1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
9 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
11 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
14 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
15 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
16 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
17 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
18 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
20 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
21 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
22 use util::sha2::Sha256;
25 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
26 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
27 use crypto::digest::Digest;
28 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
29 use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
31 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
32 use std::collections::HashMap;
33 use std::collections::hash_map;
35 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
37 mod channel_held_info {
40 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
41 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
42 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
43 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
44 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
45 pub(super) prev_short_channel_id: u64,
46 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
47 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
50 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
51 impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
52 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
55 payment_hash: [0; 32],
57 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
59 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
64 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
65 pub enum HTLCFailReason {
67 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
75 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
77 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
78 HTLCFailReason::Reason {
79 failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
84 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
85 pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
86 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
87 pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
89 enum PendingOutboundHTLC {
91 source_short_channel_id: u64,
92 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
96 session_priv: SecretKey,
98 /// Used for channel rebalancing
100 source_short_channel_id: u64,
101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
103 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
108 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
109 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
110 /// probably increase this significantly.
111 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
113 struct ChannelHolder {
114 by_id: HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
115 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
116 next_forward: Instant,
117 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
118 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
119 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
121 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
122 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<Uint256, Channel>,
123 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Uint256>,
124 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
125 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
126 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
127 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
130 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
132 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
133 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
134 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
135 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
136 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
137 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
142 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
143 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
144 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
145 /// to individual Channels.
146 pub struct ChannelManager {
147 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
148 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
149 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
150 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
151 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
153 announce_channels_publicly: bool,
154 fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
157 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
158 our_network_key: SecretKey,
160 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
163 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
165 macro_rules! secp_call {
169 //TODO: Make the err a parameter!
170 Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Key error", msg: None})
177 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
179 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
180 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
185 pub struct ChannelDetails {
186 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
187 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
188 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
189 /// lifetime of the channel.
190 pub channel_id: Uint256,
191 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
192 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
193 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
194 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
195 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
196 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
200 impl ChannelManager {
201 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
202 /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
203 /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
204 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
205 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)!
206 pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
207 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
209 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
210 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
211 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
212 monitor: monitor.clone(),
216 announce_channels_publicly,
217 fee_proportional_millionths,
220 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
221 by_id: HashMap::new(),
222 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
223 next_forward: Instant::now(),
224 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
225 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
229 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
231 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
232 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
236 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
237 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
239 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
240 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
241 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
242 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
243 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
244 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
245 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
246 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
249 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
250 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
251 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
253 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
257 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
258 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
259 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
260 match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
261 Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
266 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
267 /// more information.
268 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
269 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
270 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
271 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
272 res.push(ChannelDetails {
273 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
274 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
275 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
276 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
277 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
283 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
284 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
285 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
286 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &Uint256) -> Result<msgs::Shutdown, HandleError> {
287 let (res, chan_option) = {
288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
289 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
292 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
293 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
294 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
295 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
297 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
298 } else { (res, None) }
300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", msg: None})
303 for payment_hash in res.1 {
304 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
305 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
307 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
308 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
309 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
310 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
319 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
321 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
322 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
323 let mut res = [0; 32];
324 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
328 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
329 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
330 let mut res = [0; 32];
331 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
337 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
338 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
339 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
340 let mut res = [0; 32];
341 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
346 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
347 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
348 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
349 let mut res = [0; 32];
350 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
354 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
356 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
357 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
358 let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
359 let mut first_iteration = true;
361 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
362 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
364 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
365 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
366 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
367 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
368 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
371 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
372 first_iteration = false;
374 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
376 secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
377 blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
379 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
385 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
386 fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
387 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
389 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
390 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
396 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
406 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
407 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
408 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
409 let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
410 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
411 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
412 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
413 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
415 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
416 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
417 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
418 // the intended recipient).
419 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
420 let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
421 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
423 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
424 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
425 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
426 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
430 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
431 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
432 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!", msg: None});
434 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
435 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
436 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!", msg: None});
438 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
440 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
444 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
446 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
454 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
455 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
457 for i in 0..dst.len() {
462 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
463 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, HandleError> {
464 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
465 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
468 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
469 let end_len = iters * 65;
470 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
471 res.resize(end_len, 0);
473 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
474 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
475 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
476 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
477 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
482 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
483 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
485 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
486 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
487 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
488 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
490 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
491 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
492 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
495 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
498 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
499 hmac.input(&packet_data);
500 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
501 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
504 Ok(msgs::OnionPacket{
506 public_key: onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey,
507 hop_data: packet_data,
512 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
513 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
514 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
515 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
517 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
518 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
519 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
520 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
521 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
522 data: packet_crypted,
526 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
527 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
529 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
532 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
533 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
534 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
535 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
539 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
540 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
543 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
545 failuremsg: failuremsg,
549 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
550 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
551 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
557 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
558 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
559 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
562 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
563 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
564 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
565 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", msg: None}),
569 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
571 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
572 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
573 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
574 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
575 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
576 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
577 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
578 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
579 fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
582 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
583 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
585 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
591 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
592 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
593 /// fields for more info.
594 /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
595 /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
596 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
597 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
598 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size", msg: None});
600 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
601 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
602 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
603 return Err(HandleError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us", msg: None});
607 let session_priv = secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
608 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
609 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
613 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
615 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
616 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
617 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, associated_data)?;
619 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
620 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
621 let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
622 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", msg: None}),
623 Some(id) => id.clone()
626 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
627 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
628 return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", msg: None});
630 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
633 let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
635 if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
639 // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
640 // third-party might make this happen:
641 panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
645 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
646 None => return Ok(()),
650 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
651 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
654 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
655 events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
656 node_id: first_hop_node_id,
657 msgs: vec![update_add],
658 commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
663 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
664 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
665 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &Uint256, funding_txo: OutPoint) {
666 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
667 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
668 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
670 match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
672 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
675 //TODO: Push e to pendingevents
682 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
683 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
684 unimplemented!(); // maybe remove from claimable_htlcs?
687 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
688 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
689 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
694 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
695 channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
698 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
699 if !chan.is_usable() { return Ok(None) }
701 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
702 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
703 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
705 Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
706 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
707 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
708 node_signature: our_node_sig,
709 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
713 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
714 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
715 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
717 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
718 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
720 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
724 for (short_chan_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
725 if short_chan_id != 0 {
726 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
727 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
729 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
730 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
731 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
733 // TODO: Send a failure packet back on each pending_forward
737 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
739 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
740 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
741 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
743 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
744 failed_forwards.push((forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
749 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
751 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
752 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
753 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
754 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
755 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
756 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
757 // this channel currently :/.
764 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
765 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
768 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
772 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
773 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
775 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
779 for forward_info in pending_forwards {
780 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
781 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
782 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
789 for failed_forward in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
790 match failed_forward.2 {
791 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: Vec::new() }),
792 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failed_forward.0, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: failed_forward.1, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
796 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
798 new_events.retain(|event| {
799 if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
800 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
801 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
807 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
808 events.reserve(new_events.len());
809 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
810 events.push(event.1);
814 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
815 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
819 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
820 let mut pending_htlc = {
821 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
822 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
823 None => return false,
828 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
829 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.clone(), PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
833 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
839 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
840 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
841 mem::drop(channel_state);
843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
844 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
845 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
849 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret } => {
850 let err_packet = match onion_error {
851 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
852 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
853 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
855 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
856 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
860 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
861 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
862 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
866 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
867 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(payment_hash, err_packet) {
868 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
870 //TODO: Do something with e?
877 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
878 mem::drop(channel_state);
880 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
881 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
884 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
885 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
888 commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
899 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
900 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
901 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
902 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
903 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
904 self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
906 pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
907 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
908 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
909 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
910 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
912 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
913 let mut pending_htlc = {
914 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
915 Some(pending_htlc) => pending_htlc,
916 None => return false,
921 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, route, session_priv } => {
922 if from_user { // This was the end hop back to us
923 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret };
924 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv });
925 } else { // This came from the first upstream node
926 // Bank error in our favor! Maybe we should tell the user this somehow???
927 pending_htlc = PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { route, session_priv };
928 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret });
935 PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
936 PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
938 panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
940 mem::drop(channel_state);
941 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
942 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
947 PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData { source_short_channel_id, .. } => {
948 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
949 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
950 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
954 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
955 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
956 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
958 //TODO: Do something with e?
964 mem::drop(channel_state);
966 Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
967 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
968 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
971 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
972 pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
985 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
986 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
987 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
990 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
991 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
993 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
998 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
999 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1000 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1001 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1002 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
1007 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
1008 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
1009 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1012 let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
1013 let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1014 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1015 if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
1016 let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1019 //TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
1023 new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
1024 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1025 msg: funding_locked,
1026 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
1028 short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
1030 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
1031 for tx in txn_matched {
1032 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
1033 if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
1034 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1035 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1037 channel.force_shutdown();
1038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1039 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1048 if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1049 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1050 short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
1052 channel.force_shutdown();
1053 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1054 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1062 for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
1063 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
1065 for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
1066 channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
1069 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1070 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
1071 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
1075 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
1076 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1077 for channel in channel_state.by_id.values_mut() {
1078 if channel.block_disconnected(header) {
1079 //TODO Close channel here
1085 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
1086 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
1087 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
1088 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1089 return Err(HandleError{err: "Unknown genesis block hash", msg: None});
1091 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1092 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1093 return Err(HandleError{err: "temporary_channel_id collision!", msg: None});
1096 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1098 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1099 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1100 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1101 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1102 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1103 channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1104 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
1105 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1108 let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1109 rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1110 match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1112 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1116 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
1117 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
1118 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1122 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1123 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1124 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1125 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1127 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1128 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1130 chan.accept_channel(&msg)?;
1131 (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1133 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1136 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1137 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1138 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1139 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1140 output_script: output_script,
1141 user_channel_id: user_id,
1146 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
1147 //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
1148 //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
1149 //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
1150 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1151 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1152 match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1154 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1155 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1157 match chan.funding_created(msg) {
1158 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1159 (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
1166 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1168 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1169 // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1170 // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1171 // for a bogus channel.
1172 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1175 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1176 channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
1180 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1181 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1182 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1183 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1185 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1186 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1188 let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg)?;
1189 (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1191 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1194 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1197 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1198 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1199 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1200 user_channel_id: user_id,
1205 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
1206 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1209 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1210 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1212 chan.funding_locked(&msg)?;
1213 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan)?);
1215 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1219 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
1220 let (res, chan_option) = {
1221 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1222 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1224 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1226 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1227 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1229 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1230 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1231 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1232 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1234 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1235 } else { (res, None) }
1237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1240 for payment_hash in res.2 {
1241 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1242 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1244 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1245 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1246 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1247 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1255 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
1256 let (res, chan_option) = {
1257 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1258 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1261 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1262 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1264 let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)?;
1265 if res.1.is_some() {
1266 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1267 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1268 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1269 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1270 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1271 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1272 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1274 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1275 } else { (res, None) }
1277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1280 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1281 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1283 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1284 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1285 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1286 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1294 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
1295 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1296 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1297 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1299 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1300 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1301 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1302 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1304 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
1305 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1307 let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here?
1309 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1312 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1313 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1314 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1315 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1321 macro_rules! return_err {
1322 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1323 return Err(msgs::HandleError {
1325 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
1326 msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1327 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1328 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1329 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1336 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1337 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1338 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1339 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1340 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1341 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1342 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1343 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1346 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1347 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1348 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
1349 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1350 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1353 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1354 let next_hop_data = {
1355 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1356 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1357 match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
1359 let error_code = match err {
1360 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
1361 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1363 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1369 let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1371 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
1372 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1374 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1375 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1378 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1379 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1380 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1381 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1383 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1385 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1386 short_channel_id: 0,
1387 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1388 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1389 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1392 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1393 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1394 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1396 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
1398 let blinding_factor = {
1399 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1400 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1401 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
1402 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1403 sha.result(&mut res);
1404 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1406 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1408 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1414 match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1416 // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
1418 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1423 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1425 public_key: new_pubkey,
1426 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1427 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1430 //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
1432 PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1433 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1434 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1435 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1436 prev_short_channel_id: 0,
1437 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1438 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1442 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1443 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1445 if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1446 let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1448 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1450 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1452 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1453 if !chan.is_live() {
1454 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
1455 return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x4000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1459 let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
1461 // We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
1462 // destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
1463 // mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
1464 // we send permanent_node_failure.
1465 match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
1466 &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
1467 let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
1469 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1470 acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
1474 if !acceptable_cycle {
1475 return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
1481 let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1483 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1484 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1486 if !chan.is_usable() {
1487 return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", msg: None});
1489 let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
1490 pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1491 (short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
1493 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None}), //TODO: panic?
1496 match claimable_htlcs_entry {
1497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
1498 let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
1499 let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
1500 &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1501 (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
1503 _ => { panic!("WAT") },
1505 *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
1506 source_short_channel_id,
1507 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1513 e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
1514 source_short_channel_id,
1515 incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1523 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1524 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1525 // Claim funds first, cause we don't really care if the channel we received the message on
1526 // is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
1527 self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
1530 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1531 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1533 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1534 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1536 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
1538 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1541 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1547 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
1548 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549 let payment_hash = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1551 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1552 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1554 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1556 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1559 if let Some(pending_htlc) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.get(&payment_hash) {
1560 match pending_htlc {
1561 &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
1562 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1563 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1565 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1566 if res.is_some() { return; }
1568 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1570 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1571 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1572 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1573 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1574 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1576 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::decode(&packet_decrypted) {
1577 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1578 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1580 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1581 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1582 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1583 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1584 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1585 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1586 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1587 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1588 TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1589 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1590 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1591 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1592 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::decode(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len]) {
1593 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1601 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1602 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1603 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1604 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1607 _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1622 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1623 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1624 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1626 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1627 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1629 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1631 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1635 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
1636 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1637 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1638 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1640 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1641 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1643 chan.commitment_signed(&msg)?
1645 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1648 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1652 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1655 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
1656 let (res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor) = {
1657 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1658 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1660 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1661 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1663 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg)?
1665 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1668 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1671 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &failure.0, failure.1);
1675 let mut forward_event = None;
1676 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1677 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1678 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1679 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1680 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1682 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1683 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1685 entry.get_mut().push(forward_info);
1687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1688 entry.insert(vec!(forward_info));
1693 match forward_event {
1695 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1696 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1697 time_forwardable: time
1706 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1707 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1708 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1710 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1711 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1713 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg)
1715 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1719 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
1720 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1721 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1722 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1724 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1725 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg: None})
1727 if !chan.is_usable() {
1728 return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", msg: None });
1731 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1732 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
1734 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1735 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1736 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
1737 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
1739 let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
1741 (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1742 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1743 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1744 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1745 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1746 contents: announcement,
1747 }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1749 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", msg: None})
1752 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1753 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1757 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
1758 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1761 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1762 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1763 if no_connection_possible {
1764 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
1765 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1766 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1767 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1769 let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
1770 for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
1771 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1773 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1774 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1784 for chan in channel_state.by_id {
1785 if chan.1.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
1786 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout). Also
1787 //fail and wipe any uncommitted outbound HTLCs as those are considered after
1793 if !new_events.is_empty() {
1794 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1795 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1796 pending_events.push(event);
1804 use chain::chaininterface;
1805 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
1806 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
1807 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
1809 use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
1810 use util::test_utils;
1811 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1813 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
1814 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
1815 use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
1816 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
1817 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
1818 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1819 use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
1820 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
1822 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1823 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1825 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
1826 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1828 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1830 use std::collections::HashMap;
1831 use std::default::Default;
1832 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
1833 use std::time::Instant;
1836 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1837 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1838 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1843 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1844 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1847 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1848 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1851 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1852 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1855 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1856 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1859 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1860 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
1865 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1867 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
1868 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
1873 fn onion_vectors() {
1874 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
1875 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1877 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
1878 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
1879 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
1880 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
1881 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
1883 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
1884 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
1885 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
1886 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
1887 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
1889 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
1890 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
1891 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
1892 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
1893 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
1895 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
1896 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
1897 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
1898 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
1899 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
1901 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
1902 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
1903 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
1904 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
1905 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
1907 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
1908 let payloads = vec!(
1909 msgs::OnionHopData {
1911 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1912 short_channel_id: 0,
1914 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1918 msgs::OnionHopData {
1920 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1921 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
1922 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
1923 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1927 msgs::OnionHopData {
1929 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1930 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
1931 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
1932 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1936 msgs::OnionHopData {
1938 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1939 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
1940 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
1941 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1945 msgs::OnionHopData {
1947 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
1948 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
1949 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
1950 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
1956 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, hex_bytes("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()).unwrap();
1957 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
1959 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
1963 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1964 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1966 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1967 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1968 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1970 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1971 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1973 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1974 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
1976 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1977 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1979 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1980 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1982 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1983 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
1986 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
1987 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1988 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
1990 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
1991 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
1996 feeest: Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>,
1997 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
1998 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
1999 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2001 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2005 static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
2006 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
2007 let open_chan = node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
2008 let accept_chan = node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan).unwrap();
2009 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2011 let chan_id = unsafe { CHAN_COUNT };
2015 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2016 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2018 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2019 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2020 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2022 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2023 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2025 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2027 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2028 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2029 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2030 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2031 added_monitors.clear();
2033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2036 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2038 let funding_signed = match events_2[0] {
2039 Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2040 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2041 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2042 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2043 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2044 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2045 added_monitors.clear();
2048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2051 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2053 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2054 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2055 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2056 added_monitors.clear();
2059 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2060 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2062 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2063 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2064 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2069 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2070 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2071 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2073 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2074 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2075 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2076 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2083 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2084 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2085 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2086 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_5[0] {
2087 Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2088 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2089 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2090 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2091 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2092 as_announcement_sigs
2094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2097 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2098 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2099 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_6[0] {
2100 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2106 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2107 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2108 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2109 let bs_update = match events_7[0] {
2110 Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2111 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2121 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2124 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction) {
2125 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2127 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2128 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2129 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2131 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2134 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &Uint256, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2135 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2136 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2139 let shutdown_a = node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2140 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2141 if !close_inbound_first {
2142 assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2144 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2145 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2146 if close_inbound_first {
2147 assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2148 closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2149 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2150 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2152 let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2153 assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2154 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2155 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2157 closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2158 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2159 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2161 let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2162 assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2163 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2164 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2166 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2167 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2168 funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
2169 tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2171 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2172 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2173 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2174 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2180 let events_2 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2181 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2182 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2183 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2189 (as_update, bs_update)
2194 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2195 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2198 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2200 Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
2201 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
2203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2208 static mut PAYMENT_COUNT: u8 = 0;
2209 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2210 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2211 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2212 let our_payment_hash = {
2213 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2214 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2215 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2216 sha.result(&mut ret);
2220 let mut payment_event = {
2221 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2223 let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2224 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2225 added_monitors.clear();
2228 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2230 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2232 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2234 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2235 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2237 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2239 let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2240 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
2243 let revoke_and_ack = node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
2245 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2246 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2247 added_monitors.clear();
2249 assert!(prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2250 let prev_revoke_and_ack = prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2252 let mut added_monitors = prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2253 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2254 added_monitors.clear();
2256 assert!(node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &prev_revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2257 assert!(prev_revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2259 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2260 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2261 added_monitors.clear();
2264 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2265 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2267 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2271 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2272 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
2274 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2275 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2276 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2278 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2279 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2280 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2286 let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2287 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2288 added_monitors.clear();
2290 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2291 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2297 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2300 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2301 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2303 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2304 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2305 added_monitors.clear();
2308 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2309 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2310 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2312 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2314 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2316 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2318 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2319 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2321 added_monitors.clear();
2323 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2325 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2326 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2327 added_monitors.clear();
2329 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2330 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2331 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2333 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2334 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2335 added_monitors.clear();
2337 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2339 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2340 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2341 added_monitors.clear();
2347 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2348 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2349 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2350 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2351 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2352 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2355 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2358 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2359 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2360 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2368 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2369 update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2371 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2374 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2375 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2383 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2384 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2385 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2386 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2387 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2390 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2393 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2394 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2396 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2397 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2400 let our_payment_preimage = unsafe { [PAYMENT_COUNT; 32] };
2401 unsafe { PAYMENT_COUNT += 1 };
2402 let our_payment_hash = {
2403 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2404 sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
2405 let mut ret = [0; 32];
2406 sha.result(&mut ret);
2410 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2411 assert_eq!(err.err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
2414 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2415 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
2416 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
2419 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
2420 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
2422 let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2423 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2424 added_monitors.clear();
2427 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2428 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
2429 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2431 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2432 let revoke_and_commit = $node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1).unwrap();
2435 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2436 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2437 added_monitors.clear();
2439 assert!($prev_node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.0).unwrap().is_none());
2441 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2443 added_monitors.clear();
2445 let revoke_and_ack = $prev_node.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_commit.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
2447 let mut added_monitors = $prev_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2448 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2449 added_monitors.clear();
2451 assert!(revoke_and_ack.1.is_none());
2452 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2453 assert!($node.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack.0).unwrap().is_none());
2455 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2457 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2459 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2460 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2462 added_monitors.clear();
2468 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2469 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2470 for node in expected_route.iter().rev() {
2471 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2472 if next_msgs.is_some() {
2473 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2476 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2479 Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
2480 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2481 next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
2483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2489 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2490 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2492 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2495 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
2496 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
2498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2502 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
2503 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
2504 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2505 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2507 for _ in 0..node_count {
2508 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
2509 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
2510 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2511 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
2513 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
2514 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
2515 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
2517 let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
2518 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
2519 nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
2526 fn fake_network_test() {
2527 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2528 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
2529 let nodes = create_network(4);
2531 // Create some initial channels
2532 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2533 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2534 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2536 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2537 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2538 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2540 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2542 // Send some more payments
2543 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2544 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
2545 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
2547 // Test failure packets
2548 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
2549 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
2551 // Add a new channel that skips 3
2552 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2554 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2555 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
2556 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2557 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2558 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2559 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2560 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
2562 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
2563 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2564 hops.push(RouteHop {
2565 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2566 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2568 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2570 hops.push(RouteHop {
2571 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2572 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2574 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2576 hops.push(RouteHop {
2577 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2578 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2580 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2582 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2583 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2584 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
2586 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
2587 hops.push(RouteHop {
2588 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
2589 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2591 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2593 hops.push(RouteHop {
2594 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
2595 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2597 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
2599 hops.push(RouteHop {
2600 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
2601 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
2603 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
2605 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2606 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
2607 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
2609 // Claim the rebalances...
2610 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
2611 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2613 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
2614 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
2616 // Send some payments across both channels
2617 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2618 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2619 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2621 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
2623 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
2625 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2626 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2627 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
2629 // Close down the channels...
2630 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
2631 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
2632 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
2633 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
2634 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
2636 // Check that we processed all pending events
2638 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2639 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2643 #[derive(PartialEq)]
2644 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
2645 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Uint256, Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2646 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2647 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
2649 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2651 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
2652 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
2654 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2655 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
2656 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2657 funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
2658 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2659 res.push(tx.clone());
2663 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
2665 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
2666 for tx in node_txn.iter() {
2667 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
2668 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2669 funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
2670 tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2671 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
2672 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
2674 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
2676 res.push(tx.clone());
2680 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
2686 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2687 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2689 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2691 let mut found_prev = false;
2693 for tx in prev_txn {
2694 if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
2695 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2696 funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
2697 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2699 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
2700 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
2706 assert!(found_prev);
2708 let mut res = Vec::new();
2709 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
2713 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
2714 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2715 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2716 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
2717 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2723 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2724 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2725 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
2726 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
2734 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
2739 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2740 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2741 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2742 let nodes = create_network(5);
2744 // Create some initial channels
2745 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2746 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2747 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2748 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2750 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2752 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2753 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2756 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2757 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2759 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2760 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2761 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2762 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2764 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2765 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2766 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2768 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2769 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2771 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
2772 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2774 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2775 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2776 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2777 assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2779 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
2780 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2781 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2783 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2784 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2786 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2788 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2789 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2790 added_monitors.clear();
2793 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2794 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2796 Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
2797 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2805 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2806 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2807 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2809 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2811 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2812 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2814 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2815 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2817 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2819 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
2820 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2821 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2823 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2824 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2827 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2828 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2829 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2830 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2831 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2834 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2836 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2837 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2839 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2840 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2841 for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
2842 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2843 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
2846 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2848 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2849 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5, &[&node_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2851 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2853 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
2854 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2855 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2857 // Create some new channels:
2858 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2860 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2861 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2862 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2863 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
2864 // Revoke the old state
2865 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2868 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2869 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2871 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2872 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2875 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2876 funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2877 node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2881 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &vec![&revoked_local_txn[0]; 1], &[4; 0]);
2882 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2883 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2884 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[1]; 1], &[4; 1]);
2886 //TODO: At this point nodes[1] should claim the revoked HTLC-Timeout output, but that's
2887 //not yet implemented in ChannelMonitor
2889 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2890 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2891 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2893 // Check that we processed all pending events
2895 assert_eq!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2896 assert_eq!(node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);