1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
8 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
10 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
13 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
14 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
16 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
17 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
19 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
20 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
21 use util::sha2::Sha256;
22 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
23 use util::logger::Logger;
24 use util::errors::APIError;
27 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
28 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
29 use crypto::digest::Digest;
30 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
33 use std::collections::HashMap;
34 use std::collections::hash_map;
35 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
36 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
37 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
39 mod channel_held_info {
42 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
43 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
44 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
45 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
46 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
47 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
48 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
49 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
50 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
53 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
54 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
55 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
56 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
59 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
60 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
61 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
62 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
66 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
67 impl PendingHTLCStatus {
68 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
69 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 payment_hash: [0; 32],
73 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
75 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
83 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
91 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
93 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
94 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
95 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
100 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
101 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
102 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
103 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
105 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
106 IntermediaryHopData {
107 source_short_channel_id: u64,
108 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
112 session_priv: SecretKey,
114 /// Used for channel rebalancing
116 source_short_channel_id: u64,
117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
119 session_priv: SecretKey,
123 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
124 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
125 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
126 /// probably increase this significantly.
127 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
129 struct ChannelHolder {
130 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
131 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
132 next_forward: Instant,
133 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
134 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
135 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
136 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
137 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
138 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
139 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
141 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
143 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
144 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
145 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
146 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
147 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
148 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
151 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
153 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
154 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
155 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
156 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
157 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
162 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
163 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
165 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
166 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
167 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
168 /// to individual Channels.
169 pub struct ChannelManager {
170 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
171 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
172 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
173 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
174 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
176 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
177 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
178 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
179 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
181 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
182 our_network_key: SecretKey,
184 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
189 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
191 macro_rules! secp_call {
192 ( $res: expr, $err_msg: expr, $action: expr ) => {
195 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err_msg, action: Some($action)})
202 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
204 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
205 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
210 pub struct ChannelDetails {
211 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
212 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
213 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
214 /// lifetime of the channel.
215 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
216 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
217 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
218 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
219 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
220 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
221 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
225 impl ChannelManager {
226 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
227 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
228 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
229 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
230 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
231 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
232 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
234 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
235 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
236 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
237 monitor: monitor.clone(),
241 announce_channels_publicly,
242 fee_proportional_millionths,
243 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
246 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
247 by_id: HashMap::new(),
248 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
249 next_forward: Instant::now(),
250 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
251 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
255 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
259 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
260 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
264 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
265 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
266 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
267 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
268 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
269 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
270 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
271 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
272 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
273 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
275 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
276 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
277 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
278 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
279 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
280 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
281 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
282 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
285 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
286 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
287 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
289 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
293 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
294 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
295 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
296 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
297 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
301 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
302 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
303 node_id: their_network_key,
309 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
310 /// more information.
311 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
312 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
313 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
314 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
315 res.push(ChannelDetails {
316 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
317 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
318 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
319 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
320 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
326 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
327 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
328 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
329 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
330 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
331 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
332 if channel.is_usable() {
333 res.push(ChannelDetails {
334 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
335 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
336 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
337 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
338 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
345 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
346 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
347 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
348 /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
349 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
350 let (res, node_id, chan_option) = {
351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
352 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
355 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
356 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
357 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
358 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
360 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
361 } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
366 for payment_hash in res.1 {
367 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
368 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
370 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
371 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
376 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
377 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
378 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
382 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
391 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
392 let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
393 for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
394 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
395 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
397 for tx in local_txn {
398 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
400 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
401 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
402 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
403 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
404 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
407 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
408 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
409 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
412 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
413 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
414 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
415 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
422 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
423 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
424 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
425 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
431 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
432 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
433 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
434 for chan in self.list_channels() {
435 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
440 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
442 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
443 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
444 let mut res = [0; 32];
445 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
449 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
450 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
451 let mut res = [0; 32];
452 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
458 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
459 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
460 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
461 let mut res = [0; 32];
462 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
467 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
468 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
469 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
470 let mut res = [0; 32];
471 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
475 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
477 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
478 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
479 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
481 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
482 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
484 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
485 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
486 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
487 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
488 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
490 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
492 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
493 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
495 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
501 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
502 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
503 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
505 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
506 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
512 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
522 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
523 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
524 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
525 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
526 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
527 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
528 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
529 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
531 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
532 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
533 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
534 // the intended recipient).
535 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
536 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
537 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
539 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
540 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
541 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
542 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
546 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
547 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
548 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", action: None});
550 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
551 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
552 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", action: None});
554 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
556 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
560 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
562 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
570 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
571 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
573 for i in 0..dst.len() {
578 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
579 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
580 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
581 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
584 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
585 let end_len = iters * 65;
586 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
587 res.resize(end_len, 0);
589 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
590 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
591 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
592 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
593 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
598 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
599 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
601 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
602 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
603 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
604 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
606 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
607 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
608 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
611 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
614 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
615 hmac.input(&packet_data);
616 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
617 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
620 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
622 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
623 hop_data: packet_data,
628 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
629 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
630 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
631 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
633 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
634 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
635 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
636 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
637 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
638 data: packet_crypted,
642 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
643 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
645 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
648 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
649 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
650 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
651 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
656 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
659 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
661 failuremsg: failuremsg,
665 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
666 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
667 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
673 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
674 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
675 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
678 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, Option<SharedSecret>, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
679 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
682 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
683 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
684 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
685 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
691 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
692 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
693 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
694 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
695 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
696 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
697 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
698 })), None, self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
701 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
702 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
704 let mut channel_state = None;
705 macro_rules! return_err {
706 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
708 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
709 if channel_state.is_none() {
710 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
712 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
713 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
714 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
715 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
716 })), Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap());
721 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
722 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
723 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
724 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
725 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
726 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
727 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
728 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
731 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
732 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
733 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
734 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
735 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
738 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
739 let next_hop_data = {
740 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
741 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
742 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
744 let error_code = match err {
745 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
746 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
748 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
754 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
756 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
758 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
759 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
761 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
762 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
765 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
766 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
767 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
768 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
770 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
772 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
774 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
775 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
776 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
779 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
780 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
781 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
783 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
785 let blinding_factor = {
786 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
787 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
788 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
789 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
790 sha.result(&mut res);
791 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
793 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
799 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
800 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
803 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
805 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
806 hop_data: new_packet_data,
807 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
810 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
811 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
812 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
813 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
814 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
815 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
816 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
820 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
821 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
822 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
823 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
824 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
826 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
828 Some(id) => id.clone(),
830 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
831 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
833 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
835 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
836 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
837 Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
839 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
840 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
847 return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
852 (pending_forward_info, Some(shared_secret), channel_state.unwrap())
855 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
856 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
857 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
858 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
862 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
864 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
865 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
866 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
867 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
868 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
869 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
870 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
871 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
872 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
873 excess_data: Vec::new(),
876 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
877 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
879 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
885 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
886 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
887 /// fields for more info.
888 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
889 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
890 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
891 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
892 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
893 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
894 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
895 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
896 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
897 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
898 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", action: None});
900 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
901 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
902 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
903 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", action: None});
907 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
908 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
909 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
911 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
913 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
915 //TODO: This should return something other than HandleError, that's really intended for
917 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv), "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected", msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError);
918 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
919 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
921 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
923 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
925 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
926 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
927 Some(id) => id.clone()
930 let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
931 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
932 return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
936 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
937 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
938 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
940 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
943 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
945 claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
951 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
952 None => return Ok(()),
956 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
957 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
960 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
961 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
962 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
963 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
964 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
965 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
966 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
967 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
974 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
975 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
976 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
977 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
978 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
980 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
983 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
984 pending_events.push($event);
989 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
990 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
991 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
993 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
995 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
998 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
999 mem::drop(channel_state);
1000 add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1001 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1010 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1011 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1012 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
1014 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1015 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1019 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1020 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1022 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1030 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1031 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1033 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1035 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1037 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1038 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1040 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1041 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1042 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1043 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1044 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1048 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1049 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1050 /// Will likely generate further events.
1051 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1052 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1053 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1055 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1056 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1058 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1062 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1063 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1064 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1065 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1067 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1068 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1069 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1074 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1076 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1077 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1078 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1080 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1081 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1086 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1088 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1089 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1090 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1091 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1092 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1093 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1094 // this channel currently :/.
1101 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1102 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1105 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1109 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1110 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1111 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1112 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1113 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1114 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1115 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1116 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1121 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
1122 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1123 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1124 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1131 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1132 match failed_forward.2 {
1133 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
1134 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1138 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1140 new_events.retain(|event| {
1141 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1142 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1143 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1149 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1150 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1151 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1152 events.push(event.1);
1156 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1157 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1158 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
1161 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1162 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1163 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1164 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1165 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1166 /// still-available channels.
1167 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
1168 let mut pending_htlc = {
1169 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
1170 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1171 None => return false,
1175 match pending_htlc {
1176 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1177 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
1181 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1186 match pending_htlc {
1187 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1188 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1189 mem::drop(channel_state);
1191 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1192 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1193 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1197 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
1198 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1199 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1200 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1201 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1203 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1204 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1208 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1209 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1210 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1211 None => return false
1214 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1215 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
1216 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1218 //TODO: Do something with e?
1225 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1226 mem::drop(channel_state);
1228 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1229 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1232 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1233 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1235 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1236 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1237 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1238 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1239 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1240 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1252 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1253 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1254 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1255 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1256 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1257 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
1259 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
1260 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1261 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1262 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1263 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1265 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1266 let mut pending_htlc = {
1267 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
1268 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
1269 None => return false,
1273 match pending_htlc {
1274 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
1275 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
1276 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
1277 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
1278 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
1279 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
1280 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
1281 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
1287 match pending_htlc {
1288 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
1289 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1291 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
1293 mem::drop(channel_state);
1294 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1295 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1300 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
1301 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1302 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
1303 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1305 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1306 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1312 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1313 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
1314 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1316 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1317 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1318 //TODO: Do something with e?
1324 mem::drop(channel_state);
1325 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1326 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1327 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1331 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1332 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1333 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1335 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1336 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1337 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1338 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1339 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1340 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1349 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1350 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1351 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1354 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1355 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1357 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1362 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
1363 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1364 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1365 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1366 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1371 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1372 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1373 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1374 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1376 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1378 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1379 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1380 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
1381 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
1382 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
1383 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1384 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1385 msg: funding_locked,
1386 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1388 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1389 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
1390 new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
1391 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1394 if channel.is_shutdown() {
1398 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1399 for tx in txn_matched {
1400 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1401 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
1402 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1403 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1405 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
1406 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
1407 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
1408 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1409 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1410 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1419 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1420 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1421 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1423 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1424 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
1425 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
1426 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
1427 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
1428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1429 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1438 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1439 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1441 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1442 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1443 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1445 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
1448 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
1449 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1450 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1451 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
1453 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1455 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1456 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
1457 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
1458 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
1459 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1461 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
1462 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
1463 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1473 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
1474 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
1476 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1477 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1478 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1479 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1482 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1486 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1487 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1488 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1489 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1490 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", action: None});
1492 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1493 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1494 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", action: None});
1497 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1499 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1500 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1501 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1502 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1503 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1504 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1505 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1506 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1509 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1510 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1511 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1513 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1517 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
1518 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1519 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1523 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1524 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1525 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1528 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1529 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1531 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1532 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1534 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1537 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1538 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1539 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1540 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1541 output_script: output_script,
1542 user_channel_id: user_id,
1547 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1548 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1549 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1550 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1552 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1553 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1555 match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1556 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1557 (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1560 //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
1565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1567 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1568 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1569 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1570 // for a bogus channel.
1571 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1574 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1575 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1577 return Err(HandleError {
1578 err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
1579 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
1582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1589 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1590 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1591 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1592 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1594 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1595 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1597 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1598 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1600 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1603 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1606 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1608 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1609 user_channel_id: user_id,
1614 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1615 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1616 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1618 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1619 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1621 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1622 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1624 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1628 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1629 let (res, chan_option) = {
1630 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1635 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1636 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1638 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1639 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1640 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1641 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1643 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1644 } else { (res, None) }
1646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1649 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1650 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1651 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1653 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1655 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1656 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1664 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1665 let (res, chan_option) = {
1666 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1667 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1670 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1671 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1673 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1674 if res.1.is_some() {
1675 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1676 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1677 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1678 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1679 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1680 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1681 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1683 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1684 } else { (res, None) }
1686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1689 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1690 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1692 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1693 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1694 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1695 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1703 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1704 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1705 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1706 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1708 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1709 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1710 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1711 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1713 let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1714 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1716 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1718 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1719 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1720 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1721 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1722 let mut will_forward = false;
1723 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1724 if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1725 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1726 if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
1727 acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
1729 if !acceptable_cycle {
1730 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
1731 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1732 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1733 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1734 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret.unwrap(), 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
1737 will_forward = true;
1740 will_forward = true;
1744 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1746 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1747 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1749 if !chan.is_usable() {
1750 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
1752 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1753 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
1754 forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1756 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1758 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
1762 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1764 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1765 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1766 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1767 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1769 _ => unreachable!(),
1771 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1772 source_short_channel_id,
1773 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1779 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1780 source_short_channel_id,
1781 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret.unwrap(),
1790 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1791 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1792 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1793 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1794 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1796 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1797 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1799 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1800 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1802 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1804 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1808 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1809 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1810 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1812 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1813 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1815 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1817 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1820 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1821 match pending_htlc {
1822 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1823 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1824 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1826 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1827 if res.is_some() { return; }
1829 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1831 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1832 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1833 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1834 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1835 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1837 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1838 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1839 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1841 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1842 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1843 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1844 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1845 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1846 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1847 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1848 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1849 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1850 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1851 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1852 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1853 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1854 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1862 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1863 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1864 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1865 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1868 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1883 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1884 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1885 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1887 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1888 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1890 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1892 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1896 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1897 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1898 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1901 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1902 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1904 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1906 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1909 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1913 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1916 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1917 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1921 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1924 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1926 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1929 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1932 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1936 let mut forward_event = None;
1937 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1938 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1939 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1940 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1941 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1943 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1944 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1946 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1949 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1954 match forward_event {
1956 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1957 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1958 time_forwardable: time
1967 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1968 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1971 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1972 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
1974 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1976 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
1980 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1981 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1982 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1983 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1985 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1986 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) })
1988 if !chan.is_usable() {
1989 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
1992 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1993 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1995 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1996 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1997 let bad_sig_action = msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.channel_id.clone(), data: "Invalid signature in announcement_signatures".to_string() } };
1998 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), "Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", bad_sig_action);
1999 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), "Bad announcement_signatures bitcoin_signature", bad_sig_action);
2001 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2003 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2004 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2005 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2006 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2007 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2008 contents: announcement,
2009 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2011 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)})
2014 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2015 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
2019 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2020 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2021 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2025 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2026 if no_connection_possible {
2027 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2028 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2029 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2030 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2032 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2033 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2034 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2044 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
2045 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2046 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
2047 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
2053 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2054 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2056 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2057 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2058 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2059 pending_events.push(event);
2064 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2065 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2067 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2068 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2072 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2079 use chain::chaininterface;
2080 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2081 use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2082 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2083 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2085 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2086 use util::test_utils;
2087 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2088 use util::logger::Logger;
2090 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2091 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2092 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2093 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2094 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2095 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2096 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2100 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2101 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2103 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2104 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2106 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2108 use std::collections::HashMap;
2109 use std::default::Default;
2110 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2111 use std::time::Instant;
2114 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2115 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2116 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2121 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2122 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2125 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2126 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2129 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2130 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2133 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2134 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2137 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2138 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2143 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2145 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2146 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2151 fn onion_vectors() {
2152 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2153 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2155 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2156 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2157 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2158 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2159 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2161 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2162 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2163 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2164 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2165 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2167 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2168 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2169 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2170 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2171 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2173 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2174 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2175 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2176 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2177 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2179 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2180 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2181 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2182 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2183 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2185 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2186 let payloads = vec!(
2187 msgs::OnionHopData {
2189 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2190 short_channel_id: 0,
2192 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2196 msgs::OnionHopData {
2198 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2199 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2200 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2201 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2205 msgs::OnionHopData {
2207 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2208 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2209 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2210 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2214 msgs::OnionHopData {
2216 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2217 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2218 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2219 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2223 msgs::OnionHopData {
2225 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2226 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2227 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2228 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2234 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
2235 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2237 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
2241 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2242 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2244 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2245 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2246 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("4c2fc8bc08510334b6833ad9c3e79cd1b52ae59dfe5c2a4b23ead50f09f7ee0b0002200200fe0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
2248 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2249 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2251 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2252 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2254 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2255 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2257 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2258 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2260 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2261 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2264 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2265 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2266 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2267 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2269 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2270 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2275 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2276 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2277 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2278 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2282 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2283 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2284 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2286 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2287 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2288 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2289 Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2290 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2291 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2296 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2298 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2302 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2303 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2305 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2306 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2307 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2309 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2310 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2312 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2314 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2315 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2316 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2317 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2318 added_monitors.clear();
2320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2325 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2326 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2327 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2328 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2329 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2330 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2331 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2332 added_monitors.clear();
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2338 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2340 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2341 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2342 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2343 added_monitors.clear();
2346 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2347 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2349 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2350 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2351 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2356 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2357 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2358 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2360 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2361 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2362 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2363 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2370 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2371 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2372 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2373 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2374 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2375 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2376 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2377 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2378 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2379 as_announcement_sigs
2381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2384 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2385 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2386 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2387 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2393 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2394 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2395 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2396 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2397 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2398 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2408 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2411 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2412 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2414 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2415 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2416 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2418 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2421 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2422 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2423 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2426 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2427 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2428 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2429 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2430 Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2431 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2437 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2438 if !close_inbound_first {
2439 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2441 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2442 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2443 if close_inbound_first {
2444 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2445 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2446 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2447 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2449 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2450 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2451 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2452 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2454 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2455 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2456 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2458 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2459 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2460 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2461 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2463 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2464 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2465 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2466 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2468 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2469 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2470 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2471 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2477 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2478 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2479 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2480 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2486 (as_update, bs_update)
2491 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2492 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2495 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2497 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
2498 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2499 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2500 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2501 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2508 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2509 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2510 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2511 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2512 let our_payment_hash = {
2513 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2514 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2515 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2516 sha.result(&mut ret);
2520 let mut payment_event = {
2521 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2523 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2524 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2525 added_monitors.clear();
2528 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2530 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2532 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2534 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2535 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2537 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2539 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2540 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2543 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2545 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2547 added_monitors.clear();
2549 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2550 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2552 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2553 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2554 added_monitors.clear();
2556 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2557 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2559 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2561 added_monitors.clear();
2564 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2565 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2567 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2568 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2571 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2572 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2574 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2575 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2576 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2578 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2579 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2580 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2586 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2587 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2588 added_monitors.clear();
2590 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2591 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2597 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2600 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2601 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2603 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2604 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2605 added_monitors.clear();
2608 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2609 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2610 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2612 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2614 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2616 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2618 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2620 added_monitors.clear();
2622 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2624 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2625 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2626 added_monitors.clear();
2628 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2629 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2630 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2632 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2633 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2634 added_monitors.clear();
2636 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2638 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2639 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2640 added_monitors.clear();
2646 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2647 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2648 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2649 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2650 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2651 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2654 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2657 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2658 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2659 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2660 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2661 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2662 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2663 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2671 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2672 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2674 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2677 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2678 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2684 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2686 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2687 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2688 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2689 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2690 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2693 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2696 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2697 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2698 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2699 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2700 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2703 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2704 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2705 let our_payment_hash = {
2706 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2707 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2708 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2709 sha.result(&mut ret);
2713 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2714 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2717 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2718 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2719 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2722 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2723 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2725 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2726 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2727 added_monitors.clear();
2730 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2731 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2732 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2734 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2735 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2738 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2739 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2740 added_monitors.clear();
2742 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2744 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2745 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2746 added_monitors.clear();
2748 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2750 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2751 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2752 added_monitors.clear();
2754 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2755 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2756 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2758 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2760 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2762 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2763 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2765 added_monitors.clear();
2771 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2772 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2773 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2774 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2775 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2776 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2779 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2782 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2783 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2784 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2785 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2786 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2787 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2788 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2797 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2799 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2802 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2803 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2809 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2810 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2811 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2813 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2815 for _ in 0..node_count {
2816 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2817 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
2818 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2819 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2821 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2822 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2823 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2825 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
2826 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
2827 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
2834 fn fake_network_test() {
2835 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2836 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2837 let nodes = create_network(4);
2839 // Create some initial channels
2840 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2841 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2842 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2844 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2845 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2846 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2847 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2848 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2850 // Send some more payments
2851 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2852 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2853 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2855 // Test failure packets
2856 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2857 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2859 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2860 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2862 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2863 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2864 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2865 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2866 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2867 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2868 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2870 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2871 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2872 hops.push(RouteHop {
2873 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2874 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2876 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2878 hops.push(RouteHop {
2879 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2880 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2882 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2884 hops.push(RouteHop {
2885 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2886 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2888 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2890 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2891 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2892 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2894 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2895 hops.push(RouteHop {
2896 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2897 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2899 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2901 hops.push(RouteHop {
2902 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2903 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2905 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2907 hops.push(RouteHop {
2908 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2909 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2911 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2913 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2914 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2915 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2917 // Claim the rebalances...
2918 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2919 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2921 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2922 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2924 // Send some payments across both channels
2925 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2926 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2927 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2929 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2931 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2933 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2934 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2935 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2937 // Close down the channels...
2938 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2939 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2940 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2941 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2942 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2944 // Check that we processed all pending events
2946 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2947 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2951 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2952 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2953 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2954 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2955 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2957 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2959 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2960 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2962 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2963 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
2964 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2965 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2966 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2967 res.push(tx.clone());
2971 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2973 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2974 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2975 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
2976 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2977 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2978 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2979 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2980 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2982 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2984 res.push(tx.clone());
2988 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2994 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2995 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2997 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2998 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2999 let mut found_prev = false;
3001 for tx in prev_txn {
3002 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3003 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3004 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
3005 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3007 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3008 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3014 assert!(found_prev);
3016 let mut res = Vec::new();
3017 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3021 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3022 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3023 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3024 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3025 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3031 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3032 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3033 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3034 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3041 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3042 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3047 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3048 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3049 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3050 let nodes = create_network(5);
3052 // Create some initial channels
3053 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3054 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3055 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3056 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3058 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3059 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3060 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3061 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3062 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3064 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3065 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3067 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3068 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3069 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3070 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3072 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3074 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3076 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3077 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3079 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3080 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3082 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3083 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3084 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3085 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3087 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3088 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3089 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3091 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3092 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3094 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3096 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3097 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3098 added_monitors.clear();
3101 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3104 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3105 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3115 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3116 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3117 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3119 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3121 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3122 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3124 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3125 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3127 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3129 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3130 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3131 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3133 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3134 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3137 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3138 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3139 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3140 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3141 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3144 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3146 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3147 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3149 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3150 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3151 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3152 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3153 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3156 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3158 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3159 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3161 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3163 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3164 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3165 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3167 // Create some new channels:
3168 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3170 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
3171 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
3172 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
3173 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
3174 // Revoke the old state
3175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3178 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3179 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3181 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3182 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3183 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3185 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3186 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
3187 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3188 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
3190 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3192 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3193 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3194 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3195 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
3197 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
3198 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
3200 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3201 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3202 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3204 // Check that we processed all pending events
3206 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3207 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3212 fn test_unconf_chan() {
3213 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
3214 let nodes = create_network(2);
3215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3217 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3218 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
3219 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
3220 mem::drop(channel_state);
3222 let mut headers = Vec::new();
3223 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3224 headers.push(header.clone());
3226 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3227 headers.push(header.clone());
3229 while !headers.is_empty() {
3230 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
3232 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3233 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
3234 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
3238 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
3239 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
3240 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3241 let nodes = create_network(2);
3243 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3245 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3246 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3247 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3248 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
3250 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3252 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3253 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3255 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
3256 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
3258 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
3260 let mut chan_announcement;
3262 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
3264 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3265 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
3266 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
3267 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3268 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
3269 node_id_2: if !were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
3270 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
3271 bitcoin_key_2: if !were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
3272 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3277 macro_rules! sign_msg {
3278 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
3279 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
3280 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3281 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
3282 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
3283 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
3284 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3285 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
3286 node_signature_2 : if !were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
3287 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
3288 bitcoin_signature_2 : if !were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
3289 contents: $unsigned_msg
3294 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3295 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3296 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
3297 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
3299 // Configured with Network::Testnet
3300 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3301 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
3302 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3303 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
3305 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
3306 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
3307 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
3308 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());