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2563                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2564                                 added_monitors.clear();
2565                                 res
2566                         },
2567                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2568                 };
2569
2570                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2571                 {
2572                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2573                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2574                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2575                         added_monitors.clear();
2576                 }
2577
2578                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2579                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2580                 match events_4[0] {
2581                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2582                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2583                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2584                         },
2585                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2586                 };
2587
2588                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2589                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2591                 match events_5[0] {
2592                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2593                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2594                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2595                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2596                         },
2597                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2598                 };
2599
2600                 let channel_id;
2601
2602                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2603                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2604                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2605                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2606                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2607                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2608                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2609                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2610                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2611                                 as_announcement_sigs
2612                         },
2613                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2614                 };
2615
2616                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2617                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2618                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2619                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2620                                 (msg, update_msg)
2621                         },
2622                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2623                 };
2624
2625                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2626                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2627                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2628                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2629                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2630                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2631                                 update_msg
2632                         },
2633                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2634                 };
2635
2636                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2637
2638                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2639         }
2640
2641         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2642                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2643                 for node in nodes {
2644                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2645                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2646                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2647                 }
2648                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2649         }
2650
2651         macro_rules! check_spends {
2652                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2653                         {
2654                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2655                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2656                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2657                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2658                         }
2659                 }
2660         }
2661
2662         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2663                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2664                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2665                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2666
2667                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2668                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2669                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2670                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2671                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2672                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2673                                 msg.clone()
2674                         },
2675                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2676                 };
2677
2678                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2679                 if !close_inbound_first {
2680                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2681                 }
2682                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2683                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2684                 if close_inbound_first {
2685                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2686                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2687                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2688                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2689
2690                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2691                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2692                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2693                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2694                 } else {
2695                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2696                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2697                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2698
2699                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2700                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2701                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2702                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2703                 }
2704                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2705                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2706
2707                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2709                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2710                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2711                                 msg.clone()
2712                         },
2713                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2714                 };
2715
2716                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2717                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2718                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2719                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2720                                 msg.clone()
2721                         },
2722                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2723                 };
2724
2725                 (as_update, bs_update)
2726         }
2727
2728         struct SendEvent {
2729                 node_id: PublicKey,
2730                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2731                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2732         }
2733         impl SendEvent {
2734                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2735                         match event {
2736                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2737                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2738                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2740                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2741                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2742                                 },
2743                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2744                         }
2745                 }
2746         }
2747
2748         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2749                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2750                         {
2751                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2753                                 added_monitors.clear();
2754                         }
2755                 }
2756         }
2757
2758         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2759                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2760                         {
2761                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2762                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2763                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2764                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2765                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2766                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2767                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2768                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2769                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2770                                 if $fail_backwards {
2771                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2772                                 }
2773                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2774                                 {
2775                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2776                                         if $fail_backwards {
2777                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2778                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2779                                         } else {
2780                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2781                                         }
2782                                         added_monitors.clear();
2783                                 }
2784                         }
2785                 }
2786         }
2787
2788         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2789                 ($node: expr) => {
2790                         {
2791                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2792                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2793                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2794                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2795                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2796                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2797                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2798                         }
2799                 }
2800         }
2801
2802         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2803                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2804
2805                 let mut payment_event = {
2806                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2807                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2808
2809                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2810                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2811                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2812                 };
2813                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2814
2815                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2816                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2817
2818                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2819                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2820                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2821
2822                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2823                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2824                         match events_1[0] {
2825                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2826                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2827                         };
2828
2829                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2830                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2831
2832                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2833                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2834                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2835                                 match events_2[0] {
2836                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2837                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2838                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2839                                         },
2840                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2841                                 }
2842                         } else {
2843                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2844                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2845                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2846                         }
2847
2848                         prev_node = node;
2849                 }
2850
2851                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2852         }
2853
2854         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2855                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2856                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2857
2858                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2859                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2860                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2861                                 {
2862                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2863                                         if $last_node {
2864                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2865                                         } else {
2866                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2867                                         }
2868                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2869                                 }
2870                         }
2871                 }
2872
2873                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2874                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2875                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2876                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2877                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2878                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2879                         }
2880
2881                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2882                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2883                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2884                                 match events[0] {
2885                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2886                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2887                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2888                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2889                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2890                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2891                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2892                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2893                                         },
2894                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2895                                 }
2896                         } else {
2897                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2898                         }
2899                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2900                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2901                         }
2902
2903                         prev_node = node;
2904                 }
2905
2906                 if !skip_last {
2907                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2908                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2909                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2910                         match events[0] {
2911                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2912                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2913                                 },
2914                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2915                         }
2916                 }
2917         }
2918
2919         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2920                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2921         }
2922
2923         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2924
2925         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2926                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2927                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2928                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2929                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2930                 }
2931
2932                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2933         }
2934
2935         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2936                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2937                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2938                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2939                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2940                 }
2941
2942                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2943
2944                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2945                 match err {
2946                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2947                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2948                 };
2949         }
2950
2951         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2952                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2953                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2954         }
2955
2956         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2957                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2958                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2959
2960                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2961                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2962                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2963                                 {
2964                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2965                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2966                                 }
2967                         }
2968                 }
2969
2970                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2971                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2972                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2973                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2974                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2975                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2976                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2977                                 // second-to-last node!
2978                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2979                         }
2980
2981                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2982                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2983                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2984                                 match events[0] {
2985                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2986                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2987                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2988                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2989                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2990                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2991                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2992                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2993                                         },
2994                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2995                                 }
2996                         } else {
2997                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2998                         }
2999                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3000                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3001                         }
3002
3003                         prev_node = node;
3004                 }
3005
3006                 if !skip_last {
3007                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3008
3009                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3010                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3011                         match events[0] {
3012                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3013                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3014                                 },
3015                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3016                         }
3017                 }
3018         }
3019
3020         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3021                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3022         }
3023
3024         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3025                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3026                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3027                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3028                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3029
3030                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3031                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3032
3033                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3034                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3035                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3036                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3037                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3038                         let node_id = {
3039                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3040                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3041                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3042                         };
3043                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3044                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3045                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3046                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3047                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3048                         });
3049                 }
3050
3051                 nodes
3052         }
3053
3054         #[test]
3055         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3056                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3057                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3058                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3059
3060                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3061                         ($node: expr) => {{
3062                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3063                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3064                                 chan.get_feerate()
3065                         }}
3066                 }
3067
3068                 // balancing
3069                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3070
3071                 // A                                        B
3072                 // update_fee                            ->
3073                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3074                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3075                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3076                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3077                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3078                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3079                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3080                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3081                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3082                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3083                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3084                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3085                 //                                       <- RAA
3086                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3087
3088                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3089                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3090                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3091
3092                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3093                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3094                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3095                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3096                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3097                         },
3098                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3099                 };
3100
3101                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3102
3103                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3104                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3105                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3106                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3107
3108                 let payment_event = {
3109                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3110                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3111                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3112                 };
3113                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3114                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3115
3116                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3117                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3118                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3119                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3121
3122                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3123                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3124                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3125                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3126
3127                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3128                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3129                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3130                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3131                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3132                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3133                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3134
3135                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3136                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3137                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3138                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3139                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3140                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3142
3143                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3144                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3145                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3146
3147                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3148                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150
3151                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3152                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3153
3154                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3156                 match events_2[0] {
3157                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3158                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3159                 }
3160
3161                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3162                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3163         }
3164
3165         #[test]
3166         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3167                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3168                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3169                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3170                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3171                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3172
3173                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3174                         ($node: expr) => {{
3175                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3176                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3177                                 chan.get_feerate()
3178                         }}
3179                 }
3180
3181                 // balancing
3182                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3183
3184                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3185                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3186                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3187
3188                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3189                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3190                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3191                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3192                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3193                         },
3194                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3195                 };
3196
3197                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3198
3199                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3200                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3201                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3203
3204                 let payment_event = {
3205                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3206                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3207                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3208                 };
3209                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3210                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3211
3212                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3213                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3214                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3215                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3217
3218                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3220
3221                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3222         }
3223
3224         #[test]
3225         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3226                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3227                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3228                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3229
3230                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3231                         ($node: expr) => {{
3232                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3233                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3234                                 chan.get_feerate()
3235                         }}
3236                 }
3237
3238                 // A                                        B
3239                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3240                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3241                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3242                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3243                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3244                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3245                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3246                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3247                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3248                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3249                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3250                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3251                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3252                 //                                          B should send no response here
3253                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3254                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3255                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3256
3257                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3258                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3259                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3260                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3261
3262                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3263                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3264                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3265                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3266                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3267                         },
3268                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269                 };
3270
3271                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3272                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3273                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3274                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3275
3276                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3277                 // transaction:
3278                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3279                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3280
3281                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3282                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3283                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3284                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3285                 };
3286
3287                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3288
3289                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3290                 // Deliver (3)
3291                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3292
3293                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3294                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3296                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3297                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3298                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3299                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3300                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3301                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3302                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3303
3304                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3305                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3307                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3308
3309                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3310                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3311
3312                 // Delever (4)
3313                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3314                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3315
3316                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3317                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3318
3319                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3320                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3321                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3322
3323                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3325         }
3326
3327         #[test]
3328         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3329                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3330                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3331                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3332
3333                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3334                         ($node: expr) => {{
3335                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3337                                 chan.get_feerate()
3338                         }}
3339                 }
3340
3341                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3342                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3343
3344                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3346                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3347                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3348                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3349                         },
3350                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3351                 };
3352                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3353
3354                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3355                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3356                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3358
3359                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3360                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3362
3363                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3364                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3366
3367                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3368                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3370         }
3371
3372         #[test]
3373         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3374                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3375                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3376                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3377
3378                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3379                         ($node: expr) => {{
3380                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3382                                 chan.get_feerate()
3383                         }}
3384                 }
3385
3386                 // balancing
3387                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3388
3389                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3390                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3391
3392                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3394                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3395                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3396                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3397                         },
3398                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3399                 };
3400                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3403                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3404                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3405
3406                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3407
3408                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3409
3410                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3411                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3412                 {
3413                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3414                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3415                         added_monitors.clear();
3416                 }
3417                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3418                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3419                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3420
3421                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3422                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3424
3425                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3426                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3429                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3430
3431                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3432                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3433                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3434                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3435                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3436                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3437
3438                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3439                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3441                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3442                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3443                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3446
3447                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3449                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3450                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3451                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3453
3454                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3455                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3456                 match events[0] {
3457                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3458                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3459                 };
3460                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3461                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3462
3463                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3464                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3465                 match events[0] {
3466                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3467                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468                 };
3469
3470                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3471
3472                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3473                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3474                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3475         }
3476
3477         #[test]
3478         fn test_update_fee() {
3479                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3480                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3481                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3482
3483                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3484                         ($node: expr) => {{
3485                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3487                                 chan.get_feerate()
3488                         }}
3489                 }
3490
3491                 // A                                        B
3492                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3493                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3494                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3495                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3496                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3497                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3498                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3499                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3500                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3501                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3502                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3503                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3504
3505                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3506                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3507                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3508
3509                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3510                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3511                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3512                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3513                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3514                         },
3515                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3516                 };
3517                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3518
3519                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3520                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3521                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3523                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3524
3525                 // Deliver (2):
3526                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3527                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3528                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3529
3530                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3531                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3532                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3533                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3534                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3535                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3536                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3537                         },
3538                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3539                 };
3540                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3541
3542                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3543                 // ... creating (5)
3544                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3547
3548                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3549                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3550                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3552
3553                 // Deliver (5):
3554                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3555                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3557
3558                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3559                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3560                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3561                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3562
3563                 // Deliver (7)
3564                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3565                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3566                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3567                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3568                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3569                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3570
3571                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3572                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3573                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3574         }
3575
3576         #[test]
3577         fn fake_network_test() {
3578                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3579                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3580                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3581
3582                 // Create some initial channels
3583                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3584                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3585                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3586
3587                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3588                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3589                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3590                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3591                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3592
3593                 // Send some more payments
3594                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3595                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3596                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3597
3598                 // Test failure packets
3599                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3600                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3601
3602                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3603                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3604
3605                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3606                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3607                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3608                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3609                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3610                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3611                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3612
3613                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3614                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3615                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3616                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3617                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3618                         fee_msat: 0,
3619                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3620                 });
3621                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3622                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3623                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3624                         fee_msat: 0,
3625                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3626                 });
3627                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3628                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3629                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3630                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3631                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3632                 });
3633                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3634                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3635                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3636
3637                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3638                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3639                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3640                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3641                         fee_msat: 0,
3642                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3643                 });
3644                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3645                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3646                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3647                         fee_msat: 0,
3648                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3649                 });
3650                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3651                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3652                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3653                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3654                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3655                 });
3656                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3657                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3658                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3659
3660                 // Claim the rebalances...
3661                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3662                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3663
3664                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3665                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3666
3667                 // Send some payments across both channels
3668                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3669                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3670                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3671
3672                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3673
3674                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3675
3676                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3677                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3678                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3679
3680                 // Close down the channels...
3681                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3682                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3683                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3684                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3685                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3686         }
3687
3688         #[test]
3689         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3690                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3691                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3692                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3693
3694                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3695                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3696                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3697                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3698                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3699                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3700
3701                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3702
3703                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3704                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3705
3706                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3707                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3708
3709                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3710                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3711                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3712         }
3713
3714         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3715         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3716         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3717         ///
3718         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3719         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3720         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3721         ///
3722         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3723         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3724         ///
3725         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3726         /// also fail.
3727         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3728                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3729                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3730
3731                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3732                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3733                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3734                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3735                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3736                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3737                                 }
3738                                 false
3739                         } else { true }
3740                 });
3741                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3742                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3743                 }
3744
3745                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3746
3747                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3748                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3749                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3750                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3751                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3752                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3753                                         } else {
3754                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3755                                         }
3756                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3757                                         false
3758                                 } else { true }
3759                         });
3760                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3761                 }
3762
3763                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3764                 res
3765         }
3766
3767         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3768         /// HTLC transaction.
3769         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3770                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3771                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3772                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3773                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3774                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3775                                 false
3776                         } else { true }
3777                 });
3778                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3779         }
3780
3781         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3782                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3783
3784                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3785                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3786                 let mut found_prev = false;
3787
3788                 for tx in prev_txn {
3789                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3790                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3791                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3792                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3793
3794                                 found_prev = true;
3795                                 break;
3796                         }
3797                 }
3798                 assert!(found_prev);
3799
3800                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3801                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3802                 res
3803         }
3804
3805         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3806                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3807                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3808                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3809                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3810                                 msg.clone()
3811                         },
3812                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3813                 };
3814
3815                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3816                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3817                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3818                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3819                                 msg.clone()
3820                         },
3821                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3822                 };
3823
3824                 for node in nodes {
3825                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3826                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3827                 }
3828         }
3829
3830         #[test]
3831         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3832                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3833                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3834                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3835
3836                 // Create some initial channels
3837                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3838                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3839                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3840                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3841
3842                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3843                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3844                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3845                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3846                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3847
3848                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3849                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3850                 {
3851                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3852                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3853                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3854                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3855                 }
3856                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3857                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3858                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3859
3860                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3861                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3862
3863                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3864                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3865                 {
3866                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3867                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3868                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3869                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3870                 }
3871                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3872                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3873                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3874
3875                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3876                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3877                                 {
3878                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3879                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3880
3881                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3882                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3883                                         match events[0] {
3884                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3885                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3886                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3887                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3888                                                 },
3889                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3890                                         };
3891                                 }
3892                         }
3893                 }
3894
3895                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3896                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3897                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3898                 {
3899                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3900
3901                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3902                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3903
3904                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3905                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3906
3907                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3908                 }
3909                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3910                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3911                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3912
3913                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3914                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3915
3916                 {
3917                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3918                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3919                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3920                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3921                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3922                         }
3923
3924                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3925
3926                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3927                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3928
3929                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3930                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3931                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3932                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3933                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3934                         }
3935
3936                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3937
3938                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3939                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3940
3941                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3942                 }
3943                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3944                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3945                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3946
3947                 // Create some new channels:
3948                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3949
3950                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3951                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3952                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3953                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3954                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
3955                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3956                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
3957                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
3958                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3959                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
3960                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
3961                 // Revoke the old state
3962                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3963
3964                 {
3965                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3966                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3967                         {
3968                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3969                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3970                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3971                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
3972
3973                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3974                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3975                         }
3976                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3977
3978                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3979                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3980                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3981                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3982                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3983                 }
3984                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3985                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3986                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3987         }
3988
3989         #[test]
3990         fn revoked_output_claim() {
3991                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
3992                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
3993                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3994                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3995                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
3996                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3997                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
3998                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
3999                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4000                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4001                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4002
4003                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4004                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4005                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4006                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4007                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4008
4009                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4010
4011                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4012                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4013
4014                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4015                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4016                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4017         }
4018
4019         #[test]
4020         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4021                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4022                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4023
4024                 // Create some new channel:
4025                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4026
4027                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4028                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4029                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4030                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4031                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4032
4033                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4034                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4035                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4036                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4037                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4038                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4039                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4040                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4041                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4042
4043                 //Revoke the old state
4044                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4045
4046                 {
4047                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4048
4049                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4050
4051                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4052                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4053                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4054
4055                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4056                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4057
4058                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4059
4060                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4061                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4062                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4063                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4064                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4065                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4066                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4067                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4068
4069                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4070                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4071                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4072
4073                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4074                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4075                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4076                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4077                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4078                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4079                 }
4080                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4081                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4082                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4083         }
4084
4085         #[test]
4086         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4087                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4088                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4089
4090                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4091
4092                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4093                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4094                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4095                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4096                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4097                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4098
4099                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4100                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4101
4102                 //Revoke the old state
4103                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4104
4105                 {
4106                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4107
4108                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4109
4110                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4111                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4112                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4113
4114                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4115                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4116                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4117                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4118                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4119                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4120                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4121
4122                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4123                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4124                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4125
4126                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4127                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4128                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4129                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4130                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4131
4132                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4133                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4134                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4135                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4136                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4137                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4138                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4139                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4140
4141                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4142                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4143
4144                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4145                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4146                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4147                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4148                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4149                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4150                 }
4151                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4152                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4153                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4154         }
4155
4156         #[test]
4157         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4158                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4159                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4160                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4161                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4162
4163                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4164                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4165                 {
4166                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4167                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4168                         match events[0] {
4169                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4170                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4171                                 },
4172                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4173                         }
4174                 }
4175
4176                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4177                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4178
4179                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4180                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4181
4182                 {
4183                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4184                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4185                         match events[0] {
4186                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4187                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4188                                 },
4189                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4190                         }
4191                 }
4192
4193                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4194                 // registering new transactions
4195                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4196         }
4197
4198         #[test]
4199         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4200                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4201                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4202                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4203                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4204
4205                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4206
4207                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4208
4209                 let mut payment_event = {
4210                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4211                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212
4213                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4214                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4215                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4216                 };
4217
4218                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4219                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4220
4221                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4222                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4223                 match events_1[0] {
4224                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4225                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4226                 };
4227
4228                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4229                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4230
4231                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4232                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4233                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4234                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4235
4236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4237                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4238                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4240
4241                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4242                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4243                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4244
4245                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4246                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4247                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4248                 match events_3[0] {
4249                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4250                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4251                         },
4252                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4253                 }
4254
4255                 let tx = {
4256                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4257                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4258                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4259                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4260                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4261                         node_txn.remove(0)
4262                 };
4263
4264                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4265                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4266
4267                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4268                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4269                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4270                 match events_4[0] {
4271                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4272                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4273                         },
4274                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4275                 }
4276
4277                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4278                 {
4279                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4280                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4281                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4282                 }
4283                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4284                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4285                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4286                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4287                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4288                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4289                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4290
4291                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4292         }
4293
4294         #[test]
4295         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4296                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4297                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4298                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4299
4300                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4301                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4302                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4303                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4304
4305                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4306                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4307                 headers.push(header.clone());
4308                 for _i in 2..100 {
4309                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4310                         headers.push(header.clone());
4311                 }
4312                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4313                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4314                 }
4315                 {
4316                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4317                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4318                         match events[0] {
4319                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4320                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4321                                 },
4322                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4323                         }
4324                 }
4325                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4326                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4327                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4328         }
4329
4330         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
4331                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4332                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4333
4334                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4335                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4336                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4337                 }
4338                 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4339                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4340                 } else {
4341                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4342                 }
4343
4344                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4345                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4346                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4347                 }
4348                 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4349                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4350                 } else {
4351                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4352                 }
4353
4354                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4355                 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4356
4357                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4358                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4359                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4360                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4361                         } else {
4362                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4363                         }
4364                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4365                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4366                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4367                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4368                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4369                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4370                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4371                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4372                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4373                                 }
4374                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4375                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4376                                 }
4377
4378                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4379                         } else {
4380                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4381                         }
4382                 }
4383
4384                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4385                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4386                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4387                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4388                         } else {
4389                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4390                         }
4391                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4392                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4393                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4394                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4395                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4396                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4397                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4398                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4399                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4400                                 }
4401                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4402                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4403                                 }
4404
4405                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4406                         } else {
4407                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4408                         }
4409                 }
4410         }
4411
4412         #[test]
4413         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4414                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4415                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4416                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4417                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4418
4419                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4420                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4422
4423                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4424                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4425                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4426                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4427
4428                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4429                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4430                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4431
4432                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4433                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4434                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4435                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4436
4437                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4438                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4439
4440                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4441                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4442
4443                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
4444                 {
4445                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4446                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4447                         match events[0] {
4448                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4449                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4450                                 },
4451                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4452                         }
4453                         match events[1] {
4454                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4455                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4456                                 },
4457                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4458                         }
4459                 }
4460
4461                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4462                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4463         }
4464
4465         #[test]
4466         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
4467                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
4468                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4469                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4470
4471                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4472
4473                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4474                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4475                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4476                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4477
4478                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4479
4480                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4481                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4482
4483                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
4484                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
4485
4486                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
4487
4488                 let mut chan_announcement;
4489
4490                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4491                         () => {
4492                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4493                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4494                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4495                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4496                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4497                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4498                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4499                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4500                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4501                                 };
4502                         }
4503                 }
4504
4505                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4506                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4507                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4508                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4509                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4510                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4511                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4512                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4513                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4514                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4515                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4516                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4517                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
4518                                 }
4519                         }
4520                 }
4521
4522                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4523                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4524                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4525                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4526
4527                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4528                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4529                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4530                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4531                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4532
4533                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4534                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4535                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4536                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4537         }
4538 }