1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
69 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
86 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
93 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
101 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
103 pub enum HTLCSource {
104 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
107 session_priv: SecretKey,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
123 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134 err: msgs::HandleError,
135 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
143 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
146 data: err.to_string()
150 needs_channel_force_close: false,
154 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
158 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
161 data: err.to_string()
165 needs_channel_force_close: true,
169 fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
173 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
178 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
179 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
180 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
181 /// probably increase this significantly.
182 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
184 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
185 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
187 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
190 struct ChannelHolder {
191 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
192 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
193 next_forward: Instant,
194 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
195 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
196 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
197 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
198 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
199 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
200 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
202 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
204 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
205 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
206 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
207 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
208 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
209 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
212 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
214 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
215 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
216 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
217 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
218 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
223 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
224 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
226 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
227 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
229 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
230 /// to individual Channels.
231 pub struct ChannelManager {
232 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
233 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
234 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
235 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
236 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
238 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
239 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
240 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
241 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
243 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
244 our_network_key: SecretKey,
246 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
251 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
253 macro_rules! secp_call {
254 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
257 Err(_) => return Err($err),
264 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
266 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
267 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
272 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
273 pub struct ChannelDetails {
274 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
275 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
276 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
277 /// lifetime of the channel.
278 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
279 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
280 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
281 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
282 /// The node_id of our counterparty
283 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
284 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
285 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
286 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
290 impl ChannelManager {
291 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
293 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
294 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
296 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
297 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
299 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
300 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
303 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
304 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
305 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
306 monitor: monitor.clone(),
310 announce_channels_publicly,
311 fee_proportional_millionths,
312 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
315 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
316 by_id: HashMap::new(),
317 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
318 next_forward: Instant::now(),
319 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
324 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
328 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
329 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
333 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
335 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
336 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
337 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
338 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
340 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
341 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
343 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
344 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
345 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
347 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
348 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
349 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
350 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
351 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
352 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
353 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
354 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
357 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
358 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
359 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
361 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
365 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
366 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
367 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
368 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
370 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
373 panic!("RNG is bad???");
376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
379 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
380 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
381 node_id: their_network_key,
387 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
388 /// more information.
389 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
390 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
391 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
392 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
393 res.push(ChannelDetails {
394 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
395 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
396 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
397 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
398 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
404 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
405 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
406 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
407 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
408 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
409 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
410 if channel.is_usable() {
411 res.push(ChannelDetails {
412 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
413 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
414 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
415 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
416 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
423 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
424 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
425 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
427 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
428 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
429 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
431 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
434 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
435 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
436 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
437 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
439 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
440 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
445 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
446 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
447 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
449 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
450 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
455 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
456 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
457 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
461 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
470 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
471 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
472 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
473 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
474 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
476 for tx in local_txn {
477 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
479 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
480 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
481 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
482 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
483 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
484 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
485 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
488 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
489 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
490 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
493 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
494 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
495 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
496 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
503 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
504 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
505 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
506 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
512 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
513 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
514 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
515 for chan in self.list_channels() {
516 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
521 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
523 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
524 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
525 let mut res = [0; 32];
526 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
530 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
531 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
532 let mut res = [0; 32];
533 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
539 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
540 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
541 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
542 let mut res = [0; 32];
543 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
548 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
549 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
550 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
551 let mut res = [0; 32];
552 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
556 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
558 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
559 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
560 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
562 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
563 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
565 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
566 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
567 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
568 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
569 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
571 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
573 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
574 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
576 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
582 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
583 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
584 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
586 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
587 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
593 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
603 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
604 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
605 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
606 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
607 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
608 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
609 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
610 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
612 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
613 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
614 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
615 // the intended recipient).
616 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
617 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
618 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
620 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
621 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
622 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
623 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
627 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
628 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
629 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
631 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
632 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
633 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
635 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
637 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
641 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
643 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
651 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
652 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
654 for i in 0..dst.len() {
659 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
660 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
661 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
662 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
665 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
666 let end_len = iters * 65;
667 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
668 res.resize(end_len, 0);
670 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
671 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
672 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
673 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
674 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
679 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
680 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
682 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
683 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
684 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
685 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
687 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
688 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
689 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
692 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
695 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
696 hmac.input(&packet_data);
697 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
698 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
703 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
704 hop_data: packet_data,
709 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
710 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
711 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
712 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
714 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
715 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
716 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
717 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
718 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
719 data: packet_crypted,
723 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
724 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
726 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
729 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
730 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
731 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
732 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
736 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
737 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
740 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
742 failuremsg: failuremsg,
746 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
747 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
748 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
754 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
755 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
756 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
759 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
760 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
763 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
764 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
765 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
766 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
772 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
773 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
774 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
775 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
776 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
777 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
778 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
779 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
782 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
783 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
785 let mut channel_state = None;
786 macro_rules! return_err {
787 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
789 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
790 if channel_state.is_none() {
791 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
793 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
794 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
795 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
796 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
797 })), channel_state.unwrap());
802 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
803 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
804 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
805 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
806 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
807 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
808 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
809 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
812 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
813 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
814 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
815 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
816 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
819 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
820 let next_hop_data = {
821 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
822 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
823 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
825 let error_code = match err {
826 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
827 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
829 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
835 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
837 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
839 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
840 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
842 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
843 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
846 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
847 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
848 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
849 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
851 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
853 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
855 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
856 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
857 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
860 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
861 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
862 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
864 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
866 let blinding_factor = {
867 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
868 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
869 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
870 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
871 sha.result(&mut res);
872 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
874 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
880 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
881 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
884 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
886 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
887 hop_data: new_packet_data,
888 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
891 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
892 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
893 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
894 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
895 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
896 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
897 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
901 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
902 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
903 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
904 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
905 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
907 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
909 Some(id) => id.clone(),
911 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
912 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
914 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
916 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
917 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
918 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
920 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
921 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
928 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
933 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
936 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
937 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
938 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
939 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
943 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
945 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
946 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
947 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
948 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
949 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
950 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
951 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
952 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
953 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
954 excess_data: Vec::new(),
957 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
958 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
960 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
966 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
968 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
969 /// fields for more info.
971 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
972 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
973 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
974 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
975 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
976 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
978 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
980 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
981 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
982 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
983 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
984 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
986 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
987 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
988 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
989 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
993 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
994 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
995 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
997 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
999 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1001 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1002 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1003 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1004 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1006 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1007 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1008 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1010 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1011 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1012 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1016 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1017 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1018 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1020 if !chan.is_live() {
1021 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1023 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1024 route: route.clone(),
1025 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1026 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1029 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1032 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1033 None => return Ok(()),
1037 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1041 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1042 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1043 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1044 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1045 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1046 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1048 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1056 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1058 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1060 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1061 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1062 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1064 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1067 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1068 pending_events.push($event);
1073 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1074 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1075 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1077 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1078 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1079 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1082 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1083 mem::drop(channel_state);
1084 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1085 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1094 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1095 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1098 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1099 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1106 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1114 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1115 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1117 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1119 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1121 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1122 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1124 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1125 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1126 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1127 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1128 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1132 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1134 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1135 /// Will likely generate further events.
1136 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1137 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1138 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1140 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1141 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1143 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1147 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1148 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1149 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1150 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1152 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1153 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1154 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1155 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1156 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1157 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1159 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1164 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1166 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1167 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1168 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1169 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1170 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1173 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1175 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1176 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1181 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1183 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1184 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1185 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1186 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1187 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1188 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1189 // this channel currently :/.
1196 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1197 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1200 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1201 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1203 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1205 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1209 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1210 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1211 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1212 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1213 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1214 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1215 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1217 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1222 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1223 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1224 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1225 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1228 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1232 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1233 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1234 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1241 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1243 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1244 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1248 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1250 new_events.retain(|event| {
1251 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1252 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1253 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1259 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1260 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1261 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1262 events.push(event.1);
1266 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1267 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1268 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1269 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1270 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1271 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1272 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1279 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1280 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1281 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1282 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1283 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1284 /// still-available channels.
1285 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1287 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1288 mem::drop(channel_state);
1290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1291 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1292 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1296 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1297 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1298 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1299 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1301 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1302 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1306 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1307 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1308 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1312 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1313 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1314 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1316 //TODO: Do something with e?
1323 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1324 mem::drop(channel_state);
1326 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1327 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1330 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1331 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1333 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1334 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1337 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1339 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1349 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1350 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1351 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1353 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1354 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1355 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1356 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1357 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1358 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1360 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1361 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1362 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1363 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1364 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1365 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1370 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1372 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1373 mem::drop(channel_state);
1374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1375 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1379 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1380 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1381 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1382 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1383 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1385 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1386 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1392 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1393 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1394 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1396 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1397 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1398 //TODO: Do something with e?
1404 mem::drop(channel_state);
1405 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1406 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1407 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1411 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1412 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1413 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1415 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1416 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1417 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1418 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1419 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1421 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1429 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1430 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1431 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1434 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1435 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1437 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1441 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1442 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1445 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1446 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1450 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1452 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1453 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1454 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1455 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1456 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1457 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1458 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1459 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1462 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1463 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1464 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1466 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1470 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
1471 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1472 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1476 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1477 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1478 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1479 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1481 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1482 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1485 chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1486 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1488 //TODO: same as above
1489 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1492 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1493 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1494 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1495 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1496 output_script: output_script,
1497 user_channel_id: user_id,
1502 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1503 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1504 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1507 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1508 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1511 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1512 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1513 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1516 return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1522 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1523 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1524 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1525 // for a bogus channel.
1526 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1529 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1530 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1541 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1542 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1543 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1546 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1547 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1550 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1551 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1553 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1556 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1559 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1560 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1561 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1562 user_channel_id: user_id,
1567 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1568 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1569 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1571 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1572 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1575 chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1576 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1578 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1582 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1583 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1589 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1590 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1593 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1594 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1595 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1596 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1598 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1599 } else { (res, None) }
1601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1604 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1605 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1606 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1608 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1610 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1611 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1619 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1620 let (res, chan_option) = {
1621 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1622 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1623 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1625 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1626 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1627 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1629 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1630 if res.1.is_some() {
1631 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1632 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1633 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1634 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1635 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1636 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1637 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1639 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1640 } else { (res, None) }
1642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1645 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1646 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1648 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1650 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1651 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1659 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1660 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1661 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1662 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1664 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1665 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1666 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1667 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1669 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1670 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1672 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1674 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1675 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1678 if !chan.is_usable() {
1679 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1681 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1683 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1687 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1688 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1689 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1691 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1692 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1693 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1695 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
1697 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1699 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1703 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1704 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1705 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1707 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1708 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1711 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1713 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1717 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1718 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1719 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1721 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1722 if res.is_some() { return; }
1724 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1726 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1727 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1728 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1729 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1730 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1732 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1733 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1734 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1736 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1737 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1738 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1739 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1740 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1741 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1742 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1743 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1744 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1745 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1746 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1747 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1748 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1749 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1757 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1758 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1759 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1760 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1763 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1775 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1776 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1777 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1779 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1780 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1783 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1786 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1790 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1791 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1792 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1795 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1796 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1799 chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1801 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1804 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1808 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1811 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1812 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1813 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1814 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1816 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1817 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1820 (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1822 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1825 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1828 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1829 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1832 let mut forward_event = None;
1833 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1834 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1836 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1837 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1839 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1840 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1842 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1845 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1850 match forward_event {
1852 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1853 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1854 time_forwardable: time
1863 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1864 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1867 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1868 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1869 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1871 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1873 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1877 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1878 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1879 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1880 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1882 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1885 if !chan.is_usable() {
1886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1889 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1890 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1891 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1893 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1894 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1895 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1896 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1897 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1899 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1901 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1902 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1903 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1904 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1905 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1906 contents: announcement,
1907 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1909 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1912 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1913 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1917 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1919 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1920 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1922 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1925 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1926 (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1928 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1931 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1932 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1939 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
1940 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
1941 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1942 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
1944 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1945 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1946 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
1947 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
1949 if !chan.is_usable() {
1950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
1952 if !chan.is_outbound() {
1953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
1955 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
1956 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1960 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1961 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1962 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1963 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1964 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1965 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1966 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1967 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
1978 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1979 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1981 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1982 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1987 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1988 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1989 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1990 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1994 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1995 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1996 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1997 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1998 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1999 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2000 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2001 msg: funding_locked,
2002 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2004 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2005 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2006 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2007 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2010 if channel.is_shutdown() {
2014 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2015 for tx in txn_matched {
2016 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2017 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2018 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2019 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2021 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2022 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2023 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2024 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2025 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2026 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2035 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2036 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2037 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2039 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2040 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2041 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2042 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2043 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2044 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2045 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2054 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2055 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2057 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2058 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2059 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2061 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2064 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2065 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2066 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2067 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2069 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2071 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2072 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2073 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2074 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2075 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2077 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2078 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2079 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2089 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2090 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2092 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2093 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2094 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2095 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2098 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2102 macro_rules! handle_error {
2103 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2106 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2107 if needs_channel_force_close {
2109 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2110 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2111 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2113 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2116 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2117 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2118 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2119 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2120 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2122 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2134 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2135 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2136 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2137 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2140 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2141 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2144 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2145 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2148 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2149 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2152 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2153 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2156 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2157 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2160 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2161 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2164 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2165 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2168 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2169 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2172 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2173 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2176 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2177 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2180 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2181 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2184 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2185 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2188 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2189 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2192 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2193 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2196 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2197 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2200 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2201 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2202 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2203 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2205 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2206 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2207 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2208 if no_connection_possible {
2209 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2210 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2211 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2212 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2214 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2215 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2216 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2226 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2227 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2228 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2229 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2230 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2231 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2232 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2234 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2235 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2236 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2245 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2246 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2248 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2249 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2250 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2251 pending_events.push(event);
2254 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2255 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2256 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2261 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2262 let mut res = Vec::new();
2263 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2264 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2265 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2266 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2267 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2268 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2269 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2273 res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2278 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2282 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2283 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2284 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2285 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2286 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2290 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2297 use chain::chaininterface;
2298 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2299 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2300 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2301 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2303 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2304 use util::test_utils;
2305 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2306 use util::errors::APIError;
2307 use util::logger::Logger;
2308 use util::ser::Writeable;
2310 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2311 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2312 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2313 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2314 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2315 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2316 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2320 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2321 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2323 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2324 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2326 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2328 use std::cell::RefCell;
2329 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2330 use std::default::Default;
2332 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2333 use std::time::Instant;
2336 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2337 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2338 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2343 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2344 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2347 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2348 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2351 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2352 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2355 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2356 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2359 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2360 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2367 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2368 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2373 fn onion_vectors() {
2374 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2375 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2377 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2378 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2379 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2380 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2381 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2383 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2384 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2385 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2386 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2387 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2389 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2390 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2391 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2392 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2393 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2395 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2396 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2397 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2398 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2399 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2401 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2402 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2403 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2404 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2405 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2407 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2408 let payloads = vec!(
2409 msgs::OnionHopData {
2411 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2412 short_channel_id: 0,
2414 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2418 msgs::OnionHopData {
2420 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2421 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2422 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2423 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2427 msgs::OnionHopData {
2429 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2430 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2431 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2432 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2436 msgs::OnionHopData {
2438 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2439 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2440 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2441 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2445 msgs::OnionHopData {
2447 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2448 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2449 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2450 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2456 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2457 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2459 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2463 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2464 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2466 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2467 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2468 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2470 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2471 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2473 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2474 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2476 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2477 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2479 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2480 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2482 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2483 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2486 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2487 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2488 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2489 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2491 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2492 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2497 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2498 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2499 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2500 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2502 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2503 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2505 impl Drop for Node {
2506 fn drop(&mut self) {
2507 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2508 // Check that we processed all pending events
2509 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2510 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2515 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2516 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2518 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2519 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2520 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2521 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2522 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2523 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2528 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2530 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2534 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2535 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2537 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2538 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2539 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2541 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2542 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2544 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2546 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2547 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2548 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2549 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2550 added_monitors.clear();
2552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2555 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2556 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2557 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2558 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2559 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2560 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2561 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2562 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2563 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2564 added_monitors.clear();
2567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2570 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2572 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2573 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2574 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2575 added_monitors.clear();
2578 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2579 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2581 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2582 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2583 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2588 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2589 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2592 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2593 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2594 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2595 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2602 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2603 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2604 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2605 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2606 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2607 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2608 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2609 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2610 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2611 as_announcement_sigs
2613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2616 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2617 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2618 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2619 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2625 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2626 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2627 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2628 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2629 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2630 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2636 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2638 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2641 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2642 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2644 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2645 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2646 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2648 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2651 macro_rules! check_spends {
2652 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2654 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2655 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2656 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2657 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2662 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2663 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2664 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2667 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2668 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2669 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2670 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2671 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2672 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2678 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2679 if !close_inbound_first {
2680 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2682 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2683 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2684 if close_inbound_first {
2685 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2686 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2687 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2688 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2690 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2691 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2692 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2693 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2695 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2696 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2697 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2699 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2700 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2701 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2702 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2704 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2705 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2707 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2709 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2710 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2716 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2717 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2718 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2719 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725 (as_update, bs_update)
2730 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2731 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2734 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2736 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2737 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2738 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2740 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2741 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2748 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2749 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2751 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2753 added_monitors.clear();
2758 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2759 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2761 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2762 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2763 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2764 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2765 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2766 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2767 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2768 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2769 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2770 if $fail_backwards {
2771 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2773 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2775 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2776 if $fail_backwards {
2777 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2778 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2780 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2782 added_monitors.clear();
2788 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2791 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2792 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2793 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2794 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2795 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2796 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2797 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2802 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2803 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2805 let mut payment_event = {
2806 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2807 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2809 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2811 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2813 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2815 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2816 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2818 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2819 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2820 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2822 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2823 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2825 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2829 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2830 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2832 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2833 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2834 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2836 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2837 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2838 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2843 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2844 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2845 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2851 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2854 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2855 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2856 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2858 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2859 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2860 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2862 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2864 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2866 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2868 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2873 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2874 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2875 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2876 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2877 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2878 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2881 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2882 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2885 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2886 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2887 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2888 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2889 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2890 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2891 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2892 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2897 assert!(events.is_empty());
2899 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2900 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2907 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2908 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2911 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2912 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2919 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2920 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2923 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2925 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2926 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2927 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2928 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2929 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2932 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2935 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2936 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2937 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2938 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2939 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2942 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2944 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2946 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2947 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2951 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2952 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2953 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2956 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2957 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2958 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2960 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2961 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2962 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2964 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2965 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
2970 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2971 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2972 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2973 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2974 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2975 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
2976 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
2977 // second-to-last node!
2978 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
2981 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2982 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2985 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2986 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2987 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2988 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2989 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2990 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2991 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2992 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2997 assert!(events.is_empty());
2999 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3000 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3007 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3009 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3012 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3013 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3020 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3021 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3024 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3025 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3026 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3028 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3030 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3031 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3033 for _ in 0..node_count {
3034 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3035 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3036 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3037 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3039 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3040 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3041 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3043 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3044 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3045 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3046 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3047 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3055 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3056 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3057 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3058 let channel_id = chan.2;
3060 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3062 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3063 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3069 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3073 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
3074 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3075 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3076 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3077 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3078 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
3079 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
3080 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
3081 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
3082 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3084 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
3086 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
3088 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3089 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3092 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3093 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3094 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3095 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3096 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3103 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3104 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3105 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3108 let payment_event = {
3109 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3110 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3111 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3113 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3114 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3116 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3117 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3118 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3119 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3122 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3123 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3124 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3127 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3128 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3129 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3130 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3131 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3132 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3135 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3136 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3137 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3138 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3139 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3140 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3143 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3144 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3147 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3148 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3154 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3157 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3166 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3167 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3168 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3169 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3170 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3171 let channel_id = chan.2;
3173 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3175 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3176 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3184 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3185 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3188 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3189 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3190 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3191 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3197 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3199 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3200 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3201 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3204 let payment_event = {
3205 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3206 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3207 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3209 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3210 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3212 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3213 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3214 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3215 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3218 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3221 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3225 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3226 let nodes = create_network(2);
3227 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3228 let channel_id = chan.2;
3230 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3232 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3233 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3239 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3240 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3241 // update_fee (never committed) ->
3242 // (3) update_fee ->
3243 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3244 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3245 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3246 // <- (1) RAA delivered
3247 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
3248 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3249 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3250 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3251 // revoke_and_ack ->
3252 // B should send no response here
3253 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
3254 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3255 // revoke_and_ack ->
3257 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3258 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3259 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3262 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3263 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3264 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3265 Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3266 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3272 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3273 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3276 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3278 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3279 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3281 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3282 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3283 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3284 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3289 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3291 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3293 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3294 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3296 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3297 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3298 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3299 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3300 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3301 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3302 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3304 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3305 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3307 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3309 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3313 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3316 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3319 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3320 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3323 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3328 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3329 let nodes = create_network(2);
3330 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3331 let channel_id = chan.2;
3333 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3335 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3341 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3342 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3344 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3346 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3347 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3348 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3354 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3355 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3359 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3360 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3363 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3364 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3367 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3368 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3373 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3374 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3375 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3376 let channel_id = chan.2;
3378 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3380 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3387 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3389 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3390 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3392 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3394 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3395 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3396 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3400 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3403 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3408 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3410 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3411 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3413 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3414 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3415 added_monitors.clear();
3417 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3419 // node[1] has nothing to do
3421 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3422 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3425 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3426 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3429 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3431 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3432 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3433 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3434 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3435 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3436 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3438 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3439 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3442 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3443 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3447 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3449 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3450 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3454 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3457 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3460 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3461 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3463 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3466 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3470 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3472 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3473 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3474 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3478 fn test_update_fee() {
3479 let nodes = create_network(2);
3480 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3481 let channel_id = chan.2;
3483 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3485 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3486 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3492 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3493 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3494 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
3495 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
3496 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3497 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3498 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
3499 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3500 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
3501 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3502 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3503 // revoke_and_ack ->
3505 // Create and deliver (1)...
3506 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3507 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3509 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3510 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3511 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3512 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3513 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3519 // Generate (2) and (3):
3520 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3521 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3526 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3527 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3530 // Create and deliver (4)...
3531 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3532 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3533 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3534 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3535 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3536 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3540 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3542 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3544 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3548 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3549 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3550 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3554 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3555 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3558 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3559 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3560 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3565 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3567 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3568 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3571 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3572 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3573 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3577 fn fake_network_test() {
3578 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3579 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3580 let nodes = create_network(4);
3582 // Create some initial channels
3583 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3584 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3585 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3587 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3588 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3589 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3590 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3591 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3593 // Send some more payments
3594 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3595 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3596 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3598 // Test failure packets
3599 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3600 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3602 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3603 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3605 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3606 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3607 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3608 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3609 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3610 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3611 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3613 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3614 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3615 hops.push(RouteHop {
3616 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3617 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3619 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3621 hops.push(RouteHop {
3622 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3623 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3625 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3627 hops.push(RouteHop {
3628 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3629 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3631 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3633 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3634 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3635 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3637 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3638 hops.push(RouteHop {
3639 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3640 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3642 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3644 hops.push(RouteHop {
3645 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3646 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3648 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3650 hops.push(RouteHop {
3651 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3652 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3654 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3656 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3657 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3658 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3660 // Claim the rebalances...
3661 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3662 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3664 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3665 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3667 // Send some payments across both channels
3668 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3669 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3670 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3672 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3674 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3676 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3677 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3678 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3680 // Close down the channels...
3681 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3682 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3683 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3684 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3685 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3689 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3690 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3691 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3692 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3694 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3695 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3696 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3697 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3698 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3699 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3701 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3703 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3704 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3706 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3707 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3709 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3710 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3711 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3714 #[derive(PartialEq)]
3715 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3716 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3718 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3719 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3720 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3722 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3723 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3725 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3727 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3728 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3729 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3731 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3732 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3733 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3734 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3735 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3736 res.push(tx.clone());
3741 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3742 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3745 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3747 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3748 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3749 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3750 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3751 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3752 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3754 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3756 res.push(tx.clone());
3760 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3763 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3767 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3768 /// HTLC transaction.
3769 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3770 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3771 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3772 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3773 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3774 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3778 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3781 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3782 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3784 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3785 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3786 let mut found_prev = false;
3788 for tx in prev_txn {
3789 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3790 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3791 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3792 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3798 assert!(found_prev);
3800 let mut res = Vec::new();
3801 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3805 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3806 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3807 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3808 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3809 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3815 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3816 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3817 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3818 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3825 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3826 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3831 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3832 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3833 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3834 let nodes = create_network(5);
3836 // Create some initial channels
3837 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3838 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3839 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3840 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3842 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3843 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3845 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3846 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3848 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3849 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3851 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3852 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3853 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3854 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3856 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3857 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3858 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3860 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3861 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3863 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3864 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3866 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3867 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3868 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3869 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3871 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3872 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3873 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3875 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3876 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3878 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3879 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3881 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3884 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3885 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3886 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3887 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3895 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3896 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3897 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3899 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3901 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3902 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3904 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3905 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3907 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3909 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3910 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3911 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3913 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3914 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3917 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3918 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3919 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3920 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3921 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3924 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3926 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3927 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3929 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3930 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3931 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3932 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3933 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3936 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3938 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3939 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3941 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3943 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3944 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3945 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3947 // Create some new channels:
3948 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3950 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3951 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3952 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3953 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3954 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
3955 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3956 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
3957 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
3958 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
3959 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
3960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
3961 // Revoke the old state
3962 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3965 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3966 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3968 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3969 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3970 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
3971 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
3973 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3974 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3976 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3978 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3979 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3980 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3981 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3982 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
3984 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3985 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3986 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3990 fn revoked_output_claim() {
3991 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
3992 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
3993 let nodes = create_network(2);
3994 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3995 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
3996 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
3998 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
3999 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4000 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4001 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4003 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4004 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4005 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4006 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4007 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4009 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4011 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4012 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4014 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4015 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4016 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4020 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4021 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4022 let nodes = create_network(2);
4024 // Create some new channel:
4025 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4027 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4028 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4029 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4030 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4031 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4033 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4034 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4035 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4036 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4037 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4038 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4039 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4040 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4041 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4043 //Revoke the old state
4044 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4047 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4049 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4051 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4052 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4053 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4055 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4056 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4058 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4060 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4061 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4062 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4063 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4064 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4065 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4066 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4067 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4069 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4070 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4071 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4073 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4074 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4075 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4076 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4077 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4078 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4080 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4081 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4082 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4086 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4087 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4088 let nodes = create_network(2);
4090 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4092 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4093 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4094 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4095 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4096 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4097 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4099 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4100 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4102 //Revoke the old state
4103 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4106 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4108 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4110 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4111 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4112 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4114 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4115 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4116 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4117 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4118 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4119 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4120 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4122 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4123 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4124 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4126 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4127 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4128 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4129 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4130 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4132 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4133 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4134 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4135 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4136 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4137 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4138 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4139 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4141 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4142 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4144 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4145 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4146 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4147 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4148 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4149 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4151 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4152 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4153 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4157 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4158 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4159 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4160 let nodes = create_network(2);
4161 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4163 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4164 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4166 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4169 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4170 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4176 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4177 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4179 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4180 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4183 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4186 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4187 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4193 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4194 // registering new transactions
4195 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4199 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4200 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4201 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4203 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4205 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4207 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4209 let mut payment_event = {
4210 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4215 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4218 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4221 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4222 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4224 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4228 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4229 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4231 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4232 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4233 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4234 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4237 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4238 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4241 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4242 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4243 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4245 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4246 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4247 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4249 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4250 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4256 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4257 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4258 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4259 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4260 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4264 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4265 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4267 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4268 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4269 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4271 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4272 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4277 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4279 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4280 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4281 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4283 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4284 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4285 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4286 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4287 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4288 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4289 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4291 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4295 fn test_unconf_chan() {
4296 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4297 let nodes = create_network(2);
4298 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4300 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4301 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4302 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4303 mem::drop(channel_state);
4305 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4306 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4307 headers.push(header.clone());
4309 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4310 headers.push(header.clone());
4312 while !headers.is_empty() {
4313 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4316 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4319 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4320 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4325 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4326 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4327 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4330 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
4331 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4332 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4334 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4335 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4336 resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4338 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4339 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4341 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4344 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4345 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4346 resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4348 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4349 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4351 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4354 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4355 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4357 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4359 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4360 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4362 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4364 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4365 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4366 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4367 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4368 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4369 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4370 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4371 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4372 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4374 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4375 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4378 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4380 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4384 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4386 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4387 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4389 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4391 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4392 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4393 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4394 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4395 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4396 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4397 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4398 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4399 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4401 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4402 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4405 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4407 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4413 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4414 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4415 let nodes = create_network(3);
4416 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4419 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4423 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4424 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4425 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4426 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4428 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4429 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4430 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4432 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4433 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4434 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4435 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4437 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4438 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4440 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4441 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4443 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
4445 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4446 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4448 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4449 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4454 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4455 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4461 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4462 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4466 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
4467 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
4468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4469 let nodes = create_network(2);
4471 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4473 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4474 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4475 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4476 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4478 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4480 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4481 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4483 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
4484 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
4486 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
4488 let mut chan_announcement;
4490 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4492 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4493 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4494 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4495 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4496 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4497 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4498 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4499 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4500 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4505 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4506 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4507 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4508 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4509 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4510 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4511 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4512 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4513 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4514 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4515 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4516 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4517 contents: $unsigned_msg
4522 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4523 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4525 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4527 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4528 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4529 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4530 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4531 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4533 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4534 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4535 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4536 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());